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fix: Protected fields bypass via dot-notation in query and sort (GHSA-r2m8-pxm9-9c4g)#10167

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mtrezza merged 2 commits intoparse-community:alphafrom
mtrezza:fix/GHSA-r2m8-pxm9-9c4g-v9
Mar 10, 2026
Merged

fix: Protected fields bypass via dot-notation in query and sort (GHSA-r2m8-pxm9-9c4g)#10167
mtrezza merged 2 commits intoparse-community:alphafrom
mtrezza:fix/GHSA-r2m8-pxm9-9c4g-v9

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@mtrezza mtrezza commented Mar 10, 2026

Pull Request

Issue

Protected fields bypass via dot-notation in query and sort (GHSA-r2m8-pxm9-9c4g)

Tasks

  • Add tests
  • Add changes to documentation (guides, repository pages, code comments)
  • Add security check
  • Add new Parse Error codes to Parse JS SDK

Summary by CodeRabbit

  • Bug Fixes

    • Strengthened protection against dot-notation bypasses for protected fields in queries and sorting; nested access via $or, $and, $nor is validated and blocked where appropriate while non-protected fields remain accessible and master-key access is preserved.
  • Tests

    • Added test suite validating query and sort restrictions for protected object-type fields.

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parseplatformorg commented Mar 10, 2026

Snyk checks have passed. No issues have been found so far.

Status Scanner Critical High Medium Low Total (0)
Open Source Security 0 0 0 0 0 issues

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coderabbitai bot commented Mar 10, 2026

📝 Walkthrough

Walkthrough

Adds tests and updates request-time validation to block accessing protected fields via dot-notation in query where-clauses and sort keys; preserves existing behavior for direct nested object queries and allows master-key access where applicable.

Changes

Cohort / File(s) Summary
Test Suite
spec/vulnerabilities.spec.js
Adds new tests "(GHSA-r2m8-pxm9-9c4g) Protected fields WHERE clause bypass via dot-notation on object-type fields" covering where/$or/$and/$nor and sort behaviors against protected fields, plus master-key cases.
Query Validation
src/RestQuery.js
Updates denyProtectedFields to iterate over where keys, check root fields split at the first dot, and additionally validate sort keys against protected fields; throws OPERATION_FORBIDDEN referencing the offending key.
Manifests
manifest_file, package.json
Manifest/package metadata files modified (non-API changes).

Estimated code review effort

🎯 3 (Moderate) | ⏱️ ~20 minutes

Possibly related PRs

🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 2 | ❌ 1

❌ Failed checks (1 warning)

Check name Status Explanation Resolution
Description check ⚠️ Warning The PR description follows the template with Issue and Tasks sections filled, but the Approach section is missing, which is required to explain the code changes. Add an Approach section describing how the protected fields bypass vulnerability was fixed, including the changes to RestQuery.js for where-clause and sort validation.
✅ Passed checks (2 passed)
Check name Status Explanation
Docstring Coverage ✅ Passed No functions found in the changed files to evaluate docstring coverage. Skipping docstring coverage check.
Title check ✅ Passed The title clearly and specifically summarizes the main change: fixing a security vulnerability (GHSA-r2m8-pxm9-9c4g) related to protected fields bypass via dot-notation in query and sort operations. It directly matches the changeset which adds validation in RestQuery.js and corresponding tests.

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Actionable comments posted: 1

🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.

Inline comments:
In `@spec/vulnerabilities.spec.js`:
- Around line 1456-1458: The new describe block titled "(GHSA-r2m8-pxm9-9c4g)
Protected fields WHERE clause bypass via dot-notation on object-type fields" is
accidentally nested inside the previous "(GHSA-gqpp-xgvh-9h7h)" describe; move
the entire describe("(GHSA-r2m8-pxm9-9h7h)..." {...}) block boundary so that the
GHSA-r2m8-pxm9-9c4g describe is a top-level sibling (i.e., close the
GHSA-gqpp-xgvh-9h7h describe before starting the GHSA-r2m8-pxm9-9c4g describe),
and remove the now-redundant extra closing `});` at the file end that was
compensating for the incorrect nesting.

ℹ️ Review info
⚙️ Run configuration

Configuration used: Organization UI

Review profile: CHILL

Plan: Pro

Run ID: ac100741-62c3-4cb5-aa27-aef599d60bb1

📥 Commits

Reviewing files that changed from the base of the PR and between 27add6d and 2e3e992.

