fix: SQL injection via Increment operation on nested object field in PostgreSQL (GHSA-q3vj-96h2-gwvg)#10161
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughAdds input validation and test coverage for SQL injection vulnerability (GHSA-q3vj-96h2-gwvg) affecting Increment operations on nested object fields. The Postgres adapter now validates that increment amounts are numeric values, and a comprehensive test suite verifies the fix prevents SQL injection attacks and data exfiltration attempts. Changes
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Actionable comments posted: 1
🧹 Nitpick comments (2)
spec/vulnerabilities.spec.js (2)
1079-1118: Assert theINVALID_JSONrejection in the Postgres probes.These two tests currently pass on any fast failure or silent no-op. Since the adapter now rejects string amounts explicitly, please assert the 400/code/message here too; otherwise a different parser or DB error would still look green.
Suggested tightening
- await request({ + const response = await request({ method: 'PUT', url: `http://localhost:8378/1/classes/IncrTest/${obj.id}`, headers, body: JSON.stringify({ 'stats.counter': { __op: 'Increment', amount: '0+(SELECT 1 FROM pg_sleep(3))' }, }), - }).catch(() => {}); + }).catch(e => e); const elapsed = Date.now() - start; + expect(response.status).toBe(400); + const text = JSON.parse(response.text); + expect(text.code).toBe(Parse.Error.INVALID_JSON); + expect(text.error).toBe('incrementing must provide a number'); expect(elapsed).toBeLessThan(3000);🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed. In `@spec/vulnerabilities.spec.js` around lines 1079 - 1118, Update the two tests named "does not execute injected SQL via Increment amount with pg_sleep" and "does not execute injected SQL via Increment amount for data exfiltration" to assert that the adapter rejects string amounts with the expected INVALID_JSON/400 response instead of just timing or silent no-op: call request and capture the response/error, then expect the HTTP status to be 400 (or the returned error.code/message to equal INVALID_JSON) before proceeding; keep the existing verification that the Parse.Object ('IncrTest') counter remains unchanged (the save/get logic using Parse.Query and the obj.id) but replace the current catch-and-ignore pattern with explicit assertions on the error payload from the request call.
1053-1139: Add one multi-field nested update regression.The adapter change reworked placeholder ordering for
incrementValuesand delete keys, but this suite only exercises a single nested increment. One request that updatesstats.aandstats.btogether, and ideally one that mixes nested increment + nested delete on the same object, would cover the new indexing logic much more directly.🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed. In `@spec/vulnerabilities.spec.js` around lines 1053 - 1139, Add a new multi-field nested update test that updates two nested keys in the same object in a single PUT (e.g., 'stats.a' and 'stats.b' both with { __op: 'Increment', amount: <number> }) and assert both fields are incremented correctly, and add another test that mixes a nested Increment and a nested Delete on the same parent object (e.g., 'stats.x': { __op: 'Increment', amount: 1 } and 'stats.y': { __op: 'Delete' }) and verify after the request that the increment applied and the deleted key is removed; base both tests on the existing patterns used in the file (construct Parse.Object('IncrTest'), save initial stats, send PUT to /1/classes/IncrTest/{id}, then fetch with new Parse.Query('IncrTest').get(id) and assert final state) so the adapter's multi-field placeholder ordering and delete-key handling are exercised.
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
Inline comments:
In `@src/Adapters/Storage/Postgres/PostgresStorageAdapter.js`:
- Around line 1743-1750: The code in updateObjectsByQuery uses the loop variable
c from originalUpdate and directly interpolates it into the SQL fragment
(`->>'${c}'` and `CONCAT('{"${c}":'...)`), which can break SQL/JSON for keys
containing quotes or special chars; instead push the key c into the query
parameters and build the JSON using parameterized functions: add c to the
parameter array (alongside incrementAmounts in incrementValues), replace the
interpolated CONCAT fragment with a parameterized jsonb_build_object call that
uses name->>$keyParam for safe key lookup and adds $amountParam (e.g.
jsonb_build_object($keyParam, (COALESCE(name->>$keyParam,'0')::int +
$amountParam)) ), and adjust the indices (index, amountIndex) so the key
parameter is in the correct position; do not interpolate c directly and ensure
originalUpdate/incrementValues and the values array reflect the new parameter
ordering.
---
Nitpick comments:
In `@spec/vulnerabilities.spec.js`:
- Around line 1079-1118: Update the two tests named "does not execute injected
SQL via Increment amount with pg_sleep" and "does not execute injected SQL via
Increment amount for data exfiltration" to assert that the adapter rejects
string amounts with the expected INVALID_JSON/400 response instead of just
timing or silent no-op: call request and capture the response/error, then expect
the HTTP status to be 400 (or the returned error.code/message to equal
INVALID_JSON) before proceeding; keep the existing verification that the
Parse.Object ('IncrTest') counter remains unchanged (the save/get logic using
Parse.Query and the obj.id) but replace the current catch-and-ignore pattern
with explicit assertions on the error payload from the request call.
