fix: MFA recovery code single-use bypass via concurrent requests (GHSA-2299-ghjr-6vjp)#10275
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughAdds a regression test for concurrent MFA recovery-code use, relaxes Mongo authData query key parsing, adds JSONB object-equality handling in Postgres for dot-notated fields, and applies optimistic-locking predicates when updating Changes
Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant Client
participant UsersRouter as Router
participant Storage as DB
rect rgba(0,128,0,0.5)
Client->>Router: POST /1/login (recoveryCode)
end
Router->>DB: SELECT user (master key, authData)
DB-->>Router: user record (authData with recoveryCodes)
Router->>DB: UPDATE _User SET authData.. WHERE objectId=... AND authData.<prov>.<field>=<original> (optimistic-lock)
alt update succeeds
DB-->>Router: 1 row updated
Router-->>Client: 200 OK (login success)
else update fails (no rows)
DB-->>Router: 0 rows updated
Router-->>Client: 403 / failure (recovery code invalid)
end
Estimated code review effort🎯 4 (Complex) | ⏱️ ~60 minutes Possibly related PRs
🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 1 | ❌ 2❌ Failed checks (2 warnings)
✅ Passed checks (1 passed)
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Actionable comments posted: 2
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
Inline comments:
In `@spec/vulnerabilities.spec.js`:
- Line 4242: The GHSA-2299-ghjr-6vjp test suite describe('(GHSA-2299-ghjr-6vjp)
MFA recovery code reuse via concurrent requests') is wrongly nested inside the
GHSA-g4cf-xj29-wqqr describe; close the GHSA-g4cf-xj29-wqqr describe block
before adding the new describe so both are siblings. Locate the
GHSA-g4cf-xj29-wqqr describe block and move its closing brace (and any necessary
closing parentheses) so that describe('GHSA-2299-ghjr-6vjp', ...) starts at the
same nesting level, and ensure you also fix the corresponding misplaced closing
brace later in the file (same pattern at lines ~4315-4316).
In `@src/Adapters/Storage/Postgres/PostgresStorageAdapter.js`:
- Around line 343-347: The code treats any object value as raw JSONB equality
(in the branch guarded by typeof fieldValue === 'object'), which incorrectly
converts operator-documents like { $eq:.., $ne:.., $exists:.. } into a JSON
equality predicate and breaks later operator handling in buildWhereClause;
update the logic in that branch (referencing transformDotFieldToComponents,
patterns, values, index, and fieldValue) to detect operator documents (e.g.,
object keys starting with '$' and not arrays) and skip the raw JSONB equality
path for them so they fall through to the operator-handling code in
buildWhereClause.
🪄 Autofix (Beta)
Fix all unresolved CodeRabbit comments on this PR:
- Push a commit to this branch (recommended)
- Create a new PR with the fixes
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📒 Files selected for processing (4)
spec/vulnerabilities.spec.jssrc/Adapters/Storage/Mongo/MongoTransform.jssrc/Adapters/Storage/Postgres/PostgresStorageAdapter.jssrc/Routers/UsersRouter.js
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🧹 Nitpick comments (1)
spec/vulnerabilities.spec.js (1)
4302-4314: Tighten the loser-path assertions.Right now any 9 rejections satisfy this test, so it would still pass if the losing requests returned an unrelated 4xx/5xx instead of the expected
SCRIPT_FAILED/"Invalid auth data"remap fromsrc/Routers/UsersRouter.js. I’d also pin the final recovery-list size so the test catches accidental over-deletion.🧪 Suggested assertion tightening
const results = await Promise.allSettled(Array(10).fill().map(() => loginWithRecovery())); const succeeded = results.filter(r => r.status === 'fulfilled'); const failed = results.filter(r => r.status === 'rejected'); // Exactly one request should succeed; all others should fail expect(succeeded.length).toBe(1); expect(failed.length).toBe(9); + failed.forEach(result => { + expect(result.reason.data.code).toBe(Parse.Error.SCRIPT_FAILED); + expect(result.reason.data.error).toBe('Invalid auth data'); + }); // Verify the recovery code has been consumed await user.fetch({ useMasterKey: true }); const remainingRecovery = user.get('authData').mfa.recovery; + expect(remainingRecovery.length).toBe(1); expect(remainingRecovery).not.toContain(recoveryCode);🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed. In `@spec/vulnerabilities.spec.js` around lines 4302 - 4314, The test should assert that each failed promise from loginWithRecovery() fails for the expected reason and that exactly one recovery code was removed; before calling Promise.allSettled capture the initial recovery list length from user.get('authData').mfa.recovery, then after awaiting results assert succeeded.length === 1 and for every failed result assert its reason contains the expected error signature (e.g. error.code === 'SCRIPT_FAILED' or error.message includes "Invalid auth data" as remapped by UsersRouter.js) to rule out unrelated 4xx/5xx failures, and finally fetch the user and assert remainingRecovery.length === initialLength - 1 to pin the exact count.
