Skip to content

fix: Account takeover via operator injection in authentication data identifier (GHSA-5fw2-8jcv-xh87)#10185

Merged
mtrezza merged 1 commit intoparse-community:alphafrom
mtrezza:fix/GHSA-5fw2-8jcv-xh87-v9
Mar 11, 2026
Merged

fix: Account takeover via operator injection in authentication data identifier (GHSA-5fw2-8jcv-xh87)#10185
mtrezza merged 1 commit intoparse-community:alphafrom
mtrezza:fix/GHSA-5fw2-8jcv-xh87-v9

Conversation

@mtrezza
Copy link
Member

@mtrezza mtrezza commented Mar 11, 2026

Pull Request

Issue

Account takeover via operator injection in authentication data identifier (GHSA-5fw2-8jcv-xh87)

Tasks

  • Add tests
  • Add changes to documentation (guides, repository pages, code comments)
  • Add security check
  • Add new Parse Error codes to Parse JS SDK

@parse-github-assistant
Copy link

parse-github-assistant bot commented Mar 11, 2026

🚀 Thanks for opening this pull request! We appreciate your effort in improving the project. Please let us know once your pull request is ready for review.

Note

Please respond to review comments from AI agents just like you would to comments from a human reviewer. Let the reviewer resolve their own comments, unless they have reviewed and accepted your commit, or agreed with your explanation for why the feedback was incorrect.

Caution

Pull requests must be written using an AI agent with human supervision. Pull requests written entirely by a human will likely be rejected, because of lower code quality, higher review effort and the higher risk of introducing bugs. Please note that AI review comments on this pull request alone do not satisfy this requirement.

@coderabbitai
Copy link

coderabbitai bot commented Mar 11, 2026

📝 Walkthrough

Walkthrough

Introduces validation for authData.id type checking in the authentication provider flow to reject non-string identifiers at runtime. Adds comprehensive test coverage for operator injection vulnerabilities, including scenarios for anonymous login and custom adapter configurations with regex, equality, and existence operators.

Changes

Cohort / File(s) Summary
Operator Injection Tests
spec/RegexVulnerabilities.spec.js
New test suites validating rejection of $regex, $ne, and $exists operators in authData injection, including valid string ID login scenarios and custom adapter edge cases.
AuthData Validation
src/Auth.js
Runtime type check added to findUsersWithAuthData to reject non-string providerAuthData.id values with early error throw.

Estimated code review effort

🎯 2 (Simple) | ⏱️ ~15 minutes

Possibly related PRs

🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 2 | ❌ 1

❌ Failed checks (1 warning)

Check name Status Explanation Resolution
Description check ⚠️ Warning The description follows the template with the Issue section properly filled with the security advisory link. However, critical tasks remain incomplete: documentation updates, security checks, and error code additions are unchecked despite being part of the standard checklist. Complete or document why remaining tasks (documentation, security checks, error codes) are not applicable. At minimum, address whether these tasks truly don't apply to this security fix.
✅ Passed checks (2 passed)
Check name Status Explanation
Docstring Coverage ✅ Passed No functions found in the changed files to evaluate docstring coverage. Skipping docstring coverage check.
Title check ✅ Passed The title accurately describes the main change: a security fix for operator injection vulnerability in authentication data, matching the code changes that add type validation and tests.

✏️ Tip: You can configure your own custom pre-merge checks in the settings.

✨ Finishing Touches
🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
  • Create PR with unit tests
  • Post copyable unit tests in a comment

Thanks for using CodeRabbit! It's free for OSS, and your support helps us grow. If you like it, consider giving us a shout-out.

❤️ Share

Comment @coderabbitai help to get the list of available commands and usage tips.

@codecov
Copy link

codecov bot commented Mar 11, 2026

Codecov Report

✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests.
✅ Project coverage is 92.61%. Comparing base (6009bc1) to head (dc98abf).
⚠️ Report is 102 commits behind head on alpha.

Additional details and impacted files
@@           Coverage Diff           @@
##            alpha   #10185   +/-   ##
=======================================
  Coverage   92.61%   92.61%           
=======================================
  Files         192      192           
  Lines       16256    16258    +2     
  Branches      190      190           
=======================================
+ Hits        15055    15057    +2     
  Misses       1188     1188           
  Partials       13       13           

☔ View full report in Codecov by Sentry.
📢 Have feedback on the report? Share it here.

🚀 New features to boost your workflow:
  • ❄️ Test Analytics: Detect flaky tests, report on failures, and find test suite problems.
  • 📦 JS Bundle Analysis: Save yourself from yourself by tracking and limiting bundle sizes in JS merges.