- Around line 1053-1139: Add a new multi-field nested update test that updates
two nested keys in the same object in a single PUT (e.g., 'stats.a' and
'stats.b' both with { __op: 'Increment', amount: <number> }) and assert both
fields are incremented correctly, and add another test that mixes a nested
Increment and a nested Delete on the same parent object (e.g., 'stats.x': {
__op: 'Increment', amount: 1 } and 'stats.y': { __op: 'Delete' }) and verify
after the request that the increment applied and the deleted key is removed;
base both tests on the existing patterns used in the file (construct
Parse.Object('IncrTest'), save initial stats, send PUT to
/1/classes/IncrTest/{id}, then fetch with new Parse.Query('IncrTest').get(id)
and assert final state) so the adapter's multi-field placeholder ordering and
delete-key handling are exercised.
ℹ️ Review info
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📒 Files selected for processing (2)
spec/vulnerabilities.spec.jssrc/Adapters/Storage/Postgres/PostgresStorageAdapter.js
Increment operation on nested object field in PostgreSQL (GHSA-q3vj-96h2-gwvg)
# [9.6.0-alpha.3](9.6.0-alpha.2...9.6.0-alpha.3) (2026-03-09) ### Bug Fixes * SQL injection via `Increment` operation on nested object field in PostgreSQL ([GHSA-q3vj-96h2-gwvg](GHSA-q3vj-96h2-gwvg)) ([#10161](#10161)) ([8f82282](8f82282))
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🎉 This change has been released in version 9.6.0-alpha.3 |
Codecov Report✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests. Additional details and impacted files@@ Coverage Diff @@
## alpha #10161 +/- ##
==========================================
- Coverage 92.58% 92.17% -0.41%
==========================================
Files 192 192
Lines 16207 16212 +5
Branches 183 183
==========================================
- Hits 15005 14944 -61
- Misses 1190 1252 +62
- Partials 12 16 +4 ☔ View full report in Codecov by Sentry. 🚀 New features to boost your workflow:
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# [9.6.0](9.5.1...9.6.0) (2026-03-22) ### Bug Fixes * LiveQuery `regexTimeout` default value not applied ([#10156](#10156)) ([416cfbc](416cfbc)) * Account lockout race condition allows bypassing threshold via concurrent requests ([#10266](#10266)) ([ff70fee](ff70fee)) * Account takeover via operator injection in authentication data identifier ([GHSA-5fw2-8jcv-xh87](GHSA-5fw2-8jcv-xh87)) ([#10185](#10185)) ([0d0a554](0d0a554)) * Add configurable batch request sub-request limit via option `requestComplexity.batchRequestLimit` ([#10265](#10265)) ([164ed0d](164ed0d)) * Auth data exposed via /users/me endpoint ([GHSA-37mj-c2wf-cx96](GHSA-37mj-c2wf-cx96)) ([#10278](#10278)) ([875cf10](875cf10)) * Auth provider validation bypass on login via partial authData ([GHSA-pfj7-wv7c-22pr](GHSA-pfj7-wv7c-22pr)) ([#10246](#10246)) ([98f4ba5](98f4ba5)) * Block dot-notation updates to authData sub-fields and harden login provider checks ([#10223](#10223)) ([12c24c6](12c24c6)) * Bypass of class-level permissions in LiveQuery ([GHSA-7ch5-98q2-7289](GHSA-7ch5-98q2-7289)) ([#10133](#10133)) ([98188d9](98188d9)) * Classes `_GraphQLConfig` and `_Audience` master key bypass via generic class routes ([GHSA-7xg7-rqf6-pw6c](GHSA-7xg7-rqf6-pw6c)) ([#10151](#10151)) ([1de4e43](1de4e43)) * Cloud function dispatch crashes server via prototype chain traversal ([GHSA-4263-jgmp-7pf4](GHSA-4263-jgmp-7pf4)) ([#10210](#10210)) ([286373d](286373d)) * Concurrent signup with same authentication creates duplicate users ([#10149](#10149)) ([853bfe1](853bfe1)) * Create CLP not enforced before user field validation on signup ([#10268](#10268)) ([a0530c2](a0530c2)) * Denial