Skip to content

fix: Sanitize control characters in page parameter response headers#10237

Merged
mtrezza merged 2 commits intoparse-community:alphafrom
mtrezza:fix/pages-crlf-header-sanitization
Mar 18, 2026
Merged

fix: Sanitize control characters in page parameter response headers#10237
mtrezza merged 2 commits intoparse-community:alphafrom
mtrezza:fix/pages-crlf-header-sanitization

Conversation

@mtrezza
Copy link
Member

@mtrezza mtrezza commented Mar 18, 2026

Issue

Sanitize control characters in page parameter response headers

Strip control characters from page parameter header values to prevent
ERR_INVALID_CHAR errors when parameters contain CRLF or other control
characters. The sanitization is applied regardless of the
encodePageParamHeaders setting.
@parse-github-assistant
Copy link

parse-github-assistant bot commented Mar 18, 2026

🚀 Thanks for opening this pull request! We appreciate your effort in improving the project. Please let us know once your pull request is ready for review.

Tip

  • Keep pull requests small. Large PRs will be rejected. Break complex features into smaller, incremental PRs.
  • Use Test Driven Development. Write failing tests before implementing functionality. Ensure tests pass.
  • Group code into logical blocks. Add a short comment before each block to explain its purpose.
  • We offer conceptual guidance. Coding is up to you. PRs must be merge-ready for human review.
  • Our review focuses on concept, not quality. PRs with code issues will be rejected. Use an AI agent.
  • Human review time is precious. Avoid review ping-pong. Inspect and test your AI-generated code.

Note

Please respond to review comments from AI agents just like you would to comments from a human reviewer. Let the reviewer resolve their own comments, unless they have reviewed and accepted your commit, or agreed with your explanation for why the feedback was incorrect.

Caution

Pull requests must be written using an AI agent with human supervision. Pull requests written entirely by a human will likely be rejected, because of lower code quality, higher review effort and the higher risk of introducing bugs. Please note that AI review comments on this pull request alone do not satisfy this requirement.

@parseplatformorg
Copy link
Contributor

parseplatformorg commented Mar 18, 2026

Snyk checks have passed. No issues have been found so far.

Status Scan Engine Critical High Medium Low Total (0)
Open Source Security 0 0 0 0 0 issues

💻 Catch issues earlier using the plugins for VS Code, JetBrains IDEs, Visual Studio, and Eclipse.

@coderabbitai
Copy link

coderabbitai bot commented Mar 18, 2026

📝 Walkthrough

Walkthrough

Extended test coverage for CRLF injection handling in PagesRouter page parameters. Refactored PagesRouter to centralize page parameter header construction into a dedicated helper method that handles URI-encoding and control character stripping.

Changes

Cohort / File(s) Summary
Test Coverage
spec/PagesRouter.spec.js
Added two test cases to verify CRLF injection robustness: one validating 200 response for direct page requests with CRLF-containing tokens, and another ensuring no 500 errors on resend_verification_email POST requests with CRLF injection.
Header Parameter Centralization
src/Routers/PagesRouter.js
Introduced new composePageParamHeaders(params) helper method that consolidates header construction logic with URI-encoding (when enabled) and control character stripping. Replaced inline header-building code across multiple call sites to use this centralized method.

Estimated code review effort

🎯 3 (Moderate) | ⏱️ ~20 minutes

Possibly related PRs

🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 2 | ❌ 1

❌ Failed checks (1 warning)

Check name Status Explanation Resolution
Description check ⚠️ Warning No pull request description was provided by the author, missing all required sections from the template including Issue, Approach, and Tasks. Add a comprehensive description following the repository template, including issue reference, approach explanation, and completion status of required tasks.
✅ Passed checks (2 passed)
Check name Status Explanation
Title check ✅ Passed The title clearly and specifically describes the main change: sanitizing control characters in page parameter response headers.
Docstring Coverage ✅ Passed No functions found in the changed files to evaluate docstring coverage. Skipping docstring coverage check.

✏️ Tip: You can configure your own custom pre-merge checks in the settings.

✨ Finishing Touches
🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
  • Create PR with unit tests
📝 Coding Plan
  • Generate coding plan for human review comments

Thanks for using CodeRabbit! It's free for OSS, and your support helps us grow. If you like it, consider giving us a shout-out.

❤️ Share

Comment @coderabbitai help to get the list of available commands and usage tips.

Copy link

@coderabbitai coderabbitai bot left a comment

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

Actionable comments posted: 1

🧹 Nitpick comments (1)
spec/PagesRouter.spec.js (1)

1056-1068: Tighten this redirect-path test with explicit status/behavior assertions.

