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fix: Stored XSS via file upload of HTML-renderable file types (GHSA-v5hf-f4c3-m5rv)#10162

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mtrezza merged 4 commits intoparse-community:alphafrom
mtrezza:fix/GHSA-v5hf-f4c3-m5rv-v9
Mar 9, 2026
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fix: Stored XSS via file upload of HTML-renderable file types (GHSA-v5hf-f4c3-m5rv)#10162
mtrezza merged 4 commits intoparse-community:alphafrom
mtrezza:fix/GHSA-v5hf-f4c3-m5rv-v9

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@mtrezza mtrezza commented Mar 9, 2026

Pull Request

Issue

Stored XSS via file upload of HTML-renderable file types (GHSA-v5hf-f4c3-m5rv)

Tasks

  • Add tests
  • Add changes to documentation (guides, repository pages, code comments)
  • Add security check
  • Add new Parse Error codes to Parse JS SDK

Summary by CodeRabbit

  • Tests

    • Added tests validating blocking of dangerous upload types (.svgz, .xht, .xml, .xsl, .xslt), including extensionless payloads with XML-related content types, while confirming common safe types remain uploadable.
  • Bug Fixes

    • Broadened upload-restriction defaults to cover additional XML-related and other risky extensions.
  • Documentation

    • Updated guidance to explicitly reference HTML, SVG, and XML and describe additional problematic patterns.

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coderabbitai bot commented Mar 9, 2026

📝 Walkthrough

Walkthrough

Adds tests blocking uploads of .svgz, .xht, .xml, .xsl, .xslt and expands the default file-extension exclusion regex and docs to include XML/XHTML/XSLT and SVG variants; test suite is duplicated in the spec file.

Changes

Cohort / File(s) Summary
Test Suite
spec/vulnerabilities.spec.js
Adds new tests for GHSA-v5hf-f4c3-m5rv validating file upload protections: ensures .svgz, .xht, .xml, .xsl, .xslt uploads are rejected with FILE_SAVE_ERROR; verifies safe types (txt, png, jpg, gif, pdf, doc) remain allowed; includes extensionless payloads with specific content-types. Note: suite appears duplicated.
File Extension Configuration & Docs
src/Options/Definitions.js, src/Options/docs.js, src/Options/index.js
Expands FileUploadOptions.fileExtensions default regex to additionally exclude XML/XHTML/XSLT and SVG variants (e.g., svgz, xht, xsl, xslt); updates help/documentation text to mention XML alongside HTML and SVG. No exported API signature changes.

Estimated code review effort

🎯 3 (Moderate) | ⏱️ ~25 minutes

Possibly related PRs

🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 2 | ❌ 1

❌ Failed checks (1 warning)

Check name Status Explanation Resolution
Description check ⚠️ Warning PR description follows the template structure with Issue and Tasks completed, but the Approach section is empty and critical context is missing. Complete the Approach section describing the changes made to fix GHSA-v5hf-f4c3-m5rv. Note that documentation updates and security checks remain unchecked despite changes being present in the PR.
✅ Passed checks (2 passed)
Check name Status Explanation
Docstring Coverage ✅ Passed No functions found in the changed files to evaluate docstring coverage. Skipping docstring coverage check.
Title check ✅ Passed The title directly describes the main security fix: addressing stored XSS vulnerability via file upload of HTML-renderable types (GHSA-v5hf-f4c3-m5rv), which aligns with all the changes made across the codebase.

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parseplatformorg commented Mar 9, 2026

Snyk checks have passed. No issues have been found so far.

Status Scanner Critical High Medium Low Total (0)
Open Source Security 0 0 0 0 0 issues

💻 Catch issues earlier using the plugins for VS Code, JetBrains IDEs, Visual Studio, and Eclipse.

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Actionable comments posted: 1

🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.