Copy link

@coderabbitai coderabbitai bot left a comment

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

Caution

Some comments are outside the diff and can’t be posted inline due to platform limitations.

⚠️ Outside diff range comments (1)
src/Auth.js (1)

451-457: ⚠️ Potential issue | 🟠 Major

Fix the authData.id type guard to support numeric IDs from OAuth providers.

The new typeof providerAuthData.id !== 'string' check at line 455–457 will reject authentication from real-world OAuth providers. GitHub's API (and others like Spotify, Line, etc.) return numeric user IDs, not strings. These numeric IDs flow through adapter.beforeFind() without type conversion — for example, BaseCodeAuthAdapter at line 58 assigns authData.id = user.id directly. The new guard will then throw INVALID_VALUE and break login/signup.

Additionally, the earlier if (!providerAuthData?.id) check still treats falsy non-strings like 0 or false as absent, so the invariant is not enforced consistently.

Please either:

  • Normalize provider IDs to strings immediately after adapter.beforeFind() (e.g., providerAuthData.id = String(providerAuthData.id))
  • Replace the type check with an explicit null/undefined check and reject only objects/operators that could cause injection (e.g., if (typeof providerAuthData.id === 'object' || ...))
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.

In `@src/Auth.js` around lines 451 - 457, The type guard rejects numeric provider
IDs; change the logic around providerAuthData/id (after adapter.beforeFind() and
before the current typeof check) to normalize IDs to strings (e.g., set
providerAuthData.id = String(providerAuthData.id)) or alternatively replace the
falsy check and typeof guard with an explicit null/undefined check (e.g., if
(providerAuthData.id == null) return null) and reject only object/operator types
(check typeof providerAuthData.id === 'object' or
Array.isArray(providerAuthData.id')) to avoid rejecting valid numeric IDs;
update the checks near providerAuthData, adapter.beforeFind(), and
BaseCodeAuthAdapter usage accordingly so numeric IDs are accepted or converted
consistently.
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.

Outside diff comments:
In `@src/Auth.js`:
- Around line 451-457: The type guard rejects numeric provider IDs; change the
logic around providerAuthData/id (after adapter.beforeFind() and before the
current typeof check) to normalize IDs to strings (e.g., set providerAuthData.id
= String(providerAuthData.id)) or alternatively replace the falsy check and
typeof guard with an explicit null/undefined check (e.g., if
(providerAuthData.id == null) return null) and reject only object/operator types
(check typeof providerAuthData.id === 'object' or
Array.isArray(providerAuthData.id')) to avoid rejecting valid numeric IDs;
update the checks near providerAuthData, adapter.beforeFind(), and
BaseCodeAuthAdapter usage accordingly so numeric IDs are accepted or converted
consistently.

ℹ️ Review info
⚙️ Run configuration

Configuration used: Organization UI

Review profile: CHILL

Plan: Pro

Run ID: 117c2637-ba3e-4826-8242-d2686ddfb97c

📥 Commits

Reviewing files that changed from the base of the PR and between ad826e1 and dc98abf.

📒 Files selected for processing (2)
  • spec/RegexVulnerabilities.spec.js
  • src/Auth.js

@parseplatformorg
Copy link
Contributor

Snyk checks have passed. No issues have been found so far.

Status Scanner Critical High Medium Low Total (0)
Open Source Security 0 0 0 0 0 issues

💻 Catch issues earlier using the plugins for VS Code, JetBrains IDEs, Visual Studio, and Eclipse.

@mtrezza mtrezza changed the title fix: GHSA-5fw2-8jcv-xh87-v9 fix: Account takeover via operator injection in authentication data identifier (GHSA-5fw2-8jcv-xh87) Mar 11, 2026
@mtrezza mtrezza merged commit 0d0a554 into parse-community:alpha Mar 11, 2026
24 checks passed
parseplatformorg pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 11, 2026
# [9.6.0-alpha.12](9.6.0-alpha.11...9.6.0-alpha.12) (2026-03-11)

### Bug Fixes

* Account takeover via operator injection in authentication data identifier ([GHSA-5fw2-8jcv-xh87](GHSA-5fw2-8jcv-xh87)) ([#10185](#10185)) ([0d0a554](0d0a554))
@parseplatformorg
Copy link
Contributor