of service via unindexed database query for unconfigured auth providers ([GHSA-g4cf-xj29-wqqr](GHSA-g4cf-xj29-wqqr)) ([#10270](#10270)) ([fbac847](fbac847)) * Denial-of-service via unbounded query complexity in REST and GraphQL API ([GHSA-cmj3-wx7h-ffvg](GHSA-cmj3-wx7h-ffvg)) ([#10130](#10130)) ([0ae9c25](0ae9c25)) * Email verification 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([6c3317a](6c3317a)) * LiveQuery subscription query depth bypass ([GHSA-6qh5-m6g3-xhq6](GHSA-6qh5-m6g3-xhq6)) ([#10259](#10259)) ([2126fe4](2126fe4)) * LiveQuery subscription with invalid regular expression crashes server ([GHSA-827p-g5x5-h86c](GHSA-827p-g5x5-h86c)) ([#10197](#10197)) ([0ae0eee](0ae0eee)) * Locale parameter path traversal in pages router ([#10242](#10242)) ([01fb6a9](01fb6a9)) * MFA recovery code single-use bypass via concurrent requests ([GHSA-2299-ghjr-6vjp](GHSA-2299-ghjr-6vjp)) ([#10275](#10275)) ([5e70094](5e70094)) * MFA recovery codes not consumed after use ([GHSA-4hf6-3x24-c9m8](GHSA-4hf6-3x24-c9m8)) ([#10170](#10170)) ([18abdd9](18abdd9)) * Missing audience validation in Keycloak authentication adapter ([GHSA-48mh-j4p5-7j9v](GHSA-48mh-j4p5-7j9v)) ([#10137](#10137)) ([78ef1a1](78ef1a1)) * Normalize HTTP method case in `allowMethodOverride` middleware ([#10262](#10262)) ([a248e8c](a248e8c)) * NoSQL injection via token type in password reset and email verification endpoints ([GHSA-vgjh-hmwf-c588](GHSA-vgjh-hmwf-c588)) ([#10128](#10128)) ([b2f2317](b2f2317)) * OAuth2 adapter app ID validation sends wrong token to introspection endpoint ([GHSA-69xg-f649-w5g2](GHSA-69xg-f649-w5g2)) ([#10187](#10187)) ([7f9f854](7f9f854)) * OAuth2 adapter shares mutable state across providers via singleton instance ([GHSA-2cjm-2gwv-m892](GHSA-2cjm-2gwv-m892)) ([#10183](#10183)) ([6009bc1](6009bc1)) * Parse Server OAuth2 authentication adapter account takeover via identity spoofing ([GHSA-fr88-w35c-r596](GHSA-fr88-w35c-r596)) ([#10145](#10145)) ([9cfd06e](9cfd06e)) * Parse Server role escalation and CLP bypass via direct `_Join table write ([GHSA-5f92-jrq3-28rc](GHSA-5f92-jrq3-28rc)) ([#10141](#10141)) ([22faa08](22faa08)) * Parse Server session token exfiltration via `redirectClassNameForKey` query parameter ([GHSA-6r2j-cxgf-495f](GHSA-6r2j-cxgf-495f)) ([#10143](#10143)) ([70b7b07](70b7b07)) * Password reset token single-use bypass via concurrent requests ([GHSA-r3xq-68wh-gwvh](GHSA-r3xq-68wh-gwvh)) ([#10216](#10216)) ([84db0a0](84db0a0)) * Protected field change detection oracle via LiveQuery watch parameter ([GHSA-qpc3-fg4j-8hgm](GHSA-qpc3-fg4j-8hgm)) ([#10253](#10253)) ([0c0a0a5](0c0a0a5)) * Protected fields bypass via dot-notation in query and sort ([GHSA-r2m8-pxm9-9c4g](GHSA-r2m8-pxm9-9c4g)) ([#10167](#10167)) ([8f54c54](8f54c54)) * Protected fields bypass via LiveQuery subscription WHERE clause ([GHSA-j7mm-f4rv-6q6q](GHSA-j7mm-f4rv-6q6q)) ([#10175](#10175)) ([4d48847](4d48847)) * Protected fields bypass via logical query operators ([GHSA-72hp-qff8-4pvv](GHSA-72hp-qff8-4pvv)) ([#10140](#10140)) ([be1d65d](be1d65d)) * Protected fields leak via LiveQuery afterEvent trigger ([GHSA-5hmj-jcgp-6hff](GHSA-5hmj-jcgp-6hff)) ([#10232](#10232)) ([6648500](6648500)) * Query condition depth bypass via pre-validation transform pipeline ([GHSA-9fjp-q3c4-6w3j](GHSA-9fjp-q3c4-6w3j)) ([#10257](#10257)) ([85994ef](85994ef)) * Rate limit bypass via batch request endpoint ([GHSA-775h-3xrc-c228](GHSA-775h-3xrc-c228)) ([#10147](#10147)) ([2766f4f](2766f4f)) * Rate limit bypass via HTTP method override and batch method spoofing ([#10234](#10234)) ([7d72d26](7d72d26)) * Rate limit user zone key fallback and batch request bypass ([#10214](#10214)) ([434ecbe](434ecbe)) * Revert