Inline comments:
In `@src/Options/index.js`:
- Around line 651-652: The current denylist in Options/index.js still lets
extensionless uploads with MIME types like application/xhtml+xml or
application/xslt+xml pass because FilesRouter.js falls back to using
contentType.split('/')[1] without normalizing the subtype; update the default
extensions/regex in Options/index.js to also reject +xml vendor subtypes (or
extend the pattern to match `(\+xml)?` variants), and modify FilesRouter.js
where it derives the subtype (the contentType.split('/')[1] fallback logic) to
normalize the subtype by removing any +suffix (e.g., split on '+' and take the
left-hand part or map +xml to xml) before matching; add a regression test that
POSTs to the no-extension path (the code path where FilesRouter.js uses
contentType fallback) with application/xhtml+xml and application/xslt+xml to
ensure they are rejected, and regenerate Options/Definitions/docs by running npm
run definitions so the changes propagate to src/Options/Definitions.js and
src/Options/docs.js.

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Configuration used: Organization UI

Review profile: CHILL

Plan: Pro

Run ID: 07d1a9cd-fe2a-4558-81a6-d242d7715f0e

📥 Commits

Reviewing files that changed from the base of the PR and between a6c0926 and 2580457.

📒 Files selected for processing (4)
  • spec/vulnerabilities.spec.js
  • src/Options/Definitions.js
  • src/Options/docs.js
  • src/Options/index.js

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Actionable comments posted: 1

🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.

Inline comments:
In `@spec/vulnerabilities.spec.js`:
- Around line 1182-1200: The failing test's HTTP request is missing the shared
headers used elsewhere in this suite; update the POST request object passed to
request(...) (the call that sends to 'http://localhost:8378/1/files/payload') to
include the same headers property (e.g., headers: headers) instead of relying on
_ApplicationId/_JavaScriptKey in the body, and apply the same headers addition
to the sibling extensionless upload test (the subsequent request call) so both
tests use the consistent authentication pattern used by the other tests.

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Configuration used: Organization UI

Review profile: CHILL

Plan: Pro

Run ID: 15956e57-c422-490e-b82b-dca5116b3b03

📥 Commits

Reviewing files that changed from the base of the PR and between 2580457 and b28606b.

📒 Files selected for processing (4)
  • spec/vulnerabilities.spec.js
  • src/Options/Definitions.js
  • src/Options/docs.js
  • src/Options/index.js
🚧 Files skipped from review as they are similar to previous changes (2)
  • src/Options/docs.js
  • src/Options/index.js

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Actionable comments posted: 1

🧹 Nitpick comments (1)
spec/vulnerabilities.spec.js (1)

1038-1235: Consider table-driving this upload matrix.

The six extension cases and two extensionless cases all duplicate the same request/assert flow. A small helper plus a case table would make future additions to the blocked-extension list less error-prone.

♻️ Example direction
+ async function expectBlockedUpload({ url, body, includeHeaders = true, expectedExtension }) {
+   const response = await request({
+     method: 'POST',
+     ...(includeHeaders ? { headers } : {}),
+     url,
+     body,
+   }).catch(e => e);
+   expect(response.data.code).toBe(Parse.Error.FILE_SAVE_ERROR);
+   expect(response.data.error).toBe(
+     `File upload of extension ${expectedExtension} is disabled.`
+   );
+ }
+
+ const blockedCases = [
+   // filename/content-type/body/expectedExtension tuples
+ ];
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.

In `@spec/vulnerabilities.spec.js` around lines 1038 - 1235, The tests duplicate
the same request/assert pattern across many cases; refactor by adding a small
helper (e.g. expectBlockedFileUpload or assertBlockedUpload) that takes
parameters (url, filenameOrPayload, base64Body, contentType,
expectedErrorMessage) and performs the request + .toBeRejectedWith assertion,
then replace the six extension tests and the two extensionless tests with a
table/array of case objects (fields: extension, mixed-case variants,
contentBase64, contentType, url (either `/1/files/malicious.{ext}` or
`/1/files/payload`), expected message) and loop over that table to call the
helper for each variant; locate and modify the existing it blocks (the tests
creating svgContent/xhtContent/xmlContent/xslContent/xsltContent and the two
extensionless blocks) and consolidate them into the table-driven loop using the
new helper.
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.

