fix: Account takeover via operator injection in authentication data identifier (GHSA-5fw2-8jcv-xh87)#10185
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughIntroduces validation for authData.id type checking in the authentication provider flow to reject non-string identifiers at runtime. Adds comprehensive test coverage for operator injection vulnerabilities, including scenarios for anonymous login and custom adapter configurations with regex, equality, and existence operators. Changes
Estimated code review effort🎯 2 (Simple) | ⏱️ ~15 minutes Possibly related PRs
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Codecov Report✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests. Additional details and impacted files@@ Coverage Diff @@
## alpha #10185 +/- ##
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Coverage 92.61% 92.61%
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Files 192 192
Lines 16256 16258 +2
Branches 190 190
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⚠️ Outside diff range comments (1)
src/Auth.js (1)
451-457:⚠️ Potential issue | 🟠 MajorFix the authData.id type guard to support numeric IDs from OAuth providers.
The new
typeof providerAuthData.id !== 'string'check at line 455–457 will reject authentication from real-world OAuth providers. GitHub's API (and others like Spotify, Line, etc.) return numeric user IDs, not strings. These numeric IDs flow throughadapter.beforeFind()without type conversion — for example,BaseCodeAuthAdapterat line 58 assignsauthData.id = user.iddirectly. The new guard will then throwINVALID_VALUEand break login/signup.Additionally, the earlier
if (!providerAuthData?.id)check still treats falsy non-strings like0orfalseas absent, so the invariant is not enforced consistently.Please either:
- Normalize provider IDs to strings immediately after
adapter.beforeFind()(e.g.,providerAuthData.id = String(providerAuthData.id))- Replace the type check with an explicit
null/undefinedcheck and reject only objects/operators that could cause injection (e.g.,if (typeof providerAuthData.id === 'object' || ...))🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed. In `@src/Auth.js` around lines 451 - 457, The type guard rejects numeric provider IDs; change the logic around providerAuthData/id (after adapter.beforeFind() and before the current typeof check) to normalize IDs to strings (e.g., set providerAuthData.id = String(providerAuthData.id)) or alternatively replace the falsy check and typeof guard with an explicit null/undefined check (e.g., if (providerAuthData.id == null) return null) and reject only object/operator types (check typeof providerAuthData.id === 'object' or Array.isArray(providerAuthData.id')) to avoid rejecting valid numeric IDs; update the checks near providerAuthData, adapter.beforeFind(), and BaseCodeAuthAdapter usage accordingly so numeric IDs are accepted or converted consistently.
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
Outside diff comments:
In `@src/Auth.js`:
- Around line 451-457: The type guard rejects numeric provider IDs; change the
logic around providerAuthData/id (after adapter.beforeFind() and before the
current typeof check) to normalize IDs to strings (e.g., set providerAuthData.id
= String(providerAuthData.id)) or alternatively replace the falsy check and
typeof guard with an explicit null/undefined check (e.g., if
(providerAuthData.id == null) return null) and reject only object/operator types
(check typeof providerAuthData.id === 'object' or
Array.isArray(providerAuthData.id')) to avoid rejecting valid numeric IDs;
update the checks near providerAuthData, adapter.beforeFind(), and
BaseCodeAuthAdapter usage accordingly so numeric IDs are accepted or converted
consistently.
