



INTERNATIONAL **RELATIONS**

for Civil Services Examinations



INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

for Civil Services Main Examinations

About the Author



Pavneet Singh graduated with Honours in Political Science from Delhi University. He then followed it with an MBA from the International Management Institute in Belgium.

Following the completion of his formal education, Pavneet sought to make a mark for himself in the field of the teaching for the UPSC Civil Services exam.

He has taught various subjects, including Political Science and Current Affairs for almost a decade now.

Since 2013, he has been associated with Vajiram and Ravi, India's premier institute for the civil services exam, at New Delhi.

His area of expertise here has been International Relations.

It is this expertise, earned through years of voracious reading and enriched through interactions with thousands of aspirants, that he brings to this textbook.

*To my students
and
the future civil servants of India*

Preface

AN INVESTMENT IN KNOWLEDGE PAYS THE BEST INTEREST.

Since the time I was an aspirant for the civil services myself, I had to struggle for a proper textbook on International Relations (IR) for General Studies. Moreover, having been a student of Political Science and International Relations (PSIR) optional subject for civil services examinations, I keenly felt the crunch for a one-stop solution for IR. Our PSIR teachers used to tell us to read books written by former diplomats and some books meant for university exams, but these books were neither written exclusively for the civil services exam, nor covered the syllabus of the examination.

I started teaching IR at Vajiram and Ravi, an institute for IAS examination in New Delhi, in 2013. In the first year, I taught 14,000 students. During my first year of teaching at Vajiram, I realised that the students continued to struggle for quality work on IR. As my teaching entered the further batches in 2014, and subsequently in 2015, 2016 and 2017, a lot of students at Vajiram asked me whether there was any book in the market for IR that could be helpful as a textbook for General Studies. Many students of PSIR also needed a textbook that could serve the purpose of their optional study. More importantly, I found that the students needed a book for IR that could provide them with backgrounds of diplomatic relations of India with every country.

After intense discussions with my colleague and close friend, Brijendra Singh, who teaches Ethics, Integrity and Aptitude at Vajiram, I decided to work on a book of IR that could cater to not only the needs of students for General Studies but also act as a foundation for those with PSIR as optional subject. I began working on the monumental task of writing the book in December, 2015 and it finally came to an end in October 2017. In the process of having undertaken a work of this magnitude, I had interacted with 29 officers of the Indian Foreign Services (IFS) and eight senior officers of Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW). The views of these people and an insider's knowledge about how India conducts its diplomacy with the world is reflected in various chapters of the book.

I am now satisfied that the future civil services aspirants shall no longer have to struggle to find a textbook for IR for General Studies portion. This book also fulfills the gap for the students of PSIR as it also completely caters to all topics of the optional syllabus defined by the UPSC. I can assure the student that once the entire book is read, he/she will be able to understand the happenings in the world in a much better way. This book is bound to change the way they think.

The most interesting feature of the book is that I have incorporated plenty of diagrams and case studies. Each diagram tries to summarise the core discussion at hand. These diagrams not only facilitate revision but can also be used directly in the mains examination while writing answers. Such diagrams will certainly fetch an aspirant additional marks in the paper, giving them an edge over their competitor. The case studies in the chapters add on to the existing understanding and are designed to provide the readers a completely fresh perspective on the dimension being discussed, along with providing applications for the policies that are under scrutiny.

I have explained how to use the book optimally while reading for General Studies and for PSIR for civil services examination separately in the pages ahead.

Note for Students of General Studies

HOW TO READ THE BOOK

As stated in the Preface, this work on International Relations (IR) is a mandatory subject for students preparing for the General Studies papers. The book acts as a foundation builder for any aspirant for civil services because the book serves as a primary source to prepare for Current Affairs of International importance (Item-1 of Part-A, Paper-1 General Studies, Preliminary examination) and International Relations (Item-17, 18, 19, 20 of Paper-III-Part-B-General Studies-II-Mains Examination).

I suggest that all students read the book in the chronology in which it is set. All the chapters are interlinked to each other, and to enhance understanding and build critical linkages, a chronological reading is mandatory. I strongly urge the readers to read and internalise all the key terms related to International Relations mentioned in the [Section A of Part A, Chapter 2](#). After the key terms are internalised, the readers should read the chapters in [Section A, Part B](#). All the four chapters of this part are intended to give the students a panoramic glimpse of international world history from ancient to post-Cold War times. From my teaching experiences of IR at Vajiram, I have come to the conclusion that when students are given a proper understanding of international world history, their command over the subject drastically improves. The Section B of the book relates to theories of IR. This chapter is exclusively for the students of Political Science and International Relations (PSIR). However, for a better analytical grasp on the subject, I would urge the students of General Studies (who do not have PSIR as optional subject for civil services exam) to also read the six chapters in the section. This will give the readers a different perspective for the issues that may prove relevant for the exam and will be beneficial while writing answers in the mains examination.

Each chapter in the book is meticulously written with an intention to enhance the understanding of the reader on the topic discussed. The chapters adopt multi-dimensional analysis paradigm and start with basic background and history of diplomatic relations and then covers different dimensions involved in diplomatic relations. This holistic coverage from background till the present day diplomacy enhances the overall understanding of the reader. Once the reading of the entire book is over, the student shall have complete command on the subject. The students would now be in a position to appreciate what is happening around them and analyse the events in the newspapers better. Before the exam, the diagrams in the book will help the reader keep the core ideas and points in their minds fresh to be reproduced in the answer sheets of UPSC Mains exam. After reading the book completely, a deep understanding of how India has dealt with each country in the world from 1947 till now, will be achieved. For example, if a student peruses the portion of the border issue between India and China and goes through the literature in the chapter carefully, which has analyzed the border problem since the British times till today, he/she would be able to appreciate why the border issue between India and China persists and what can be done to resolve the issues. Once the chapters are read, the reader can continue to read the newspapers and keep on building their notes further as all issues happening in the present times in the diplomacy will make sense since the entire background is exhaustively covered in each chapter. The book will thereby equip the students with

adequate knowledge for Current Affairs of International Importance (part of Preliminary exam syllabus of UPSC), International Relations (part of GS Mains exam paper) and Civil Services Personality test.

Note for Political Science and International Relations Students

HOW TO READ THE BOOK

Having once been a student of Political Science and International Relations (PSIR) optional for civil services exam myself, I wish to clarify a few myths for the students of PSIR optionals. A lot of PSIR optional teachers misguide the students by asserting that the knowledge required to write the answers in the optional subject is the same as the knowledge required in the General Studies (GS) papers for the civil services exam. The optional and GS subjects are NOT the same. The knowledge of GS can act as a **foundation** for the optional (PSIR) but **cannot substitute** the knowledge. If the UPSC wanted to test an aspirant on the same knowledge of GS in the optional subject, then the entire exercise of having an optional, in the first place, would be self-defeating. I request the PSIR optional students to not proceed with this conviction, as this would mean that they would never be able to pass the optional subject exams, being unable to realise the difference.

For example, lot of teachers insist that the Indian Polity section read for GS is the same as the Indian polity needed in the PSIR optional subject in the section of Indian Government and Politics. This is not the case. The basics and foundation of the Indian Polity that one reads in GS may be the same for PSIR optional subject, but if you write the same content you read in polity in both GS and PSIR examinations, you will never obtain high marks. The same is true for IR. A lot of teachers say that the IR of GS is the same as IR for PSIR. This is not the case. While writing the answer of IR, the student has to distinguish the answer from what an aspirant will write in the GS paper. In the optional, the student has to quote scholars, mention researches and use scholarly names while justifying each statement written in the IR part of the PSIR. Let me illustrate here.

In GS, an aspirant, while writing an answer on India and China relations, will simply assert as follows:

China is a country that is willing to cooperate with other countries today (as is visible in the recent Chinese attempts through their One Belt One Road initiative) as China is not yet a country powerful enough to alter the balance of power equations in the world politics. Thus, OBOR of China is the Chinese Ashwamedha.

If a similar assertion is to be made by a student of PSIR optional subject to be written in IR, then this statement has to be written as follows

Amitabh Mattoo is of the view that as the balance of power is presently not in favour of China; therefore, it prefers to cooperate (as is visible in the recent Chinese attempts through their One Belt One Road initiative). However, Mattoo asserts that the case would not always be as such because, as China increases its military capabilities (Ashley Tellis), it would use its military might in the future to subdue states in the region. This would be more so because China attaches great importance to the use of offensive force (Brahma Chellany) and as such, the use of offensive power is a part of the Chinese strategic culture (Gurmeet Kanwal).

As you can see in the statements written above, a student of PSIR firstly has to quote scholars, in this case, Amitabh Mattoo, Brahma Chellany, Ashley Tellis and Gurmeet Kanwal. Secondly, almost the same meaning is conveyed by the student of PSIR optional subject but with additional information about the Chinese strategic culture, which enhances the quality of the answer and shows to the examiner that the examinee has done an analytical and in-depth study of the PSIR from the optional point of view.

Whenever students write IR answers in the PSIR optional subject, the aspirants have to take care of scholarly justification and analytical study. For the ease of PSIR students, I have written a chapter in Section-I of the book, entitled ‘India’s Grand Strategy.’ This is the chapter that will equip the students of PSIR optional subject with the requisite tools and information to write such answers as needed in the optional paper.

For any clarifications, the readers can feel free to reach the author at Vajiram and Ravi IAS Institute, New Delhi. All suggestions are welcome at pavneet.ir@gmail.com.

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—Pavneet singh

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1
CHAPTER

A Conceptual Review of the Evolution and Relevance of the State in International Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Why we need to study International Relations?
- Evolution of the state from the ancient times till the present

WHY STUDY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS?

The world in which we live is divided into nation states. All men, women and children inhabit some state or the other. No state lives in isolation. All states interact with each other. The interaction amongst the states has been occurring since ancient times. The nature of this interaction has certainly got transformed in the modern, globalised age. When the states interact, these interactions affect the domestic populations of these states. When all the states in the world interact, it creates an international state system. The interaction that happens amongst the state in the international state system creates historical, political and socio-economic consequences for the domestic populations. International Relations (hereafter IR) is the study of all these interactions and the subsequent consequences.

However, the question that now arises in our minds is about what the concept of the state primarily entails? How did it evolve? What is the present situation of the conceptual state in a globalised world?

The next section attempts to provide a brief glimpse of the evolution of the state. The subsequent chapters of Part-B of this section would help us to understand the deeper nuances of study of the state in an international historical context from ancient times till the age of globalisation. Let us turn first our attention to the gradual historical evolution of the state.

HOW DID THE STATE EVOLVE?

The ‘State’ is a creation of man and not a creation of mother earth or nature, which makes it a man-made ‘construct’. Man was initially a hunter-gatherer. He was leading a nomadic life. Over a period of time, as man developed techniques of agriculture and learned domestication of animals, he decided to do away with his nomadic life in favour of a settled life. As he settled in an area, the population in that patch of land began to grow. It

gradually transformed into a microcosmic society. As this mini-society got established at one place, so it did in other areas. Initially, a majority of these societies got established near rivers or other water sources. This is also one reason why we had a majority of all ancient civilisations established near rivers. Our own Indus Valley civilisation, which flourished on the banks of the Indus river, is testimony to the fact.

As the societal groups enlarged over a period of time, there was felt a need to establish a code of conduct for the members of the society to impose a form of order on the chaotic tribes. Once the rules of societal interactions were established, further need arose to create an authority to enforce these rules. Initially, it saw its manifestation in the form of conferring the authority on the most elder people but, this gradually shifted to the strongest man amongst the group. Over a period of time, a need was also felt to protect the group of persons, now in the form of a settlement, from attacks by members of the other groups. This manifested not only in the physical protection of people but also the land occupied. Thus, protection emerged as the most rudimentary reason of political formations, headed by a strong chief.

These groups from one place interacted with other groups situated some distances away as well. The nature of this interaction often varied. The interaction at times was to subjugate the other area and enhance one's own area or, at times, it was to achieve mutual coexistence. The protector of the area and its population by now was called the king and the king was thought to possess divine powers during these ancient times.

In the ancient times, there was a complete absence of the concept of sovereignty. Yet, in the absence of the state sovereignty we have seen ancient empires flourish. One of the very successful ancient empires was the Greek city state system. It had a common language and religion. The Greeks later became subjects of the Romans. During Roman times, the concept of authority got significantly transformed. A new authority of the papacy (Pope) emerged along with the Emperor.

Medieval society got established in the form of feudalism. The feudal medieval order was effectively broken down with the coming of the Renaissance and Reformation which ultimately culminated in the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 which created the first ever modern nation states based on the idea of sovereignty. This was followed by geographical discoveries, enlightenment, age of reason and imperialism. The mercantilism that emerged during this period along with industrial revolution and colonisation led the world ultimately to the World War-I.

What is worth noting is that, since the Peace of Westphalia and emergence of Westphalian nation state, the kings in command or monarchs not only became absolute in their power but also went on to shrug off Papal authority over the state. It is in reality **this** transformation in the governance of the state that gave birth to modern statecraft. The nation states began to flourish under the rule of these monarchs. The new-found growth led to an urge to expand and indulge in practices like imperialism and colonialism. The imperialist world learnt its hard lesson during the World War I, but the settlement reached through the infamous Treaty of Versailles post-World War I also sowed the seeds for the next total war—the World War II.

The period post world war-II witnessed the rise of super powers—the USA and the

USSR—with their mutual mistrust leading the world into an extended Cold War period. The end of communism and the eventual collapse of the USSR in 1989 led to the rise of unipolarity, with the USA emerging as the surviving power bloc. This period of unipolarity saw a subsequent rise of a new force in the world called globalisation. As the states got affected by globalisation, many scholars in the twenty first century began to advocate that the relevance of state in a globalised world would become redundant. However, this was not the truth as, though, undoubtedly, globalisation has (and continues to) affect the states, it has only transformed the nature of the states in terms of their being demonstrators of absolute power in the world. The role of the state remains intact even in a globalised economy as globalisation can flourish only with rule of law and a stable social order which can only be guaranteed by the instrument called the state.

Please keep the meanings of the three following terminologies in mind throughout your reading of the book:

- **State** – It is a political association that has a defined territory with a permanent population to be governed by a government which is sovereign.
- **Sovereignty** – It means a situation of an absence of an authority higher than the state. It means state has the freedom to take independent decisions in domestic and international affairs without being answerable to any authority above it.
- **Security** – It means a situation of an absence of any threat. Security at a micro level is called human security, at state level is called national security and at a global level is called international security.

2
CHAPTER

Key Terms in International Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Basic terms in International Relations
- Key concepts and terms used in Nuclear Diplomacy
- Advanced terms and concepts in International Relations
- Terms used in economic integration

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to provide the readers with an authoritative overview of terms and concepts in international relations. This chapter acts as a foundation as well as the entry point to the understanding of the rest of the book. I strongly urge the readers to read each and every term in this chapter carefully before proceeding to read the subsequent chapters of the book.

BASIC TERMS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Anti-ballistic Missile: It is a system with two components—namely a radar and an interceptor missile. An anti-ballistic missile protects or defends a designated target against an incoming missile from an enemy territory.

Accidental War: There are two meanings to this term. Firstly, it may be used to define a war that may have resulted from a technical malfunction or mishap. In this case, it is unintentional and not deliberate. Secondly, it may be caused due to perceptions misconstrued by a state where it fails to read a particular situation correctly and responds with violence.

Action-Reaction: This term is mostly used in conflict analyses and game theory. Lewis Fry Richardson, a scholar who theorized the arms race, explained the concept in the Richardson process. To easily understand this concept, we can take example of two states, A and B. Let's say, for instance, that State B increases its military capability. Perceiving this as a threat, State A reacts by increasing own military expenditure. The reaction by State A is perceived by State B differently. State B feels that increased military expenditure by State A has reduced the margins of safety of State B, and thus State B responds to it, in turn, by increasing its own arms budget. Thus, an action leads to a reaction.

Actor: In international relations, any entity which plays an identifiable role or is a stakeholder is termed as an actor. It is a very broad term which is used to signify

personalities, organizations, states, institutions, and so forth.

Adjudication: Adjudication is a process of using international law to settle international disputes by referring them to a court of law. The League of Nations, after the World War I, established the Permanent Court of International Justice, which was succeeded by International Court of Justice in 1945.


Administered Territory: This concept was advocated by Jan Smuts and George Louis Beer under Article XXII of the covenant of the League of Nations to control and administer the colonial possessions of Germany in Africa, Pacific and Turkey in the Middle East. It was a system that did not involve direct annexation and traditional imperialism. The ‘responsible’ states in ‘sacred trust’ of the League of Nations would provide guidance and support to powers incapable of self-governing themselves. The Permanent Mandates Commission established managed the entire process. Frederick Samuel North edge, in his book, *The League of Nations: Its Life and Times* (1986), says that the mandate system was the first ever experiment in the world with international control on dependent territories.

AIC (Advanced Industrial Countries): The Brandt Report of 1980 used this term to refer to countries of North America, Western Europe, Japan and Australia. The UN also uses the same abbreviation and it refers basically to all developed countries.

Alliance: When two or more actors formally sign an agreement to cooperate mutually in security related issues, it is called an alliance. Normally, alliances are defence pacts that operate during the situations of war. Alliances have been most visible during the period of Cold War, but in the post Cold War period today, as explained by Christensen and Snyder, strong alliances would be difficult to envisage given the multipolarity of global politics.

Arbitration: In arbitration, the two conflicting parties argue to submit their difference to a third party for settlement. The third party undertaking arbitration announces a binding decision in the process of settling the disputes.

Arms Control: It is an exercise where an actor advocates restraint in acquiring, deploying and using military capabilities. The assumption underlying arms control is based on deterrence policies. But arms control theorists, at an ideological level, differ from theorists advocating disarmament. Disarmament scholars advocate a world without weapons or a situation where the threat of using force reduces substantially. The scholars of arms control on the other hand work along the existing structure.



Armistice: It is an opportunity between two or more conflicting states to suspend

hostilities and opt for a peaceful settlement. It is never unilateral but bilateral, and is a temporary declaration of peace, providing an opportunity to the conflicting states to terminate the state of war. It helps in maintaining a status quo. From 1949 to 1978, there was armistice between Arabs and Israel (explained in the chapter on the issues in the Middle East-Section-H-Chapter-1).

Asian Tigers: It is a term applied to certain states in Asia that had experienced aggressive economic growth within a short span of time. These Asian economies have become a new standard for economic liberalism in the recent times. The five Asian Tigers are Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia in this context are known as Tiger Cubs while Hong Kong and China are collectively also called Asian Dragons.

Asylum: The word ‘asylum’ means refuge. It is a quasi-legal process where a national of another state gets protection from a state for sanctuary. As per the article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, the rights of asylum are vested in a state and not with the individuals.

Autonomy: It is a term very frequently used in political discourse. The liberal meaning of autonomy is self-government. The Treaty of Westphalia, 1648, marked the origin of the concept of the autonomy of states. It is stated that the beginning of the concept of autonomy also introduced the concept of anarchy amongst states in the international system.

Anarchy: The etymology of this term derives from a Greek word which implies ‘without a ruler.’ In day to day life, it is used as a term to signify chaos and lawlessness such as it happens when there exists a situation of no stable government or monarchy to maintain peace. Normally, the term, in political discourse, is used when there is some revolutionary upheaval or sociopolitical turbulence. In international relations, anarchy is used specifically to signify international politics where no state has any absolute control on the overall system. The first political philosopher who described international relations as anarchical was Thomas Hobbes. The realist scholars have used the concept of anarchy while formulating their theories.

Appeasement: It is a term which is based on an assumption that there would be no war if the demands of an aggressive state are met.

Balkanization: The term was used by diplomats in later nineteenth century period to delineate the policy of Russia towards the states of Balkan Peninsula. Balkan is a Turkish derivative for forested mountains. It is used as a term to describe fragmentation of a region into independent but mutually hostile power centers. This term was used on erstwhile Ottoman Empire States of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia.

Bases: In the context of international relations, it is a term that signifies a point of military supply and troop concentration. Bases are strategically located and during the Cold War, both the US and the USSR established points of troop concentration in the territory of their allies.

Balance of Power (BOP): This term has developed no clear meaning due to multiple interpretations available. However, balance of power as a concept in international relations was used from the sixteenth century to early twentieth century, to describe an instrument


of policy to prevent power dominance. The European state system from 1815 to 1914 was an example of the use of BOP as an instrument to curb the quest for hegemonic ambitions. Hedley Bull asserted that BOP has prevented the formation of a universal empire through conquest. As per Bull, BOP has not only protected the independence of discrete states but has also facilitated the development of institutions like diplomacy and greater power management. As per BOP, the world in which we live in is a system where countries exist in a perfect equilibrium. The BOP theory says that the equilibrium of the system can be disturbed if a state in the system dramatically increases its power. This would compel other states in the system to form alliances or increase their own powers to reestablish balance in the system which had been disturbed in the first place due to the increase of power by one state. A term derived from BOP is Balance of Terror. In Balance of Terror, one state actor credibly threatens another state actor with destruction. During the Cold War, the US and the USSR often used the term in specific references to nuclear deterrence.

Choke Points: In context of naval diplomacy, it is a geopolitical term used to signify an international strait whose control could potentially affect commercial transit.

Civil War: A civil war is an internal state of violence within a nation where two or more factions fight to take over control of the political or legal apparatus of the state. There are three broad reasons as to why a civil war may happen. A civil war could happen to end colonialism; break away from a state and lastly, to achieve a reunion of separated states. In case of colonialism, there could be a civil war when some people in a colony favour an end to colonialism while a significant body intends to support colonial rule for the fear that the anticolonial insurgents could establish a political and an economic order that may affect those people.

The idea to secede away from a state may also lead to a civil war. In this case, it is an assertion of nationalism by ethnically homogenous people to achieve self-determination. The civil wars driven by a desire to seek reunion too are nationalistic in character. At the diplomatic level, at times there would be diplomatic support to insurgents to help them establish a government in exile. There could be military intervention by third party states when they engage by sending their own forces in case of a war. A case in point is that of India intervening in East Pakistan (Bangladesh) *Muktijuddho* (War of Independence) of 1971. Ironically, the UN has failed to evolve an effective mechanism to prevent third party states to intervene in situations of civil war.

Cold War: The term was coined by HB Scope, who was an American journalist. Walter Lipmann popularised the term, and stated that Cold War describes a situation where there is no war, yet no peace. It is a term that signified the global ideological tensions in the world created in the aftermath of the World War II by the US and the Soviet Union.



Colonialism: Colonialism is a form of imperialism where one country tries to control the politics and economy of another country. A country is made into a colony by a mother country, whereby the territory that gets colonised becomes a subordinate and servile country. The period from fifteenth to nineteenth century saw Portugal, British, France, Holland and Spain colonising the Americas, Asia and Africa. In the present context, non-colonialism is a term used to signify domination by developed countries of post colonial independent states. Similarly, internal colonialism as a term is used when a peripheral region is treated as a subordinate by an economically dominant segment of the state. For example, central Asian Republics were victims of internal colonialism post disintegration of the erstwhile Soviet Union. A process where a colony undertakes independence from a colonial power is called decolonisation. After the World War II, the world witnessed a surge of states gaining independence from colonial rulers and a term called the ‘Third World’ began to be used as a collective expression for these new states.

Deterrence: In a simplistic sense, deterrence means a situation where a person A may seek a certain behaviour from person B. If person B does not display the desired behaviour or tries to deviate from the desired behaviour, then person A can deter person B from behaving in an unacceptable manner by threatening person B with punishment. The basic idea of deterrence is to issue a threat to prevent any undesirable behaviour from another state. Deterrence is a special form of a power relationship where an imposer may make a threat upon a target whose behaviour the impostor wishes to oppose. Thus, deterrence is all about negative sanctions.

Disarmament: Disarmament is a process to reduce, remove and eliminate certain weapon systems identified by a state. It is normally used in the context of nuclear weapons. Once the process of disarmament is complete, it leads to an establishment of a completely disarmed world.

Exile: A situation where a person or group of persons is banished from one place to another. Though it is mostly viewed as a punishment, it could be either self-imposed or enforced.

Extradition: It is a legal term that signifies a situation or a process where one state hands over a fugitive to another state. To facilitate the transfer of persons, an extradition treaty is required. In the case of an absence of an extradition treaty, there is no duty upon a state under the international law to undertake extradition. It is normally used for transfer of criminals who seek refuge in a state other than the one where they happened to commit the

offence.

Failed Nation States: During the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union extended aid and support to other states with an intention to contain each other. As the Cold War ended, the term called failed nation state began to emerge and it signifies those states that could not survive without an aid.



Foreign Aid: It is a tool of economic diplomacy where the donor state may use monetary instrument to achieve certain policy goals within the recipient state. The most important factor in this scenario is the capability that the donor state needs to possess to assert economic influence on the recipient state. The capabilities are often measured as surplus national resource. At times, foreign aid could be used as a power instrument when it is used by a state actor to reward a behaviour of another state after removal of sanctions.


Free Trade (related to *laissez-faire*): It is a form of trading system which involves two actors where the trade of goods happens between the two without any restrictions. It indicates the abstention by governments from interfering in the workings of the free market. Any form of free trade promotes competition and efficiency and therefore is beneficial from an economic point of view. Free trade not only benefits a trader but also the consumers because traders through free trade can access foreign markets while the consumers can get access to imported goods. Thus, free trade promotes growth of interdependence amongst the actors. When actors establish a free trade area, they abolish the tariffs on identified goods amongst themselves and establish a free trade pact which then becomes a prerequisite for the establishment of a customs union.

Genocide: Genocide means the systematic extermination or mass killings of specific groups of people. Normally, genocide is much broader than simple mass killings and may involve acts like starvation, forced resettlement and even mass deportations, as in case of the Holocaust, which wiped out a significant ratio of European Jews. In December, 1948, the UN General Assembly has passed a Genocide Convention and it came into force in January, 1951. As per the second article of the genocide convention, genocide means destruction in whole or in part, of a national, ethical, racial or religious group.

Geopolitics: Geopolitics is a method of undertaking foreign policy analysis which tries to explain the political behavior of the state on the basis of the use of geographical variables. Geopolitics is a dynamic concept. A country may not be as geopolitically important today but may become so in future. For example, since the end of the World War II, the state of West Asia, for instance, Saudi Arabia, has been geopolitically important due to the fact that it possessed an extremely important resource in the form of oil and is located near the sea, allowing for easy trade of oil. However, as the world in the twenty first century is looking for cleaner and greener fuels and alternatives to oil, the countries possessing

natural gas and access to sea may become more geopolitically important in the future. Thus, the world is likely to see a decline of geopolitical significance of Saudi Arabia while Iran and Russia, which are in possession of natural gas, are likely to become geopolitically important in the near future.

Great Powers: This term is used in the theory of realism by realist scholars and it signifies the ranking of the global states in terms of their economic and military capabilities they possess. The hierarchy that is established on the basis of capabilities is as follows:



The term called ‘great powers’ found its first written mention in the Treaty of Chaumont in 1817, as, by the Congress of Vienna in 1815, Austria, Britain, France, Prussia and Russia were granted the great power status for the first time. In 1944, a foreign policy and IR scholar named William Thornton Rickert Fox replaced the term ‘great powers’ with ‘superpowers’ and since then, the US, Britain, France, Russia and China have been given the status of superpowers.

Gunboat Diplomacy: It is a term that has been used with respect to foreign policy since the nineteenth century. Its first mention was seen in the British foreign policy where the British navy would often be dispatched in a particular region to coerce a state or a ruler to pay debts. The British even dispatched naval squadrons to enforce punishments and restore order. Thus, over a period of time, gunboat diplomacy as a term came to be used for naval ships which are used for signalling intentions to an adversary state and are used for power projection.

Hegemony: Hegemony in the international system is the political, economic, or military predominance or control of one state over others. A state with adequate capabilities is called a hegemonic power in relationship to which the other states in the system define their relationship. When other states define their relationship with a hegemonic power, they could display a behaviour of opposition, display indifference, or even practise acquiescence with the hegemonic state.

Hot Pursuit: It is a legal doctrine mostly associated with maritime law. Nowadays, it is used to cover activities on land where one state may reserve the right to pursue an offender

outside its own territorial limits in national interest. In hot pursuit, the authorised agents of a state begin the action in the jurisdiction of the violated party and engage in the operation till the offender is broken off.

Immigration: It involves the movement of people from (one place to the other) from one state to another state in search of better employment and living conditions. It is different from a refugee wave. In immigration, the immigrant moves voluntarily rather than having been forced or evicted due to political or natural circumstances, which is the case with a refugee. In some countries, the immigrants do pose a cultural threat to the receiving state due to differences in their ideologies and beliefs. Immigrants do play an important economic role in a society as they send remittances back to their home state.

Junta: Junta means an administrative council or a ruling committee. In 1808, in opposition to the rule of Napoleon, during the Peninsula war, such councils were formed to signify a military government.

Military–Industrial Complex (MIC): The term was used by the US president Dwight Eisenhower in 1961 in his farewell speech. It was a term used during the Cold War times to establish a link between economic activity and military expenditure. The economic definition of MIC is that a state has consensus about the fact that if it undertakes military expenditure, it would lead to the generation of employment, which would, in turn, boost the economy. Thus, military expenditure is linked to employment generation. During the entire Cold War period, MIC was a phrase that signified the relationship between the government and defense manufacturers.

Multipolarity: Multipolarity identifies an international system with multiple poles or power actors. The first ever mention of the term dates back to the European system of the balance of power. However, the term has become more popular since the end of the Cold War and it refers to capabilities or power potentials of multiple actors to assert dominance in the international system. The US, Japan and the European Union in the post Cold War era are referred to as poles while India is perceived to be a near-polar power.

Paradiplomacy: In 1990, an American scholar named John Kincaid proposed the concept of paradiplomacy. If we try to define paradiplomacy in the Indian context, then it is a concept where we analyse and study the role played by a local government or a state government to enhance diplomatic ties with countries in the neighborhood. Paradiplomacy can allow a state to promote trade, culture, flow of economic ideas, and even outsource business and so on. In the recent times, paradiplomacy has been activated by India between India's north eastern states and Bangladesh when Sheikh Hasina visited India in 2017.


Revolution: A revolution means a sudden change in the system of governance of a state through violence. A revolution also signifies a change in the value system of the state. For the Marxist and Leninists, a revolution involves a socio-economic change in the society. Scholars like Edward Hallett Carr and Martin Wight feel that revolutions often cause instability and thus are not conducive to maintain order in the system.

Sphere of Influence: It refers to a situation where an outside state exercises particular economic or military exclusiveness over another region. In the context of a sphere of influence, there is no sovereign control over the other territory. When one state exercises

its sphere of influence over another state, it restricts the rights of the other power to exercise influence and also imposes limitations on the autonomy of states on which influence is exercised.

Tariffs: A tax on imports is called tariff. It is an important tool of raising revenue; however, at times, countries also use the system of tariffs for protectionism.

Treaty and Conventions: A treaty is a written agreement which is signed by countries or international organisations, making it obligatory for the signatory parties to accept certain rules that have been consensually agreed upon in the contract. On signature of the treaty, the signatory parties agree to follow the written obligations while agreeing to accept liabilities on failure to follow said obligations. The treaties are governed through the Vienna Convention (1969), which is also called the laws of treaties or the treaty of treaties. One important thing to remember is that when a state signs a treaty, it remains a party to the treaty even if domestically, after signing a treaty, the state government changes. On the other hand, a convention is a special treaty that concludes the discussion of an issue of global significance leading to the creation of an agreement to be ratified by the member states discussing the global issue. For instance, climate change and its consequences are discussed in conventions attended by several global member states.



Protocol: It is also a kind of a treaty but a specialised one as it allows amendments and alterations in the main text of the treaty.



Signature and Ratification of Treaties: If a state undertakes a signature to a treaty it means that the state has an interest in following the points mentioned in the treaty. Signature is a legal process but is of two types—simple signature and definitive signature. In a simple signature, a state is not bound to follow the points of the treaty until it ratifies the treaty. Thus, it means that a simple signature involves no obligation on the state as the state reserves the option of putting the treaty before the domestic national parliament allowing its people to have a say in the external matters of the state. On the other hand, in a definitive signature of a treaty, the state expresses its willingness to be bound by all the points of the treaty without the need for ratification of the treaty. When a state ratifies a treaty, it gives its consent to be bound by the treaty. In the ratification of a treaty, the state agrees to get the treaty approved by its national parliament and also indicates its willingness to be bound to other contracting parties in the treaty. In ratification, it gives the national parliament of state a much bigger role to direct state's external affairs.



Veto: Veto means an ability or power to stop an undesirable outcome unilaterally. A state needs to possess capabilities to exercise veto.

ADDITIONAL TERMS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Asia Pacific and Indo-Pacific: The term Asia Pacific encompasses Oceania, North-East-Asia and South-East-Asia. Asia-Pacific is not a security term but an economic concept used to describe the emerging market economies of South-East and East-Asia. On the other hand, Indo-Pacific is an evolving concept capturing the region from East-Africa to Western Pacific and is a strategic-cum-economic conception with special focus on sea lanes of communication.

Comprehensive National Power (CNP): Every country has to undertake some actions internationally. Such actions are based upon the strategic objectives a country may set. To achieve such actions as part of strategic objectives of state, it mobilises and utilises the strategic resources at its disposal. The capacity to mobilise these resources to achieve such actions set by the strategic objectives of a country is called its CNP. When we say mobilisation of ‘strategic resources’, there is an understanding that these resources could range from economic and military strength to diplomatic strength to national resources and so forth.

Hyphenation and Dehyphenation: Hyphenation is looking at two countries together when referring to their bilateral relationship. USA used the policy of hyphenation between India and Pakistan while building relationships with the two during cold war. Let us assume that there are three states A, B and C. In hyphenation, lets say A has hyphenated state B and C. Now, if A augments the capacities of B, because of hyphenation, A will have to factor out its impact on state C. One can understand the above illustration better by replacing state A with USA and States B and C with India and Pakistan. The governments of USA, from Bush to Trump, have finally led to dehyphenation of India and Pakistan. This has allowed the USA to augment military and strategic capabilities of India without worrying about its impact and reaction from Pakistan.

Joint Naval Exercises: These are exercises between the navies of two friendly states primarily organised to enhance joint operational skills and doctrinal learning. Such exercises can also be multilateral (MILAN exercise, for example) and are usually theme-based.

Joint Naval Patrolling: To address maritime challenges, two countries may resort to a cooperative deployment of their navies. These arrangements could be made for prevention of piracy, tackle illegal smuggling, illegal fishing and so on.

Natural Ally and Strategic Partners: Natural allies are states sharing common cultural, political, economic and historical values with each other, as, for instance, the USA and

Britain did in the Second World War. On the other hand, if two countries don't share the values as natural allies, but they witness a similar security threat, to mitigate the same, the two countries may come together and pool their resources, and then the two could become strategic partners but not natural allies, for example, USA and USSR in world war against a common security threat from fascists. (Indian concept of explanation, See [Section-E, Part-D, Chapter 3](#))

Non-Traditional Security Threats: These threats are very different from traditional security threats which primarily encompass environmental, economic and societal threats. Some of the prominent non-traditional security threats include migration, poverty, climate change, terrorism and Responsibility To Protect etc.

Nuclear Safety and Nuclear Security: Nuclear safety is concerned with safeguarding civilian nuclear infrastructure while nuclear security is concerned with ensuring that nuclear materials, technology and weapons do not fall into the hands of non-state actors or terrorists. The then president of USA, Barack Obama, in 2009, initiated the Prague Summit or Nuclear Security Summit to raise issues related to nuclear security. India has ratified the convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials since 2005 and has been a party to the International Convention for Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

Overt and Covert: When a country does something outright, in the open, it is called as an overt decision. India tested nuclear weapons in 1998 and overtly became a nuclear weapons state. Covert are actions done undercover and in a hidden manner. For instance, the RAW uses covert operations to keep Pakistan under check.

Research and Analysis Wing (RAW): During the British period in India, they created an organisation to gather external and domestic intelligence. This organisation was called the Intelligence Bureau (IB). After India became independent, the IB continued to gather external intelligence for India. After the defeat of India in the Sino-Indian conflict in 1962, a need was felt to have a separate organisation for external intelligence. During the Indira Gandhi government, in 1968, the separate agency called RAW was finally created with Rameshwari Nath Kao as its first chief. The RAW is a wing under the cabinet secretariat and is directly answerable to the Prime Minister. One of the important responsibilities of the RAW is to carry out covert operations with an intention to safeguard the national interests of India. The personnel of RAW are not called agents but research officers. RAW has its own service called RAW Allied Services (RAS). The RAW has successfully undertaken campaigns related to psychological warfare, subversion, sabotage and assassinations. In the chapters ahead in the book, we shall study some of the core operations of RAW.

Strategic Depth: Let us suppose that there are three hypothetical states—A, B and C. Strategic depth is a policy whereby state A may try to enhance its influence in state B to the extent that it emerges in a position to prevent the state C to exercise political influence in the state B. For instance, Pakistan has enhanced its presence in Afghanistan to ensure that there is a favourable regime in Afghanistan since a regime favourable to Pakistan in Afghanistan will allow Pakistan to limit the political influence of India in Afghanistan. Thus, Pakistan pursues a policy of strategic depth against India in Afghanistan.

Strategic Restraint: It is a term used for conflict resolution where a state would not use

force to resolve conflicts but deploy diplomatic and psychological options to attain objectives instead. In a policy of strategic restraint, a state prefers not to use violence and force to resolve crises and disputes. An alternative term to strategic restraint is resolve where the state may resort to using force as an option in situation of crises. As we shall see in the subsequent chapters ahead, India uses a mixture of both resolve and restraint in its foreign policy towards hostile states.

Tactical and Strategic Nuclear Warheads: Tactical nuclear warheads are short or small yield nuclear warheads which are used immediately in proximate locations while strategic nuclear warheads are long range nuclear warheads having capability of intercontinental ballistic strikes.

Thucydides Trap: A term used to signify a situation where a rising power establishes fear in an established power, leading to a conflict.

War and Conflict: When two countries have a disagreement which is not resolved, there could be tensions. Such tensions could manifest as a fight by one aggrieved party against the other. Such a fight or violence is called a conflict. Between two countries, if there is a violent spat or a disagreement on any issue, it may lead to a conflict. The conflicts have to be resolved through dialogue and negotiations to prevent a full-scale war. A war is a type of a conflict where the two countries may indulge in violence when one party officially declares and discloses the need to resort to violence to protect its sovereignty, rights and existence. The 1962 Indo-China disagreement over the border question led to the Sino-Indian conflict. Neither side ‘declared’ war, and consequently, 1962 is called a conflict. On the other hand, in 1971, India declared war on Pakistan after Indian base was attacked by Pakistan.


KEY CONCEPTS AND TERMS USED IN NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY

The 123 Agreement: It refers to the section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act, 1954 under which the US undertakes nuclear commerce with various countries. The US used this section to enter into agreements with various countries pertaining to nuclear cooperation. In 1963, India and the US had signed the 123 agreement for Tarapur Atomic Power Station. The US, after passing the Hyde Act in 2006, signed a 123 agreement with India in July 2007, thereby making an exception by allowing the US to permit nuclear commerce with India despite India being a non-signatory to the NPT. After the NSG specific waiver (explained in detail in the chapter of India-US relationship in the later part of the book), the 123 agreement was approved by both the houses of the US congress, thereby enabling the ‘US-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Non-Proliferation Enhancement Act.’

Additional Protocol: Additional protocols are basically safeguard agreements. After it was revealed that Iraq had violated the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, a need was felt to have extra safeguards. Under the old IAEA safeguards, all NPT signatories would specify their nuclear sites and IAEA would carry out inspections in the specified sites. Thus, IAEA, under the old safeguards, could only carry out inspection for unauthorised activities only at designated or specified sites declared by a country. This basically left an option open for states to carry out covert nuclear programmes. Thus, in 1993, the IAEA designed Additional Protocols (AP) to tighten the existing safeguarding

regime. But the AP was kept voluntary for a state. India, as part of the Indo-US nuclear deal, signed the AP with IAEA. Indian specific Additional Protocols (AP) do not give IAEA the right to hinder or interfere with activities which are outside the scope of India's safeguard agreements, thus recognising that India reserves a right to a military nuclear program outside IAEA agreement.

Atomic Energy Act, 1962: It was in 1948 that India passed its first atomic legislation to establish a framework to manage the Indian nuclear sector. The Atomic Energy Act, 1948, modelled on the British Atomic Energy Act, established the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) as the main regulatory body. In 1962, the Atomic Energy Act 1948 was superseded with a new Atomic Energy Act of 1962. Both the legislations have only centralised the Indian State Control over nuclear related activities.



Atoms for Peace: It was a programme which had its origin in the speech of US President Dwight Eisenhower at the UN General Assembly in 1953. In the speech, Eisenhower not only highlighted the dangers of nuclear weapons but also proposed peaceful use of nuclear technology. During the Cold War, the US began to use the programme to win allies in the global order. The US declassified nuclear documents and began to transfer nuclear technology to other states for peaceful use. India, Pakistan and Iran took advantage of the declassified knowledge to build up peaceful nuclear programmes.

Civil Nuclear Liability Act: The Indian Parliament, in August 2010, passed the Civilian Liability for Nuclear Damages Act (CLNDA). The legislation is important because India, after the signing of the Indo-US nuclear deal, would have to buy nuclear technologies from various countries. The law manages the liabilities of suppliers. Now, the Indian version of the CLNDA is perceived by many stakeholders as unworkable due to significant ambiguities in the legislation. For example, there is ambiguity about calculation of potential liability of a supplier. Due to this ambiguity, most of the insurance companies are reluctant to provide insurance coverage to the suppliers. Thus, in turn, due to the lack of insurance coverage, the suppliers are reluctant to supply parts and take part in Indian nuclear projects. There are other differences in the Indian law and other liability legislations. For instance, Indian law has limited the total compensation to 320 SDR or 450 million US dollars. Under the Indian law, the supplier of a nuclear part can also be held liable for faulty supply of equipment in case of a disaster.



There is a case made for an insurance pool where contribution by Indian government and insurance firms could mitigate the challenge of unwillingness to provide insurance cover.

Deterrence: Explained in the earlier section.


First Strike: First strike is a nuclear strategy of identifying and completely destroying enemy countries' nuclear forces. The attacker needs to not only have complete idea as to where the enemy has kept its nuclear weapons (to destroy them) but also needs to have some additional reserve of nuclear forces to prevent any devastating reprisal in case of an unsuccessful first strike. The first strike should not be seen as same as the first attack. A first attack would be a limited attack that may not destroy the enemy's nuclear forces.

First Use: If a state is not able to defend itself with conventional military forces or feels that there is uncertainty in its capacity to defend itself through conventional forces, it may reserve a right to the first use of nuclear weapons. Normally, when a state feels that its adversary may possess significantly superior conventional forces, it may be compelled to adopt first use. But first use does not mean early use, as states having first use may still resort to use of nuclear weapons as last resort. India has no first use doctrine.


Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: The first ever version of CTBT was proposed by Nehru in 1954 to ban atmospheric nuclear testing. It was later in 1993 that the Conference on Disarmament began to negotiate a CTBT. A text of the CTBT was finally prepared in 1996. The treaty decided to ban all forms of nuclear testing worldwide. The treaty till date has not come into force. As we shall see later in the chapter detailing India's Nuclear Policy, India due to various reasons, has refused to sign the treaty. As India refused to sign the treaty, the treaty itself could not be enforced as it was based on consensus of all parties in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). In September 1996, Australia took the text of the treaty to the UN General Assembly where while voting, India along with Libya opposed the treaty. The treaty can only come into force if all parties at the CD sign the treaty.

Conference on Disarmament (CD): It is a disarmament negotiating agency with its headquarters in Geneva. Five members from NATO and five members of Warsaw Pact in 1960 in Geneva had established the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament or the TNCD. To encourage further dialogue between the US and Soviet Union, the UN, in 1961, established Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENCD). The ENCD added eight members from the Third World and the ten from TNCD. The ENCD, in 1969, was rechristened and reconstituted as Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) and finally the CD replaced CCD in 1979. The CD has been instrumental in negotiation of CTBT (as explained above) along with acting as a forum to negotiate First Missile Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) and prevention of arms race in outer space treaty.

Fissile Material Cut off Treaty (FMCT): FMCT is a treaty being proposed to prohibit production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium. Regarding the scope of verification procedure, there is unanimity that the procedure should be strong, effective and also politically acceptable. Many countries have advocated that the procedure should not be the same as prescribed under NPT. Some sections in the Indian establishment are of the view that FMCT should have mechanisms whereby all states comply with all obligations. India's ambassador at the CD has reiterated that India would only favour a treaty if it intends to ban future production of fissile material only.



Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR): To prevent the proliferation of unmanned delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons, an informal agreement has been established called as MTCR in 1987 by the US, United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany, Italy and Japan. As per the MTCR, it places a ban on the transfer of such missiles that can carry more than 500 kilogrammes or have a range beyond 300 kilometres. In 1992, the MTCR expanded its mandate to add unmanned aerial vehicles.



India joined the MTCR in June, 2016. In 2015, India's membership to join the MTCR was blocked by Italy. China is not a member of the MTCR.



Peaceful Nuclear Explosion: When a nuclear explosion is carried out for non-military purposes, it is called a PNE. Such explosions are permitted by the NPT. Theoretically, characterising a test as a peaceful is very difficult. In 1974, India undertook a PNE at Pokhran.

KEY CONCEPTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The purpose of this section is to explain some of the major concepts in international relations.¹

Balance of Power: Explained in detail in the earlier section as well as the ensuing chapters on the rise of the nation states.

Collective Security: In a simplistic sense, collective security is equivalent to the doctrine of ‘one for all and all for one’. The idea of collective security is to create mechanisms legally to prevent an aggression by any state in the system against other states. This situation entails a collection of nation states enforcing peace by informing the aggressor state of a credible threat of sanctions or military actions. The essence of collective security is to use military action to enforce peace and to use overwhelming power collectively as a punishment to the aggressor. In a system of collective security, the states remain sovereign but relinquish the quest of using force to settle disputes among themselves to maintain peace among the members of the system. If a state illegally uses force against another state in a situation of collective security, it is assured of assistance from others, where by the state itself relinquishes its own ability to unilaterally use force. NATO is a collective defense system and not a collective security system.



The first attempt of collective security found mention in the League of Nations but as the idea behind the formation of the League of Nations, that of preventing another world War, failed, its successor, the UN, did not bring up this issue for discussion.



In the post-Cold War times, the idea of cooperative security has become more popular than the idea of collective security. The eastward expansion of NATO in the post-Cold War period justified the idea as it is also based on the logic that peace is indivisible and cooperative security therefore advocates use of regional institutions for collective action.


National Interest: It is used as an analytical tool in foreign policy to identify the objectives of foreign policy of a state. National interest is always those basic determinants used by a state to guide state policy in relation to other states in an international system. According to Charles Beard, the term ‘national interest’ gained momentum in political lexicon during sixteenth century in Europe, when it replaced *raison d'état* during the

gradual development of the idea of nationalism. The idea expressed was of development of interest of the whole of the society. Later on, it was used in the international relations as an exercise of state power.

In the subsequent sections of the book, we will see that the concept, in theoretical political analysis, is mainly used in the school of Realism and Hans Morgenthau was its most influential advocate. Morgenthau, as shall be later examined, advocated that the primary national interest of a state is acquisition and use of power, especially that of military power. Later theorists went on to say that the interests of a state are diverse and guided by shifts in the international environment. The root of national interests remains survival and security of a nation.

ADVANCED TERMS AND CONCEPT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Aid: It is a generalised term signifying a transfer of goods and services by two international actors on a concessional basis to each other. Aid can be given with certain strings attached but can also be granted without expectations of favour. The concept of aid gained popularity during Cold War times when aid was used as foreign policy tool by the US through the European recovery programme.



Ambassador: An ambassador is a principle enabling vehicle for official communications between states. An ambassador is a career diplomat of a sovereign state residing in another foreign state. It was in the fourteenth and fifteenth century in Venice and Milan, when the modern practice of resident ambassadors appeared. However, it was only in the Congress of Vienna in 1815 that recognised Corps Diplomatique and established the concept of resident ambassadorial system.


Capability: It is a term used while analysing the concept of power. The focussed attribute considered in case of capability is the possessions of the state actors involved. Earlier, the military and economic possessions were used as terms to signify the capability of a state. However, now, even diplomatic skill are equally recognised. In order to be powerful and more ‘capable’, one state should always possess more attributes than other actors.

Economic Sanctions: It is a form of economic statecraft whereby one state may resort to deliberately coercing another state actor to follow certain policy objectives. It involves an imposer-target relationship. The imposer uses tools of statecraft to compel the target to behave in a specifically desired way by threatening or imposing economic limitations, including boycotts and embargoes. Normally, in economic sanctions, the imposer tries to control access of goods and services for the target.

Hot Pursuit: It is a legal doctrine which has been primarily associated with the high seas.

In the recent times, the states have started using the doctrine of hot pursuit on land to pursue offenders which may normally be in the territorial jurisdiction of a foreign state. Such kind of a pursuit of offenders in a foreign territory may happen only in exceptional circumstances. The actions in such pursuits are always carried out by law enforcement officials of a state.

Strategic Partnership: Two countries normally have bilateral diplomatic relations. However, as the depth in bilateral diplomacy increases, the countries would favour changing their diplomatic niceties into strategic partnership, just stopping short of an alliance. The important elements of cooperation could manifest in the form of convergence in security diplomacy, defense diplomacy and even commercial diplomacy. The origin of the concept of strategic partnership goes back to the Cold War era. During the Cold War, states were allied to the two power blocks. However, as at the end of the Cold War the states found themselves independent, each of them began to stitch an important relationship with a more superior power by using the term strategic partnership.




India and its Strategic Partners: In SP, countries normally identify elements of vital diplomatic convergence. The concept of SP, as it has evolved in the last few decades, allows a state to enter into a cooperation-cum-partnership only in those areas where the two states feel that there is enough convergence, despite there being a lack of formal alliance. In other words, unlike an alliance that is binding for nations on all issues in all situations, SP convergences are always in areas where both states envisage a long term cooperation. India, since the end of cold has signed SP agreements with many nations. We will read about such agreements in detail in further sections of the text. For India, the common yardstick while entering into such an agreement is whether the other country has a critical role to play vis-à-vis our national security and national interest.



Summit Style Diplomacy: The origin goes back to the Cold War times when Winston Churchill used the term to define the summit meetings between the leaders of great powers. It is a form of international negotiation where leaders meet, negotiate and resolve issues. In summit level meetings, Churchill favoured face-to-face interactions with the leaders. In fact, Lloyd George also advocated that to settle things, leaders should meet face to face and talk. He is, in fact, known as the initiator of the idea of summit style diplomacy. In modern times, leaders meeting face-to-face to resolve issues are more common.

Different Tracks of Diplomacy: The word tracks in this context means channels used by international state order to undertake negotiations.

- **Track-I:** This means official diplomacy where heads of the states and diplomats and other government officials interact and negotiate to resolve issues.
- **Track-II:** This means use of non-official actors like NGOs, civil societies, business houses, media persons and even conflict resolution specialists negotiate to resolve issues.
- **Multi-track:** Multi-track diplomacy is a term coined by Dr Louis Diamond who has identified nine different tracks of diplomacy. The word track is mentioned as (T) in the below diagram.



White Shipping Agreement: When two states agree to conclude a white shipping agreement, both decide to exchange information with each other related to movement of non-military commercial merchant vessels. Since, in the waters around a state, a lot of vessels from small fishing ships to big trawlers move around, such an agreement reduces threat and brings more predictability and stability in the seas. Indian navy is striving to achieve complete Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) in waters around India. For the MDA to succeed, white shipping information exchange agreements help in knowing the vessels' countries of origin, countries enroute and destination points, thereby helping in

collating MDA.

Net Security Provider: It is a term associated with a country which can ensure a stable, peaceful and secure neighbourhood in the region it is based in.

Backchannel Diplomacy: When two adversaries carry out secret communication through secret lines to achieve a diplomatic breakthrough, such communications are called backchannel diplomacy. For example, Barack Obama and Hassan Rouhani opened up backchannel diplomatic talks that led to the US-Iran nuclear deal in 2015.

Pariah State: Any state in the international community which is perceived as an outcast is called a pariah state. It is also known as a global pariah.

Ping-pong Diplomacy: In the initial years of the Cold War, the US perceived China as a threat because of the Chinese propensity to lean towards the Soviet. In Early 1970s, the US and China began to exchange table tennis players. These table tennis matches paved a way for the two to open up communication channels which ultimately culminated in Nixon's visit to China. The ping pong refers to the table tennis opening up diplomatic channels of communication.

Soft Power Diplomacy: A concept of diplomacy coined by Joseph Nye where he explains that it is a form of diplomacy exercised by a state to win its avowed aim without resorting to military coercion or by extending an economic inducement as a carrot.

Brown Water Navy: It is a naval force which comprises of small ships, like patrol boats and gunboats, that are used to assist other mother ships. These vessels are primarily used in rivers.

Green Water Navy: It is a naval force which has capabilities to carry out offensive operations in the littoral zones of a state. They operate in coastal waters.

Blue Water Navy: It is a naval force having capabilities to project power abroad in foreign territories. The naval force can project power in deep oceans far away from the domestic waters of the state. Such ability to project power is possible through acquisition of aircraft carriers. India has aspiration of becoming a blue water navy.

TERMS USED IN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION


Economic integration between the states is a process driven by different kinds of agreements. Here, we will try to understand the technical differences amongst the different terms so that it eases out our reading of the book in its entirety where such terms would be frequently encountered.

Any economic integration opens up with agreement to remove disputes. In the first stage, the states may conclude a Trade Investment Framework Agreement or TIFA . Whenever two states intend to expand trade and resolve any bilateral disputes, TIFA is their usual first step. In 2009, ASEAN and the USA concluded a TIFA. At the same level, in the first stage, a Bilateral Investment Treaty or BIT too could be envisaged. The BIT is signed to invite Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and to pledge to protect the investments of investors in each other's territory. Germany and Pakistan had concluded the first BIT in the world in the 1940's.


The second step in the integration is to first conclude a Preferential Trade Agreement

or PTA. In a PTA, the participating states not only make the non-tariff barriers insignificant but also the tariff barriers stand to be reduced. The PTAs are a prelude to a Free Trade Agreement or FTA. In an FTA, the states eliminate tariffs on goods and services. The FTAs, by removing barriers to trade, promote a competitive advantage by boosting specialisation and division of labour. If countries envisage integration beyond an FTA, then they conclude a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) or Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA). In CECA, the countries not only promote trade in goods and services by liberalising tariffs, but also establish an investment regime. On the other hand, in a CEPA, apart from liberalisation of trade in goods and services there are agreements on investments, intellectual property and fair competition.

The last stage is known as a Common Market where there is free movement of capital and labour from one nation to another apart from the free trade in goods, services and investments. The Common Market removes all technical, physical and fiscal barriers amongst participating states. The highest form of economic integration, however, is when the group of states decides to charge a similar import duty for imports and allowing complete free trade amongst the group. Such an integration mechanism is called a Customs Union.



The theoretical mechanism of integration is as follows:



Three World Theory: The First World refers to the club of rich nations and this term came into use during the Cold War to signify the nations of the West led by the capitalist US. The Second World during the Cold War signified states economically and militarily stronger than the Third World and the countries led by USSR had this tag. A stereotypical term, Third World, was used to signify states which were decolonised after the World War II and were less industrialised and relatively poor states. Though the Third World countries were mostly non-aligned countries, the tag was also associated with the communist state of Cuba.

1. As mentioned in the syllabus of Political Science and International Relations optional (Paper-II, Part – Comparative Political Analysis and International Politics, item (6) for the Main examination conducted by the UPSC.

1
CHAPTER

International Historical Context and World History for International Relations from Ancient Times till the Rise of Europe

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Need for history in International Relations
- Illustration—Afghanistan and historical repetition
- Evolution of the concept of International Society
- Hedley Bull's theory on international society
- International history of the ancient world, medieval times and modern times.

INTRODUCTION

The chapter introduces us to international history from the ancient to modern times. The task of this chapter is to demonstrate to the reader through theory and multiple case studies the basic principles of diplomacy existing from ancient to modern times. Our attempt in the next three chapters will be to study how the past has not only shaped our modern world but what patterns have emerged over a period of time in the past giving us potential indicators of the world ahead. For the ease of chronology, this chapter will be discussing events from ancient times till the rise of Europe. The next chapter (chapter two) will focus on the events leading up to World War I until World War II and chapter three will examine in detail global events during the Cold War. The fourth chapter is a brief description of the ongoing post-Cold War period and the hints on the future of the post-Cold War period.

THE NEED FOR HISTORICAL BACKGROUND IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

We study history in International Relations because the subject of history and politics are interlinked with each other. It is from the interaction of the two subjects that we see the birth of diplomacy. Thus, to understand the nuances of diplomacy, the study of history and politics helps. The study of past plays an important role because it helps us to get equipped with the background and context of the present nature of the world. Also, the study of past eases our day understanding as it is aptly stated that history repeats itself.

Illustration—Afghanistan and Historical Repetition

Our understanding of the past of Afghanistan helps us to understand its present. Due to its strategic location, Afghanistan has always been important for various powers. The British tried to control it in the pre-World War II period by having a puppet ruler Shah Shuja on the throne. In the post-Cold War period, it is the Americans who moulded much of recent Afghan history with their close proxy rulers namely, Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani. History not only repeats itself but, it also teaches patterns of repetition as visible above.

THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

Every society has certain rules and practices. Societies also do not act and exist in isolation. All societies do interact and the interaction amongst the societies has been going on since ages. But in the past, many times societies did interact with each other based on certain rules and practices which were common to all those societies which interacted. This gave birth to the idea of international society. It is understood that when some common rules and practices bind interactions in society, the world in which these societies are bound becomes an international society.

Thus we can conclude by saying that international societies play an important role in the understanding of history and politics. International societies emerge when nations form associations on the basis of certain values, rules and interest. The concept owed its origin to European nation states but today, in the post-Cold War world, this order is applied to distinct political arrangements amongst distinct political communities.

According to a scholar named **Hedley Bull**, when a group of states, on the basis of common interests and values, form a society and get bound by common rules of interaction amongst themselves, this is the time when states accept no power higher than themselves, thus existing in a situation of international anarchy.

The proper origin of the idea of an international society owes its origin to Europe where, in the modern times, especially after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, we witness the rise of the European state system which was based on core ideas, rules and practices which knitted the nations on themes like non-interference, sovereignty, equality, and so on. After 1648, the system that emerges in Europe not only gave rise to modern diplomacy but also paved way for a drastic re-haul of the structures of the world leading to the birth of the modern world.

INTERNATIONAL HISTORY OF THE ANCIENT TIMES

Our study of the ancient times begins from the period of the rise of successive civilisations. We do not include the time period when man was a hunter and a food gatherer, since it is part of pre-history, that is, the time period from where no historical record has survived and evidences mostly include only fossils and archaeological findings.

In our study of the ancient period, we shall have a look at cases of ancient Indian foreign policy, the case of the special hegemonic system of ancient Greece and the diplomacy in ancient China. In the study all of three cases, it will become clear to us that since ancient times, diplomacy did indeed exist. Even during this period, the countries/civilisations conducted themselves according to a well-defined foreign policy. Elements of modern international diplomacy, like alliances, treaties, self interests, strategy, and exchange of diplomatic envoys, hegemony and shifting conditions were deeply present during this period. In fact, the first ever traces of diplomacy go back to as early as 3000 BC in Mesopotamia, which showed the earliest recorded evidences. Traces were also visible in 2300 BC when a peace treaty had been recorded between the Ebla King of Syria and the King of Assyrians.

In case of civilisations in the ancient times, things were very different than the modern state system, where we have societies that have a well defined territory and exist

on the principle of legal equality and sovereignty. As man gradually transformed from being a hunter-gatherer and began to lead a settled life, the situation led to a rise in economic complexity within the group, necessitating trade.

Due to trade between communities not only did people from one region come into contact with others, it also fuelled an urge amongst territory controllers (later known as ‘kings’) to extend authority over more and more land. War certainly was one option but another peaceful way out was negotiation through diplomatic envoys and treaties. A very interesting feature of the ancient period was that not only was it monarchical but the king was also ordained with divine powers and the reflection of this divinity found manifestation in diplomatic missions as well.

For example, during ancient times, in the Middle East, not only did the kings sign treaties on border trade, grazing rights, and so forth, these treaties were accompanied by ceremonies and rituals and the treaties were concluded by diplomats. But more importantly, in these treaties, there were frequent delineations of detailed and elaborate procedures to be followed upon the violation of treaties. The violation of treaties was perceived to have divine retributions as the treaties were supposed to have been bestowed with divine sanctions. Though nation states do not use divine concepts in official diplomacy in modern times but divine words are still very much in fashion in the Middle East and North Africa.