📒 Files selected for processing (2)
  • spec/vulnerabilities.spec.js
  • src/RestQuery.js

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codecov bot commented Mar 10, 2026

Codecov Report

✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests.
✅ Project coverage is 92.19%. Comparing base (169d692) to head (9f07a61).
⚠️ Report is 117 commits behind head on alpha.

Additional details and impacted files
@@            Coverage Diff             @@
##            alpha   #10167      +/-   ##
==========================================
- Coverage   92.60%   92.19%   -0.42%     
==========================================
  Files         192      192              
  Lines       16214    16220       +6     
  Branches      183      183              
==========================================
- Hits        15015    14954      -61     
- Misses       1187     1250      +63     
- Partials       12       16       +4     

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🧹 Nitpick comments (1)
spec/vulnerabilities.spec.js (1)

1647-1659: Consider adding explicit error code assertion for consistency.

This test only checks res.status while other tests in the suite verify both res.data.code and res.data.error. Adding these assertions would make the regression test more robust and consistent with the rest of the suite.

💡 Suggested enhancement
   it('should still block direct query on protected field (existing behavior)', async () => {
     const res = await request({
       method: 'GET',
       url: `${Parse.serverURL}/classes/SecretClass`,
       headers: {
         'X-Parse-Application-Id': Parse.applicationId,
         'X-Parse-REST-API-Key': 'rest',
       },
       qs: { where: JSON.stringify({ secretObj: { apiKey: 'SENSITIVE_KEY_123' } }) },
     }).catch(e => e);
-    expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+    expect(res.data.code).toBe(Parse.Error.OPERATION_FORBIDDEN);
+    expect(res.data.error).toBe('Permission denied');
   });
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.

In `@spec/vulnerabilities.spec.js` around lines 1647 - 1659, The test "should
still block direct query on protected field (existing behavior)" only asserts
res.status; update it to also assert the response body contains explicit error
details like other tests in the suite by adding assertions on res.data (e.g.,
expect(res.data).toHaveProperty('code') and
expect(res.data).toHaveProperty('error') or assert specific expected values if
consistent with the suite), referencing the local variable res and the existing
it(...) test block to locate where to add these checks.
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.

Nitpick comments:
In `@spec/vulnerabilities.spec.js`:
- Around line 1647-1659: The test "should still block direct query on protected
field (existing behavior)" only asserts res.status; update it to also assert the
response body contains explicit error details like other tests in the suite by
adding assertions on res.data (e.g., expect(res.data).toHaveProperty('code') and
expect(res.data).toHaveProperty('error') or assert specific expected values if
consistent with the suite), referencing the local variable res and the existing
it(...) test block to locate where to add these checks.

ℹ️ Review info
⚙️ Run configuration

Configuration used: Organization UI

Review profile: CHILL

Plan: Pro

Run ID: 3392c259-3840-465b-8e79-8f2eca591526

📥 Commits

Reviewing files that changed from the base of the PR and between 2e3e992 and 9f07a61.

📒 Files selected for processing (1)
  • spec/vulnerabilities.spec.js

@mtrezza mtrezza changed the title fix: GHSA-r2m8-pxm9-9c4g-v9 fix: Protected fields bypass via dot-notation in query and sort (GHSA-r2m8-pxm9-9c4g) Mar 10, 2026
@mtrezza mtrezza merged commit 8f54c54 into parse-community:alpha Mar 10, 2026
21 of 24 checks passed
parseplatformorg pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 10, 2026
# [9.6.0-alpha.6](9.6.0-alpha.5...9.6.0-alpha.6) (2026-03-10)

### Bug Fixes

* Protected fields bypass via dot-notation in query and sort ([GHSA-r2m8-pxm9-9c4g](GHSA-r2m8-pxm9-9c4g)) ([#10167](#10167)) ([8f54c54](8f54c54))
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🎉 This change has been released in version 9.6.0-alpha.6

@parseplatformorg parseplatformorg added the state:released-alpha Released as alpha version label Mar 10, 2026
@mtrezza mtrezza deleted the fix/GHSA-r2m8-pxm9-9c4g-v9 branch March 10, 2026 02:06
parseplatformorg pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 22, 2026
# [9.6.0](9.5.1...9.6.0) (2026-03-22)