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📒 Files selected for processing (2)
spec/RegexVulnerabilities.spec.jssrc/Auth.js
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# [9.6.0-alpha.12](9.6.0-alpha.11...9.6.0-alpha.12) (2026-03-11) ### Bug Fixes * Account takeover via operator injection in authentication data identifier ([GHSA-5fw2-8jcv-xh87](GHSA-5fw2-8jcv-xh87)) ([#10185](#10185)) ([0d0a554](0d0a554))
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🎉 This change has been released in version 9.6.0-alpha.12 |
# [9.6.0](9.5.1...9.6.0) (2026-03-22) ### Bug Fixes * LiveQuery `regexTimeout` default value not applied ([#10156](#10156)) ([416cfbc](416cfbc)) * Account lockout race condition allows bypassing threshold via concurrent requests ([#10266](#10266)) ([ff70fee](ff70fee)) * Account takeover via operator injection in authentication data identifier ([GHSA-5fw2-8jcv-xh87](GHSA-5fw2-8jcv-xh87)) ([#10185](#10185)) ([0d0a554](0d0a554)) * Add configurable batch request sub-request limit via option `requestComplexity.batchRequestLimit` ([#10265](#10265)) ([164ed0d](164ed0d)) * Auth data exposed via /users/me endpoint ([GHSA-37mj-c2wf-cx96](GHSA-37mj-c2wf-cx96)) ([#10278](#10278)) ([875cf10](875cf10)) * Auth provider validation bypass on login via partial authData ([GHSA-pfj7-wv7c-22pr](GHSA-pfj7-wv7c-22pr)) ([#10246](#10246)) ([98f4ba5](98f4ba5)) * Block dot-notation updates to authData sub-fields and harden login provider checks ([#10223](#10223)) ([12c24c6](12c24c6)) * Bypass of class-level permissions in LiveQuery ([GHSA-7ch5-98q2-7289](GHSA-7ch5-98q2-7289)) ([#10133](#10133)) ([98188d9](98188d9)) * Classes `_GraphQLConfig` and `_Audience` master key bypass via generic class routes ([GHSA-7xg7-rqf6-pw6c](GHSA-7xg7-rqf6-pw6c)) ([#10151](#10151)) ([1de4e43](1de4e43)) * Cloud function dispatch crashes server via prototype chain traversal ([GHSA-4263-jgmp-7pf4](GHSA-4263-jgmp-7pf4)) ([#10210](#10210)) ([286373d](286373d)) * Concurrent signup with same authentication creates duplicate users ([#10149](#10149)) ([853bfe1](853bfe1)) * Create CLP not enforced before user field validation on signup ([#10268](#10268)) ([a0530c2](a0530c2)) * Denial of service via unindexed database query for unconfigured auth providers ([GHSA-g4cf-xj29-wqqr](GHSA-g4cf-xj29-wqqr)) ([#10270](#10270)) ([fbac847](fbac847)) * Denial-of-service via unbounded query complexity in REST and GraphQL API ([GHSA-cmj3-wx7h-ffvg](GHSA-cmj3-wx7h-ffvg)) ([#10130](#10130)) ([0ae9c25](0ae9c25)) * Email verification resend page leaks user existence (GHSA-h29g-q5c2-9h4f) ([#10238](#10238)) ([fbda4cb](fbda4cb)) * Empty authData bypasses credential requirement on signup ([GHSA-wjqw-r9x4-j59v](GHSA-wjqw-r9x4-j59v)) ([#10219](#10219)) ([5dcbf41](5dcbf41)) * GraphQL WebSocket endpoint bypasses security middleware ([GHSA-p2x3-8689-cwpg](GHSA-p2x3-8689-cwpg)) ([#10189](#10189)) ([3ffba75](3ffba75)) * Incomplete JSON key escaping in PostgreSQL Increment on nested Object fields ([#10261](#10261)) ([a692873](a692873)) * Input type validation for query operators and batch path ([#10230](#10230)) ([a628911](a628911)) * Instance comparison with `instanceof` is not realm-safe ([#10225](#10225)) ([51efb1e](51efb1e)) * LDAP injection via unsanitized user input in DN and group filter construction ([GHSA-7m6r-fhh7-r47c](GHSA-7m6r-fhh7-r47c)) ([#10154](#10154)) ([5bbca7b](5bbca7b)) * LiveQuery bypasses CLP pointer permission enforcement ([GHSA-fph2-r4qg-9576](GHSA-fph2-r4qg-9576)) ([#10250](#10250)) ([6c3317a](6c3317a)) * LiveQuery subscription query depth bypass ([GHSA-6qh5-m6g3-xhq6](GHSA-6qh5-m6g3-xhq6)) ([#10259](#10259)) ([2126fe4](2126fe4)) * LiveQuery subscription with invalid regular expression crashes server ([GHSA-827p-g5x5-h86c](GHSA-827p-g5x5-h86c)) ([#10197](#10197)) ([0ae0eee](0ae0eee)) * Locale parameter path traversal in pages router ([#10242](#10242)) ([01fb6a9](01fb6a9)) * MFA recovery code single-use bypass via concurrent requests ([GHSA-2299-ghjr-6vjp](GHSA-2299-ghjr-6vjp)) ([#10275](#10275)) ([5e70094](5e70094)) * MFA recovery codes not consumed after use ([GHSA-4hf6-3x24-c9m8](GHSA-4hf6-3x24-c9m8)) ([#10170](#10170)) ([18abdd9](18abdd9)) * Missing audience validation in Keycloak authentication adapter ([GHSA-48mh-j4p5-7j9v](GHSA-48mh-j4p5-7j9v)) ([#10137](#10137)) ([78ef1a1](78ef1a1)) * Normalize HTTP method case in `allowMethodOverride` middleware ([#10262](#10262)) ([a248e8c](a248e8c)) * NoSQL injection via token type in password reset and email verification endpoints ([GHSA-vgjh-hmwf-c588](GHSA-vgjh-hmwf-c588)) ([#10128](#10128)) ([b2f2317](b2f2317)) * OAuth2 adapter app ID validation sends wrong token to introspection endpoint ([GHSA-69xg-f649-w5g2](GHSA-69xg-f649-w5g2)) ([#10187](#10187)) ([7f9f854](7f9f854)) * OAuth2 adapter shares mutable state across providers via singleton instance ([GHSA-2cjm-2gwv-m892](GHSA-2cjm-2gwv-m892)) ([#10183](#10183)) ([6009bc1](6009bc1)) * Parse Server OAuth2 authentication adapter account takeover via identity spoofing ([GHSA-fr88-w35c-r596](GHSA-fr88-w35c-r596)) ([#10145](#10145)) ([9cfd06e](9cfd06e)) * Parse Server role escalation and CLP bypass via direct `_Join table write ([GHSA-5f92-jrq3-28rc](GHSA-5f92-jrq3-28rc)) ([#10141](#10141)) ([22faa08](22faa08)) * Parse Server session token exfiltration via `redirectClassNameForKey` query parameter ([GHSA-6r2j-cxgf-495f](GHSA-6r2j-cxgf-495f)) ([#10143](#10143)) ([70b7b07](70b7b07)) * Password reset token single-use bypass via concurrent requests ([GHSA-r3xq-68wh-gwvh](GHSA-r3xq-68wh-gwvh)) ([#10216](#10216)) ([84db0a0](84db0a0)) * Protected field change detection oracle via LiveQuery watch parameter ([GHSA-qpc3-fg4j-8hgm](GHSA-qpc3-fg4j-8hgm)) ([#10253](#10253)) ([0c0a0a5](0c0a0a5)) * Protected fields bypass via dot-notation in query and sort ([GHSA-r2m8-pxm9-9c4g](GHSA-r2m8-pxm9-9c4g)) ([#10167](#10167)) ([8f54c54](8f54c54)) * Protected fields bypass via LiveQuery subscription WHERE clause ([GHSA-j7mm-f4rv-6q6q](GHSA-j7mm-f4rv-6q6q)) ([#10175](#10175)) ([4d48847](4d48847)) * Protected fields bypass via logical query operators ([GHSA-72hp-qff8-4pvv](GHSA-72hp-qff8-4pvv)) ([#10140](#10140)) ([be1d65d](be1d65d)) * Protected fields leak via LiveQuery afterEvent trigger ([GHSA-5hmj-jcgp-6hff](GHSA-5hmj-jcgp-6hff)) ([#10232](#10232)) ([6648500](6648500)) * Query condition depth bypass via pre-validation transform pipeline ([GHSA-9fjp-q3c4-6w3j](GHSA-9fjp-q3c4-6w3j)) ([#10257](#10257)) ([85994ef](85994ef)) * Rate limit bypass via batch request endpoint ([GHSA-775h-3xrc-c228](GHSA-775h-3xrc-c228)) ([#10147](#10147)) ([2766f4f](2766f4f)) * Rate limit bypass via HTTP method override and batch method spoofing ([#10234](#10234)) ([7d72d26](7d72d26)) * Rate limit user zone key fallback and batch request bypass ([#10214](#10214)) ([434ecbe](434ecbe)) * Revert accidental breaking default values for query complexity limits ([#10205](#10205)) ([ab8dd54](ab8dd54)) * Sanitize control characters in page parameter