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Problem statement

github-actions[bot] edited this page Nov 18, 2026 · 3 revisions

Problem statement: why LionDriver exists

On 21 September 2026 the US vehicle-safety regulator, NHTSA, opened an investigation into crashes of cars driven by openpilot on comma devices. Eighteen days later, on 9 October, LionDriver made its first commit. This page is the problem LionDriver was started to work on. It explains and links; the facts and the analysis live in field case FI-2026-001, where they are reviewed.

Important

A Preliminary Evaluation is not a finding of defect. No crash in it has been reconstructed, and nothing on this page says why any one crash happened.

What happened

NHTSA's Office of Defects Investigation opened Preliminary Evaluation PE26007, "Crashes involving comma.ai driving automation products". It covers the comma three, 3X and four devices and the openpilot software, about 30,000 units. In five crashes, a car with a comma device "reportedly struck stopped or slowly moving vehicles within the same travel lane". Three people died and eleven more were injured. ODI confirmed the system was on or engaged in several of the crashes, and its first look suggests it "may not have adequately detected or responded to the in-lane vehicles".

The resume is held unaltered in the repository: INOA-PE26007-17274.pdf. Every fact in this section is quoted from it, and the case report marks each one as verified against it.

Three top-down scenes of a red car on a two-lane road: it strikes a stopped vehicle in its lane, it closes on a slow vehicle and strikes it, and a lead car changes lane late and reveals a stopped vehicle that it then strikes. A dashed green outline marks where the car should have stopped.

The crash pattern: the first two scenes in NHTSA's words, the third a late reveal the root cause analysis examines. From the FI-2026-001 problem statement, drawn by fig_fi001_problem.py.

Why it is LionDriver's problem

LionDriver keeps openpilot's driving stack: the same perception, the same planner, the same collision warning and the same driver monitoring. NHTSA has said that when a fork is involved in a crash it will look at "the shared components between openpilot and the fork". LionDriver is such a fork. The case report sets out what is shared, file by file: applicability.

The gap

A crash into a vehicle stopped in the lane needs three independent protections to fail together: openpilot's own braking, the driver, and the car's stock emergency braking. The root cause analysis read the code LionDriver inherits and found a weakness in each. One of them, the collision warning, depends on the same perception as openpilot's braking, so the two can fail together.

Three protection layers that the hazard passes through, each with a hole: openpilot, the driver, and stock AEB and PCS, with the weaknesses the root cause analysis found in each and the common cause between the first two.

The three layers and their weaknesses, from the root cause analysis (RCA §3).

Underneath is a gap of method, not just of code. Stopped vehicles in the lane were a documented upstream limitation, so the user was told about them and nothing was engineered against them. No requirement set how far ahead a stopped vehicle must be detected, or how hard the car must brake for one. Driver-monitoring timings were tuned to avoid nuisance alerts, not set from how fast the hazard develops.

Stopping distance from the moment the stopped vehicle is confirmed, at openpilot's braking cap against about full braking, at four speeds from 72 to 126 km/h.

What openpilot's braking cap costs in distance, idealized and computed, not measured (RCA §3.1).

What LionDriver does about it

LionDriver puts the engineering record around the code that openpilot does not have. The pages in this wiki walk through each part:

The gap What LionDriver does Read
A hazard handled only by telling the user Analyse the hazard and set a safety goal for it, with requirements and tests that can fail From hazard to test
The system can be right in its own terms and still not be safe enough Look for the conditions in which it is not, such as a stopped vehicle revealed late, and validate against them SOTIF and ISO 26262
No argument that the protections are enough A safety case published as it is built, with its evidence and its counter-evidence What is a safety case?
Crashes found by the regulator first Field monitoring from intake to root cause to corrective action After release, Reporting a safety concern

What is in place for this case, and what is still open, is listed on the problem statement. The corrective actions, with their root causes and verification, are in CORRECTIVE-ACTIONS.md.

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