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
Nitpick comments:
In `@spec/vulnerabilities.spec.js`:
- Around line 4302-4314: The test should assert that each failed promise from
loginWithRecovery() fails for the expected reason and that exactly one recovery
code was removed; before calling Promise.allSettled capture the initial recovery
list length from user.get('authData').mfa.recovery, then after awaiting results
assert succeeded.length === 1 and for every failed result assert its reason
contains the expected error signature (e.g. error.code === 'SCRIPT_FAILED' or
error.message includes "Invalid auth data" as remapped by UsersRouter.js) to
rule out unrelated 4xx/5xx failures, and finally fetch the user and assert
remainingRecovery.length === initialLength - 1 to pin the exact count.
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Review profile: CHILL
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Run ID: fe951534-26c5-4d13-b0b7-b8a37d97af01
📒 Files selected for processing (2)
spec/vulnerabilities.spec.jssrc/Adapters/Storage/Postgres/PostgresStorageAdapter.js
Codecov Report❌ Patch coverage is
Additional details and impacted files@@ Coverage Diff @@
## alpha #10275 +/- ##
==========================================
- Coverage 92.53% 92.13% -0.41%
==========================================
Files 192 192
Lines 16458 16477 +19
Branches 226 226
==========================================
- Hits 15230 15181 -49
- Misses 1208 1272 +64
- Partials 20 24 +4 ☔ View full report in Codecov by Sentry. 🚀 New features to boost your workflow:
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# [9.6.0-alpha.54](9.6.0-alpha.53...9.6.0-alpha.54) (2026-03-22) ### Bug Fixes * MFA recovery code single-use bypass via concurrent requests ([GHSA-2299-ghjr-6vjp](GHSA-2299-ghjr-6vjp)) ([#10275](#10275)) ([5e70094](5e70094))
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🎉 This change has been released in version 9.6.0-alpha.54 |
# [9.6.0](9.5.1...9.6.0) (2026-03-22) ### Bug Fixes * LiveQuery `regexTimeout` default value not applied ([#10156](#10156)) ([416cfbc](416cfbc)) * Account lockout race condition allows bypassing threshold via concurrent requests ([#10266](#10266)) ([ff70fee](ff70fee)) * Account takeover via operator injection in authentication data identifier ([GHSA-5fw2-8jcv-xh87](GHSA-5fw2-8jcv-xh87)) ([#10185](#10185)) ([0d0a554](0d0a554)) * Add configurable batch request sub-request limit via option `requestComplexity.batchRequestLimit` ([#10265](#10265)) ([164ed0d](164ed0d)) * Auth data exposed via /users/me endpoint ([GHSA-37mj-c2wf-cx96](GHSA-37mj-c2wf-cx96)) ([#10278](#10278)) ([875cf10](875cf10)) * Auth provider validation bypass on login via partial authData ([GHSA-pfj7-wv7c-22pr](GHSA-pfj7-wv7c-22pr)) ([#10246](#10246)) ([98f4ba5](98f4ba5)) * Block dot-notation updates to authData sub-fields and harden login provider checks ([#10223](#10223)) ([12c24c6](12c24c6)) * Bypass of class-level