Right now it only proves “not 500.” Please also assert the expected redirect contract (e.g., 303 and expected location pattern) so this test catches semantic regressions, not just crashes.

Suggested assertion hardening
       const response = await request({
         method: 'POST',
         url: url,
         headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded' },
         body: `username=${encodeURIComponent(crlf)}`,
         followRedirects: false,
       }).catch(e => e);
       expect(response.status).not.toBe(500);
+      expect(response.status).toBe(303);
+      expect(response.headers.location).toContain('/email_verification_send_');
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.

In `@spec/PagesRouter.spec.js` around lines 1056 - 1068, The test currently only
asserts the response is not 500; tighten it by asserting the full redirect
contract: when posting to the resend_verification_email endpoint with the CRLF
payload (variable crlf) and followRedirects: false, assert response.status
equals the expected redirect status (e.g., 303) and assert
response.headers.location matches the expected pattern (e.g., contains the
verification page or safe base URL) to ensure proper redirect behavior; keep the
existing variables (crlf, url, request) and the non-redirecting request options
but replace the loose not-to-be-500 check with explicit status and Location
header assertions.
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.

Inline comments:
In `@src/Routers/PagesRouter.js`:
- Around line 552-573: The composePageParamHeaders function currently calls
encodeURIComponent directly (when pagesConfig.encodePageParamHeaders is true),
which throws URIError on malformed Unicode; update composePageParamHeaders to
convert the param value to a string and call String.prototype.toWellFormed() on
it before calling encodeURIComponent (use value =
value.toString().toWellFormed() when available) so lone surrogates are fixed and
encodeURIComponent won't throw; keep the existing control-character stripping
and header key construction using pageParamHeaderPrefix and p[0].toLowerCase().

---

Nitpick comments:
In `@spec/PagesRouter.spec.js`:
- Around line 1056-1068: The test currently only asserts the response is not
500; tighten it by asserting the full redirect contract: when posting to the
resend_verification_email endpoint with the CRLF payload (variable crlf) and
followRedirects: false, assert response.status equals the expected redirect
status (e.g., 303) and assert response.headers.location matches the expected
pattern (e.g., contains the verification page or safe base URL) to ensure proper
redirect behavior; keep the existing variables (crlf, url, request) and the
non-redirecting request options but replace the loose not-to-be-500 check with
explicit status and Location header assertions.
🪄 Autofix (Beta)

Fix all unresolved CodeRabbit comments on this PR:

  • Push a commit to this branch (recommended)
  • Create a new PR with the fixes

ℹ️ Review info
⚙️ Run configuration

Configuration used: Organization UI

Review profile: CHILL

Plan: Pro

Run ID: 17b536bf-bca9-400a-bb11-75cdf7431eca

📥 Commits

Reviewing files that changed from the base of the PR and between c77c884 and 64aeecf.

📒 Files selected for processing (2)
  • spec/PagesRouter.spec.js
  • src/Routers/PagesRouter.js

@codecov
Copy link

codecov bot commented Mar 18, 2026

Codecov Report

✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests.
✅ Project coverage is 92.60%. Comparing base (f521576) to head (ef1fd00).
⚠️ Report is 44 commits behind head on alpha.

Additional details and impacted files
@@           Coverage Diff           @@
##            alpha   #10237   +/-   ##
=======================================
  Coverage   92.60%   92.60%           
=======================================
  Files         192      192           
  Lines       16351    16351           
  Branches      201      201           
=======================================
  Hits        15142    15142           
  Misses       1192     1192           
  Partials       17       17           

☔ View full report in Codecov by Sentry.
📢 Have feedback on the report? Share it here.

🚀 New features to boost your workflow:
  • ❄️ Test Analytics: Detect flaky tests, report on failures, and find test suite problems.
  • 📦 JS Bundle Analysis: Save yourself from yourself by tracking and limiting bundle sizes in JS merges.