Illustration–Divinity–Iran and Saudi Arabia

Recently, in January 2016, when Saudi Arabia executed Sheikh Nimr Al Nimr, who was a religious Shia leader in Saudi, executed for on terrorism offences, the Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warned Saudi Arabia of “divine revenge”.

Now let us turn our attention to the core text and case studies and have a look at ancient India's foreign policy to identify certain core principles of ancient diplomacy to begin with.

India and Realism in Kautilya's *Arthashastra*

The ancient Indian period saw numerous religious norms exercised within the purview of international relations. There were elaborate rituals on diplomacy. The birth of the idea of diplomatic envoys goes back to the times of the *Rig Veda*; however, the existence of diplomatic missions in reality emerged much later. The conduct of the state in war and at times of diplomacy emerged during the times of the scholar Kautilya. His *Arthashastra* specially talks about diplomacy. It is only in *Arthashastra* that we get an in-depth idea of ancient Indian diplomacy.

Arthashastra advocated that self-interest is the driving force of diplomacy and that the state is the primary actor in politics. (Later in the chapter on Realism, we will see that the modern realists have propounded similar notions while advancing the theory of Realism in international relations.)

All states act to maximise their self-interest. *Arthashastra* says that State A may make State B its ally, but this alliance between them will be based upon some kind of self-interest A may achieve on alliance with B and vice-versa. More so, even if a state may behave in an altruistic fashion, it certainly would be having a touch of self-interests in some subtextual context or other.

Alliances were deemed important for various reasons. Self-interest is the driving force of an alliance but alliances could be made for acquisition of territory, acquisition of uninhabited areas, and joining forces together to crush rivals or as a defence against other powers. In any case, alliances were to be formed by elaborate treaties to be signed by the king in good mutual faith.

Apart from emphasis on self-interest in diplomacy and alliance formation, *Arthashastra* advanced the Mandala theory of foreign policy. This theory states that a state's immediate neighbour will be an enemy state and the neighbour of the enemy state is an ally (we shall see later how India actually practises Mandala Theory in bilateral relations with Afghanistan).

The most interesting aspect of *Arthashastra* is its linkage of diplomacy and war. It advocates that diplomacy is a subtle act of aggression done with an intention to weaken the enemy and gain advantage for oneself with an ultimate aim towards conquest. The role of ambassadors finds a special mention in the *Arthashastra*. Ambassadors are potential spies with diplomatic immunity. They play an important role in apprising the ruler with all inside information of the kingdom they reside in. At the level of foreign policy, the advice of Kautilya is that in foreign policy matters, one either conquers or suffers conquest depending upon the role of the diplomats and the kings. To explain this, in *Arthashastra*, he advanced an idea of foreign policy based on expediency. He argued that if the domestic state's king is weaker than the neighbouring king, then the domestic king needs to maintain peace and if domestic king is stronger than the neighbour then foreign policy should be driven by war with

an ultimate aim towards conquest.

Thus, we can see that when it comes to *Arthashastra*, it clearly asserts self-interest of a state as the core guiding tool for foreign policy. It also talks about alliances, treaties and diplomacies as was undertaken in Greece or in China (as we will see ahead).

Sun Tzu, Liberalism and Competitive Diplomacy in China

The Chinese concept of diplomacy in the ancient period was relatively different. The Chinese understanding of political domination was based on the promise of cultural superiority as the Chinese identified themselves in cultural terms and, in cultural hierarchy of the world, saw themselves on the top of the world.

Some accounts of Chinese foreign policy analysis can be culled from the ideas advanced by ancient Chinese scholar, Sun Tzu. Sun Tzu advanced the theory that countries should form great power relations on principles of cooperation and trust (similar to the ideals held by Liberalism in foreign policy). In fact, Sun Tzu rejected the idea of the use of force in form of war but advanced the idea of warfare by deception. The basic logic of warfare of deception was to subdue the enemy without fighting. As Sun Tzu aptly says in his book *The Art of War*: “When capable, reign in activity; when active; inactivity”.

Sun Tzu propounded the idea of competitive diplomacy in which he states that to remove conflict, a nation must have a strategy for diplomacy and war. A country without a strategy would be easily made captive by the one having a strategy. Thus, in case of China, we can identify that the ancient times advanced an idea of cooperation and trust in diplomacy. Greece, however, is a different matter altogether. Let us turn our attention to the study of Greece.

The Ancient Greek Concept of the Balance of Power

Greece is an example where, during ancient times, we witness not only league formation (which surfaced in the form of alliances elsewhere in ancient times) but also instances of shifting alliances to maintain the balance of power. In fact, the origin of balance of power based foreign policy is seen in Europe during modern times, but was also evident in Greece as early as the ancient period.

The political entities in Greece in the ancient period were called ‘**city states**’. The city states had differing forms of political control ranging from monarchy to aristocracy to oligarchy but were commonly bound by religion and language. All city states were differently governed but were independent of each other. In our study, our concern is mostly about two important Greek city states, namely Sparta and Athens. Sparta is a classic example of how ancient Greece exercised the concept of power. The location of Sparta was such that in its north lay Athens and south of Sparta was the city state of Peloponnesian. In Sparta, the lower class people were called Helots. Sparta always believed the southern city states may use Helots to create trouble for the city state Sparta. Thus, to ensure that nothing of this ever happens, to ensure

security of its own city state, Sparta built up alliances in the Peloponnesian peninsula, exercised its influence and ensured that none of the Peloponnesian city state use Helots and encourage them to revolt. The Peloponnesian states existed independently but supported Sparta at times of need. Sparta also gave liberty to the Peloponnesians to exist independently and support Sparta in case of crises. Thus, through this alliance network, Sparta ensured its own security effectively.

In north, Greece had Athens. Athens was frustrated with repeated Persian invasions. To bring about an end to the Persian invasions, the city states of Athens formed a Delian League. This League consisted of around 200 city states, all which were vulnerable to repeated Persian invasions. Through this league, Athens successfully managed the Persian menace.

The story of Greece is not just about Athens and Sparta but other powerful city states like Corinth, Thebes and Argos which were also strong and played a role in maintaining the overall balance of power. In one of the wars in 404 BC, Athens got defeated. Seeing this, Sparta began to assert its hegemony. To control the Spartan's hegemony, Corinthians, Thebes and Athens formed an alliance against Sparta. Later on, a peace treaty was pushed with Sparta to control its assertion. Thus, one can see not only hegemonic tendencies but also anti-hegemonic coalition formed in Greece to ensure balance of power amongst the states.

Thus, through our study of the ancient times, it becomes clear that certain common core features in diplomacy did exist despite differences in space and time. These common threads include

- Alliance formations,
- Self interest of states,
- Importance of cooperation,
- Hegemonic assertions
- Role of treaties in diplomacy

Not only did all these undoubtedly continue in the medieval period, but they were then extended in the modern times, albeit in differing degrees of usage and in varying forms. The continuity is observed in Roman Empire in medieval times, including in the period of Renaissance and Reformation. Obviously, as the world became more complex, so did these core threads evolve with time. Let us look at the 'medieval Roman Empire and how it fell to Ottoman conquests,' finally paving the way for the rise of the modern world.

INTERNATIONAL HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL ERA

As the ancient empires began to crumble, the kings who succeeded them were unable to exercise greater influence than their ancestors. This paved the way for the land-owning nobles, called the gentry or aristocracy to assert superiority. This period is often known as a period of feudalism in Europe. The nobles not only controlled the land but also the army. The kings had less and less power with time. The kings were mostly dependent upon the nobles to supply soldiers and ammunition for the royal army in case of conflict as the king himself did not possess resources to mobilise a strong army. The impact of feudalism is visible in the society too. The medieval society was a relatively closed society. The nobles had created a very hierarchical system where commodity production was highly

controlled. The goods were produced mainly to fulfil domestic societal needs. There was absolutely no need for extra production for any trade. This also proves why society in medieval times was more developed in villages and lacked development for towns and cities.

In the study of international relations, our interest in the medieval period shall be restricted to the West and the Eastern Rome. During this period the international diplomacy as a tool did not flourish in the way it did in the modern times ahead. The main reason was the slide of Europe into the dark ages due to feudalistic tendencies. This period was also marked by invasions, wars and ultimately, the Crusades. This period was also a period of transition. It ultimately began to decline from 1453, which paved the way for the rise of the modern world.

It is generally accepted by historians that Rome began to rise from 753 BC and continued its existence till 1453. The history of Rome in initial period from 509 BC to 27 BC is that it existed as a 'Republic'. The territory was managed by elected officials. It was only from 27 BC to 476 AD that Rome had an Emperor and it is under the leadership of later emperors that the Roman Empire began to expand. It is generally accepted by the historians that sometime around 117 AD, the Roman Empire was territorially at its peak. As the empire expanded, the governance of a large territory became difficult. It was due to administrative difficulties in governance of this mega-territory that in 285 AD it compelled the Roman Emperor Diocletian to split the empire. From then onward, one part of the territory was called Western Rome while other was called Eastern Rome or the Byzantine Empire. The Western and Eastern Rome began to have distinctive phases of history.

Almost beginning around 410 AD, various Germanic barbarians, namely Visigoths, began invading Western Rome. Western Rome had already depleted a sizeable amount of its resources in its conflict with Sassanid Persians. At the time of barbarian invasions, Western Rome was relatively very weak both on the economic and military levels. Thus began the gradual decline of western Rome and, for the next 500 years, almost till 10th century, Western Rome crippled and slipped into the dark ages. However, the Pope in Western Rome still managed to consolidate his presence though failing to exercise his authority beyond a particular point.


This was not the condition in Eastern Rome. The Byzantine Empire or Eastern Rome was located on land which was relatively resource rich. Also, its location was strategic in the sense that it acted as a transit hub for European and Asian trade. Thus, the rulers of Eastern Rome not only consolidated themselves after the separation, but also reformed their economic and military institutions at a time when the western part drifted into dark ages.

But the success of Byzantine was not to be long lasting. The stability of the Byzantine Empire had already roused the jealousy of the Pope. There were visible tendencies of interference from the Pope in East Rome. To counter and contain the rising authority of the East, the Pope in the West, in 800 AD, crowned Charlemagne as the Emperor. But all these attempts to revive the West as a counter to the East ultimately led to a split in 1054 AD between Holy Roman Emperor's Churches of the West and that of the Church of the East. This schism in the Church was followed by imperial feuds as to who

would be the successor in the East. This led to the East focussing more on internal feuds than in presenting a consolidated front to the Seljuk Turks who began to attack the Byzantine Empire. This internal fixation of the East led to the first blow which came when, in 1076 AD, the Seljuk Turks successfully defeated the Byzantinians in the battle of Manzikert. It was from this time that the decline of the East began. The decline of the East finally culminated in 1453 AD when Ottomans (who succeeded Seljuk Turks) defeated the Eastern Empire with the capture of city of Constantinople.

Thus one can see that in the medieval period, western society was a very complex mosaic of the Papacy and monarchy. The church did play an important role in laying down a behavioural norm for medieval societies. The role of the Papacy dominated this period. However, as we shall later see how, in the times ahead, the role of Pope declined with rise of modern states and absolute monarchies.

The entire medieval world order can be depicted as below:



RISE OF MODERN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY AND THE NATION STATES

In the medieval times, the Crusades had begun. Due to the Crusades, the Europeans had gradually come into contact with the people of the Far East. When the Crusaders came back to European lands, they brought back a lot of luxurious commodities from the east. As the Europeans gradually got accustomed to these luxuries from the East, the urge to acquire more of the same grew. Some of the rich nobles who tasted these luxuries demanded more of them. They started exerting pressures on the land and serfs to produce more in agriculture and crafts so that they could exchange them with the luxuries of the east. This pressure on the land and people, coupled with a desire to acquire luxuries, began to give the poor more reasons to acquire wealth and seek jobs to meet the rising demands.

Gradually all these energies pulsated outwards in its contribution to the gradual decline of feudalism. People began to expand not only their skills but also began to move to towns. Gradually, more towns and cities began to emerge. A group of people in towns and cities acted as merchants who took control of ensuring the supply of luxuries. As the

production in Europe began to increase and as merchants began to engage in more trade, the domestic income in the hands of the new rising middle class began to grow. This also created an urge amongst this middle class to taste the luxuries. A new system was about to emerge even as the old feudal order began to get dismantled. The trade with east began to prosper, only to be limited, however, by the Turkish invasion of Constantinople.

The Turks captured Constantinople in 1453 and it came as a final blow to the Byzantine Empire, which was already on the verge of decline since 1054 (the great schism in the church).

The situation in Italy in 1453 was relatively different. In Italy, there was negligible Papal control. The Papacy, over a period of time, had lost control of the Italian territory. Italy was largely controlled by merchants. An atmosphere of free thinking had prevailed here as the merchants were busy in trade. Due to merchant control, a lot of scholars in Italy were motivated by the ancient past and were busy digging ancient Greek and Roman Cultures.

The moment Turks captured Constantinople in 1453, scholars from Constantinople began to move to Italy. In Italy, they hardly faced any opposition from the merchants controlling the city and it began to serve as a sanctuary for scholars. These scholars, over a period of time, began to intermingle with the scholars in Italy. The scholars who fled Constantinople carried with them whatever ancient scholarly work they possessed. This led to a further impetus to the existing Italian scholars who were digging ancient Greek and Roman cultures.

Gradually, due to the integration of scholars in the system, coupled with an environment conducive for free thinking, Italy began to emerge as a centre of learning. Scholars in Italy increased their intensity in digging ancient Greek and Roman cultures. There was a sudden revival of ancient Greek and Roman cultures and a new urge to appreciate the ancient past and ancient classics.

The reading of the ancient past gave Europe a new lease of life. His thought processes gradually began to change. Man began to appreciate the ability to reason. For him, this revival of study of ancient past and subsequent gain of aspiration culminated in a landmark movement called the Renaissance. Renaissance freed man from the tutelage of the past and encouraged him to think beyond. Not only did his mental horizons begin to widen but it was coupled with another important invention—the press.

One of the most important things to happen during this period was the invention of the printing press. The press provided an impetus to making the greatness of the ancient past available to all. This was accompanied by a rise in the vernacular languages. The texts were now made available for the larger population to read. This increased the curiosity of the common people, who, after reading ancient texts, including, more importantly the Bible, began to develop a critical spirit of enquiry. This particularly laid the seeds for religious reformation.

Renaissance as a movement began to spread and it not only awakened man's mind but also taught him to appreciate other humans. This appreciation and love of humans saw its manifestations in art, architecture, sculpture, music, paintings, and so forth. It developed during this period as a force under humanism.

Renaissance certainly brought about the propensity towards rationality in the minds of people and encouraged them to think independently. It also encouraged people to criticise things that lacked logic. Renaissance revolutionised the human mind and inculcated a spirit of learning.

This period of Renaissance is also crucial for other developments that paved ways for the rise of modern Europe. Firstly, when Turks captured Constantinople, they also got hold of all trade routes by Europe and Asia. Europe witnessed a situation of deprivation of oriental luxuries. The Europeans were gradually becoming impatient. They understood that the Turks would act as obstructions in case of trade with the east. The Europeans now began to search for new trade routes and this search for the same paved way for the rise of geographical discoveries. The geographical discoveries gave rise to a new merchant class and a subsequent new middle class in Europe which became a new social force. This class began to accumulate wealth and made attempts to control municipalities and later on, state power. Geographical discoveries also increased the ambition of men to reach new territories to undertake more trade. Thus, this was the time period when we witnessed the rebirth of Europe. The Renaissance and geographical discoveries gave it the much-needed push.

Another important development of this period was invention of gunpowder. This brought about a radical shift in political power structures. In the medieval feudal world order, as we saw previously, the kings were basically dependent upon standing armies from the nobles and barons. As the invention of gunpowder happened, the kings now were not dependent upon nobles for armed support anymore. The relevance of nobles gradually began to decline, and taking advantage of invention of gunpowder, the kings began to take control of the armies and began consolidation of their positions. The kings began not only to consolidate their positions but also began to give impetus to the rising middle class and took steps to promote trade. The monarchs began to accept the new social rules and also decided to shed off the medieval social order in favour of the new social rules and a new society.

One of the other crucial things happening in this period was gradual birth of a movement called the Reformation.

The roots of Reformation could be very well traced in the ongoing revival or rebirth of Europe. Renaissance and geographical discoveries gave birth to trade and a rise of the merchant class. This new merchant class made cities their new homes. As people saw opportunities for intellectual and material growth in cities, they gradually began to migrate outwards from villages to cities. The intellectual revolution brought about by the Renaissance also encouraged people to challenge the medieval notions of the authority of the church. Over a period of time, as the printing press was discovered, not only did it contribute in making available classics of ancient past for people, but the boost to vernaculars also led to translation of Bible for the common man who was hitherto unable to read it in traditional Latin. As people read the Bible, they began to question the authority of the Church more than before. Two things clearly emerged out of this new situation. Firstly, the rise of a city life drastically reduced the revenue of the church. As people began to move to cities, they paid less attention on the church and focussed more on survival. This drastically reduced the availability of money to the church. Church

seriously needed finance to re-assert its authority over the people. Due to commercial revolution and a need to sustain oriental luxuries, there was a thrust amongst monarchs to promote trade and patronise the emerging middle class to consolidate their position. Due to this, many monarchs also felt lesser need to use church for state power. The monarchs also did not feel like risking the use of the church to suppress a newly emerging social order. Also, the past events like the Great Schism of 1054 had already caused cracks in the authority of the Church.

More importantly, the invention of the printing press facilitated the emergence of religious reformers like Martin Luther. In 1517, Pope Leo X desperately needed money to complete the construction of St. Peter's Cathedral in Rome. To collect money, the Pope authorised the sale of something called indulgences. The idea of indulgences went back to the times of the Crusades. The logic was that if person committed a sin, he or she could ask for forgiveness from God by purchasing an indulgence from the Pope on offering the required payment. The justification involved was that a person paying for the indulgence is paying a part of his hard earned money as a sacrifice to the Church and thus, God would forgive the person for his sacrifice. In 1517, when Martin Luther saw the authorisation of indulgence sale by Pope Leo-X, he stimulated a debate on the sale of indulgences and began to question its rationality. This debate ended years later not only in religious reforms in the church but ultimately concluded with a split in Christianity, leading to the rise of Protestantism along with existing Catholicism. The religious question concluded with the Thirty Years' War which ended in the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and finally ended the religious question once and for all in Europe.

Renaissance, the Reformation and new geographical discoveries not only created a new spatial awareness and an interest in cartography but also emphasised the need of territorial expansion and strictly defined boundaries. The balance of power now became a new instrument which would act to mitigate hegemony, thus rendering it a new tool in statecraft. As the developments mentioned previously brought about a new doctrine of sovereign independence in Europe, the rise of the nation states and absolute monarchy ushered Europe into a new phase of conflict. The Peace of Westphalia (1648) Peace of Westphalia, European settlements of 1648, which brought to an end the Eighty Years' War between Spain and the Dutch and the German phase of the Thirty Years' War, was the peace negotiated, from 1644, in the Westphalian towns of Münster and Osnabrück. The Spanish-Dutch treaty was signed on January 30, 1648. This treaty finally ended the religious struggle of Europe which began with the Reformation. The Peace of Westphalia stated clearly that the rulers of states have the right to observe religious tolerance in their internal policies and there will be no Papal interference in religious affairs of the state. As the Peace of Westphalia accepted that rulers of the states would have the right to decide the religion of its subjects, it also was a clear acknowledgement of the state sovereignty. Additionally, Spain also recognised the independence of the Dutch Republic.

The Peace of Westphalia created a basis for national self-determination and established the precedent of peace established by diplomatic congress. It also founded a new system of political order in central Europe, later called Westphalian sovereignty, based upon the concept of co-existing sovereign states. Inter-state aggression was to be held in check by a balance of power. A norm was established against interference in another state's domestic affairs. As European influence spread across the globe, these

Westphalian principles, especially the concept of sovereign states, became central to international law and to the prevailing world order.

At the political level, in 1700, in Europe the crisis emerged again on the question of succession to the powerful Spanish crown after the death of Charles II, the last Habsburg king of Spain. The concern was that whosoever would be the successor of Spain should be able to preserve balance of power. The challenge of succession was more dependent upon external forces like France and Austria, who, due to imperial relationships, made equal claims. The war of Spanish succession came to an end with the Treaty of Intercut in 1713 which recognised the principle of the balance of power.

As the kings consolidated positions, their energies pulsated outwards and the urge to conquer lands for sustaining the new commercial and intellectual revolution. All this firstly stabilised Europe, and secondly, gave birth to diplomacy. Not only did the states begin to rise to the logic of territoriality but the states' interests became so inextricably linked with each other that if one state took an unwelcome measure, it affected others and this led to a reaction by other states to normalise the unification, which gave way to rise of concept of the balance of power. States realised that they needed a path open to the other states through which important information and dialogue could flow. This paved way for rise of permanent ambassadors who began playing an important role in international politics of the newborn Europe.

The king also realised the need to rehabilitate the nobles who were disenchanted because of their deliberate neglect by the king and thus, initially, it was the nobility that acted as the first diplomats in the diplomatic corps of the modern times. This gave eliteness to the concept of diplomacy which happened due to rehabilitation of the nobles in the diplomatic corps and is visible even today in the practice of 21st century diplomacy. Thus, this period saw the rise of a professional diplomatic service that had the ability to maintain the balance of power through treaties which no more had religious sanctions but were based on an agreement as per international law. Thus, the period from Renaissance till the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 introduced in Europe the period of stability and brought about rise of the principles of modern society like sovereignty, non intervention, institutions of diplomacy, balance of power and international law.

Meanwhile, as trade flourished through new sea routes, it could not be financed anymore through money from individual merchants. There was felt a need for a more organised source of trade finance. This led to the rise of joint stock companies to finance trade. As geographical discoveries continued, there came an age of enlightenment. This enlightenment by intellectual scholars which was a continuation of the spirit ignited by the Renaissance and reason had a profound impact on European society. The age of Enlightenment encouraged the man to think freely and scholars and intellectuals lent support in building a societal foundation based on reason and critical enquiry. The Enlightenment had two consequences on the European history. It, firstly, produced the spark for political revolutions and secondly, gave impetus to experimentation which ultimately led to the industrial revolution.

The first cataclysmic event in the west was the American Revolution. The Enlightenment scholars had an effective contribution in igniting and sustaining the struggle. The sustained intellectual contributions of Jefferson, Locke, Milton and Thomas

Paine are a testimony to the fact. In 1776, America finally became a republic. It witnessed its own troubles in the form of civil wars in its road to stability. But the American Revolution had two important consequences. The first was that it sowed the seeds for a revolution in France and the second, the ideal of democracy was seen as an inspiration by the French. This paved way for the French revolution in 1789 which was based on the ideas of liberty, equality and fraternity. The ideas spearheaded by the French Revolution resonated deeply amongst Europeans almost till 1945.

This intellectual revolution also brought about an urge in man to indulge in experimentation. The manifestation of this spirit was seen at the industrial level where man began developing modern techniques of production. His thinking and application of reason in industry was encouraged through the ongoing period of Enlightenment. This intellectual revolution ultimately paved way for important changes in industrial production and gradually provided a strong imperative for the industrial revolution. As the industrial revolution progressed, the monarchs not only felt an urge to procure resources to fuel domestic industrial build-up but also felt the need to establish markets to sell their products. A strong need was felt to get resources and slaves for continuing the industrial revolution. At the economic level, the manifestation of Enlightenment was a new economic policy of 'Mercantilism' (dealt with later in detail) which developed and engulfed the thinking of European monarchs.

The search for new trade destinations for resources, slaves and later, markets for produced goods, fuelled the industrial revolution and later contributed to the increase in the interstate rivalry in Europe. As France, Denmark and Britain began to industrialise, they gave way to imperial endeavours. The British certainly had the edge considering they were the first amongst Europeans to stabilise politically through democracy which was established successfully after the Glorious Revolution of 1688. The situation created enormous desperation amongst Europeans to colonise distant lands in Asia and Africa. The impulse to colonise of Asia and Africa certainly owes its origin to the mercantilist and imperialist behaviour of these absolute monarchs.

The fight amongst the Europeans to colonise the other part of the world created intense inter-European rivalry. This rivalry ultimately paved way for urge amongst Europeans to maintain balance of power. To maintain this balance of power, the Europeans experimented with a multitude of alliances. But, none of the alliance systems were adequate to prevent this rivalry from emerging again and again. This intense rivalry fuelled a situation of enormous mistrust and suspicion. These alliances certainly took the entire Europe to a very dangerous and volatile scenario where a major conflict was gradually becoming inevitable. Inter-state rivalry and the urge to stop the other nations to colonise distant lands and ensure one's own supremacy in the continent as a dominant power brought Europe to its first continental conflict which became a world conflict later, and was called the World War-I.

The next chapter creates a foundation of international history by explaining the events building up to WW I, the inter war period and WW II.

2
CHAPTER

International Historical Context and World History for International Relations from Modern Times till the Onset of the Cold War

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- The reasons for rivalry of the European states
- Emergence of the USA and Germany on the global scene
- Rise of German and British rivalry in Europe
- Alliance formations as a hedge against rivalries
- Rise of Serbian nationalism, Austrian cautiousness and Russian urge
- Case study: Diplomatic crisis in Morocco
- Case study: Bosnian annexation and rise of Serbian hostility
- Case study: Crisis in port of Agadir and a victory of Entente
- Case study: The conflicts in the Balkans
- Analysis of the Balkan conflict
- Case study: Alliances executed leading to World War-I
- Analysis of treaties at the end of World War- I
- The treaty of Versailles, 1919; The Treaty of St. Germain, 1919; Treaty of Trianon, 1920; Treaty of Neuilly, 1919; Treaty of Sevres, 1920
- The rise of League of Nations; Sweden–Finland issue; Organizations under the League of Nations
- Rise of Mussolini in Italy
- German reparations and Weimer Republic
- Genoa Conference, Dawes Plan, Locarno Treaties and Kellogg–Briand Pact
- Rise of socialists and NAZI party in Germany
- Case study: Russia from Tsarism to Communism
- Case study: Japan—The power actor of Far East
- Lebensraum policy of Hitler and invasion of Poland and Czech—1939
- Outbreak of the World War-II
- German invasion of Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium and France and Battle of Briton

- German Pact of Non-Aggression with Russia and Operation Barbarossa
- Japanese invasion of Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Burma and Philippines
- The incident of Pearl Harbor and entry of US in the war
- Capture of Sicily and defeat of Mussolini
- Operation Overlord and opening of the Second Front
- Unconditional surrender of Germany, death of Hitler and conclusion of war in the European battleground
- US bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and conclusion of the war
- League of Nations is replaced by the United Nations and the rise of the Cold War

SITUATION OF EUROPE IN THE MODERN TIMES

From the study of the previous chapter it is quite clear that the Renaissance, Enlightenment and Industrial Revolution had put Europe on a path of recovery and rise. The time was not far for Europe to become one of the strongest contenders of world power. The Industrial Revolution had led many Europeans nations to lead the search for resources and new markets. One of the manifestations of this was imperialism and colonialism. Africa and Asia were the new battlegrounds for an imperialist Europe. As Industrial Revolution progressed in Europe, it created stronger, more powerful economies back home. If the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 led to the emergence of strong political entities in the form of the nation states, then it is Industrial revolution that created strong economies in Europe. Some prominent economies by 1900 were France, Britain, Belgium, the Hapsburg Empire, Japan, Italy, USA and Germany.

A special mention of USA and Germany needs to be made here. In the previous chapter we studied that America undertook a successful revolution and declared independence in 1776. After Declaration of Independence it witnessed a mild civil war but overcome it soon and embarked upon a programme of economic recovery. America almost got a full century to undertake economic development without any external interference. From almost 1800 to 1900, as America was on a steady path to economic empowerment, this time Europe started witnessing revolutions. Also this was the time period (1800 to 1900) when Europeans also began Industrial Revolution, imperialism and colonialism. This gave USA an opportunity to emerge as a strong player during World War-I.

Similarly, if we see that Germany, after its unification by Bismarck, had embarked upon a programme of rapid industrialisation, as also a path of colonial acquisitions. Germany, by 1900, became a very strong economic contender for power in Europe and along with its new love for colonial conquests (*Weltpolitik*), it ended up outranking the British and French. Germany, empowered by its economic success, began to use its wealth for enhancing its military and naval power. Soon Europe witnessed a tremendous rise in Anglo-German naval rivalry.

Apart from this, the strong economies of Europe also began to feel extremely suspicious of each other's economic success. Everyone wanted to ensure that the other does not become so economically powerful as to threaten somebody else's existence. One consequence of this insecurity was alliance formation. It began in 1882, when German and Austria-Hungary formed an alliance which was subsequently followed by the Franco-Russian alliance in 1894 and, most importantly, the British and French Entente Cordiale of

1904. In fact, at the time of outbreak of the WW I, these alliances played a very important role. Some scholars, in fact, are of the view that it was these alliances and the bid to maintain the balance of power that led to the—WW I. But, it would be wrong to accept it as the sole cause of—the war, because there were many other immediate causes that—were responsible for it, of which colonial rivalry was certainly a much bigger contributory factor, along with the fervour of intense nationalism.

Serbian nationalism in this context needs to be elaborated. The root cause of Serbian dissent was over Bosnia. In 1878, the Territory of Berlin was signed and as per this treaty, Austria was allowed to control Bosnia even while Bosnia would continue to be a part of the Turkish Empire. On the other hand, Serbia had an aim of establishing a greater Serbia by uniting all Serbs and Croats living in the Balkans into large kingdom called Yugoslavia, for which it needed control over Bosnia. Austria did not support Serbian nationalism and wanted to put an end to it because Austria knew that if Serbia has its way of getting Serbs and Croats, it would endanger the stability of the—Austro-Hungarian Empire because of the large number of Serbs residing there. Serbians were supported by the Russians, on the other hand. For Russia, the Balkan was the only territory left where other European powers had not undertaken colonial expansion. The Russian support to Serbia was also not appreciated by Austrians at all.

Thus, to conclude, we may say that by 1900, Europe economically was able to assert itself, but was also in a very volatile situation because economic success ignited a race for colonialism which created intense inter-state rivalry threatening the European balance of power and to maintain this balance of power, alliances were formed which again made the outbreak of a war imminent. Apart from this, as we saw in case of Serbia, nationalism itself was one of the causes of rivalry, and eventually brought Europe on the verge of world war. Other reasons for unrest were the crisis in Morocco, the crisis in Bosnia, Agade and the war in Balkans. Some of these major sparks can be seen in the form of cases below.



Diplomatic Crisis in Morocco

Core Players, Treaties and Learning

Key Players: French, British, Moroccan sultan, Germans

Key Treaties: The 1904 British and French Entente Cordiale

Case Learning: Psychological Victory of Entente and the defeat of Germany

In 1904, the British and French had signed an *Entente Cordiale*. Germany was quite alarmed to witness the treaty between the two erstwhile rivals and wanted to see if this *entente cordiale* would genuinely hold fast under duress. It tried to test the entente in Morocco. Morocco was one area in Africa which was not yet fully colonised by any European power but the French were adamant to control the Moroccan police and its banking system. The Germans openly began to assert their support to the Moroccan Sultan. In order to put an end to the rivalry in Morocco, the

Germans organised a conference in 1906 in Algeciras in Spain. The British understood that in case the Germans are able to control Morocco through their support to the sultan, it would be a victory of German diplomacy and would ultimately strengthen German Weltpolitik. Realising this in the conference in Algeciras, British began to support the French. To Germany's surprise, the French also got support for their plan to control the bank and police of Morocco from Spain, Russia and Italy. This conference in Algeciras ultimately ended in support for the French by the majority and was not only a big diplomatic boost to the British and French cordialle but a big blow to Germany.

After the crisis in Morocco, in 1907, Britain and Russia also concluded an agreement. This was natural as Russia and France had already concluded an agreement in 1894 and British and French in 1904. After the defeat of Russia by Japan in Russo-Japanese War of 1905, Russia was badly in need of financial help. The British were not willing to help an autocratic Russia under the control of the Tsar. To ensure that British help Russians, the Tsar in 1905 had made certain concessions for the Russian society of which the most important was the freedom of speech. These little concessions enabled the British to conclude an agreement with Russia and enabled it to receive the much needed financial help. However, the Germans, witnessing the agreement between the British and the Russians, now became deeply concerned again. The British had signed agreements with the Russians and the French, both of them encircled Germany. The Germans now developed a fear of encirclement by the British and their allies. In the meantime, crisis broke out in Bosnia in 1908.

Bosnian Annexation and the Rise of Serbian Hostility

Key Features: Young Turks, Austria, Britain, France, Germany, Serbia

Key Treaties: Treaty of Berlin, 1878; Germany-Austria alliance, 1882

Case Learning: Germany becomes anti-British and Serbia becomes anti-Austria.

As we saw above, as per the Treaty of Berlin 1878, Austria would administer Bosnia. Let us elaborate it upon this situation a little more. Bosnia was a Turkish province. Turks administered Bosnia. But in 1878, the Treaty of Berlin clarified that Bosnia would remain a part of Turkey but would be administered by Austria. This upset the Turks but they were not in a position in 1878 to challenge the mighty Austro-Hungarian Empire. But in 1908, a small group of Turks called Young Turks emerged forcefully on the national scene and demanded that Bosnia be given back to Turkey and Turks be allowed to control and administer Bosnia and Austria. Seeing this, Austria decided to annex Bosnia. The annexation made Serbia very unrestful as Serbians had always wanted to annex Bosnia so that they could make Bosnia a part of Greater Serbia. As the Serbians saw the Austrians annex Bosnia, Serbs asked Russians for help. In the meantime, Germany openly supported Austrians in their annexation. Russia also had ambitions in Balkans and the Bosnian Crisis was an apt moment for Russia to fulfil its ambitions. But before Russia could respond, it

witnessed the response of the British and the French on Bosnian annexation. The British and the French avoided any direct confrontation with Austria as Germany had openly supported Austria. Both the British and the French wanted to avoid any confrontation with Germans and Austrians and that too over Bosnia. Russia also did not possess a very strong enough military in 1908 to openly support Serbia but it still tried to organise a conference in support of Serbia. The Serbs had wanted Russian military support which, due to the reasons explained above, was not offered. Thus, the issue concluded when Austria succeeded in annexing Bosnia. Russians felt deeply humiliated and in order to avoid such humiliation of their inability to support Serbia, they embarked upon massive military mobilisation. The Serbs became extremely hostile to Austrians and Germans for their support to Austrians. In the meantime, as the situation became more volatile, crisis emerged next in Agadir.

Crisis in the Port of Agadir and a Victory of the Entente

Key Players: France, Germany, British

Key Treaties: British- French Entente Cordialle 1904

Case Learning: Supremacy of British and Entente

The crisis of Morocco as discussed gave a free hand to the French in the control of Morocco banks and their police. The Agadir crisis emerged when the French moved its troops in Morocco primarily driven by an intention to keep the Moroccan Sultan under check. The movement of the French troops in Morocco was perceived by the Germans as an act of interference in the affairs of Morocco. The Germans responded to this by sending a gunboat called Panther to the port of Agadir. The basic intention of Germany was that the gunboat would exert pressure on France so that France would feel compelled to seek reconciliation and in turn, as compensation, the Germans would ask for French Congo. Seeing the gunboat in Agadir, the British became very concerned. The British thought that a German gunboat in Agadir means Germany was planning to further enhance its naval presence there. More German naval presence in Agadir was perceived by the British as a threat to its free passage in the seas nearby. The French on the other hand refused to toe the line as envisaged by Germany. In the end, Germany again ended up accepting Morocco as a French Protectorate.

The War in the Balkans

Key Features: Serbia, Greece, Montenegro, Bulgaria, Turkey, Britain, Germany, France, Macedonia and Albania

Key Treaties: Treaty of Bucharest, 1913; Settlement Plan, 1912

Case Learning: Emergence of a resurgent Serbia

Before we attempt to understand the Balkan wars and its consequences, we first need to remember that Balkan territory was a territory located in the East and was majorly a part of the old Ottoman or Turkish Empire. The major territory in Balkan region comprised of Serbia, Greece, Montenegro and Bulgaria. Now the situation by 1912 was that Turkey or Ottoman territory had drastically weakened. Taking advantage of a weakened Ottoman territory, the major Balkan states of Serbia, Montenegro, Greece and Bulgaria established a Balkan League. The Balkan League launched an attack on Ottoman territory with an intention of undertaking territorial expansion. The British and the Germans were alarmed to witness this Balkan expansion. They organised a conference in London where they announced a settlement plan. The aim of the settlement plan was to put an end to the expansionist urges of the Balkan States. The British were well aware of the rise of Serbian Nationalism. To ensure that Serbia does not become a powerful player outright in the Balkans, they drew up a settlement plan in which they insisted upon having an independent Albania. An independent Albania made the Serbs extremely dissatisfied as they wanted Albania to be a part of Serbia, which would have given the Serbs an access to the sea, and would not only serve to make Serbia strong, but would have also put Austria in a weaker situation vis-á-vis Serbia. For that matter, this settlement plan also upset the Bulgarians who wanted Macedonia which was given to Serbia. Thus, Bulgarians attacked Serbia only to be defeated by Serbia in the war. Austrians wanted to support Bulgaria in their attack against Serbia as Austrians wanted to put an end to Serbian nationalism but, the Serbian-Bulgarian war ended in the Treaty of Bucharest and the British-German influence ended the Balkan conflict there itself without allowing Austria to further escalate the conflict.

Thus one thing is clear, Balkan crisis made the Balkan territory extremely volatile.



Alliances Executed Leading to World War-I

Key Players: Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Italy, USA, Austria-Hungary, Turkey.

Key Treaties: Entente Cordiale and Triple Alliance

Key Outcome: Balance of power and alliance concluded in the first total war.

As the Balkan wars of the previous case prove, the situation in the Balkans was very volatile. One of the reasons of volatility was the settlement plan which had upset

many Balkan states. On 28th June 1914, the Austrian Archduke, Franz Ferdinand, while on tour in Sarajevo, Bosnia, was shot dead by a Serbian terrorist, Gavrilo Princip. The Austrians blamed Serbia for this. On 28th July, 1914, Austria declared a war on Serbia. Serbia asked for military help from Russia. Russia obviously never wanted a repeat of its failure to help Serbia as earlier, and so, it ordered immediate military mobilisation. Germany ordered a halt to Russian mobilisation. The outright refusal by Russians to comply with Germany's request compelled Germany to declare a war on Russia. Germany went on to even declare a war on France as Germany thought that the Russians and the French have an agreement and Russia would eventually get French help. When Germany decided to attack France, it had to cross over Belgium, which had thus far remained a neutral state. Belgium had not formed any alliances. In fact in 1839, even Britain had assured Belgium that they respected, and would uphold, their neutrality. As Germany proceeded to attack France and entered Belgium, the British ordered Germany to withdraw. The Germany refused to comply, leading Britain to declare war on Germany. Towards 1917, the USA found out that Germany was trying to persuade Mexico to wage a war on the USA. In the entire duration of the war, Germany was reluctant to help Russia as it was under the rule of autocratic Tsar but by 1917 April there was a Revolution in Russia (to be explained ahead). The USA was already supplying men and material support to Britain and France and after the Communist revolution in Russia, it decided to become a proper supporter, thereby ending up in strengthening the allied section of Britain, France and Russia. The support of the US in the war wreaked an ultimate blow on Germany and Austria and helped to conclude the war. This European conflict, which later on became a global conflict, owed its origin to the alliances, mutual hostility and intense nationalism of the nation states. It involved not only the armies but also people on a large scale, making it truly the first ever modern, total and global war.

As the World War-I (WW-I) ended Britain, France and the USA emerged victorious. Russia and Italy were also amongst the victorious. Now it was time for the entente powers to take decisions about the central powers. The powers that lost the WW-I included Austria, Turkey and more importantly, Germany. The end of WW-I saw a rise of multiple treaties that gave birth to future conflicts, including the WW-II.



The Treaty of Versailles of 1919 emerged as one of the landmark treaties at the end of WW-I. The importance of Treaty of Versailles can be gleaned from the fact that it contained a league covenant which established an international body called the League of

Nations. This was followed by a specific demand by the British and the French to make Germany pay for war damages. The provisions for German reparations and compensation for damages was made a part of Treaty of Versailles and sowed the seeds for the WW-II. The treaty wanted to ensure that Germany would not emerge as a threat to Britain and France in the future. To ensure this, the Treaty of Versailles made Germany accept that it would lose its colonial possessions, have a very limited military cum economic built up and pay to the British and French not only reparations but also share its resources with the two. Germany lost 12% of its population and 13% of its territory. Alsace-Lorraine, which had been ceded to the German Empire by France after the Franco-Prussian War of 1871, was taken back by France, and proved one of the biggest losses for Germany to have borne. Germany was also split into two with the creation of the Polish Corridor, which gave Poland access to the Baltic Sea.

The Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, 1919, dealt with Austria where it ended up losing tremendous territory including Bohemia and Moravia which were given Czechoslovakia, Dalmatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were given to Serbia and was merged with Montenegro to form Yugoslavia. Thus, the Treaty of St. Germain undertook territorial division creating Yugoslavia. As per the treaty, Poland got Romania, Galicia and Bukovina from Austria while Italy received South Tyrol and Istria. Thus, the Austro-Hungarian or Hapsburg Empire finally broke up.

In 1920 came the Treaty of Trianon which divided the Hungarian territory whence Hungary along with Slovakia and Ruthenia was given to the Czech, creating Czechoslovakia with Hungary. Burgenland was given to Austria, Yugoslavia got Croatia and Slovenia while Romania received the territory of Transylvania. Hungary lost two-thirds of its territory after this treaty.

The Treaty of Neuilly was signed in November 1919 to divide Bulgarian territory. Western Thrace was given to Greece; Dobrudja was given to Romania and Northern Macedonia was given to Yugoslavia via this treaty.

The Treaty of Sevres came in 1920 to divide Turkey. The British got administrative rights over the territories of Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan while the French got Syria and Lebanon. This formalised the 'Mandate system'. Some Aegean Sea islands, East Trace and Smyrna were given transferred from Turkey to Greece while Italy got Adalia and Rhodes from Turkey. Surprisingly, the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 gave Turkey East Thrace, Smyrna and Constantinople back. Saudi Arabia became independent.

The aim of the Treaty of Versailles through League Covenants was also to establish the League of Nations. But before the League was established, in the transitory period following up to the League, a body called a Conference of Ambassadors was established. The body had to cease once the League of Nations was finally created. The League of Nations was established on the principles of collective security but it certainly did fail to preserve peace. This failure is apparent in the sense that despite its existence, the WW-II did occur. It would be wrong to assert, however, that the outbreak of the WW-II can be attributed solely to failure of the League. There were other reasons contributing to the conflict as we will see ahead. The League of Nations also succeeded in some instances, for example,

■ **Instance 1:** There was a dispute that broke out between Finland and Sweden over the Aaland Island. The League successfully arbitrated the dispute in favour of Finland.

■ **Instance 2:** Successfully established the sub-organisations under the League, like Labour organisation, Refugee organisation and Health organisation, which continued a sub-organisations of the United Nations after it was formed.

But largely, the League remained unsuccessful as the US Senate refused to ratify League of Nations and Treaty of Versailles as it did not want to support the Article X of the League of Nations whereby it was proclaimed that members of the League agreed to use their powers to resist aggression wherever it might occur. The US did not sign the Treaty of Versailles, which had a huge impact on the League of Nations. The period after the treaties was not a relatively stable period as the treaties had sown seeds for deep resentment leading to future conflict. Germany and Italy were certainly the two most disgruntled parties after the Treaty of Versailles had been signed.

Italy had joined the WW-I with a hope that, after the war, it would receive some territory. However, Italy was not happy with the post-war settlement of lands. Also, its participation in the war led to its poor domestic economic performance and its unhappiness over post-war settlement led to the gradual rise of Mussolini in Italy who went on to establish the first ever Fascist State.

The issue for Germany was different. The German question deeply involved the British and French. When the World War-I ended, Germany had lost as a participant and as per the Treaty of Versailles, it was required to pay reparations. The French, before 1919, had already suffered two German attacks. France, being one of the victorious powers, wanted to teach the Germans a hard lesson. The French favoured a weak Germany. In contrast, the British never wanted a very weak Germany since they were of the opinion that German economy though weak enough, should still be able to purchase British goods and function as a ready market.

To resolve the issue, many attempts were made. Post Treaty of Versailles, the German economy found itself devastated. Several times did Germany convey its inability to pay such harsh reparations as were imposed upon it in the treaty. The French would not accept any leniency, though the British certainly were more sympathetic in this regard. In 1922, when Germany again expressed its inability to pay reparations, the French responded in 1923 by occupying the region of Ruhr from Germany. Ruhr was an important industrial base. The British wanted to ensure that some peace prevails between Germany and France as even the USA wanted the same. Certain attempts to cool down the situations are evident from the Genoa conference where British thought to end German-French disenchantment over reparations. The US also tried to help out by extending monetary assistance to Germany. Through the Dawes plan, it tried to enable Germany by giving it loans to ensure the payment of reparations to France. An attempt was again made in 1925 by the British through the Locarno treaties to put an end to territorial aggression. The execution of the Kellogg Briand pact in 1928 ensured that 65 nations, including the USA and France, renounced war.

However, all these attempts received a serious setback in 1929 when the economic crisis of the Great Depression occurred. All attempts by Germany to improve situations at

home and abroad received a setback. The German people were very angry with their government for not tackling inflation and unemployment at home. The economic crisis of 1929 gave an opportunity to the socialists.

A brief note on political situation of Germany may enhance our understanding. After the end of WW-I, the Germans adopted a new constitution in Weimer which gave it a new name—The Weimer Republic. The new Chancellor of Germany from 1923 was Gustav Stresemann, who later continued to be the Foreign Minister of Germany till his death in 1929. The major treaties and pacts that saw Germany's recovery and its induction into the League of Nations as a permanent member of the security council in 1926 is credited to the Nobel Peace Prize winning Stresemann. Stresemann died just as Germany was being hit by the economic crisis of 1929. Germany's inability to meet domestic economic pressures and its failure to pay smooth reparations led to the collapse of the Weimer Republic in 1932 but, the systematic weakness of the German society post 1929 paved way of rise of the National Socialist German Worker's Party (NAZI Party).

The Nazi party began a campaign of hope for the people. They pledged to the people that, if voted into power, they would work for the revival of the economy. By 1933, the Nazi party was able to secure a handsome electoral victory, paving the way for rise of Hitler. He not only defied the treaty of Versailles and began economic and military production but also began work to restore the German psyche by inculcating a spirit of fierce national pride.

He gave effect to his theory of racial superiority, propounded by his deputy Joseph Goebbels, which ultimately ended up causing the Holocaust. He also announced a special policy of Lebensraum, literally meaning the justified territory a nation believes is needed for its natural development. The basic idea of Lebensraum was to get more space for the German people, which, according to him, was, in the form of the existing territory less than what Germany needed to flourish, necessitating him to add extra territory by the conquest of war.

Before we proceed further to the events leading to the outbreak of the WW-II, a special emphasis needs to be put on Japan and Russia in the inter-war period. This is explained through case studies below.

Russia from Tsarism to Communism

Actors: Nicholas-II, Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin

Treaties: Treaty of Brest-Litovsk 1918

Terms: Duma—The Russian Parliament, Bolshevik—Majority faction of Russian Socialist Democratic, Purges—processes of elimination, Gulag—Agency of the Government for labour management.

The situation of Russia relevant for our study commences from the year 1900. It was a time when Russia was governed under the autocratic rule of the Tsar Nicholas II. The Tsar ruled Russia without owing any responsibility to the Duma. When, in 1905,

a war started between Japan and Russia, Russia was defeated in the war. This also contributed in lowering the domestic prestige of the Tsar. This was followed by a gradual revival of socialist Democratic Labour Party with Bolsheviks and Mensheviks on the ground. The events of the World War I from 1914 did not go in Russian favour, necessitating reforms. Though Nicholas II had been already undertaking certain reforms, they still did not politically free Russia from Tsarist control. While the WW-I was still underway, in February 1917, the Russian Tsar brought about some reforms but as they were still ineffective, in October 1917, a second revolution happened (after February revolution of 1917) under the leadership of Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin. As the World War I ended, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was concluded whereby Russians lost the territory of Poland, Georgia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania and Ukraine. As Lenin began the consolidation of power, he witnessed revolts from Mensheviks and also the Tsarists pushing Russia to the brink of a civil war. Lenin, however, emerged successful and began to assert communism as an alternate to Tsarist rule. He succeeded in establishing the world's first communist state called the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The creation of the USSR created enormous suspicion amongst the western states. Lenin died in 1924, before the USSR could fully delineate its contours. The Russian system now came under the control of Joseph Stalin, who consolidated his position through the 'Purges' (aimed to end all opposition he may face) and the *Gulag*, the government agency that administered the Soviet forced labour camps. He also made attempts to bring the territories that had broken up away from Russia by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Stalin ruled till 1953.

Japan—The Power Actor of Far East

Actors: US Navy Commander Perry, Emperor-Meiji, PM-Inukai, Emperor-Hirohito
Treaties: Treaty of Versailles

The story of Japan goes back to 1890's when Europe was undertaking colonisation. At that time, the US, which itself was looking to colonise territories, reached Japan in 1853 and the US commander, Matthew C. Perry advocated that Japan open up its territory for trade. The US heavily used Yokohama for trade. The Japanese felt very humiliated at their territory being used by a colonial power for trade and its own sphere of influence. It was only in 1868 that Japan witnessed the Meiji restoration where Emperor Meiji re-established his grip on Japan and took on the path of economic recovery. Meiji also embarked upon an expansion to annex Korea and Manchuria, eventually bringing Japan into direct conflict with China in 1894–95 and with Russia in 1904–05. Japan very successfully defeated both China and Russia. Specifically after defeating Russia in 1904–1905, it emerged as a major power actor of the Far East. It was also in 1906 that Japan and Britain concluded a militarily pact. Japan effectively sided with the entente in the World War I and helped the British in launching attacks on the German bases in China. Japan was also present during the signing of Treaty of Versailles in 1919 and was also a founder member of the League

of Nations. The situation in Japan drastically changed after the world global economic crisis in 1929. The domestic economy witnessed severe crises. The Emperor was unable to control his empire as there was rampant corruption. Also Japan began to face problems in its territories in China, especially Manchuria. Gradually, due to all these factors, the army in Japan began to take control. Manchuria was a territory in China that was being controlled by Japan. Due to the economic crisis and the ensuing weakness of Japan to take on the crisis, China tried to put pressure on Japan for withdrawal. The Japanese army feared that Japan could lose an important outpost in Manchuria where they had significant interest. The Japanese army in 1931 attacked Manchuria. This was done by the army without the Japanese government's approval. The then Japanese Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi ordered a halt but the Japanese army was not keen on taking the Premier's advice. China took the matter to the League of Nation which ruled that both sides (China and Japan) are at a flaw and ordered Japan to withdraw from Manchuria. Japan refused to comply with the directives of the League and left the membership of the League. European states like Britain and France could not impose any economic sanctions on Japan as they were themselves crumbling under the economic crisis (of 1929). From then onwards, the Manchurian crisis clearly asserted the failure of the League of Nations to ensure compliance and Japan did remain a power actor till 1944, when the WW-II ended in its defeat.

WORLD WAR II (1939–1945)

Axis powers: Germany, Italy, Japan, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria

Allies: US, Britain, France, USSR, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Greece, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, South Africa, Yugoslavia.

The situation by 1937–38 was very volatile again. Benito Mussolini was in power in Italy and Adolf Hitler in Germany. We also saw that in Germany Hitler had announced his famous Lebensraum policy.

To give effect to Lebensraum, in 1939, Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia and Poland. This invasion again plunged Europe into conflict, ultimately leading to the World War-II, which was waged in the period between September 1939 and September 1945. Between September 1939 and December 1940 is the time when Lebensraum saw execution when Germany attacked Poland and Czechoslovakia. The Russians went to consolidate their positions in the territories they lost by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk specially Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland. Germans moved at lightning speed in attacking Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium and France. In September 1940, Germans fought the British in Battle of Britain but the British retaliated well. In June 1941, Hitler had concluded a Pact of Non-Aggression with Russia. But in October 1941, Hitler violated the pact of non-aggression, and after initial successes in the war, launched an operation called Operation Barbarossa and attacked Russia. Germany made inroads into Russia but could not reach Moscow and Leningrad due to hostile climate and an excessively harsh Russian winter. Emperor Hirohito of Japan wanted to stay out of WW-II initially, but after witnessing the success of Germany, he indulged in some military adventurism. The Japanese army captured Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Burma and Philippines. Japan also concluded

a pact with Germany where the Germans assured the Japanese every support in the event of an attack from the USA.

The Japanese army, meanwhile, on 7 December, 1941, launched an offensive on the US naval base at Pearl Harbour. This brought the hitherto reticent USA into the conflict, and it entered the war against Japan. As per the Germany–Japan alliance, Germany declared war on the USA. Germans, on the other hand, continued to face Russian resistance. The US first defeated Japan by successfully destroying Japanese military, then its navy and finally its air power. The USA then moved to support the British, French and the Russians.

The entry of the US in WW– II was a game changer. Firstly, Britain, France and the US, having made inroads through Sicily, caused the downfall of Mussolini. Thereafter, the Allied powers used Sicily as a base to attack the Germans in the Balkans and Central Europe. It was on 6 June, 1944, that Operation Overlord was launched by the Allies leading to the opening of the second front. The combined forces landed in Normandy compelling the Germans to retreat from France and Russia. The conditions by May, 1945, were such that Germany surrendered unconditionally while Britain and the US continued attacking Japan. The US finally dropped two atomic bombs on Hiroshima (6 August, 1945) and Nagasaki (9 August, 1945) leading to a total Japanese surrender by 14 August 1945 thereby ending World War-II.

The end of the war saw the replacement of the League of Nations with the United Nations as a new, more effective arbitrator of peace. However, as the war concluded with the USA and Russia emerging victorious, the world entered a new phase of history called the Cold War. Before we study the Cold War, however, we have to analyse the post-war settlements. The history of each is elaborated in the next chapter.

3
CHAPTER

International Historical Context and World History for International Relations During the Cold War

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- The nature of the post-war settlement in Europe
- Yalta Conference and Potsdam Conference
- The world events leading towards institutionalization of the Cold War
- Case study: Russia making an East European satellite state system and the Iron Curtain
- Existence of Poland and Polish question at Yalta and Potsdam
- Case study: The Issue of Greece—Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan
- Case study: Czech crisis and assertion of Communism—Gottwald and Beneš crisis
- Case study: Division of Germany, Berlin airlift and formation of the NATO
- Establishment of the Berlin Wall—The new symbol of institutionalisation of the Cold War
- European Economic Community and the Treaty of Rome, 1957
- Charles de Gaulle and Gaullism—The manifestation of new nationalism in France
- Partial Test Ban Treaty, 1963 and steps towards disarmament
- Integration in East Europe—Communist Information Bureau, Council of Mutual Economic Assistance and Warsaw Treaty Organization
- The Treaty of San Francisco, 1951 and alliance with Japan
- Case study: The crisis in the Korean peninsula
- Formation of SEATO and Baghdad Pact
- Rise of Nikita Khrushchev and peaceful coexistence theory—Rise of the Détente
- Visit of Khrushchev to US and Camp David talks
- US installation of Jupiter and Thor missiles in Turkey and expansion of the NATO
- Russia shooting down the spy plane U-2 of the USA and end of Détente
- The revival of arms race, Cold War and crisis in Indo-China, US Vietnam war and Cuban missile crisis
- Case study: The US and crisis in Indo-China and US –Vietnam War
- The end of Détente and coming of Brezhnev, SALT-I and SALT-II, Brezhnev Doctrine

- Soviet invasion of Afghanistan-1979 and Cold War 2.0
- Coming of Gorbachev, Glasnost, Perestroika, collapse of USSR and end of Cold War 1989
- Case study: Poland from Stalin to Lech Walesa
- Case study: Hungary under USSR to József Antall, Jr.
- Case study: German unification and fall of Berlin Wall
- Case study: Communist romanticism in Czechoslovakia
- Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin in Russia.
- Analysis of the modern period
- Systemic shift from Balance of Power to Collective Security
- The rise of the concept of alternative sovereignty and Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

POST-WAR SETTLEMENT AND THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF COLD WAR

As the WW-II ended, the victorious powers met at the Crimean' resort of Yalta and organised a conference. The conference came to be known as Yalta Conference. One of the most notable and successful achievements of the Yalta Conference was the establishment of the United Nations (UN). The two stickiest issues at Yalta were of Poland and Germany. Let us understand the Polish and German issues through two distinct cases. The study of Poland and Germany along with issues of Greece and Czechoslovakia will help us understand the institutionalisation of the Cold War after Yalta and Potsdam.



Russia Making an East European Satellite State System and Iron Curtain

Actors: Joseph Pilsudski (Head of the Socialist Party of Poland); Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov (Minister of Foreign Affairs, USSR), Joachim von Ribbentrop (Nazi foreign minister), Harry S. Truman (US President).

Treaties: Treaty of Riga, 1921 and Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact.

Poland existed as an independent state till 1795. However, after 1795, the Polish territory was divided into parts by Russia, Austria and Prussia. The Poles kept on fighting for independence till World War-I. After the WW-I, Poland managed to get West Prussia back from Germany, thereby enabling Poland to have access to the sea. After the 1921 war between Poland and Russia, Poland, through the Treaty of Riga (1921) got a huge territory in the East near the Russian border. As the World War-II progressed, and Germans attacked Poland in 1939, Britain and France helped Poland in its fight against Germany. At the end of WW-II, Germany was expelled out of Poland. During the WW-II period, there was a government in Poland which existed in exile in London. It certainly wanted to be back in Poland after WW-II. But before the commencement of WW-II, Stalin had also reached an understanding with Hitler

about the fate of Poland. Stalin, through his foreign minister Molotov, had concluded the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact that assured Russia and Germany non-aggression from each other. However, Hitler violated the pact to use Poland as a base to attack Russia. As per the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact, Hitler had allowed Russia to exercise control over East Poland (the area Russia had prior to Treaty of Riga 1921). But after the WW-II, Russia was determined to ensure that Poland is not used by any European State against Russia. Stalin knew this was possible only if Poland becomes a part of the Russian sphere of influence. At the Yalta conference, Stalin was determined to ensure the above. After WW-II, even before the government of Poland in exile in London could establish its rule, Russia had already established a pro-Russia government in Lublin city in East Poland. France and Britain knew that Stalin held the key to the East but still could not just allow Stalin a free hand. They could not possibly allow a Polish takeover by Russia without focussing on ‘self-determination’ of the Polish people (the key idea that dominated the policies of the European nation states since WW-II). The British and the French urged Russia to create a provisional government for the time being with democratic elements from the Polish government in exile and later allow for fresh elections. By advocating this, Britain and French France played safe and could even convince their constituencies back home that they upheld democracy in Poland. As far as Russia was concerned, it certainly could not allow Polish aggression. Russians continued to strengthen their position and eventually recaptured territories they had lost, before Treaty of Riga in 1921. This aggressive tactic of USSR irked the USA as it became all the more suspicious with rising Communist influence in Europe. Russians used the same policy for installing Communist regimes in Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and Albania, heightening the fears of the West and cementing the divisions in the East leading to Churchill announcing an ‘Iron Curtain’ in Europe separating the East (Communist) to that of West (Capitalist). The Russian attempt in establishing a sphere of influence in the Eastern European states happened after the Potsdam conference (July 1945).

The Issue of Greece—Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan

Greece was under the control of Germany till 1944. The British, after the WW-II, began to assist Greece in setting up a monarchy. Russia was not keen upon witnessing the development. Some communists in Greece began to make attempts to overthrow the monarchy. Witnessing this development, the USA under President Harry Truman, began to assert that America would be a supporter of the free people who would resist any subjugation by outside powers. Called the Truman Doctrine, this came to be known as the principle that the US should give support to countries or peoples threatened by Soviet forces or Communist insurrection. First expressed in 1947 by US President Truman in a speech to Congress seeking aid for Greece and Turkey, the doctrine was seen by the Communists as an open declaration of the Cold War. The USA began to pump enormous amounts of money to assist Greece, which ended in the restoration of the monarchy and through this, a peaceful victory over USSR involving no violence, with the situation in Greece preventing an attempted overthrow by Communists. The US, after the issue in Greece, managed to

successfully shed off its isolationist policy and now began to curtail the rise of Communism. In June 1947, the US announced the economic component of the Truman Doctrine called the Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan was also called the European Recovery Plan and was aimed at providing economic aid and support to Western Europe to hasten their recovery from the devastating WW-II.