🎉 This change has been released in version 9.6.0-alpha.12

@parseplatformorg parseplatformorg added the state:released-alpha Released as alpha version label Mar 11, 2026
@mtrezza mtrezza deleted the fix/GHSA-5fw2-8jcv-xh87-v9 branch March 11, 2026 18:37
parseplatformorg pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 22, 2026
# [9.6.0](9.5.1...9.6.0) (2026-03-22)

### Bug Fixes

*  LiveQuery `regexTimeout` default value not applied ([#10156](#10156)) ([416cfbc](416cfbc))
* Account lockout race condition allows bypassing threshold via concurrent requests ([#10266](#10266)) ([ff70fee](ff70fee))
* Account takeover via operator injection in authentication data identifier ([GHSA-5fw2-8jcv-xh87](GHSA-5fw2-8jcv-xh87)) ([#10185](#10185)) ([0d0a554](0d0a554))
* Add configurable batch request sub-request limit via option `requestComplexity.batchRequestLimit` ([#10265](#10265)) ([164ed0d](164ed0d))
* Auth data exposed via /users/me endpoint ([GHSA-37mj-c2wf-cx96](GHSA-37mj-c2wf-cx96)) ([#10278](#10278)) ([875cf10](875cf10))
* Auth provider validation bypass on login via partial authData ([GHSA-pfj7-wv7c-22pr](GHSA-pfj7-wv7c-22pr)) ([#10246](#10246)) ([98f4ba5](98f4ba5))
* Block dot-notation updates to authData sub-fields and harden login provider checks ([#10223](#10223)) ([12c24c6](12c24c6))
* Bypass of class-level permissions in LiveQuery ([GHSA-7ch5-98q2-7289](GHSA-7ch5-98q2-7289)) ([#10133](#10133)) ([98188d9](98188d9))
* Classes `_GraphQLConfig` and `_Audience` master key bypass via generic class routes ([GHSA-7xg7-rqf6-pw6c](GHSA-7xg7-rqf6-pw6c)) ([#10151](#10151)) ([1de4e43](1de4e43))
* Cloud function dispatch crashes server via prototype chain traversal ([GHSA-4263-jgmp-7pf4](GHSA-4263-jgmp-7pf4)) ([#10210](#10210)) ([286373d](286373d))
* Concurrent signup with same authentication creates duplicate users ([#10149](#10149)) ([853bfe1](853bfe1))
* Create CLP not enforced before user field validation on signup ([#10268](#10268)) ([a0530c2](a0530c2))
* Denial of service via unindexed database query for unconfigured auth providers ([GHSA-g4cf-xj29-wqqr](GHSA-g4cf-xj29-wqqr)) ([#10270](#10270)) ([fbac847](fbac847))
* Denial-of-service via unbounded query complexity in REST and GraphQL API ([GHSA-cmj3-wx7h-ffvg](GHSA-cmj3-wx7h-ffvg)) ([#10130](#10130)) ([0ae9c25](0ae9c25))
* Email verification resend page leaks user existence (GHSA-h29g-q5c2-9h4f) ([#10238](#10238)) ([fbda4cb](fbda4cb))
* Empty authData bypasses credential requirement on signup ([GHSA-wjqw-r9x4-j59v](GHSA-wjqw-r9x4-j59v)) ([#10219](#10219)) ([5dcbf41](5dcbf41))
* GraphQL WebSocket endpoint bypasses security middleware ([GHSA-p2x3-8689-cwpg](GHSA-p2x3-8689-cwpg)) ([#10189](#10189)) ([3ffba75](3ffba75))
* Incomplete JSON key escaping in PostgreSQL Increment on nested Object fields ([#10261](#10261)) ([a692873](a692873))
* Input type validation for query operators and batch path ([#10230](#10230)) ([a628911](a628911))
* Instance comparison with `instanceof` is not realm-safe ([#10225](#10225)) ([51efb1e](51efb1e))
* LDAP injection via unsanitized user input in DN and group filter construction ([GHSA-7m6r-fhh7-r47c](GHSA-7m6r-fhh7-r47c)) ([#10154](#10154)) ([5bbca7b](5bbca7b))
* LiveQuery bypasses CLP pointer permission enforcement ([GHSA-fph2-r4qg-9576](GHSA-fph2-r4qg-9576)) ([#10250](#10250)) ([6c3317a](6c3317a))
* LiveQuery subscription query depth bypass ([GHSA-6qh5-m6g3-xhq6](GHSA-6qh5-m6g3-xhq6)) ([#10259](#10259)) ([2126fe4](2126fe4))