@mtrezza mtrezza merged commit 337ffd6 into parse-community:alpha Mar 18, 2026
23 of 24 checks passed
parseplatformorg pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 18, 2026
# [9.6.0-alpha.38](9.6.0-alpha.37...9.6.0-alpha.38) (2026-03-18)

### Bug Fixes

* Sanitize control characters in page parameter response headers ([#10237](#10237)) ([337ffd6](337ffd6))
@parseplatformorg
Copy link
Contributor

🎉 This change has been released in version 9.6.0-alpha.38

@parseplatformorg parseplatformorg added the state:released-alpha Released as alpha version label Mar 18, 2026
parseplatformorg pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 22, 2026
# [9.6.0](9.5.1...9.6.0) (2026-03-22)

### Bug Fixes

*  LiveQuery `regexTimeout` default value not applied ([#10156](#10156)) ([416cfbc](416cfbc))
* Account lockout race condition allows bypassing threshold via concurrent requests ([#10266](#10266)) ([ff70fee](ff70fee))
* Account takeover via operator injection in authentication data identifier ([GHSA-5fw2-8jcv-xh87](GHSA-5fw2-8jcv-xh87)) ([#10185](#10185)) ([0d0a554](0d0a554))
* Add configurable batch request sub-request limit via option `requestComplexity.batchRequestLimit` ([#10265](#10265)) ([164ed0d](164ed0d))
* Auth data exposed via /users/me endpoint ([GHSA-37mj-c2wf-cx96](GHSA-37mj-c2wf-cx96)) ([#10278](#10278)) ([875cf10](875cf10))
* Auth provider validation bypass on login via partial authData ([GHSA-pfj7-wv7c-22pr](GHSA-pfj7-wv7c-22pr)) ([#10246](#10246)) ([98f4ba5](98f4ba5))
* Block dot-notation updates to authData sub-fields and harden login provider checks ([#10223](#10223)) ([12c24c6](12c24c6))
* Bypass of class-level permissions in LiveQuery ([GHSA-7ch5-98q2-7289](GHSA-7ch5-98q2-7289)) ([#10133](#10133)) ([98188d9](98188d9))
* Classes `_GraphQLConfig` and `_Audience` master key bypass via generic class routes ([GHSA-7xg7-rqf6-pw6c](GHSA-7xg7-rqf6-pw6c)) ([#10151](#10151)) ([1de4e43](1de4e43))
* Cloud function dispatch crashes server via prototype chain traversal ([GHSA-4263-jgmp-7pf4](GHSA-4263-jgmp-7pf4)) ([#10210](#10210)) ([286373d](286373d))
* Concurrent signup with same authentication creates duplicate users ([#10149](#10149)) ([853bfe1](853bfe1))
* Create CLP not enforced before user field validation on signup ([#10268](#10268)) ([a0530c2](a0530c2))
* Denial of service via unindexed database query for unconfigured auth providers ([GHSA-g4cf-xj29-wqqr](GHSA-g4cf-xj29-wqqr)) ([#10270](#10270)) ([fbac847](fbac847))
* Denial-of-service via unbounded query complexity in REST and GraphQL API ([GHSA-cmj3-wx7h-ffvg](GHSA-cmj3-wx7h-ffvg)) ([#10130](#10130)) ([0ae9c25](0ae9c25))
* Email verification resend page leaks user existence (GHSA-h29g-q5c2-9h4f) ([#10238](#10238)) ([fbda4cb](fbda4cb))
* Empty authData bypasses credential requirement on signup ([GHSA-wjqw-r9x4-j59v](GHSA-wjqw-r9x4-j59v)) ([#10219](#10219)) ([5dcbf41](5dcbf41))
* GraphQL WebSocket endpoint bypasses security middleware ([GHSA-p2x3-8689-cwpg](GHSA-p2x3-8689-cwpg)) ([#10189](#10189)) ([3ffba75](3ffba75))
* Incomplete JSON key escaping in PostgreSQL Increment on nested Object fields ([#10261](#10261)) ([a692873](a692873))
* Input type validation for query operators and batch path ([#10230](#10230)) ([a628911](a628911))
* Instance comparison with `instanceof` is not realm-safe ([#10225](#10225)) ([51efb1e](51efb1e))
* LDAP injection via unsanitized user input in DN and group filter construction ([GHSA-7m6r-fhh7-r47c](GHSA-7m6r-fhh7-r47c)) ([#10154](#10154)) ([5bbca7b](5bbca7b))
* LiveQuery bypasses CLP pointer permission enforcement ([GHSA-fph2-r4qg-9576](GHSA-fph2-r4qg-9576)) ([#10250](#10250)) ([6c3317a](6c3317a))