Czech Crisis and the Assertion of Communism—Gottwald and Beneš Crisis

The situation in 1946 was that in Czechoslovakia had a communist Prime Minister, Klement Gottwald and a non-communist President, Edvard Beneš. Initially, Beneš wanted Czechoslovakia to act as a bridge between East and West Europe. Since Gottwald was a communist, he refused aid from the USA under the Marshall Plan. Since elections were due in 1946, just before the elections, the communists did undertake a military coup. The elections finally took place in May 1948, but due to the military coup, all non-communist leaders had resigned leaving only communists to fight the elections. The May elections led to Gottwald becoming the President. This alarmed the West and they became fearful of the rising tide of communism.

Division of Germany, Berlin Airlift and Formation of the NATO

The conference at Yalta and Potsdam had divided Germany and Berlin into four parts. Three parts were under the USA, France and Britain, broadly known as West Germany and other part was under the USSR, called East Germany. The western part consolidated its position and underwent faster economic recovery, while eastern part remained mired in poverty. The escalation of the crisis happened in June, 1948. The western part decided to introduce a new currency in West Berlin. Russia became extremely upset at this. Since West Berlin was located almost 110 km deep within the Russian territory, Russia ordered a blockade of all rail, road and canals between West Berlin and West Germany. The Russians were of the view that this would compel the Western powers to withdraw from West Berlin, but instead, the move backfired for Soviet as the British, French and Americans organised airdropping of essential commodities to West Berlin to prevent it from starvation. Finally, in 1949, Stalin lifted the blockade and this came as a big blow to the USSR as its failure to achieve anything concrete had become apparent. After the Berlin blockade and airlift, in the west, the German Federal Republic was formed, which elected Konrad Adenauer as its head, while in East, the German Democratic Republic. The west cemented a security alliance in 1949 with formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), which included the major West European states. The US learned a hard lesson and came out of its isolationism to contain communism. The Truman doctrine, the Marshall Plan and the formation of the NATO were steps in this regard.

The Cold War of containment of communism not only got institutionalised but also spread to Korea and Vietnam in Asia. But the establishment of East and West German

states only increased their antagonism. Attempts to unify Germany failed as, for Adenauer, integration of West Germany inside the ambit of the US and Western culture and values was more important than the unification, while for East Germany and Stalin, to prevent movement of people from East to West was more important. Thus it ended up in the attempt of East Germany in 1961 to erect a Berlin Wall which became a symbol of the Cold War till its final collapse in 1989 leading to German unification in 1990.

Meanwhile, with the economic aid begotten under the Marshall Plan, Western Europe began integration. In 1951, France, West Germany, Italy and Benelux nations established the European Coal and Steel Company which later on manifested in 1957 under the Treaty of Rome for the establishment of a European Economic Community. In France, Charles de Gaulle had his own unique vision of a strong Europe based on the idea of an association of strong nations and not a Europe dominated by the US or by Britain. Through his refusal to allow a NATO weapon shield in France and refusal to sign the Partial Test Ban Treaty, 1963, he kept the Anglo-US dominance under check by strengthening relations with West Germany.

Gaullism (the nationalist and elitist approach of Charles de Gaulle, characterized by conservatism, national pride, the idea of France as a ‘strong state’ and advocacy of centralised government) kept English dominance under check, and he also tried to recognise the diplomatic relations with China in 1964 which the USA has not done post-WW-II. Thus, if Western Europe was undergoing tremendous economic integration, the East Europe, the Satellite of Russia, had different instruments. The Russians firstly responded to the Marshall Plan as dollar imperialism and in 1947 established the Cominform, also called the Communist Information Bureau. The Cominform was a mechanism developed by the USSR to tighten its grip on satellite states of East Europe by undertaking industrialisation, collectivisation and centralised control. In 1947, the USSR also announced Molotov Plan, which was a plan for economic integration under COMECON (Council of Mutual Economic Assistance). With the coming of a communist regime in China, Russia and China concluded a treaty. This spread of Communism to the East made the US look east as well. The expanding US influence in East Asia compelled Russia in 1955 to create a new Warsaw Pact on the lines of the NATO.

By the time the WW-II ended, the US had inflicted heavy damage on Japan, especially through the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The events, as they unfolded from 1947 till 1950, the most important being the agreement concluded between China and Russia and China emerging as a communist state, made the US realise the importance of Japan. In 1951, the US and Japan entered into a Treaty of San Francisco making these two allies of each other. The US desperately needed a base for operations aiming to contain communism in the East. Japan, after cementing an alliance with the US, received tremendous economic support for economic recovery and gave US the needed base for the East.



The Crisis in the Korean Peninsula

Korea was under Japanese control since 1910. As Japan lost WW-II, Russia and the US decided to divide Korea into two parts along the 38th Parallel. The northern part

was to come under Russian influence while southern part under American influence. The UN had ordered free and fair elections in both parts of Korea. The US was confident that as 2/3rd population lived in the South, the population would vote against communism. The results led to the control of Syngman Rhee in South and Kim II in North. In June 1950, the Northern part, with backing of USSR and China, invaded the South. The US saw this as a deliberate attempt to spread communism and intervened and supported the southern part. In the meantime, through UN intervention, the crisis came to an end. The 38th Parallel was reasserted as a line of demarcation. By now, the US realised the need to contain communism.

After the Korean crises, the US formed multiple alliances with states in South East and East Asia on one side and South Asia and Middle East on the other. The US also established SEATO and CENTO. The focus of SEATO was to incorporate Pakistan, which would act as a base to keep an alliance that would get cemented due to SEATO, and would prove to be of great significance for India.

In the meantime, in 1953, Joseph Stalin died, leading to the rise of Nikita Khrushchev as the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, in Russia. On the other hand, in USA, Truman embarked upon a policy of de-Stalinisation. The prime intention of Khrushchev was to relax the strained relationships between US and USSR and provide a conducive environment for talks. Khrushchev began to diplomatically assert a peaceful existence as, for Khrushchev, peaceful coexistence with the West seemed like a real possibility.

Not only did Khrushchev work for a detente, but also eased up relations amongst satellite states. The idea of peaceful coexistence was successful to the extent where Nikita Khrushchev paid a visit to the US in 1959 and even discussed disarmament at Camp David. But even when at the political level, some relaxation was observed, the arms race continued. The US installed missiles (Jupiter and Thor series) in Turkey, which in turn aggravated Russia. The detente almost ended in 1960 when Russia ended up shooting a U-2 spy plane in the Russian territory. This was followed by US-Vietnam war (1961) and Cuban missile crisis that brought the Cold War back in full force. Let us have a look at these two cases.

US and the Crisis in Indo-China and the US–Vietnam War

The entire area region of Indo-China comprises of what is called as Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. The Indo-China area was under French colonial control. Between 1946 to 1954, Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam defeated the French forces and gave them a final blow in 1954 at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu. A subsequent Geneva conference was organised which declared Laos and Cambodia to be independent of the French control while Vietnam was to be divided into two parts along the 17th Parallel. As per the Geneva conference, an election was planned in Vietnam. The elections were to be held in the year of 1956. In the North, a government was formed by Ho Chi Minh. But the US was not happy with this. Ho Chi Minh had had a Russian influence. He had established a state on Soviet lines. The US got was concerned that this again

signalled the widespread popularisation and acceptance of communism as a political philosophy, and perceived this as a repetition of the events happened in Korea. In South Vietnam, the US, through a referendum (not election as envisaged by Geneva conference) installed a Roman Catholic Ngo Dinh Diem. The ruler Ngo Dinh Diem became extremely brutal en route to asserting his supremacy. The population in south was majorly Buddhists. They wanted Soviet and Chinese style reforms. The ruler crushed all their demands. There was a situation of civil war in the South Vietnam. The US envisaged the civil war as being instigated by North Vietnam led by Ho Chi Minh. Also, in South, in the meanwhile, a National Liberation Front was formed which began to fight Ngo Dinh. Fearing that this dissenting Front is supported by Ho Chi Minh, the US increased its economic and military aid to Ngo Dinh. The people of South resorted to guerrilla tactics (by forming groups called Vietcong). The US retaliated militarily in the Northern territory. But nothing worked in US favour as the Vietcong and North Vietnam launched a severe counter-offensive. Sensing a defeat, the US, in 1968, suspended all military operations and organised a peace conference in Paris. A diplomatic engagement began and finally, by January 1973, the US war engagement came to an end, paving the way for the creation of a united Vietnam. The US made a crucial mistake in confusing Vietnam's nationalism with communism.



Cuban Missile Crisis

America and Spain fought a war in 1898. Since the war, Cuba had been under American control. At the onset of the Cold War, America had a proxy in Cuba called Fulgencio Batista, who was gradually growing unpopular. There were a lot of American businesses in Cuba that flourished. Taking advantage of the weakened rule of Batista, Fidel Castro, on 26th July 1953, led an attack on the Moncada army barracks. He was imprisoned for this assault. By the time he was released, Batista's rule dwindled as it faced financial bankruptcy. Thus, there was a vacuum to be filled. This was undertaken successfully by Castro. One thing to be kept in mind was that Cuba, at the time of the power transition, did not witness a civil war. As Castro strengthened his rule, he initiated the programme of nationalisation of property owned by US business houses. Castro gave the logic of sovereignty and nationalism to justify his move. The US retaliated by closing down its markets for import of sugarcane from Cuba. A lot of Cubans were affected due to this. Some even left Cuba for the US to settle in Florida. As the economy of Cuba got badly hit, Castro domestically fuelled nationalism and internationally requested help from Russia. Perceiving this, the then-US President Kennedy gave the task of solving Cuban menace to CIA. The CIA drew up a plan of using Cuban exiles in Florida to be airdropped on Cuban beaches (Bay of Pigs). The idea was that exiles would be dropped on the beaches, and as per the plan they would intermingle with the Cuban population to create unrest for Castro.

The basic assumption was that CIA thought that Castro did not enjoy popular support of the Cuban people. The plan was executed. The exiled Cubans were dropped in Bay of Pigs. Within a span of three days the local Cubans overpowered them. The exiled Cubans requested help from CIA. The US did not help them as they

were not prepared for something like this. Observing the matter thus unfolding, Nikita Khrushchev decided to defend the small range missiles in Cuba, since this would not only defend Cuba, but also ensure his presence in Cuba, which would be at a proximate destination to launch attacks on the US on the East Coast. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) got photographic evidence of sites of Russians creating missile launching sites in Cuba, after which the US ordered quarantine and a blockade for incoming Russian ships and began to scan for nukes. Russia, in the meanwhile, backed out. Diplomatically, a huge nuclear crisis was averted. The Russian aim seems to have been to teach the US how it feels to have missiles near them (recollect US had stationed Jupiter and Thors in Turkey). The issue concluded by the acceptance of the US not to militarily invade Cuba and the subsequent removal of its missiles from Turkey. Both US and USSR realised how quickly a small issue like Cuba could have escalated conflicts. They took a step towards disarmament namely, the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty.

These two crises, Vietnam and Cuba, convinced the US to explore non-military solutions. Even Russia realised that the arms race was not leading them anywhere. Even steps like SALT-I and SALT-II were taken by Krushchev's successor, Leonid Brezhnev, through the active pursuance of the Brezhnev Doctrine to keep the East European satellites in check broadly continued the detente of Khrushchev. The detente post Cuba received a setback with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and this led to the second Cold War again.

COLLAPSE OF USSR AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR

In 1985, after the death of Leonid Brezhnev, Gorbachev assumed power. He belonged to the group of reformists. He understood that while it remained a continuous closed economy of a suppressive regime over satellite states, USSR would always be a state with restricted growth. It is not that he wanted to do away with communism, but he wanted a communist state with a more democratic and human face. He initiated the *glasnost*—allowing the press the rights to criticise government actions, which, since the era of Stalin, had been prohibited. He allowed citizens a voice through press and encouraged an open society. For economic reforms, he initiated *Perestroika*. The reforms he initiated were step by step and slow, but they began to have far-reaching effects on society. The *Glasnost* he initiated received tremendous response from the satellite states since it gave the satellite states the much needed vent to speak out. But as the reforms he initiated badly affected the economy, disenchantment against the government grew. The satellite states saw a weak central control and began to assert independence (*glasnost* was one of the mediums). The communist model began to collapse and eventually political power was handed over by Gorbachev to Boris Yelstin in 1991. This marked an end to communism in Russia. The satellites asserted independence. A special analysis of Poland, Hungary, Germany and Czech will enhance our understanding here.

Poland from Stalin to Lech Walesa

The story goes back to Stalin. Stalin was an authoritarian leader and did not allow

any liberty to the satellite states. In 1956, he imprisoned Wladyslaw Gomulka for being a supporter of Josip Broz Tito (the leader of Yugoslavia) who had a lot of disagreement with Stalin over the communist model to be followed and ended up in establishing his own alternative form of communism (though Stalin did not press hard as Tito enjoyed people's support). Khrushchev paid a visit to Yugoslavia and even encouraged his communism, but ultimately his appreciation and visit to Yugoslavia created a severe dent in USSR and China relations. In 1956, when Khrushchev eyed Poland, the first thing he did was that he released Gomulka and allowed him a liberal rule till the time he was willing to respect and support Russia in deciding the foreign policy of Poland. By 1981, the head of Poland was Wojciech Jaruzelski, who succeeded Tito. He did make attempts to improve the economic condition of Poland but failed. Witnessing an economic failure, a solidarity movement (a form of trade union) emerged which organised a lot of strikes in Poland. Finally, Jaruzelski in 1989, decided to change the constitution allowing the solidarity movement to be headed by Tadeusz Mazowiecki to be a political party. In December 1990, after the collapse of the USSR, the new solidarity leader Lech Walesa completed the transition of Poland to an independent state and became its President.

Hungary under USSR to József Antall, Jr.

Hungary saw a lot of political change till 1989. When Stalin came to power, he imprisoned a leader János Kádár and replaced him with Rakosi. Rakosi became the Hungarian head of state but when Khrushchev came to power, he replaced Rakosi with Imre Nagy. Rakosi continued to interfere in the affairs of Hungary and gradually overthrew Rakosi and re-emerged as a leader. Imre Nagy now advocated an end to Hungarian participation in the Warsaw Pact. Russia did not allow this, and ordered his removal. Now Imre Nagy was executed and János Kádár was released and he became the head of the state. Kádár continued to rule till 1988 but lost his grip on the economy. By 1990, a New Democratic Forum was able to win elections and József Antall, Jr. was elected as the new Hungarian PM.

German Unification and Fall of Berlin Wall

We have already made mention of the division of Germany, the blockade and the airlift. The thaw came in 1989 when Gorbachev paid a visit to West Germany. The ruler in West was Helmut Kohl and in East was Erich Honecker (since 1971). At the time of Gorbachev, the Protestant Church in the West supported New Forum as an opposition party to remove communist rule. Erich Honecker was removed and replaced by Egon Krenz. As the Soviet Union collapsed, on 9th November 1989, the protesters pulled down the Berlin Wall and decided to unify Germany. In December 1990, fresh elections were organised and Helmut Kohl knitted an alliance of CDU/CSU parties over the socialists and emerged as the first Chancellor of the United Germany.

Communist Romanticism in Czech

The Czech territory was controlled by Antonin Novotny. It was in 1968 that Novotny was replaced by Alexander Dubcek. Dubcek had his own ideas of communism with a human face. He tried bringing on his reforms. But, in Russia we had Brezhnev. He was not as keen on reforms and freedom to satellite states as was Khrushchev. Brezhnev was in favour of maintaining strong control over East Europe. Thus, to keep the Czech under control and the ambitions of Dubcek in check, Brezhnev ordered invasion of Czechoslovakia. It is during this invasion that he outlined his Brezhnev Doctrine asserting that if any society emerged as a threat to the Soviets, then Soviet would not shy away from intervention and this intervention was to be justified on grounds of National interests. As a Soviet foreign policy, the Brezhnev Doctrine was first and most clearly outlined by S. Kovalev in a September 26, 1968, *Pravda* article, entitled *Sovereignty and the International Obligations of Socialist Countries*. Post the Czech invasion, Dubcek was replaced by Gustav Husak who ruled Czechoslovakia till 1987. It was only after the Collapse of Soviet Union that a velvet revolution happened in Czech and Vaclav Havel became the new head of the state.


The era of Gorbachev ended with 15 satellite states of Soviet Union demanding and asserting independence. Gorbachev was succeeded by Boris Yelstin who gave the economy the much-needed boost and after the expiry of two terms, Boris Yelstin handed over power to Vladimir Putin. The Putin era has made Russia emerge again on the top and as a power player in the world again.

FINAL ANALYSIS OF THE MODERN PERIOD

From our discussion it is clear that modern and contemporary societies exist in the form of nation states where nation states are the core actors in IR. The modern states operate on the logic of sovereignty where any form of outside intervention in management of domestic affairs of the state is not welcome. These sovereign states are headed by sovereign masters and these states conduct official communication with other states through an instrument called diplomacy. The nation states at the international level operate as per international law. In the eighteenth century, the international law aimed at maintenance of balance of power. The statecraft as an instrument has gradually evolved and, since the decline of feudalism, the other power contenders like the Pope and barons have paved way for strong monarchies. These monarchies, along with professional diplomats and treaties, maintained the balance of power, with the Peace of Westphalia (1648) and the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) finally settling the religious question and declaring the balance of power to be the core instrument of harmony. The period from 1648 to 1776 witnessed the decline of Ottoman Empire and rise of the British, and Russian empires. The states did interact with each other in this period but primarily with an intention to ensure systemic balance.

The American Revolution ended up making the US as a superpower in the twentieth century while the French Revolution asserted that sovereignty rests with the people and

not the ruler. This assertion by the French Revolution had a serious consequence as it unleashed a force of national self determination which resonated all over Europe till World War-II. But, another consequence of the French Revolution was that after the defeat of Napoleon, witnessing his expansionary urge in the revolution period, the Europeans decided to ensure that no European nation should be allowed to disturb the balance of the system. The culmination of the French Revolution again saw an institutional attempt to maintain the balance of power through the Concert of Europe. The Concert of Europe did bring peace in Europe but it also legitimised the domination of Europeans in Africa and Asia. The Concert of Europe was replaced by the League of Nations in 1919 which became the first universal international body. The League of Nations shifted the entire concept of maintenance of peace with a focus on collective security as it was widely believed that balance of power was one of the causes of war. The more important point here was that the League was based on a wider membership by inviting non-European nations which the concert had not.



Since the end of the Cold War, globalisation as a force has been unleashed. It has deeply impacted the multiple dimensions of states envisaged. Since globalisation is affecting general decision making of states, a new force has been unleashed, arguing for a new definition of sovereignty. For example, today, the idea of sovereignty being forwarded is for a state to be responsible for protecting its citizens and if a state fails to protect its citizens, the principle of non-intervention (as envisaged by traditional sovereignty) is to be read as international responsibility to protect. The basic idea here is that if a country fails to protect its citizens, and the UN Security Council is convinced that the sovereignty of the people is violated then international players have a responsibility to intervene and protect citizens of that state. This principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was recently the doctrine used in justifying intervention in Libya in 2011.

4
CHAPTER

International Historical Context and World History for International Relations in the World After the Cold War

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- The ending of Cold War and rise of Global War on Terrorism.
- The conceptual shifts in the trends of international politics post-Cold War
- Key trends in the post-Cold War era

THE WORLD AFTER COLD WAR

As we have noted previously, as the WW-II concluded, a deep suspicion emerged amongst the two superpowers, the USSR and the USA. Both were hostile to each other's ideologies and were determined to ensure the containment of the other. The idea to contain another's ideology brought almost the entire world into the aegis of the two ideologies. The insecurity generated by each created an arms race which eventually transformed into a nuclear arms race. But the Cold War did establish its norms of governance of the international society. One thing was clear, both wanted to contain the other but the containment happened cautiously. Both powers avoided nuclear exchanges despite coming extremely close to the brink of a nuclear war in Cuba in 1962.

As the Cold War ended, one thing was clear: the prospect of the USSR being the sole contender to the power of the US went out of the scene. Similarly, due to USA's presence in West Europe during Cold War, it continued to enjoy their patronage. More so, the military balance was now only in favour of US as no other power remained after 1989 to challenge the US. One can easily assert that this was the time when the US became the sole unipolar superpower. Thus, when the Cold War ended, a new world order dominated by US supremacy was a reality. The USA, throughout the Cold War, had been a champion of human rights, liberal democracy and justice. But when the Cold War ended, there were many countries that had not accepted these values which the US had stood for. Although the US now, at the end of the Cold War, had the power necessary to spread these values amongst these nations, it instead preferred to remain silent in the first decade after the end of the Cold War. After 9/11, when the US voted against the UN to control terror and ended up launching its own Global War on Terror, it irked many nations. The exceptionalism exhibited by the US post 9/11 did not go well with many Third World Nations.

Another factor that erupted as a strain was the reluctance of the US to accommodate

rising economies as instruments of economic governance. For example, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) created after WW-II, was designed to help nations with monetary assistance to remove non-performing threads in an economy. But IMF assistance was conditional for nations and were offered specifically where IMF was allowed to interfere in the domestic affairs of the economy of a country, making many nations feel as if they were dependents or satellites of the IMF.

As far as the United States is concerned, as the Cold War ended, it understood that it has both power and capabilities but to some extent, it was confused with regard to what it should do beyond the expected and necessary demonstrations with respect to democracy and globalisation. Almost till 9/11, it remained a superpower without a mission. The European continent at the end of the Cold War also took steps to integrate further leading to the birth of European Union. It was a predictable integration as they had been steadily witnessing integration even during the Cold War era.

As the US, in the second decade of the post-Cold War era, got militarily occupied in wars in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), on the East came up a strong superpower, China. China aggressively accelerated its economic recovery and began to emerge a strong economic power in the East. It is only in the third decade at the end of the Cold War today that the US has adequately acknowledged the 'rising China' as a threat to the global hegemony of the US. It has since taken steps to counter the hegemonic rise of China through Trans Pacific Partnership (T.P.P.) and the 'Pivot to Asia' missions.

The world today no doubt witnesses the unipolarity of USA, but many rising nations like China, India, and Russia (after Putin in power) have restored the balance more towards multipolarity. Globalisation will continue to integrate the world and countries have realised non-military means to ensure peace in the system, but how far counter hegemonic initiatives work in restraining nations from the course of war needs to be seen. Also, the world now witnesses multiple new threats in the form of terrorism, poverty, rising inequality and climate change. It is to be seen how the globalised world resorts to solving these.

The challenges in the 21st century require a new form of diplomacy. Some of the challenges like the containment of piracy in Africa, poverty in Asia, nation building in the Middle East are some regional challenges. Arab Spring is throwing up new challenges in the Middle East and it is still an ongoing transformation. Climate change and environment diplomacy is now the next big global challenge where attainment of consensus on the most viable course of action remains missing. The emerging economies are now exerting pressures on institutions established by the west and are asserting force in favour of reforms. A failure to reform institutions like the World Bank and IMF is encouraging the emerging market economies to establish their own regional institutions, for instance, the New Development Bank established by the BRICS countries. All these challenges require a new level of cooperation which is now the main task of the state actors and diplomats globally after the end of the Cold War.

End of Section Questions

1. How different are Medieval Islamic and Christian underpinnings of International society?

2. Examine the concept of International Society propounded by Headley Bull?
3. "The Peace of Westphalia-1648 laid down the foundation of modern international society." Examine?
4. "The Treaty of Versailles contributed to the birth of all conflicts in the world post World War-I." Do you agree?
5. "Nuclearisation of the world after 1945 helped in maintaining a stable Europe." Analyze.
6. "Cuban Missile crisis of 1962 and Berlin Crisis of 1961 brought the world on the brink of a nuclear war." Discuss.
7. Why did the world slip into a Cold War? Examine the cases when the Cold War almost turned into a Hot War?
8. In the post-Cold War World Order, can Russia led by Putin emerge as threat to the West?
9. Keeping in mind the rising Chinese aspirations, can the post-Cold War world order be dominated by China?
10. Is the US President Donald Trump responding to the problem of terrorism strategically?

Section B

Theories and Approaches in International Relations

[Chapter 1 The Difference between Theory and Approach](#)

[Chapter 2 Theory of Idealism](#)

[Chapter 3 Theory of Realism](#)

[Chapter 4 Theory of Liberalism](#)

[Chapter 5 Theory of Functionalism](#)

[Chapter 6 Theory of Marxism](#)

1
CHAPTER

The Difference between Theory and Approach

I

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- What is an approach?
- How is it different from theory?
- Classification of approaches
- Development of a theory

THEORY AND APPROACH

To study an academic question, if one uses a certain act of standards that governs the inclusion and exclusion of questions and data, it is called an ‘approach’. The criteria to select problems and approaches depend upon the scholars. Thus, there is no limit to the number of approaches, since, as the number of scholars increase, so does the number of approaches. Since there is a limit we need to set in the study of approaches, we need to classify them into certain categories. For the purpose of using the knowledge of approaches in the study of IR for the paper in General Studies (UPSC), we will study the approaches of Idealism, Realism, Liberalism and Marxism in depth. The subsequent chapters in this part help us deepen our understanding of these approaches. Before we proceed, we need to keep in mind that an approach helps to build a theory. A scholar begins with a phenomenon, tries to explain it, makes predictions, and uses techniques, thus developing a distinct theory.

2
CHAPTER

Theory of Idealism

Core thinkers: Woodrow Wilson, Hugo Grotius, Gautam Buddha, Mozi, Emmanuel Kant, Dante Alighieri

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Assumptions of Human Behaviour
- Foundations of Idealism in International Relations
- Origin of School of Idealism
- Core Principles and Forms
- Criticism of the school

ASSUMPTIONS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOUR

Man has a nature which is inherently good. His behaviour is to strive for the goodness of the self and of others. Man displays a bad behaviour due to inherent flaws in the environment surrounding him. Therefore, man's behaviour may be altered if the environment is successfully modified. If man faces conflict, he will resolve it through cooperation.

FOUNDATIONS OF IDEALISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

If we try to apply the idea of human behaviour as explained above in the field of IR, then the theory of Idealism emerges as follows: states at the international level strive for peace and believe that peace can be achieved through cooperation. States do not prefer war as an outcome of conflict since war is perceived as harmful and irrational as a tool for conflict resolution. The reason of war is lack of understanding amongst states of each other's interests. If each state is able to understand the interests of the other state and accommodate those interests in the interest of resolving conflicts amicably, then all states will be able to cooperate and maintain peace within the international system.

ORIGINS OF IDEALISM

In the previous part of the book, we have already noted how the balance of power and its maintenance ultimately led to the outbreak of World War I. As the states resorted to alliance formations, it increased competition amongst the states, ultimately leading to WW-I. The establishment of the League of Nations as an international body post the Treaty of Versailles 1919 brought some semblance of stability in the system. The idea of League of Nations emerged out of fourteen points of Wilson which had envisaged not only

the establishment of an international body to ensure abstinence from wars in the future, but had also emphasised upon the need for behavioural modification on the part of the states to promote peace and harmony. Many scholars branded Wilson's proposals as 'idealistic'. This school emerged from the ruins of WW-I. Before proceeding further, it will be important to note that idealism is not a fully accepted tradition in IR as scholars have never worked consistently to develop it as a proper school of thought. Scholars have propagated various ideas and views have been built upon the ideas advocated. Thus, some scholars often refuse to provide idealism a philosophical tag of a 'school' in IR.

CORE PRINCIPLES AND FORMS

Idealism can be read as a policy prescription with faith in human reasoning. It tries and envisages a world which ought to be a better place in the future. It prescribes suggestions to envisage the world as the scholars see it. It promotes a set of universal ethics with an intention to establish the idea of 'one world' throughout the entire scheme of things, with the global citizenry taking centre stage in that thought. For the idealists, there is a firm belief that people will always cooperate to achieve harmony rather than opt for war or conflict. People have an ability to think, but they shall exercise their rational faculties only when states promote education. It prescribes that leaders of the states should promote education in the country since the more people are educated in a state, the more they shall exert control over their leaders so as to ensure peace. Thus, not only is education important, but public opinion in the decision making is also deemed to be paramount. The public opinion is better informed if the public is provided access to education. The idealists are also of the view that international organisations play a very crucial role in global harmony and that is why they put a lot of emphasis on such bodies.

One form of Idealism is known as Pacifism. Pacifists are those who emphasise upon human reason, morality and advocate promotion of democracy and public opinion in decision making. They press for a greater role of morality in the dealing and resolution of international affairs. Another group is called Globalists. The Globalists' philosophy also revolves around human reasoning and emphasis on democracy and public opinion, but what sets them apart is their emphasis on harmony of interests and universal ethics. One commonality between Pacifists and Globalists is that both perceive war as exceedingly harmful and contrary to human interest. In another form called Classical Liberalism, we find war branded as irrational, along with an emphasis on capitalism and an advocacy of idea that some greed is good. A summary in the table below gives a clear picture of the similarities and differences in the various streams of Idealism while the subsequent diagram captures the Idealist thought.

Form	Human Reason	Morality	Harmony of Interests	Public Opinion	Democracy	War	Capitalism	Universal Ethics
Pacifists	✓	✓	—	✓	✓	Bad	—	—
Globalists	✓	—	✓	✓	✓	Bad	—	✓
Classical Liberalism	✓	—	Some greed is good	✓	✓	Irrational	✓	✓



CRITICISM OF THE SCHOOL

A subsequent school of political thought that rose up called Realists termed these inter-war scholars ‘Idealists’. Realism as a school emerged after the failure of the League of Nations to prevent the outbreak of WW-II. Scholars heavily criticised these inter-war scholars for fantasising about a world that ought to be than accepting the world as it is. The scholar EH Carr, a Realist, called the Idealists Utopians and their phenomenon of study as one emphasising upon Utopianism. EH Carr says that these scholars neglected the role of power and IR is all about power politics. Power, as per EH Carr, is a constant which cannot be eliminated from statecraft. Others also criticised Idealists by advancing the notion that if harmony was the core focus, then the League should have been able to prevent the outbreak of WW-II. Scholars have branded Idealists as scholars who overestimated the role of morality in IR and neglected the role of power as an instrument in state politics.

3
CHAPTER

Theory of Realism

Core thinkers: Thucydides, Sun Tzu, Kautilya, Nicholas Spykman, Reinhold Niebuhr, E H Carr, Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, Mearsheimer, Machiavelli, Rousseau

Concept in Realism: Power, National Interest, National Security, Conflict, Balance of Power, Deterrence

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Understand core concepts in Realism
- Idea of Human Behaviour in Realism
- Foundation of Realism in International Relations
- Origin of Realism
- Thucydides explanation of the Peloponnesian war
- Hobbes and Realism
- Application of Realism in Syrian Crisis
- Hegemonic ambitions of Iran and Realism
- Conclusion.

CORE CONCEPTS

1. *Power*: The school of Realism, from Thucydides until Hans Morgenthau, has not been officially able to define what is meant by power. Some ideas, however, have emerged in how thinkers may explain the role and function of power in a context. The basic idea in power in statecraft is a situation where one state is able to control the actions of another state. In Realism, power is always used as a relational concept, meaning that power is always exercised by one state in relation to the other(s). Also, in Realism, the term power is seen as having a strong underlying military connotation. Power is the military capability of a state.

2. *National Interest*: Realists say that every state has individuals and individuals have certain values. The individuals of a state, based on shared values, are able to develop a culture and a sense of common identity. The idea of protection is not just restricted to the security of its people but also the protection of its identity and culture. If a state has to survive, then the survival of its identity and culture is its national interest. How the state uses this as its national interest in foreign policy is the objective of our study. This is

linked to the next concept.

3. *National Security*: If, as explained above, if a state needs to survive, it has to secure itself from its enemy state(s). The ruler has to take adequate steps to ensure safety, security and survival of its people. Thus, national security is one of the primary national interests of a state.

4. *Conflict*: Man by nature is conflict-mongering. It is this conflict-seeking nature of man that brings him into confrontation with others. But why is man's nature so fraught? Man is conflicting in nature because he has to ensure his own survival. Now if we apply this logic to the state, we may see that, since the national interest of the state is national security and survival, it brings one state into conflict with other states. In this situation, a state has no option but to fend for its own self as there is no one above the state in the system to help the state. There are two important observations we need to remember here. First, there is no authority above the state for its help, which consequently means that in the international system, there is complete anarchy. Second, it is anarchy in the international system that compels a state to exercise self-help. Self-help could manifest as building up of economic and military capabilities. These capabilities can give the state an edge in an anarchic global stage and ensure its survival.

5. *Balance of Power*: Since national interest of a state lies in ensuring national security, to make its survival certain, in national interest, a state will undertake weaponisation. This weaponisation will secure the state but will also simultaneously cause insecurity in another state. The other states will feel insecure as the state which undertook weaponisation endangers and undercuts their own security. This leads to the other state to form alliances. The state may undertake subversion or may compete by increasing its own power to help a check on a predatory power. This will enable it to balance out power on an international scale once again.

6. *Deterrence*: As explained before, this is nothing but Balance of Power as understood in the nuclear age. In today's world, where there is a tremendous pace of nuclearisation and an arms race constantly underway, the balance of power has got a new name, called 'deterrence'. Deterrence is nothing but a threat of punishment by one party on the other if the other party fails to behave in the way as expected by the threatening party. It is believed that the threat of punishment in deterrence is exercised by procuring and leveraging the nuclear option.

IDEA OF HUMAN BEHAVIOUR IN REALISM

Man by nature is egoistic. He has self interests. He loves to fulfill his interests to gain an edge over others. His most important self-interest is his survival. He has to ensure survival in a world where others are also trying to serve their respective self-interests. Thus, this brings man into conflict with others. In situations of conflict, man does not like domination but rather loves to dominate. This encapsulates the universal display of human behaviour.

FOUNDATION OF REALISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

When we apply the concepts and idea of human behaviour envisaged by Realists to the nation state, we can understand Realism as a political philosophy. In the world, we now

have the existence of nation states. Each nation state intends to survive. The core national interest of a nation state is national security, which entails fighting for its survival. This survival is in a situation where others also intend to survive. Since each state has to survive on its own, the situation is of international anarchy. In an international system beset with anarchy, the state resorts to self-help. While self-help is undertaken, the state may expand its economic and military power. This will disturb the power equilibrium bringing the state into conflict with others. In this situation, war is inevitable. War is justified as it is fought for state survival which is also the national interest of the state. Thus, for Realism, the three things below are at its core:



ORIGIN OF REALISM


As stated in the previous chapter, Realism emerged in response to the interwar scholars. The interwar scholars had placed too much emphasis on morality and other, more idealistic goals. They neglected the core instrument of power in IR. But it will be wrong to say that Realism emerged from the ashes of WW-II. Infact, we see traces of Realism quite eloquently discussed in the ancient past, as exemplified in Thucydides's explanation of the Peloponnesian War, Kautilya's *Arthashastra* and even Sun Tzu's *Art of War*. For that matter, Hobbes also talked of the security dilemma of the nation states. Separate case studies below talk of Thucydides's Peloponnesian war and Hobbes. However, we also need to keep in mind that, as is evident from our previous discussions, Realism considers the state to play primacy in IR. It relegates all other functional agencies like UN, IPCC, and WTO etc as secondary. Infact classical realists did not accept the idea of these other actors, which is accepted by Neo-Realists atleast. But neo-realists still accord primacy to state only.



Thucydides's Explanation of the Peloponnesian War

We have already made mention of the city-state system of the ancient Greeks. As per Thucydides, who posited his explanation on the theme of conflict, competition and justice, every state needs to understand its status in the international system. He remarked that all the states were not equal and if a state wished to survive in the system, it had to understand its own position well, vis-à-vis all other states in the system. This was required as justice is not on basis of equality but on the basis of the standing of a state in the system. Between 431 to 404 BCE, the powerful city state Athens came into conflict with the city state of Melos. The city state of Melos was extremely small in comparison to the mighty and all-powerful Athens. In the course of the ensuing war, Melos put up an argument that Athens should respect the

independence and the dignity of a weak, and small yet independent city state. Thucydides's explanation was that Melos could not seek justice at this juncture as its own status in the system was not that of one which was equal to Athens. He advised Melos to understand the reality where the reality was its unequal status to Athens which could not possibly warrant justice.



Hobbes and Realism

Hobbes took us back to the origin of humanity. He elucidated the trajectory of man turning from a nomad to a hunter-gatherer. Later he began to lead a settled life and finally he developed a community around himself. While settling into an agrarian way of life, man preferred to live in a community as it could help him feel a little more secure from the attack of wild animals and the devastation wrought by them. Gradually, as the size of his community grew, so did the frequency of emergence of other communities. Now, man's security was not merely endangered by wild animal but by other communities and the fear of attack from other men. This situation was described by Hobbes as a state of nature and a pre-civil condition. Hobbes explained that man, in the state of nature, is not secure. Thus, he progresses to create a sovereign state. This creation of a state is based on an emotion of fear, and thus, he feels his individual fears can be jointly collaborated by a security pact that can guarantee him safety. However, the problem is that if he created a sovereign state, so did other communities. This subsequently led to the fear of other states. This situation is called a security dilemma. In this situation, Hobbes states, that a man can guarantee his own individual security in a state but cannot ensure international security amongst other sovereign states, thus making war one of many available options. Thus, we can see that Hobbes also agreed that war could be a potential tool used by a state for seeking survival in the international system.

One of the other important classical realists is Hans Morgenthau. Hans says that man is a political animal and he has a certain lust for power. As the nature of man is egoistic, he craves for more power. The nature of man that makes him crave for power is called *animus dominandi*. Ironically, it is this lust for power that also makes him search for safety. His search ends in the establishment of control over a piece of territory. In this territory he establishes a state as the formation of a state gives man the needed security. But as he craves for more, this craving brings man into conflict with surrounding territories similarly created by other individuals. This explanation of man's behaviour is applied by Hans directly to the system of nations states. He says that the world comprises of states. States have a lust for power and survival. This lust for territorial expansion and the urge to control more and more land and resources bring a state at the juncture of war with another state or even multiple states. During armed conflict or wars, a defending state also displays military power. This display of military power leads to human rights violation, but this human right violation is justified by the defending state as necessary for

the protection of its national interest of survival and security. A leader of this state in this case, by displaying some wisdom and resorting to the use of military power, is perhaps able to avert a greater evil. Thus, the idea propounded by Hans Morgenthau allows a state to act in hostility for the maintenance of its national interest and survival, especially if they are under threat. The ruler shall use his/her wisdom to use force to protect the state and avert a greater evil and maintain the balance of power.

Realism as a school has, over the decades, witnessed a shift to Neo-Realism from Classical Realism in 1980's. This shift owes to the work of Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* (1979). The emphasis on human nature of classical realists have gradually been theorised by the Neorealists into an emphasis on anarchy. They also do accept the presence of the other non-state actors in the system but continue to assert the primacy of the state. The Neorealists allege that as the international system is that of complete anarchy, it leads to nations acting in their own self-interest. This struggle for power is due to an absence of a global leviathan to protect smaller states. The Neorealists have propounded a deterministic theory, which says that the structure of the system in which a sovereign state functions causes the state to behave in the way that it behaves, which is to say, that a largely anarchic global system occasions inevitable conflict and warfare. Thus, they argue aptly that war happens in a context and the context is that of anarchy. Kenneth Waltz explains that international system consists of smaller units and the units are these nation states. IR is nothing but the study of the interaction of these units. All units in the system perform basic functions like taxation, municipal services, creation of infrastructure, and so forth. A change in the states' behaviour happens when the balance of power changes. The units are impacted when there are changes in of the interaction of great powers. The Neorealists believe that there is always an establishment of a hierarchy of states that the international system changes when great powers in the top hierarchy rise or fall. A fall or rise may break down the system but eventually paves way for the balance of power to emerge again in some or the other form. In this sense, the Neorealists are also 'Structuralists' as, for them, the structure of the overall system determines individual or collective behaviour. Neorealism is therefore a structuralist determinist explanation.

APPLICATION OF REALISM IN REAL LIFE

Concepts of Machiavelli as Propounded in *The Prince*

We shall now try to apply the understanding of Realism in some real life examples. But before we attempt such a study, we need to have some understanding of Realism as discussed by another Realist—Niccolò Machiavelli. The imprint of Machiavelli's applied wisdom may clearly be deduced from our case studies below. Machiavelli tries to explain Realism by using analogies. He uses the allegory of a fox and a lion to present the case. Machiavelli says that the world is a dangerous place, but if the ruler has a fine mix of traits of a lion (strong) and a fox (cunning), that is, if the leader is both strong and cunning, then he can seek opportunities in this dangerous world for himself and the nation that he rules. Machiavelli is also critical of Christian ethics. He emphasise that a ruler should never follow the Christian dictum of loving one's neighbour. It is because if the neighbour is smart and strong, he may invade the ruler and as a result he shall not only lose his territory but also the faith his people had in him as a ruler. He advocates that a ruler take decisions for the protection of people and that he ensures growth and prosperity of the nation and its

citizens. The ruler, in so doing, may display power politics for ensuring safety and survival of its people and it depends upon his agility whether he shall achieve status amongst his peers.

Syrian Crisis


In case of the Syrian crisis, the two important powers involved would be Russia and the USA. In the past few years, Russia has vetoed US sponsored resolutions on Syria at the UN. One Realist explanation is that Russia wants to pursue power politics in Syria as not only is the country the last relic of the Cold War in the Middle East but also holds the key to the balance of power in that region. This is because Syria, along with Iran, gives Russia a certain leverage to contain the US sponsored Saudi axis. The Syrians and Iranians, being Shia strongholds, act collectively as a strong balancer of Sunni domination led by Saudi Arabia and sponsored by the US. Thus, if US succeeds in effecting a regime change in Syria, the Shia–Sunni axis is going to be disturbed and the axis will tilt towards the Sunni side. Thus, Russia through Syria, pursues power to maintain a balance in the Middle East. (For detailed understanding of Syrian Crisis and issues in the Middle East, See [Section-H, Chapter-1](#))

Hegemonic Ambitions of Iran

Under the Atoms for Peace initiative of the US since 1953, Iran began to receive support for a nuclear programme. The coming of Ayatollah Khomeini in the 1979 Islamic revolution led to a cancellation of all ongoing nuclear projects. But the subsequent Iran–Iraq war and Gulf War-I compelled Iran not only to restart its nuclear programme but have ambitions to develop a nuclear weapon. This is so because Iran knows that nuclear weaponisation will not only give it an edge in the region, allowing it to exercise hegemony, but will also tilt the power balance in favour of Iranians since Saudi Arabians do not possess any nuclear weapons. The Iranians feel such an attempt would tilt the balance of power towards the Shia axis and strengthen Shia hegemony in the region.

CONCLUSION

The diagram below summarises the entire concept.



4
CHAPTER

Theory of Liberalism

Key thinkers: John Locke, John Burton, J.P. Swell, Paul Taylor, Joseph Nye, Christopher Mitchell, Robert Keohane, Michael Doyre, Karl Deutsch

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Idea of Human Behaviour
- Foundation of Liberalism in International Relations and Classical Liberalism
- Four different types of Schools of Liberalism
- Real life Case Study of Liberalism—US Invasion of Iraq

IDEA OF HUMAN BEHAVIOUR

The central explanation of Liberalism is that man has cognitive capabilities to think and undertake reasoning. Accordingly, it is understood that man acts upon self-interest only upto a point as his basic urge is to cooperate. In fact, it will not be wrong to assert that, for the assumptions of liberalism, man is a cooperative animal. Man wants to cooperate for the welfare of others and also for his own intellectual stimulation.


FOUNDATION OF LIBERALISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND CLASSICAL LIBERALISM

If we apply the idea of Liberalism in IR, we find that the concept of the nation state is premised on cooperation. Liberals are of the philosophical opinion that the state is not merely an instrument of war (as realists would suggest) all the time. They say that the evolution of the state is based upon a well-founded social contract between the individuals and the state itself. The state is composed of individuals. The individuals have capacity to think and the intentionality of that thought is aimed at cooperation with others.

The state, as per the social contract, needs to ensure conditions for the growth of the individual. This is possible if one state cooperates with another state. If all the states cooperate for each other's welfare, there will be peace. The states have to cooperate with other states because, as per the social contract, they have to work for the welfare of individuals within the state, which is deemed impossible if the states remain in a continuous state of warfare and instability. If the state has to create conditions conducive for growth of individuals, it can do so by cooperating with others. This interaction one state undertakes with other state will be based on mutual interest. This interaction can also be facilitated by international organisations. The overall analysis of such interaction leading to cooperation on mutual interests will foster peace. As the interaction between the

states will deepen, it will lead to interdependency of the states. As the states become interdependent, if a situation of conflict arises, the states will resolve them peacefully and would not opt for war as they would realise that mutual interest and welfare of the people is more important than the ensuing conflict to settle issues. As the states would modernise, the cooperation would increase and chances of war would decrease. Thus, one can clearly outline now that the core of Liberalism revolves around human cognition, freedom cooperation, peace, progress, mutual interest, modernisation and liberal democracy.

All these core principles are also well established in the thought of scholars advocating for core liberalism. However, there is a sub-school known as Neo-Liberalism which also accepts all the principles of core Liberalism but is less optimistic about cooperation as envisaged by core liberals. They are neo-liberals in the sense that they go a little beyond man and advocate cooperation on little larger scale:



Neo Liberalism is the school of Liberalism that originated in the time period between 1780 to 1850. This was the time when industrial revolution began and rapidly progressed. The new bunch of scholars emerged on the scene during this period. These scholars were deeply moved by the progress mankind was making at the industrial level. These scholars began to appreciate human capabilities. A wave of enlightenment began as the scholars took appreciation of human cognition. The age of reason asserted that humans have ability to reason and are at the very centre stage of the entire civilisation and universe. This gave birth to the ideas of more progress and a cooperative spirit amongst mankind. This time period also saw cementing of the idea of Classical Realism. The school of Realism is basically explained through four different types.

TYPE A – INTERDEPENDENCY THEORY

Here, the dominating principle mainly takes flight from Classical Realism. The idea at the heart of this theory is that, as societies interact, the interaction gradually happens on the basis of shared mutual interest. This interaction leads to interdependence amongst states. This interdependence gradually emerges so strongly that at times of conflict, states prefer reaching resolutions more peacefully rather than going for outright war. In 1970, two scholars, namely Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, aptly articulated this reasoning in their complex interdependence theory. They said as the societies modernise, it will lead to greater integration amongst societies. This will put societies on the path of interdependence amongst each other. In case a conflict may arise, the society will resort to negotiations through non-military skills than war. The societies will strive to make peace due to mutual interest and interdependency. Such cooperation will lead to a conflict free world.

TYPE B – INSTITUTIONAL LIBERAL MECHANISM

As the name clearly suggests, the focus, in this case, is on institutional mechanisms as tools for achieving mutual cooperation. As per this type, international organisations are platforms for states to interact and as states interact on this platform, the institution fosters

cooperation amongst them. The main reason why a state may resort to interaction at an institutional level is that a state may fear non-compliance. Thus, it feels that intervention at an international institution will foster cooperation and the institutional mechanism may foster compliance. Even if the states are unwilling at first, gradually, through shared goals and achievements, they should steadily become more and more compliant of international laws and dispute resolution can be embarked upon peacefully through these platforms.

TYPE C – SOCIOLOGICAL LIBERALISM

This type of Liberalism says that the study of IR should not be restricted to just the study of the nation states and relations between them. It takes a much broader view to assert that IR should be concerned with multiple actors like studies of different people, groups, civil society organisations, and so forth. Sociological Liberalism asserts that within a state, all these multiple actors also interact and cooperate. This emphasises the plural character of international dialogues and also lends the same pluralism to the understanding and expounding of Liberalism. In the era of globalisation, the interaction in a state happens amongst multiple transnational's actors and this interaction tremendously increases integration.


A scholar by the name Karl Deutsch has contributed to Sociological Liberalism by undertaking a study of the impact of rising communication and transaction (CNT) between peoples and societies. He says that those societies that may interact more (where more interaction could be, for instance, due to tourism between the two states, trade between them or movement of labour), may undertake more transactions amongst each other and this incremental rise in communication and transaction between them will lead to more unification. As the societies unify, when in conflict, they shall resort to peaceful ways of conflict resolution than war, as transactions and communications between states have caused such cooperation and neither state will be willing to easily sacrifice these beneficial modalities of exchange.

TYPE D – REPUBLICAN LIBERALISM

The basic core of Republican Liberalism is that democracy and Liberalism can combine together to create a peaceful global environment. This theory explains that those societies which are democratic are more transparent and open and are based on the rule of law. In these societies, the decision making is done more openly, in a transparent manner and the states are deemed to be law abiding. But do democracies fight wars? The answer is, at once, both yes and no. They don't fight wars amongst themselves at all. But they do see dictatorial regimes as a threat. The reason they see dictatorial regimes as a threat is because in these regimes, there is no transparency in decision making. Secondly, in these regimes, a dictator may resort to deception, thus making democracies more vulnerable to dictators and their political whimsicalities. In this kind of a situation, democracies may take resort to replacing these dictator regimes and replacing them with parties amenable to their policies and the international statutes to bring about nation building and promote democracy, failing which, they may even go so far as to install puppet governments so that long term peace may be achieved in the region. Unfortunately, this may not always have the desired results, leading to more conflicts and global unrest in some cases (refer to the ensuing case studies in this chapter).

Thus, as per the study of four types of Neo-Liberalism, we can clearly articulate that broadly, the theory talks about globalism and the world order. According to neo-liberals, it is the interaction amongst the states that establishes the world order and not the balance of power. The world does witness global problems which could crop up in the shape of global warming, drug trafficking, black money, and so on. These are problems which individual countries cannot solve. They require cooperation as states' own resources are too limited to enable them to solve these problems on their own. The only solution for the states is to interact amongst themselves. As they interact and coordinate, they strive to establish a global consensus to cooperate and solve the problems. A global consensus, however, is only possible if the states apply prioritisation of their demands first and secondly, undertake a process of transparent decision making in a democratic set-up to achieve consensus on the aforementioned priorities.

In 1972, a scholar named John Burton summarised the difference between Realism and Liberalism through his billiard ball model. While Realism is envisaged as an arena of relatively independent state actors (such as self-controlled units in an enclosed space, like balls on a billiard table), Liberalism is a complex mosaic of multiple actors causing deep interactions, integrations and cooperations.



REAL LIFE CASE STUDY OF LIBERALISM—US INVASION OF IRAQ

This case is well explained through the Republican Liberalism typology of Neo-Liberalism. Here, a democracy establishes the (apparent or perceived) threat of a dictatorial society as a dictator may resort to deception and non-transparency. US developed a fear that Iraq, under dictatorial rule, could be a threat to its sovereignty. Iraq under Saddam Husain, had used chemical weapons in the first Gulf War. The fear that Iraq was in possession of weapons of mass destruction grew relentlessly as time progressed. It was believed that Iraq, being a dictatorial country, would resort to deception of the inspectors of IAEA. This fear compelled US to invade Iraq to remove the dictator and secure peace. The post-war Iraq saw promotion of democracy and exercise of nation building in Iraq. However, in the long term, it has led to an increased unrest on a regional scale, with several patches of territory in Iraq compromised due to factional dispute; while on the global scale, it has contributed to the steady rise of fanaticism and terrorism.

5
CHAPTER

Theory of Functionalism

Thinkers: David Mitrany, Ernst Haas, A.J.R. Groom

Idea of Human Behaviour: The idea of human behaviour is similar to ideas propounded by the school of liberalism. The basic idea is that man, by nature, is cooperative.

Origin: Functionalism has emerged as an alternative school to Neo-Realism and has its roots deep in the school of liberalism.

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Foundation of functionalism School in International Relations
- Neo-Functionalism
- Real life case study

FOUNDATION OF FUNCTIONALISM SCHOOL IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The key scholar in this field is David Mitrany. He is of the view that, firstly, transnational actors play a key role in a stable world order. This is the case because transnational actors seek cooperation through the integration of societies. To run these transactional actors, we require technicians and not laymen politicians. Secondly, he says that nation states, by themselves, do not foster the cooperation we need to establish non-political cooperative groups. We can start creating such groups at a micro-level, for instance, health, education, and so on, and then replicate such non-political groups upward at a macro-level for culture, transport, and so forth. David Mitrany says the non-political cooperative groups are based on mutual interests of the states. Thus, they do not cause any resistance amongst states. The reason that Mitrany advocates beginning at a micro-level and proceeding ahead upward is due to the spill-over effect. He says that success in such non-political cooperative groups at micro-level is bound to automatically push a state to establish more such groups in other dimensions and as this cooperation from micro to regional level will increase, there will be more cooperation and peace, and subsequently the relevance of nation states will decrease.

NEO-FUNCTIONALISM

Neo-Functionalism wants to advocate integration of the existing nation states, unlike functionalists who prefer to render nation states into museums of institutional curiosity.

They prefer political interaction and the fostering of cooperative decision making. The scholar Ernst Haas, a neo functionalist, adds that the way forward to have a completely integrated community functionalism is that rulers agree to surrender some sovereignty and pool resources for growth.

REAL LIFE CASE STUDY

A classical example of Functionalism is Ernst Haas's explanation of European Union where state leaders have surrendered some sovereign powers for the growth of the entire union. (For detailed analysis, see [Section-H, Chapter 4](#)).

6
CHAPTER

Theory of Marxism

Core Thinkers: Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin, Joseph Stalin, Robert Cox, Immanuel Wallerstein, Antonio Gramsci

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Idea of Human Behaviour and Society
- Foundation of Marxism in International Relations
- Idea of Lenin and Power Re-distribution
- Idea of Gramsci
- Idea of Cox
- Idea of Wallerstein
- Marxism and Economic Crisis of 2008.

IDEA OF HUMAN BEHAVIOUR AND SOCIETY

Marxism offers a very distinct analysis in contrast to Realism or Liberalism as it takes the study of class to the very deepest levels of societal structures. In IR, Marxist theory advances that all that happens in the world is due to certain structures which exert influence on states compelling them to behave in the way they do. To understand IR, we need to understand these structures.

Foundation of Marxism in International Relations

For Karl Marx, the study of the social world needs to be a study of totality. By totality, he means that individual study of disciplines such as history, economics, politics and so on leads us to an incomplete understanding of society and the world, as to better understand the social world, these disciplines need to be studied together. Marx believed that any change in history is driven by a change in the economic development of a nation, and history is further characterised by the class struggle that ensues between the moneyed capitalist classes and the poorer labour/proletariat classes. Marx propounds, through works such as essays ('Wage Labour and Capital') and books (*Das Kapital Volume One*, 1867) that, in a society, there are two concepts—factors of production and relations of production. These two factors interact and produce tensions and the tensions both produce and determine the history of the society. As societies progress, the means of production in the societies also change. The old traditional methods of production become outdated and redundant, and this puts a certain kind of pressure on the society.

The market institution is based on a simple rule of exchange whereby individuals,

through a legal tender called currency, are able to exchange goods in lieu of that currency. The legal tender called money is an instrument of exchange regulated by the government. This brings the state into the fold of economy. This means that the state provides a legally recognised instrument to allow transactions in the market, which indicates that the state and the market are interacting. This interaction is at the core of international political economy. But economy was never the core field of study of IR. We can already appreciate, as per our understanding of chapters two, three and four, that initially, after the World Wars, the situation warranted prevention of another war. The idea was that avoidance of war and maintenance of peace is far more important in any study of IR. This relegated economy to get a secondary position.

This fact is very succinctly put by Charles de Gaulle of France. He once pointed out that statesmen should focus on war and peace issues as the economy can be handled by 'lesser minds'. Economy as a core domain in the study of IR has gained more significance since the end of the cold war and onset of the ways of globalisation. Infact, the need arose from the 1970's to bring in the economic paradigm and link it to IR. In the 1970's, we first witnessed a prolonged US-Vietnam war. This caused tremendous drain of resources. This was coupled with the oil crises of 1973 which again made US economy vulnerable. Then the financial stress of USSR in the management of East Europe was witnessed during the times of Gorbachev and the end of the cold war. The subsequent US supremacy again brought economy to a firm footing as globalisation began. Thus, economy became important in the study of society or polity.

It is in 16th/17th century that the new ideology of Mercantilism began to emerge. It advocated that politics should use economics as a tool for power acquisition. It emphasised that the world is an area of conflict as each state has its own national interest and all national interests of states are opposed to each other as national interests are not based on cooperation or gain for anyone. The situation is that states compete at the economic level with each other in the world making it a zero sum game. It is a zero sum game because the gain of one state is the loss of the other. This theory is at the core of Mercantilism. Mercantilism also advocates a state to be careful of the gain another state makes because a gain made at an economic level by another state will lead to the state gaining military strength. This military power that a state is able to achieve is the result of a strong economy. This military power now can be used by the state to colonise territories and again increase its economic power. This is why governmental regulations of a state's finances and economic profits is necessarily tied in with the eventual desired augmentation of state power.

This will enable the state to acquire more national wealth. Thus a strong economy enables a state to pursue the twin goals of wealth and power simultaneously. The Mercantile ideology has evolved over a period of time. In the 16th century, when Spain was able to acquire bullion from its colonisation of America, the mercantilists argued that states should acquire bullion to be powerful. But gradually, as Netherlands began to acquire wealth by a vast overseas territorial trade, the mercantilists argued that states should acquire wealth through trade and by building a surplus. The next step of the evolution came when Britain began wealth acquisition by virtue of the industrialisation of its economy. This gave mercantilists a chance to argue that nations should focus on industrialisation and gain wealth but to do so, the state should take measures to ensure

protection and development of local industries, giving birth to the idea of protectionism.

Gradually economic liberalism began. It advocated a situation where a market is allowed to operate freely without political interference. This school is of the view that the market should be allowed to operate freely to provide goods and services in an economy. Political interventions by the states, which would merely create conflict, came to be understood as retrogressive and thus avoidable. This system came to be known as *laissez faire* (free market trade without the interference from governments).

The idea was that no one country could possibly be successful in producing everything. Each has a specific specialisation in something or the other and if there is free trade, this specialisation will enable economic interaction leading to trade and increase in global wealth. The way this school differs from the mercantilists is that economic liberalism puts the individual consumer at the centre stage and defines the role of the state as an agency. The idea is that the individual is always willing to maximise his interests and his interests are maximised only in a free market economy. Many early economic liberals advocated *laissez faire*—a situation where the markets operate freely and there is no political restriction. But we need to remember that market may not always operate freely. At times it may not work for mutual gain of all. For example, during the recent drive of odd-even scheme in New Delhi in 2016, the private cab operators took the odd-even scheme as an opportunity and this led to surge pricing. Such a situation is called market failure and to rectify this, we needed political regulation. Thus the modern and more acceptable view is that we do need the free markets but also a certain amount of regulation by the state in the management of the economy is desirable.

Now if we look at the basic tenets of Marxism, it states that, firstly, economy is a place where humans are exploited and there is class inequality. For Marx, economy is based on two social classes—the capitalist class which owns the factors of production and strives for profit maximisation; and the labour class, which sells itself to the capitalists to survive. The labour makes profit for the capitalist and the capitalist does not share the profit leading to labour exploitation. Marx believes that capitalism is a step forward from feudalism. The reason being that in feudalism, the serf was attached to the land and had little choice in choosing his master. Surprisingly, in many cases during the feudal era, when the land was sold from one feudal lord to the other, the serfs were attached and sold along with the land to the new feudal lord. Marx says that capitalism is at least better in the sense that the labour at least has some degree of choice and is free to decide to whom he would sell his labour power to. But Marx also predicted that a time will come when the labour class or proletariat will overthrow the capitalist or bourgeoisie class and take over the means of production.

Marx stated that each state is driven by interests of the ruling class and the interests of the ruling class impacts the state power structure deeply. Thus, if there is a capitalist class and if the state fights a war, we need to understand the concept of class interest in the war as the capitalist class is based on profit maximisation and the urge to generate profit is a never ending urge. Thus, Marx's theory believes that capitalism is a repressive machinery because, in its urge to make more profit, it will gradually move to those nations to explore new markets and options that grant it an opportunity to make further profit. This aptly explains why Mercantilism and Economic Liberalism caused cultural

imperialism and colonisation of a new order which is now reflected in the 21st century under the dominant trends of globalisation by Trans National Corporations in their hunt for cheap labour and more profit in the Third World countries. Thus, globalisation is an example of capitalist expansion in 21st century.

Lenin and Power Re-distribution

Lenin analysed the economic process and puts it aptly. Lenin said that in 18th/19th century, British made colonies, practised imperialism and became a strong political force to contend with. However, in the beginning of the 20th century, when Germany became an economic powerhouse after its unification and rose to a strength similar to Britain, it demanded its share in the colonies by announcing its policy of colonial expansion under Weltpolitik. Lenin explains that this is part of a natural process as when one power economically expands, it will demand re-division of the sphere of influences for its own benefit and such disparities invariably bring conflict, as has been witnessed between the British and the Germans, finally climaxing in the World War-I.