permissions in LiveQuery ([GHSA-7ch5-98q2-7289](GHSA-7ch5-98q2-7289)) ([#10133](#10133)) ([98188d9](98188d9)) * Classes `_GraphQLConfig` and `_Audience` master key bypass via generic class routes ([GHSA-7xg7-rqf6-pw6c](GHSA-7xg7-rqf6-pw6c)) ([#10151](#10151)) ([1de4e43](1de4e43)) * Cloud function dispatch crashes server via prototype chain traversal ([GHSA-4263-jgmp-7pf4](GHSA-4263-jgmp-7pf4)) ([#10210](#10210)) ([286373d](286373d)) * Concurrent signup with same authentication creates duplicate users ([#10149](#10149)) ([853bfe1](853bfe1)) * Create CLP not enforced before user field validation on signup ([#10268](#10268)) ([a0530c2](a0530c2)) * Denial of service via unindexed database query for unconfigured auth providers ([GHSA-g4cf-xj29-wqqr](GHSA-g4cf-xj29-wqqr)) ([#10270](#10270)) ([fbac847](fbac847)) * Denial-of-service via unbounded query complexity in REST and GraphQL API ([GHSA-cmj3-wx7h-ffvg](GHSA-cmj3-wx7h-ffvg)) ([#10130](#10130)) ([0ae9c25](0ae9c25)) * Email verification resend page leaks user existence (GHSA-h29g-q5c2-9h4f) ([#10238](#10238)) ([fbda4cb](fbda4cb)) * Empty authData bypasses credential requirement on signup ([GHSA-wjqw-r9x4-j59v](GHSA-wjqw-r9x4-j59v)) ([#10219](#10219)) ([5dcbf41](5dcbf41)) * GraphQL WebSocket endpoint bypasses security middleware ([GHSA-p2x3-8689-cwpg](GHSA-p2x3-8689-cwpg)) ([#10189](#10189)) ([3ffba75](3ffba75)) * Incomplete JSON key escaping in PostgreSQL Increment on nested Object fields ([#10261](#10261)) ([a692873](a692873)) * Input type validation for query operators and batch path ([#10230](#10230)) ([a628911](a628911)) * Instance comparison with `instanceof` is not realm-safe ([#10225](#10225)) ([51efb1e](51efb1e)) * LDAP injection via unsanitized user input in DN and group filter construction ([GHSA-7m6r-fhh7-r47c](GHSA-7m6r-fhh7-r47c)) ([#10154](#10154)) ([5bbca7b](5bbca7b)) * LiveQuery bypasses CLP pointer permission enforcement ([GHSA-fph2-r4qg-9576](GHSA-fph2-r4qg-9576)) ([#10250](#10250)) ([6c3317a](6c3317a)) * LiveQuery subscription query depth bypass ([GHSA-6qh5-m6g3-xhq6](GHSA-6qh5-m6g3-xhq6)) ([#10259](#10259)) ([2126fe4](2126fe4)) * LiveQuery subscription with invalid regular expression crashes server ([GHSA-827p-g5x5-h86c](GHSA-827p-g5x5-h86c)) ([#10197](#10197)) ([0ae0eee](0ae0eee)) * Locale parameter path traversal in pages router ([#10242](#10242)) ([01fb6a9](01fb6a9)) * MFA recovery code single-use bypass via concurrent requests ([GHSA-2299-ghjr-6vjp](GHSA-2299-ghjr-6vjp)) ([#10275](#10275)) ([5e70094](5e70094)) * MFA recovery codes not consumed after use ([GHSA-4hf6-3x24-c9m8](GHSA-4hf6-3x24-c9m8)) ([#10170](#10170)) ([18abdd9](18abdd9)) * Missing audience validation in Keycloak authentication adapter ([GHSA-48mh-j4p5-7j9v](GHSA-48mh-j4p5-7j9v)) ([#10137](#10137)) ([78ef1a1](78ef1a1)) * Normalize HTTP method case in `allowMethodOverride` middleware ([#10262](#10262)) ([a248e8c](a248e8c)) * NoSQL injection via token type in