### Bug Fixes

*  LiveQuery `regexTimeout` default value not applied ([#10156](#10156)) ([416cfbc](416cfbc))
* Account lockout race condition allows bypassing threshold via concurrent requests ([#10266](#10266)) ([ff70fee](ff70fee))
* Account takeover via operator injection in authentication data identifier ([GHSA-5fw2-8jcv-xh87](GHSA-5fw2-8jcv-xh87)) ([#10185](#10185)) ([0d0a554](0d0a554))
* Add configurable batch request sub-request limit via option `requestComplexity.batchRequestLimit` ([#10265](#10265)) ([164ed0d](164ed0d))
* Auth data exposed via /users/me endpoint ([GHSA-37mj-c2wf-cx96](GHSA-37mj-c2wf-cx96)) ([#10278](#10278)) ([875cf10](875cf10))
* Auth provider validation bypass on login via partial authData ([GHSA-pfj7-wv7c-22pr](GHSA-pfj7-wv7c-22pr)) ([#10246](#10246)) ([98f4ba5](98f4ba5))
* Block dot-notation updates to authData sub-fields and harden login provider checks ([#10223](#10223)) ([12c24c6](12c24c6))
* Bypass of class-level permissions in LiveQuery ([GHSA-7ch5-98q2-7289](GHSA-7ch5-98q2-7289)) ([#10133](#10133)) ([98188d9](98188d9))
* Classes `_GraphQLConfig` and `_Audience` master key bypass via generic class routes ([GHSA-7xg7-rqf6-pw6c](GHSA-7xg7-rqf6-pw6c)) ([#10151](#10151)) ([1de4e43](1de4e43))
* Cloud function dispatch crashes server via prototype chain traversal ([GHSA-4263-jgmp-7pf4](GHSA-4263-jgmp-7pf4)) ([#10210](#10210)) ([286373d](286373d))
* Concurrent signup with same authentication creates duplicate users ([#10149](#10149)) ([853bfe1](853bfe1))
* Create CLP not enforced before user field validation on signup ([#10268](#10268)) ([a0530c2](a0530c2))
* Denial of service via unindexed database query for unconfigured auth providers ([GHSA-g4cf-xj29-wqqr](GHSA-g4cf-xj29-wqqr)) ([#10270](#10270)) ([fbac847](fbac847))
* Denial-of-service via unbounded query complexity in REST and GraphQL API ([GHSA-cmj3-wx7h-ffvg](GHSA-cmj3-wx7h-ffvg)) ([#10130](#10130)) ([0ae9c25](0ae9c25))
* Email verification resend page leaks user existence (GHSA-h29g-q5c2-9h4f) ([#10238](#10238)) ([fbda4cb](fbda4cb))
* Empty authData bypasses credential requirement on signup ([GHSA-wjqw-r9x4-j59v](GHSA-wjqw-r9x4-j59v)) ([#10219](#10219)) ([5dcbf41](5dcbf41))
* GraphQL WebSocket endpoint bypasses security middleware ([GHSA-p2x3-8689-cwpg](GHSA-p2x3-8689-cwpg)) ([#10189](#10189)) ([3ffba75](3ffba75))
* Incomplete JSON key escaping in PostgreSQL Increment on nested Object fields ([#10261](#10261)) ([a692873](a692873))
* Input type validation for query operators and batch path ([#10230](#10230)) ([a628911](a628911))
* Instance comparison with `instanceof` is not realm-safe ([#10225](#10225)) ([51efb1e](51efb1e))
* LDAP injection via unsanitized user input in DN and group filter construction ([GHSA-7m6r-fhh7-r47c](GHSA-7m6r-fhh7-r47c)) ([#10154](#10154)) ([5bbca7b](5bbca7b))
* LiveQuery bypasses CLP pointer permission enforcement ([GHSA-fph2-r4qg-9576](GHSA-fph2-r4qg-9576)) ([#10250](#10250)) ([6c3317a](6c3317a))
* LiveQuery subscription query depth bypass ([GHSA-6qh5-m6g3-xhq6](GHSA-6qh5-m6g3-xhq6)) ([#10259](#10259)) ([2126fe4](2126fe4))
* LiveQuery subscription with invalid regular expression crashes server ([GHSA-827p-g5x5-h86c](GHSA-827p-g5x5-h86c)) ([#10197](#10197)) ([0ae0eee](0ae0eee))
* Locale parameter path traversal in pages router ([#10242](#10242)) ([01fb6a9](01fb6a9))