To enhance our understanding at this juncture, we may also consider the writings of Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci wanted to study as to why it was difficult to promote a revolution in Western Europe as Marx says that an advanced industrial society will eventually undergo a social revolution. He wanted to analyse why a nonindustrial, backward Russia had succeeded in the revolutions while industrialised Western Europe had failed. To explain this, Gramsci studied the entire phenomena through the lens of hegemony in his *Prison Notebooks*. Gramsci understood that power is a mixture of coercion and consent. He explained that the primary focus of Marx was on study of coercion and how a coercive society exploits the majority. He analysed the situation in Western Europe, and found that there, power was driven by consent as well. Gramsci says that in a society where hegemony is consent dominated, the ruling capitalist class first tries to control all cultural, moral and political values. Then they take steps to disperse these values amongst different classes in the society. In this value dispersion, the civil society plays an important role as civil society provides a platform for interaction of the masses with the dominant group. The interaction helps in enhancing the understanding of the thoughts of the masses. A little bit of modification allows the dominant class to make its values acceptable to all and thus maintain the legitimacy of its power over society through what he calls ‘cultural hegemony’.

Thus, once the values are accepted, the superstructure is moulded, and the masses help in maintaining *status quo* rather than revolting against it. Gramsci propounds that Marx focussed only on the study of the base, but the study of superstructure cannot be negated as the superstructure in this case is moral and cultural values. Thus, Gramsci asserts that a study is valid only if it takes into account both the superstructure and socio-economic base. For the political hegemony of the dominant class to be challenged, the transformation can only happen if counter hegemonic structures emerge in a society and civil society allows alternative historical blocs to emerge.

The scholar, Robert W. Cox has further developed the core argument of Gramsci.

Cox has also criticised existing IR theories and developed an alternative. The first thing Cox asserted was that theory is always for someone and for some purpose. He says theory is always a reflection of context, time and space. Thus, the knowledge is not timeless as we need to study theories propounded till date. Cox asserts that theorists often serve interests of those rules under whom they prosper and try in some or other way to reinforce and legitimise the status quo and make the society believe that IR can follow a very naturalised set of laws.

In his book, *Production, Power and the World Order* (1987), Cox argues that the concept of hegemony is important to understand the power structures of the world and the behaviour of nations. He says we have an international system where there is a world which is dominated by the Anglo-US axis and they have developed a world order that suits the axis. The Anglo-US axis has not only maintained hegemony only through coercion but also through consent, where the consent generated is making all nations virtually believe that free trade is beneficial for all societies. The fact is that this idea of free trade being beneficial is even accepted by societies who are inherently disadvantaged by free trade. But Cox asserts (like Marx) that soon there will be counter hegemonic movements to challenge this common sense notion of free trade being beneficial for all.

These views of Cox to some extent are extensively argued by another neo-Marxist scholar, Immanuel Wallerstein. His theory is based on the idea of world system analysis. He says that the world is made up of unified areas, and in each unified area, we witness an interaction between politics and economics. He says there are two types of world systems. One is called 'World Empire System', where politics and economics are under a unified control; for example the Holy Roman Empire. The second is the 'World Economic System'. Here the economies are unified but politics is decentralised. Wallerstein, in his model, argues that the capitalist world economy is divided in a hierarchy. We have core areas on the top where we have a mass market and a strong state. In core areas we have very advanced agricultural. Then at the other end, we have peripheral areas which produce basic stuff like wood, sugar, grain, and so on. Then there are semi peripheral areas which, due to their contacts with the core and peripheral areas, have succeeded in building an indigenous industrial base and successfully act as a buffer. The basic working model of the capitalist world economic system is through unequal exchange where surplus flows from the periphery to the core. In the periphery, the weak state is subdued by the strong state and the surplus appropriation is enacted by enforcement of the strong state. This creates a tension in the system. The tension is diffused by semi peripheral states which act as shock absorbers or buffers. But Wallerstein asserts that, in the long run, all this will lead to an end of the capitalist system because a time will come when the quest to expand will halt, producing crisis. Every World System has a beginning, middle and an end phase. Wallerstein argues that with the end of the Cold War, the world system has entered the crises stage which originated with 16th century geographical discoveries.

The Economic Crisis in 2008

At the end of the Cold War, it was argued that the Marxist paradigm is finished as USSR has collapsed. The other economies like Cuba, China and so on, have transited

into being more market friendly economies. No doubt initially, after the Cold War ended, Marxism did decline, but today we witness a kind of a renaissance as we witness an analysis of 1987 stock crash, Asian financial crisis, US subprime crisis or the more recent European crisis. All these instances deeply open up the consequences of the capitalist system itself.

The 2008 financial crisis is a classic example. The crisis that erupted in the banking system led the state to undertake a bailout. As the states are highly indebted after they offered the bailout, states resorted to austerity. The austerity caused a rise in unemployment, ultimately posing a threat to the political system. David Harvey aptly summarises the phenomena—‘privatise profits, socialise risks, save banks, but put screws on the people’. In US, this crisis in 2011 manifested as the Occupy movement where protestors highlighted the social disparity and inequality on streets, with an overarching slogan of ‘We are the 99%’.

End of Section Questions

1. How have transnational actors emerged as driving forces of global politics?
2. Discuss the impact of Balance of Power on global politics. Do you think Balance of Power is full of confusion?
3. Marxist approach adopts the approach of economic reductionism. Do you agree?
4. Why are Idealists known as intellectual precursors of Realists?
5. Examine the explanation offered by Realists of the 9/11 wars.
6. Can it be stated that Realism is an ideology of powerful states? Discuss.
7. “International Relations are inhospitable to liberalism.” (Stanley Hoffmann). Discuss.
8. Apply the Marxism theory to argue that USA as a power is in decline.
9. How does Marxism theory help our understanding of world politics?
10. Superiority of liberal institutions and values is reflected in the ascendency of democratic regimes. Examine.

Section C

Making and Origin of the Indian Foreign Policy

[Chapter 1 Indian Foreign Policy in Ancient Times and India's Strategic Thought](#)

[Chapter 2 An Overview of Indian Foreign Policy from British Time till Nehru](#)

[Chapter 3 Determinants and the Formation of Indian Foreign Policy](#)

[Chapter 4 Overview of Indian Foreign Policy from Nehru Till the Present](#)

1
CHAPTER

Indian Foreign Policy in Ancient Times and India's Strategic Thought

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- India's strategic culture and its key elements
- Concept of Grand Strategy
- Ramayana and India Foreign Policy
- Why is Hanuman called India's First Diplomat
- Kautilya's Arthashastra in Indian Foreign Policy
- Application of Kautilyan ideology to 1962 Indo-China war
- Conception of National Power

INTRODUCTION

The 21st century is aptly called the Asian Century, and India is being one of the key Asian players has a great responsibility. It can act as a great stabilizer and power projector. Before we attempt an analysis of India's relation with the world, our concern should be to analyse and see whether India has any strategic culture. As we shall study in this entire unit, India's Foreign Policy till now has had a high degree of consistency since independence. What is unique is that this has been the case despite different ideologies being in power over the last decades. This continuity hints at the presence of a strategic autonomy in the political ethos which is based on its civilization. One of the key elements is the cooperative behaviour India intends to achieve through peaceful resolution of conflicts as India gives preference to dialogue over coercion or violence. This point is most visible in India–Pakistan relationship, wherein one of the governments will initiate a dialogue, and then due to irritants posed by non-state actors, the dialogue will be halted. The act of non-state actor will increase suspicion between the two states. But again, after normalization, the two will resort to initiating dialogue. The most important aim India intends to achieve in its strategic culture is socio-political cum economic justice for all in the decolonised world.



Another key linked to its strategic culture is grand strategy. A grand strategy is an aggregation of national resources and national capacity of a country. It includes a

combination of military, diplomatic, political, economic, cultural and moral capabilities a nation deploys in the service of national security. A grand strategy is all about protection of domestic values. Every state has certain values and to uphold those values are the primary goals of every state. But as a state cannot protect all values, it resorts to satisfactorily protecting the few it holds most sacred. In case the value of a state may be threatened, say by a non-state actor or an act of nature like an earthquake or tsunamis, how the state manages to restore the value threatened is our concern here. The combination of its capabilities the state may deploy to protect its internal and external security is known as grand strategy. This takes us to strategic thought. Strategic thought signifies the resources a government has (like diplomacy, military, economic strength, cultural values, etc) and the way it uses these resources to achieve security for the society. For India, strategic thought means certain values and preferences which leads to the state evolving some ideas and using these ideas in its policies and approaches in foreign policy.

THE RAMAYANA AND INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY


If we study *The Ramayana*, our ancient Indian epic, we get to know that there are many principles of modern diplomacy we follow today that owe their origin to the text. Our concerns in this section are to deduce the principles of modern diplomacy originating from *The Ramayana*.

As readers are possibly already aware, in this ancient epic, Sita, the wife of Ram, is kidnapped by Ravana, the king of Lanka. Ram entrusts on Hanuman the responsibility to locate Sita. Hanuman, who is able to locate Sita in Lanka, first tries to convince her that he is an agent of Ram and not that of Ravana. Once he convinces Sita that he has been sent by Ram, Sita conveys a message to Hanuman and Hanuman delivers the message back to Ram. From this situation, we may infer that Hanuman, who delivered the message to Ram of Sita, is seen to be doing what a diplomat does in modern times. In modern times, diplomats are called information agents. They carry information from one state and convey it to their own parent state. As the diplomats carry sensitive information, when they deliver it, the diplomats must provide a truthful account. They must not distort or manipulate information. This is precisely what Hanuman did. He carried the information to Ram and delivered the message without distortion.

The next scene that is important for us is the court scene where Hanuman argues with Ravana to liberate Sita. He initiates his dialogue by telling Ravana about the power of Ram. He tells Ravana of how popular Ram is back in Ayodhya. He informs the enemy about his leadership and his followership. He is thereby indulging in something called power projection. He is projecting the power of Ram in front of Ravana.

During ancient and medieval times in world history, power projection was always individual in nature. It meant that diplomats, during this time, always undertook power projection of an individual personality which was always invariably their own king. For instance, if a king in South India during ancient times sent a diplomatic mission to another state, say in West Asia or East Africa, the diplomat used to project the might of his king in the court of the other king. The diplomat would glorify his own king's power, and his military prowess and his territorial extent. That is why we say that in ancient and medieval times, power projection was always individual and personality-centric in nature. During the early modern times of colonial rule, the coercive elements of power projection

diplomacy emerged. However in the modern times today, power projection is more economic in nature. However, power projection continues owing its origins to the epic discussed.



Now in another scene we find Hanuman telling Ravana that it is against Dharma to keep Sita in captivity over a long period of time and if Ravana does not liberate Sita, Ram may burn Lanka into ashes. To this, Ravana reacts angrily and orders that Hanuman should be put to death. But Ravana's brother Vibheeshana says, that Hanuman, who has come to Lanka as an emissary from a foreign state cannot be put to death. This emerges as the first ever instance of diplomatic immunity. This practice continues in modern times even today.

THE ARTHASHASTRA AND INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

It is important to understand Kautilya's *Arthashastra* as it is an Indian treatise on statecraft and diplomacy and also gives valuable insights into our international relations and foreign policy. Kautilya is India's own realist as his ideas resonate with realism. Realism, for example, Kautilya says, is when a state, as an instrument, focusses on power enhancement as the international situation is one of anarchy. In this context, the policy of the state should be to acquire power. This is also the basis of theory of Realism we have.

For Kautilya, the state is the most important and legitimate instrument which enjoys sovereignty. The responsibility of the king is to guard his subjects and ensure their protection and survival. This should be the primary national interest of the state. The core objective of the state is to acquire wealth, deliver justice and undertake expenditure. A state has to be strong and to be strong it needs good administration, stability and justice. This results in a conducive situation for wealth creation and leads to military expeditions for conquests. Kautilya talks about how a strong state is needed to create wealth. The wealth in the state is generated by an elaborate taxation machinery. The Dharma of the king is the welfare of the people. If the king is unable to make the people prosper, it is inevitable that people will become restless and they will rebel. The rebellion can take any form, including that of violence. Thus, the primary focus of the king should be welfare. Welfare can only be occasioned by the king if he takes steps to promote wealth creation as wealth augments power. The Kautilyan idea of national interest is, therefore, based on welfare of people. If people prosper, so will the state. Kautilya's concept of power begins

from society. He says power is of three kinds. The first is intellectual strength.

Kautilya's grand strategy is based on the idea that the king needs to be a conqueror. He needs to aim to increase his power over neighbours. The king is envisaged as a '*Chakravartin*'. *Chakravartin* (in Sanskrit *cakravartin*, and in Pali *cakkavattin*) is an ancient Indian term used to refer to an ideal universal ruler who rules ethically and benevolently over the entire world. Such a ruler's reign is called *sarvabhauma*. The goal of such a king is to promote national economy and ensure national security and social order.

The state is primarily agrarian in nature. Cattle rearing and agriculture are primary activities. This leads to production of surplus which leads to trade. As trade is undertaken, economy is strengthened. A strong economy sustains the state and the army. To develop this kind of a state, which is based on powerful agrarian economy, the state needs to conquer new lands. The king undertakes expeditions to conquer new lands. The new lands conquered would allow citizens to expand opportunities to earn livelihood. This is the Dharma of the ruler. The goal of the ruler is a stable state which needs to be achieved for the welfare of citizens and to achieve such a state, the ruler is responsible for good governance. Governance is a means to achieve the aforementioned goals, as well as to achieve social harmony.

At the foreign policy level, Kautilya has a different thought. As stated previously, the ruler has to be a conqueror (*Chakravartin*). If he has to be a conqueror, then war is a natural outcome of his foreign policy. Kautilya says that the ruler has to be careful because his immediate neighbours are enemy states who are jealous of the social harmony and progress of the ruler and his kingdom. Thus, conflicts with neighbours are likely to be natural and to resolve the conflict the king has to decide if he would resort to conciliation and give gifts to another state to make it an ally, or sow dissension and use force if needed. All this depends upon the power of the king and options for war available to discussion and use of force when the need arises.

Kautilya propounds that the power exuded by the state is of three types. The first is individual power. This is the power and courage of the king. This is psychological in nature. The second is hard power. This is the military and economic capacity of the ruler and the state. The third is soft power. This is the diplomatic power of the ruler. Kautilya says that before a ruler declares war on an enemy state, he should measure his power. The ruler, before the declaration of war, should ensure that he possesses superiority over all three levels i.e., terrain of warfare (place), season and his own counsellors. Hence, if a ruler is intelligent and moral and has good counsel, he will win diplomatically. If a ruler has adequate economic and military strength he will win on the basis of physical power and achieve physical success (application of hard power). The ruler, Kautilya says, should strive for soft power rather than hard power.

Depending upon the situation, he has three types of war to wage. The first is *Dharma-yudha* which is outright, righteous war, fought while following certain predetermined rules. The second option is alternative to *Dharma-yudha* which is war by deception. There is no lawful framework governing this war. The third is silent warfare where a state undertakes war without public attention. Kautilya also says that aim of the state should be to expand national power. This can be done by conquests or alliances. The components of national power are called *prakritis*. There are seven components, viz,

political leadership, administration, resources, infrastructure, economy, security forces and alliances. The ruler should use hard, soft and individual power to expand national power. So, *shakti* and *prakriti* if used prudently, leads to rise of comprehensive national power.



Kautilya and Indo-Pak War of 1948 and Indo-China War of 1962

In the preceding section we have attempted to explain how Kautilya's *Arthashastra* was used by Chandragupta Maurya to defeat Nanda and also to stop the advancement of Alexander, leading to the formation of a united India. Kautilya has explained state priorities and economic conditions and has propounded that the power of the state rests on seven *prakritis* and if any one of the seven Prakritis is weak, the state is fragile. We need to understand the contemporary security environment by applying his theories.

According to the political theories of Max Weber, a state could be said to "succeed" if it maintains a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within its borders. When this is broken (for instance, through the dominant presence of warlords, paramilitary groups, or terrorism), the very existence of the state becomes dubious, and the state becomes a failed state. Political scholar Querine Hanlon says that states are of three categories—weak, failing and failed. Hanlon says that half of this world is in fragile category today and it is that leads to instability conflict and war which provide conditions for terrorism, militias and crime in 21st century. Fund for Peace's **Fragile States Index** underlines the democratic character of state institutions in order to determine its level of failure.

An application of Kautilya's ideas in 1948 Indo-Pak war explains the relevance of terrain, weather conditions and strategy as important dimensions. In August 1947, British rule in India came to an end. The state of Jammu and Kashmir was not clear. In October 1947, Pakistan, through tribal Pathans, began to invade Kashmir. Sensing a security threat, Hari Singh, Maharaja of Kashmir, acceded to India by signing an Instrument of Accession. The conflict between India and Pakistan on Kashmir ended on 1st January, 1949 with an agreed ceasefire. The ceasefire created a Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) region. The Indian Army could have marched ahead in POK zone to drive out Pakistan but the hostile climate and Pakistani guerrilla tactics prevented India from taking these measures. Kautilya clarifies that a state should not go and fight in an area which has a territory which is ungovernable. The inhospitable terrain of POK and its hostile climate made India land up in a situation where it could not, finally, capture POK. The logistics kept India back while poor military infrastructure compounded upon it to complicate issues. The two concepts of Kautilya, *Bhumisandhi* (not entering in territory which is ungovernable) and *Vyasana* (a state needs to take precautions and ensure logistics before war) were both missing.

In case of the 1962 conflict with China, which ultimately concluded in a ceasefire in Arunanchal, the Chinese had indeed reached the foothills but retreated because the people of Arunanchal did not support China and from the *Bhumisandhi* point of view, China refrained from getting into the business of capturing land (Arunachal) which was deemed ungovernable.

2
CHAPTER

An Overview of Indian Foreign Policy from British Time till Nehru

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Role of British in Indian Foreign Policy
- Instances of British assertion of Grand Strategy
- Indian Foreign Policy till 1947
- Early years of Indian Foreign Policy
- Final Analysis

INTRODUCTION

In the year 1600, the East India Company was formed in Britain to trade with India. The British subsequently acquired control of the Indian territory. The Regulating Act of 1773 is a landmark Act as it marks the establishment of British control over the Presidencies of Bengal, Bombay and Madras. The Act of 1773 also made the Governor of Bengal as the Governor General of British possessions in India. The British primarily aimed to ensure that no European power threatens British presence in India. The British, to control India, used three instruments of national power, namely, industry, navy and their world-wide empire. While establishing control over India, the British first consolidated their position and succeeded in its completion by 1856. The year 1857 saw the Great Indian Mutiny and the consequent transfer of power to the crown and this consolidated the British hold over Indian subjects. From then onwards, the British developed a colony in India, used its men and material resources and undertook plunder of its resources. By early 1900's, a nationalist tendency developed in India. Subsequently, the Acts of 1919 and 1935 secured successful participation of Indians in World War-I and helped in prolonging British rule in India without an aim of self-governance. Up till 1947, the Indian Foreign Policy was used by the British as per British interests. The British, in this period, applied their grand strategy which was based on securing trade routes and using the resources of India for self-benefit. The Government of India enjoyed liberty in decision making but foreign policy was decided in London as per British interests.

British Indian Diplomacy

In this sub section we will have a look at various instances of British Indian diplomacy. In each instance the British tried to assert their Grand Strategy.

Instance–1: In 1798, Napoleon invaded Egypt. Napoleon also planned, with the then-Russian Czar Alexander–I, in 1807 to invade India. The Russian Czar and Napoleon concluded the Treaty of Titlist to achieve their objectives. When the British got to know

about this treaty, they sent friendly missions to secure Muscat, Afghanistan, Persia, Sindh and safely secured all routes to the British Empire in India.

Instance–2: The British decided to manage the entire stretch of land border by establishing a semicircle from Iran to Burma and the Indian Government decided that except Iran, the foreign relations of all states would be decided by the British Crown. They adopted the policy of a buffer establishment.

The idea was to protect one nation by making its neighbour a buffer from outside interference. This policy was followed since 1880's. The buffer was not a satellite state—it had its sovereign government internally but its external sovereignty was under British control. For example, in 1902 Lord Lansdowne also clarified that a buffer state prevents direct contact between the British and other states. The entire system of these buffers was called the system of rising fence. In the outer rising fence were Iran, Afghanistan and Tibet and in the inner were Nepal, Bhutan and Ceylon. By this method, the British successfully kept China and Russia at bay.

Instance–3: China, in the mid-17th century, was ruled by the Qing dynasty. It ruled over major areas in China but Tibet and Xinjiang were sovereign territories. The British had control over Tibet, Nepal and Bhutan as buffers. These territories were neither princely states nor colonies and the British maintained separate treaties with each of them. For the British, Tibet was not very important till early 1700. Over a period of time, some Tibetan monks had established relations with the Tsar in Russia. In 1899, Lord Curzon decided to send an expedition to Tibet for fear that the Tzar may use Tibetans to foment trouble for the British. In 1903, the expedition left for Lhasa. But in 1904, when they reached Tibet, Dalai Lama fled to Mongolia. The British subsequently signed a convention in 1904 and made Tibet a British protectorate with Tibet remaining under the Qing Dynasty. From then onwards, Qing Dynasty ruled over it but Tibet was a British Protectorate. After the Tibetan revolt in 1912, the British in 1914 undertook a survey and established a map and demarcated, using a red line, the Indo–Tibet boundary.

Instance–4: At the international level, post-World War I, India was a part of Imperial war conference and signed the Treaty of Versailles and subsequently became a member of League of Nations and ILO. India, surprisingly, was the one and only non-self-governing nation of the world in the League of Nations and after the World War II, India became a UN member in 1945 while still under British rule. India had also participated in the Bretton-Woods Conference in 1944.

MAKING OF FOREIGN POLICY TILL 1947

International relations with respect to India began to develop in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Below are the three broad views that originated laid foundation of our foreign policy:



As Indian nationalism became stronger, India developed the idea that India should strive for human liberty and brotherhood and nationalism assumed a global character as

Gandhi entered the scene. *Ahimsa* became a new line of thought. After 1947, there was further clarity on foreign policy. Idealism and world peace were established as stated goals by India's non-alignment movement and were rooted in ideology of non-violence and non-aggression. The Constituent Assembly debates talked about foreign policy twice. Firstly it debated Article 51 in the constitution that strives to promote international peace and security by having honourable relations with all and respect to international peace and security by having honourable relations with all and respect to international treaties, laws and encouraged that disputes be settled by arbitration. This view of Article 51 was recognized by Biswanath Das and B M Khardekar as combined legacy of India's spiritual heritage. The second instance was that of the issue of India's membership to the Commonwealth (elaborated as a case study in India-Britain relations chapter). The nationalist leaders favoured a united Asia and an Asian Federation. In 1930, the first Pan Asiatic Federation Conference happened as well. As the WW II ended, the establishment of UN translated the Indian idea of an Asian Federation into a World Federation.

The Congress had established an outlook on the world since 1885. Initially, the idea was to use the support of the British to get Indians in the administration and then use it as a bargaining chip. India supported the British against Russia but Indian leaders knew that Russia would not attack India. India opposed the British advancement in the North East as territorial aggression. After WW I, India supported the idea of 'Right to Self Determination' and democracy but as the British refused to extend it to India, the leaders felt disillusioned. The tilt towards leftist ideology grew during the interwar period and finally emerged in the post-independence period under Non-Aligned Movement or NAM.

EARLY YEARS OF INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY

The foreign policy of a nation is always conducted within a context and a time period and the past always plays an important role in its formulation. When we say time period, it signifies the way the nations of the world are behaving as of then, and when world politics displays a certain trend in behaviour, the way India behaves vis-à-vis those trends. When India became independent, its first priority was to focus on economic rebuilding. As a nation state, India realised that a strong economic foundation is the key to great power. India, under Nehru, initiated the Idea to remain non-aligned. India asserted that it would not align to US or USSR but would neither antagonise the US or the USSR and would engage with both the countries. The USSR never invited India to be a part of the communist camp while India always perceived capitalism to be a form of imperialism and hence decided to stay away from it. The only middle course available for our foreign policy was to be Non Aligned. The basic spirit of non-alignment was to undertake interaction with all without identifying the nation state as either one or the other affiliate.



India continued to maintain an equidistant political stance from two competing ideologies, yet undertake engagement with both powers and their allies. Nehru vested a lot

of faith in the UN and according to him, the UN would take the world out of the present crises. Nehru perceived the UN to be not only a world organization but a world Parliament.

FINAL ANALYSIS

In this chapter we have clearly analysed that India aspires to be a great power, and this owes its origin to the greatness of the nation personified in ancient texts, as perceived by Indians. India's ancient past had a great imprint on the Nehruvian period, which blended perfectly with modern aspirational values India developed during colonial times. India, under Nehru, displayed a suitable combination of assertion and non-violence by maintaining positive neutralism through non-alignment. The policy of non-alignment, rightly based on enlightened self-interest, aptly guided India during the turbulent Cold War period and also echoed in us that great power status can be achieved only by moral idealism and not by any form of territorial or military aggression.

However, despite India advocating for non-alignment, India did recognise and diplomatically engage with a host of nations, ranging from Korea to Congo. The US certainly was not comfortable with NAM and perceived it as an international liability that undermined American influence. Thus, it was natural for Pakistan, after Partition, to align with the US under SEATO in 1954. During early 1950's, India continued to support China on every platform as Indian support was based on civilizational amity between the two. However, after growing distrust due to Chinese aid to Naga and Mizo insurrections, it culminated in 1962 war. The post-1962 period saw the cementing of US–Pakistan relations and Sino–Pakistan axis, which ultimately compelled India to move beyond the orbit of reduced defense expenditure. The subsequent victories in 1965 and 1971 wars with Pakistan helped India come out of the eclipse of humiliation imposed by 1962 defeat at the hands of the Chinese. The period of Indira and Rajiv Gandhi doctrines saw use of military force to up the deterrence in the region. The end of the Cold War saw India use its economic significance and power to assert influence. The adoption of a liberal economy gave India the needed space to repair the Indo–US relationship and since the 1990's, India has steadily increased its regional and international standing in the world to achieve the goal of being a great power.

3
CHAPTER

Determinants and the Formation of Indian Foreign Policy

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Role of MEA in foreign policy
- Role of state governments in foreign policy
- Role of Defence Ministry in foreign policy
- Role of DRDO in foreign policy
- Role of Parliament in foreign policy
- Role of Union Executive in foreign policy
- Role of private sector in foreign policy
- Role of media in foreign policy
- Role of PMO in foreign policy


This chapter introduces the reader to various institutions responsible for foreign policy formation and execution in India. In 1947, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) was created. Initially, it was placed under the Prime Minister of India. The Indian MEA announced that friendly relations were to be established with all nations, with special attention on decolonisation. India envisaged the need to have one world. In 1947, the MEA developed two circles, one for neighbours and the other for the rest of the world. This might be interpreted as a British legacy since they had used the policy of the ring fence, and had also established buffer states and protectorates. The MEA, when created in 1947, had the infrastructure to engage with many states at their disposal.

Britain–Afghanistan and Independent India

When the British had control over India, they had decided to engage with Afghanistan. The British engagement with Afghanistan was undertaken to keep the Russians, under the Tsar, at bay. Due to British presence in Afghanistan, the situation was somewhat eased for India after 1947. In 1949, an Afghan Trade Delegation visited Delhi and concluded a Treaty of Friendship. India subsequently opened up consulates in Afghanistan to streamline the gulf operations as Britain had employed a lot of Indians to work in the oil fields in the Gulf. Thus, the Indian Government used its British links to engage with West Asia.

The World Wars also played an important role in our immediate worldview. Due to the World Wars, the British had taken a lot of Indians to work overseas. This not only

helped India to internationalise its presence in the post-independence period but also gave us insight on how to protect our frontiers. The British had taken a lot of people of Indian origin to work in other colonies. They came to constitute the Indian diaspora. The immediate task for MEA now was to provide citizenship to these migrants. Subsequently, the MEA, in later years, began to get professional diplomats recruited by Union Public Service Commission (UPSC). State governments play an important role in the foreign policy decisions in India at times, but during the electoral discourse, foreign policy is not debated as domestic politics in India has not evolved yet to use the policies of India at the international level in political campaigning. Nuclear weapon alliance, foreign diplomatic strategies and so forth are not used as campaign issues in India. Regional parties, however, try to generate regional sensation by occasionally raising up foreign policy issues. For example, DMK and AIADMK in Tamil Nadu use Tamil grievances in Sri Lanka as a plank to galvanise votes and, at times, have put tremendous pressures on the Central government to tow the regional line.



The Foreign Ministry, though it plays a very important role in the foreign policy decisions of India, is highly under-staffed. The diplomatic strength of India is very limited in comparison to Japan, the US or Germany. The officials are often overburdened. A joint secretary in MEA has a large portfolio and resultantly is unable to effectively process information. The Defence ministry has a huge pool of officials from the three forces but lacks officials with in-depth knowledge on modern complex acquisition and defence policies. The defence acquisitions fall upon career bureaucrats with little or no specialisation. There is a general tendency to delay decisions and this, overall, contributes in reduction in the influence of the military in foreign policy decisions.

Since our domestic acquisition is slow from foreign nations, at the defence level, to meet the shortage, we resort to self-sufficiency which is pledged by the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO). The problem repeatedly observed with DRDO is of over-promise and under-delivery. There is a huge soldier-scientist disconnect that aggravates concerns of domestic defence production. The Home Ministry provides support through the Indo Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) at the Chinese border and Border Security Force (BSF) at Pakistan and Bangladesh border and is involved in border conflicts with the nations.

In India, foreign policy and defence of the nation are domains of the Union executive that finds mention in List 1 of the seventh schedule of the Constitution. As foreign policy is the domain of the executive, there is no need of Parliamentary approval to declare treaties unlike in the US, where both houses of US Congress need to approve bills, thereby imposing limits on Federal authority. In the US, two instances are worth noting where Congress refused ratification. The first was when Woodrow Wilson agreed that the US would be a part of League of Nations which the congress rejected and same was the case in 1999, when Clinton signed Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) while the Congress rejected it again. In India, if a treaty is very significant and if some groups oppose it and if

they want to ascertain the confidence of the government's own numbers, then the Parliament could vote. This happened, for instance, in case of the Indo-US nuclear deal when a vote of confidence was sought. However, in India, the Executive does not have unbridled control as the Parliament, through the Estimates Committee, the Public Accounts Committee, and various other notions and resolutions can scrutinise the government's actions and seek explanations. For instance, in the first annual financial statement in the Parliament, some members had discussed the increase in postal rates in India and Pakistan.



Instances of Scrutiny and Checking

When India joined the Commonwealth, it was a free association of nations. Many people in India did not appreciate India joining the British Commonwealth. A heated debate took place in the Parliament and members proposed many changes. The government finally accepted the use of appropriate language to explain the reasons of joining the Commonwealth to all members lucidly. This clearly proved that even during the prime ministerial rule of Jawaharlal Nehru, he was highly checked by the forces of the Indian Parliament.

Again in November, 2013, Manmohan Singh had taken the decision to be a part of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) Summit in Colombo at a time that coincided with the fourth Eelam War. The DMK and AIADMK in Tamil Nadu Legislative Council passed a resolution urging the Indian Government to enforce economic sanctions and let UN investigate civilian genocide in Sri Lanka. The sentiment touched a raw nerve and Manmohan Singh decided not to attend CHOGM and send the Foreign Minister instead.

From 1950 to 1980, India had a closed economy and the private sector had little scope in having any role in foreign relations. However, by the end of the Cold War, the private sector had become a key player. In fact, in many bilateral relations, we find that trade diplomacy is purely dominated by the private sector. As we shall see in subsequent chapters on Africa and Latin America, Indian commercial diplomacy is primarily private sector dominated.

The media plays an important role in moulding foreign policy and taking it to the people. Media can draw attention on foreign policy issues. There have been cases where the media was responsible for creating public support for the government but at times, the media is also found to indulge in manufacturing consent. The media was highly controlled in India during Cold War and was only somewhat liberated in the post-Cold War period. In 1999, during the Kargil War, the media actually reported from the warzone and helped in creating an emotional wave of sympathy for soldiers giving rise to a feeling of nationalism. The government also used the conflict situation appropriately to empower the media.

Indian media helped shape perceptions but the lack of correspondence from abroad and reliance on foreign footage made the job difficult for them at times. The extent of how much media can mould perception is based on the government's agenda and in India, the

media is yet to evolve fully to influence the electorate as, for instance, in the US. For example, the role of media in India can be judged by the fact that when in 2004-2005, India and the US undertook aggressive rapprochement, the left parties were highly critical of growing Indo-US proximity but the media stood by the government in their support to the increasing bonhomie between India and US.

A lot of foreign policy bureaucrats do play a role in PMO as also wherever they go on deputation. At times, the PMO also creates special envoys to negotiate on issue of paramount importance, such as climate change and nuclear power. Considering the fact that India's economic profile is growing, coordination at times does become an issue.

Indian Constituency Development Abroad

India, in the recent times, has decided to develop constituencies abroad as a part of its soft policy approach. It invites students to come to India on visa for study. At times, if a student in research intends to extend his or her stay in India, then they need to approach Foreigners Regional Registration offices to renew the visa. This body is in the Home Ministry. Thus, at times, due to the lack of coordination between the MEA and the MHA, the visas get delayed. For instance, at one point of time, there was even a situation when Indian Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon wrote to then Home Secretary V K Duggal about the need is to create a faster regime due to lack of efficiency. India was unable to develop constituencies like China because of its lack of efficiency and coordination.

4
CHAPTER

Overview of Indian Foreign Policy from Nehru till the Present

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Foreign policy of Nehruvian era
- Foreign policy of Indira Gandhi
- Foreign policy of Rajiv Gandhi
- Foreign policy of P V Narshimha Rao
- Foreign policy of I K Gujral
- Foreign policy of Atal Bihari Vajpayee
- Foreign policy of Manmohan Singh
- Foreign policy of Narendra Modi
- Analysis of major shifts in foreign policy from Cold War to the post-Cold War period
- Final analysis

INTRODUCTION

This chapter traces the foreign policy of Indian Prime Ministers from Nehru till the present times. As the analysis progresses, the focus would be on understanding the dramatic transitions witnessed by Indian foreign policy. Then the chapter will proceed to scrutinise the overall evolution of Indian foreign policy of the last seven decades. There will be special emphasis upon theorising the transition of foreign policy of India at the end of the Cold War and how India adjusted its relationship with the West. The chapter then further examines the foreign policy of the new government in India since 2014 and discusses the doctrines of the Modi era.

FOREIGN POLICY OF THE NEHRUVIAN ERA

History and geographical coordinates are two primary factors that influence the foreign policy of a country. The most important factor influencing the operational part of foreign policy is the geopolitics that governs the nation and its neighbouring region. After India became independent in 1947, it initiated the process of developing its foreign policy. The Indian Foreign Policy (hereafter referred to as IFP) that came to be developed was under the leadership of Nehru. Nehru nurtured and shaped the IFP but did not invent the IFP. The IFP has its roots in India's past and its traditions. When India became independent, it was economically and militarily underdeveloped. It was imperative, at that moment, to evolve the right set of priorities. India had to make a choice of either developing the state

militarily or economically. Nehru realised that states like Pakistan and Thailand focused on developing their military establishments at the cost of developing their nations economically; these states thereby had unstable politics. In this context, Nehru understood that the foundation of social coherence lies in economic strength. The Nehruvian perspective was that economic strength is the guarantee of security of a state and a strong economic base could also later enable India to develop a robust military. Nehru, therefore, shifted India's focus on industrial development.

An understanding of the weaknesses of a nascent nation at the time of independence and the potential of India as a great power were the two core approaches that dominated the IFP in that period. Some scholars assert that Nehruvian policy lacked a sense of realism. This may not be entirely true because events during his tenure suggest that he steered the country through the prism of the Cold War without sacrificing the quest for India's strategic autonomy. During the Cold War, when the USA and the USSR were trying to bring other states into their ideological orbit, Nehru, in order to shield India from predatory international powers, made a decision to join the Commonwealth as a security guarantee. Joining the Commonwealth in no way affected India's quest for strategic autonomy in the international affairs. It would be right to assert that Nehru was against ideologisation, but favoured the logic of power of ideas in foreign policy even while rejecting any sort of fundamentalism in the foreign policy discourse. In fact, Nehru never favoured moralism in the application of foreign policy; rather, he stated that it was the bipolar world that had resorted to preaching one or the other kind of ideology. Nehru clarified that the art of conducting foreign policy is about asserting the national interests of India. Nehru stated that while a country is focussed on its own self-interests, it may enter into situations leading to clash of interests with other states. In such scenarios, Nehru favoured focussing on enlightened self-interest as a tool to harmonise the differentiated interests of the states.


Though the origin of IFP is traced to ancient texts and leaders, its immediate roots lay in the Indian struggle for independence against the British. It was during the Indian National Movement (INM) that India developed certain principle elements to its foreign policy that were used by India throughout the Cold War. It was during the INM that India declared its commitment to fight imperialism and colonialism and support the unity of all nations struggling to fight imperialism and colonialism. The period after the World War-II saw the decline of imperialism but also led to the economic and military dominance of the USA. This led to an arms race between the USA and the USSR which ultimately became nuclear in nature during the Cold War. It was against such a backdrop, with an arms race and an ideological war waging across the world, that India had to evolve its foreign policy. India, being a non-communist country, was not welcomed in the Soviet bloc. India on its part did not entertain any intentions of joining the Communist bloc either. Joining the US bloc was out of the question as India perceived USA as a mouth piece for capitalism which it believed to be a form of neo imperialism. During the Cold War, India always felt that the USA is trying to step into the shoes of the erstwhile imperialist powers. Joining the US bloc would have therefore meant for India to go against the entire tradition of its national movement.

The Nehruvian idea was very clear. Joining any bloc would lead to lessening of the sovereign space for decision making that India fought for during the INM. For Nehru, the

priority was to promote global peace and support anti-colonial struggles while adopting independence in deciding domestic, foreign, economic and military policy. For India, its immediate foreign policy priority was not the conflict in Europe but India's immediate neighbourhood. For that matter, Nehru himself asserted that India's neighbouring countries were the first on his mind and this was followed by other Asian states and Africa. For Nehru, the main problem during the Cold War was not Communism or its containment but the development of India and to do so, it had to avoid falling in line either with the Soviet camp or the Washington led 'Freedom' camp that was gaining prominence in Asia. At the heart of our foreign policy was an urge to advance our national interests and ensure our space for strategic autonomy. For India, its priority was to have an independent foreign policy. An independent foreign policy involved interactions with all players of the system while retaining the ability to make one's own decisions regarding one's own issues. It is from here that the spirit of non-alignment was born. Non-aligned movement (NAM) eventually emerged as India's core foreign policy tool for the next few decades.



In fact, it is not wrong to assert that non-alignment emerged as the sister policy of the non-violent Satyagraha movement pioneered by Gandhi. As more and more independent nations were sucked up into the ideological orbit of the two superpowers in Asia and Africa, India saw this as a rise of neo-colonialism. For Nehru, the falling of the shadow of Cold War in Asia and Africa was colonialism in new clothes. Thus, India and its foreign policy took up the lead to support movements against colonialism and imperialism (perceived as neo-colonialism) to maintain world peace. These two were deeply enmeshed in the IFP concept of non-alignment which was based on the core principle of rationality.



The basis of non-alignment was the ancient Indian philosophy of looking at reality from different prisms and recognising that reality is not merely black and white and that it could have many shades of grey. For the US, during the Cold War, the world was a completely polarised affair, with a clear demarcation of black and white and no other shade in between. Thus, the US found it very difficult to reconcile with the Indian concept of NAM all throughout the cold war.

International Politics and the Kashmir Question

Pakistan, after independence, sent its armed forces personnel disguised as tribesmen to invade the Kashmir valley. This brought India and Pakistan into conflict with each other. To complain about the Pakistani aggression, India, on advice of the British, took the matter to the UN Security Council. The western powers led by the USA were determined on getting an unfavourable resolution passed at the UNSC against India. They wanted to favour Pakistan for allowing its territory to be used by the West to contain the Soviets. The USA, for that matter, had urged Turkey and Pakistan to sign a mutual defence treaty which was followed by the creation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in 1954 and Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) in 1955. Pakistan emerged as a member of both SEATO and CENTO, thereby bringing Cold War politics right to India's doorsteps. In order to strengthen the case of Pakistan, the West started to support Pakistan outright at the Security Council. This compelled India to deter Western action by tilting towards Soviets and compelling the Soviets to use their veto power in the Council. In fact, the Kashmir issue and the Soviets veto brought India and the USSR closer. This proximity deepened in 1954 when Nikita Khrushchev on a visit to India visited Kashmir and asserted it to be an integral part of India. It is not wrong to conclude that the Kashmir issue led to qualitative improvements in Indo-Soviet relations.

India, throughout the initial years, kept its foreign policy focus on providing support to nations to fight imperialism and preserve peace post-independence. Preservation of peace became an integral part of our own foreign policy because only with peace in the world was consistent economic development possible. The preservation of peace found its presence even in the Belgrade Conference of Non-aligned states held in 1961 from where a delegation was dispatched to both USA and USSR to halt nuclear testing. All these initiatives of Nehru, despite the economic and military backwardness of India, brought India to the centre of the world stage.

Many times, India's offices were used to sort out international differences. In early 1950's, Northern Korea invaded South Korea. North Korea stated that the invasion was launched as an attempt to unify Korea. The US forces joined the war to assist South Korea. The US forces, led by General MacArthur, drove the forces of North back and the USA forcibly unified Korea, stretching the unified territory till the Chinese and North Korean frontier. The Chinese felt that the US could attack their territory and they immediately responded by dispatching their volunteer forces to check USA. The unfolding Korean crises led to the establishment of a Korean Commission at the UN under the chairmanship of India to resolve the issues. This issue of the Korean crisis proves how the good offices of India were used in unravelling the knots between USA and China.

China's history had been dominated by feudalism and a lot has depended on the ability of the Emperor to provide staple food (rice) to the people. From 1945 to 1947, a nationalist uprising in China led to the coming of a new government. The erstwhile sick man of Asia had finally turned around with a powerful central government that ended all disruption affecting China since the last century. India also understood clearly, like the rest of the world, that the Chinese revolution indeed entailed a fundamental transformation of the Chinese society where the new nationalist upsurge led to the rise of a communist state. In this rise of a new China, India now had to adopt its policy. The new China became very assertive and even dispatched a military force to Tibet compelling Sardar Vallabhbhai

Patel to draw the Indian government's immediate attention to the issue. Patel perceived Chinese aggression in Tibet and India's North-Eastern borders as fertile grounds that could be used by Indian communists to access ideas and commands from across. Though Patel was right in ringing the alarm bell, many believe that his focus was less on Chinese nationalism and more on the emergence of Chinese communism. If we draw an analogy here, it may not be wrong to argue that what USA did with respect to confusing nationalism in Vietnam with Communism in Vietnam (leading to USA–Vietnam war subsequently), is what Patel did with respect to China.

In 1959, while speaking in the Lok Sabha, Nehru echoed the concerns of Patel. Nehru asserted that a study of Chinese history showed that China tended to territorially expand when it had a strong central government and such expansionist aspiration was definitely a cause of concern for India as its borders would be threatened. However, Nehru argued that the focus of India was to maintain friendly relations with China and overlook such issues at the larger cost of friendship. India could not undertake any form of military adventurism in Tibet as it lacked the military strength and because the Indian army was busy on the Pakistani front post the first Indo–Pakistan war of 1947–48. Also, any intervention in Tibet by India would not make sense as Tibetan independence was not recognised internationally. Nehru did, however, make a mistake in making an uninformed judgment. He failed to understand that in the ancient imperial era, the empire pulsated outwards and expanded, and Chinese expansion happened only at the peripheries as China did not favour contact with the 'barbarian' world outside. On the other hand, after the World War-II, a revolutionary China, propelled by a heady mix of intense Nationalism and Marxism, pulsated outwards to recover lost territories of the past. For Nehru, clash with China was inevitable; but his priority was to postpone it and pursue peace. For him, peace with China was the key focus area of India's neighbourhood policy. He even attempted to normalise the Tibet issue and concluded the Panchsheel agreement whereby India accepted Tibet as a part of China. Though USA was very critical of Panchsheel, in the same way as it was critical of NAM, ironically, it later adopted the same five principles of Panchsheel to undertake rapprochement with China under the Nixon administration. This was known as the famous Shanghai Declaration.

In 1959, after the Tibetan revolt was crushed by China, Dalai Lama took refuge in India. Though Nehru favoured that China be recognised as a responsible international power, USA always perceived the revolutionary China as a hostile state and thereby ended up undercutting Nehruvian policies on China. Soon, a border issue began to brew between India and China. China began to circulate maps where it showed territories regarded by India as their territory as Chinese territory. India took up the issue with China to which the Chinese responded by suggesting that these maps used by China (with claim over Indian territories) were maps belonging to KMT regime and due to internal domestic issues and civil war, the new revolutionary Chinese government had not had the time to look into the maps. However, a little later the Chinese began to make official claims of Indian territories and declared that such claims were correct. At this juncture, Nehru made a move of making Indian position on the border public. Nehru's perception was that a confrontation with China was useless and publicising the issue would give Chinese the opportunity to undertake objections and reactions. This, however, might have been a strategic error. Instead of Nehru publicising the Indian position (to which Chinese did not react), it would

have been better had India made an offer of a formal recognition of Tibet as a Chinese region in return for a written agreement from China on border alignment, with concessions on India's border positions. Had the Chinese objected to a written agreement on the border alignment, such an issue raised with China by India would have enhanced Indian sincerity about the issue.

The situation was especially sensitive since after the Dalai Lama sought refuge in India in 1959, China began to feel that the 1959 Tibetan revolt could have had encouragement from the Indian side. This made China more hostile to India and it saw its manifestations on the border dispute. Perceiving no Chinese retreat from the disputed area, coupled with discovery of Chinese roads through the Aksai Chin region; India initiated a forward policy ultimately compelling the Chinese to react in October 1962. The Chinese reaction in the form of a strike from across the border was again miscalculated by India as it thought that the Chinese could possibly launch a full-scale offensive in the Assam hills and occupy large tracts of North-East India. This led India to hastily seek USA's support where a letter from Nehru to John F. Kennedy was sent to solicit military assistance to mitigate the Chinese threat. The Chinese, before USA could even respond, retreated back to the old positions and observed status quo. The intention of the Chinese was not to launch an outright offensive with India but, to teach India a lesson and assert Chinese superiority. Ultimately, China did not gain anything from the hostilities, as it later resorted to what Nehru had advocated. It initiated a replica of Nehruvian NAM in the name of Chinese independent foreign policy. The Chinese too later realised the need to make peace with honour, which itself was at the core of the Nehruvian ideology. Even till date, in dealing with China, no alternative policy to peace with honour has been encouraged and it continues to be at the heart of Indian diplomacy with China.

FOREIGN POLICY OF IINDIRA GANDHI

After the death of Nehru, Lal Bahadur Shastri succeeded him as the next Prime Minister. It is during the regime of Shastri that India and Pakistan fought an inconclusive war in 1965. Though the war of 1965 remained inconclusive, it boosted the confidence and morale of the Indian army, especially after the crushing defeat of India in the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962. It was also important, as for the first time after the 1962 war, the USSR assisted India and Pakistan to launch an initiative to bring peace. The USSR invited Shastri and Ayub Khan to Tashkent where both sides agreed to resolve future bilateral disputes peacefully and concluded the Tashkent agreement. However, after the conclusion of the Tashkent Agreement on 10th January, 1966, Shastri passed away, to be then succeeded by Indira Gandhi on 24th January, 1966.

When Indira Gandhi took over as the Prime Minister, the domestic and security environment of India was not too benign. Domestically, India faced famine and serious food shortages. The food imports were at an all-time high and this had put a severe burden on the country's foreign exchange as well. At the security level, India had fought expensive wars with Pakistan and China and both were looming as new security threats, threatening India's sovereignty. Indira Gandhi embarked on her foreign policy mission by paying a visit to Egypt and Yugoslavia to reassert their strong relationship, using NAM as a tool. She then visited USA with a hope of evolving a new dimension in the bilateral relationship based on democratic values. Her visit to the USA, however, failed to

fraternise an abrasive bilateral relationship. The USA spent its powers of persuasion in muting Indian criticism of USA–Vietnam war, linking Indian response to the USA–Vietnam conflict to future food shipments, which led Indira Gandhi to adopt a domestic strategy to revive agriculture. Indira Gandhi, after her USA visit, was firm that India would not remain dependent upon foreign states for food security and would achieve self-sufficiency in food production within the next five years.

It was during the 1970 Lusaka NAM summit where scholars were able to get an insight into the essential tenets of foreign policy as was being adopted by Indira Gandhi. For the first time, she emphasised that India wished to be friends with all nations but on the basis of equality. She asserted that no state can look to India as an inferior state and India would conduct its diplomacy with all states (read the USA and the USSR) on equal footing. In fact, Indira Gandhi boldly criticised the US at various NAM meetings for their aggression in Vietnam while the Indian agriculture saw a revival.


However, it wasn't long before India faced another crisis in the form of East Pakistan's bid for secession from the unity of Pakistan. When the British left India and Pakistan, they had divided Pakistan into West and East Pakistan. East Pakistan or East Bengal was a Muslim majority area, with the population consisting of mostly Bengali Muslims. East Pakistan had always received a step-brotherly treatment from West Pakistan. West Pakistan even imposed Urdu over their native Bengali Language and looted East Pakistani resources without focussing on any substantial economic development of the region. This neglect paved way for the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, who, under the umbrella of Awami League, championed the cause of Bengali nationalism. In December 1970, elections took place in both East and West Pakistan and as per the result, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman of the Awami League won the elections in East Pakistan while Zulfikar Ali Bhuto's Pakistan People's Party won in West Pakistan. Bhutto, trying to mitigate his party's loss in East Pakistan, began to initiate a new 'democratic' principle and began to assert that as per this principle, both West and East being at par with each other, the West has an equal right to form the government in the East. West Pakistan, thereafter, imposed martial law in East Pakistan, leading to arrest of Mujibur Rehman and a massive crackdown in the region. Due to the arrest of Rehman, an internal crisis began in East Pakistan and a lot of East Pakistanis began to enter into India for safety. India began to build international pressure on West Pakistan to halt suppression and revert back to the democratic processes. The USA remained unmoved even as the international media highlighting the atrocities in the East. As USA refused to budge, India took up the opportunity to conclude a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation¹ with the USSR in August 1971 where the Soviets agreed to an immediate consultation with each other if either side met with any form of aggression. The treaty served the purpose of warning Washington not to pursue any military design against India.

In December 1971, Pakistan resorted to a pre-emptive strike on Indian Air Force airplanes. The Indian side perceived this as an attack on Indian sovereignty and decided to retaliate. War broke out yet again and within three days, Indian forces reached Dacca and recognised Bangladesh as a new state, compelling Pakistani troops to finally surrender. The USA even sent a nuclear armed USS Enterprise Aircraft Carrier into the Bay of Bengal but the Indo–Soviet treaty constrained it further. Sheikh Mujibur Rehman was handed over power finally while India held 92,000 prisoners of war. This was followed by

the Simla Summit of June 1972, where Pakistani PM Bhutto urged for release of not only the prisoners of war but also the territory captured by India belonging to West Pakistan. On 1st July 1972, the Simla Agreement was signed urging peaceful resolution of Kashmir issue through dialogue and negotiations. The creation of Bangladesh came as a big blow to USA, with US president Nixon, along with Henry Kissinger, having to reconcile to the new ground realities of South Asia.

The USA faced another issue in 1974 when India tested a nuclear explosion. It understood that India cannot be taken lightly and that it is a major regional power. Indira Gandhi, however, chose to keep the nuclear testing to level of peaceful use only and did not go a step further to declare India a nuclear weapon state. India clearly understood that the root cause of the regional imbalance plaguing South Asia was created by the USA's supplying of arms to Pakistan, which wanted to attain parity with India. The USA on the other hand, after the 1974 nuclear test by India, again announced an arms package designed for Pakistan. It asserted that 1974 nuclear test has disturbed the balance and the new power structure favours India, compelling USA to redress and re-maintain the balance. However, due to the severe economic costs of the 1971 war, India again slipped into crisis and the subsequent domestic developments like emergency contributed to the fall of Indira Gandhi and the rise of Morarji Desai. Even during the Desai regime, there was no change in the major practices of the IFP. However due to internal disturbances, the government fell and was then replaced in 1980 with an Indira Gandhi government yet again. Indira Gandhi, upon taking power in 1980, was confronted with the question of Afghanistan.

In 1979, on the invitation of Kabul, the Soviets had invaded Afghanistan. The USA realised the problem and further began to pump aid and arms to Pakistan. The USA began to use Pakistan as a frontline state to support and arm elements to weaken Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Such elements created by the USA and nurtured by Pakistan emerged in the form of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. This period saw the birth of the Al-Qaeda to target the Communist front in Afghanistan. India maintained neutrality. It neither condemned the Soviet invasion nor supported it. The USA asserted that non-condemnation by India is a sign of Indian support to the Soviet policy. But India stood upright and based its policy on the merit of the situation. Indira Gandhi sustained a prolonged dialogue with the US and maintained the economic dimension of their bilateral diplomacy. She did the same with respect to China and followed the same policy to break the ice with India's mighty neighbour. In both cases, she restored the same hallmark of the IFP, that is, to follow the India's basic interests without sacrificing India's strategic autonomy. She beautifully enmeshed flexibility with national interests and continued her foreign policy on realistic terms. Her most important contribution was to make India into a brand equal to the great powers.



FOREIGN POLICY OF RAJIV GANDHI

Foreign policy under Rajiv Gandhi had a fine blend of idealism and realism. His approach in foreign policy was to follow the tradition of non-alignment but he simultaneously attempted giving it a contemporary touch. In his visit to the USA in 1985, he reaffirmed the common values that India and USA stood for while also highlighting the dangers of the possibility of a nuclearised Pakistan. A considerable amount of diplomatic efforts unfolded between India and USA in political and economic aspects. Social and cultural diplomacy found a new place in the evolving relationship. The major focus of Rajiv Gandhi was on India's neighbourhood where considerable diplomatic and political capital was invested. During his times, India and Pakistan signed an agreement not to attack each other's nuclear facilities but the rapid acceleration of Pakistani nuclear capabilities became an immense concern for India. Though Rajiv Gandhi was a strong advocate of nuclear disarmament and in 1988 had even presented the Rajiv Gandhi action plan for nuclear disarmament, he had to also guarantee India's security. Rajiv gave a nod to the Indian nuclear scientist fraternity and authorised them to manufacture nuclear weapons for India. This decision was taken to prevent any nuclear blackmailing from any side. Sri Lanka was another state that demanded Rajiv's attention. The Sri Lankan army had taken siege of Jaffna region and the Tamilian Sri Lankans faced tremendous chaos and persecution. India decided to airdrop supplies of essentials for the people of Jaffna which was perceived by Sri Lanka as a violation of its sovereignty. To break the ice, in 1987, Rajiv and J. Jayawardene concluded India–Sri Lanka Accord. As per the accords, LTTE would surrender; there would be a unified Sri Lanka; Sri Lanka to undertake devolution in Tamil majority areas and Sri Lanka will allow its territory be used by foreign powers. As per the Accord, an Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) would supervise the surrender of LTTE to ensure peace. The accord and IPKF were perceived by many in Sri Lanka as a violation of their sovereignty. Jayawardene was succeeded by Premadasa who ordered immediate withdrawal of Indian troops from Sri Lanka. Rajiv Gandhi, in the meantime, was assassinated by LTTE cadre and this led to withdrawal of all Indian sympathy for LTTE.

Rajiv Gandhi also took steps to speed up relations with China. During his 1989 visit to China, both sides agreed that the border issue should not hinder the improvement of bilateral ties in other dimensions. The idea of Deng Xiaoping was that the border issue should be separated from other issues and both sides should deepen ties in other

dimensions and later renegotiate the border issue in a more relaxed atmosphere. Rajiv Gandhi agreed to this logic. During his tenure, Rajiv Gandhi remained committed to the core values of non-alignment and supported anti-racialist struggles in Africa. He also used NAM as a tool to promote the economic interests of India. Thus, it is not wrong to conclude that Rajiv Gandhi, too, followed the policy of “enlightened self-interests”.

FOREIGN POLICY OF P V NARASIMHA RAO

In the general elections of 1990, Rajiv Gandhi lost, paving way for the V P Singh government. At that moment, IFP had to face some serious challenges. These challenges are going to be elaborated in depth in the chapter ahead. Here, we attempt a brief glimpse of the situation.

In 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. This led to the beginning of the Gulf War-I. As Gulf War-I broke out in a region which was the economic lifeline for the west, USA jumped into the conflict to help Kuwait. USA could not allow Saddam Hussein to have a free run in this strategic region. For India, the Gulf War-I had severe consequences. India had perceived Iraq very differently. Iraq was not only one of the most secular states but also not a member of Organization of Islamic States. From the Indian point of view, Iraq was a crucial state because it had always been favourable towards India on the Kashmir question. In 1990, India and Iraq had even entered into an agreement where Iraq was to supply 2.5 million tons of oil to India in 1990–91. All this led to a delayed response from India on the Gulf war. India, however, supported the UN resolution against Iraq and urged Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. By that time, the USA had launched a fully-fledged military invasion of Iraq to force it to withdraw from Kuwait. What also worked in favour of the USA was the situation in Russia. In 1989, the Soviet Union had already disintegrated. The Communist regimes in Eastern Europe had collapsed. This ended the sole adversary of USA in the world. The US displayed tremendous military power in Iraq during Gulf War. The situation ended the bipolar world order established after the World War-II and eventually led to the origin of a new, unipolar world order. The USA now emerged as the sole superpower. Its military intervention against Iraq could not be challenged by any player in the international system.

After a while, in India, P V Narasimha Rao emerged as a new PM. Rao inherited a crumbling domestic economy and a rapidly changing international situation. At the domestic level, Rao initiated a dialogue to intensify relations with the USA and China. However, at that time, USA wanted a roll back of the Indian nuclear programme. The Clinton administration, aiming for parity between India and Pakistan, began the hyphenation of the two states. In America, Senator Larry Pressler had passed an amendment to some laws which stated that any state engaging in a nuclear weapons programme would not receive any aid and if any aid was being given to such a nation, it shall be suspended automatically. The Clinton administration, in their tilt towards Pakistan, lobbied with the Congress aggressively for abolishing the Pressler amendment which, according to the USA administration, was a barrier to equip Pakistan with military aid. Aid to Pakistan was suspended during the administration of George Bush Senior. It is ironical that, to counter the USSR's influence in Afghanistan, not only did USA aid Pakistan, but also conveniently turned a blind eye to the Pakistani nuclear programme. Things, however, changed after Geneva Accords 1989 and subsequent Soviet

disintegration. The priorities of Clinton administration were the hyphenation of India and Pakistan and to make both parties sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). In the period immediately after the Cold War, though USA had begun to favour Pakistan and wanted to revive its alliance with the country, it also realised that it could not ignore India as India was a new emerging market.

On the other hand, by 1990, following the complete disintegration of Soviet Union, the erstwhile USSR was now succeeded by Russia, which meant that India had now lost the patronage of the erstwhile USSR. What was worrisome for India was the future supply of defence products. During the Cold War, Russia was one of the major defence suppliers to India. Now after the end of Cold War, India had to renegotiate all contracts and at certain places even sign new contracts. However, the greater dilemma was with whom were these new contracts to be negotiated. There was a vacuum and not much clarity. At this juncture, many in Russia felt the need to end the special favour for India. Under intense USA pressure, Russia even refused to provide India with cryogenic technology for its space programme, citing that the technology could be used by India for military purposes. However, things normalised when Boris Yeltsin visited India in 1993. During his visit, the 1971 India–Russia Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was revised with 14 additional clauses and was signed to mark a new era in bilateral relationship post-Cold War.

At the same time Rao also developed new contacts with the five Central Asian Republics that emerged after the breakup of USSR. Today, Central Asia continues to be the area of the New Great Game where search for oil continues even at present. India is actively engaged in the region now, officially as a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). During the time, when Rao was reaching out to USA, China Russia and Central Asia, India's relationship with Pakistan remained tensed. In 1992, the Babri Masjid demolition by Swayam Sewaks and the subsequent 1993 Mumbai blasts deteriorated the relationship and could not be normalised as Pakistan initiated verbal threats about using a nuclear bomb in case of a future conflict with India. By this time, it was an open secret that China had helped Pakistan acquire its nuclear capabilities. Despite all these developments, Rao tried to put up a strong face but during this tenure, any improvements in the relationship with Pakistan could not materialise.