* LiveQuery subscription query depth bypass ([GHSA-6qh5-m6g3-xhq6](GHSA-6qh5-m6g3-xhq6)) ([#10259](#10259)) ([2126fe4](2126fe4))
* LiveQuery subscription with invalid regular expression crashes server ([GHSA-827p-g5x5-h86c](GHSA-827p-g5x5-h86c)) ([#10197](#10197)) ([0ae0eee](0ae0eee))
* Locale parameter path traversal in pages router ([#10242](#10242)) ([01fb6a9](01fb6a9))
* MFA recovery code single-use bypass via concurrent requests ([GHSA-2299-ghjr-6vjp](GHSA-2299-ghjr-6vjp)) ([#10275](#10275)) ([5e70094](5e70094))
* MFA recovery codes not consumed after use ([GHSA-4hf6-3x24-c9m8](GHSA-4hf6-3x24-c9m8)) ([#10170](#10170)) ([18abdd9](18abdd9))
* Missing audience validation in Keycloak authentication adapter ([GHSA-48mh-j4p5-7j9v](GHSA-48mh-j4p5-7j9v)) ([#10137](#10137)) ([78ef1a1](78ef1a1))
* Normalize HTTP method case in `allowMethodOverride` middleware ([#10262](#10262)) ([a248e8c](a248e8c))
* NoSQL injection via token type in password reset and email verification endpoints ([GHSA-vgjh-hmwf-c588](GHSA-vgjh-hmwf-c588)) ([#10128](#10128)) ([b2f2317](b2f2317))
* OAuth2 adapter app ID validation sends wrong token to introspection endpoint ([GHSA-69xg-f649-w5g2](GHSA-69xg-f649-w5g2)) ([#10187](#10187)) ([7f9f854](7f9f854))
* OAuth2 adapter shares mutable state across providers via singleton instance ([GHSA-2cjm-2gwv-m892](GHSA-2cjm-2gwv-m892)) ([#10183](#10183)) ([6009bc1](6009bc1))
* Parse Server OAuth2 authentication adapter account takeover via identity spoofing ([GHSA-fr88-w35c-r596](GHSA-fr88-w35c-r596)) ([#10145](#10145)) ([9cfd06e](9cfd06e))
* Parse Server role escalation and CLP bypass via direct `_Join table write ([GHSA-5f92-jrq3-28rc](GHSA-5f92-jrq3-28rc)) ([#10141](#10141)) ([22faa08](22faa08))
* Parse Server session token exfiltration via `redirectClassNameForKey` query parameter ([GHSA-6r2j-cxgf-495f](GHSA-6r2j-cxgf-495f)) ([#10143](#10143)) ([70b7b07](70b7b07))
* Password reset token single-use bypass via concurrent requests ([GHSA-r3xq-68wh-gwvh](GHSA-r3xq-68wh-gwvh)) ([#10216](#10216)) ([84db0a0](84db0a0))
* Protected field change detection oracle via LiveQuery watch parameter ([GHSA-qpc3-fg4j-8hgm](GHSA-qpc3-fg4j-8hgm)) ([#10253](#10253)) ([0c0a0a5](0c0a0a5))
* Protected fields bypass via dot-notation in query and sort ([GHSA-r2m8-pxm9-9c4g](GHSA-r2m8-pxm9-9c4g)) ([#10167](#10167)) ([8f54c54](8f54c54))
* Protected fields bypass via LiveQuery subscription WHERE clause ([GHSA-j7mm-f4rv-6q6q](GHSA-j7mm-f4rv-6q6q)) ([#10175](#10175)) ([4d48847](4d48847))
* Protected fields bypass via logical query operators ([GHSA-72hp-qff8-4pvv](GHSA-72hp-qff8-4pvv)) ([#10140](#10140)) ([be1d65d](be1d65d))
* Protected fields leak via LiveQuery afterEvent trigger ([GHSA-5hmj-jcgp-6hff](GHSA-5hmj-jcgp-6hff)) ([#10232](#10232)) ([6648500](6648500))
* Query condition depth bypass via pre-validation transform pipeline ([GHSA-9fjp-q3c4-6w3j](GHSA-9fjp-q3c4-6w3j)) ([#10257](#10257)) ([85994ef](85994ef))
* Rate limit bypass via batch request endpoint ([GHSA-775h-3xrc-c228](GHSA-775h-3xrc-c228)) ([#10147](#10147)) ([2766f4f](2766f4f))
* Rate limit bypass via HTTP method override and batch method spoofing ([#10234](#10234)) ([7d72d26](7d72d26))
* Rate limit user zone key fallback and batch request bypass ([#10214](#10214)) ([434ecbe](434ecbe))
* Revert accidental breaking default values for query complexity limits ([#10205](#10205)) ([ab8dd54](ab8dd54))
* Sanitize control characters in page parameter response headers ([#10237](#10237)) ([337ffd6](337ffd6))