* MFA recovery code single-use bypass via concurrent requests ([GHSA-2299-ghjr-6vjp](GHSA-2299-ghjr-6vjp)) ([#10275](#10275)) ([5e70094](5e70094))
* MFA recovery codes not consumed after use ([GHSA-4hf6-3x24-c9m8](GHSA-4hf6-3x24-c9m8)) ([#10170](#10170)) ([18abdd9](18abdd9))
* Missing audience validation in Keycloak authentication adapter ([GHSA-48mh-j4p5-7j9v](GHSA-48mh-j4p5-7j9v)) ([#10137](#10137)) ([78ef1a1](78ef1a1))
* Normalize HTTP method case in `allowMethodOverride` middleware ([#10262](#10262)) ([a248e8c](a248e8c))
* NoSQL injection via token type in password reset and email verification endpoints ([GHSA-vgjh-hmwf-c588](GHSA-vgjh-hmwf-c588)) ([#10128](#10128)) ([b2f2317](b2f2317))
* OAuth2 adapter app ID validation sends wrong token to introspection endpoint ([GHSA-69xg-f649-w5g2](GHSA-69xg-f649-w5g2)) ([#10187](#10187)) ([7f9f854](7f9f854))
* OAuth2 adapter shares mutable state across providers via singleton instance ([GHSA-2cjm-2gwv-m892](GHSA-2cjm-2gwv-m892)) ([#10183](#10183)) ([6009bc1](6009bc1))
* Parse Server OAuth2 authentication adapter account takeover via identity spoofing ([GHSA-fr88-w35c-r596](GHSA-fr88-w35c-r596)) ([#10145](#10145)) ([9cfd06e](9cfd06e))
* Parse Server role escalation and CLP bypass via direct `_Join table write ([GHSA-5f92-jrq3-28rc](GHSA-5f92-jrq3-28rc)) ([#10141](#10141)) ([22faa08](22faa08))
* Parse Server session token exfiltration via `redirectClassNameForKey` query parameter ([GHSA-6r2j-cxgf-495f](GHSA-6r2j-cxgf-495f)) ([#10143](#10143)) ([70b7b07](70b7b07))
* Password reset token single-use bypass via concurrent requests ([GHSA-r3xq-68wh-gwvh](GHSA-r3xq-68wh-gwvh)) ([#10216](#10216)) ([84db0a0](84db0a0))
* Protected field change detection oracle via LiveQuery watch parameter ([GHSA-qpc3-fg4j-8hgm](GHSA-qpc3-fg4j-8hgm)) ([#10253](#10253)) ([0c0a0a5](0c0a0a5))
* Protected fields bypass via dot-notation in query and sort ([GHSA-r2m8-pxm9-9c4g](GHSA-r2m8-pxm9-9c4g)) ([#10167](#10167)) ([8f54c54](8f54c54))
* Protected fields bypass via LiveQuery subscription WHERE clause ([GHSA-j7mm-f4rv-6q6q](GHSA-j7mm-f4rv-6q6q)) ([#10175](#10175)) ([4d48847](4d48847))
* Protected fields bypass via logical query operators ([GHSA-72hp-qff8-4pvv](GHSA-72hp-qff8-4pvv)) ([#10140](#10140)) ([be1d65d](be1d65d))
* Protected fields leak via LiveQuery afterEvent trigger ([GHSA-5hmj-jcgp-6hff](GHSA-5hmj-jcgp-6hff)) ([#10232](#10232)) ([6648500](6648500))
* Query condition depth bypass via pre-validation transform pipeline ([GHSA-9fjp-q3c4-6w3j](GHSA-9fjp-q3c4-6w3j)) ([#10257](#10257)) ([85994ef](85994ef))
* Rate limit bypass via batch request endpoint ([GHSA-775h-3xrc-c228](GHSA-775h-3xrc-c228)) ([#10147](#10147)) ([2766f4f](2766f4f))
* Rate limit bypass via HTTP method override and batch method spoofing ([#10234](#10234)) ([7d72d26](7d72d26))
* Rate limit user zone key fallback and batch request bypass ([#10214](#10214)) ([434ecbe](434ecbe))
* Revert accidental breaking default values for query complexity limits ([#10205](#10205)) ([ab8dd54](ab8dd54))
* Sanitize control characters in page parameter response headers ([#10237](#10237)) ([337ffd6](337ffd6))
* Schema poisoning via prototype pollution in deep copy ([GHSA-9ccr-fpp6-78qf](GHSA-9ccr-fpp6-78qf)) ([#10200](#10200)) ([b321423](b321423))