FOREIGN POLICY OF I K GUJRAL

In 1997, Gujral became the PM and evolved a fresh approach vis-à-vis the foreign policy which is now known as the Gujral doctrine. The basic foreign policy idea of Gujral was that India is a dominant power in the South Asian region and by this virtue when it deals diplomatically with states around itself, it should not look for arithmetical reciprocity. The core of the idea was to give more than what you may take from a foreign state. In a simpler language, the Gujral Doctrine meant that if a neighbour moved an inch, India should move a yard. This policy would enable India, according to him, to pursue a new quality of relationship with its neighbours, leading to sober and constructive responses from the neighbourhood.

Gujral took his first lead with Bangladesh. Bangladesh and India relations were deeply frozen since the assassination of Mujibur Rehman. Gujral took into confidence Jyoti Basu, the then Chief Minister of West Bengal, and began to initiate a dialogue with

Hasina Wajed of Bangladesh on settling the issue related to water utilisation of Ganga River. A thirty-year treaty on Ganga River water sharing was hammered out. This brought about a new air of freshness in the relationship. After the death of Rajiv Gandhi, India had stayed away from the domestic political concerns of Sri Lanka and the relations had slipped to an all-time low. But Gujral also initiated talks with the Chandrika Kumaratunga government in Sri Lanka.

With respect to Pakistan, Gujral asserted to call off all verbal warfare tactics which were on in full swing due to the issues arising out of the nuclearisation of Pakistan. He even instructed RAW to dismantle all human assets it had established in Pakistan for covert operations as he perceived them as tools that would hinder constructive engagement with Pakistan. Gujral revived the dialogue process with Nawaz Sharif at the foreign secretary level. India wanted a dialogue on the political, economic, cultural and social fronts while Pakistan's sole agenda was Kashmir. A dialogue was initiated but ties hobbled. During Gujral's term, relations with China improved significantly. Chinese president Jiang Zemin visited India in 1996. Both sides signed an agreement to maintain peace and tranquillity at the border. Jiang visited Pakistan after his visit to India. He urged Pakistan to shelve those issues for some time that hinder bilateral cooperation and explore other diplomatic dimensions. The reference indirectly was to Kashmir. But hardly any change was seen in the Pakistani establishment. As argued previously, the core goal of Clinton administration was to make India sign the CTBT; India realised that CTBT along with NPT would create a discriminatory world order. During Gujral's meeting with Clinton in 1997 on the side lines of the UN General Assembly meeting, Gujral explained the reasons for India's refusal to sign the CTBT but also showcased the tremendous economic opportunities available for the USA with India. This dual approach worked well. Thus, during the tenure of Gujral, a push for economic diplomacy with the US became the core driver of the foreign policy.

FOREIGN POLICY OF ATAL BIHARI VAJPAYEE

After the withdrawal of support by the Congress party, the Gujral government fell and was later replaced by the government of Atal Bihari Vajpayee. From 11th to 13th May 1998, the government carried out nuclear tests. These tests were significant because one of the tests conducted in Pokhran was a thermonuclear test which indicated hydrogen bomb capability. India reached the sub-critical level in the tests and generated enough data in these experiments where further improvements could be carried out through computer simulation. Thus, after the operation Shakti I-V (the codename for the tests), India declared itself a Nuclear Weapon State. The most important achievement of Pokhran-II was the fact that India no longer required to undertake underground nuclear tests but could successfully use the data generated for computer simulations to improvise the yield of the bomb. India thus declared a voluntary moratorium on further nuclear testing. The tests done by India were immediately followed by nuclear tests by Pakistan. The Pakistani side also tested their atomic bombs. Vajpayee in a letter to Clinton asserted that India faced threats from China and Pakistan and that these were compelling reasons for India to undertake nuclear tests. The letter to Clinton was leaked to the *New York Times* and this aggravated tensions further between India and China. After the tests in India, there were international sanctions including sanctions by IMF and World Bank on further assistance to India.

However, Vajpayee decided to break the logjam with Pakistan and inaugurated a bus service between Delhi and Lahore. Vajpayee also visited Lahore and concluded the Lahore Declaration. Even as new enthusiasm between the two states to improve ties was being generated, the Pakistan army led by General Pervez Musharraf planned a new campaign in Kashmir. The manifestation of this planning was seen in May–June 1999 when the Pakistani side crossed the Line of Control and captured peaks on the Indian soil in Kargil. As India began to drive out the intruders, Nawaz Sharif asked for help from the Clinton administration in US in case India increased the offensive. Clinton, on the other hand, advised Sharif to order his army to pull back from the occupied territories and not breach the LOC. The conflict ended after Indian forces captured all the peaks occupied by Pakistan. In Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif was deposed and after a dubious referendum, Musharraf took over as the President of Pakistan.

In 2001, another initiative towards dialogue took place between Vajpayee and Musharraf at Agra. The Agra Summit failed to achieve any breakthrough as Pakistan wanted Kashmir to be added as the core issue in the joint statement while India wanted the addition of cross border terrorism. Both sides rejected each other's demand and therefore no joint statement came out after the Agra summit.

The last year of Clinton administration saw a new approach towards India. The administration tilted in favour of India during the Kargil conflict. This was followed, in 2000, by a visit of Clinton to India and Clinton became the fourth USA president after Eisenhower, Nixon and Carter to visit the country. Clinton's visit saw a push towards bilateral economic diplomacy as deals worth three billion dollars were signed, ranging from broadband connectivity to energy dimensions. The emerging economic opportunities for USA in India and a presence of a vibrant Indian diaspora in USA that played a pivotal role in US politics proved instrumental factors in creating a new bridge in the bilateral relationship. The Clinton administration was replaced by the Bush administration. The momentum of establishing a new relationship with India gained strength with the coming of Bush. The 9/11 attacks bolstered some major changes in the subcontinent. Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, India went ahead to put on record that it was willing to enter into military alliance with and work with USA on its war on terrorism. Bush, on the other hand, while appreciative of the Indian offer, turned to strengthen its military alliance and partnership with Pakistan. Pakistan not only emerged as a non-NATO ally but also a new USA–Pakistan axis was born. The US entered the subcontinent by invading Afghanistan in 2001. The rule of Taliban in Afghanistan ended. This was a big blow to Pakistan which favoured the Taliban in Afghanistan as it enabled it to maintain strategic depth against India. The cross-border terrorism from Pakistani side in 2001 increased and saw its first manifestation in the form of an attack on Kashmir assembly, culminating in the attack on Indian Parliament. India responded to this by launching a mega-military mobilisation exercise on Indo–Pakistan border under the name of operation Parakaram.

The US faced a severe dilemma on how to respond to the situation as, on one hand, it was building up a grand coalition at the global level against terrorism. It could not afford to take the terrorist attacks on India lightly but could not be hard on Pakistan as it needed their support in the invasion of Afghanistan. The United States had to also ensure that India did not retaliate aggressively in response to the provocation perpetrated by Pakistan. The strategy of the Bush administration was now to prevent a South Asian war and

thereby increase its outreach to both India and Pakistan. As the American war on Afghanistan was ongoing, USA launched another invasion, that of Iraq, in 2003. The regime of Saddam Hussein was toppled and elections were organised. However, a sectarian conflict unfolded in Iraq and the region has remained unstable since then. The sectarian conflict led to the rise of ISIS as a new force in the region since 2014.

The Iraq war brought about a shift in the Indian policy as well. We noted previously that India welcomed the US invasion of Afghanistan as the intention of the invasion was to dismantle the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. But the US invasion of Iraq did not go well with India. Though the Vajpayee government wanted to go ahead with its intention of providing military assistance to the USA for the Iraq war, public opinion in India was against any support to USA since people were largely unconvinced by the logic that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Due to the fierce resistance by the opposition parties, the Vajpayee regime dropped the idea. The US accepted India's decision and still continued to strengthen ties with India. For the Bush administration, ties with India needed to be strengthened at the highest level.



The sanctions imposed by the US on India post Pokhran were lifted. A new initiative called the 'Next step in Strategic Partnership' was launched and cooperation on Civilian Nuclear and Missile defence dimensions began. As the relations with America progressed, in the 2004 SAARC summit, India and Pakistan not only resumed dialogue but issued a joint statement that laid down a framework to enhance bilateral commercial cooperation. As the peaceful dialogue with Pakistan and strategic dialogue with the US began, India held its next general elections and Vajpayee was replaced by Dr Manmohan Singh as the next Indian PM.

FOREIGN POLICY OF MANMOHAN SINGH

The government of Manmohan Singh initiated a policy to intensify the peace process and dialogue with Pakistan. On 24th September 2004, Manmohan met Musharraf on the side lines of the UNGA Summit in New York. Singh outlined his vision of deepening the relationship with Pakistan to such an extent that the borders on the ground dividing the two nations would become irrelevant. Confidence Building Measures (CBM) were taken to normalise the situation in Kashmir as well. The launch of a composite dialogue between the two sides saw intensive discussions on bilateral issues ranging from Wular Barrage to Siachen Glaciers demilitarisation to discussions on Tulbul Project. A bus service from Srinagar to Muzaffarabad was undertaken as an important CBM. Public opinion on both sides welcomed the diplomatic overtures. The policy of Manmohan was to evolve bilateral relations based upon a strong constituency of peace, and working towards the establishment of a favourable public opinion. But we should not forget that the trust deficit was not bridged and the cordial atmosphere of the relations were constantly affected due to Jihadi attacks in India. Despite attacks in Delhi (2005), Varanasi (2006) and Mumbai

(2006) however, dialogues continued, with Indian public opinion gradually tilting towards impatience.

The relationship with China under Manmohan took a momentous step ahead. In 2005, the Indian foreign secretary, Shyam Saran, and Vice-Foreign Minister of China, Wu Dawei, met in Beijing. A new strategic dialogue unfolded between the two sides, on topics ranging from UN reforms to combating terrorism. In April 2005, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited India and both sides entered a new phase of strategic and cooperative partnership. Emphasis was laid upon improving economic and trade relations and cooperation in the defence dimension. Efforts were made to resolve the border dispute by the adoption of a new set of guidelines. Intense negotiations followed on bilateral issues, especially on the border disputes, but no solution was reached except that the differences were significantly narrowed. In 2006, both sides agreed to intensify military cooperation and defence became a new CBM between both sides. In 2006 itself, the two sides decided to boost bilateral trade and reopened the Nathu La Pass. The two sides also agreed to cooperate than compete with each other in each other's search for energy supplies. The visit of Chinese President Hu Jintao to India in 2006 led to a continued search for peace by the two sides.

The India–Russia ties that had been stabilised by Boris Yeltsin were renewed afresh during the regime of Vladimir Putin. In 2004, Manmohan and Putin met at the India–Russia Summit. The two sides decided to resolve their long pending disputes related to defence. India was concerned about the supply of defence spares and their timely delivery and pricing. Russia was concerned about India's IPR laws. During the 2004 summit meeting, India conveyed its assurance to Russia that it would respect intellectual property rights of all equipments supplied to India by Russia and ensure they were neither copied nor secretly stolen by any state. The two sides subsequently strengthened cooperation in defence and energy in the years ahead.

The Next Steps in Strategic Partnership launched during the Vajpayee regime between India and USA ultimately culminated into the India–USA Civilian Nuclear Cooperation in 2005. The nuclear deal between India and USA not only opened up a new chapter in bilateral relationships but also signified that the USA had come to accept India as a major power of the future.

One of the big challenges that Manmohan Singh faced during his tenure as the PM at the foreign policy level was related to Nepal. In 2005–2006, Nepal initiated a movement to rewrite its Constitution. The public opinion in Nepal was majorly against the monarchy. As Nepal took up the path of democracy, the Maoist elements in Nepal joined the democratic momentum. Though India did favour democracy in Nepal, it was worried about how or whether the Maoists would integrate well within the democratic process. Under intense international pressure, in 2006, the King restored democracy which was under suspension since the beginning of the Jan Andolan. India welcomed the move and kept a close watch on the unfolding Constitutional saga in Nepal.


Manmohan Singh continued to deepen India's relationship with the ASEAN states which had started with a sectoral dialogue partnership between India and ASEAN at the end of the Cold War. During Manmohan Singh's regime as the PM, India and ASEAN concluded a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in goods (2010) and services (2012). Singh also

invested tremendous diplomatic capital to strengthen ties with Japan. The two sides, under the leadership of Manmohan Singh and Shinzo Abe, concluded an agreement to establish a single seamless whole envisaging free movement of navy, capital and people. Between India and Japan Manmohan also strengthened Indian ties with Africa. India launched multiple initiatives, ranging from Focus Africa Programme to Pan-Africa-e-Network Projects, to enhance people-to-people ties. The ties with West Asia saw resurgence based on the theme of oil diplomacy. It was during Manmohan Singh's regime that the India and Saudi Arabia concluded a strategic partnership agreement. Cooperation with UAE, Kuwait, Qatar and Oman continued. India and Qatar signed an agreement on LNG and Qatar decided to supply India LNG for energy security. The foreign policy of Manmohan Singh saw India emerge as one of the lead players in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. His ten year tenure as a Prime Minister gave Manmohan Singh an opportunity to touch all dimensions of international relationships, ranging from the Great Powers, Middle Powers to the immediate Neighbours.

FOREIGN POLICY OF NARENDRA MODI

The year 2014 saw Modi coming to power as the Prime Minister of India. His very first foreign policy initiative won the hearts of many globally. Modi invited the heads of South Asia (SAARC leaders) during his oath taking ceremony in New Delhi in 2014. This gesture reflected of what awaited ahead in the high-powered diplomatic ventures he was about to undertake. The earliest signs of Modi's diplomacy date back to his tenure as the Chief Minister (CM) of Gujarat. During his decade-long stint as the CM, he travelled to various countries to get investment for his state. During his foreign visits, he developed a style of personal diplomacy where he emphasised building of strong personal relationships with leaders of the states he visited. This style of personal diplomacy is now recognised as the hallmark of Modi's way of engaging with the world. Modi's diplomatic skills were further strengthened when Vajpayee, as the PM, deputed Modi to travel abroad for party work where he always displayed avid interest in learning how foreign states solved problems related to infrastructure, roads and rivers etc. and applying that learning to Indian situations. This ability of learning from foreign states to replicate the same in India is visible in his style of India First diplomacy.

Modi's background in RSS has also inculcated in him a sense of a wider engagement with people of all walks of life for suggestions. In fact, during his RSS days in 1970's and 1980's, Modi effectively worked upon the RSS pillar, *Samvad*. *Samvad* also eventually emerged as a key pillar of his foreign policy. He has effectively developed contacts with followers at all levels. When he travels abroad, he does not restrict his engagement with merely the heads of states but widens his reach to include private sector firms to monks to students to workers in factories. His idea of foreign policy or diplomacy is that it should not just be perceived as the art of government-to-government interaction but more as a leader-to-people interaction. Diplomacy involving leader-to-people interactions is called retail diplomacy. In retail diplomacy, the state leader interacts, meets and shakes hands with a wide spectrum of scholars to monks to workers. Retail diplomacy not only enhances the perceived approachability of the leader in the eyes of the public but also helps in developing very strong interpersonal relationships. Thus, the two core diplomatic values identified in the Modi Doctrine are as below:



While interacting with world leaders, Modi ensures that he develops a strong personal chemistry with them. Modi's idea is that a strong personal bond helps India to bargain its national interests at the highest level possible. One of the most important influences of RSS on Modi's foreign policy has been his interest in spearheading India's culture and values and promotion of the same at a global level. The RSS background has infused this value in Modi who practises the same with much vigour in the foreign policy. His cultural and civilizational diplomacy is clearly reflected in his visits to temples in foreign states. The Modi doctrine is defined by his emphasis on 4D's:

Modi has adopted Democracy, Demography and Demand as key drivers to highlight India's economic powers abroad. However, Diaspora is the oxygen to his foreign policy. Modi has, from day one, addressed concerns related to the Indian diaspora. On any foreign tour, Modi makes it point to address a gathering of the Indian diaspora. There are two purposes of addressing the diaspora. First, he addresses the diaspora to not only reconnect with them as a messenger from their homeland but also to convey to them the problems India faces in the twenty first century. In most of his addresses to the diaspora, Modi outlines domestic issues of India and government initiatives to tackle them. He often discusses issues like lack of manufacturing base in India, issues related to cleanliness and so on. In the address, he apprises the diaspora of initiatives the government has taken, ranging from Make in India to Swachh Bharat and so forth. The intention of this exercise is to convince the diaspora that they can emerge as effective stakeholders in the problems faced by India. He intends to convey to the diaspora that their contribution is imperative for India's development story and its rise as a global power. Second, his address to the Indian diaspora in foreign countries are a message to the governments of those countries —'if you take care of this constituency, they will take care of your governments in elections'.

This diaspora diplomacy is a classic example of how the diaspora can be a catalyst for transformative diplomacy in the era of globalisation. His focus, in the long run, is to use the diaspora for domestic development. His intention is to attract the interests of the diaspora back home and affect a reversal from brain drain to brain gain. Thus, it is not wrong to say that Modi knows that the diaspora is a part of the great Indian family which will be a partner to India's emergence as a global player. This is also in sync with the

BJP's perception of the importance of the diaspora. An important thing to remember here is that in his addresses to the diaspora, he would link the past, present and the future in such an array that the diaspora gets galvanised, energised and enthusiastic to play a role in India's future. His addresses to the diaspora in the USA, Australia and the UK reflect the intermixing of past, present and future. The doctrine of the diaspora here aims to attract FDI to India and use it for domestic development. Modi's idea of diaspora diplomacy is to ensure a collective Indian voice in the countries of their residence where they are simultaneously loyal citizens.

Another very crucial dimension of the Modi doctrine is his thrust on economic diplomacy. All diplomatic engagements undertaken by Modi till date are driven by the economic thrust of making India a commercial power. The value of economic diplomacy was imbibed by Modi from Gujarat. Gujarat had been an important port of international trade during the peak of trade via the ancient silk route. Trade was natural to Gujarat and this had emerged as a crucial element of the Modi doctrine. Modi understood well that domestic growth rates cannot be boosted by domestic initiatives alone and that geo-strategic imperatives arising out of external engagement with rest of the world are a key to India's growth story. The economic diplomacy strategy of Modi is based on a model where domestic growth is to be propelled by FDI in the manufacturing sector. To make FDI absorption easy, the 'Make in India' initiative and 'Skill India' initiatives have been launched and steps have been taken to improve India's performance in the ease of doing business.

In 2014, Modi addressed the IFS probationers and instructed them to focus on enhancing India's export potential in textile and traditional medicine. The important element here is that Modi understands the needs of the investors well and has worked upon government-to-business contacts. For example, in order to illustrate this idea, Modi, during an address at a business lunch in Tokyo in 2014, said that while he had been the CM of Gujarat, he had invited Japanese investments. As Japanese businesses came, he began to study Japanese tastes and found that the Japanese like to play golf. This led Modi to establish world class golf courses in Gujarat, thereby showing that what a proactive government can do for investors. For Modi, economic diplomacy is about marketing, streamlining, downsizing and modernisation brought about in a seamless manner within a global economy.



Under the new neighbourhood first policy, Modi's key focus vis-à-vis India's relations with its neighbours is economic trade. Modi believes that aggressive economic trade with neighbours will benefit all and the benefits will percolate deep down in the society. This will bring about a radical shift in the way its neighbours perceive India. The erstwhile image of India, projected to its neighbours as a 'Big Brother,' will transform into one of a collaborative ally and shall prove positive spill over for the entire region. At the neighbourhood level, connectivity has emerged as an inbuilt dimension of economic diplomacy. Apart from that, usage of India's soft power capabilities has taken primacy in

the Modi doctrine. For instance, the intense diplomacy to get 21st June declared as the International Day of Yoga at the UN General Assembly is an example of soft power diplomacy. Thus, one may conclude that the Modi Doctrine is all about putting India into a higher international orbit and for achieving the same, tasks have been clearly cut out for the future.

Our understanding of the foreign policy of Modi helps us to analyse few goals the IFP intends to achieve in the future. Modi has clarified that India is not going to be a balancing power but intends to aspire to be a leading power. India is to have a three step foreign policy

- (a) Observe and react to international events
- (b) If needed, infuse energy to shape international events
- (c) Occasionally, play a role to drive the events

The government's Indian Ocean strategy, economic diplomacy, development diplomacy, African Outreach, Pacific Island Outreach and Act East Policy are some of the bold and timely initiatives. The 3C formula of Connectivity, Contacts and Cooperation is being used. There is new energy for cultural diplomacy and Indian Diaspora and soft tools like yoga. We will see in the various chapters of India and bilateral diplomacy in subsequent sections that a new tool of gifting spiritual texts of India to world leaders is a new phenomena. Though there is a thrust on building a personal chemistry with leaders, we need to be careful as personal chemistry does not always give results. The issues with China on NSG, Masood Azhar are some examples. Modi has realised that even if diplomacy may not fetch political votes domestically, it does enhance India's standing in the world and helps garner resources for developing India. At times, domestic political standing can be improved if a country leverages external partners well. In 1969, deeper embrace of USSR won the Congress support of the Left parties in India. This helped the Congress party counter the rivals on the Right side of the political spectrum. Though India's great power diplomacy only boosts some excitement at the domestic political level, it is in reality, the neighbourhood diplomacy where there is greater domestic political resonance. For example, Nepal on Bihar, Sri Lanka on Tamil Nadu and Bangladesh on West Bengal explain the same.



Faith and Diplomacy

In the recent times, Modi has taken steps to bridge a link between faith and diplomacy. In India's Asian Policy, Buddhism has acquired a new focus. When Modi went to Mongolia, he delivered a lecture in their Parliament where he highlighted the importance of Buddhism to solve contemporary Asian and global challenges. The IFP has always emphasised upon cultural, historical and civilisational ties and has tried to keep religion out of foreign policy engagements. Modi has initiated a new diplomatic path of using religion as a tool to promote global harmony. Globally there is a trend of using religion as a diplomatic tool. US has an Office of Religious and Global Affairs in the Department of State which assists the US Secretary of State on religious issues. European Union does so in case of West Asia while China has been doing so since long. India is trying to put its IFP in line with this global trend. It has

begun with Buddhism which helps India reinforce its leadership in South East Asia.

Some scholars assert that under Modi, the IFP has turned towards a mixture of inward policy and internationalism. This policy strives to seek support for development of the country and at the level of Internationalism, aims to contribute to global humanity. At the inward level, our focus is on our national interests and at the international level we focus upon being a part of global institutional architecture.

Modi focuses on three core points in diplomacy.

1. Personal energy with pragmatism
2. Focus on problem solving based diplomacy
3. Prioritizing national interests with economic diplomacy

ANALYSIS OF MAJOR SHIFTS IN THE FOREIGN POLICY OF INDIA FROM THE PERIOD OF COLD WAR TO THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD


The basic theme we analyse in this section is the qualitative transformation in India's foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. Our concern would be to investigate the philosophical changes in the foreign policy of India that compelled it to embrace a completely new relationship with the external world. The essence of the section is to capture the key drivers of foreign policy transformation at the end of the Cold War. One important thing to note here is that when Nehru was the PM, he tried to educate the political leaders and the public of India on foreign policy issues through his speeches. This was not the case after the end of the Cold War. The Indian Prime Ministers, from Rao till Manmohan Singh, did not favour much debate about the change of direction in the foreign policy. I K Gujral was the only exception and he did vocalise a few ideas and shed some insights on his doctrine.

In January 1992, Narasimha Rao attended the special session of the UN Security Council (UNSC) on nuclear issues. At the special session, the UNSC declared that proliferation of nuclear weapons is a threat to world peace. Rao understood that the world is envisaging collective action to restrain states from acquiring nuclear weapons. The immediate priority of the USA was to make India sign CTBT and ensure India does not acquire nuclear weapon. Rao perceived that the special session of the UNSC had the backing of world powers. However, the greater dilemma for Rao was whether he could have allowed the international community to decide something that was at the very core of the national security of India, especially when the previous decade of 1980's had been spent in verbal clashes with Pakistan with regard to the latter's nuclearization policy? India's domestic and economic position was not strong enough at that juncture to give the country any weight at the global level.

The US, led by Bush at that time, proposed a multilateral agreement to India where India, along with Pakistan, China, USA and Russia, undertake discussions on nuclear non-proliferation in the subcontinent. For India, such a multilateral format of discussion was completely unacceptable because it favoured only a global framework in case of any discussion on nuclear issues. What irritated India further was that, as per the initiative envisaged by Bush, Russia, China and USA could supervise India–Pakistan nuclear issues. This was not acceptable to India as it saw China as a new guarantor of security in the

region in which India considered itself an equal player. Instead of committing to the proposal outright, Rao favoured a deeper discussion with the US at a bilateral level. Rao successfully launched a dialogue with the US on one hand, and on other hand, at an invisible level, began to prepare India for a nuclear weapon. The nuclear scientists were instructed to prepare for a nuclear test but they demanded a delivery time frame of minimum two years. At the diplomatic level, India kept on bargaining for more time and searched for all rules possible in the diplomatic book to avoid an entry into a multilateral nuclear treaty. By 1995, India was ready to enter a different strategic pedestal by conducting a nuclear test. On 15th December, 1995, the *New York Times* reported that India was making preparations for a nuclear test at Pokhran. India, in order to give a sign of relief to the international community, affirmed that India is not planning Rubicon but also decided not to give up the future option of tests. Rao continued to face two key dilemmas. The first was what could be the economic consequences of the test and second was how could he finally undertake nuclear tests, thereby shedding off all normative dimensions in favour of the security considerations of the realpolitik.

After the end of the Cold War, the security situation drastically changed. India's sole supporter during the Cold War—the USSR—was no longer in the picture. China had been constantly arming Pakistan and equipping it with covert nuclear capabilities. The US, instead of developing relations with India as the largest democracy in the world, favoured the containment of India and its nuclear programme through the Clinton administration's overt fixation on non-proliferation. Though India since Nehru was an ardent supporter of a CTBT aimed for complete Disarmament, in 1996, when India read the draft of CTBT, it realised that the real intention was not to go for complete Disarmament but ensure that states like India don't acquire weapons. At this juncture, a school of thought argued that India should not undertake a nuclear test but instead outline the journey for developing credible deterrence. However, the scientific community ruled that for the deterrence to be credible, India would need to conduct a small number of tests to get data for sub-criticality. The BJP government led by Vajpayee took the risk and went ahead with nuclear testing. The nuclear tests in 1998 gave India the opportunity to redress the contours of nuclear diplomacy. India was an ardent supporter of the fact that the world is discriminating between nuclear haves and have nots. After testing the weapons and being armed with a new confidence, India now began to call for incremental nuclear reforms. India shifted to advocacy for pragmatic arms control from its earlier strategy of disarmament.



Even post-1998, India has not given up the goal of complete disarmament. For India, the immediate priority was to conclude a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) because India was of the view that states should focus on reducing the production of nuclear material. A cessation on the production of the nuclear material could be the first step towards a treaty for complete disarmament ahead. The Indian policy had thus shifted from

being a dissident at global nuclear level to a nation with its focus on developing an arms control regime.

As the Cold War ended, there was considerable uncertainty about the future of India's non-alignment. As the IFP progressed in the first decade after the end of the Cold War, India kept on defending the concept but the way its foreign policy was unfolding clearly indicated that India's focus was no longer simply on non-alignment. The idea of non-alignment was developed by Nehru. Later, it turned into a movement called NAM. NAM offered India a platform to pursue its international relations. The Indian policy of staying non-aligned during the Cold War was based on the logic of maintaining strategic manoeuvrability. India professed the idea that the decolonised states could lead an independent worldview and a developmental strategy without getting entangled with the ideologies of the Capitalist West and the Socialist East. Non-alignment emerged as a third way of articulating the philosophy of the third world countries. As the Cold War ended, the idea of non-alignment lost its relevance and transformed into a philosophical relic. But many years into the post-Cold War world order, India kept on insisting that the spirit of NAM was still as relevant. Many Indian foreign policy practitioners asserted that the spirit of NAM was alive in the pursuit of multilateralism and opposition to military alliances. India followed a policy of adopting itself to the changing world scenario after the end of Cold War but decided not to give up the past altogether.

During this time of a changing world order, Narasimha Rao emerged as a chief architect of the change of the IFP. He did not reject NAM altogether but began to reorient the IFP incrementally. As Rao opened up the Indian economy, and at the foreign policy level, Rao steadily began a more serious rapprochement with the West. India's pro-West tilt later on continued under the regime of Vajpayee. The Vajpayee government, without discrediting NAM, somewhat marginalised it and continued with a pro-USA approaching its foreign policy. The relevance of NAM during cold war lay in giving international voice to a country like India which had not much real power. After the 1998 nuclear test, India had now acquired a new tool of military power to bargain with the world and thereby the utility of NAM automatically diminished. During the Cold War, non-alignment was used as an economic tool to seek economic aid from both camps. At the end of the Cold War, the old economic system led to severe economic crisis and had to be reformed. This also reduced the relevance of non-alignment.

However, though the practitioners of IFP realised that the utility of non-alignment was decreasing, they failed in identifying an alternative to the policy. This, they felt, could deprive India of a force in global affairs. After the 1998 nuclear tests, India realised that the only way it could leave a mark on the international system was through a demonstration of its capacity to maintain peace. It realised that the idea of playing third worldism and anti-westernism cards would not help. India began to search for an alternative to non-alignment in the form of capacity demonstration. India now had the option of either sticking to NAM or establish a new partnership with the US and other powers. India began to conclude pivotal strategic partnerships with great powers to enhance its national strength.

In fact, four months after the 1998 tests, Vajpayee announced that India and USA are natural allies. This announcement was a radical departure from India's erstwhile foreign

policy which was bent upon non-alignment. This insistence on a natural alliance by Vajpayee saw its magnification during the regime of Bush who took the Indo–USA relations to an unthinkable level and brokered a nuclear deal with India, enabling it to emerge as a true world power. As India enhanced its ties with USA, it insisted that the IFP stood for multi-polarity and not an alliance with the west. India clarified that its policy was to engage with all world powers who served India's national interests. India began advocating a multi-polar world but this advocacy clashed with its natural alliance with the US. Indian diplomacy, however, embraced this duality. India called for a deep relation with the US while keeping open the option to expand cooperation with other powers under the idea of multipolarity. The emphasis on non-alignment was replaced with advocacy of multipolarity and the gradual democratisation of foreign policy. The emphasis upon multipolarity asserted India's rise as a major power in global politics. The new self-image of India was enhanced further by rapid thrusts in domestic economy since the end of Cold War, including the opening up of the Indian markets for the west.

The recent developments in Indo–USA relations, like the conclusion of the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), which is a tweaked version of the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA), which the US has with several countries it has close military ties, suggest that India will enhance its strategic space under the framework established by the US and that it may not be wrong to say that the possibility of a future alliance with west has started taking a root in Indian thinking. Indian advocacy of a multipolar world reflects that India intends to retail space for strategic autonomy. India, during Cold War, intended to be the leader of the third world. Since the end of the Cold War, India has switched over to becoming a developed power in the twenty first century. India, while negotiating with the west, asserts that it is the sole state outside Europe and North America that stands for the core values of European enlightenment. For that matter, scholar and professor Sunil Khilnani asserted that the Indian experiment is the third great moment of democracy in the world after American being the first and French being the second.

For the practitioners of Indian foreign policy, Lord Curzon is a great source of strategic inspiration as his writings emphasised upon a powerful role India could play in the Indian Ocean and the rest of Asia. The Curzonians in the Indian foreign policy are of the view that India has the potential to influence not only the Indian Ocean but the entire arc from Iran to Thailand. During the time of Nehru, the partition of India and Pakistan became an obstacle to the influence India could leverage in the Indian Ocean. The complicated post independence relations with Pakistan and China imposed limitations on the exercise of hegemonic influence in the Indian Ocean. Throughout the cold war, India's proximity to the USSR and its anti-USA approach also acted as deterrents to its display of power in the Indian ocean. Even though Curzon's idea of India being a dominant player in the Indian ocean were formulated on the basis of British interests, there is no reason why India today, decades after the end of the Cold War realise the vision. Since the end of Cold War, India has switched its Indian Ocean policy. If during the Cold War, India's policy was to keep foreign powers away from the Indian Ocean, now India intends to cooperate with the US and achieve influence over the Indian ocean as its natural strategic space.




It will not be wrong to assert that since the end of Cold War, India has initiated a forward policy and its diplomatic activism is visible in India's neighbourhood from its actions in Afghanistan to strategic partnership with Africa to the Act East Policy in East Asia. During the Cold War, because of the Indian policy of non-alignment and its closed economic orientation, India remained isolated. At the global level, it did talk about macro-security matters but could not provide any security to small states (like Singapore) in the region. Thus, during the Cold War, Indian policy was primarily a policy of masterly inactivity. The end of the Cold War ushered in a wave of freshness in the foreign policy thought of India. As it began to reorient its economy, it initiated commercial contacts with various states. The focus for energy security shifted to west Asia and for investments and trade to east Asia. An important element of the IFP became the focus upon building institutional link with regions. As India initiated a Look East Policy, it found easy synchronisation with ASEAN's Look West Policy and thus began the Indo-ASEAN institutional co-operation. A new component of Indian strategy was to go for improvements in physical connectivity. The recently concluded BBIN (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal) agreement and India-Myanmar-Thailand highway are steps in the direction of a new forward policy. To shed off isolation, India stepped up defence cooperation with states in the region. The recent defence and naval contacts from the Gulf to East Asia are testimony to India's growing defence diplomacy. India is now focussing upon institutionalised defence contacts and strategic dialogue as themes of its forward policy of defence diplomacy. India wants to be a key element in the maintenance of the balance of power in the Indian Ocean to balance an aggressive and rising China.

FINAL ANALYSIS

It was only when the Cold War ended that India began to realise material capabilities and began to aspire to be a great power. It engaged with the US and began to boost the economic arms of its diplomacy. Two and a half decades of economic growth finally provided India the resources to modernise its defence forces. The biggest impact at the defence level is seen in the Indian Navy. Though Indian foreign policy has seen fundamental shifts since the end of Cold War, it has failed to bring about deep-rooted changes with Pakistan and China also at times India has failed to demonstrate leadership in matters of global governance, like climate change and foreign trade. The polemical arguments advanced by India at both places are hardly of any merit. Even recently, some foreign policy practitioners aim at reviving the idea of non-alignment which, as a paradigm, has lost its sheen in the post-Cold War times. Thus, unwillingness to shed off the past is preventing India from taking stands on global issues of critical importance. The unresolved question in the Indian foreign policy is what role India aspires to play at the global level. India does advocate for multi-polarity, and as we saw in the previous section, it also favours democratisation of institutions so that it can be a part of the decision making process of the bodies like the UN Security Council and the World Bank.

In order to conclude this section, a few assertions can be made. Our study of IFP till

now shows us that Indian Foreign Policy during the Cold War had limited manoeuvrability. The limitations were imposed by India's normative policy of non-alignment and an insular economic policy. Nehru gave India the needed push at the foreign policy level. He ensured that India's idea of non-alignment gives it a standing in the international arena, which, at the time, was highly divided due to ideological warfare. The tenure of Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi saw attempts to take India away from the ideological accents introduced by Nehru. In this regard, the efforts of Rajiv Gandhi to remove the choke points in India's external interests are worth noting. Rajiv not only injected blood in Indo–USA relations but went a step forward with China. The end of the Cold War led to a root-and-branch overhaul of India's economic and foreign policy imperatives. The Nehruvian outlook of perceiving capitalism as an extension of imperialism leading to a deep hospitality to the West was replaced by new undercurrents in the foreign policy. The diplomatic straitjacket was now loosened up and India began a rapprochement with the West. The Cold War rhetoric of non-alignment and of being a protestor in the global system was replaced with greater aspiration for power in a multipolar world where India was now willing to take up responsibilities. The era saw diplomatic innovations by Indian diplomats who became reapers of investment from across the globe. The testing of nuclear weapon gave India a new power stature to influence and win over new friends in the international system.



Whether India's being a part of these institutions at the global level will reshape the world remains ambiguous. India is not very comfortable with the 'doctrine of responsibility to protect' and is also, at the same time, reluctant in shaping the global programme to fight climate change. Though India is critical of existing arrangements, it fails to provide an alternative. What prevents India to adopt a more intellectual approach to foreign policy? The reason is perhaps India is too imaginatively limited and for the present, just willing to outline its own role in reshaping the global order as an emergent pole in the same multipolar world. The absence of quality trained foreign policy practitioners in the system has also prevented the policy makers to get access to rigorous analysis and changing paradigms in international relations. Thus, the future of the IFP lies in establishing new imaginative approaches at the diplomatic level which shall eventually decide what kind of role India would like to play in a multipolar world.

End of Section Questions

1. Personal chemistry has emerged as a powerful tool in India's diplomatic kit since 2014. Discuss.

2. Foreign policy rarely figures in domestic political debates in India. Discuss.
3. If India plucks the low hanging diplomatic fruit with the world, India's efforts to detox the domestic environment will get a boost. Examine.
4. Convergence of Buddhism and democracy provides us a path to build a world of peace, cooperation, harmony and equality. Discuss.
5. Indian foreign policy is trying to be in line with the trend of faith diplomacy but India must guard against the dangers involved in implementation of religious diplomacy. Examine.
6. Turning statesmanship to salesmanship is a new phenomenon in Indian Foreign Policy. Examine.

1. For details of the Treaty and its Articles, please visit: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indo-Soviet_Treaty_of_Friendship_and_Cooperation

Section D

India and its Neighborhood Relations

[Chapter 1 India and Neighbourhood Policy—Key Drivers](#)

[Chapter 2 India and Bhutan Relations](#)

[Chapter 3 India and Nepal Relations](#)

[Chapter 4 India and Bangladesh Relations](#)

[Chapter 5 India and Myanmar Relations](#)

[Chapter 6 India and Sri Lanka Relations](#)

[Chapter 7 India and Maldives Relations](#)

[Chapter 8 India and Afghanistan Relations](#)

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CHAPTER

India and Neighbourhood Policy— Key Drivers of the Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Historical analysis of India's engagement with the neighborhood
- India's Neighborhood First Policy
- Core Elements of Neighborhood First Policy
- Problems in Neighborhood First Policy
- Stratospheric Diplomacy
- Role of border states in Neighborhood Policy

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF INDIA'S ENGAGEMENT WITH THE NEIGHBOURHOOD

The entire South Asian subcontinent was unified under the British for the first time after the decline of the Mughal Empire in India. The British established a double line of defence, based on the policy of reverse slopes. Under this policy, as per the plan envisaged by the British, China and Russia were to have no presence in the subcontinent and the British tried to ensure this through the subordination of individual states. The British established a buffer state fence on reverse Himalayan slopes. The Partition of India and Pakistan in 1947 saw a reversal of the reverse slope policy and opened up the possibility of foreign intervention in the region which India did not favour. After the Partition in 1947, despite a loss of territory in borders of West and East, India emerged as a pre-eminent regional power since a huge amount of land still came to India. Due to a huge territory and its geographical importance in the subcontinent, the subsequent security conception of India was not national but geopolitical and regional in nature. India realised that, due to its geopolitical location, it would witness a threat first from powers of the region than powers outside the region. India felt that it may witness a threat from the neighbours who may be weak or unstable. India was of the view that if a neighbour is weak or unstable, it would be given an option to decide whether it wants an external, more powerful state, to intervene. This would bring external powers to a zone, India felt fell in its own sphere of influence.

India felt that an unstable Pakistan meant a high possibility of a foreign intervention in Pakistan. Due to this reason, India has always favoured a stable Pakistan, but also not a Pakistan that may be strong enough to potentially emerge as a threat to India. China, through its investments in the Gwadar port and the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, has favoured developing a strong economy in Pakistan to keep India under check. Thus,

for India, security of South Asia is based on stability of South Asia. India, in the neighbourhood, faces a Gringo problem. Like USA, India has realised that assuming dominance is a complex process. Other Asian states harbour a similar feeling for China. India has its own regional security policy. It feels that the South Asian subcontinent is India's sphere of influence where India can be the only power that can intervene. India's ideal policy is not to allow outside powers to intervene in South Asia as it feels that South Asia is its exclusive sphere of influence. Nehru propounded this view during his earliest days as Prime Minister. Some scholars have referred to such a view as the Indian Monroe doctrine. In the 19th century, USA exercised a similar influence in the Western hemisphere under the Monroe Doctrine. Nehru, after Independence, resonated with similar views when he advocated that foreign colonial powers should stay out of South Asia. During the Cold War, India followed the foreign policy of trying to limit the influence of foreign powers in Asia, but such an attempt proved difficult for India. During British rule, smaller states were provided a sense of security by the British. India lacked both the resources and the experience in governance to extend the same to its neighbouring states.



However, India, during Nehru's times, followed a global strategy of non-alignment to keep India away from Cold War politics. The neighbourhood policy did not receive the same attention as India tried to position itself as a neutral force in the era of bipolarity.

The coming of Indira Gandhi brought about a change in India's neighbourhood policy. She added a new component of bilateralism in the neighbourhood policy. Indira Gandhi insisted that India should bilaterally resolve issues of the region without any intervention from external powers. Indira ensured that external powers have no role when matters are resolved bilaterally by India. The Indian neighbourhood policy, for that matter, was always fraught with contradictions. Regionally, in South Asia, India clung to the precepts of the balance of power and sphere of influence, while rejecting the same internationally. Regionally India provided security to small nations while internationally opposing the intervention of the great powers in the affairs of the weak states. India, under Indira, preached bilateralism at a time when it globally advocated for multilateralism. Another feature of Indira's neighbourhood policy was that she resorted to military interventions with a neighbour if it threatened India's security. India's intervention in 1971 during the East Pakistan crisis is a testimony to the fact. Many of the neighbours began to perceive India's military strategy as an interventionist approach.



When Rajiv Gandhi assumed control, the Indian intervention in Maldives and Sri Lanka in 1980s (explained in the subsequent chapters) transformed India into a perceptual regional hegemon. Many scholars raised issues with India establishing itself as a regional hegemon. They asserted that India, during Indira and Rajiv's times (under Indira Doctrine and Rajiv Doctrine), did not provide economic and security benefits to the neighbours (as the definition of a regional hegemon warranted). In fact, as mentioned earlier, the South Asian states perceived India's doctrine as interventionist in nature.



When the Cold War ended, India began to realise that the interventionist approach had become unsustainable. India was visibly upset by rising anti-Indian sentiment. In 1996, India began to negotiate a water sharing treaty with Nepal (explained in detail in the chapter of India–Nepal relations ahead). As the negotiation proceeded, a perception began to evolve in Nepal that India was grabbing the only national asset (water) that Nepal could lay claim to. As the crises deepened in 1990s, a new approach to the neighbourhood policy was needed.

When P V Narasimha Rao became the PM, he evolved a fresh approach to the neighbourhood policy. He followed a hands-off approach. His idea was that India should not interfere in the functioning of the neighbouring states. If the hands-off policy did not create new tensions, it also did not contribute to reducing old problems. Later the, approach of Rao was carried forward by Gujral. I K Gujral, as Prime Minister, introduced a proper doctrine for the neighbourhood for the first time.




I K Gujral's foreign policy doctrine was based upon the logic of non-reciprocity and generosity. Under Gujral, India re-evaluated its self-interests and decided to be more generous towards its neighbours. Under the Gujral Doctrine, India's avowed aim was to build goodwill amongst its neighbours instead of leaving space for the development of anti-India sentiments. India, though its non-reciprocity and generosity, wanted to show to the neighbours that there lay a huge economic and political benefit in cooperating with India.



Some in the Indian foreign policy establishment found that the Gujral Doctrine was idealistic, but the neighbours and the other states appreciated non-reciprocity and generosity. The first missing link in the Gujral Doctrine was that Gujral did not have ample amount of time as the PM to force the foreign bureaucracy of India to accept the

value of cooperation. Moreover, despite advocating openness and generosity, the Gujral Doctrine was reluctant on opening up foreign trade in the region.



When the Bharatiya Janta Party came to power in 1998, it became busy in managing the fallout of the Pokhran-II test. Most of the energies of the BJP were diverted into managing Pakistani state sponsored terrorism. The BJP government began to realise that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) had begun to deepen its presence in Nepal and Bangladesh. The subsequent hijacking of the Indian Airlines IC-814 aircraft was testimony to this.

As the BJP government began to shift its focus to its neighbours, it decided to use SAARC as platform for regional cooperation. However, the government was not able to achieve much success in using SAARC as a platform due to problems caused by Pakistan. The Vajpayee government wanted a kind of South Asian Union by upgrading the SAARC where there was a free trade amongst states and a very small negative list. India had a grand vision of using the South Asian Union under SAARC not only for economic cooperation but as a political union in the lines of European Union. However, one reason why the idea failed was that India, under the BJP, insisted on a security guarantee for economic cooperation. Till 1947, the South Asian subcontinent had good trade relations, but, when new borders were created, trade began to decline. Pakistan never opened up on trade owing to hostilities with India. Bangladesh, after a few years of its creation, also ceased enthusiastically cooperating on the economic front with India. Border trade became negligible. Globalisation had impacted trade, and it had compelled some neighbours to open up to India. However, since trade remained in favour of India due to trade surplus, the states were reluctant to further open up.



The Manmohan Singh government too tried to use SAARC as a platform to further integration amongst the neighbouring states. The UPA government favoured political dialogue with neighbours. It almost followed all dimensions of the Gujral doctrine without publicly accepting the same.


INDIA'S NEIGHBOURHOOD FIRST POLICY

The previous section analysed India's regional policy with respect to its neighbours as influenced by many regional dynamics. Firstly, in South Asia, since the end of the Cold

War, there had been a rise of international involvement in regional affairs. After USA invaded Afghanistan, it has continued to remain a dominant power in Afghanistan. This has only gone on to cement the USA–Pakistan relation that has been in existence since the Cold War. The USA's dependence on Pakistan increased after USA invaded Afghanistan.

Sri Lanka, on the other hand, witnessed the rising LTTE problem. In the recent times, Norway had emerged as a core player in solving the LTTE crisis in Sri Lanka. Nepal too has always been dependent upon foreign powers for economic assistance. There has been a rising Chinese presence in the region of South Asia. The Chinese Belt and Road initiative and its rising presence in the Indian Ocean have given jitters to India. India has realised the need to be a rising power in the post-Cold War times, which, many scholars read as India's tendency to behave like a proto-imperialist power. India, according to such scholars, has not been able to enhance its influence in South Asia and has instead been perceived as a second-tier imperialist power by the South Asian states.

Though, this scholarly view resorts to an extreme picture, the ground reality is that India's abilities to push a strong regional agenda in its quest to emerge as a rising power has remained weak. Since the beginning of the Cold War till the present, the societies of South Asia, instead of working with each other to enhance cooperation at the regional level, have preferred to look towards the North for technology and resources. Due to this, economic interaction and integration of the South Asian region has remained largely neglected. Some scholars assert that India has tried to emerge as the regional hegemon, but this may not be a genuine assessment of India's neighbourhood policies because a regional hegemon provides economic and security benefits to other states while India has not done any such thing in South Asia. It is in this context, to rectify its earlier shortcomings in the neighbourhood policy, that India has announced its 'Neighbourhood First' policy in 2014.



Modi's vision of South Asia and the initiation of the neighbourhood first policy began on a political high when Modi invited all SAARC nation heads for his swearing-in ceremony in 2014. The idea of the neighbourhood first policy is to link India's development to the development of South Asia. In order to realise this vision, a special focus is given to SAARC and the idea is to transform the entire South Asian region into an integrated economic union with enhanced connectivity. The neighbourhood first policy has picked up grains from the Gujral doctrine without publicly accepting the same. India, under the neighbourhood first policy, has conveyed that it shall attach enormous political and diplomatic capital to fostering cooperation with the neighbours. A special thrust is laid upon improving connectivity within South Asia so that all the states in the region can benefit from mutual cooperation leading to shared prosperity.



On the neighbourhood level, India has put a dedicated SAARC satellite for all its neighbours. The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) launched the satellite in May 2017 for India's neighbours so that they take advantage of telemedicine and e-learning. Under the neighbourhood first policy, Modi first visited Bhutan. The subsequent chapter on India and Bhutan will throw light upon his core foreign policy achievements. His visit to Nepal also strengthened the idea of India prioritising neighbouring states. In a landmark visit to Bangladesh, Modi concluded the long pending Land Boundary Agreement. The visit to Sri Lanka happened after a long gap. Modi also became the first head of the state to visit the Northern Sri Lankan region where Tamils reside.


The basic idea of the neighbourhood first policy is that India would shape events in its neighbourhood rather than merely reacting to them. Such an attempt to shape events is in sync with India's quest to play an important role in global affairs. It also signified that India is now willing to shoulder responsibilities in its neighbourhood. Through the neighbourhood first policy, the idea is that India wants to adopt a well-defined model for promoting economic cooperation in areas of mutual interests. At the heart of India's neighbourhood first policy is the economic diplomacy strategically followed by India. India wants to use the neighborhood first policy not only to limit rising Chinese presence in South Asia but also expand India's influence in South Asia through commercial diplomacy. The focus of the policy is on fostering regional trade through connectivity. The idea of the policy is also to use its pro-USA tilt in foreign policy to achieve a larger role in South Asia by emerging as a Net Security Provider.



The core idea of Neighbourhood First Policy is '*Vistaarvaad Nahi, Vikasvaad*'. (The focus is not expansion but development for all.) India wants to establish a developmental compact with South Asia by line of credits, grants, skill development, and technology transfers to all in the neighbours. India wants the development compact as a catalyst for growth in South Asia.

Under the Neighbourhood First Policy, India has infused a new level of energy at two levels in its bilateral ties with neighbours. One of the first components of the new policy is to work upon building up of defence relationships. In 2017, when the Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina visited India, the two sides concluded a defence cooperation pact. In the post Cold War period, India has realised that the growing economic influence of China in India's neighbourhood is likely to have strategic consequences. Scholars argue that India has woken up late to the strategic power play in the subcontinent, but, India has now sought to expand its defence and strategic influence under the Neighbourhood First Policy. India now intends to build up its defence production base under Make in India

programme to catch up with China. Secondly, under the Neighbourhood First Policy, India has committed many projects in the neighbouring states but, there are several constraints in India's strategic diplomacy. Firstly, inadequate resources create a constraint. Secondly, most of the diplomatic scholars assert that even if India is able to commit projects, it fails to invest proportional diplomatic capital to pursue the projects. Due to this, the projects get delayed and lags are imminent. Thirdly, the strategic diffidence in the strategic culture of India is aggravated due to its insistence on going solo for such engagements. To address such issues, India needs to evolve a grand strategy for the neighbourhood. Secondly, India needs to evolve a multilateral approach based upon global consensus on core challenges. For example, when India asserts that a multilateral approach is needed in development, it can apply the same thoughts to live diplomatic instances. For the last 13 years, India has been trying to develop the Chabahar port in Iran. The project has been delayed and is yet to be completed. When we apply the multilateral formula, we argue that instead of India developing the Chabahar port alone, it can take help of Japan in financing and technology and co-develop the port. In fact, developing a loose multilateral coalition driven by the strategic objectives and interests of India can help in mitigating the self imposed unilateral biases we have in engaging with our neighbourhood. The essence of India's new policy is to build up a new geo-economic constituency in the neighbourhood.



Aid to the Neighbours

Since 1950s, India has given technical assistance to neighbours like Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bhutan. India has been giving Human Resource related training in India's

neighbourhood under non-planned grants in the budget. India uses IITEC scholarships and line of credits as a tool of development diplomacy. The Ministry of External Affairs grants lines of credits to Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal while the Department of Economic Affairs in the Ministry of Finance allows lines of credits to other states. In 2003, India launched the India Development initiative. Now, lines of credit are not granted by the Department of Economic Affairs but interest subsidies are provided to the Export-Import Bank of India (EXIM) bank and they, in turn, grant lines of credit. India also provides aid to foster relations as a goodwill gesture. Such aid is in sync with the ancient Indian value of *daan* or ‘charity’.

Some scholars argue that this aid is a step by India towards establishing regional hegemony while others tend to argue that aid by India to other states is to promote political and economic goodwill for mutual interests and shared prosperity. India and neighbours have a weak link at the political level. The exchanges are not frequent at the political level, and therefore, mutual trust has not been built up adequately over the years. Even when political exchanges happen, India has shown reluctance in compromising its expectations. Political will to resolve historical disputes with Pakistan and China has been relatively weak. Lack of economic, cultural, commercial planning and delivery deficits are high. South Asian nations feel that, for India, its neighbourhood policy is more about security than anything else. For India, even if integrity is at the core of its policy, it cannot have a *Dhritarashtra*-like blindness and have its eyes shut to security concerns altogether.



Instances of Subtle, Distasteful and Unimaginative Diplomacy

India's neighbourhood policy began on a positive note but things have not progressed well. Nepal alleges that India has interfered in the internal affairs of the state and such intervention has not been appreciated by the Nepalis at all. India has publicly expressed unhappiness with the Nepali Constitution. The chapter of India–Nepal relationship will further elaborate upon India's approach to the Madhesi issue. Nepal has alleged that India resorted to a blockade for which Nepal was compelled to complain to the United Nations. Nepal even alleged that India used R&AW to topple the Oli government. Things have normalised at present after the recent visit of Bidhya Devi Bhandari to India in 2017. In Sri Lanka too, there were allegations that the then-R&AW station chief for Sri Lanka, K Elango, was an active supporter of the Srisena followers who intended to topple the Rajapakse government. In Maldives, allegations are that India has been overenthusiastic and displayed inappropriate behaviour when Nasheed was arrested. India even issued a public statement saying that it was concerned about the arrest of Nasheed to which Maldives reacted by stating that it did not appreciate any interference by others in its internal affairs. Such

instances clearly prove that India should stop behaving like the erstwhile British Raj and stop feeling that its diplomats are viceroys. India has to remember that if a neighbour follows up with China for investment, it has a right to do so and India should resort to patient diplomacy rather than displaying arrogance or resorting to a regime change. India should try to focus on other forms of diplomacy and create infrastructure to stabilise things than resort to coercive diplomacy. A parliamentary standing committee on external affairs has recently noted that India's aid to neighbours has decreased and this is not a positive sign. Our Neighbourhood First Policy can only be effective when bolstered with the understanding of the political, historical and social dynamics of each neighbour. The present day foreign bureaucratic manpower is inadequate to build such capacities.

Modi has attempted to emphasise upon economic integration, and if the goal materialises, then it could alter the face of the South Asian subcontinent and its future practice of international relations amongst each other. India has realised that a push towards economic integration could establish a conducive climate for resolution of political disputes. Pakistan remains the slowest camel in the caravan. It insists that only the successful resolution of political disputes can accelerate economic progress. India is now finding a way to bypass Pakistan. India has developed relations with Afghanistan and Iran. Also, India has concluded Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal–Motor Vehicle Agreement (the BBIN–MVA has been explained in subsequent chapters). The BBIN–MVA could become a South Asian growth quadrangle in the times ahead. India feels that Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal are untapped storehouses of energy. If Nepal and Bhutan have hydroelectric power potential, then West Bengal and Bihar have coal while Bangladesh, Assam and Tripura have hydrocarbons. The entire zone is full of endowments. India's Act East Policy and BBIN–MVA are a step to develop the North Eastern Region as a growth engine under India's Neighbourhood First Policy. Till now, India had remained reluctant as it felt that economic integration with neighbours would deeply affect India's aid policies and India may lose its economic aid leverage. However, at present, India feels that economic integration could add fuel to political ties in the neighbourhood that would yield positive results on the economic front. Thus, India has now begun to look beyond Monroe Doctrine and has favoured cooperation.



In conclusion, we can assert that India has initiated the Neighbourhood First Policy for many reasons. Firstly, India wants a stable neighbourhood to undertake its own domestic growth. Secondly, because it gives a push to India's own global ambitions as it can lay ground works for India to emerge as a Net Security Provider. Thirdly, India can peddle off economic diplomacy to the neighbours which they will find difficult to resist. Fourthly, such a policy will bring more economic and connectivity benefits for all. Fifthly, if others don't undermine the national interests of India, they can enhance ties with India to go for regional economic integration. Sixthly, the economic integration can create a

conclusive environment for political negotiations. Seventhly, subsequent political negotiations backed up by economic dependence will stabilise the South Asian region as a whole. Lastly, by enduring primacy in neighbourhood, India can emerge as a global credible power. On 5th May 2017, India launched the SAARC satellite for economic and developmental priorities of the region.



Role of Border States in Neighbourhood Policy

The border states have a critical role in ensuring a peaceful neighbourhood. The development of border states will help India to pursue a regional power policy. Under India's Neighbourhood First Policy and Act East Policy, the development of Border States is an agenda of high priority. The PM has envisaged a South Asian Customs Union (SACU). India, under its Neighbourhood First Policy, has augmented connectivity and participation in South Asia. The recently concluded BBIN–MV has been undertaken on the theme of sub-regional cooperation. The north-eastern states are envisaged as hub of the BBIN–MVA. There is a special focus on reverie transport development as well. India has changed its perception related to borders. It feels that borders with its neighbours are connectors rather than walls to protect them from outside interference. This change in the mindset with respect to the borders is not just restricted to using the borders for physical connectivity but also in using borders to facilitate speedy movement of goods, people, ideas, culture and technology.

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CHAPTER

India and Bhutan Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Historical background
- India–Bhutan Treaty–1949
- India–Bhutan Commercial Diplomacy
- India–Bhutan Hydrodiplomacy
- India–Bhutan Security Cooperation
- Chumbi Valley Issue
- Operation All Clear
- China factor in Indo-Bhutan relations
- Analysis of Visit of Indian PM to Bhutan, 2014.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The ancient kingdom of Bhutan was originally the State of Monyul. Its traditional name is Drukyul, that is, the country of Drukpas or the ‘land of thunder dragons’. India’s relations with Bhutan go back to 747 AD when a Buddhist monk Padmasambhava went from India to Bhutan and led the Nyingmapa sect of Buddhism. Thus, India contributed to the cultural growth of Buddhism in Bhutan. In the modern times, there were Anglo–Bhutan wars and Bhutan became a part of British Empire. In 1910, as per the Treaty of Punakha, between China–Tibet and Bhutan, Bhutan was not officially annexed but the legal status of Bhutan itself remained undefined. When India became independent in 1947, Nehru went on a horseback to Bhutan to build relations and advised King J D Wangchuk to build relations with India. Bhutan also preferred India over China as, in 1949, when China took over Tibet, it did create tensions and fears of annexation in Bhutan. In 1949, India and Bhutan concluded a Treaty of Friendship. The treaty discusses peace, trade, commerce and equal justice between India and Bhutan. In the treaty, one important article was Article-2. As per Article-2, India accepted the sovereign and independent status of Bhutan but advised that Bhutan, in matters of external affairs, seek assistance from India. India did not interfere in internal affairs of Bhutan and in fact, in 1971, took up the matter of UN membership for Bhutan. The Indo–Bhutan treaty is the bedrock of India and Bhutan’s relationship.

INDIA–BHUTAN TREATY, 1949

India and Bhutan concluded a Treaty of Friendship in 1949. As per the treaty, India and Bhutan have agreed to extend national treatment to each other. As per the precepts of national treatment, Indian citizens have same right for employment in Bhutan as Bhutani


nationals do in India. Under the treaty, India and Bhutan have agreed to have an open border. Under the open border system, citizens of India and Bhutan have a right to move into each other's territory without a visa. The treaty has a special mention of a clause of extradition. Again, as mentioned earlier, the Treaty has Article-2 and under the Article-2, Bhutan has to seek advice of India in matters related to external affairs. In 2007, Bhutan raised the issue of Article-2 with India and advocated the modification of Article-2. India, immediately agreeing to revise the treaty, modified the Article-2 in the treaty. This instilled confidence in Bhutan about its broad relations with India and made an impression that India is a partner in Bhutan's progress. India recognises the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Bhutan. The treaty also talks about cultural cooperation, sports development, cooperation in science and technology and healthcare. Under the revised treaty of 2007, India and Bhutan will cooperate with each other on matters of national security.

INDIA–BHUTAN COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY

The origin of commercial diplomacy goes back to 1961 when India began to provide assistance to the first and second five year plans of Bhutan. In 1971, when Bhutan became a UN member, the external aid it received got diversified as other nations in the world began to contribute. Bhutan has 80% of its trade with India and it majorly happens through the Kolkata port. There is a Phuntsholing to Paro road that facilitates Indo–Bhutan trade. Indian banks, such as the SBI and Bank of Baroda, have presence in Bhutan. Indian firms are undertaking work related to hydroelectric power, minerals exploration and construction in Bhutan. India imports from Bhutan, minerals, hydropower, wood and chemicals while it exports machinery and food products. The trade is governed by the Agreement on Trade and Commerce, 2006, which also provides for duty free trade and use of territory for third country transit.