password reset and email verification endpoints ([GHSA-vgjh-hmwf-c588](GHSA-vgjh-hmwf-c588)) ([#10128](#10128)) ([b2f2317](b2f2317)) * OAuth2 adapter app ID validation sends wrong token to introspection endpoint ([GHSA-69xg-f649-w5g2](GHSA-69xg-f649-w5g2)) ([#10187](#10187)) ([7f9f854](7f9f854)) * OAuth2 adapter shares mutable state across providers via singleton instance ([GHSA-2cjm-2gwv-m892](GHSA-2cjm-2gwv-m892)) ([#10183](#10183)) ([6009bc1](6009bc1)) * Parse Server OAuth2 authentication adapter account takeover via identity spoofing ([GHSA-fr88-w35c-r596](GHSA-fr88-w35c-r596)) ([#10145](#10145)) ([9cfd06e](9cfd06e)) * Parse Server role escalation and CLP bypass via direct `_Join table write ([GHSA-5f92-jrq3-28rc](GHSA-5f92-jrq3-28rc)) ([#10141](#10141)) ([22faa08](22faa08)) * Parse Server session token exfiltration via `redirectClassNameForKey` query parameter ([GHSA-6r2j-cxgf-495f](GHSA-6r2j-cxgf-495f)) ([#10143](#10143)) ([70b7b07](70b7b07)) * Password reset token single-use bypass via concurrent requests ([GHSA-r3xq-68wh-gwvh](GHSA-r3xq-68wh-gwvh)) ([#10216](#10216)) ([84db0a0](84db0a0)) * Protected field change detection oracle via LiveQuery watch parameter ([GHSA-qpc3-fg4j-8hgm](GHSA-qpc3-fg4j-8hgm)) ([#10253](#10253)) ([0c0a0a5](0c0a0a5)) * Protected fields bypass via dot-notation in query and sort ([GHSA-r2m8-pxm9-9c4g](GHSA-r2m8-pxm9-9c4g)) ([#10167](#10167)) ([8f54c54](8f54c54)) * Protected fields bypass via LiveQuery subscription WHERE clause ([GHSA-j7mm-f4rv-6q6q](GHSA-j7mm-f4rv-6q6q)) ([#10175](#10175)) ([4d48847](4d48847)) * Protected fields bypass via logical query operators ([GHSA-72hp-qff8-4pvv](GHSA-72hp-qff8-4pvv)) ([#10140](#10140)) ([be1d65d](be1d65d)) * Protected fields leak via LiveQuery afterEvent trigger ([GHSA-5hmj-jcgp-6hff](GHSA-5hmj-jcgp-6hff)) ([#10232](#10232)) ([6648500](6648500)) * Query condition depth bypass via pre-validation transform pipeline ([GHSA-9fjp-q3c4-6w3j](GHSA-9fjp-q3c4-6w3j)) ([#10257](#10257)) ([85994ef](85994ef)) * Rate limit bypass via batch request endpoint ([GHSA-775h-3xrc-c228](GHSA-775h-3xrc-c228)) ([#10147](#10147)) ([2766f4f](2766f4f)) * Rate limit bypass via HTTP method override and batch method spoofing ([#10234](#10234)) ([7d72d26](7d72d26)) * Rate limit user zone key fallback and batch request bypass ([#10214](#10214)) ([434ecbe](434ecbe)) * Revert accidental breaking default values for query complexity limits ([#10205](#10205)) ([ab8dd54](ab8dd54)) * Sanitize control characters in page parameter response headers ([#10237](#10237)) ([337ffd6](337ffd6)) * Schema poisoning via prototype pollution in deep copy ([GHSA-9ccr-fpp6-78qf](GHSA-9ccr-fpp6-78qf)) ([#10200](#10200)) ([b321423](b321423)) * Security fix fast-xml-parser from 5.5.5 to 5.5.6 ([#10235](#10235)) ([f521576](f521576)) * Security upgrade fast-xml-parser from 5.3.7 to 5.4.2 ([#10086](#10086)) ([b04ca5e](b04ca5e)) * Server crash via deeply nested query condition operators ([GHSA-9xp9-j92r-p88v](GHSA-9xp9-j92r-p88v)) ([#10202](#10202)) ([f44e306](f44e306)) * Session creation endpoint allows overwriting server-generated session fields ([GHSA-5v7g-9h8f-8pgg](GHSA-5v7g-9h8f-8pgg)) ([#10195](#10195)) ([7ccfb97](7ccfb97)) * Session token expiration unchecked on cache hit ([#10194](#10194)) ([a944203](a944203)) * Session update endpoint allows overwriting server-generated session fields ([GHSA-jc39-686j-wp6q](GHSA-jc39-686j-wp6q)) ([#10263](#10263)) ([ea68fc0](ea68fc0)) * SQL injection via `Increment` operation on nested object field in PostgreSQL ([GHSA-q3vj-96h2-gwvg](GHSA-q3vj-96h2-gwvg)) ([#10161](#10161)) ([8f82282](8f82282)) * SQL injection via aggregate and distinct field names in PostgreSQL adapter ([GHSA-p2w6-rmh7-w8q3](GHSA-p2w6-rmh7-w8q3)) ([#10272](#10272)) ([bdddab5](bdddab5)) * SQL injection via dot-notation field name in PostgreSQL ([GHSA-qpr4-jrj4-6f27](GHSA-qpr4-jrj4-6f27)) ([#10159](#10159)) ([ea538a4](ea538a4)) * SQL Injection via dot-notation sub-key name in `Increment` operation on PostgreSQL ([GHSA-gqpp-xgvh-9h7h](GHSA-gqpp-xgvh-9h7h)) ([#10165](#10165)) ([169d692](169d692)) * SQL injection via query field name when using PostgreSQL ([GHSA-c442-97qw-j6c6](GHSA-c442-97qw-j6c6)) ([#10181](#10181)) ([be281b1](be281b1)) * Stored cross-site scripting (XSS) via SVG file upload ([GHSA-hcj7-6gxh-24ww](GHSA-hcj7-6gxh-24ww)) ([#10136](#10136)) ([93b784d](93b784d)) * Stored XSS filter bypass via Content-Type MIME parameter and missing XML extension blocklist entries ([GHSA-42ph-pf9q-cr72](GHSA-42ph-pf9q-cr72)) ([#10191](#10191)) ([4f53ab3](4f53ab3)) * Stored XSS via file upload of HTML-renderable file types ([GHSA-v5hf-f4c3-m5rv](GHSA-v5hf-f4c3-m5rv)) ([#10162](#10162)) ([03287cf](03287cf)) * User enumeration via email verification endpoint ([GHSA-w54v-hf9p-8856](GHSA-w54v-hf9p-8856)) ([#10172](#10172)) ([936abd4](936abd4)) * Validate authData provider values in challenge endpoint ([#10224](#10224)) ([e5e1f5b](e5e1f5b)) * Validate body field types in request middleware ([#10209](#10209)) ([df69046](df69046)) * Validate session in middleware for non-GET requests to `/sessions/me` ([#10213](#10213)) ([2a9fdab](2a9fdab)) * Validate token type in PagesRouter to prevent type confusion errors ([#10212](#10212)) ([386a989](386a989)) ### Features * Add `enableProductPurchaseLegacyApi` option to disable legacy IAP validation ([#10228](#10228)) ([622ee85](622ee85)) * Add `protectedFieldsOwnerExempt` option to control `_User` class owner exemption for `protectedFields` ([#10280](#10280)) ([d5213f8](d5213f8)) * Add `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` header and customizable response headers for files via `Parse.Cloud.afterFind(Parse.File)` ([#10158](#10158)) ([28d11a3](28d11a3))
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🎉 This change has been released in version 9.6.0 |
Issue
MFA recovery code single-use bypass via concurrent requests (GHSA-2299-ghjr-6vjp)