Inline comments:
In `@spec/vulnerabilities.spec.js`:
- Around line 1043-1062: The test is converting server Parse.Error rejections
into plain Error objects via `.catch(e => { throw new Error(e.data.error); })`,
so update the catch to rethrow a Parse.Error using `new Parse.Error(e.data.code,
e.data.error)` (or alternatively remove the catch and assert on
`error.code`/`error.message`), so the `expectAsync(...).toBeRejectedWith(new
Parse.Error(...))` assertions (surrounding the `request({...})` call and using
`expectAsync`) will receive the original Parse.Error type; apply this change to
the identical catch sites referenced in the spec (the `request` calls checking
file upload extensions).

---

Nitpick comments:
In `@spec/vulnerabilities.spec.js`:
- Around line 1038-1235: The tests duplicate the same request/assert pattern
across many cases; refactor by adding a small helper (e.g.
expectBlockedFileUpload or assertBlockedUpload) that takes parameters (url,
filenameOrPayload, base64Body, contentType, expectedErrorMessage) and performs
the request + .toBeRejectedWith assertion, then replace the six extension tests
and the two extensionless tests with a table/array of case objects (fields:
extension, mixed-case variants, contentBase64, contentType, url (either
`/1/files/malicious.{ext}` or `/1/files/payload`), expected message) and loop
over that table to call the helper for each variant; locate and modify the
existing it blocks (the tests creating
svgContent/xhtContent/xmlContent/xslContent/xsltContent and the two
extensionless blocks) and consolidate them into the table-driven loop using the
new helper.

ℹ️ Review info
⚙️ Run configuration

Configuration used: Organization UI

Review profile: CHILL

Plan: Pro

Run ID: 1ebe3f5f-19c1-444a-ab3a-1ebc2302a0ae

📥 Commits

Reviewing files that changed from the base of the PR and between b28606b and 08a6bc7.

📒 Files selected for processing (1)
  • spec/vulnerabilities.spec.js

@mtrezza mtrezza changed the title fix: GHSA-v5hf-f4c3-m5rv-v9 fix: Stored XSS via file upload of HTML-renderable file types (GHSA-v5hf-f4c3-m5rv) Mar 9, 2026
@mtrezza mtrezza merged commit 03287cf into parse-community:alpha Mar 9, 2026
19 of 22 checks passed
@mtrezza mtrezza deleted the fix/GHSA-v5hf-f4c3-m5rv-v9 branch March 9, 2026 23:51
parseplatformorg pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 9, 2026
# [9.6.0-alpha.4](9.6.0-alpha.3...9.6.0-alpha.4) (2026-03-09)

### Bug Fixes

* Stored XSS via file upload of HTML-renderable file types ([GHSA-v5hf-f4c3-m5rv](GHSA-v5hf-f4c3-m5rv)) ([#10162](#10162)) ([03287cf](03287cf))
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🎉 This change has been released in version 9.6.0-alpha.4

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codecov bot commented Mar 10, 2026

Codecov Report

✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests.
✅ Project coverage is 92.59%. Comparing base (8f82282) to head (08a6bc7).
⚠️ Report is 121 commits behind head on alpha.

Additional details and impacted files
@@           Coverage Diff           @@
##            alpha   #10162   +/-   ##
=======================================
  Coverage   92.59%   92.59%           
=======================================
  Files         192      192           
  Lines       16212    16212           
  Branches      183      183           
=======================================
  Hits        15011    15011           
  Misses       1189     1189           
  Partials       12       12           

☔ View full report in Codecov by Sentry.
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parseplatformorg pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 22, 2026
# [9.6.0](9.5.1...9.6.0) (2026-03-22)

