Uruguayan eID

Uruguayan eID (cédula de identidad)

OpenSC supports the Uruguayan national electronic ID card (cédula de identidad electrónica) through the dedicated cedulauy card driver. The card is a Gemalto/Thales IAS Classic platform, exposed as a read-only synthesized PKCS#15 card, so it works with the PKCS#11 provider on Linux, macOS and Windows with no card-specific configuration.

Two applet versions are in circulation, both supported over the contact interface:

• IAS Classic v4 (2015 chip, contact only), which AGESIC labels a hybrid card.
• IAS Classic v5 (2022 chip, MultiApp V5.0), which AGESIC labels a dual-interface card. It adds a contactless/NFC interface with PIN verification over PACE.

Cards issued from late 2022 are the v5, earlier ones are the v4. The card reports its own version in the applet label, read with GET DATA (tag 7F30, object C0): the ASCII string is either IAS Classic v4 or IAS Classic v5. OpenSC does not need to tell them apart, the driver matches both batches with a single masked ATR (the version and batch bytes are masked out).

The card is issued by the Dirección Nacional de Identificación Civil (DNIC) of the Ministry of the Interior. The surrounding digital-identity infrastructure is run by AGESIC.

Note: support is currently in the master branch and will ship in the next OpenSC release. Until then, build OpenSC from source.

Resources:

• Official digital-identity information: AGESIC.
• firmauy: a third-party command-line tool to sign and verify PDF (PAdES), XML (XAdES) and arbitrary files (CAdES/.p7s) with the cédula over PKCS#11, with local certificate-chain validation up to the Uruguayan national root.

Card capabilities

• Interface: contact (ISO 7816) on both v4 and v5. The contactless/NFC interface (PIN over PACE), present only on the v5 (2022) card, is not supported yet.
• Signing: a single RSA-2048 key with sign and non-repudiation usage. The signature is computed on-card (MSE:SET DST, then PSO:HASH and PSO:CDS), with SHA-256 as the algorithm used in practice.
• Certificate: the signing certificate is readable without a PIN.
• Identity data: the document number, biographic data, cardholder photo and MRZ are exposed as PKCS#15 data objects, readable without a PIN.
• PIN: a single global user PIN protects the signing key.

Example

Reading the card structure with pkcs15-tool (cardholder name, serial number and the identity data-object contents redacted, they are personal data):

$ pkcs15-tool -D
Using reader with a card: ACS ACR 38U-CCID 00 00
PKCS#15 Card [CARDHOLDER NAME]:
    Version        : 0
    Serial number  : <redacted>
    Manufacturer ID: (null)
    Flags          :

PIN [PIN]
    Object Flags   : [0x00]
    ID             : 01
    Flags          : [0x30], initialized, needs-padding
    Length         : min_len:4, max_len:12, stored_len:12
    Pad char       : 0x00
    Reference      : 17 (0x11)
    Type           : ascii-numeric

Private RSA Key [Clave de Firma]
    Object Flags   : [0x01], private
    Usage          : [0x204], sign, nonRepudiation
    Access Flags   : [0x1D], sensitive, alwaysSensitive, neverExtract, local
    Algo_refs      : 0
    ModLength      : 2048
    Key ref        : 1 (0x01)
    Native         : yes
    Auth ID        : 01
    ID             : 01

X.509 Certificate [Certificado de Firma]
    Object Flags   : [0x00]
    Authority      : no
    Path           : a00000001840000001634200::b001
    ID             : 01

Data object 'Numero de documento'
    applicationName: Numero de documento
    Path:            3f0070007001
    Data (12 bytes): <document number, redacted>

Data object 'Datos biograficos'
    applicationName: Datos biograficos
    Path:            3f0070007002
    Data (103 bytes): <names, nationality, dates, place of birth, redacted>

Data object 'Fotografia'
    applicationName: Fotografia
    Path:            3f0070007004
    Data (10164 bytes): <JPEG portrait, redacted>

Data object 'MRZ'
    applicationName: MRZ
    Path:            3f007000700b
    Data (93 bytes): <machine-readable zone, redacted>

Notes

• The ATR differs between card batches (the applet version and batch bytes), so the driver matches it with a mask.
• The identity data objects are readable without authentication by design, since the same data is printed on the card itself.