* Schema poisoning via prototype pollution in deep copy ([GHSA-9ccr-fpp6-78qf](GHSA-9ccr-fpp6-78qf)) ([#10200](#10200)) ([b321423](b321423))
* Security fix fast-xml-parser from 5.5.5 to 5.5.6 ([#10235](#10235)) ([f521576](f521576))
* Security upgrade fast-xml-parser from 5.3.7 to 5.4.2 ([#10086](#10086)) ([b04ca5e](b04ca5e))
* Server crash via deeply nested query condition operators ([GHSA-9xp9-j92r-p88v](GHSA-9xp9-j92r-p88v)) ([#10202](#10202)) ([f44e306](f44e306))
* Session creation endpoint allows overwriting server-generated session fields ([GHSA-5v7g-9h8f-8pgg](GHSA-5v7g-9h8f-8pgg)) ([#10195](#10195)) ([7ccfb97](7ccfb97))
* Session token expiration unchecked on cache hit ([#10194](#10194)) ([a944203](a944203))
* Session update endpoint allows overwriting server-generated session fields ([GHSA-jc39-686j-wp6q](GHSA-jc39-686j-wp6q)) ([#10263](#10263)) ([ea68fc0](ea68fc0))
* SQL injection via `Increment` operation on nested object field in PostgreSQL ([GHSA-q3vj-96h2-gwvg](GHSA-q3vj-96h2-gwvg)) ([#10161](#10161)) ([8f82282](8f82282))
* SQL injection via aggregate and distinct field names in PostgreSQL adapter ([GHSA-p2w6-rmh7-w8q3](GHSA-p2w6-rmh7-w8q3)) ([#10272](#10272)) ([bdddab5](bdddab5))
* SQL injection via dot-notation field name in PostgreSQL ([GHSA-qpr4-jrj4-6f27](GHSA-qpr4-jrj4-6f27)) ([#10159](#10159)) ([ea538a4](ea538a4))
* SQL Injection via dot-notation sub-key name in `Increment` operation on PostgreSQL ([GHSA-gqpp-xgvh-9h7h](GHSA-gqpp-xgvh-9h7h)) ([#10165](#10165)) ([169d692](169d692))
* SQL injection via query field name when using PostgreSQL ([GHSA-c442-97qw-j6c6](GHSA-c442-97qw-j6c6)) ([#10181](#10181)) ([be281b1](be281b1))
* Stored cross-site scripting (XSS) via SVG file upload ([GHSA-hcj7-6gxh-24ww](GHSA-hcj7-6gxh-24ww)) ([#10136](#10136)) ([93b784d](93b784d))
* Stored XSS filter bypass via Content-Type MIME parameter and missing XML extension blocklist entries ([GHSA-42ph-pf9q-cr72](GHSA-42ph-pf9q-cr72)) ([#10191](#10191)) ([4f53ab3](4f53ab3))
* Stored XSS via file upload of HTML-renderable file types ([GHSA-v5hf-f4c3-m5rv](GHSA-v5hf-f4c3-m5rv)) ([#10162](#10162)) ([03287cf](03287cf))
* User enumeration via email verification endpoint ([GHSA-w54v-hf9p-8856](GHSA-w54v-hf9p-8856)) ([#10172](#10172)) ([936abd4](936abd4))
* Validate authData provider values in challenge endpoint ([#10224](#10224)) ([e5e1f5b](e5e1f5b))
* Validate body field types in request middleware ([#10209](#10209)) ([df69046](df69046))
* Validate session in middleware for non-GET requests to `/sessions/me` ([#10213](#10213)) ([2a9fdab](2a9fdab))
* Validate token type in PagesRouter to prevent type confusion errors ([#10212](#10212)) ([386a989](386a989))

### Features

* Add `enableProductPurchaseLegacyApi` option to disable legacy IAP validation ([#10228](#10228)) ([622ee85](622ee85))
* Add `protectedFieldsOwnerExempt` option to control `_User` class owner exemption for `protectedFields` ([#10280](#10280)) ([d5213f8](d5213f8))
* Add `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` header and customizable response headers for files via `Parse.Cloud.afterFind(Parse.File)` ([#10158](#10158)) ([28d11a3](28d11a3))
@parseplatformorg
Copy link
Contributor

🎉 This change has been released in version 9.6.0

@parseplatformorg parseplatformorg added the state:released Released as stable version label Mar 22, 2026
Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment

Labels

state:released Released as stable version state:released-alpha Released as alpha version

Projects

None yet

Development

Successfully merging this pull request may close these issues.

2 participants