India and Bhutan also have a developmental partnership and India has assisted Bhutan in development administration, as can be seen in three phases. In Phase-1, from 1960 to 1980, initially, India provided support for physical infrastructure creation. The subsequent phase, from 1980 to 2000, was a period when Bhutan explored the dimension of a transition to democracy. During this period, India provided assistance for development of democratic values and provided capacity support for decentralisation. In this period, institutional sharing of the best democratic and decentralisation related practices were encouraged for exchange. The third phase, which is ongoing from 2000 till present, is where Indian developmental assistance has been diversified. Today, the assistance ranges from hydroelectricity generation to IT services including support in education and skill development.

A comparison with Bangladesh–Bhutan trade is warranted at this stage. The relationship between Bhutan and Bangladesh is at three levels viz., trade, culture and environment. Bangladesh is very keen on purchasing power from Bhutan and allows Bhutan to use their sea ports for third country trade. A lot of Bangladeshi workers have been significantly present in Bhutanese construction companies.



INDIA–BHUTAN HYDRODIPLOMACY

Bhutan is a Himalayan state with tremendous hydropower potential. It is an upper riparian state where rivers originate. Bhutan exports around 45% of its hydropower to India. Surprisingly, the electricity generation in Bhutan was developed in 1960s with Indian assistance itself. India in the 1960s, had provided Bhutan with diesel sets which helped in providing electricity in towns. During this period, Bhutan lacked capacity to generate electricity and in 1967 Bhutan began to replace Indian diesel sets with import of electricity from Jaldakha plant in Bengal. In 1989, India helped Bhutan with the establishment of a 33 Megawatt electricity plant in Chukha.

It is only in the 1980s that, with Indian assistance, Bhutan realised the potential of hydropower. Bhutan also became convinced that hydropower generation is safe and is environment friendly. Bhutan realised that if it succeeds in developing hydropower, it can also emerge as a net exporter of the same which can eventually help Bhutan generate foreign exchange. They began to seek Indian assistance which can be broadly seen in two phases.


Phase-1—1987 to 2007: In this initial phase, India provided assistance to Bhutan in the establishment of specific site based plants at Chukha, Kurichu and Tala. India provided monetary assistance in the form of 60% grant and 40% loan for these projects. Meanwhile, India domestically worked to establish grid infrastructure in its territory. As these plants became operational, they supplied electricity to India and this electricity from Bhutan fed the Northern and North Eastern power grid in India.

Phase-2—2007 to 2020: In this phase, India has committed to undertake creation of mega hydro plants in India primarily to harness the targeted 10,000 Megawatt electricity by 2020.

Over a period of time, due to the existence of hydrodiplomacy between India and Bhutan, some issues have erupted on both sides. The Indian side witnessed massive flooding in the downstream state of Assam in 2014. Bhutan alleges today that due to hydro cooperation with India, there is a dominance of Indian firms in Bhutan. It feels that an overwhelming presence of Indian firms in Bhutan has restricted the space of growth for the Bhutanese corporate sector. Moreover, Bhutan feels that the Indian firms end up recruiting cheap Bangladeshi labour, as a result of which Bhutanese don't stand to benefit from the diplomacy. This issue was taken up by Bhutan during India PM visit to Bhutan in 2014.

INDIA–BHUTAN SECURITY COOPERATION

Since the 1962 Sino–India war, India has been focussing on forward access to the upper reaches of Himalayas to keep an eye on China. In this respect, Bhutan becomes strategically significant from the Indian point of view. India has strategic presence in Bhutan. Bhutan, due to its border skirmishes, does not have a diplomatic relation with China. An absence of diplomatic relation with China enhances India’s chance to exercise its sphere of influence in Bhutan. India has established the IMTRAT, that is, the Indian Military Training Team unit, in Haa district of Bhutan.



Under a bilateral agreement, India also provides training to army officers of Bhutan in India. The Border Roads Organisation has, since 1961, run Project Dantak. Under this, the BRO provides for roads construction, telecom works, colleges, schools and other infrastructure. Under the project, there have been notable achievements too.

Chumbi Valley Issue

Chumbi valley is a tri-junction between Bhutan, India and China. It is close to the chicken’s neck (the Siliguri corridor) and a gateway to India’s north east. Chumbi valley holds significance for China as it connects Tibet and Sikkim and China wants to expand its manoeuvres here. The Bhutan–China border problem began in 1950 when China published a map and claimed the West Bhutan area. This map also included Chinese claims on North Bhutan. China and Bhutan began negotiations on border issue in 1984. China, in West Bhutan, claims Doklam, Charithang, Sinchulimpa and Dramana pastures. This brings China close to Chumbi Valley, between Sikkim and Bhutan. The Chumbi Valley has one artery running from the Tibetan city of Shigaste to Yatung. By claiming area in West Bhutan, China can widen its land and in the eventuality of war, it can have more space on their side as otherwise, the size of Chumbi Valley is less for the stationing of any number of troops. For India, any such claim is dangerous as Chumbi Valley is barely 500 km from the Siliguri corridor, which is a narrow strip of Indian territory connecting the Indian north east to the rest of India.

Operation All Clear

In 2003–04, the Royal Bhutan Army launched a mega operation to eliminate

militarily ULFA and NDFB cadres in South Bhutan. As Bhutanese army launched the operation, Indian army positioned itself near the border. Indian army placed 12 Battalions along the border to ensure no insurgent cadres enter into India. Bhutan successfully neutralised 650 insurgents and destroyed 30 insurgent camps.

CHINA FACTOR IN INDO–BHUTAN RELATIONS

When the British left Bhutan, the Chinese captured some border villages of Bhutan. Since 1947, those territories are under dispute. Bhutan does not maintain diplomatic relation with China due to this persisting border dispute. This gives India enough space to exercise a sphere of influence in Bhutan.

Even in the recent times, the border has not been resolved and China has undertaken tremendous intrusions into the border area around Bhutan. These intrusions deprive the people of Bhutan of forest produce and create uncertainty about their resources and livelihood. In recent times, China has begun to engage in cultural and religious diplomacy with Bhutan. China has committed itself to the establishment of the tallest statue of Buddha in Bhutan (in Thimpu). It is investing in the telecom sector of Bhutan as well. In Rio+20 Summit in 2012, the Bhutanese PM met Wen Jiabao and the two leaders did discuss a potential bus agreement and discussed other avenues of trade. But diplomatic relation remained off. The situation, as of 2017–18, is such that India still has an edge where Bhutan is concerned.

ANALYSIS OF VISIT OF THE INDIAN PM TO BHUTAN, 2014

In 2014, after the swearing in of the new government, the thrust towards neighbourhood first policy saw the Indian PM, Narendra Modi, visiting Bhutan. During his visit, the PM inaugurated the Supreme Court building in Bhutan, made with Indian assistance. He addressed a joint session of the Bhutanese Parliament. Normally, the people of Bhutan do not use clapping as a congratulatory gesture. However, when the PM delivered a well-crafted speech, the Bhutanese legislators in the house clapped to convey a positive gesture to the PM. The PM also laid a foundation for a 600 Megawatt Kholongchu Hydroelectric power plant and announced two hundred scholarships worth two crores for the Bhutanese youth. The PM committed establishment of a digital library to give access to two million books for the youth of Bhutan. To pacify fears of Bhutan related to dominance of Indian firms in hydropower sector, the Indian Prime Minister agreed to establish a Power Training Institute in Bhutan to provide its youth skilled training to ensure they contribute to the Bhutanese workforce.

Bhutan has an open economy. Due to a liberalised system, Indian FDI finds place in Bhutan. But, Bhutan also has high number of Indian firms. In 2014, during the PM's visit, he had committed Indian assistance for the skill development of Bhutanese youth. Bhutan faces a Rupee crunch at the financial level and to address this, India has agreed to provide Bhutan with a credit facility. The hydropower generation of Bhutan is basically seasonal in nature. In the recent times, domestic consumption of power in Bhutan is on the rise. In the winter season, Bhutan imports electricity from India while in summers it exports electricity to us. To address the problem, India has agreed to establish a power bank in Bhutan in future. The Indian PM also agreed to assist Bhutan in the establishment of a University of Himalayan studies in Bhutan.

3
CHAPTER

India and Nepal Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Historical background
- Nepalese struggle with democracy
- India–Nepal treaty of peace and friendship, 1950
- Critical issues in Indo–Nepal treaty
- India–Nepal border related issues
- Case Study on security threats at the border
- Hydropower diplomacy
- Commercial diplomacy
- China factor in India–Nepal relations
- Analysis of Indian PM visit 2014
- India–Nepal power trading agreement
- India and Nepali Constitution
- India and Madhesi Problem and the blockade
- BBIN–Motor vehicle agreement
- Analysis of visits from Nepal to India

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The relation between India and Nepal goes back to the times of rule of the Sakya clan and Gautama Buddha. Initially, Nepal was under tribal rule and only with the coming of Licchavi rule in Nepal did its feudal era truly begin. Feudalism in Nepali society owes its origin to Licchavis. From 750 to 1750 AD was a period when Nepal came under Newari rule and they consolidated their presence in Kathmandu. This time period also saw a shift from Buddhism to Hinduism in Nepal and witnessed widespread cultural diffusion. In the 12th century, during the Malla period and rule of Yakshamala in Nepal, the two nations reached their cultural zenith. The early 1700s witnessed a change in the Nepalese power structure. The subsequent period witnesses both monarchical and prime ministerial rule. In 1846, Jung Bahadur Kunwar established a dynastic rule for the Prime Minister, known as the ‘Rana’. The Rana rule took hold and continued in Nepal till 1951. Though the Rana regime was not very efficient, it did contribute to social developments in the field of schools and education. In the 1920s, as the Indian freedom struggle progressed, many educated Nepalese people came to India and partook in the struggle. This gave the Nepalese elite an insight into nonviolent struggle. The Nepali elite subsequently launched a movement in Nepal and succeeded in ousting the Rana rule. The most instrumental role

in this movement was played by the Nepali Congress (NC).

NEPALESE STRUGGLE WITH DEMOCRACY

In 1951, after the ousting of the Rana rule, the monarchy continued to dominate Nepalese politics. Three important kings with respect to this period of Nepalese history are King Tribhuvan, Mahendra and Birendra. In the elections that were held in Nepal in 1951, Nepali Congress party (hereafter referred to as NC) won. The period of 1951 to 1959 witnessed the King, Tribhuvan Bir Bikram Shah, and thereafter, his successor, Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah, and the NC struggle to control Nepal. The situation was not stable due to the insecurity of the king as the king wanted to retain his power and was not keen on sharing power with new democratic elements like the NC. In 1959, the confrontation between the king, Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah, and the NC reached a level where the king declared NC as corrupt, removed it from power and subsequently installed a party-less Panchayat system.

This system was such where people would elect their representatives but actual power would be wielded by the King. Thus, a highly centralised rule began from 1960. The period of party-less Panchayat System witnessed protests from NC and other sections of society. The protests finally culminated in the First Jan Andolan in Nepal in 1990. During this time, the King Birendra Bir Bikram Shah, divested of any other options, brought back democracy and a new government under the NC was formed. During the rule of the NC in Nepal in the period after 1990, there was not much progress witnessed on the developmental front. In 1994, the Unified Marxist Leninist Party (UML) tried to generate an anti-India feeling in Nepal. The UML began to assert that the NC is in reality controlled by Congress party of India. This led to a perception amongst the Nepali people about India's control and interference over Nepal and its internal affairs through the NC. The anti-India plan worked in favour of UML and they succeeded in capturing power for a short period of 9 months in Nepal. The UML was removed and the NC assumed power again in 1994. The subsequent period not only saw civil unrest but also witnessed the development projects of Nepal suffer. The civil unrest, over a period of time, evolved into civil uprising and took an ideological turn to Maoism. The Maoist movement in Nepal became fully manifested by 2005. Perceiving the unrest and violence in society, King Gyanendra dissolved the Parliament again. This dissolution of the Parliament caused massive protests, ultimately leading to the second Jan Andolan in 2005. The Jan Andolan led to a signing of a Peace Accord in 2006. An interim constitution was prepared in 2007.



As mentioned, the 2006 Peace Accord planned that Nepal would establish the new constitution by 2010. However, by 2010, the constitution was not ready. It got delayed due to two key issues. The first related to the disagreement about the succeeding form of

government. Maoists favoured the Presidential system while others favoured Parliamentary system. The second issue related to federalism. Maoists favoured ethnic federalism while others rejected the idea. Another important factor that delayed the Constitutional development was Madhesi assertion. Madhesis are people living in South of Nepal in the region of Terai. They are people living close to the border of India. The Madhesis have always been discriminated against by Pahadis or the people living in the upper reaches of Nepal. In fact, the discrimination against Madhesis at one point of time, was so intense by Pahadis that if a Madhesi citizen wanted to visit Kathmandu, they had to apply for a permit. The Madhesis, through their representation, demanded rights in the new constitution. After tremendous delays, Nepal finally accepted a constitution in September 2015.



INDIA–NEPAL TREATY OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP, 1950

India and Nepal, on 31st July, 1950, signed a Treaty of Friendship and Peace. This treaty acts as the bedrock of the relation between the two nations. The treaty extends mutual peace, friendship and sovereignty to each other while it accepts non-interference in each other's territory. As per the treaty, Nepal would consult India whenever they undertake any arms imports from any nation other than India.

The treaty lets the nations extend national treatment to each other. The national treatment clause also extends for industrial and economic development. Basically, under Indo–Nepal national treatment, their citizens are empowered to the same privileges for property, trade and residence and movement in both countries. That means, a Nepali citizen can buy property in India while an Indian citizen can do so in Nepal if he/she so chooses. Also, an Indian citizen can reside anywhere in Nepal and a Nepali citizen too enjoys the right to residence in India under national treatment. Another important point of the treaty is open borders. As per this point, Indian citizens can move to Nepal without the need of a visa and vice versa. As per the Article X in the treaty, either party can ask for a change in the treaty whenever demanded.

Critical Issues in Indo–Nepal Treaty

The Treaty favours Nepal more than India, but Nepal still has certain issues with it. Nepal initially complained that when the treaty was concluded in 1950, India concluded the treaty with a Rana ruler. Nepal alleges that India signed the treaty with the Rana who had become unpopular. Certain sections in Nepal also alleged that the way treaty was signed signified that India considered Nepal as a small state and not an equal state. It was further alleged that the conclusion of the treaty by the Indian ambassador and Nehru himself not coming to sign the treaty signified an unequal

status of the countries. As mentioned earlier, in 1994, the UML had successfully generated an anti-India plank in the election. Since then, raising anti-India slogans and alleging that the Indo–Nepal Treaty of 1950 favours India more than Nepal has become a norm for gaining political mileage. Many times, Nepali political parties have demanded a change in the treaty. Under Article X of the treaty, Nepal can ask India to bring change and India has to establish a mechanism for the same. Whenever Nepal has asked for a change in the treaty, India has accepted the Nepali request, but, absence of consensus in Nepal on issues that need revision prevents any meaningful engagement about the issue. This demand for revision of the treaty was recently also raised during Indian the PM's visit to Nepal in 2014.

INDIA–NEPAL BORDER RELATED ISSUES

India and Nepal have an open border with each other—a practice that dates back to the British times. Even the British had continued to maintain an open border between India and Nepal. The British and Nepal, after the Anglo–Nepal wars in 1814, concluded the Treaty of Sagauli in 1816. The British had drafted the Treaty of Sagauli on 2nd December, 1815. The treaty was to be signed by Nepal by the deadline of 17th December 1815. Nepal refused to sign it by the date declared. The British subsequently threatened an invasion of Kathmandu and after a 92 days stalemate, a courtier, C S Upadhyay, signed the treaty. The Treaty of Sagauli was not signed by the King and thus led to troubles in later times but the Treaty established Mahakali River as a dividing line in the Western sector.

After Independence, India continued with the tradition of an open border and it was noted under the Indo–Nepal Friendship Treaty of 1950. The open border has helped domestic Nepalese people to take advantage. The people of Nepal, through the open border, also entered into India for economic opportunities. The Nepalis who come to India for work are well accepted in India and are not treated as aliens. Nepali citizens have important contribution in India's security setup as well.

The entire border is demarcated by border pillars but at various stretches, due to natural calamities and lack of maintenance, the border pillars have gone missing, necessitating a proper demarcation of the border to ensure that an absence of the same doesn't lead to escalation of tensions. In 1981, India and Nepal established a Joint Technical level Boundary Committee to survey the boundary again. The committee in 2007 submitted 182 strip maps which were to be ratified by both nations. The ratification of the 182 strip maps is still pending as of 2017. In July, 2014, both countries established a Boundary Working Group (BWG) to resolve the Kalapani and Susta issues. The main issue related to the border management between India and Nepal is that the borders have been demarcated on the basis of a flowing river. The problem is that the rivers shift their courses over a period of time. This impacts the border which gets affected due to shifting rivers. No doubt the boundary of the river is also based on a principled fixed border but if the river shifts, it results in creation of adverse possessions. The shifting of the rivers has led to the destruction of boundary pillars. The BWG will use GPS observations and generate data. The data will be used by the foreign secretaries of both nations to solve pending border issues. The BWG is also to look into the Kalapani issue. The origin of the Kalapani issue goes back to Treaty of Sagauli. As per the treaty, Kali river is designated as the western part of the boundary. In between the two streams of the Kali river lies


Kalapani. The issue arises as the segments to the West of Kalapani of Kali river are claimed by Nepal while India claims segments to the East of Kalapani of Kali river area, thereby making a claim to entire Kalapani. In the 1962 Indo-China war, Kalapani was occupied by Indian forces and India considers it strategically important.

Security Threats at the Border

The open border has fostered socio economic linkages between the two nations and India also provides national treatment to Nepali citizens. However, since the end of the Cold War, the border has created some concerns. Intelligence reports today suggest that Pakistan has been taking advantage of the open border to infiltrate into India and that it uses the Nepal border route to pump fake currency into India with an intention to destabilise the Indian economy. The open border has given rise to criminality. Today, criminals of both nations use each other's territory for refuge making it tough for law enforcement agencies to track and catch criminals. There have been numerous cases of drug trafficking, gold smuggling, human trafficking and illegal arms trade that have been reported. Though closing the border is no solution, better management of the border areas are required. A Cross Border Crime Control Action Plan can be prepared and jointly enforced. Shashtra Seema Bal (SSB) can be empowered with modern technology and also empowered under the Passport Act to arrest criminals. (In July 2017, the Government of India has given the approval to SSB to establish its own intelligence wing).

INDIA-NEPAL HYDROPOWER DIPLOMACY

Nepal is an upper riparian state and has a hydropower generation potential of around 80,000 Megawatts power. However, it has installed a capacity of around 800 Megawatts only. On an average, 15 to 18 hours of power cuts are common throughout the country. Unfortunately, Nepal has not developed its hydropower potential due to a fear that if they undertake hydropower generation, India will assert dominance over the generated hydroelectricity. Despite the fact that India always cites the example of Bhutan-India hydro diplomacy as a successful case to Nepal, Nepal is still reluctant to improve its generation capacity. There are three treaties to regulate our water sharing today.




Let us examine each treaty individually. In 1954, India and Nepal signed the Kosi

treaty. Kosi river causes tremendous flooding and has been also called the Sorrow of Bihar. As per the treaty, the two sides agreed to cooperate to manage Kosi flooding. India, under the treaty, committed to create a low head diversion or a barrage dam which, through gates, can regulate Kosi's water flow. India constructed the barrage in Nepal and Nepal agreed to give its management rights to India for 199 years. Over a period of time, certain sections in Nepal have brought up some issues pertaining to the Kosi treaty. A section in Nepal feels that barrages have a normal life of 50 years and India getting a lease of 199 years has given India rights to control it for long beyond the need. Certain sections in Nepal also allege that India, while managing the barrage, does not release adequate water for irrigation and during floods, opens the gates, leading to many villages getting submerged completely. A solution to this issue may come forth if both sides undertake a multi-stakeholder negotiation and resolve the issues.

In 1959, India and Nepal also signed the Gandak River treaty. The treaty has 13 articles and under the treaty, both sides are to utilise water from the Gandak river to generate twenty thousand megawatts electricity. In 1996, both concluded Mahakali treaty. Under the treaty, India has agreed to undertake the creation of three dams at Sarda, Tanakpur and Pancheshwar. Both sides have agreed to share costs. However there has been no progress on these projects owing to pending social and environmental impact assessment.

INDIA–NEPAL COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY

India and Nepal signed a trade treaty in 1996 which was later revised in 2009. Ninety five per cent of Nepali trade happens with India. Open border and twenty-two transit routes facilitate the trade. Raxaul, Tanakpur and Bratmandandi are prominent transit routes. There are more than 150+ Indian firms in Nepal working in manufacturing and services sectors. In 2013, both sides agreed to an Inter-Governmental Commission on Trade under which India has allowed the use of Kolkata port by Nepal for third country trade and designated customs points have been established. The trade is imbalanced as India exports a majority of things ranging from food products to petroleum products while imports, being negligible, primarily include wood and traditional medicines. There have been instances when some sections in Nepal have created a perception of a trade flood by India.



CHINA FACTOR IN INDO–NEPAL RELATIONS

The basic reason of Chinese presence in Nepal is to ensure that Nepalese territory is not used by Tibetans for breeding of discontent. In the initial years, from 1950s to 1980s, the Chinese tried to build an economic presence in Nepal, which got enhanced tremendously post 1990s. China has increased participation with Nepal at the economic front. In the last decade, Chinese engagement with Nepal has got strengthened at soft policy level. For that


matter, China has opened up many Mandarin language training schools in the Terai region. Chinese are providing Mandarin language training to Madhesis to ensure that in the near future, the Madhesis emerge as potential labours to work in the ever-expanding Chinese economy. China has made inroads into Nepal in infrastructure, education and health sectors. India feels that the Chinese inroads into Nepal is necessarily to counterbalance the Indian influence in Nepal. Certain sections in the Indian security establishment feel that Maoism in Nepal has been encouraged by China and they have potential links with the Indian Naxalite movement, though this is not an officially accepted view by the Indian government today.

In the recent times, Nepal has made a tilt towards China. China is helping Nepal to fill the infrastructure gap. Nepal wants to take advantage of the rail infrastructure built by China in Tibet. Nepal has asserted that its relationship with China is purely economic and will not be hurting the Indian strategic interests in any way. The rising Nepal and China cooperation also signals that Himalayas are not a barrier anymore and for India, a strategy to check the Chinese engagements is required rather than reactions. Chinese strategy is to directly engage with the Nepali politicians and this has led China to build more trust. The China-Nepal relations can be judged from the following facts:

1. Nepal-China Agreement on Transit and Trade
2. Nepal-China Rail link agreement
3. Joint Military Exercise Pact
4. Rasawagadi-Syabrubesi Road link
5. Nepal is a part of Chinese Belt and Road Initiative with a SEZ promised
6. 1200 MW project on Budhi river by Gezhouba group

ANALYSIS OF INDIAN PRIME MINISTERIAL VISIT IN 2014 TO NEPAL

The Indian PM visited Nepal in 2014. During the visit, the PM paid a visit to Pashupatinath temple and even donated Sandalwood. The PM announced one billion dollars credit for Nepal and committed an immediate rise in scholarships for Nepali students for education in India from then 180 to the present 250. Nepal has agreed to complete a Detailed Project Report for the Pancheshwar project. Both sides have agreed to establish a Joint Commission to review Indo–Nepal Treaty of 1950. A new Track-II initiative called Expert Persons Group—Nepal India Relations has been established. India has agreed to provide assistance to Nepal on goitre control and also concluded various MoUs.



Before the Indian Prime Minister's visit to Nepal, Indian Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj paid a visit to Nepal and agreed to negotiate a Power Cooperation Agreement. During her visit, the draft was agreed to. It was believed that during the visit of the PM, the PTA would be signed. However, during the PM's visit, the PTA negotiations could not be concluded. It was decided that within the next 45 days after PM's visit, the PTA would be signed. The PTA between India and Nepal was finally signed in September 2014. Under the PTA, nine articles are concluded and it has been decided to have a review of PTA after 10 years. The agreement shall be valid for 50 years. Under the PTA, Nepal would give licence to Indian firms to undertake 28 surveys in Nepal to explore 8000 MW power generation. By 2021, GMR will establish a plant in Karnali to export 900 MW electricity to India.



INDIA AND NEPALI CONSTITUTION, 2015 AND MADHESI PROBLEM, 2016

Nepal is governed according to the Constitution of Nepal, which came into effect on September 20, 2015, replacing the Interim Constitution of 2007. The Constitution was drafted by the Second Constituent Assembly following the failure of the First Constituent Assembly to produce a constitution in its mandated period. The present constitution, which is its seventh, took almost nine years in the making. Nepal has alleged that India did not "welcome" the Nepali Constitution promulgated by the Constituent Assembly but merely "noted" it.

What makes this constitution different from previous six¹ constitutions is that old constitutions were written by monarchs and this seventh one is written by an elected Constituent Assembly (CA). The new Constitution has been written by politicians and not by Jurists and legal luminaries. It has adopted a rights based framework which is high on promises. The CA mechanism was adopted to ensure that the diverse social and ethnic groups of Nepal come together on a platform and work on rules to be made for the entire society. The CA aimed to have an inclusive order with all groups on board. However, the idea of a collective ownership to a constitution has not evolved. The Constitution has not given representation to the Madhesis on the basis of population. In the Pahadi region, there is one representative for every 5000 people while in the Terai region, it is one representative for every one lakh people. In the new constitution, the Madhesis and Tharus (who constitute 70% of the population of Terai) were left out. Madhesis consist of Maithili, Bhojpuri, Avadhi, Hindi and Urdu speaking people. The people in the hills or Pahadis consist of Limbus, Khambus, Magurs, Gurungs, Tamangs, Khasas and Nepali

Aryans. Nepal has faced severe problems in accommodating people of South Terai. The Pahadis, in the new constitution, have reasserted their dominant role. The new constitution does not have equal representation of all groups in the Parliament. The total number of seats planned for the Parliament is 165. More than 50% of the Nepali population lives in the Terai region. The total seats allotted to people of Terai are just 65 in number. The Pahadi region has got 100 seats at a time when they had less than fifty percent of the population. India has requested Nepal to go for an inclusive constitution with equal representation. The Madhesis argue that by demarcating the Terai region differently, the Pahadis intend to destroy the *roti-beti* character. Under the *roti-beti* characteristic concept, women from UP and Bihar states of India who marry a Madhesi will be treated as a foreigner for upto five years from now. The Madhesis protests this and want Ek Madhesh, Ek Pradesh.


As mentioned, in 2007, there was an interim constitution that had, since then, been governing Nepal. In the interim constitution, as per Article 63(3), it was stated that geographical position and special characteristics would guide the electoral constitution. The Article 63(3) also stated that Madhesis would be given representation as per their population. In the new constitution, Article 84, which talks of representation, has dropped the point related to Madhesis. The interim constitution, under Article 21, had advocated that various Nepali groups will participate in state structure on the basis of the proportional inclusion principle, while under Article 42 of the new constitution, is dropped, something that which India is asserting be reinserted.

Citizenship issues are also at the forefront. Many Madhesis have acquired citizenship by birth or naturalisation. As per the new constitution under Article 282, it mandates that the posts of President, VicePresident and Prime Minister of Nepal and so forth, are to be reserved exclusively for those with citizenship by descent. India has been pitching for the addition of citizens who have acquired citizenship by birth and naturalisation also to be considered for higher posts. Over a period of time, some amendments were made by Nepal in Articles 42, 84 and 286 (dealing with the delimitation process). Some sections of Nepali groups in Southern Nepal for long undertook a blockade of Birgunj border in Raxaul. As a result of this, basic supplies could not reach Nepal. There was subsequently a severe shortage of commodities, including LPG cylinders. The Nepali people have a perception that through the blockade (in which India categorically denies any role), India has imposed its own version of economic sanctions in Nepal. The blockade has affected the people in the Pahadi region a lot. Even in case of the Terai region, due to the blockade, there was a strong anti-India sentiment. The major businessmen community in the Terai region consists of Marwaris. They have good relations with the people of the hills but are not very comfortable with the Madhesis, Due to the blockade, India's story has not won and its soft power policy has been eroded. It is stated by a scholar named Joseph Nye that in the 21st Century, it is the soft power that wins. India must follow a strategy in Nepal that wields soft power influence. India should take steps to recognize the diversity of the Nepali people and work with all sections of the society to eliminate poverty.

Due the blockade, the Nepali state began to witness fuel shortages. India annually supplies 1.3 Million Tonnes petroleum products to Nepal. Due to the blockade, Nepali people had to resort to cutting of trees to meet the fuel shortages, There was a massive deforestation and this led to a huge layer of smog in Kathmandu and other areas. Despite

immense poverty, Nepali people now had to face health related issues due to the smog.


In February 2016, the Nepali PM, KP Oli visited India and brought about an assurance to India on constitutional changes. During the visit, he signed some MoUs and, jointly with Indian PM, inaugurated Muzaffarpur–Dhalkebar transmission line.



In August 2016, Pushpa Kamal Dahal-Prachanda became the new Prime Minister of Nepal. Prachanda sent his Deputy PM, Bimalendra Nidhi, as a special envoy to India on 18th August, 2016, and his visit created a ground for Prachanda's visit to India in September. Prachanda's visit focussed on support from India for reconstruction efforts in Nepal after the 2015 earthquake, improvement in road connectivity and industrial development.

Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal (BBIN) Motor Vehicle Agreement (MVA)


In June, 2015, the four SAARC nations, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal (BBIN) concluded a sub-regional MVA for regulation of passenger personnel and cargo vehicular traffic. The MVA will not only facilitate economic development and integration of the region but will simultaneously facilitate seamless movement of goods and people amongst the four signatory states. The governments will boost regional connectivity.



One of the major aims of the BBIN member states is to enhance connectivity and ensure seamless passenger traffic up to Thailand. The BBIN states are contemplating an MVA with Myanmar and Thailand as well. This would allow BBIN access to the ASEAN states. In the 2014 SAARC Summit in Kathmandu, there was a proposal to establish an MVA amongst all SAARC states. Due to reservations by Pakistan, the idea was dropped and a sub-regional MVA was envisaged which finally got concluded in 2015 in Thimpu.

By 2016, all the states ratified the agreement, thereby paving way for seamless connectivity in South Asia. India and Bangladesh at the bilateral level have taken a number of steps to improve connectivity. In June, 2016, the two concluded a transhipment operation agreement, enabling India the access to Ashuganj port of Bangladesh to be used for transporting goods to Tripura and other North Eastern States. There is an ongoing Kolkata–Dhaka–Agartala and Dhaka–Shillong–Guwahati Bus service already operational. One of the biggest achievements of the MVA would be that it will enable the establishment of regional South Asian supply chains, especially in textiles, yarn and readymade garments. Thus, it may not be wrong to say that the agreement indeed is a force multiplier that may boost economic integration in the region. The BBIN clearly is a step forward in India's neighbourhood first policy.

Bhutan had been a little hesitant with the MVA as it feared that an increase in the vehicular traffic in Bhutan due to the MVA from other states could lead to adverse environmental impacts on Bhutan. But studies have proven that regional MVA boosts not only economic integration but tourism as well. However, the truck and taxi operators of Bhutan have been quite critical of the MVA as they feel that the Bhutanese road infrastructure may not be able to sustain incoming vehicular traffic. The National Council of Bhutan, in November 2016, rejected the MVA. India, since then, has hopes that the royal Bhutanese government will take steps to ensure that all internal issues would be sorted out soon and the agreement would be operationalised. The issue raised by Bhutan has emerged as a key challenge to the implementation of the BBIN–MVA.




ANALYSIS OF VISITS FROM NEPAL TO INDIA—SEPTEMBER 2016, APRIL 2017 AND AUGUST 2017

Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’ visited India in September 2016, after taking charge as the Prime Minister of Nepal. During his visit to India, he reiterated his acknowledgement of India’s support in the development of Nepal. He outlined the new depth of the emerging Indian–Nepal ties due to continuous support of India in strengthening the institutions of democracy in Nepal. Prachanda also stated the importance of implementing the constitution of Nepal by accommodating the various and diverse sections of Nepalese society through an inclusive dialogue. During Prachanda’s visit, India extended 750 million US dollars’ worth line of credit to Nepal to undertake post-earthquake reconstruction. For construction of roads in the second phase in the Terai region and establishment of power transmission lines, substations and a polytechnic in Kaski, India has granted additional line of credit.



During the visit of Prachanda, certain MoUs were also signed.



In April 2017, Nepali President Bidya Devi Bhandari visited India and committed to continue the ongoing strengthening of bilateral ties between India and Nepal. Nepal has also got a new Prime Minister, Sher Bahadur Deuba. The India–Nepal relations have deteriorated due to the blockade and other issues in the recent times. Some scholars have asserted that economic pressure always does not lead to achievement of some specific goals. India has a history of using economic coercion to achieve its goals. From 1946 to 1993, India used its economic coercive powers to resist engagement with South Africa and a similar tactic was visible in Nepal in the recent times. Deuba has been a pro-India leader and now has a special responsibility to take the India–Nepal relationship forward. In August 2017, Prime Minister of Nepal Sher Bahadur Deuba visited India. Both sides tried to reboot the India-Nepal relations. In the meeting with his Indian counterpart, both sides have decided to put an end to some of the issues that acted as irritants in the relations in the recent past. There were widespread discussions on multiple issues. Most important has been the issue related to the open border. In the recent times, Indian security agencies have raised some security concerns. The Left parties in Nepal too have favored some restrictions on the border. Due to the losses in life and property caused by annual flooding caused due to monsoons, the two sides have decided to establish a permanent mechanism at the bilateral level to check the rise of settlements in the Chure (Shivalik) region. The two sides have discussed the impact of demonetization and GST on the Nepali economy. Discussion on Nepal selling electricity via Dhalkebar-Muzaffarpur transmission line have progressed and the two sides have shown determination to resolve the pending issues. Nepal raised issues related to quarantine of Nepali agricultural produce by the Indian custom agencies and the high handedness of Indian Sashastra Seema Bal. The recent

meeting has been very fruitful and the two sides are likely to enhance their bilateral cooperation in the times ahead.

1. The previous constitutions of Nepal were enacted in 1948, 1951, 1959, 1962, 1990 and 2007

4
CHAPTER

India and Bangladesh Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Historical background
- Anti-India faultiness in the relations
- Defense diplomacy
- Commercial diplomacy
- Land boundary agreement issue
- Maritime and security issues
- Teesta river issue and river disputes
- Energy security diplomacy
- Radicalisation in bangladesh
- Tipaimukh dam controversy
- Analysis of Indian PM visit in 2015
- Analysis of Shiekh Hasina's visit in 2017

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Bangladesh is closely linked to India through its shared culture and ethnicity with West Bengal. The language, a slightly varied dialect of Bengali, acts as a bridge between East India, North East India and Bangladesh. The piece of land where Bangladesh exists has undergone three partitions. It began in October, 1905, when the British, as per their 'divide-and-rule' policy, divided the Bengal Presidency on Hindu-Muslim lines. The Muslims, in majority in the state, landed in the area that was to later become East Pakistan. Due to massive mobilisation and political protests that eventually came to be known as the 'Banga bhanga Andolan', the territory was reunited on 12th December, 1911. However, as far as the national movement was concerned, the seeds for partition were already sown by the initial decision of the British to divide the region along religious lines.

The Muslim League, which was established on 30th December, 1906 in Dhaka, later demanded that the area be under East Pakistan during the Partition of India in 1947. As the partition took place in 1947, it led to the formation of East Pakistan with large-scale riots preceding the event in Calcutta and Noakhali.

The territory again witnessed a split in 1971 to become Bangladesh. The factors that led to divisions of East Pakistan in 1971 emerged in the period after 1947. East Pakistan always had inadequate representation; it got access to fewer resources and, despite the popularity of the Bengali language, Urdu was imposed as the administrative language.

This led to confrontation between the government and the masses and violence erupted in East Pakistan. In 1970, when elections took place, the Awami League won the elections. The regime in West Pakistan refused to recognise the mandate of the election and unleashed violence, disallowing Sheikh Mujibur Rehman to take power. The subsequent planning of a pre-emptive attack on India by Pakistan forced India to militarily retaliate and support the formation of independent Bangladesh as a new nation. The confrontation finally led to emergence of Bangladesh in December 1971. From 1971 to 1975, came the era of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman who assumed power. In 1972, India and Bangladesh signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation which became the foundation of the modern India–Bangladesh relations.

Today, in Bangladesh, there are two key parties. Awami League, headed by Sheikh Hasina, is a party which has stood up for secular ideals and is favourable towards India while Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) which is headed by Begum Khaleda Zia, is a party that favours Bengali nationalism and is not favourably inclined towards India.

Was the period of 1971 to 1975 a real honeymoon?

In the period after the creation of the new nation of Bangladesh, the relations between India and Bangladesh were cordial, but some issues did erupt. In 1951, India had initiated the construction of the Farakka Barrage. It was on the river Ganga, which flows from India into Bangladesh, where its primary distributary is known as the river Padma. The river drains into Bay of Bengal after a confluence with river Meghna. In 1975, the barrage was finally constructed. Bangladesh began to insist that Ganga is an international river so the water flow must be regulated as per a mutual agreement. The reason for India to establish the barrage was to flush out the silt of Bhagirathi Hoogly river to ensure smooth operationalisation of Kolkata port. The two nations, in 1972, established a Joint River Commission (JRC) to negotiate terms of the water settlement. Soon, differences arose over fair weather flow of river Ganga. India asserted its right of regular flushing of water of river Hoogly, which Bangladesh vehemently opposed. This issue created some friction between the two nations. Some disagreements also emerged over post 1971 war settlements over the share of spoils. Bangladesh alleged that it did not receive a fair share of the spoils of war. The assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman on 15th August, 1975 ended the honeymoon period.

The death of Mujibur Rehman saw a period of immense political instability when a coup and a counter-coup were staged in rapid succession, following which Zia-Ur-Rehman finally came to power as Bangladesh's seventh President in 1977. Zia was not favourably disposed towards India. He took the Farakka barrage issue to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). The UNGA urged him to resolve the issue at a bilateral level. The act of raising the issue at UNGA created further tensions in the already strained relations between the nations. In 1977, in India, Indira Gandhi was replaced by the Janata Party government, which made an attempt to revive the fractured relationship with Bangladesh. In November 1977, Babu Jagjivan Ram undertook an official visit to Bangladesh and signed an accord to resolve the Farrakka issue. However, other issues

persistent between the nations as irritants.

Eventually, the border issue between India and Bangladesh began to unfold. Historically people of Bangladesh have been moving into the region of Brahmaputra valley due to the lack of habitable and arable land in Bangladesh. India perceives this movement as illegal immigration into Indian territory. The improvement in relations dipped with the comeback of Indira Gandhi in 1980 and finally improved somewhat during Rajiv Gandhi's tenure. Rajiv Gandhi successfully concluded an MoU on water issues in 1982 and in 1985, signed the Nassau Accord, which resulted in another MoU valid for three years. A Joint Commission of Experts (JCE) was established for alternative water-sharing plans and to augment the Ganga–Brahmaputra basin. Rajiv Gandhi also allowed Nepal to be a part of water sharing thereby sweetening the entire deal. However, domestic constraints prevented the pact from yielding the desired results. The entire period, till end of the Cold War, witnessed a fluctuating relationship between the neighbouring states. The end of the Cold War saw a change in the domestic policy of Bangladesh. The dictator Ershad decided to step down and elections followed in 1991. The BNP won the elections. In 1996, the BNP was replaced by Awami League and the new government concluded a fresh treaty over the river Ganga with India in 1996. Since the end of the Cold War, Indo–Bangladesh relations are primarily driven by the policy orientations of the two parties—the BNP and the Awami League. The BNP has a propensity to incline its policies to favour Pakistan and China while the Awami League favours a partnership with India.



Anti-India Faultlines

The BNP is not favourably disposed to India and has at times stated that it is suspicious of India. In 1991, at the time of the ousting of Ershad, Khaleda Zia had led a Farakka march to mobilise public support against Indian interference. She succeeded in forming the government in 1991 illustrating the exploitation of anti-India faultlines in domestic politics.


DEFENCE DIPLOMACY

At the defence level, India prefers Bangladesh as a defence market, though, in recent times, Bangladesh has preferred to receive arms imports and defence equipment from the US, Russia and China. It is possible that China is to provide submarines to Bangladesh in future. A unique point for India's advantage is that Bangladesh is a leading contributor to UN Peace Keeping Mission (UNPKM). This allays India's fears as the dominant theory is that the more Bangladesh participates in UNPKM, the lesser would be the idle availability of its armed forces to control polity and hence, the lesser would be the chance of Bangladesh becoming an active threat like Pakistan. India firmly supports Bangladesh to evolve fully as a democracy on the lines of Turkey and Indonesia. Both nations have regularly undertaken joint exercises at the army and navy level. In 2013, the nations also signed an extradition treaty. In 2017, during the visit of Shiekh Hasina to India, the two countries have concluded a new defence pact (elaborated later in the chapter).

COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY

Bangladesh is an agrarian economy but has a strong demand for goods and India has emerged as an important trade partner in this context. India provides duty free, quota free access for Bangladeshi exports to India. The trade is tilted in favour of India. India also gives line of credits and loans to Bangladesh and provides developmental aid. In 2012, India provided one billion US dollars in credit to Bangladesh and a further 200 million USD for development of infrastructure. Tata is establishing a three billion USD steel plant in Bangladesh and there are other Indian firms in power generation, linking of power grids, telecom and transport which are setting up presence in Bangladesh. However, India's steps to integrate Bangladeshi economy with India may be perceived with some suspicious by Bangladesh. It has also steadfastly refused Indian transit to North East which, in reality, might have proved beneficial for both.

LAND BOUNDARY AGREEMENT ISSUE



When India became independent, Sir Radcliffe demarcated the boundary between India and Pakistan as well as India and East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). While dividing the territory in East Pakistan, Radcliffe did not pay attention to small patches of land called 'enclaves'. These enclaves were, in the pre-independence era, called Chitmahals and they were used by the Raja of Cooch Behar and Maharaja of Rangpur as stakes in the game of chess. After independence, Radcliffe drew a line to divide the territory. Efforts were made by Nehru in 1958 to divide the territories through an agreement with Feroz Khan Noon. As per the agreement, India got the enclave of Dahagram and Angarpota while half of Berubari enclave was to be given to East Pakistan. The origin of the Berubari territory also goes back to the time of Radcliffe. Radcliffe tried to demarcate the boundary on the basis of *thanas* but he accidentally omitted the Berubari number-12 *thana*. The Nehru–Noon agreement resolved this issue. As the Berubari number-12 *thana* was within the Jalpaigudi *thana*, half of it was given to East Pakistan as they laid claims over it. To give effect to the Nehru–Noon agreement 1958, an amendment under article 368 of Indian constitution was made under the 9th Amendment Act of 1960. When Bangladesh was created in 1971, Indira Gandhi decided to resolve the pending disputes with Mujibur Rehman. In 1974, a Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) was designed which clarified the need to exchange 111 Indian enclaves in Bangladesh and 51 Bangladeshi enclaves in India. In these enclaves, citizens were living with no available rights and facilities. On 16th May, 1974, the agreement was signed but was not ratified by India and thereby the exchange under the LBA could not proceed successfully. According to the LBA, Bangladesh was to get Dahagram and Angarpota while India would get the other half of Berubari.

Dahagram and Angarpota were to be connected through a corridor called Tin Bigha and India was to lease out the Teen Bigha Corridor to Bangladesh in perpetuity. Due to strong internal resistance, the Indian government was finally only able to grant

Bangladesh access to the corridor in 1992, and that too, for a limited number of hours per day. Full access to the corridor was finally granted in 2011. In 2006, the Hasina government in Bangladesh assumed power and in 2007 established a consultative mechanism in the area demarcated in the LBA. The people in the consultative mechanism asserted that they would not leave their areas. The rights of the people inhabiting the region of the LBA now came in stark incongruence to the precepts of the LBA which advocated territorial relocations. In 2010, Hasina visited India and in 2011, a Protocol to the LBA was agreed to.

As per the protocol, it was decided that status quo was to be maintained in the regions and the wishes of the people would be respected. Thus in 2011, the procedural acceptance was completed on ground and the national exchange was agreed to. Since there was to be no cession of territory, the Indian Parliament ratified the bill in May 2016 and the entire process got completed by June 2016.

MARITIME AND SECURITY ISSUES

India–Bangladesh maritime cooperation goes back to 1974. From 1974 to 2009, the two nations have had eight rounds of talks. The failure of Bangladesh to achieve success on negotiations related to New Moore Island in 2009 led Bangladesh to approach the Permanent Court of Arbitration under UNCLOS. The UNCLOS, under Annex-7 of the convention for Delimitation of Maritime Boundary between India and Bangladesh, handed over the case to a five-member arbitration tribunal. The tribunal gave an award on 7th July 2014 and upheld Indian sovereignty over the New Moore islands and enabled India to have access to Haribhanga River. Bangladesh has been granted an additional access to an 19,000 square kilometres Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). India shall continue to hold rights over its continental shelf but Bangladesh is allowed an outlet to the extended continental shelf. Bangladesh also now gets access to open sea and shall no more be a sea locked nation due to overlap of EEZ.

TEESTA RIVER ISSUE AND RIVER DISPUTES

Of the 57 transboundary rivers, Bangladesh shares 54 of them with India. Teesta is the 4th largest river in Bangladesh (after Ganga, Bramhaputra and Meghna). The flood plain of Teesta is 2750 square kilometres in Bangladesh. In 1972, a Joint River Commission was established to share resources of 54 rivers. However, till now the only success is on an agreement related Ganga river signed in 1996 for 30 years for water sharing. A key irritant is the issue related to the river Teesta. River Teesta originates from Kangse glacier in Charamullake in Sikkim and finally drains in the Bay of Bengal. It is the fourth largest river in Bangladesh after Padma, Ganga and Meghna. In 1983, both nations agreed an ad-hoc agreement where India received 39% of Teesta water while 36% was allocated to Bangladesh. Around 25% water was unallocated. In 2011, an agreement to establish a Joint Hydro Observation Station was evolved which proposed an interim agreement for the next 15 years under which India was to get 42.5% of the Teesta water while Bangladesh was to get 37.5% of water flow during the dry season. The agreement could not be adopted due to opposition by the CM of West Bengal. The issue remains unresolved up to 2017. The key problem relates to a barrage at Gajoldaba in India and another at Dalia in Bangladesh. Using the barrages, both nations draw water for irrigation. The problem arises due to the severe shortage of water in the dry months. Bangladesh has been


consistently demanding 50% share of the water. A solution often proposed by hydrological experts is establishing a link canal between Manas–Ganga–Teesta and Sankosh but the issue remains.

ENERGY SECURITY DIPLOMACY

In 1997, the Bangladeshi firm Mahana Holdings proposed the idea of supplying gas from Sitwe fields in South Myanmar to India via Bangladesh. In 2005, Bangladesh, Myanmar and India reached an agreement that Myanmar would be supplying around 90 tonnes cubic feet gas. However, the Khaleda Zia government backed out of the agreement, citing as its reason, the fact, that India does not allow Bangladesh access to hydropower from Bhutan and Nepal. As the project got stuck, Myanmar signed a deal with China to supply China gas from Kyaukryu port to Ruilli city in Yunan province. Since 2015, with the coming back of Sheikh Hasina to power, the negotiations have begun anew.

RISE OF RADICALISATION IN BANGLADESH

The vulnerability of Bangladesh as a centre of terror is not new. Since 9/11, the vulnerability of Bangladesh to terror attacks has increased manifold. Bangladesh is a secular republic. The Islamic NGOs of foreign nations have been promoting Wahhabism in Bangladesh. Pakistan has links with many such NGOs in Bangladesh which it uses to target India. Since 1990, in Bangladesh, religion as a card in politics has been largely used to garner power. There is growing Al-Qaeda and ISIS presence in Bangladesh. In July 2016, during Eid, there were also terror attacks staged by ISIS.



The political compulsion to act against terror is a constraint for the present Bangladeshi government as the opposition uses it as a tool against radical organised religion and ends up creating a possibility of a severe backlash. In Bangladesh, there has been a systematic attempt to target rationalists, atheists and bloggers. The implications of all this are very severe for India. In 2015, in Burdwan in West Bengal, the bombs that were found were purportedly to be used in Bangladesh. For India, it is worrisome as ISIS is at its very doorstep.


Tipaimukh Dam

A joint River Commission in 1978 was established to explore possibility of a dam on Barak river. Due to regular flooding of Barak, a dam was proposed at junction of Mizoram, Assam and Manipur. It was decided to use water for irrigation also. Bangladesh says that the dam will affect water supply downstream and affect flow of water in summers. A 1500 MW dam is proposed where Manipur being the host state will get 15% free electricity.

ANALYSIS OF THE INDIAN PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO

BANGLADESH—2015

The Indian PM visited Bangladesh and paid homage to the liberation war memorial. The PM also unveiled a new bus service to enhance bilateral connectivity and inaugurated bus routes from Kolkata–Dhaka–Agartala and Dhaka to Guwahati. The PM also exchanged the Land Boundary Agreement and a list of 22 agreements was agreed upon. An important agreement was signed on the issue of coastal shipping. The merchant vessels of India can now use Chittagong port and Mangla port to ship goods to Bangladesh. To boost cooperation on regional waters, blue economy and maritime cooperation was envisaged. India also extended two billion USD credit for health infrastructure and education to Bangladesh. India has moreover agreed to provide support for construction of additional grids and provide 100 MW electricity from Tripura. To reduce the six billion USD trade deficit, India will establish an Economic Zone in Bangladesh which will export goods to India. Bangladesh has decided to offer SEZs to India at Mangala and Bhermara.



VISIT OF SHIEKH HASINA TO INDIA—2017

Shiekh Hasina paid a state visit to India in April, 2017. During her visit, the two sides reiterated the historical link between the two states. Shiekh Hasina presented citations to the kins of Indian soldiers who lost their lives in the 1971 war. India, under the Muktijoddha¹ scholarship scheme, has decided to extend medical treatment to additional 100 Muktijoddhas of Bangladesh in hospitals in India. The two sides have decided to deepen their bilateral cooperation in defense and connectivity. The two nations have further decided to strengthen defense cooperation to combat terrorism. The two sides will enhance cooperation in prevention of human and drug trafficking and illegal narcotics traded across the border. India has committed to develop Bangladesh by assisting it in skill development, energy, infrastructure and high technology. Neither of the sides could achieve success on the conclusion of Teesta water sharing agreement as of 2017 but have decided to enhance cooperation for its early conclusion. A thrust towards enhancing military to military relationship was laid upon during the visit. The two sides have concluded a defense cooperation framework and to promote strategic studies, an MoU has been concluded between the Defense Services Staff College, Tamil Nadu and the National Defense College, Dhaka. The MoU has been signed between the two states on peaceful use of nuclear energy and outer space. An MoU to jointly regulate border *haats* has been signed. The two will cooperate in the areas of cyber security, judicial cooperation, earth science research, mass media, audio-visual co-production and passenger traffic. India has extended an additional line of credit to the government of Bangladesh. India will also establish 36 community clinics in Bangladesh.



1. The Bangladesh War of Independence is known as ‘Muktijuddho’ in Bangladesh. The war veterans are known as Muktijoddha.

5
CHAPTER

India and Myanmar Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Historical background of diplomacy
- Defence and security relationship
- Extremism in Myanmar
- Rohingya issue
- Commercial diplomacy
- Border trade
- Border Issues
- Operation Golden Bird
- Kaladan multi modal transit transport project
- Analysis of recent visits
- India's core interests in Myanmar

DIPLOMATIC HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The most important connecting link between India and Myanmar (previously known as Burma) is Buddhism. In the ancient times, Gautama Buddha sent the two monks, Tapusa and Bhallika, with eight strands of his own hair to promote Buddhism in the Myanmar region. Tapusa and Bhallika built a pagoda in Shwedagon, which is now known as the Shwedagon Zedi Daw. Ashoka, during his reign, also sent missionaries to Burma. The people of Burma, since the ancient times, have been majorly Kshatriyas and their origins can be traced back to India, in the Gangetic valley. The 17th century Pyu dynasty used Indian titles like Hari Vikramaditya and Surya Vikramaditya. In modern times, the British had exiled Bahadur Shah Zafar, the last Mughal Emperor of India, to Yangon in Myanmar and the Konbaung King of Myanmar to Ratnagiri.

In 1951, India and Burma established diplomatic relations through a treaty of friendship. Although the bedrock of the relationship is the India–Myanmar Treaty of Friendship signed in 1951, the foundation of the Indo–Myanmar relations was laid down by the visit of Rajiv Gandhi in 1987. After the victory of Ne Win in Burma, he undertook drastic nationalisation which led to lot of discrimination from the Indian diaspora present in Burma. The Indian diaspora in Burma had British origins as Burma is an erstwhile British colony that gained independence in 1948 and the British had taken a large number of Indians to work in Burma as plantation workers. The regime of Ne Win did not boost the Burman economy, plunging the nation into deep economic crisis. In 1988, Ne Win's resignation led to a referendum on whether or not multi-party democracy needed to be adopted in Myanmar. General Saw Haung took control of Myanmar and established the

state law and order restoration council (SLOC). In 1990, SLOC announced elections. However, as per the SLOC, the election was to be held only for the purpose of redrafting the Constitution of the Myanmar.

In the elections, the National League for Democracy (NLD) won 392 of 485 seats and the rest were won by the National Unity Party (backed by the army). The NLD demanded immediate transfer of power on the basis of popular vote. This led to a confrontation based on the political values of democracy and autocracy. India has always been a supporter of NLD. Subsequently, Aung San Suu Kyi, the founder of NLD, was put under house arrest because of China's support of SLOC. Post 1992, Myanmar decided to head towards an open economy and joined ASEAN as a member and ended martial law. It also revived its relations with India. Since 1993, Indo–Myanmar relations have prospered. The military backed party is called Union Solidarity and Development Party, or USDP.

As India, at the end of the Cold War, announced its Look East Policy, the significance of Myanmar increased. In 2011, Thein Sein took steps to promote democracy. In the same year, Thein Sein visited India while in 2012 Suu Kyi visited India after her release from house arrest. Manmohan Singh also visited Myanmar in 2012 and these visits eventually brought security and developmental diplomacy back on track. In the March 2016 elections, NLD won again and Htin Kyaw became the new President of Myanmar. Myanmar remains extremely important to India for its proximity to Bengal, Bihar, Odisha, Bhutan and India's North East. It also shares a border with China. The Myanmar territory is used by insurgents for drug trade and narcotics crimes. India had maintained cordial relations with Myanmar despite it being under military rule for a significant time and even today, Myanmar remains a focal point of India's Act East Policy.

Act East Policy and Myanmar

Myanmar is the most crucial state for India's Act East Policy. Under the Act East Policy, India has realized the economic potential of boosting up connectivity with Myanmar as it will be a gateway to South East Asia. The importance of Myanmar in the Indian foreign policy can be judged from the fact that India announced the Act East Policy in the territory of Myanmar in 2014 (at the backdrop of 12th India-ASEAN Summit). Under the Act East Policy India has decided to boost connectivity with Myanmar to leverage the geographical proximity. The connectivity with Myanmar can be a gateway to South East Asia. Taking advantage of 2014 – India – Myanmar MOU on border cooperation and intelligence sharing, India on 9th June 2015 conducted a surgical strike against the insurgent groups. India is also connecting with Myanmar to leverage Buddhism through the Buddhist circuit where India intends to use Buddhism's cultural heritage to promote tourism and create job.



India and Myanmar jointly have to address bottlenecks to ensure implementation of the five themes. The two sides need to immediately push bus and air connectivity. To

support the Indian private sector in Myanmar, there needs to be enhanced presence of Indian financial institutions in Myanmar. India and Myanmar should as sub-regional groupings like Mekong-Ganga cooperation, BIMSTEC and BCIM etc. India has decided to leverage its Diaspora to enhance the cooperation in the five themes envisaged above.

INDIA-MYANMAR BORDER ISSUES

Myanmar and India share both land and maritime borders but since the 1990s, there has also been a growing proximity between China and Myanmar, who also share a land border. Myanmar continues to witness piracy and ethnic crises. Myanmar has focussed its security policy more on ethnic issues and intra-state conflicts than on international issues. Military has dominated Myanmar politics for a long time and has secured legitimacy in Myanmarese society. India, on the other hand, began to realise the security significance of Myanmar after it implemented its Look East Policy.

The growing presence of China in Myanmar has increased India's concerns. Myanmar also has proximity to the Andaman and Nicobar islands. China is undertaking port construction in Myanmar. India felt that China would probably encircle India and thus, this fear compelled India to go for security cooperation. In fact, from Myanmar point of view, the deepening of its relations with China compelled it to diversify and it became natural for Myanmar to look towards India to counter the dominating influence exerted by China.

In 1994, India and Myanmar signed an MoU on Maintenance and Tranquillity in border areas. Since then, India and Myanmar have been cooperating in the area of counter insurgency. Indian army chiefs regularly interact with their Myanmarese counterparts. In 2006, both concluded an MoU on intelligence sharing and training, where India envisages training of Myanmar's military to boost their military capabilities. Since 2010, they have a mutual Legal Assistance Treaty and in 2012, established a Joint Working Group on terrorism. In 2014, they signed an MoU on border cooperation. India assists Myanmar in building Offshore Patrol Vehicles under Coordination Protocol (CORPAT). Recently, India also carried out a surgical strike on the Indian side of the border to shoot down insurgents operating in the region. The broad contours of our defence engagement include border training, intelligence sharing and the training of Myanmar forces.

EXTREMISM IN MYANMAR AND ROHINGYA ISSUE

Since the 19th Century, people from various parts of India migrated to Myanmar. Over a period of time, they became prosperous and asserted their economic strength in the society. The local people of Myanmar were not happy and felt insecure. From 1920s to 1940s, there were violent revolts. During Ne Win's time, the non-Buddhist people were also targeted. Many of them left Myanmar during Ne Win's time.

From Bengal, a lot of Muslims were taken by the Britishers to Burma from 1823 onwards when the British occupied the Rakhine state of Myanmar. After the independence of Burma in 1948, these Muslims stayed back in Burma. Many of them are settled in South West Burma, which is known as the Rakhine area. The Rakhine area is in Arakan. From 'Rakhine' a word has originated for these Muslims in Myanmar's language and the word is Rohingyas. These Muslims are therefore called Rohingyas. According to the 1982 Citizenship law of Myanmar, the Rohingyas were not recognized as an official ethnic

group and since then have become stateless in Myanmar. In the 1990s, a movement in Myanmar began, which came to be known as the 969 movement. The movement was a brain child of Kyaw Lwin. Under the 969 movement, the government used Lwin's ideas to win over people by preaching the good practices of Buddhism. In the 2000s, another movement called the 786 movement began. The origin of the 786 movement is in Arabic Abjad numerical system and is inspired from the opening passage of Quran. In Myanmar, 786 usually demarcates an area as belonging to Muslims. The Buddhist began to misinterpret the 786 movement and they began to think that this means that 786 movement aimed to dominate 21st century ($7 + 8 + 6 = 21$) as the Islamic century. It saw a rise in insecurity of Buddhists manifesting in riots in 2011 in the Sittwe–Rakhine region and the brain behind this ethnic violence was Ashin Wirathu. A widespread belief in the fact that Muslims want to dominate Myanmar spread like wildfire. The rise of the radical and rightist Ashin Wirathu has brought out the face of radical Buddhism. This has led to the mass exodus of Rohingyas to Indonesia and Thailand in 2015. Those who remain are ritually ghettoised and persecuted. India is not a signatory to the UN Refugee Convention of 1951 and thus is not mandated to accept refugees. But, on humanitarian grounds, India has accepted a few Rohingyas. India needs to develop an imaginative diplomacy for the Rohingyas, India needs to ask Myanmar to rehabilitate the Rohingyas as not rehabilitating them is detrimental to Indian security interests. If the Rohingyas get radicalized, they could pose a serious security threat for India, India is contemplating appointment of a special envoy to discuss Rohingya problem with Myanmar.

COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY

There has been steady gradual improvement in the trade ties between India and Myanmar. India imports beans, pulses and forest products from Myanmar while it exports steel and pharmaceutical products. Myanmar stands to be the second largest supplier of pulses to India. There is a rising cooperation in the field of IT and plantation products.



The overall quantum of Indian investment is rising in Myanmar. India has steadily increased investment in the oil and gas sectors. There has been a huge presence of Indian companies in Myanmar as well. Tata Motors has established a truck assembly plant in Magway. There is presence of other Indian firms in Myanmar as well.