* Security fix fast-xml-parser from 5.5.5 to 5.5.6 ([#10235](#10235)) ([f521576](f521576))
* Security upgrade fast-xml-parser from 5.3.7 to 5.4.2 ([#10086](#10086)) ([b04ca5e](b04ca5e))
* Server crash via deeply nested query condition operators ([GHSA-9xp9-j92r-p88v](GHSA-9xp9-j92r-p88v)) ([#10202](#10202)) ([f44e306](f44e306))
* Session creation endpoint allows overwriting server-generated session fields ([GHSA-5v7g-9h8f-8pgg](GHSA-5v7g-9h8f-8pgg)) ([#10195](#10195)) ([7ccfb97](7ccfb97))
* Session token expiration unchecked on cache hit ([#10194](#10194)) ([a944203](a944203))
* Session update endpoint allows overwriting server-generated session fields ([GHSA-jc39-686j-wp6q](GHSA-jc39-686j-wp6q)) ([#10263](#10263)) ([ea68fc0](ea68fc0))
* SQL injection via `Increment` operation on nested object field in PostgreSQL ([GHSA-q3vj-96h2-gwvg](GHSA-q3vj-96h2-gwvg)) ([#10161](#10161)) ([8f82282](8f82282))
* SQL injection via aggregate and distinct field names in PostgreSQL adapter ([GHSA-p2w6-rmh7-w8q3](GHSA-p2w6-rmh7-w8q3)) ([#10272](#10272)) ([bdddab5](bdddab5))
* SQL injection via dot-notation field name in PostgreSQL ([GHSA-qpr4-jrj4-6f27](GHSA-qpr4-jrj4-6f27)) ([#10159](#10159)) ([ea538a4](ea538a4))
* SQL Injection via dot-notation sub-key name in `Increment` operation on PostgreSQL ([GHSA-gqpp-xgvh-9h7h](GHSA-gqpp-xgvh-9h7h)) ([#10165](#10165)) ([169d692](169d692))
* SQL injection via query field name when using PostgreSQL ([GHSA-c442-97qw-j6c6](GHSA-c442-97qw-j6c6)) ([#10181](#10181)) ([be281b1](be281b1))
* Stored cross-site scripting (XSS) via SVG file upload ([GHSA-hcj7-6gxh-24ww](GHSA-hcj7-6gxh-24ww)) ([#10136](#10136)) ([93b784d](93b784d))
* Stored XSS filter bypass via Content-Type MIME parameter and missing XML extension blocklist entries ([GHSA-42ph-pf9q-cr72](GHSA-42ph-pf9q-cr72)) ([#10191](#10191)) ([4f53ab3](4f53ab3))
* Stored XSS via file upload of HTML-renderable file types ([GHSA-v5hf-f4c3-m5rv](GHSA-v5hf-f4c3-m5rv)) ([#10162](#10162)) ([03287cf](03287cf))
* User enumeration via email verification endpoint ([GHSA-w54v-hf9p-8856](GHSA-w54v-hf9p-8856)) ([#10172](#10172)) ([936abd4](936abd4))
* Validate authData provider values in challenge endpoint ([#10224](#10224)) ([e5e1f5b](e5e1f5b))
* Validate body field types in request middleware ([#10209](#10209)) ([df69046](df69046))
* Validate session in middleware for non-GET requests to `/sessions/me` ([#10213](#10213)) ([2a9fdab](2a9fdab))
* Validate token type in PagesRouter to prevent type confusion errors ([#10212](#10212)) ([386a989](386a989))

### Features

* Add `enableProductPurchaseLegacyApi` option to disable legacy IAP validation ([#10228](#10228)) ([622ee85](622ee85))
* Add `protectedFieldsOwnerExempt` option to control `_User` class owner exemption for `protectedFields` ([#10280](#10280)) ([d5213f8](d5213f8))
* Add `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` header and customizable response headers for files via `Parse.Cloud.afterFind(Parse.File)` ([#10158](#10158)) ([28d11a3](28d11a3))
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🎉 This change has been released in version 9.6.0

@parseplatformorg parseplatformorg added the state:released Released as stable version label Mar 22, 2026
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