### Bug Fixes

*  LiveQuery `regexTimeout` default value not applied ([#10156](#10156)) ([416cfbc](416cfbc))
* Account lockout race condition allows bypassing threshold via concurrent requests ([#10266](#10266)) ([ff70fee](ff70fee))
* Account takeover via operator injection in authentication data identifier ([GHSA-5fw2-8jcv-xh87](GHSA-5fw2-8jcv-xh87)) ([#10185](#10185)) ([0d0a554](0d0a554))
* Add configurable batch request sub-request limit via option `requestComplexity.batchRequestLimit` ([#10265](#10265)) ([164ed0d](164ed0d))
* Auth data exposed via /users/me endpoint ([GHSA-37mj-c2wf-cx96](GHSA-37mj-c2wf-cx96)) ([#10278](#10278)) ([875cf10](875cf10))
* Auth provider validation bypass on login via partial authData ([GHSA-pfj7-wv7c-22pr](GHSA-pfj7-wv7c-22pr)) ([#10246](#10246)) ([98f4ba5](98f4ba5))
* Block dot-notation updates to authData sub-fields and harden login provider checks ([#10223](#10223)) ([12c24c6](12c24c6))
* Bypass of class-level permissions in LiveQuery ([GHSA-7ch5-98q2-7289](GHSA-7ch5-98q2-7289)) ([#10133](#10133)) ([98188d9](98188d9))
* Classes `_GraphQLConfig` and `_Audience` master key bypass via generic class routes ([GHSA-7xg7-rqf6-pw6c](GHSA-7xg7-rqf6-pw6c)) ([#10151](#10151)) ([1de4e43](1de4e43))
* Cloud function dispatch crashes server via prototype chain traversal ([GHSA-4263-jgmp-7pf4](GHSA-4263-jgmp-7pf4)) ([#10210](#10210)) ([286373d](286373d))
* Concurrent signup with same authentication creates duplicate users ([#10149](#10149)) ([853bfe1](853bfe1))
* Create CLP not enforced before user field validation on signup ([#10268](#10268)) ([a0530c2](a0530c2))
* Denial of service via unindexed database query for unconfigured auth providers ([GHSA-g4cf-xj29-wqqr](GHSA-g4cf-xj29-wqqr)) ([#10270](#10270)) ([fbac847](fbac847))
* Denial-of-service via unbounded query complexity in REST and GraphQL API ([GHSA-cmj3-wx7h-ffvg](GHSA-cmj3-wx7h-ffvg)) ([#10130](#10130)) ([0ae9c25](0ae9c25))
* Email verification resend page leaks user existence (GHSA-h29g-q5c2-9h4f) ([#10238](#10238)) ([fbda4cb](fbda4cb))
* Empty authData bypasses credential requirement on signup ([GHSA-wjqw-r9x4-j59v](GHSA-wjqw-r9x4-j59v)) ([#10219](#10219)) ([5dcbf41](5dcbf41))
* GraphQL WebSocket endpoint bypasses security middleware ([GHSA-p2x3-8689-cwpg](GHSA-p2x3-8689-cwpg)) ([#10189](#10189)) ([3ffba75](3ffba75))
* Incomplete JSON key escaping in PostgreSQL Increment on nested Object fields ([#10261](#10261)) ([a692873](a692873))
* Input type validation for query operators and batch path ([#10230](#10230)) ([a628911](a628911))
* Instance comparison with `instanceof` is not realm-safe ([#10225](#10225)) ([51efb1e](51efb1e))
* LDAP injection via unsanitized user input in DN and group filter construction ([GHSA-7m6r-fhh7-r47c](GHSA-7m6r-fhh7-r47c)) ([#10154](#10154)) ([5bbca7b](5bbca7b))
* LiveQuery bypasses CLP pointer permission enforcement ([GHSA-fph2-r4qg-9576](GHSA-fph2-r4qg-9576)) ([#10250](#10250)) ([6c3317a](6c3317a))
* LiveQuery subscription query depth bypass ([GHSA-6qh5-m6g3-xhq6](GHSA-6qh5-m6g3-xhq6)) ([#10259](#10259)) ([2126fe4](2126fe4))
* LiveQuery subscription with invalid regular expression crashes server ([GHSA-827p-g5x5-h86c](GHSA-827p-g5x5-h86c)) ([#10197](#10197)) ([0ae0eee](0ae0eee))
* Locale parameter path traversal in pages router ([#10242](#10242)) ([01fb6a9](01fb6a9))