At the level of hydrocarbons, India and Myanmar signed a MoU in 2006 on cooperation in the petroleum sector. Since then India's ONGC Videsh Limited and GAIL have been present in exploration and development activities. India has acquired stakes in Shwe development and production area. Jubilant Energy and Reliance are also working in shallow water blocks in Myanmar. Since 2016, the State Bank of India has been granted a commercial license for banking purposes in Myanmar. On 17th February 2017, the 5th India–Myanmar Joint Trade Committee Meeting was held in Myanmar and efforts were made to intensify the ongoing trade. The two countries announced a new bilateral trade target of 10 billion dollars to be achieved in the next five years. Under the India's Act East Policy, India and Myanmar have agreed to intensify trade through maritime level and border trade level. The two sides have decided to promote more trade through the Moreh-Tamu post in Manipur–Myanmar border area. The maritime trade is to be strengthened through Kaladan Multilateral Transport Project.

In the eighth India–ASEAN Delhi Dialogue, 2016, the two sides also agreed to cooperate on improving connectivity and bilateral trade. At the level of connectivity, the two sides decided to expedite the India–Myanmar–Thailand Highway construction. At the maritime level, the two sides in 2016 concluded a standard operating procedure for Joint Naval Portal. India has clarified that Myanmar is core to India's Act East Policy and that India is keen to improve connectivity and trade with Myanmar.

India–Myanmar Border Trade

The border trade is different from the trade that is done between countries through air, land or sea. In the trade at air, land or sea, there is involvement of customer clearances. Also, the trade through these three routes involves huge volumes. On the other hand, when it comes to the border trade, the people living on two sides of the international border prepare a list of commodities and undertake overland bilateral exchange. India and Myanmar signed a border trade agreement in 1994 which got operationalised in 1995. As per the agreement, the two sides will undertake border trade through designated check posts.

Around 1% of the India–Myanmar trade happens through the border. The present duty is 5% for the 40 identified select items traded at the border.

DEFENCE AND SECURITY RELATIONS

India and Myanmar have maintained substantive defence relations since 1990s. The security situation has been necessitated by India's North Eastern states sharing border with Myanmar. The important dimension of the defence relationship is that India has been an important arms supplier to Myanmar. India has supplied T-55 tanks, transport planes and naval crafts to Myanmar, to name just a few. In 2015, the first India–Myanmar Joint Consultative Commission Meeting was held. In the meeting, both sides decided to strengthen security cooperation to tackle rising terrorism and insurgency. The two sides decided to use bilateral Regional Border Committee mechanism to promote border cooperation. In the meeting, India reaffirmed its support to assist Myanmar in the modernisation of its defence forces. A new dimension under India's Act East Policy is to also assist naval modernisation of Myanmar. One of the key drivers of India-Myanmar defence cooperation has been the insurgency in North Eastern States. India, way back in 1950, had provided Myanmar with six Dakota aircrafts to aid in its fight against insurgency. There are still insurgent groups operating across the borders of the two countries. In 1994, India and Myanmar signed an agreement to maintain peace and tranquillity in the border areas and this facilitated the launch of operation Golden Bird in 1995. Another driver of defence cooperation has been drug smuggling. Myanmar is a part of the Golden Triangle (Myanmar, Thailand and Laos) and has become an important transit country for illegal drug trafficking. In 2010, India and Myanmar established Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty on criminal matters which has emerged as the core legal instrument to address issues related to drug smuggling and gun running. There is active cooperation between the two countries at capacity building level. India has been offering military training to Myanmar.

The Inside Story of Operation Golden Bird

In 1995, in Mizoram along the India–Myanmar border, the 57 Mountain division of the Indian Army carried out the operation Golden Bird. Though it is stated that the operation was jointly carried out by India and Myanmar, in reality, the operation was carried out by the Indian army alone and Myanmar was not involved in the design of the operation. The operation was launched because Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) had provided information that a huge consignment of arms for North Eastern insurgents had reached Cox Bazar (Bangladesh) and was to be sent to insurgents in Manipur. The arms, as per intelligence, were meant for groups in Nagaland and the Isak-Muivah group in Manipur. On 31st March 1995, it was reported that a large number of insurgents had entered into Mizoram. Mizoram, being a peaceful state, had lesser presence of forces. Forces were deployed for counter


insurgency in the states of Manipur and Nagaland. In the initial phase of the operation, troops were air dropped into Mizoram from Manipur and Nagaland. Radio sets and other technological instruments were used to intercept the insurgents' messages. On 5th April 1995, the insurgents crossed over to Myanmar and started using porters to carry loads of material. The Indian troops began a hot pursuit of the insurgents. This led to the Indian troops capture an insurgent named Hathi Barvah. Hathi was trained by the Pakistani 151 near Karachi. Hathi provided valuable information about insurgent route, ammunition, and so forth on interrogation. In May 1995, after deployment of forces, the operations were carried out and finally by 21st May 1995, the operation was officially called off.

Another key driver of defence cooperation is maritime security. As India undertakes oil exploration in Myanmar, maritime cooperation has emerged as a new dimension. As Myanmar faces piracy and illegal fishing problems, India has been providing training to Myanmar's forces and especially navy.

Nagas have been living in the North East since time immemorial. In 1935, Myanmar was created as a separate state. It got decolonised in 1947. After the decolonisation of Myanmar, new boundaries were created with India. This led to a division between India and Myanmar and affected the Nagas, who became ethnic minorities on both sides. To resolve the issue, the governments of both countries decided to establish a free movement regime (FMR) which could allow Nagas greater interaction either side of the border. As per the FMR, the Nagas can travel 16 km across either side of the border without a visa. This FMR facilitated interaction between Konyaks, Khiamniungans and Yimchungar Nagas living in Eastern districts of Nagaland. Not only does regular movement happen due to the FMR but children from NSAZ come to the Indian side to study as well. In the recent times, the Myanmar side has started erecting a fence along the border. The locals believe that Myanmar is doing so in concurrence with Indian authorities. The Indian side has clarified that the fence is on the side of Myanmar and not India and a fence on the Indian side will be created only if locals approve. The creation of the fence has angered the locals as they feel this fence would restrict their movements. Security agencies have found that locals and Nagas moving across the borders do pose security threats as they have been found carrying drugs and smuggling arms at times.

RECENT BILATERAL VISITS

In January 2015, the Vice President of Myanmar, Dr Sai Mauk Kham, paid a visit to India. The two sides affirmed commitment to strengthen economic ties between the countries. This visit was followed by the visit of U Winna Haung Lwin, the minister of Foreign Affairs of Myanmar, to India in June, 2015. In August 2016, the President of Myanmar, U Htin Kyaw, visited India. In October 2016, the State Counsellor of Myanmar, Aun San Suu Kyi, paid a state visit to India. She participated in the BRICS–BIMSTEC¹ outreach Summit in Goa on 16th October, 2016. During her visit, India affirmed its commitment to support the economic and social development of Myanmar. India has decided to support cooperation in identified areas.



Both sides identified new areas of cooperation which include construction of LPG terminals, railway cooperation and petroleum cooperation. The two sides decided to finalise a proposal for the establishment of varietal development and seed production centre on pulses. India has decided to support a pilot project on LED based lighting. In Myanmar, new areas of cooperation identified are police training and cyber security. India will now also provide training to diplomats of Myanmar and assist in diplomacy training. Multiple MoUs to establish insurance institutes, power sectors and undertake banking supervision, were signed.

ANALYSIS OF INDIAN PM'S VISIT TO MYANMAR

On 11th November 2014, the India PM visited Myanmar to take part in 12th India–ASEAN Summit where he unveiled the Act East Policy. A lot of measures to boost connectivity with Myanmar were announced. In 2016, a motor vehicle agreement was concluded for Thailand–Myanmar–India roadways. Trial runs have been undertaken from Imphal to Mandalay and on the Myanmar–Bangkok road. As of November 2016, the agreement to establish connectivity from Moreh to Mae Sot was due to be signed.

Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project

The detailed project report was prepared in 2003 and a framework was agreed upon in 2008. The project is expected to be operational for shipment from 2017. It was conceived as an idea to have multi modal transit transport for shipments from ports on India's east coast and North East through Myanmar. The project aimed to develop North East economy and integrate India's North East to South East Asia. Through this, North East would be open to sea connectivity. It is a combination of rail, road and river transport. In October 2015, the cabinet approved `2400 cores for the project. There are no land acquisition issues or environmental concerns, but security threats from insurgents and cost overrun are recurring issues. It will connect Kolkata to Sittwe by sea; from Sittwe to Paletwa by river transport and then a highway to Zorinpuri, Mizoram. The project will boost employment and will lower the food prices in the region but the intrusion into the region will create a threat to local heritage.

Analysis of Htin Kyaw's visit to India, August, 2016

During his visit, he went to both Agra and Bodh Gaya. India expressed interest to support the experience of diacritic institutions with Myanmar. There were discussions on border

and maritime security and discussions were also undertaken on important issues like agriculture, connectivity and industrial training. India has committed to upgrade the Yangon Children's Hospital and Sittwe General Hospital and provide modern medical equipments. India will help Myanmar in IT skills and vocational training. Myanmar has agreed to give license to the State Bank of India to expand operations in their country. Myanmar agreed to supply pulses to India through a special contract. Immigration facilities to promote people contacts at Tamu–Moreh and Rhi–Zowk hathar border were agreed upon. An MoU was signed concerning bridge construction, the Kalewa–Yagyi road, renewable energy and traditional medicines.

ANALYSIS OF THE PM VISIT TO MYANMAR—2017

The Indian PM visited Myanmar in September 2017. During the visit, the PM has committed support for overall development of Myanmar in multiple projects as below:-

1. Financial assistance for Kalaldan project.
2. Repair of Tamu-Kalewa road
3. Construction of Kalewa- Yargyi corridor.
4. Construction of Rhi-Tiddim road.

The Indian PM also announced various capacity building initiatives ranging from English language skill, industrial skill training and a program for cultural interaction. India announced developmental assistance for Rakhine State Development Program. In all, 11 MoU's were concluded which included agreements on India providing police training, IT training, skill training and health cooperation. India also signed a Maritime Security Agreement with Myanmar. Under the agreement, India and Myanmar will be sharing data related to non classified merchant ships with each other. India will also provide coastal surveillance system to Myanmar.

In September 2017, the Rohingya extremist group Harakah-al-Yaqin (HaY) started targeting military posts in the Rakhine state in Myanmar. According to R&AW, ISI of Pakistan has penetrated into the cadres of the HaY and uses these groups to create unrest in the region. R&AW has found that ISI used the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and HaY to mastermind the recent attacks on military posts in the Rakhine state just prior to the visit of Indian PM to Myanmar. The leader of ARSA is Hafiz Tohar who is an asset of the ISI. Tohar has created Aqa Mul Mujahedeen (AMM) which has been trained by the Lashkar group. Brigadier Ashfaq and Major Salamat of ISI been training ARSA and HaY in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh. During the Indian PM visit to Myanmar, the two sides signed an Anti-Terror Pact and decided to broaden the bilateral security partnership. As the HaY and ARSA unleashed violence, Myanmar army retaliated by carrying out counter operations. These counter operations by the army of Myanmar led to exodus of the Rohingya Muslims to Bangladesh. There are around 10 Lakh Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar and around 40,000 in India. The Indian government has decided to deport the Rohingya Muslims as they have immigrated to India illegally. These illegal immigrants, living majorly in Kashmir, are susceptible to recruitment by terrorist groups and thus constitute a security threat to India. The influx of Rohingya Muslims to India also disturbs the demographic pattern and social, political and cultural stability of the society. India is not a signatory to 1957 UN Refugee Convention and nor to the 1967 Protocol, but, the Indian government on case to case basis accepts asylum in India. If Indian government

permits a seeker with asylum in India, the person in concern is provided with a Long Term Visa (LTV). The LTV is renewed annually and allows a holder to work in private sector in India along with access to education and basic banking services. UN has urged India to follow customary law while trying to deport Rohingya. As in Myanmar, Rohingya Muslims are stateless, under the customary law, the principle of non-refoulement is applied where refugees cannot be returned forcibly to a place where there is a threat to their life or freedom. The Indian government has legal right to deport immigrants who may pose a security threat. Though selective targeting of Rohingya Muslims may be morally incorrect but places no legal limitations on the government.

FINAL ANALYSIS


Myanmar is the only South East Asian state bordering India. Historically, both were part of the colonial empire established by the British. From the Indian Foreign policy makers' point of view, Myanmar is a nearneighbour whom India considers to be well within its area of interest. India has been quite uncomfortable with rising Chinese forays into Myanmar. India certainly wants to delimit Chinese assertion in Myanmar as it constitutes Myanmar to be region of the Indian spear of influence. India asserts this because it supported democracy in Myanmar since the 1980s. However, to lay down a foundation for political reform, India, since the beginning of 21st century, had to support the Military Junta. Burmese scholars believe that the reason India became unsuccessful in challenging rising Chinese influence in Myanmar was its support to the Junta. The scholars also believe that when India began to support the Junta, it began to lose goodwill amongst the Burmese population.

At present, India's influence is missing in the two camps of Myanmar—one camp that supports democracy and that which is supported by not only the ethnic minorities of Myanmar but also the USA, Japan and South Korea; while other camp is dominated by China and Tatmadaw or the Myanmar military. Though India has favoured the democracy camp, the views of the reformists hardly match with India. Drug trafficking across the borders is viewed by the reformists as a source of income, but perceived as major threat by India.

India and Burma gained independence simultaneously (within six months of each other), and initially, the two sides developed proximity when India proposed non-alignment. But gradually, as the military began to assume control in Myanmar, the two sides began to drift apart. The drift was aggravated by the issue of the Chettiyar community in 1988. In 1988, the '8888 revolt' started in Burma. (It began on 8-8-1988 and is hence called 8888). The revolt was led by Aung San Suu Kyi. Suu Kyi fought for democracy and won the election in Myanmar, but the military junta rejected the polls and launched massive crackdown on the activists. India, in 1992, condemned the human rights violations in Myanmar by supporting the UN resolution.

In the 1990s, when the Look East policy was announced, India neglected Myanmar and prioritised engagement with the Asian tigers. In 1998, the Vajpayee government downplayed all support to the reformists, branding it as an international issue that could only be dealt with by Myanmar. It began to offer the arms deals to the Junta, and the support to the Junta continued subsequently by the UPA government. In 2007, in Myanmar, the democratic protests under the Saffron revolution were crack down by the

Junta. In 2010, India hosted Than Shwe for a state visit and offered monetary assistance to Myanmar. In 2011, during the visit of Thein Sein to India, India extended \$500 million line of credit to the country. Whenever a bilateral visit was undertaken, there were fresh talks about connectivity. However, this remained merely rhetorical. Since the British times, owing to logistical difficulties, the Indo–Myanmar region lacked road and rail infrastructure, and supported a tough terrain, inhabited by insurgents on both sides. Since 2011, the coming of Thein Sein government has initiated a policy of global engagement. This will be beneficial for India as the Chinese influence in Myanmar will gradually diminish as Myanmar searches for new friends. India, since 2011, has decided to take this new opportunity to rebuild ties. India is now establishing physical connectivity as part of its Act East policy. India now recognises that Myanmar is a bridge to South East Asia.



Since 2011, after the coming of Thein Sein to power, the West has improved its relationship with Myanmar. However, the Chinese continued to enhance their strategic presence in Myanmar and use its presence to increase their reach in the Indian Ocean. However by early 2000s, Myanmar realised that its engagement with China had become so deep that it had reached a dangerous level and Myanmar needed to break the ice with the West. Since the coming of Thein Sein, Myanmar began to emerge as new darling of the western states. As Myanmar decided to lessen its dependence on China, it began to open up to Singapore, India, Vietnam, Thailand and Malaysia.

The USA too has opened up to Myanmar, as it knows that a deeper engagement with Myanmar favours USA in its attempt to keep the rise of China in check. The Chinese, on the other hand, began to support the United Democratic Front of Burma (UDFB). The UDFB has been getting arms and ammunition from China to fight the Myanmar government. The future depends on how Myanmar and the USA shall evolve and strengthen their relationship and whether USA will provide military and defence supplies to Myanmar to counter China. After the 1962 Sino–India conflict, the Chinese have supported Mizo and Naga rebels and has even provided them training to keep India under check. Till the rule of Mao lasted in China, the rebels received direct support from the Chinese state. India has, in 2015, concluded a peace deal with NSCN-IM group. In 2015, India resorted to a surgical strike on the Indian side of the Indo–Myanmar border and targeted the insurgent NSCN-K group. As things started to normalise between India and Myanmar, India decided to augment connectivity with Myanmar. The India–Myanmar–Thailand Highway shall be the next game changer.

1. BRICS countries consist of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. BIMSTEC is the acronym used for the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation.

6
CHAPTER

India and Sri Lanka Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Historical relations during Cold War
- Relations since the end of the Cold War
- Defence diplomacy
- Commercial diplomacy
- Role of state parties in Indo-Sri Lanka Relations
- Kachchatheevu Island Issue
- 13th Amendment Issue
- Indian diplomacy and UNHRC Issue
- Fishermen problem
- Recent bilateral visits.

HISTORICAL RELATIONS UP TO COLD WAR

The relations go back to the times of the advent of Buddhism. Buddhism as a movement spread over Sri Lanka some 2000 years ago. The earliest mention of Sri Lanka dates back to the time of the *Ramayana*. Ravana, the king of Lanka, who held Sita captive in Lanka, was rescued by Ram with the help of Hanuman, who was in a way India's first diplomat, and who built the Adams Bridge to help Ram reach Lanka.

The north and north east region of Lanka has been economically integrated to India. The native people of Sri Lanka (then Ceylon) were colonially under the British, but were not a part of British India Empire, being administered separately. From the 1830s onwards, British acquired indentured labour from India, especially from Tamil Nadu, to Ceylon. The Tamils who were transported by the British settled in the northern part of Ceylon. The northern region was relatively dry and lacked resources. The British used a well-planned policy of sending out missionaries to the northern part where the Tamils were residing. The Tamils were a mixture of Buddhists, Muslims, Hindus and Christians. They took advantage of the missionary education provided by the British. They sent their children in Ceylon to schools and later on these children contributed to the education system started by the British. India became independent in 1947 while Ceylon in 1948. Ceylon was renamed as Sri Lanka in 1972, and later, in 1978, was officially named the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. As an autonomous federation, based on mutual defence alignment with the British, Sri Lanka signed a defence treaty with Britain and the British continued using Ceylon for naval and air activity. The idea of a mutual defence federation with India did not go well with Ceylon as it perceived the Indian foreign policy as an expansionist one.


Rise of Suspicion of Ceylon and Indian Policy

When India advocated the idea of a federation based on a mutual defence agreement with India, Ceylon became extremely suspicious of India. India, time and again, did try to convey to Ceylon that it had no expansionist agenda and acknowledged its respect for Ceylon's independence and sovereignty. India, for that matter, had not interfered or reacted in 1963 when China and Ceylon signed a maritime agreement for commercial trade. India also refrained from objecting when Colombo was used by Pakistan as a refuelling hub to reach Dhaka in the 1971 war.

As previously mentioned, the British took Indian Tamils to Ceylon to work as plantation workers. After Ceylon became independent, the Sinhalese government discriminated against Tamils, thereby deepening the void in Indo-Ceylon relations. During Nehru, no attempt was made to bring any Tamils back as, for generations, these Tamils had lived in Ceylon and were more citizens of that state than of India. Ceylon, on the other hand, devised a mechanism to make it tough for Tamils to acquire state citizenship. They also wanted to ensure they put an end to Tamil dominance in public services. Due to the British missionary work, the children of the Tamils grew up to hold positions in Ceylon's administrative departments. Post-independence, through the Sinhalese language barrier, they made it tough for Tamil administrators. However, in 1964, there was a Shastri-Sirimavo pact that was signed whereby Ceylon agreed to give three lakh Indian Tamils in Ceylon citizenship and India also agreed to repatriate a sizeable number to India. However, the matter of repatriation did not complete till 1988. In 1975, Sirimavo Bandaranaike had imposed emergency in Sri Lanka while in 1977 this was done by Indira Gandhi in India.




Jayewardene JR, who succeeded Sirimavo Bandaranaike, did not promote Indo-Sri Lanka relations despite his coming to India for a state visit after being elected. Jayewardene continued to marginalise Tamils and Tamil subjugation continued unabated in Sri Lanka. Jayewardene tilted the foreign policy of Sri Lanka towards the US.



After the 1971 Indo-Pak war, Indian allegiance shifted towards the USSR as Sri Lanka gradually drifted towards the US. Jayewardene advanced a liberal and open economy and positioned Sri Lanka westward. Jayewardene not only allowed deeper presence of US firms in Lanka but granted refuelling permit for the nuclear powered US aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk. The situation especially deteriorated in 1977 and 1981 due to Tamil riots. The ruling party of Tamil Nadu, the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIDMK) was an ally of the Congress Party at the centre, and Indira Gandhi, in 1981, warned Jayewardene that India would not tolerate the persecution meted out to

Tamils and advocated him to be cautious. Post 1980, India adopted a very delicate policy. It is widely alleged by scholars and theorists that India used the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) to train Tamil rebels in Sri Lanka. The aim was to use Tamil rebels to destabilise the Jayewardene regime and also while also ensuring that the Tamil rebels do not succeed in creating a separate state. The R&AW supported Tamil Eelam Liberation organisation. It was in 1976 that the Liberation of Tamil Tigers Eelam (LTTE), a separatist and insurgent militant force, was formed by V Prabhakaran. The LTTE witnessed the R&AW's support Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) and began to seek support from Tamil political leaders in Tamil Nadu. As the R&AW had gradually succeeded in destabilising the Sri Lankan government, it slowly stopped supporting the rebels. But by this time, the LTTE had emerged as a powerful force and began to assert itself as the sole representative of Tamils in Sri Lanka. When Indira Gandhi died, Jayewardene took the help of Pakistan and the US to get Sri Lankan forces trained to counter the LTTE rebels.

This move on the part of Sri Lanka was not well-received by India. In 1987, Jayewardene formally requested India to oppose any kind of military intervention by the LTTE in Sri Lanka but India failed to act on behalf of the Sri Lankan government in any positive way. Sri Lanka launched an operation where the Indian Air Force airdropped food and other essentials to Tamils. India-Sri Lanka Accord (ISLA) had been signed on 29 July 1987, which assigned a certain amount of autonomy to Tamil areas with Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) controlling the regional council and called for the Tamil militant groups to lay down their arms. As per ISLA, the LTTE was to give up their weapons to the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) and Sri Lanka was to accommodate the Tamils and go for devolution.



India and Sri Lanka Accord-30 Years

The India-Sri Lanka Accord (ISLA) was an attempt to conclude the ethnic war of Sri Lanka through constitutional and political means. The basic idea of Rajiv Gandhi while concluding the Accord was that the ISLA would provide India an opportunity to shape the post war political trajectory of Sri Lanka. The ISLA had two goals. Firstly, the idea was to persuade the conflicting ethnic groups to join mainstream politics and secondly, seek political devolution in Sri Lanka by altering the constitution of the state to get autonomy for the Tamil community. The ISLA was rejected by the LTTE and it resorted to violence against India and Sri Lanka both and continued till 2009.

The Sri Lankan government in 1987, through the 13th Amendment, resorted to

the devolution of power by creating Provincial Councils. Though the 13th Amendment was rejected by the LTTE, it did restructure the contemporary political situation of the post-colonial Sri Lanka. Though the Councils have been created, but an analysis of the present state of the councils prove that they have become an extension of the ruling political party in power at the Centre. Corruption and patronage politics has slid the councils into complete decay and institutional paralysis.


As the ISLA was executed, a large number of LTTE cadres avoided surrendering weapons to the IPKF and consumed cyanide. Many even began to fight the IPKF. The violence unleashed post the ISLA in Sri Lanka created renewed tensions in the minds of Sinhalese who began to perceive India's role as an undue interference in Sinhalese internal affairs that was not in Sri Lanka's best interests. The Indian government increased the IPKF numbers from 6,000 to one lakh and justified the raise by citing national security reasons. In 1987, the Sri Lankan Parliament also passed the 13th amendment act to the 1978 Sri Lankan Constitution and began the devolution of powers. The Provincial Councils Act No. 42 of 1987, establishing provincial councils. On September 2 and 8, 1988, President Jayewardene issued proclamations enabling the Northern and Eastern provinces to be one administrative unit administered by one elected Council. In 1988, elections were organised in North East Provincial Councils (NEPC) and A V Perumal of Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) won the elections, becoming the first Chief Minister of the North Eastern Provincial Council.

In 1988, when the elections were held in Sri Lanka, both the political parties led by Jayewardene and Sirimavo Bandaranaike demanded the withdrawal of IPKF. India insisted that the IPKF had not been sent unilaterally by India but was the outcome of the peace accord signed in 1987. In 1989, as the election results came out in Sri Lanka, Jayewardene was replaced by Ranasinghe Premadasa, who immediately demanded the withdrawal of the IPKF from Sri Lankan territory. As elections were due in India in November 1989, Rajiv Gandhi agreed to the recall of the IPKF to contain the situation with Sri Lanka. In fact, it is widely alleged that Ranasinghe covertly began to support the LTTE with an intention that the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE both would collaboratively drive out the IPKF. India, under Rajiv Gandhi, linked the IPKF's withdrawal to the implementation of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution of Sri Lanka that granted councils in Tamil regions. In November 1989, in the Indian elections, V P Singh won and in March 1990, it ended the IPKF mission and delinked the IPKF's withdrawal from the 13th amendment. The IPKF was recalled to India and the entire idea of NEPC devolution collapsed. In May, 1991, the LTTE assassinated Rajiv Gandhi and then was subsequently designated as a terrorist organisation. After the death of Rajiv Gandhi, many Tamil groups also began to stop supporting the LTTE. As India realised the failure of its mission, it also felt the need to go for a fresh look at India's Sri Lanka policy.

INDIA–SRI LANKA TIES IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD

As the Cold War ended, India opened up its economy and gave itself a fresh outlook to explore relations with the outside world. This did impact our perception of Sri Lanka. Even the subsequent heads of state of Sri Lanka, namely, Kumaratunga and Wickremesinghe, took steps to improve relations. In 1998, India–Sri Lanka Free Trade

Agreement was signed. From 2000 till 2003, India, encouraged dialogue and ceasefire between Sri Lanka and the LTTE, without being formally involved in the process. In 2003, the LTTE backed out of the dialogue with the government and in 2004, it suffered a split. A majority faction, led by V Muralidharan, opted out to cooperate with the government. In the 2003–04 Sri Lankan elections, Mahinda Rajapaksa got elected to power and decided to follow a hard-line approach towards LTTE. Rajapaksa became President in November 2005. The period from 2005 to 2006 saw civil unrest in Lanka and the unrest reached its peak when an assassination attempt was made on Sarath Fonseka, the Sri Lankan army chief. The government of Rajapaksa increased the military backlash and launched Eelam war–IV from 2006 to 2009. Prabhakaran, the most prominent leader of the LTTE, was killed in 2007 and by May 2009, the LTTE was wiped out. During the Eelam war–IV, as India stayed out, Sri Lanka developed proximity with Pakistan and China.



The post-LTTE period witnessed rising concern on the part of India as Pakistani pilots supplied training and equipment to Sri Lanka. Arms were also provided by China, along with substantial economic aid. China was granted access to the Hambantota port, which India had earlier declined to develop citing financial reasons. This has increased Indian fears as the possibility of a civilian–military nexus in Sri Lanka could endanger Indian security. The major focus of India now is to ensure that Pakistan and China don't use Sri Lanka against India.

Motivation behind India–Sri Lanka Policy?

India has always followed the logic of national unity being the foundation of internal and external security. This is a key driver behind India's Sri Lanka policy. It has always felt that if there is a revival of separatist demands in Sri Lanka, it would have a spillover effect in India. Ironically, way back in 1963, Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) had advocated for the secession of Tamil Nadu, but did not take up the issue after 1963. India has always followed the policy that positive nation building can always lead to greater nation unity and this may happen only if inclusive policies are followed. Sri Lanka, however, since its inception, has been driven by Sinhalese majority policy, which was instrumental in creating alienation in the minds of the Tamils residing in Sri Lanka. For India, an imbalance in state building could

consequently have an external fallout and could disturb the strategic-cum-economic balance of India. Hence, India had advocated the inclusion of Tamils in the nation building process of Sri Lanka since ISLA, as the psychological unity with Sri Lanka could have proven to be beneficial for the long term national security of India itself.

ROLE OF STATE PARTIES IN INDIA-SRI LANKA RELATIONS

Any discussion of India-Sri Lanka relations obviously needs a mention of role of political parties of Tamil Nadu. We also need to understand, however, that while the influence of the DMK and the AIDMK has been detected in India's attitude to the Tamil Eelam question, their instigation was not the sole deciding factor of our policy. The main reason of influence in the past has been the presence of Tamil Nadu based parties as part of the coalition at the centre. When Rajiv Gandhi had gone to Sri Lanka to sign the ISLA in 1987, he had even taken DMK and AIDMK into confidence despite such concurrence not being mandated constitutionally. This is not the case now with the new government in the centre since 2014.

After Rajiv Gandhi's assassination in 1991, when the Congress government came back to power, the AIDMK supported Congress and in 1992, when it moved to ban the LTTE, the AIDMK was not only supportive of the demand but actively helped the process. In UPA-1 (2004–2009) government, the DMK was a supporter of the Congress Party and advocated a hands-off approach. In 2006, India accepted the DMK's Sri Lanka policy as what the Government of India's Sri Lanka policy should be in case of the Eelam war-IV. When in 2008, the LTTE were almost about to be crushed, the DMK began to threaten quitting the alliance if the Indian government took no steps to stop the Elam war-IV but ultimately refrained from anything beyond rhetoric. Post the Rajiv Gandhi assassination, none of the Tamil parties ever took a pro-LTTE stand ever again.

DEFENCE DIPLOMACY

The defence relations between the two have not evolved deeply and are mired since 1990s. However, in recent times, cooperation has begun in the areas of maritime security and joint training. India has been training Sri Lankan officials at the Defence University of India and is constantly undertaking intelligence sharing. In fact, intelligence sharing has been a key area of cooperation since the Eelam War-IV. Indian Navy has regularly shared naval intelligence with the Lankan navy and the Coast guards of the two nations regularly cooperate. However, India does not supply any major arms to Lanka and has limited this defence cooperation to the use of defensive and non-lethal equipments and tactics.



COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY

The economic relations between the two countries have opened up only since the end of the Cold War. Sri Lanka was, as a matter of fact, the first South Asian economy to go for liberalisation way back in 1978. By the end of the Cold War, trade began to increase with India as India liberalised its economy. Sri Lanka also perceives India as a potential for FDI

supplier. There has been, moreover, a steady flow of tourists from India.

The trade has gradually shifted in favour of India as Sri Lankan exports to India are lesser than their imports. Both have tried to rectify trade practices through a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). India and Sri Lanka signed the FTA in 1998, which finally became operational in 2001. The India–Sri Lanka FTA gives duty free preferential access to each other's goods in a time-bound manner. India exports petro products, pharmaceuticals, two wheelers and vegetables while importing rubber products, spices and electric wires. Indian firms operational in Sri Lanka include Tata, Jet Airways, Ashoka Leyland, Ceat, Apollo, and so forth. In 2003, a joint working group was established for a comprehensive economic partnership agreement (CEPA). This was done to enhance the FTA and envisage the promotion of cooperation in the service sector. India is also undertaking development of the Trincomalee port as this will boost its strategic presence vis-à-vis Sri Lanka. Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) is planning that a six million tonne per annum Grandfield refinery be established in Sri Lanka through direct investment. At present, Sri Lanka has only one 2.5 million tonne refinery.

India–Sri Lanka CEPA

India envisages services based cooperation in CEPA. However, Sri Lanka has had expressed some reservations, it hopes for more economic and technical cooperation rather than increased movement of Indian professionals in Sri Lanka as expressed in the CEPA. Sri Lanka favours an Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement (ETCA) over the CEPA. In the CEPA, India had decided to open up 80 sectors for Sri Lanka and advised that Sri Lanka open up IT and marine ship building sectors. As the proposed CEPA would liberalise investment and trade in services, goods and facilitate movement of people, Sri Lanka feared that Indian firms may ultimately come to dominate the Lankan economic space and might eventually lead to loss of jobs for the Sri Lankan native population. The movement of people's clause is highly resented by Sri Lanka. In 2015, Maithripala Sirisena took office as the new President of Sri Lanka and has revived the talks for a CEPA and has assured Sri Lankan industrialists that no negative impact on the Lankan economy would be occasioned by said arrangement.


KACHCHATHEEVU ISLAND ISSUE

Kachchatheevu is a small island located about 10 miles north east of Rameshwaram. The fishermen used it to dry their nets and catch fish. It has been a part of Raja of Ramnand's territory who was controlling it as the lead zamindar. When the Zamindari system was abolished, Kachchatheevu became a part of the Presidency of Madras. When India became independent and initiated a boundary negotiation at the maritime level with Sri Lanka, Kachchatheevu was a disputed territory between Ceylon and the British and there was never an agreement on boundary ever. In 1947 and 1976, as per agreements, the issue was bilaterally resolved between India and Sri Lanka, and the resultant maritime agreement has allowed Indians to visit Kachchatheevu for pilgrimage for which no visa is required. The Indian government has maintained that the right of access to Kachchatheevu does not


cover any fishing rights. In 2008, the AI DMK filed a petition in the Supreme Court (SC) asking that the SC declare the 1974 and 1976 agreements as unconstitutional. The Indian government produced the facts in the highest court and clarified the issue of Kachchatheevu, stating that the island has not been ceded. Consequently, the AI DMK's petition was disposed of by the court.

THE 13th AMENDMENT ISSUE

After the defeat of the LTTE, Sri Lanka has announced the execution of the 13th Plus Amendment act where the idea is to devolve more powers to its provinces. The members of Provincial Councils have consistently complained about their dependence on the central government of Sri Lanka for finances, with no powers to the highly restricted Provincial Councils to raise finances.



After the defeat of the LTTE, Rajapaksa began talks on the 13th Plus. The idea propounded was to devolve powers, which till then, had not been undertaken due to LTTE opposition. In 2013, a Parliament select committee met to discuss devolution but this time, land rights and police powers were not devolved. Even today, the 13th Amendment has not been implemented with full force. In fact, the 18th Amendment of the Sri Lankan Constitution had given more powers to the Sri Lankan President without an adequate system of checks and balances. However, the 19th Amendment in 2015, has rectified the issue and checks and balances have now been ensured. India has stayed away from reacting to both the 18th and 19th Amendments as they fell within the ambit of internal matters of Sri Lanka.



The basic issue is the reluctance of Sri Lanka to devolve policing powers fearing that active insurgent sleeper cells need centralised control.

INDIAN DIPLOMACY AND UNHRC ISSUE

After the killing of Prabhakaran in 2009, the Sri Lankan government articulated the need to work with Tamils and other civilians for rehabilitation. But as its commitments were not fulfilled, the matter was taken to UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC). India voted in favour of a UNHRC resolution that urged Sri Lanka to rehabilitate Tamils. The Sri Lankan government was given three years to fulfil its commitments. In 2012, the Sri

Lankan government established a lessons learned and rehabilitation commission (LLRC) to investigate war crimes. It ended up giving a clean chit to its officials stating that human right violations perpetrated by the Sri Lankan government were rare. The international community was in favour of an international enquiry in the matter of human rights violation. India voted in favour of the resolution but later, the demand for an international enquiry was no longer adopted. In 2013, the UNHRC stated that Sri Lanka should execute the recommendations of LLRC at the earliest. India also favoured this resolution and advocated the implementation of the 13th Amendment Act. In both 2012 and 2013, the resolutions that India voted in favour of in the UNHRC hearing, were literally resolutions against Sri Lanka. However, due to the persistent lack of commitment by Sri Lanka, in 2014, the UNHRC adopted a resolution advocating an international investigation into the human rights violations by the Lankan army from 2002 to 2009. In this resolution, India abstained from voting by stating that the nature of the suggested international enquiry is extremely intrusive and India does not favour country-specific resolutions as they violate sovereignty of a country.

FISHERMEN ISSUE

After the independence of both nations, fishing has become an important economic activity. Due to a large common area between the two in the sea, the two have often had issues of fishermen straying into each other's waters. In the last few decades, fish and aquatic life in the Indian continental shelf has depleted. As a result, more fishermen enter Sri Lankan waters and also resort to the use of modern fishing trolleys which Lankan fishermen are unable to match. The Indian fishermen saw a golden business opportunity during the LTTE era as the Sri Lankan government had disallowed the easy movement of Sri Lankan fishermen in waters owing to military operations. However, with the LTTE war over, since 2010, there is a resurgence of Sri Lankan fishermen in Palk Bay. They were trying to reclaim their legitimate lost base and, in the process, became engaged in conflict. In order to solve the issue, understanding the importance of ocean economy becomes significant. The department of ocean development and ministry of agriculture have to ensure assistance to the states so that fishermen are able to find alternative livelihood to fishing in Palk Bay. The Indian government has renewed the thrust on ocean economy in recent times with the PM signing MoU on ocean economy with Sri Lanka, Mauritius and Maldives in 2015. In recent times, the matter has reached the highest levels when Sirisena, in his February 2015 visit to India, raised the issue with the Indian PM. There is an immediate need to sign a protocol for joint patrolling.

ANALYSIS OF PM VISIT TO SRI LANKA—MARCH, 2015 AND MAY, 2017

The Indian PM Narendra Modi undertook the first standalone visit to Sri Lanka since 1987. The PM visited the Muhabadi society and interacted with Buddhist monks. He addressed the business community and focused on investment in infrastructure, energy, manufacturing and tourism. He visited Anuradhapura and Jaffna and handed over homes at Ilavali North West housing project to people. He flagged off Talaimannar–Madhu road train—a reconstruction of the Northern Province railway line. Economic ties saw resurgence. India proposed that Trincomalee be established as a petro hub and NTPC commence work on a 500 MW coal power plant. A joint task force on ocean economy was

planned. A decision to establish a Ramayana trail in Sri Lanka and a Buddha Circuit in India was made. Provisions for visa on arrival were taken up. Assistance of a 318-million-dollar line of credit for railways, establishment of Tagore Auditorium at Ruhuna University and 1.5 billion dollars currency swaps were planned. The two concluded an agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation and agreed to adopt a humanitarian approach to the fishermen's issue and expand defence cooperation in trilateral format with Maldives. In May 2017, the Indian PM again visited Sri Lanka as a chief guest for the first ever International Vesak Day celebrations in Colombo. Vesak is sacred for Buddhists and Sri Lanka has consistently worked hard at the UN level to get Vesak Day accepted there.



Visit of Sri Lankan PM, Ranil Wickremesinghe to India, 2017

In April, 2017, the Sri Lankan PM, Ranil Wickremesinghe visited India. This was his third visit to India since 2015. During the visit, the two sides concluded MoUs on economic and developmental projects. The two sides have identified three sectors of long-term economic collaborations in energy, infrastructure and special economic zones. In the recent times, India's Sri Lanka policy is driven less by political concerns and more by economic and security issues. The major ministries of India which are executing core projects have started delivering results. During the visit, India had decided to create infrastructure and develop the oil storage facility near Trincomalee which had never been developed and had been lying idle since World War-II. In order to keep China in check, India has focussed its energies upon delivering results in Trincomalee. Though the economic thrust displayed during the visit strengthens the premise of our Neighborhood First Policy, no mention about the resettlement of Tamils in the North in the joint communiqué was taken up at the diplomatic level. As India has decided to pledge a fund of 2.6 billion dollars for development of Sri Lanka, it should use the potential to generate livelihoods in the Northern region where growth is possible in agriculture and fishing. Though our policy has always been to perceive Sri Lanka through the Chinese lens, India, has now, under its Neighbourhood First policy, is trying to look at Sri Lanka as an equal partner and this is likely to strengthen the relationship ahead.

Our analysis of recent India and Sri Lanka relations clearly proves that since 1987 the two sides have less political and more of economic cum security engagement. India has signed the Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement (ETCA) for cooperation in services, investment and technology dimensions. The ETCA will provide Indian states in south India access to Sri Lankan markets. The ETCA has made Sri Lanka the new geo-

economic pole of South Asia. Under the ETCA, India will focus on development of Trincomalee as a hydrocarbon hub for the region of Bay of Bengal.

7
CHAPTER


India and Maldives Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Historical background
- Role of Navy in diplomacy
- Islamic extremism and Maldives
- Strategic importance of Maldives for India
- Commercial diplomacy
- GMR controversy
- Water aid diplomacy
- Analysis of recent visits

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Maldives was a British colony since mid-1880s, and became a British Protectorate on 6th December, 1887. It gained independence in 1965. Since then, India and Maldives have a diplomatic relation. There have been regular visits from each side. As Maldives is an island state, it is significant for the maritime security of India. Maldives is also a victim of piracy and favours a collective engagement to tackle it, making India a partner in providing leadership. Maritime security leadership by India for Maldives is crucial for its size. Maldives stretches out as a huge expanse in waters and has a tremendously large exclusive economic zone (EEZ) but lacks the defence capacity to ensure surveillance over the marine zone. Maldivian cooperation is also significant for preventing gun running and terrorism.



Indian Navy and Maldives

In 2007, when Eelam war-IV was being fought, a lot of the LTTE cadres reached over up to Maldivian waters. In fact, the Maldivian waters were used by the LTTE for illegal supplying of weapons, drugs and money. In this context, Maldives, in April 2007, sought Indian help and India sent assistance to Maldives to prevent this security threat. This also opened up future scope for naval cooperation between the two states. Post the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, Maldives has become concerned about the

safety of tourists on this coast.

ISLAMIC EXTREMISM AND MALDIVES

A serious cause of concern in the recent times for Maldives is the rise of radical Islam. The concern is felt as Maldives itself is an Islamic Republic. Rise of extremism in Maldives has its origin since independence. Since Maldivian independence, literacy has been high but there was an absence of higher education institutions. Many Maldivian students were indoctrinated with the Salafi-Jihadi ideology. On their return to Maldives, the gradual spread of Salafi-Jihadi ideology through these students began to take place. Ibrahim Sheikh practised a neo conservative Salafism and was jailed in 1983 by Gayoom. Ibrahim Fauzee preaches Islam through his foundation linked to Jamia Salafiya. The Maldivian-Pakistan axis has also been of concern to India. In 2007, the Maldivian police detonated a homemade bomb in Sultan Park which was kept to target tourists. This incident exacerbated fears of radical Islam in Maldives.

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF MALDIVES FOR INDIA

The strategic importance was realised for the first time during British rule. The Indian Ocean (hereafter referred to as the IO) was literally a British lake and the British presence in the IO was specifically directed at protecting its empire in India. As World War-II ended, rivalry began between Russia and the US and the geostrategic role of Maldives increased. The British introduced the US to Maldives during Cold War to use it as needed to contain India and ensure strategic defence of the gulf. For India, the IO was a lifeline and it has always wanted the IO region to be a zone of peace. India always aspired to protect the sea and its channels of communication as it is a crucial route for India's energy security. The problem in Indian Ocean continues to be of lack of a unified transoceanic community in the IO region. Almost all states witness challenges but due to difference in military and economic capabilities, convergence for security cooperation becomes a challenge. India has used mechanisms like BIMSTEC and Indian-Ocean Rim Association (IORA) to boost strategic cooperation and has also undertaken Milan naval exercises. The US presence in the IO is perceived by India as a stabilising factor. As the region will remain important for communication, fishing and minerals exploration, India needs to ensure that no external power dominates the region.

COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY

The bilateral trade has been in existence since 1981. In the same year, both signed a trade agreement for export of commodities essential to both. India exports agriculture, poultry, sugar, fruits and vegetables while importing scrap metals. Since 1974, the State Bank of India (SBI) has been instrumental in the economic development of Maldives. Tata Housing and Taj are examples of Indian investments in Maldives.



GMR Controversy

Maldives is a tourist destination. The then President Nasheed began to invite bids internationally to privatise and redevelop the Ibrahim Nasir International Airport. The bid was on the idea that any bidder willing to share maximum profit with the

government shall be eligible. The Indian multinational company, GMR group, participated in the bid overseen by the international financial corporation (IFC). The IFC is a World Bank arm, formed to assist investors in doing business in developing nations and boost investments. In 2010, the contract was won by GMR which gave it a 25 year right to run the Maldives airport. An agreed point in the contract was that, in case of a dispute, the victim party can approach the High court of Singapore or London. A coup against Nasheed in 2012, and the coming of Waheed changed things. The GMR had been levying 25 Dollars Aviation Development Fees and two Dollars as insurance, which a local Maldivian court nullified as it declared it as a tax that had been charged without Parliament authority. But GMR asserted this right as part of contract. Waheed decided to take over the airport to be managed by Maldivian Airport Company Limited (MACL). In December 2012, GMR approached Singapore Arbitration, where the ruling came in favour of Waheed. GMR thereafter filed an 800 million Dollars suit for losses. The Singapore court admitted the suit for damages and in 2014 finally gave relief to GMR and instructed MACL to pay 4 million Dollars in damages. In another order on 23rd February, 2016, the International Arbitration Tribunal also directed the MACL and the Maldives government to pay GMR the money that GMR owed to Axis Bank of Singapore under the agreement.

Analysis of President Yameen's Visit to India, 2016

In April 2016, President Abdulla Yameen came to India on an official visit. The basic thrust was to revive the relations that had plummeted post the GMR issue. He was appreciative and thanked India for their help in 2014 for water aid (see case study below). India has not been very appreciative, however, of the Maldivian propensity to politically align with China. China is building bridges and ferry terminals in Maldives, and Maldives is, further, a part of China's Silk Road project. In order to revitalise its special relations with India, Yameen visited India. A deference cooperation plan was agreed to, and long term cooperation with respect to South Asian Satellites, taxation, conservation of ancient mosques and monuments, tourism and education was envisaged. Considering the fact that radicalisation is on the rise and the ISIS influence is visible in Maldives, with more than forty Maldivian nationals arrested for ISIS related activities, India needs to maintain its bilateral relations with Maldives very closely.



Water Aid Diplomacy

In 2014, a fire broke out at Male Water and Sewage Company, originating in their generator control panel. It damaged the cables of the generator and ended up disconnecting their water supply. Maldives has no permanent rivers and streams for drinking water. Thus, suddenly there was a severe water crisis. Maldives gave a distress call to India. India immediately responded by sending 5 plane loads of drinking water and INS Sukanya and Vivek were pressed into service to purify water through reverse osmosis. India supplied 20 tonnes of fresh water for 1.5 lakh Male residents.

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CHAPTER

India and Afghanistan Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Historical background
- Origin of India–Afghanistan relations
- Indian interests in Afghanistan
- Afghanistan as a gateway to Central Asia
- Indian engagement since 2001
- Policy options for India post-2014
- Role of regional players and their power politics
- Analysis of recent visits
- Heart of Asia process
- India–Afghanistan Air Corridor

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF AFGHANISTAN

The historical study of Afghanistan becomes interesting from the British period. The British, to prevent Russian advancement into Asia, decided to render Afghanistan into a buffer state. It fought three Anglo–Afghan wars against Afghanistan, among which the most significant is the third Anglo–Afghan war of 1919 where King Amanullah succeeded in gaining right to independently govern Afghanistan. The war got concluded in 1919 with Treaty of Rawalpindi, thereby giving Afghanistan the right to be independent of British dominance. King Amanullah subsequently initiated the modernisation of Afghanistan. He was succeeded by King Nadir Shah and Zahir Shah later. It is king Zahir Shah that gave Afghanistan a Constitution in 1964.

Due to internal weaknesses in the regime and heightened Cold War tensions, in 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and installed Babrak Karmal as the head of state. The US tried to counter Soviet presence in Afghanistan by supporting rebels to undertake jihad. Saudi Arabia propagated the Wahabi ideology while Pakistan a base to the US in the endeavour. The US initiated a fully fledged Mujahedeen campaign in 1980s to counter Soviets. US initiated a Mujahedeen campaign in Afghanistan by training people to wage a war against the Soviet to save Islam. US trained Mujahedeens (fighters) to wage a Jihad (a war to protect the religion) in Afghanistan. US mobilised these Mujahedeens and established a common platform ‘The Base’ (in Arabic language called Al Qaeda) US promised these Mujahedeens that if they succeed in removing the Soviets from Afghanistan, the US would help them to acquire power in Afghanistan. These Mujahedeens unleashed a campaign of violence in Afghanistan making it tough for the Soviets to exist. The internal weakness of the Soviet puppet regime became clear and

Gorbachev replaced Babrak Karmal with Mohammad Najibullah to save Afghanistan. As the Soviet Union failed to save Afghanistan, in 1989, under the Geneva Accord, Soviet Union decided to withdraw from Afghanistan. As USSR withdrew from Afghanistan, the US too stopped all support to the Mujahedeens and did not help them to acquire power in Afghanistan as promised earlier. These Mujahedeens now became angry and decided to take revenge against the US. From 1989 to 1996, these Mujahedeens began to come together and they succeeded in using a common platform to plan a revenge against US. This common platform was called 'The Base' (In Arabic language it means Al Qaeda). As Al Qaeda was used, there were educated students in Afghanistan who became concerned about the future of their country. They knew that Najibullah was a weak ruler as he did not enjoy the Soviet backing anymore. By 1996, these educated students began to come together to establish a group to provide leadership to their country. This group was called Taliban. Taliban comes from the first few letters of the word called TALIB which means educated students. The subsequent ending of the Cold War and Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan post-1989 provided space for Mullah Omar, who was backed by Al-Qaeda, to fully establish a furiously regressive Taliban rule. The Taliban rule, firmly established by 1996, controlled Afghanistan till 2001. It was post 9/11 that US initiated Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Anaconda to counter Taliban presence in Afghanistan. The US Congress granted clearance and authorised the use of military force abroad, clearing the way for the invasion of Afghanistan in October, 2001. The Taliban and Al-Qaeda were tackled with the help of military on the ground. To build up a political consensus, the year 2001 saw a Bonn Conference in the city of Bonn in Germany. The Bonn Conference succeeded in installing an interim government in place.

Subsequently, Hamid Karzai was chosen as the first democratically elected President of Afghanistan in the most crucial period in its history. With the coming of Barack Obama to power as the US President, he shifted the focus on ending the Afghan war. In 2012, the US and Afghanistan concluded a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA). The aim of the BSA was to elicit the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan. The US, in the meantime, while discussing and finalising the withdrawal of troops, opened a new front of talks with liberal Taliban elements known as the Good Taliban with an aim to reconcile them to the mainstream. The US, on ground, have continued to focus on nation building in Afghanistan and have worked for the capacity building of the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF). Even after the US troops finally withdraw, the ANSF is deemed to be strong enough at present to prevent the Taliban from recapturing Afghanistan again. Let us now turn our attention to Taliban.

In 2016, in a missile strike by the US, Mullah Mansoor, who had succeeded Mullah Omar as the new leader of Taliban, died. Mansoor was a product of the ISI of Pakistan and was given logistical and military support by Pakistan. After Mansoor had assumed the leadership of Taliban in July 2015, the Taliban was on a rampage. Taliban and its key partner that is Haqqani Networks had initiated a series of urban bombings. Taliban in the recent times is following a two point strategy. It is trying to attack cities, civilians and protected targets like embassies etc. Through this, they are trying to give a message that they can strike anywhere and can assert more power than the state. Secondly, they have started attacking provincial capitals in Afghanistan. After attacking the capitals, they capture power for some days in the capital cities. Through this, they are trying to expose

the limits of Afghani state power.

ISI of Pakistan has its own game plan, They wanted to support Mansoor by giving him military support to satiate his appetite for military weapons while using him as a pawn to bargain for peace thereby enabling the ISI to install a Taliban government in Afghanistan. After the death of Mansoor, there has been a power struggle in Taliban. The power struggle is between Sirajuddin Haqqani, Rasool and Mullah Yakoob. The power struggle is not merely political. Taliban today controls billion dollars worth opium trade in the Helmand Province in Afghanistan. The middle and the junior leg of Taliban is least interested to join power as doing so would strip them of the power they wield today. The middle and junior leaders in Taliban have already formed their own little empires in Afghanistan and are not supporting the senior leaders in peace talks for the same reason. Hamid Karzai was the first person to understand that if Taliban is not taken on board for talks, then the fate and future of Afghanistan is very bleak. But, as seen, there is no unity in Taliban for talks. There is a belief that many junior and middle level leaders and cadres of Taliban have started deflecting towards ISIS which is striving to create its own version of a franchise in Afghanistan. Pakistan since 1970's feels that it can have a deep say in the affairs of Afghanistan but the Pakistani ISI and the military lack the capabilities for such strategic ambitions. Thus, India will play a larger role in Afghanistan in the future. Anyday, the Taliban will listen more to India than Pakistan because the Taliban is ideologically tilted towards Deobandi school of Islam and India is not only the birthplace of Deobandi Islam but also has a good rapport with the Deobandi leaders. The Quadrilateral Coordination Group (USA, China, Pakistan and Afghanistan) has become a new Concert of Powers group striving for a peaceful and a stable Afghanistan.

ORIGINS OF INDIA AND AFGHANISTAN RELATIONS

The origin of the relations goes back to the 6th century Gandhara era. However, in the modern times, the British Great Game got India closer to Afghanistan. In 1947, when India became independent, Zahir Shah was the Afghan King. In 1949, he concluded the Treaty of Friendship with India which opened up diplomatic relations. During 1950s and '60s, India developed its diplomatic proximity with Afghanistan. The 2400 km long boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan is called Durand Line. Afghanistan refused to accept it as a border alleging it divides families on two sides. This created an irritant in Af-Pak relations. In 1979, when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, India did not condemn the invasion but began to instead drift away from engaging directly with Afghanistan as it had become actively involved in Cold War politics while India was the propounder and supporter of NAM. In 1996, with the rise of the Taliban, India joined hands with Russia and Iran in supporting the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UIFSA), also called as the Northern Alliance and provided it ample support during the Taliban rule. Post US Operation Enduring Freedom and the Bonn-I conference, India supported the development of Afghanistan and sided with Hamid Karzai. India has also continued to engage with Ashraf Ghani as of 2016. An analytical survey of Indian engagement and interests in Afghanistan shall now follow in the subsequent sections.

INDIAN INTEREST IN AFGHANISTAN

India was supportive of the Northern Alliance to counter the weight of Taliban in Afghanistan, and its engagement has broadened post the 9/11 attacks in the US, and the

consequent ousting of the Taliban by Operation Enduring Freedom of the US. India's diplomatic energy in Afghanistan is invested primarily in enhancing its own interests in Afghanistan.

India's first and most important interest in Afghanistan is to ensure that Pakistan does not gain an edge within governing structures of Afghanistan. India feels that if Pakistan succeeds in installing Taliban or a Taliban-sponsored regime in Afghanistan, it will be detrimental to the cause of the regional security of India. On the other hand, Pakistan feels that India should not be allowed to get a hold on Afghanistan and perceives any growing Indo-Afghan proximity as an attempt by India to counter Pakistan by maintaining its presence in Afghanistan. Each has tried neutralising the other's influence in governance and management of Afghanistan, leading to a classic security dilemma where any measure by one elicits a counter response from other. Pakistani military has long supported Talibani elements and helped them flourish near the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan and continues to believe that the presence of the Taliban in Afghanistan would be the most effective way to undercut Indian influence in Afghanistan.

Pakistan continues to maintain strategic depth in Afghanistan and certainly favours less Indian proximity to Afghanistan. As Karzai rose to power in Afghanistan in the post-2001 period, India decided to deepen its engagement with Afghanistan by opening consulates in Herat, Mazar-e-sharif, Kandahar and Jalalabad. Pakistan alleges that India uses these consulates to contain Pakistan as these consulates give Indian agencies an access to gather intelligence from across the border. Pakistan also alleges that India provides assistance to Baluchistani rebels through these consulates. Pakistan has also tried to limit India from undertaking commerce with Afghanistan by refusing to allow transit rights over Pakistan to reach Afghanistan. India has used the alternative route of Iran to reach Afghanistan. As Indian developmental activities continue in Afghanistan, India has realised the need to protect its Border Road Organisation personnel by using the Indo-Tibetan Border Police which is stationed in Afghanistan.

Despite all tactics adopted by Pakistan to keep India out of Afghanistan, India continues to deepen its ties with the region by engaging with Afghanistan. Apart from ensuring that the region does not fall into the orbit of Pakistan giving it leverage against India, another crucial policy determinant of India in Afghanistan is to ensure zero spillover of extremists to India. India has been a victim of state sponsored terrorism from Pakistan and engages with Afghanistan to ensure no spillover of extremism or Islamic radicalism happens in India. If Pakistan succeeds in helping the Taliban establish a footing in Afghanistan, this would enable Pakistan to train extremists and militants in the uncontrolled Taliban region and use them against India and more specifically, against Kashmir. In fact, at present, the extremists fighting in Kashmir owe their patronage mostly to Pakistan's ISI and have drawn inspiration from the resistance offered by Afghan *mujahideen* against the Soviets during the Cold War. India was under the impression that after 9/11, the US would put pressure on Pakistan to dismantle the Jihadi networks that operate from Pakistan, considering that India too had been a victim of terrorism emanating from Pakistani soil. However, a reluctant approach by Islamabad to clamp down on the Jihadi cells in their territory has given the Jihadis the needed space for growth. Pakistan even continues to use Jihad as a part of its grand strategy as it gives them the power to influence the region.


AFGHANISTAN AS AN OUTREACH TO CENTRAL ASIA (CA)

Central Asia is crucial for India's energy security and an outreach to CA is crucial. India established a base at Ayni in Tajikistan, which was used to assist the Northern Alliance during the Taliban regime. In the Afghan chessboard, Iran seems to be a crucial player for many reasons. Firstly, Iran favours engagement with Afghanistan to assert its regional power. Iran certainly does not want Pakistan to deepen its roots in Afghanistan as Iran sees Pakistan as a Saudi Arabian ally. Iran is a Shia nation while Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are Sunni nations. It's the sectarian divide that configures the Iranian perspective of Pakistan. At the same time, Pakistan is also intensely uncomfortable with the India–Iran–Afghanistan axis that has every possibility of emerging. India is deepening its proximity with Iran to reach Central Asia. India is developing the Chabahar port of Iran for this purpose. As the geopolitical influence of CA in the region increases, more and more players would be involved. The US is not keen to witness greater Chinese and Russian proximity in CA while China and Russia use Shanghai Cooperation Organisation to keep the US influence under control in CA. The US favours deeper Indian engagement in CA as this will counter growing Chinese influence. As USA–Iran ties have improved, the US favours an Indo–Iranian foray into CA to contain Chinese influence in the region. As the US began to withdraw its troops in 2014, it started cooperating with Russia. It was a diplomatic masterstroke as it gave a stabilising effect in the region. Russia opened up its airspace for the US to transport its troops and supplies and this served Indian interests as cooperation between US and Russia decreases the significance of Pakistan, which in turn suits India.

India's post-2001 engagement has to be also seen in a different context. India, today, successfully uses Afghanistan as classic case to assert its regional hegemony. As India's economic and military profiles grow, India would be trying to use Afghanistan to establish its own credentials as a regional security provider and a regional stabiliser. India knows that its ability to emerge as a great power in the near future hinges upon its strategic capacity exercised in dealing with its own region. Afghanistan has a pivotal place in this regard in Indian Foreign Policy.

INDIAN ENGAGEMENT SINCE 2001

In 2001, after the Bonn–I conference, India immediately increased its engagement with Afghanistan. During the Taliban regime, between India and Afghanistan, what had continued in the name of diplomacy was merely the existence of a liaison office. In 2002, India upgraded the liaison office to an embassy. India began to support the Afghan government for political development. It also engaged with all ethnic groups in Afghanistan since 2001, which has given India a broader acceptance in the country. India has provided almost 1.2 billion Dollars for the reconstruction of the Afghan society and has pledged 2 billion Dollars for overall development. Indian assistance has been largely focussed on infrastructure, irrigation and defence.



Afghanistan and Bollywood

Bollywood is the most popular Indian connection in Afghanistan. A lot of Bollywood films have been close to Afghan hearts. Taliban, during their rule in Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001, imposed a ban on Bollywood films been screened or seen. This ban was highly ineffective. In Afghanistan, the reason that Bollywood is popular is because it has deep echoes with the psyche of Afghan society. Bollywood cinemas are based on the theme of a larger-than-life Bollywood hero fighting injustice. This synchronises well with the Afghan society, which has also faced and continues to face immense injustice. The society is able to connect it with the ground reality and thus Bollywood films provide a platform for common Afghan men to vicariously render their lives into grandiose narratives and successfully elide their real life with their strongest fantasies. This has contributed to people-to-people development in the two nations.