* LiveQuery subscription with invalid regular expression crashes server ([GHSA-827p-g5x5-h86c](GHSA-827p-g5x5-h86c)) ([#10197](#10197)) ([0ae0eee](0ae0eee))
* Locale parameter path traversal in pages router ([#10242](#10242)) ([01fb6a9](01fb6a9))
* MFA recovery code single-use bypass via concurrent requests ([GHSA-2299-ghjr-6vjp](GHSA-2299-ghjr-6vjp)) ([#10275](#10275)) ([5e70094](5e70094))
* MFA recovery codes not consumed after use ([GHSA-4hf6-3x24-c9m8](GHSA-4hf6-3x24-c9m8)) ([#10170](#10170)) ([18abdd9](18abdd9))
* Missing audience validation in Keycloak authentication adapter ([GHSA-48mh-j4p5-7j9v](GHSA-48mh-j4p5-7j9v)) ([#10137](#10137)) ([78ef1a1](78ef1a1))
* Normalize HTTP method case in `allowMethodOverride` middleware ([#10262](#10262)) ([a248e8c](a248e8c))
* NoSQL injection via token type in password reset and email verification endpoints ([GHSA-vgjh-hmwf-c588](GHSA-vgjh-hmwf-c588)) ([#10128](#10128)) ([b2f2317](b2f2317))
* OAuth2 adapter app ID validation sends wrong token to introspection endpoint ([GHSA-69xg-f649-w5g2](GHSA-69xg-f649-w5g2)) ([#10187](#10187)) ([7f9f854](7f9f854))
* OAuth2 adapter shares mutable state across providers via singleton instance ([GHSA-2cjm-2gwv-m892](GHSA-2cjm-2gwv-m892)) ([#10183](#10183)) ([6009bc1](6009bc1))
* Parse Server OAuth2 authentication adapter account takeover via identity spoofing ([GHSA-fr88-w35c-r596](GHSA-fr88-w35c-r596)) ([#10145](#10145)) ([9cfd06e](9cfd06e))
* Parse Server role escalation and CLP bypass via direct `_Join table write ([GHSA-5f92-jrq3-28rc](GHSA-5f92-jrq3-28rc)) ([#10141](#10141)) ([22faa08](22faa08))
* Parse Server session token exfiltration via `redirectClassNameForKey` query parameter ([GHSA-6r2j-cxgf-495f](GHSA-6r2j-cxgf-495f)) ([#10143](#10143)) ([70b7b07](70b7b07))
* Password reset token single-use bypass via concurrent requests ([GHSA-r3xq-68wh-gwvh](GHSA-r3xq-68wh-gwvh)) ([#10216](#10216)) ([84db0a0](84db0a0))
* Protected field change detection oracle via LiveQuery watch parameter ([GHSA-qpc3-fg4j-8hgm](GHSA-qpc3-fg4j-8hgm)) ([#10253](#10253)) ([0c0a0a5](0c0a0a5))
* Protected fields bypass via dot-notation in query and sort ([GHSA-r2m8-pxm9-9c4g](GHSA-r2m8-pxm9-9c4g)) ([#10167](#10167)) ([8f54c54](8f54c54))
* Protected fields bypass via LiveQuery subscription WHERE clause ([GHSA-j7mm-f4rv-6q6q](GHSA-j7mm-f4rv-6q6q)) ([#10175](#10175)) ([4d48847](4d48847))
* Protected fields bypass via logical query operators ([GHSA-72hp-qff8-4pvv](GHSA-72hp-qff8-4pvv)) ([#10140](#10140)) ([be1d65d](be1d65d))
* Protected fields leak via LiveQuery afterEvent trigger ([GHSA-5hmj-jcgp-6hff](GHSA-5hmj-jcgp-6hff)) ([#10232](#10232)) ([6648500](6648500))
* Query condition depth bypass via pre-validation transform pipeline ([GHSA-9fjp-q3c4-6w3j](GHSA-9fjp-q3c4-6w3j)) ([#10257](#10257)) ([85994ef](85994ef))
* Rate limit bypass via batch request endpoint ([GHSA-775h-3xrc-c228](GHSA-775h-3xrc-c228)) ([#10147](#10147)) ([2766f4f](2766f4f))
* Rate limit bypass via HTTP method override and batch method spoofing ([#10234](#10234)) ([7d72d26](7d72d26))
* Rate limit user zone key fallback and batch request bypass ([#10214](#10214)) ([434ecbe](434ecbe))
* Revert accidental breaking default values for query complexity limits ([#10205](#10205)) ([ab8dd54](ab8dd54))
* Sanitize control characters in page parameter response headers ([#10237](#10237)) ([337ffd6](337ffd6))
* Schema poisoning via prototype pollution in deep copy ([GHSA-9ccr-fpp6-78qf](GHSA-9ccr-fpp6-78qf)) ([#10200](#10200)) ([b321423](b321423))