* MFA recovery code single-use bypass via concurrent requests ([GHSA-2299-ghjr-6vjp](GHSA-2299-ghjr-6vjp)) ([#10275](#10275)) ([5e70094](5e70094))
* MFA recovery codes not consumed after use ([GHSA-4hf6-3x24-c9m8](GHSA-4hf6-3x24-c9m8)) ([#10170](#10170)) ([18abdd9](18abdd9))
* Missing audience validation in Keycloak authentication adapter ([GHSA-48mh-j4p5-7j9v](GHSA-48mh-j4p5-7j9v)) ([#10137](#10137)) ([78ef1a1](78ef1a1))
* Normalize HTTP method case in `allowMethodOverride` middleware ([#10262](#10262)) ([a248e8c](a248e8c))
* NoSQL injection via token type in password reset and email verification endpoints ([GHSA-vgjh-hmwf-c588](GHSA-vgjh-hmwf-c588)) ([#10128](#10128)) ([b2f2317](b2f2317))
* OAuth2 adapter app ID validation sends wrong token to introspection endpoint ([GHSA-69xg-f649-w5g2](GHSA-69xg-f649-w5g2)) ([#10187](#10187)) ([7f9f854](7f9f854))
* OAuth2 adapter shares mutable state across providers via singleton instance ([GHSA-2cjm-2gwv-m892](GHSA-2cjm-2gwv-m892)) ([#10183](#10183)) ([6009bc1](6009bc1))
* Parse Server OAuth2 authentication adapter account takeover via identity spoofing ([GHSA-fr88-w35c-r596](GHSA-fr88-w35c-r596)) ([#10145](#10145)) ([9cfd06e](9cfd06e))
* Parse Server role escalation and CLP bypass via direct `_Join table write ([GHSA-5f92-jrq3-28rc](GHSA-5f92-jrq3-28rc)) ([#10141](#10141)) ([22faa08](22faa08))
* Parse Server session token exfiltration via `redirectClassNameForKey` query parameter ([GHSA-6r2j-cxgf-495f](GHSA-6r2j-cxgf-495f)) ([#10143](#10143)) ([70b7b07](70b7b07))
* Password reset token single-use bypass via concurrent requests ([GHSA-r3xq-68wh-gwvh](GHSA-r3xq-68wh-gwvh)) ([#10216](#10216)) ([84db0a0](84db0a0))
* Protected field change detection oracle via LiveQuery watch parameter ([GHSA-qpc3-fg4j-8hgm](GHSA-qpc3-fg4j-8hgm)) ([#10253](#10253)) ([0c0a0a5](0c0a0a5))
* Protected fields bypass via dot-notation in query and sort ([GHSA-r2m8-pxm9-9c4g](GHSA-r2m8-pxm9-9c4g)) ([#10167](#10167)) ([8f54c54](8f54c54))
* Protected fields bypass via LiveQuery subscription WHERE clause ([GHSA-j7mm-f4rv-6q6q](GHSA-j7mm-f4rv-6q6q)) ([#10175](#10175)) ([4d48847](4d48847))
* Protected fields bypass via logical query operators ([GHSA-72hp-qff8-4pvv](GHSA-72hp-qff8-4pvv)) ([#10140](#10140)) ([be1d65d](be1d65d))
* Protected fields leak via LiveQuery afterEvent trigger ([GHSA-5hmj-jcgp-6hff](GHSA-5hmj-jcgp-6hff)) ([#10232](#10232)) ([6648500](6648500))
* Query condition depth bypass via pre-validation transform pipeline ([GHSA-9fjp-q3c4-6w3j](GHSA-9fjp-q3c4-6w3j)) ([#10257](#10257)) ([85994ef](85994ef))
* Rate limit bypass via batch request endpoint ([GHSA-775h-3xrc-c228](GHSA-775h-3xrc-c228)) ([#10147](#10147)) ([2766f4f](2766f4f))
* Rate limit bypass via HTTP method override and batch method spoofing ([#10234](#10234)) ([7d72d26](7d72d26))
* Rate limit user zone key fallback and batch request bypass ([#10214](#10214)) ([434ecbe](434ecbe))
* Revert accidental breaking default values for query complexity limits ([#10205](#10205)) ([ab8dd54](ab8dd54))
* Sanitize control characters in page parameter response headers ([#10237](#10237)) ([337ffd6](337ffd6))
* Schema poisoning via prototype pollution in deep copy ([GHSA-9ccr-fpp6-78qf](GHSA-9ccr-fpp6-78qf)) ([#10200](#10200)) ([b321423](b321423))