response headers ([#10237](#10237)) ([337ffd6](337ffd6)) * Schema poisoning via prototype pollution in deep copy ([GHSA-9ccr-fpp6-78qf](GHSA-9ccr-fpp6-78qf)) ([#10200](#10200)) ([b321423](b321423)) * Security fix fast-xml-parser from 5.5.5 to 5.5.6 ([#10235](#10235)) ([f521576](f521576)) * Security upgrade fast-xml-parser from 5.3.7 to 5.4.2 ([#10086](#10086)) ([b04ca5e](b04ca5e)) * Server crash via deeply nested query condition operators ([GHSA-9xp9-j92r-p88v](GHSA-9xp9-j92r-p88v)) ([#10202](#10202)) ([f44e306](f44e306)) * Session creation endpoint allows overwriting server-generated session fields ([GHSA-5v7g-9h8f-8pgg](GHSA-5v7g-9h8f-8pgg)) ([#10195](#10195)) ([7ccfb97](7ccfb97)) * Session token expiration unchecked on cache hit ([#10194](#10194)) ([a944203](a944203)) * Session update endpoint allows overwriting server-generated session fields ([GHSA-jc39-686j-wp6q](GHSA-jc39-686j-wp6q)) ([#10263](#10263)) ([ea68fc0](ea68fc0)) * SQL injection via `Increment` operation on nested object field in PostgreSQL ([GHSA-q3vj-96h2-gwvg](GHSA-q3vj-96h2-gwvg)) ([#10161](#10161)) ([8f82282](8f82282)) * SQL injection via aggregate and distinct field names in PostgreSQL adapter ([GHSA-p2w6-rmh7-w8q3](GHSA-p2w6-rmh7-w8q3)) ([#10272](#10272)) ([bdddab5](bdddab5)) * SQL injection via dot-notation field name in PostgreSQL ([GHSA-qpr4-jrj4-6f27](GHSA-qpr4-jrj4-6f27)) ([#10159](#10159)) ([ea538a4](ea538a4)) * SQL Injection via dot-notation sub-key name in `Increment` operation on PostgreSQL ([GHSA-gqpp-xgvh-9h7h](GHSA-gqpp-xgvh-9h7h)) ([#10165](#10165)) ([169d692](169d692)) * SQL injection via query field name when using PostgreSQL ([GHSA-c442-97qw-j6c6](GHSA-c442-97qw-j6c6)) ([#10181](#10181)) ([be281b1](be281b1)) * Stored cross-site scripting (XSS) via SVG file upload ([GHSA-hcj7-6gxh-24ww](GHSA-hcj7-6gxh-24ww)) ([#10136](#10136)) ([93b784d](93b784d)) * Stored XSS filter bypass via Content-Type MIME parameter and missing XML extension blocklist entries ([GHSA-42ph-pf9q-cr72](GHSA-42ph-pf9q-cr72)) ([#10191](#10191)) ([4f53ab3](4f53ab3)) * Stored XSS via file upload of HTML-renderable file types ([GHSA-v5hf-f4c3-m5rv](GHSA-v5hf-f4c3-m5rv)) ([#10162](#10162)) ([03287cf](03287cf)) * User enumeration via email verification endpoint ([GHSA-w54v-hf9p-8856](GHSA-w54v-hf9p-8856)) ([#10172](#10172)) ([936abd4](936abd4)) * Validate authData provider values in challenge endpoint ([#10224](#10224)) ([e5e1f5b](e5e1f5b)) * Validate body field types in request middleware ([#10209](#10209)) ([df69046](df69046)) * Validate session in middleware for non-GET requests to `/sessions/me` ([#10213](#10213)) ([2a9fdab](2a9fdab)) * Validate token type in PagesRouter to prevent type confusion errors ([#10212](#10212)) ([386a989](386a989)) ### Features * Add `enableProductPurchaseLegacyApi` option to disable legacy IAP validation ([#10228](#10228)) ([622ee85](622ee85)) * Add `protectedFieldsOwnerExempt` option to control `_User` class owner exemption for `protectedFields` ([#10280](#10280)) ([d5213f8](d5213f8)) * Add `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` header and customizable response headers for files via `Parse.Cloud.afterFind(Parse.File)` ([#10158](#10158)) ([28d11a3](28d11a3))
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🎉 This change has been released in version 9.6.0 |
Pull Request
Issue
Account takeover via operator injection in authentication data identifier (GHSA-5fw2-8jcv-xh87)
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