* Security fix fast-xml-parser from 5.5.5 to 5.5.6 ([#10235](#10235)) ([f521576](f521576))
* Security upgrade fast-xml-parser from 5.3.7 to 5.4.2 ([#10086](#10086)) ([b04ca5e](b04ca5e))
* Server crash via deeply nested query condition operators ([GHSA-9xp9-j92r-p88v](GHSA-9xp9-j92r-p88v)) ([#10202](#10202)) ([f44e306](f44e306))
* Session creation endpoint allows overwriting server-generated session fields ([GHSA-5v7g-9h8f-8pgg](GHSA-5v7g-9h8f-8pgg)) ([#10195](#10195)) ([7ccfb97](7ccfb97))
* Session token expiration unchecked on cache hit ([#10194](#10194)) ([a944203](a944203))
* Session update endpoint allows overwriting server-generated session fields ([GHSA-jc39-686j-wp6q](GHSA-jc39-686j-wp6q)) ([#10263](#10263)) ([ea68fc0](ea68fc0))
* SQL injection via `Increment` operation on nested object field in PostgreSQL ([GHSA-q3vj-96h2-gwvg](GHSA-q3vj-96h2-gwvg)) ([#10161](#10161)) ([8f82282](8f82282))
* SQL injection via aggregate and distinct field names in PostgreSQL adapter ([GHSA-p2w6-rmh7-w8q3](GHSA-p2w6-rmh7-w8q3)) ([#10272](#10272)) ([bdddab5](bdddab5))
* SQL injection via dot-notation field name in PostgreSQL ([GHSA-qpr4-jrj4-6f27](GHSA-qpr4-jrj4-6f27)) ([#10159](#10159)) ([ea538a4](ea538a4))
* SQL Injection via dot-notation sub-key name in `Increment` operation on PostgreSQL ([GHSA-gqpp-xgvh-9h7h](GHSA-gqpp-xgvh-9h7h)) ([#10165](#10165)) ([169d692](169d692))
* SQL injection via query field name when using PostgreSQL ([GHSA-c442-97qw-j6c6](GHSA-c442-97qw-j6c6)) ([#10181](#10181)) ([be281b1](be281b1))
* Stored cross-site scripting (XSS) via SVG file upload ([GHSA-hcj7-6gxh-24ww](GHSA-hcj7-6gxh-24ww)) ([#10136](#10136)) ([93b784d](93b784d))
* Stored XSS filter bypass via Content-Type MIME parameter and missing XML extension blocklist entries ([GHSA-42ph-pf9q-cr72](GHSA-42ph-pf9q-cr72)) ([#10191](#10191)) ([4f53ab3](4f53ab3))
* Stored XSS via file upload of HTML-renderable file types ([GHSA-v5hf-f4c3-m5rv](GHSA-v5hf-f4c3-m5rv)) ([#10162](#10162)) ([03287cf](03287cf))
* User enumeration via email verification endpoint ([GHSA-w54v-hf9p-8856](GHSA-w54v-hf9p-8856)) ([#10172](#10172)) ([936abd4](936abd4))
* Validate authData provider values in challenge endpoint ([#10224](#10224)) ([e5e1f5b](e5e1f5b))
* Validate body field types in request middleware ([#10209](#10209)) ([df69046](df69046))
* Validate session in middleware for non-GET requests to `/sessions/me` ([#10213](#10213)) ([2a9fdab](2a9fdab))
* Validate token type in PagesRouter to prevent type confusion errors ([#10212](#10212)) ([386a989](386a989))

### Features

* Add `enableProductPurchaseLegacyApi` option to disable legacy IAP validation ([#10228](#10228)) ([622ee85](622ee85))
* Add `protectedFieldsOwnerExempt` option to control `_User` class owner exemption for `protectedFields` ([#10280](#10280)) ([d5213f8](d5213f8))
* Add `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` header and customizable response headers for files via `Parse.Cloud.afterFind(Parse.File)` ([#10158](#10158)) ([28d11a3](28d11a3))
@parseplatformorg
Copy link
Contributor

🎉 This change has been released in version 9.6.0

@parseplatformorg parseplatformorg added the state:released Released as stable version label Mar 22, 2026
Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment

Labels

state:released Released as stable version state:released-alpha Released as alpha version

Projects

None yet

Development

Successfully merging this pull request may close these issues.

2 participants