Repository navigation
Roadmap
This page describes plans, not commitments. Scope and dates can change as work is designed, tested, or reprioritised. Security fixes can be released separately. A version ships only when its release checks pass.
The roadmap is a snapshot as of 18 November 2026. For the current plan, see the latest roadmap; older release documentation contains the plan as it stood at that release.
We aim to try smaller minor releases roughly every four weeks. The first three dates below are existing six-week planning targets and may change as their scope is split and rescheduled. Later versions are ordered plans without committed dates. A large item may take more than one release.
| Version | Planning target | Planned work |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1.0 | 23 December 2026 | Move to .NET 11; email and messaging notifications; compliance follow-ups including accessibility and personal-data handling; avoid redundant release CI runs. |
| 1.2.0 | 3 February 2027 | Track observed certificate deployments and show their locations; headless operation; Prometheus metrics. |
| 1.3.0 | 17 March 2027 | Import certificates and revocation state from an existing CA; ACME profiles; image software inventory and build provenance; a local certificate installation agent with deployment verification. |
| 1.4.0 | To be scheduled | Server database support alongside SQLite; export, review and apply configuration as code. |
| 1.5.0 | To be scheduled | Delegated OCSP responders and external CRL publication; certificate linting before issuance; early destruction of retired issuer keys and withdrawal of compromised roots from trust bundles. |
| 1.6.0 | To be scheduled | Audit streaming to security monitoring systems; cryptographic inventory and compliance reports. |
| 1.7.0 | To be scheduled | Controlled recovery of escrowed encryption keys; managed trust-store rollout and retirement on enrolled machines. |
| 1.8.0 | To be scheduled | Windows certificate auto-enrollment. |
| 1.9.0 | To be scheduled | CMP certificate enrollment. |
| 1.10.0 | To be scheduled | Workload identity integrations, including SPIFFE/SPIRE and Kubernetes; hardware-attested device enrollment, conditional on a concrete device fleet and test hardware. |
| 1.11.0 | To be scheduled | SSH user and host certificate authority. |
| 1.12.0 | To be scheduled | Timestamping authority and code-signing service. |
| 1.13.0 | To be scheduled | DANE/TLSA publication coordinated with certificate renewal, conditional on a DANE-capable service and an operational DNSSEC-signed zone. |
| 1.14.0 | To be scheduled | Private certificate transparency with independent verification, conditional on an operator requirement and an independent monitor or witness. |
The installation agent follows deployment tracking: authenticated deployment acknowledgements are planned for 1.2.0, then local installation and verification for 1.3.0. The first agent targets one service and operating system, selected during design.
Managed trust-store retirement in 1.7.0 follows authoritative compromised-root withdrawal in 1.5.0. A withdrawn root must not return through a stale bundle or automatic rollback. Earlier installation-agent work may provide reusable client enrollment, but trust-store rollout does not require the same agent.
Hardware attestation, DANE/TLSA and private transparency remain conditional despite their milestone assignments. If their deployment requirements are unmet at release planning, move them to a later milestone before releasing. Hardware attestation additionally requires a documented evidence format and trust source; a workload identity integration that chooses to consume attestation must follow its verification within the milestone. Other workload identity integrations can ship independently.
DANE/TLSA can reuse earlier deployment reporting and installation capabilities; publishing ACME challenge TXT records is not a prerequisite. Private transparency builds on existing issuance and audit behavior, but does not depend on SIEM streaming or Merkle Tree Certificate support. Related integrations do not become mandatory dependencies merely because they share a release.
We plan to review the need for a 2.0.0 release six to nine months after 1.0.0. A major release is appropriate when a necessary compatibility change cannot reasonably be made within the existing major version. No 2.0.0 scope or date is committed.
Customers may skip minor releases. Before a major release, we intend to test a direct upgrade from 1.0.0 with representative data and both deployment layouts, and publish the migration steps, backup and restore instructions, and rollback limits. See Upgrading for the currently supported upgrade procedure.