accidental breaking default values for query complexity limits ([#10205](#10205)) ([ab8dd54](ab8dd54)) * Sanitize control characters in page parameter response headers ([#10237](#10237)) ([337ffd6](337ffd6)) * Schema poisoning via prototype pollution in deep copy ([GHSA-9ccr-fpp6-78qf](GHSA-9ccr-fpp6-78qf)) ([#10200](#10200)) ([b321423](b321423)) * Security fix fast-xml-parser from 5.5.5 to 5.5.6 ([#10235](#10235)) ([f521576](f521576)) * Security upgrade fast-xml-parser from 5.3.7 to 5.4.2 ([#10086](#10086)) ([b04ca5e](b04ca5e)) * Server crash via deeply nested query condition operators ([GHSA-9xp9-j92r-p88v](GHSA-9xp9-j92r-p88v)) ([#10202](#10202)) ([f44e306](f44e306)) * Session creation endpoint allows overwriting server-generated session fields ([GHSA-5v7g-9h8f-8pgg](GHSA-5v7g-9h8f-8pgg)) ([#10195](#10195)) ([7ccfb97](7ccfb97)) * Session token expiration unchecked on cache hit ([#10194](#10194)) ([a944203](a944203)) * Session update endpoint allows overwriting server-generated session fields ([GHSA-jc39-686j-wp6q](GHSA-jc39-686j-wp6q)) ([#10263](#10263)) ([ea68fc0](ea68fc0)) * SQL injection via `Increment` operation on nested object field in PostgreSQL ([GHSA-q3vj-96h2-gwvg](GHSA-q3vj-96h2-gwvg)) ([#10161](#10161)) ([8f82282](8f82282)) * SQL injection via aggregate and distinct field names in PostgreSQL adapter ([GHSA-p2w6-rmh7-w8q3](GHSA-p2w6-rmh7-w8q3)) ([#10272](#10272)) ([bdddab5](bdddab5)) * SQL injection via dot-notation field name in PostgreSQL ([GHSA-qpr4-jrj4-6f27](GHSA-qpr4-jrj4-6f27)) ([#10159](#10159)) ([ea538a4](ea538a4)) * SQL Injection via dot-notation sub-key name in `Increment` operation on PostgreSQL ([GHSA-gqpp-xgvh-9h7h](GHSA-gqpp-xgvh-9h7h)) ([#10165](#10165)) ([169d692](169d692)) * SQL injection via query field name when using PostgreSQL ([GHSA-c442-97qw-j6c6](GHSA-c442-97qw-j6c6)) ([#10181](#10181)) ([be281b1](be281b1)) * Stored cross-site scripting (XSS) via SVG file upload ([GHSA-hcj7-6gxh-24ww](GHSA-hcj7-6gxh-24ww)) ([#10136](#10136)) ([93b784d](93b784d)) * Stored XSS filter bypass via Content-Type MIME parameter and missing XML extension blocklist entries ([GHSA-42ph-pf9q-cr72](GHSA-42ph-pf9q-cr72)) ([#10191](#10191)) ([4f53ab3](4f53ab3)) * Stored XSS via file upload of HTML-renderable file types ([GHSA-v5hf-f4c3-m5rv](GHSA-v5hf-f4c3-m5rv)) ([#10162](#10162)) ([03287cf](03287cf)) * User enumeration via email verification endpoint ([GHSA-w54v-hf9p-8856](GHSA-w54v-hf9p-8856)) ([#10172](#10172)) ([936abd4](936abd4)) * Validate authData provider values in challenge endpoint ([#10224](#10224)) ([e5e1f5b](e5e1f5b)) * Validate body field types in request middleware ([#10209](#10209)) ([df69046](df69046)) * Validate session in middleware for non-GET requests to `/sessions/me` ([#10213](#10213)) ([2a9fdab](2a9fdab)) * Validate token type in PagesRouter to prevent type confusion errors ([#10212](#10212)) ([386a989](386a989)) ### Features * Add `enableProductPurchaseLegacyApi` option to disable legacy IAP validation ([#10228](#10228)) ([622ee85](622ee85)) * Add `protectedFieldsOwnerExempt` option to control `_User` class owner exemption for `protectedFields` ([#10280](#10280)) ([d5213f8](d5213f8)) * Add `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` header and customizable response headers for files via `Parse.Cloud.afterFind(Parse.File)` ([#10158](#10158)) ([28d11a3](28d11a3))
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🎉 This change has been released in version 9.6.0 |
Pull Request
Issue
Approach
SQL injection via
Incrementoperation on nested object field in PostgreSQL (GHSA-q3vj-96h2-gwvg)Summary by CodeRabbit
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