* Security fix fast-xml-parser from 5.5.5 to 5.5.6 ([#10235](#10235)) ([f521576](f521576))
* Security upgrade fast-xml-parser from 5.3.7 to 5.4.2 ([#10086](#10086)) ([b04ca5e](b04ca5e))
* Server crash via deeply nested query condition operators ([GHSA-9xp9-j92r-p88v](GHSA-9xp9-j92r-p88v)) ([#10202](#10202)) ([f44e306](f44e306))
* Session creation endpoint allows overwriting server-generated session fields ([GHSA-5v7g-9h8f-8pgg](GHSA-5v7g-9h8f-8pgg)) ([#10195](#10195)) ([7ccfb97](7ccfb97))
* Session token expiration unchecked on cache hit ([#10194](#10194)) ([a944203](a944203))
* Session update endpoint allows overwriting server-generated session fields ([GHSA-jc39-686j-wp6q](GHSA-jc39-686j-wp6q)) ([#10263](#10263)) ([ea68fc0](ea68fc0))
* SQL injection via `Increment` operation on nested object field in PostgreSQL ([GHSA-q3vj-96h2-gwvg](GHSA-q3vj-96h2-gwvg)) ([#10161](#10161)) ([8f82282](8f82282))
* SQL injection via aggregate and distinct field names in PostgreSQL adapter ([GHSA-p2w6-rmh7-w8q3](GHSA-p2w6-rmh7-w8q3)) ([#10272](#10272)) ([bdddab5](bdddab5))
* SQL injection via dot-notation field name in PostgreSQL ([GHSA-qpr4-jrj4-6f27](GHSA-qpr4-jrj4-6f27)) ([#10159](#10159)) ([ea538a4](ea538a4))
* SQL Injection via dot-notation sub-key name in `Increment` operation on PostgreSQL ([GHSA-gqpp-xgvh-9h7h](GHSA-gqpp-xgvh-9h7h)) ([#10165](#10165)) ([169d692](169d692))
* SQL injection via query field name when using PostgreSQL ([GHSA-c442-97qw-j6c6](GHSA-c442-97qw-j6c6)) ([#10181](#10181)) ([be281b1](be281b1))
* Stored cross-site scripting (XSS) via SVG file upload ([GHSA-hcj7-6gxh-24ww](GHSA-hcj7-6gxh-24ww)) ([#10136](#10136)) ([93b784d](93b784d))
* Stored XSS filter bypass via Content-Type MIME parameter and missing XML extension blocklist entries ([GHSA-42ph-pf9q-cr72](GHSA-42ph-pf9q-cr72)) ([#10191](#10191)) ([4f53ab3](4f53ab3))
* Stored XSS via file upload of HTML-renderable file types ([GHSA-v5hf-f4c3-m5rv](GHSA-v5hf-f4c3-m5rv)) ([#10162](#10162)) ([03287cf](03287cf))
* User enumeration via email verification endpoint ([GHSA-w54v-hf9p-8856](GHSA-w54v-hf9p-8856)) ([#10172](#10172)) ([936abd4](936abd4))
* Validate authData provider values in challenge endpoint ([#10224](#10224)) ([e5e1f5b](e5e1f5b))
* Validate body field types in request middleware ([#10209](#10209)) ([df69046](df69046))
* Validate session in middleware for non-GET requests to `/sessions/me` ([#10213](#10213)) ([2a9fdab](2a9fdab))
* Validate token type in PagesRouter to prevent type confusion errors ([#10212](#10212)) ([386a989](386a989))

### Features

* Add `enableProductPurchaseLegacyApi` option to disable legacy IAP validation ([#10228](#10228)) ([622ee85](622ee85))
* Add `protectedFieldsOwnerExempt` option to control `_User` class owner exemption for `protectedFields` ([#10280](#10280)) ([d5213f8](d5213f8))
* Add `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` header and customizable response headers for files via `Parse.Cloud.afterFind(Parse.File)` ([#10158](#10158)) ([28d11a3](28d11a3))
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🎉 This change has been released in version 9.6.0

@parseplatformorg parseplatformorg added the state:released Released as stable version label Mar 22, 2026
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