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Problem statement
"Why are you doing this? Why did you start LionDriver?"
Because on 21 September 2026 the US vehicle-safety regulator opened an investigation into five crashes in which cars driven by openpilot ran into a stopped or slow vehicle in their own lane. Three people died. Eleven more were injured. openpilot is capable software that thousands of people use every day, but it does not come with an engineered, written-down and checked argument that it is safe enough in this situation; its own documentation lists stopped vehicles in the lane as a limitation and leaves them to the driver. LionDriver started eighteen days later to build that argument in the open: what can go wrong, what should stop it, and the evidence for whether it does.
The one-page version: Why LionDriver exists (PDF), a single sheet to print or send to anyone who asks.
This page is the long answer. It shows the regulator's report as it was issued, states the problem it describes, and shows how the rest of this wiki answers it. The facts belong to field case FI-2026-001, where they are reviewed. This page explains and links.
This is the opening resume of NHTSA Preliminary Evaluation PE26007, issued by the Office of Defects Investigation on 21 September 2026. It is shown as issued, page for page. The original PDF is in the repository.


NHTSA, ODI Resume PE26007, 21 September 2026, pages 1 and 2, rendered unaltered from the PDF.
- The pattern. In five crashes, a car with a comma device "reportedly struck stopped or slowly moving vehicles within the same travel lane". It was not a cut-in, a crossing car or a pedestrian.
- The cost. Two of the crashes killed three people. Four of them injured eleven others, some seriously.
- The system was on. NHTSA confirmed the system was "powered on or engaged in multiple crashes", and its early look suggests it "may not have adequately detected or responded to the in-lane vehicles".
- The scope. About 30,000 comma three, 3X and four devices, and the openpilot software.
- Forks are in it. Where a crash involves a fork of openpilot, NHTSA will "consider the shared components between openpilot and the fork". LionDriver is a fork.
- What it is not. A Preliminary Evaluation is the first step of an investigation. It is not a finding of a defect, and no crash in it has been reconstructed yet.
With openpilot engaged on public roads, a car can hit a stopped or slow vehicle in its own lane. openpilot does not brake enough in time, the driver does not take over in time, and the car's own emergency braking, where it is fitted, does not prevent the crash.
That is the problem LionDriver works on. The full problem statement draws its edges with an is / is-not table and lists what is still unknown.
The crash pattern: the first two scenes in NHTSA's words, the third a late reveal the root cause analysis examines.
Drawn by fig_fi001_problem.py.
A crash into a vehicle stopped in the lane needs three independent protections to fail together: openpilot's own braking, the driver, and the car's stock emergency braking. LionDriver's root cause analysis read the code it inherits and found a weakness in each. One of them, the collision warning, depends on the same perception as openpilot's braking, so the two can fail together.
The three layers and their weaknesses (RCA §3).
The deeper gap is one of method. Stopped vehicles in the lane were a documented upstream limitation: users were told about them, but nothing was engineered against them. No requirement set how far ahead a stopped vehicle must be detected, or how hard the car must brake for one. Driver-monitoring timings were tuned to avoid nuisance alerts, not set from how fast the hazard develops.
What openpilot's braking cap costs in distance: idealized and computed, not measured (RCA §3.1).
LionDriver keeps openpilot's code and puts the engineering record around it that openpilot does not have:
| The gap | What LionDriver does | Read |
|---|---|---|
| A hazard handled only by telling the user | Analyse the hazard, set a safety goal for it, and write requirements and tests that can fail | From hazard to test |
| The system can work as designed and still not be safe enough | Look for the conditions in which it is not safe enough, such as a stopped vehicle revealed late, and validate against them | SOTIF and ISO 26262 |
| No argument that the protections are enough | Publish a safety case as it is built, with its evidence and its counter-evidence | What is a safety case? |
| The regulator finds the crashes first | Monitor the field, from intake to root cause to corrective action | After release, Reporting a safety concern |
The problem statement lists what is in place for this case and what is still open.
Is LionDriver safer than openpilot? LionDriver doesn't claim to be. It builds the record that would show whether a change makes the car safer, and it publishes what that record says, including the counter-evidence. See Reading the Living Safety Case.
Is this about blaming comma or openpilot? No. The resume describes an investigation, not a verdict, and LionDriver runs the same code. The point is that a system this capable needs an engineered safety argument, and that argument can be built in the open on top of openpilot.
Why a fork, and not a change to openpilot? The record is large, its rules are strict, and it moves at its own pace: hazard analysis, requirements, reviews and evidence. A fork lets it be built around the code without slowing upstream down. What it finds can still go back upstream.
Has LionDriver reproduced the crashes? Not yet. The crash data is not public, and the five SGO reports have not been retrieved yet; that is action FA-02 in the corrective actions. The analysis so far reads the code; it does not say why any one crash happened.
- FI-2026-001 problem statement: the full page, with the is / is-not table and the unknowns.
- Case report: every fact, marked verified or reported, and the containment in force.
- Root cause analysis: barriers, fault tree, unsafe control actions, 5-Why.
Mirrored from wiki/ on liondriver-dev at 7bb7f49, 2026-11-20. Pages are reviewed by pull request; the wiki is not edited in place. This wiki explains and links; safety claims and evidence live in the assurance record. Work-product versions: the change ledger, row 611 (7bb7f490, 2026-11-19) (all versions).
Problem statement
LionDriver wiki
- Home
- Roadmap and status
- How LionDriver works
- How the repository is organized
- How decisions are made
- Glossary
- What is a safety case?
- Reading the Living Safety Case
- Standards at a glance
- From hazard to test
- Deriving and writing safety requirements
- ASIL decomposition
- Building a fault tree
- Hardware safety and interference
- After release (ISO 26262 Part 7)
- SOTIF and ISO 26262
- Cybersecurity and ISO/SAE 21434
- AI safety and ISO/PAS 8800
- ASPICE: is the process capable?
- Integrated standards: one system, not five
- For the assessor
- Work product versions
- Reference vehicle
- CAN, CAN FD and end-to-end protection
- Contributor guide
- Reporting a safety concern
- Session log
- FAQ
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