As US began to focus on the war on Iraq, which gave Pakistan the opportunity to seek its lost strategic space in Afghanistan. Pakistan began to sponsor the Haqqani networks who initiated widespread attacks on Indian workers in Afghanistan. Indian officials in the Border Roads Organisation were affected. The Indian embassy was attacked both in 2008 and 2009. Over a period of time, the US began to initiate a dialogue with the Taliban, giving rise to a debate called the Good Taliban versus the Bad Taliban. The US argued that certain liberal elements in the Taliban could be brought to centre stage to work in Afghanistan. The US also helped in setting a stage for Pakistan to play the role of a mediator in Kabul with the Taliban negotiations.

All these changed ground realities and India became marginalised due to the increased role accrued of Pakistan. Pakistan was now valued in the strategic calculus to

foster reconciliation between good Taliban and Afghanistan. This time period also saw Obama announcing an exit from Afghanistan by 2014. The US, in order to ensure that it does not offend Pakistan, discouraged any proactive Indian role in Afghanistan. India gradually came to see that its politico-economic-cum-cultural soft policy to engage with Afghanistan had not been yielding any strategic benefits except a success in winning the hearts and minds of the Afghani people. The subsequent period saw a steady decline of the Indian presence in Afghanistan. But all this did not demotivate India to the extent where it thought of retreating completely.

In fact, India stayed back and decided to chart out an independent strategy. To preserve its interest in the changing strategic landscape of Afghanistan and because of the commitment of NATO forces to withdraw, India stepped up its decision to provide training to the ANSF. It began to rework its engagement with Russia and Iran and also made a strong attempt to reach out to various sections of the Afghan society. Indian cooperation with Russia and Iran is important in context of the period of renewed efforts as none of them favour Sunni dominance in Afghanistan and are committed, for the benefit of India, to keep out Pakistan.

In 2011, India and Afghanistan concluded a Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA). The idea was now to use the SPA to regain the lost strategic space.



POLICY OPTIONS FOR INDIA POST 2014

Despite the ongoing strategic partnership between India and Afghanistan, the overall policy of India in Afghanistan lacks direction. India has not resorted to a forward policy of stationing its military in Afghanistan but has increased defence equipment supply to the nation. The Indian policy cannot even be called one of masterly inactivity. India has not resorted to the policy of weakening Pakistan by destabilising Pakistan from within as it has preferred political investment through dialogue. The dialogue with Pakistan often gets affected due to disturbances on both sides but it broadly remains committed to a dialogue level only. India has not officially sided with the US by being a part of USA's Global War on Terrorism but seeks US cooperation in stabilising the region. Indian policy has favoured a regional engagement for a broad solution. It remains to be seen in future as to what options India may take as presently, it resorts to a supreme mix of all of the above strategies to suit its self-interest.

Broadly, the Indian policy is to assist developmental activity in Afghanistan. It would continue to diplomatically support people-centred soft policy initiatives and create infrastructure with a broad focus of ‘winning hearts and minds’. India, thus, continues with the Afghan led, Afghan oriented, people-centric inclusive policy. India, in 2017, taking a positive note of Statements by US President Donald Trump on a proactive role for India in Afghanistan, has initiated a new India–Afghanistan Developmental Partnership Agreement (DPA). In September 2017, during the visit of Afghan foreign minister to India, the two sides concluded the DPA and India announced 160 High Intensity Development Projects in Afghanistan.

ANALYSIS OF INDIAN PM’S VISIT TO AFGHANISTAN— DECEMBER, 2015 AND JUNE, 2016

The Indian PM, Narendra Modi, visited Afghanistan in December, 2015 where he dedicated the parliament building constructed with Indian assistance to the people of Afghanistan. In the Parliament, the PM addressed the members of the Meshrano Jirga and the Wolesi Jirga. In the same Parliament, a block has been dedicated to former Indian Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee. The PM committed 170,000 tonnes of wheat supply to Afghanistan and provided support by supplying a contract to develop 1000 new buses in Afghanistan, which is expected to help in job creation. Undertaking strategic cooperation, the Indian PM handed over four Mi-25 helicopters to Afghanistan.

India had also decided to open a new consulate in Hyderabad. In June, 2016, the PM again visited Afghanistan. He was conferred with the Amir Amanullah Khan Award. It is the highest honour awarded to any civilian by Afghanistan. The PM inaugurated the Salma Dam, constructed with Indian assistance. Afghanistan decided to name it the Afghan–India Friendship dam. The project would irrigate fields of 640 villages in Chiste, Obe, Koshan, Karokh, Pashtun, Zarghun, Gozura, Injil, Zindjan and Ghoryan. It will generate 42 megawatt and irrigate 75,000 hectare land on Hari Rud River. The equipment to create the dam was sent via Bander-e-Abbas port and roads.

ROLE OF REGIONAL PLAYERS AND THEIR POWER POLITICS

The previous subsections have surveyed the entirety of the Indo–Afghan strategic reality. As far as Afghanistan is concerned, it knows that Pakistan is the key to a stable Afghanistan. However, till the time Pakistan does not stop sponsoring Taliban and halt cultivating anti-Afghanistan forces, the situation will be fragile. Pakistan wants to use Afghanistan to maintain strategic depth against India and till the time it does not do away with this policy, it will remain a stumbling block to regional peace. Turkey, in 2010, organised a conference on the future of Afghanistan. This led many to speculate about the role of Turkey vis-à-vis Afghanistan. The Turkish foreign policy establishment feels the urge to revive the Ottoman empire and Turkey is looking at finding a suitable diplomatic space in the region to increase its influence. Although Russia has, as stated in previous subsections, allowed the withdrawal of NATO troops through the Northern Distribution Network routes, it certainly favours less of US presence in the region.


As far as China is concerned, it is not comfortable with US military presence in the region. China is an aggressive player in Central Asia and as it creates a resource-centric policy to garner resources from Central Asia, it would favour a stable Afghanistan. China

certainly favours the absence of Taliban in Afghanistan and is cooperating with the US and Pakistan in the negotiations with the good Taliban. China knows that the presence of a force like the Taliban in Afghanistan can act as a springboard for extremism in Xinjiang and revive Uyghur militancy. However, due to its all-weather friendship with Pakistan, it prefers not putting pressure on Pakistan to dismantle terrorist networks as it knows that if Pakistan maintains strategic depth against India in Afghanistan, it will weaken India in Afghanistan and subsequently Central Asia. This would indeed be favourable to China as it would then not fear Indian competition with respect to the resources of Central Asia. On the other hand, the US favours more Indian presence in Central Asia to counter China and keep a check on the growing dominance by China in central Asia.


Russia is concerned with rising ISIS presence in Central Asia and it feels that ISIS and Taliban can use Central Asia as a base to target Russia. Russia feels it could be targeted by the ISIS and Taliban duo due to its support to the Shia Iran and Syria. Russia feels that an anti Russia coalition could be created by the Sunni groups like ISIS and Taliban. Russia feels that ISIS and Taliban could use narcotics trade from Central Asia to weaken Russia. This has compelled Russia to be an important stakeholder in Afghanistan and is negotiating with Taliban. Iran feels that ISIS and Taliban can create troubles for Iran in the Eastern fringes where Iran has a border with Afghanistan. Also Iran fears that in the long run if Afghanistan becomes unstable, it could lead to a refugee influx from Afghanistan to Iran. Keeping these threats in mind, Iran is also trying to offer refuge to Taliban and is harbouring a breakaway faction of Taliban (breakaway from Mansoor faction) led by Mullah Zakir. The future of Afghanistan depends upon the commitment of US in the peace process. Obama had given China a leadership role in Afghanistan but the Trump Administration has asserted that it will not allow China to flex its muscles in Afghanistan where it has spent tremendous resources. Trump Administration has complicated the entire situation due to difference in perception. During the Obama administration, US and Russia were of the view that Taliban is a part of the solution and thereby focussed on integrating Taliban to the mainstream. But, now the Trump Administration has conveyed that Taliban is a part of the problem and not the solution while Russia continues to feel that Taliban is a part of the solution. Thus, this difference in interpretation of Taliban has put Taliban and Russia on a divergent path. This new interpretation of US has put it on a similar path advocated by India because India since the beginning has asserted that Taliban is a part of the problem and not the solution. This is likely to manifest as a new phase of Indo-US cooperation in the future of Afghanistan.

HEART OF ASIA PROCESS

In 2011, in Istanbul, Turkey, the Heart of Asia (HOA) process was launched as a platform involving regional players to ensure a stable and a secure Afghanistan. There are 14 participating countries and 11 supporting countries in the HOA process.



India is one of the participating countries and has held the chair of the HOA process in 2016. The 6th Edition of HOA Istanbul Process of Afghanistan was inaugurated by Narendra Modi and Afghan President Ashraf Ghani in Amritsar in December 2016. The theme of the conference was “addressing challenges, achieving prosperity”.



The two-day conference at Amritsar was attended by delegates from over 40 countries. During the conference, Pakistan pledged 500 million Dollars to Afghanistan which the Afghan president refused to accept and rather advised Pakistan to use the wealth to dismantle the terrorist networks in Pakistan. At the end of the conference, Amritsar Declaration was concluded with a strong focus on addressing issues related to terrorism. The Declaration appreciated the European Union for its establishment of the Self Reliance Mutual Accountability Framework (SRMAF) to support development of Afghanistan and, for first time, the declaration spoke about security threats to Afghanistan and violence caused by ISIS, Haqqani networks, Al Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohamad. The Declaration asserted the need for early conclusion of comprehensive convention on International Terrorism. The Declaration appreciated the efforts of the Afghan government in bringing Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin Hekmatyar within a peaceful framework. The declaration emphasised on the need to strengthen cooperation amongst the states of HOA process in the fight against terrorism, extremism and radicalisation. The Declaration asserted that the member states of HOA Process should take steps to divert the energies of youth from extremism. A proposal was made to initiate a dialogue on drafting a regional counter terrorism framework strategy. A special emphasis in the Declaration was laid upon improving regional connectivity to boost economic cooperation. Regional initiatives like TAPI pipelines, CASA-1000, the Chabahar Agreement, Five Nation Railway and Silk Road Economic Belt were appreciated.

Why was Amritsar Chosen as a Venue for HOA?

Amritsar was chosen as a venue for the HOA conference in line with the Modi government’s policy of showcasing other cities through international conferences. The major theme of the HOA, as examined above, is connectivity. Amritsar was deliberately chosen as it lies at the heart of the Grant Trunk Road connecting Bangladesh to Peshawar. More so, India tried to convey a strong symbolic message to Pakistan by holding the conference in Amritsar. It showcased that Pakistan remains

an irritant in facilitating regional connectivity. India used the conference in Amritsar to press Pakistan to allow entry of trucks and transit to Afghanistan via the Attari–Wagah border.

REGIONAL PLAYERS AND GREAT GAME

We shall now turn our attention to the role of regional players and their policies related to Afghanistan. An analysis of Afghani history clearly tells us that most of the regional and global actors have used Afghanistan and have ensured that it perpetually remains in a state of instability. The situation has assumed a new sense of urgency after the departure of the NATO troops in 2014. It is in this context—to manage the transition—that the role of regional players has assumed significance. When Ashraf Ghani assumed office as the Afghan President in September 2014, he spent the initial few months in improving ties with Pakistan. He expanded his engagement with the military set up of Pakistan. Ashraf Ghani's engagement with Pakistan was based on the logic that Pakistan is the key to engagement with the Taliban.

Even the US wanted an engagement of Afghanistan with the Taliban. But since 2014, Pakistan's ISI has been using Taliban to instigate violence in Afghanistan. After giving enough time to Pakistan to mend ways, Ghani finally understood that courting Pakistan would yield little or no result. In a joint session of the Afghanistan Parliament in April 2016, Ghani threatened to drag Pakistan to the United Nations (UN) for inciting violence in Afghanistan. After the death of Mullah Qmar of Taliban, his successor Mullah Mansor was also killed by the US in a drone strike in Baluchistan. It is in this context that regional cooperation has emerged as a viable model for ensuring stability in Afghanistan. However, the goal of envisaging regional cooperation remains a distant one due to regional power struggles.



China has mostly undertaken economic investments in Afghanistan while following a hands free approach at the political level. At the economic level, it has made its presence felt in the Mes Aynak copper mine project where it intends to extract copper to the tune of 100 billion dollars. It was in September 2012 that China decided to end the policy of masterly inactivity. It decided to engage with Pakistan to ensure reconciliation with the Taliban. It also decided to train Afghan forces and police.

China has been concerned about the security situation post the withdrawal of the US troops. China is of the opinion that the Taliban should not be allowed to re-establish control in Afghanistan as they could lead to a spark of insurgency in Xinjiang province amongst the Uyghur. China has become all the more cautious about the role Pakistan would play in the future as rumours of Pakistan training the Uyghurs have surfaced.

The coming of Modi government in India has also led to a shift in India's Afghan Policy. India, under its new regime, has communicated to Afghanistan that it will favour a

strong and prosperous Afghanistan and would remain committed to the development of Afghanistan even after US troops withdraw. In fact, India has expanded its security profile in Afghanistan and provided military jeeps and four Mi-25 attack helicopters. India has understood that it has to fight its own battle in Afghanistan and cannot rely on US for solutions. India still asserts that the root cause of the trouble in Afghanistan is Pakistan's incitement and sheltering of the Taliban whereas China refuses to accept the Indian view. Thus, both China and India have different perceptions on how the future transition of Afghanistan should be managed. Since 2012, another unique situation witnessed in the region is the renewed relationship of Russia and Pakistan. Russia, since 2012, has professed a new interest in Pakistan, which has manifested in the form of multiple high level bilateral visits and a defence exercise between the two in 2016. Russia is expanding its alignments in Asia and Pakistan has assumed a central position in the Russian foreign policy. However, whatever be the shape of the Russia–Pakistan relationship, Russia can never replace the US when it comes to defence aid to Pakistan.

India and Iran are also deepening their engagement primarily to reach out to Afghanistan and Central Asia without going to Pakistan. Any Indo–Iranian cooperation that is undertaken is perceived by Pakistan as an attempt to encircle it. Though Pakistan and Iran have also tried to improve their ties, yet nothing concrete on ground has so far been achieved. When the US announced that it would withdraw its troops from Afghanistan starting 2014, it generated more apprehensions in Iran. This was because of the departure of the US would automatically mean more leverage to Pakistan in the region. Since 2014, Pakistan too has been at the forefront along with Afghanistan and China, initiating a dialogue between Afghanistan and the Taliban. As negotiations happen, it gives Pakistan a new influence in the region. This is not appreciated by Iran as it undermines the Iranian influence in the region outright. Thus, there is a possibility that Iran may revive support to proxies (the Shia Hazrana Community in Afghanistan) to undermine Pakistan. The present US President Donald Trump has already conveyed his displeasure with the US–Iran nuclear deal. This may compel Iran to further ignite the regional rivalry again. It is in this context that India's soft power attributes can help stabilise Afghanistan. The recognition by Ashraf Ghani of the fact that India is a credible player has brought India back into the Afghan calculus. Since India has invested around two billion Dollars in Afghanistan, this has helped India to generate tremendous goodwill in the country. India has also decided to address the feeling of neglect amongst the minorities in the provinces of North Afghanistan by undertaking investment in the area. How India will manage the instability in Afghanistan in future will finally determine the rise of India as a global player. Afghanistan, in this context, is a litmus test for India.



India and Afghanistan Air Corridor—The New Great Game?

The two countries in June 2017 established an Air Corridor which was envisaged by Ashraf Ghani and Modi in 2016. The air corridor will be a big enabler to the bilateral trade and will send a strong message to Pakistan that despite its obstructionist behaviour, India will continue to engage with Afghanistan. In 2010, Pakistan and Afghanistan concluded an Afghanistan Pakistan Trade and Transit Agreement

(APTTA). Under the APTTA, Afghanistan could send goods in trucks till India (at the Wagah border near Amritsar, Punjab) but its trucks had to return back to Afghanistan empty. Also in APTTA, Pakistan could send its trucks via Afghanistan to Uzbekistan and the Pakistani trucks were allowed to carry goods back from Central Asia. In 2016, Ashraf Ghani asserted that if Pakistan does not allow its trucks to come back with goods from India, Afghanistan would block Pakistani access to Central Asia. But, despite assertion by Ghani, Pakistan refused to budge. Ghani subsequently decided to seek help from India and the help from India finally manifested as the Air corridor agreement between the two.

End of Section Questions

1. Examine the evolution of India's Neighborhood Policy from Nehru till the end of Cold War.
2. What are the core elements of Neighborhood First Policy? Discuss the major challenges.
3. Examine India's Aid Diplomacy in the neighborhood?
4. Stratospheric diplomacy is a new element in India's Neighborhood diplomacy. Discuss.
5. Examine the impact of the China factor in Indo-Bhutan relations?
6. "Due to the economic blockage in Nepal, India's story has not won and its soft power policy stands to be eroded." Examine this statement in the light of Soft Power diplomacy concept promoted by Joseph Nye.
7. India-Bangladesh have transformed their relationship at defense and hydro carbon levels. Examine core components in both.
8. "Rohingyas could emerge as a serious threat to India's security interests." Discuss.
9. India-Sri Lanka Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement will transform Bay of Bengal as a hydrocarbon hub. Discuss.
10. Afghanistan has been a prize that Pakistan and India have fought over directly and indirectly for decades. Examine.

Section E

Bilateral Regional and Global Groupings and Agreements Involving India and/or Affecting India's Interests

Part-A: India and its Bilateral Relations with Africa

- [Chapter 1 India and Africa Policy—Key Drivers](#)
- [Chapter 2 India and Mauritius Relations](#)
- [Chapter 3 India and Kenya Relations](#)
- [Chapter 4 India and Mozambique Relations](#)
- [Chapter 5 India and Nigeria Relations](#)
- [Chapter 6 India and Angola Relations](#)
- [Chapter 7 India and Seychelles Relations](#)
- [Chapter 8 India and Namibia Relations](#)
- [Chapter 9 India and Ghana and Cote D' Ivoire Relations](#)
- [Chapter 10 India and South Africa Relations](#)
- [Chapter 11 India's Outreach to Africa](#)

Part-B: India and its Bilateral Relations with Central Asia

- [Chapter 1 India and Central Asia Policy—Key Drivers of the Relationship](#)
- [Chapter 2 India and Kazakhstan Relations](#)
- [Chapter 3 India and Kyrgyz Republic Relations](#)
- [Chapter 4 India and Tajikistan Relations](#)
- [Chapter 5 India and Turkmenistan Relations](#)
- [Chapter 6 India and Uzbekistan Relations](#)

Part-C: India and Bilateral Relations in South East Asia and Oceania

- [Chapter 1 India and South East Asia Policy—Key Drivers](#)
- [Chapter 2 India and Australia Relations](#)
- [Chapter 3 India and Vietnam Relations](#)
- [Chapter 4 India and South Korea Relations](#)
- [Chapter 5 India and North Korea Relations](#)
- [Chapter 6 India and Fiji Relations](#)

Part-D: India and its Bilateral Relations in Europe

- [Chapter 1 India and Europe Policy—Key Drivers of the Relations](#)
- [Chapter 2 India and France Relations](#)
- [Chapter 3 India and Germany Relations](#)
- [Chapter 4 India and Belgium Relations](#)
- [Chapter 5 India and Switzerland Relations](#)

Part-E: India and its bilateral relations in West Asia

[Chapter 1 India and West Asia Policy—Key Drivers](#)

[Chapter 2 India and Egypt Relations](#)

[Chapter 3 India and Qatar Relations](#)

[Chapter 4 India and Turkey Relations](#)

[Chapter 5 India and United Arab Emirates Relations](#)

[Chapter 6 India and Saudi Arabia Relations](#)

Part-F: India and its Bilateral Relations in Latin America

[Chapter 1 India and Latin America Policy—Key Drivers](#)

[Chapter 2 India and Venezuela Relations](#)

[Chapter 3 India and Mexico Relations](#)

[Chapter 4 India and Brazil Relations](#)

Part-G: India and its Relations with Middle Powers

[Chapter 1 The Concept of Middle Powers](#)

[Chapter 2 India and the Great Britain Relations](#)

[Chapter 3 India and Canada Relations](#)

[Chapter 4 India and Iran Relations](#)

Part-H: India and its Relations with Great Powers

[Chapter 1 India and Japan Relations](#)

[Chapter 2: India and the USA Relations](#)

[Chapter 3: India and Israel Relations](#)

[Chapter 4: India and Russia Relations](#)

Part-I: India and its Relations with Core Neighbors

[Chapter 1 India and Pakistan Relations](#)

[Chapter 2 India and China Relations](#)

1
CHAPTER

India and Africa Policy—Key Drivers

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Historical Background of India and Africa Diplomacy
- Significance of Africa for India
- Key drivers of India's Africa Policy
- India and Africa Trade diplomacy
- Diplomatic issues related to Security and Piracy
- Diplomatic policy of China in Africa
- Future policy of India

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND


The relations between India and Africa owe their origin to the monsoon winds. Sailors from India sailed in South East monsoonal winds to reach Africa (from June to September) and used the North Eastern monsoonal winds (from December to March) to sail back. In the ancient times, India had developed considerable marine and naval technologies. Reference of maritime strength of India is found in the *Rig Veda*. A glimpse of India's natural convergence with West Asia and Africa is found in a guide book for sailors called *the Periplus of the Erythraean Sea*, a Greco-Roman text attributed to different dates between the 1st and 3rd centuries BCE, which aptly summarizes India's ancient sea links with Zenj Coast and Egypt. During ancient sea trade, Indians used to trade rice and wheat cloth with incense, palm oil, ivory and gold from Africa. The sea trade with East African Coast also facilitated the movement of Indian traders into south and central African territories. Due to the flourishing trade, a lot of Indians also began to migrate to Africa. At any point of time in Africa, we had some form of Indian presence. In 1497, when Vasco de Gama reached Malindi, he also noted the presence of Indians in Mombasa/Khilwa etc. If the ancient time was marked by trade, it opened up people-to-people contacts, which, in medieval times, saw one of its manifestations during the Mughal rule when Africans were placed in the Mughal army and they were mainly the Siddis (people who are descendants of Bantu tribes). They were also found in the army of Mohamed Bin Qasim.

After the commencement of the imperial age in Europe, Africa became a colonial battleground. The British, French and Portuguese were the leaders in this race for

colonisation. The 17th century period saw slave trade beginning in Africa. Slaves were taken from Africa along with resources to sustain the Industrial Revolution back home in Europe. The presence of European powers in Africa also created more opportunities in Africa. For examples, as the French colonised Mauritius and Reunion, there was a need of masons, blacksmiths and carpenters and so on. Perceiving these as opportunities, the Indian traders in Africa also brought skilled persons who fit the job descriptions from various parts of the west coast of India. A lot of Indians began to settle down to these jobs in Mauritius, Reunion and other East African States. Gradually, the British also emerged on the African scene. In 1833, slavery was abolished in Britain. After this, a new system called indentured labour system, was evolved. The British now brought bonded labour from India to work on sugar plantations and cotton plantations. Bonded labour from India also worked on railway establishment in Africa. Free passengers were those people who had money, were willing to pay for transport to Africa and were driven by the spirit of entrepreneurship.

Thus, during this time also we see a continued link with Africa which had begun with ancient time maritime trade.


The following diagram represents the ancient sea trade and movement of Indians in East Africa:



During British colonial rule in India, three important actors in our relation with Africa were Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru and the Indian National Congress. The Congress, since its inception, showed support to and solidarity with the African cause. In 1890, the British sent Indian soldiers to fight in Sudan—a move that the Indian National Congress opposed vehemently as Indian soldiers in Sudan and Ethiopia did not fight for any cause that ultimately had any benefit for India. Rather, they were used by the British to suppress the natives. In 1893, Gandhi went on an assignment to Africa. During his study in Africa, he witnessed severe racial discrimination. During his stay in Africa till 1913–14, he evolved and practised the concept of Satyagraha, which eventually emerged as a technique of mass mobilisation. The success of Satyagraha in Africa affirmed its utility as a tool of non-violence and it went on to be later used as one of the core tools of Indian National Movement.

During early 20th century, when the Indian National Movement gained momentum, India did not lose touch with Africa. India always felt that Africa, like India, had also been a victim of imperialism and that India needed to assist Africa in its fight against imperial powers. In 1927, the Indian National Congress (INC), at its Calcutta session, took a decision to open offices overseas. Offices by INC were opened in Africa to assist Africans. In 1927, Nehru had already participated in the Brussels Conference of oppressed Nationalities and had advanced an idea of India being a kingpin in the process of

liberating the world from imperial powers. The conference moulded our foreign policy thought from 1928 onwards as far as Africa was concerned—we began to link our freedom struggle with the imperial struggle of Africa. India evolved a thought that its own freedom struggle and Africa's struggle against imperial powers as well as its fight against apartheid was in natural continuation with the idea of one world, free of imperialism and oppression. This Afro-Asian solidarity also moulded our foreign policy which after independence emerged as the policy of Non Alignment.



The first phase of India's relations with African nations from 1950s to 1970s was a period marked by tremendous improvement. Indian policy with regard to Africa evolved in support of African independence. India assisted the process of decolonisation in Africa. India's success in having attained independence through peaceful and non-violent mechanisms also encouraged the Africans to look for support from India. The legacy of Gandhi in Africa and his experimentation of Satyagraha and its resultant success for India strengthened this bond. Nehru played a critical role in fostering close ties and gave open support to Africans against colonisation. Moreover, Africa was also one part of the world which had not fallen into the ideological divisions occasioned by the Cold War, and became, for India, a region to assert power politics through NAM.

India and Its Attitude Against Racism

South Africa was an important trading partner to India during the times of the British Raj. In 1946, South Africa came out with a Ghetto Act which aimed to aggregate resistant colonies in South Africa as per racial differences. This move irked India, and in 1946 itself, the interim Prime Minister of India, Nehru, took up the issue of the Ghetto Act in the UN by invoking article 10 and 14 of the UN Charter. Despite flourishing trade, India decided to cut ties with South Africa after its insistence on maintaining status quo. India not only broke off its diplomatic ties with South Africa but also did not revive the same till 1994, when apartheid in South Africa officially ended.

Against apartheid

Anti-imperialism

Against racialism

Anti-colonialism

Nehru

Gandhi and his
experience in South Africa

Chief architects

of

The case of South Africa provided the necessary ammunition to India to build a constructive Indian foreign policy towards Africa based on its opposition to all other racial regimes in that continent. Thus, Indian policy in Africa introduced anti-racialism as a new tool along with anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. India taking up the fight against apartheid in the UN in 1964 also resonated well amongst Africans, all the while India's intense and sole focus being on non-violent modes of protest.

India advanced support to Africa against colonialism but it did not insist on fixing a date to end colonialism in Africa. This upset many African leaders as they deemed that India may not be serious about supporting the African struggle against colonialism. Things began to change for India domestically after the 1962 war. Firstly, after the war, India became busier to counter an aggressive China at every forum. In contrast to the precepts of non-violence championed by India, China, on the other hand, preached armed struggle amongst Africans. This appealed more to some African leaders who were not happy with the results that the slow approach advocated by India brought about. For instance, Algeria, a French Colony in Africa, resorted to an armed struggle against France. Due to all these reasons, support for India gradually began to decline amongst the African nations. The decline was visible prominently after the death of Nehru. Support for China began to grow and China began to make inroads into the African territory. The two case studies ahead aptly summarise the decline of support for India.

The NAM Summit fiasco (Cairo, 1964)

After the death of Nehru, the NAM summit held in Cairo, Egypt was led by Lal Bahadur Shastri. During the Summit, India wanted a resolution by members urging China on renouncing the use of force. There was hardly any support from African nations for this cause.


Similarly towards the end of the Summit, India wanted a resolution compelling China not to take the nuclear route. India thought that, due to its disarmament credentials, there would be support for it from the African states, but initially only Cyprus supported it. This clearly signalled a situation of declining support for India amongst the African nations.

India and East Africa

East Africa was one such area where there was a sizeable presence of the Indian diaspora. India always had close relations with this part of the continent. Nehru wanted to support East Africa against colonialism and sent his trusted aide, Apa Saheb Bala Saheb Pant, a respected Gandhian, writer, freedom fighter and diplomat, as India's ambassador to East Africa. His home had become a nerve centre for all efforts coordinated against colonialism. The British were alarmed upon seeing this. They pressurised Nehru to recall Apa Saheb Pant. Nehru was forced to recall Pant, leaving the East Africans disillusioned. This again created a strain on India's relations with East Africa.

The next phase (1970's to 1990's) began with India opening its relations with Africa due to its historical connect, bolstered by a common colonial legacy. However certain circumstances and issues ended up in creating a strain for India's relationship.

The decline in Indian popularity encouraged China to make inroads. As the African decolonisation was completed, the African nations were looking for a role model for development. India made strategies to regain the lost path, using NAM as a tool to rework its relationship with Africa. To seize the new opportunity in Africa, from 1970s, NAM became economy-oriented and India was in a place where it could flex its muscle because domestically things were in better order. The Green Revolution had succeeded in improving the food security situation. A military conflict with Pakistan succeeded in India's favour in 1971. India, then, decided to become economically assertive in Africa. The most important policy, however, was with respect to the Indian diaspora. During the Nehruvian era, Nehru insisted that the diaspora of India in Africa should place interests of the host nations they reside in over and above their own interests. More so, due to strategic concerns of the NAM, India gave less preference to the needs of the diaspora at that time.




During the second phase of reconnect (1970s till the end of the Cold War), the importance of the Indian diaspora increased. The success of India's Peaceful Nuclear Explosion in 1974 also contributed to the rise of India's international image from 1970s. India began to use NAM Summits to economically integrate diplomacy with Africa and focussed on strengthening the South-South Cooperation (SSC). In 1970, at the NAM Conference in Lusaka, India outlined its new approach for Africa. India encouraged Africa to undertake vigorous domestic growth and pledged technological and economic support in this endeavour to strengthen the idea of SSC. India encouraged its Heads of Missions in Africa to focus on economic assistance to Africa and told the diplomats to promote economic engagement. A special role for the diaspora was envisaged in this by the new relationship as Indira Gandhi called upon the Indian Diaspora to act as ambassadors of India.

Reconnecting to the Diaspora and Kenya

With a renewed focus on the diaspora from the 1970s, India and Kenya, in 1990, established the Africa–India Development Association. Apart from boosting bilateral economic engagement, the association aimed at integrating the Indian diaspora in the economic life of Kenya. This reflects the new importance attached to the diaspora acting as a bridge in the relations between the two nations.

This renewed thrust gave India an opportunity to re-establish its link with Africa. Its economic diplomacy, however, was certainly not as aggressive as that of Western powers. Whatever assistance India gave was limited but had a positive impact in the African thought process as all assistance was provided without any conditionality, and driven with an intention of helping Africans grow.



India and SWAPO Diplomacy


The Namibian territory was under the control of South Africa. The South Africans continued their illegal rule. When the matter of the illegal rule of South Africa in Namibia reached the International Court of Justice in 1972, the court deferred the decision of ending or termination of South Africa rule. In 1982, after enormous deliberation, India proposed a global level meeting and accorded full diplomatic status to South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO), while also providing it monetary and material assistance. In 1990, Namibia gained independence, which opened up diplomatic relations again.

In 1986, India, at the NAM summit in Harare, established the AFRICA fund which acted as material assistance by India in the fight against Apartheid in South Africa and Namibia. The economic engagement continued with Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Ghana re-established its ties more aggressively with Africa and continued to deepen the engagement in the post-Cold War period.



From a dip in relations to regaining lost path

India's engagement in the post-Cold War period owes its base to its Cold War engagement where energy concerns dominated. Economic diplomacy pushed the relationship. India realised the importance of Africa to ensure energy security in the future. In 2017, India organised the Fourth India-Africa Hydrocarbons Conference. The conference again provided India an opportunity to showcase its expertise in oil exploration, oil refining and drilling technology. The new strategy of India's engagement with Africa is rightly called as ABBA- Africa for Bharat and Bharat for Africa.



SIGNIFICANCE OF AFRICA AND KEY DRIVERS OF INDIA'S AFRICA POLICY


The significance of Africa for India can be summed up in one word—OIL where O stands for oil, I for investment and L for Location.

All the three factors above, that have garnered significance in Indian Foreign Policy after the Cold War, shall be elaborated upon in the sections related to trade and piracy. The time that the Cold War ended was also the time when Indian economy made a transition to an open economy. To sustain the open economy, India needed oil, which it already had from its supply from the Middle East. Over a period of time, as India diversified its import basket, Africa came in the picture. India began to forge oil based relations in Africa for energy security. India intends to obtain ownership in oil blocks in Africa. This strategy of going for equity oil is any day better than buying oil from open spot market because ownership in an oil block gives India a very deep exposure of the African markets. For India, Africa is a rising continent and offers multiple opportunities for our private sector, which can help bring India and Africa closer to each other. The location of Africa is strategic as it helps India to connect to Central and South Americas through the Cape of Good Hope and to West Asia through the African Maghreb.

There are many drivers to India's Africa Policy. First, we need to understand that India's intention is not only limited to harnessing African resources but goes much beyond. India has always kept it clear that due to our historical relations with Africa, it is in our interests to assist the entire African block in overall development. While assisting the African development process, India does not follow the white man's burden approach, but rather intends to share its own knowledge and developmental experiences with Africa.

for the mutual benefit of both. Since the time of Nehru till the present, India has initiated multiple programmes in its bid to aid to African development. A brief mention of the programmes will ease our understanding of India's foreign policy towards Africa.


(1) I.T.E.C programme: The acronym stands for Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation. The Nehruvian foreign policy envisaged the idea of 'one world,' which envisaged an interdependent world where countries cooperate in socio-economic and development well-being. After independence, India received tremendous assistance from international agencies and forums (for example India played an important role in UNCTAD) in its developmental endeavour. India thereby reached an understanding that it would be important for India to share the development lessons and its experiences with other nations. Nehru had this dream of ensuring that other developing countries learn from India's own learning. This envisaged India to position itself as a trainer for the developmental need of other Third World Countries (TWC).




Keeping this in mind, on 15th September 1964, India launched this bilateral initiative for Africa called ITEC. India envisaged giving training to other countries for their overall development. For Africa, ITEC had two parts. As of now, ITEC as a programme continues to be one of the most important diplomatic tools for India abroad. Second, ITEC is now multilateral in nature and is linked to initiatives under the ASEAN. Third, the ITEC is managed by the Development Partnership Administration Division, a division in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA).

(2) South–South Cooperation (SSC): We have already mentioned SSC and India's economic diplomacy earlier. Let us develop an insight on SSC in this section, as it stands slightly outside the purview of economic diplomacy. The origin of SSC goes back to Bandung Conference in 1955. In the conference, the African nations decided to initiate a partnership with each other at the development level. Since 1961, this partnership became a part of the NAM. Initially it had two components, namely, technical cooperation amongst developing countries and economic cooperation amongst developing countries. The idea was that the participating countries shall undertake developmental cooperation which would involve multiple stakeholders including national governments, civil societies, public–private partnerships and individuals. It envisaged the sharing of knowledge, developmental experiences, technical assistance and so forth. India always believed that North–South

Cooperation is important and it would act as a supplement to South–South Cooperation. India approached SSC without any conditionality, and with full respect for the sovereignty of the other participating countries. In contrast, economic diplomacy is an economic engagement by countries for self-benefit through trade. In fact, SSC is also different from North–South Cooperation as SSC is a demand-driven, voluntary, horizontal programme with no conditions attached. In the 21st century, India, under SSC, promotes sustainable development, inclusive growth, infrastructure and energy as goals. India assists Africa in SSC in all the parameters above.



(3) Pan Africa e-Network Project: Since 1990s, India has made tremendous progress in providing education and health in remote areas through developments in the ICT. In 2004, APJ Abdul Kalam, while addressing the Pan African Parliament, envisioned satellite based connectivity with all African nations to assist them in health and education. The Indian government used the idea to initiate Pan Africa e-Network Project. The government established a huge network to provide services in consultations with Telecom Consultants India limited. The project was officially inaugurated in 2010.



(4) TEAM-9 Initiative: In 2004, the Indian government launched the Techno-Economic Approach for Africa India Movement. This is a regional initiative exclusively meant for eight West African States. India feels the need to establish a connect with West Africa as it's a resource-rich region. India, through TEAM-9, intends to help development in this resource-rich but underdeveloped region with assistance for infrastructure and low-cost technology. The aim here is to provide assistance to specific projects and give a thrust to the private sector of India so as to promote trade. India has earmarked 500 million dollars line of credit here. The West African region does not have large Indian diaspora but the Gulf of Guinea is certainly a new hotspot of oil in Africa.


(5) India–Africa Forum Summit (IAFS): Continental level engagements with Africa is not new for India. The origin of such interactions go back to 1993, when Japan initiated the first ever Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD). This was followed by China initiating the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). On similar lines, to open up continental level engagement, India launched its first ever IAFS in 2008 in New Delhi. The forum concluded with the New Delhi Declaration which reaffirmed the shared vision of vibrancy and resurgence in India–Africa relations. The declaration set an agenda for India and Africa to collaborate on sustainable development, climate change and UN reforms. Subsequently, a second such summit was organised in 2011. The second IAFS was held in the Ethiopian Capital, Addis Ababa in 2011. The Addis Ababa Declaration adopted anew cooperative framework based on capacity building, peace and security. India envisaged the creation of institutions like the Indian Institute of Technology and the Indian Institute of Foreign Trade in Africa. In the second IAFS, India also committed to creating a two-million-dollar fund for the African Union Mission in Somalia to curb piracy. The third IAFS was held from 25th to 28th October in 2015. The third IAFS is unique in multiple aspects.

The first aspect is the issue of participation in the IAFS. This is because, in 2006, the African Union (AU) in the city of Banjul (capital of Gambia)announced the Banjul Formula. According to the Banjul Formula, (adopted in 2006), India would extend an invitation to 15 African Head of the States to participate in the India-Africa Forum Summit which would include five participating states of NEPAD (New Economic Partnership for African Development—A programme of African Union to seek global support for the development of Africa) programme, 8 member states to be identified from Regional Economic Communities of African Union and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission. These 15 nations would participate in IAFS. In the First IAFS, there was a participation by 14 states, while in the Second IAFS, there were 11 states that participated. In IAFS-3, India decided to do away with limited participation (as per the Banjul Formula) and invited all 54 Head of the States from Africa. This was done because India had decided to launch the ‘Outreach to Africa Programme’ in the third session of the IAFS. Second, the IAFS-3 opened up on the cultural note. The opening ceremony of the summit saw India showcasing Bhangra and Yoga. The two showcased India’s soft power export and asserted India’s emergence on the global scene and signified a resurgent Africa. For the first time in the history succeeding the Cold War, India organised a successful event, hosting 54 Nations at one place. The IAFS-3 concluded with the Delhi Declaration – 2015, which articulated the India–Africa relationship as ‘Partners in Progress’ and pledged to work ‘towards a dynamic and transformative development agreement’. India officially pledged support to the African Agenda 2063 and committed resources to Africa to help achieve goals of the Agenda. India also announced 10 billion dollar line of credit for projects, along with thirty thousand scholarships. What also makes the Delhi Declaration 2015 unique is that the areas in which Africa and India are going to collaborate were broadened to now incorporate solar technology, food security, blue economy, rural housing, skull development, use of social networks to enhance people-to-people cooperation and sustainable development. Delhi Declaration has also adopted a monitoring mechanism to implement the agendas

envisioned. They have also adopted the India–Africa framework for strategic cooperation. The next summit that is IAFS–4 is planned after 5 years (that is in 2020).

Western Sahara, Morocco and IAFS–3 in 2015

The region of Western Sahara was under the colonial control of Spain till 1975. Spain liberated Western Sahara in 1975. Immediately after this, Morocco and Mauritania began to claim West Sahara as it is a region rich in phosphate and has the largest phosphate reserves in the world. Over a period of time, Mauritania gradually went out of the picture but Morocco did not. In 1976, Sahrawi formed Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic and established it as a sovereign state under the Polisario Front. In 1985, India gave recognition to Saharawi Republic as it thought Polisario Front was fighting a struggle for self-determination. However, as the UN took over efforts to resolve the issue, India, in 2000, withdrew its recognition. This recognition of SADR by India had created a deep resentment in Morocco–India relations as Morocco considered SADR a part of its territory. In IAFS–3, India had invited 54 African nations including Morocco with no representation officially from SADR/Western Sahara.




India Honed Diplomatic Skills at the 3rd IAFS

The strategy of India at the 3rd IAFS was very unique. Firstly, in order to invite all 54 African states, India designed personal invitations and extended them to African Head of States. Indian Ministers travelled all over to African states and extended the invitation to the leaders to invite them for the 3rd IAFS on behalf of people of India. At the summit, it was the suave diplomat who managed it all. India decided to use the 3rd IAFS as a platform to train its young IFS officers with invaluable training on hosting the massive event. The MEA decided to pull all young IFS officers from all over the globe for providing a mega on the job training. The event gave many young IFS officers an invaluable experience of a lifetime.

INDIA–AFRICA TRADE AND COMMERCE

Africa is a land of resources. As per estimates, Africa is endowed with 10% of the world's oil and 40% of the world's gold. Different regions of Africa have different resources and the continent, in totality, is beneficial for India in multiple aspects. As the economy of Africa grows, there will be new demand for projects and goods. Indian private sector, in this regard, intends to play a key role in meeting African needs. Before we study the trade dynamics, it is important to briefly have a look at different regions in Africa.



Name of the region	Important commercial centres for India	Core competencies of the commercial centre and region	Miscellaneous information
Western Africa	Nigeria, Ghana, Ivory coast	Crude oil	Piracy Problem
Southern Africa	Angola and South Africa	Crude oil (Angola only) Non-oil like Gold, Diamonds, Steel	Market access is absent
Northern Africa	Egypt, Tunisia	Oil, Chemicals and fertilisers	Arab spring and political instability
Eastern Africa	Kenya, Mozambique, Mauritius, Seychelles	Leather products, bags and islands are strategic importance	Need to augment skill and technics
Central Africa	Chad, Congo, Uganda, Malawi, Rwanda	Vegetables and coffee	Transport and reach is an issue

Global Economic Crisis and India–Africa Trade Scenarios Beyond 2017-18

The US crisis of 2008 and EU crisis of 2011 have affected the entire global economy. Africa has been one of the important suppliers of oil internationally. Due to the crises at the global level, the demand for oil has decreased. As the demand abroad declined,

African economies had also been affected. However, many African nations have used the crises as opportunities. In order to ensure that domestic employment is not affected, many African nations have opened up sectors for cooperation with foreign players. It is with this regard that India stands to play a role. For instance, Kenya, Ghana, Ivory Coast and other nations have decided to invite investments in small and medium Enterprises, infrastructure, modernisation of agriculture and alternative energy. All these sectors present umpteen opportunities for India. As learned previously, India, in the third IAFS (2015) has committed assistance to Africa for solar technology, food security, rural housing and skill development. Even at the bilateral level, with the visits of Indian President and Vice President to Namibia, Ivory Coast, Ghana, and Tunisia, India has committed to continued support.

In order to promote trade, India has used instruments like lines of credit, Focus Africa programme and Duty Free Trade Preference Systems. The CII and FICCI from India also play an important role in this regard. They regularly organise platforms in consultation with African forums, giving India an opportunity to leverage its private sector. The private sector appropriately uses these forums to create business in Africa. A brief mention here of the Duty Free Quota Free (DF QF) market access; the Focus Africa Programme and Indian firms in Africa will aid our understanding.

The Doha round of negotiations in 2001 for the first time envisaged DFQF market access to Least Developed Countries (LDC). It was only in 2005, in the Ministerial Conference (of WTO) in Hong Kong, that the decision was taken that the developed countries would be allowed to undertake DFQF market access to LDCs. On the sidelines of the first IAFS in 2008, India went on to formally initiate Duty Free Trade Preference Scheme (DFTPS), designed to boost bilateral trade. The scheme has got further impetus in its effort to boost trade after its modification in 2014. The measures by India have further strengthened South–South cooperation.

In 2002–2003, India also launched its Focus Africa Programme (FAP). This programme is underway in select twenty-four African nations. Within this programme, heads of the Indian Missions in these 24 nations act as commercial sales agents. The diplomatic machinery does extensive research and outlines opportunities available for Indian exporters. The Indian exporters then undertake market access and market development. This helps India to boost its exports in Africa and opens up opportunities for the private sector of India.

A lot of Indian companies are doing tremendous business in Africa. The role of private sector is analysed better when we study bilateral relations but broadly the picture is as below:



52nd African Development Bank (AfDB) Summit—Gandhinagar-2017

In the section above, we have argued that India and Africa have witnessed deep economic interaction in the recent times. India is playing a catalytic role in African development by partnering with AfDB. India decided to hold the 52nd AfDB Summit in 2017 in India. As per the projection of IMF, Indian economy is going to grow at 7.7% in 2018-19 due to some bold initiatives like demonetization, GST and opening up of Pharmacy and Defense sectors. Africa is a 2.2 Trillion Dollar market offering India tremendous opportunities in transport and infrastructure sectors. India in the Summit in 2017 has decided to work with Africa in these two sectors. This will give India an opportunity to enhance its overall exports. India has initiated a Namaskar Africa programme to showcase its domestic strengths in the sectors where it can assist Africa. The core idea of the Namaskar Africa programme is to assist Africa in achieving integrated open markets. The health and infrastructure are likely to get a boost due to Asia-Africa Growth Corridor envisaged. In the Summit, India and Africa have decided to identify High-5 areas of cooperation. They include Energy, Agriculture, E-Governance, Industrialisation and Health and pharmaceuticals.

Education Diplomacy as Future India–Africa Connector

Africa has been receiving tremendous support from UN for its Millennium Development Goals and Education for All initiative. The focus of both is on universalisation of primary education and reduction of poverty and gender disparities. Due to special attention, Africa has made progress in school education but is struggling to arrange gainful employment for its school passouts since Africa lacks institutions for skill development and higher education. It is in this context that India steps in. India has been focussing on skill development and scholarships in Africa. The prime interest of India is to skill the youth of Africa and enable them to play an aggressive role in the future development of the continent. In the second IAES, in 2011, India entered the fray on continuous skill development through capacity building initiatives by building IIT and IIFT. India had, by 2015, provided more than 20,000 scholarships for higher education. The third IAES, in 2015, has envisaged 30,000 scholarships for the future. Considering India has made noticeable

advancement and tapped the skill and higher education market, it would be imminent for India at this stage to enhance this effort to become a global leader. The MEA needs to make this area its special focus and announce a properly planned HRD policy for African markets. India has decided to play a special role in enhancing the educational skill set of the Africans. India has not only invited African students to India for higher education but also offers courses with a special focus on skilling the African youth through vocational training. To ensure that India is able to attract the global student community, India needs to focus upon four things:

1. Enhance the university curriculum capabilities to support cultural diversity in university campuses.
2. At the diplomatic level, enhance academic partnerships.
3. Ensure that the African students who come to India get hands on training in Small and Medium Enterprises in India as part of academic partnerships.
4. Design special curriculums on climate change for African students

Climate Change as Future India–Africa Connector

The climate problems are not restricted by national boundaries but are global in nature. The solution to such problems also needs must be transnational. The situation of Africa is that of being one of lowest contributors of pollutants but one of the biggest sufferers of climate change. As Africa is resource-rich, the depletion of natural resources causes the continent immense anxiety. Degradation of land and environment has been at the core of a majority of the conflicts seen in Chad, Sudan-Darfur and Ethiopia. The drying up of the Nile, Orange, Zambezi and Kunene has sparked violent clashes amongst groups. If the sea levels raise, Lagos and Banjul, along with Seychelles, Mauritius, Reunion and Madagascar would be threatened. Climate change offers India a lot of opportunities to assist Africa in mitigating these challenges and helping the peace process. India has committed to the development of solar technology in IAFS–3 (2015). India may, in future, also plan assistance in wind and tidal energy. This can help the private sector of India to fetch more opportunities. Due to fluctuations related to climate change in India and the rise in demand for agricultural commodities in 2015–16, a lot of private firms have started purchasing land in Africa. The land in Africa is under state control and is far cheaper than land in India. The private sector has undertaken mechanisation of agriculture in Africa to tide over climate change and supply agriculture commodities. From June 2016, the Government of India has undertaken cultivation in Africa to mitigate domestic food shortages.

Technology Transfers and Impact

The discussions about trade and history enabled us to learn that India's economic footprint in Africa has increased since the Cold War. India has adequately shared technology with Africa leading to growth in the continent. The Pan- Africa E-Network project is one of the most important contributors to its development. At the

level of health, Apollo hospital in New Delhi is now fully connected with the International and Medical and Technical University as also the Military hospital in Dar-es-Salaam. Airtel has already launched its telecom service in Africa and is one of the biggest telecom service providers in South Africa. Technology, coupled with the skill development initiatives undertaken by India, has left its unique mark in the African continent.


Despite various kinds of developmental assistance provided by India, some of the key obstacles in enhancing trade with Africa are as follows:

- Political instability in Africa and absence of stable regimes and rule of law.
- Corruption in African governments acting as a deterrent for private firms.
- Lack of regulatory framework and regime architecture.
- Lack of access to institutional finance to promote trade.
- Logistical concerns and poor connectivity in the hinterland.

India and Africa can explore future relationships in trade, especially in healthcare and automobile. Africa presents numerous opportunities for cooperation in healthcare due to presence of widespread diseases like HIV, TB and Malaria, and so on. Africa not only lacks effective healthcare delivery but also has scarce public resources. The Indian pharmacy sector has recorded vibrant growth. It has not only shown noticeable progress in generic drugs but also quality medicines for TB, Malaria, and so forth. This is one area where India pharma sector can envisage a future market.



As the economy of Africa improves and people have more income, the demand for automobiles will increase. Maruti, Tata and Mahindra are already household names in Ghana, Nigeria and Cameroon. This is yet another area where, if certain bottlenecks are removed, India can emerge as an important player.



DIPLOMATIC ISSUES RELATED TO SECURITY AND PIRACY

Since independence, India has been consistent in sending Peace keeping Forces (PKF) to assist the UN in the process of decolonisation. The decisions of participation in UN

activities through the PKF not only helps India achieve its foreign policy goal of maintaining peace but also increases India's prestige. In a very strategic sense, India does not achieve any goals related to national interest in the purest sense, as the PKF undertakes no combat roles on the ground. The PKF is primarily responsible for peace keeping. The participation gives Indian agencies exposure to the different kinds of conflict, which provides important lessons for logistics and military diplomacy. The participation of the PKF is overall in sync with Article 51 of our Constitution which aims to promote peace and security at the international level. There is a Permanent Mission of India (PMI) in New York at the UN office. An officer of the rank of colonel in the Indian army receives requests by the UN for the PKF. The PMI forwards the application to the MEA. The file is then forwarded after clearance at MEA to the Ministry of Defence. A tri-services board under the Director General of Staff reviews the request, takes the necessary decision and hands the file back to the MEA. The file is then presented by the MEA to the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) and after approval, the MEA announces the decision to send forces in the Parliament. Thus, the decision to send the PKF is at the sole discretion of the Union Executive. Till date, India has sent PKFs in Namibia, Mozambique, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Congo and Sudan. In Africa, the PKF focuses primarily on peace and humanitarian assistance. For example, in Congo, our officials have provided medical treatment in the UN hospitals. One of the most important contributions of Indian PKF in Africa has been the promotion of gender equality. In 2004, India stationed its first ever full women's battalion of 125 (RPF) officers in Liberia.




Future of Peace Keeping Mission (PKM)

As argued above, India is a key contributor to PKM in Africa. In the recent times there is a debate if the Peace Keeping model, funded by the West and manned by the states of Asia is sustainable or not? Questions are arising if India gains anything out of such a model or not? The PKM model is becoming unsustainable because African countries that have manpower to protect themselves are not consulted in the process of designing a PKM and are deprived of an opportunity to use their own manpower. The Asian state that is getting the responsibility for the mission is also not consulted by the Western power in the mission design. The Western powers design the missions and prescribe the missions to Asian states. In this scenario, India can set up a new forum with Africa to discuss issues related to high level defense diplomacy. Under a new India-Africa Defense dialogue, India can enhance the military preparedness of the African continent by training African manpower. This kind of training by India, that has considerable skills and expertise in problems like terrorism, civil unrest and insurgency etc, can open a new chapter in the India and Africa relationship.

Piracy as an exercise has been flourishing in the Horn of Africa region. It is primarily

based in Somalia from where it spreads out in the seas affecting many nations in the Indian Ocean. Somalia is an easy base for piracy due to the absence of a stable government in the country. The US office of naval intelligence has undertaken a deep study to understand the modus operandi of Somali pirates. The office is of the view that Somali pirates undertake piracy mainly for ransom money. The pirates have a well-established system of informers in foreign ports. When the ship passes through the Horn of Africa, the pirates, through well-established, specialised teams on ground and sea, launch pirate attacks. The pirate teams on the sea have in-depth knowledge of the sea and possess other maritime skills. As the pirates in Somalia have established a good network with terrorist groups operating in the Maghreb region, availability of arms is not a difficult task. Unlike pirates in the seas of South East Asia who also loot the goods from the merchant vessel and sell it in black markets, Somali pirates are only interested in taking ships hostage and demanding ransom. The merchant firms operating vessels in the region pay ransom money to get the ships released and this emboldens the pirates.

At times, Somali pirates disguise themselves as coast guard and naval agencies and are able to fool the merchant vessels.



Why is Piracy Rampant in Somalia?

In the early modern times, the territory of Somaliland was occupied by three colonial players. One part was occupied by British, the second by Italy and the third by the French. The part occupied by the French became a new state called Djibouti. The rest of Somaliland gained independence in 1960. In 1960, there was a coup by Siad Barre wherein took over the control of the state. Opposition rebels began to fight against Siad Barre. Two prominent opposition groups emerged, namely, the Somalia National Movement (SNM) and the United Somalia Congress (USC). The two parties, SNM and USC, started controlling the northern and southern territories and succeeded in ousting Siad Barre in 1991. Despite the ousting of Barre, no united government emerged as factionalism grew to the extent where tribal warlords began to assert control over their clans, creating a situation of complete anarchy. The tribal clans turned to piracy to sustain themselves. Absence of a stable centralised government since 1991 has aggravated stability issues making Somalia politically fragile.

Due to rise in piracy, the cost of transporting goods has increased. The ships have started circumventing the area in favour of a longer route in deep sea to avoid piracy. Shipping firms have increased security on board of ships. The insurance firms have hiked

the premiums. All this have led to an increase in the cost of trade. Nations have resorted to resolutions at the UN level. These UN level resolutions have legalised naval presence in Somali water. Countries have stationed their navies to protect the sea lanes of communication.

India has also likewise increased its naval presence in the Horn of Africa. India has urged the UN to track the ransom money being paid by help of international agencies like Interpol. India has been advocating that all Joint Anti-Piracy Operations (JAPO) be brought under the UN ambit and domestically, all nations create laws to criminalise piracy. Indian Navy has been protecting sea lines of communication since 2008. The Indian coast guard has established new district head offices in Kavarati and in Minicoy. Through naval presence in Mauritius, Seychelles and Maldives, India has been able to keep the pirates in check. India has also clarified in an annual report released by the Ministry of Defence that the Indian Ocean region is central to Indian interests and piracy in the region is a cause of serious concern, to combat which the Indian Navy is ready to play a critical role in the region.

The long-term solution lies in international collaboration to criminalise ransom payment and undertake adequate social engineering to create a unified society in Somalia. A stable government, skills to the population and creation of jobs in the fishing industry can help in a big way in future.

DIPLOMATIC POLICY OF CHINA IN AFRICA

One of India's main competitors in Africa is China. Our aim in this part is to analyse Chinese presence in Africa and scrutinise the Chinese approach in the continent.

Chinese presence in Africa goes back to the Cold War times. It was during Mao's era that the Chinese began to promote armed struggle in Africa against decolonisation, which appealed to many African states. This also gave China an opportunity to provide economic aid for decolonised nations, thereby making inroads in these states. However, the Chinese engagement in Africa emerges aggressively after the end of Cold War. As Chinese economy began to grow by the 1990s, it also began to search for resources. Africa, being a resource-rich region, was a natural choice for China. China also found Africa to be a favourable market for its goods. In order to develop Africa as a sustained supplier of resources and a market for goods, China began to undertake creation of infrastructure in Africa so that it gives China an easy route to transport resources back home. Apart from this, China has been giving a lot of economic aid to Africa.

However, many are dissatisfied with the aggressive Chinese resource-centric policy towards African. The scholars assert that the Chinese model in Africa is based on its greed for resources. A simple algorithm lies at the heart of its policy: China goes to an African nation, sets up industries and factories, exports Chinese labour to Africa, digs out resources from the nation, brings the resources back using infrastructure they have created to connect the industry to the port. De Soysa (a scholar) remarks that in this entire Chinese model, the African country does not stand to gain anything except very little pecuniary profit in the form of taxation. The lives of ordinary Africans in that country do not change as the people receive no skill development from China so that they are absorbed in the industry. This leads to a lot of disenchantment in the local people, leading ultimately to a

kind of hatred against the Chinese presence. However, the state, instead of supporting the people, supports the Chinese in their endeavours, ultimately becoming a rentier state. (A rentier state is a state which derives all or a substantial portion of its national revenues from the rent of indigenous resources to external clients.) This ultimately weakens institutional development in Africa.

China has, as per its ‘going out strategy,’ tried to link its domestic development to its global aspirations. The going out strategy is reflected well in Africa where China has diplomatic relations with more than 48 African nations. The basic strategy is to give Africa aid, and undertake trade and diplomacy to establish a market for goods. We also need to remember that Africans have an inclination for China as, firstly, African states are motivated by the Chinese state led economic development model that has made them a regional hegemonic power. They take pride in how China, under Deng Xiaoping, started from a scratch to reach where it is today. This state directed capitalism, despite China being a communist regime, has earned it respect in Africa.

Secondly, the Africans to some extent are disillusioned with lack of development of their domestic economies despite proximate ties with West and Europe since a very long time. But the most important connecting factor between Africa and China is how the Africans are portrayed. The West has always been pessimistic about the future of Africa, partially due to deeply entrenched habits of racial profiling a feeling of racial superiority. For example, in one of the covers of *The Economist* magazine, it went on to brand Africa as a hopeless continent. In contrast, China has always appreciated African dynamism, winning a lot of confidence amongst Africans.

The Chinese model is unique in Africa in the sense that China allows poorly performing corporates backhome to take up opportunities in Africa. If a corporate has not been performing well, the Chinese government would encourage that company to re-emerge and prove its worth by giving it support in exploring the African market. It has been seen that, with state support, these companies are able to re-emerge powerfully. This kind of an exercise also boosts the domestic corporate sector. The networking for corporate sectors is enhanced further by interaction undertaken by China at the Forum for China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC).

All this gives China an opportunity to play a deeper role in Africa and gain the needed diplomatic weight at international forums.



Chinese Naval Base in Africa and Implications on India

China has established the first ever naval base in Africa in Djibouti. This is an attempt by China to enhance its international clout. The base is located in the Indian Ocean and is perceived by Indian strategists as an attempt to encircle India as a part of Chinese String of Pearls Alliance network (which already includes naval bases in Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka). In the recent times, Chinese are also investing in ports in Sri Lanka (Hambantota port) and Pakistan (Gwadar port) and these ports are being designed to accommodate naval vessels of China. This means that there will be an enhanced naval presence of China proximate to India. Though China has asserted that it would be using the Djibouti naval base for anti-piracy and humanitarian relief operations, but, India's R&AW has clearly asserted that port will have permanent Chinese troop presence (of Chinese Marine Corps, nearly one lakh soldiers) also. Thus, such a strong naval presence in Indian Ocean has raised alarm bells in South Block.

FUTURE POLICY FOR INDIA

India has harnessed its historical relations with Africa and envisages a bright future ahead. India also acknowledges that Africa is a vibrant continent and the next growth pole in the world (as articulated by former Indian PM Dr. Manmohan Singh). The Indian engagement is beyond resources and spreads well into IT, pharmacy, Agriculture, skill, training and capacity building, and so on. India's aim is to assist Africa in its overall development, with a larger aim of security and peace with convergence on global issues. In the twenty first century, India has also expanded its footprint aptly in the Indian Ocean owing to new security challenges emerging.



Apart from these, there are a few other areas where India and Africa need to cooperate more which require changes in diplomacy from the Indian side. Some salient points are given below:

- India needs to firstly articulate a policy on Africa and engage with the continent through a doctrine.
- India needs to appoint an ambassador of India for Africa in the MEA who would act as a nerve centre for all policies in Africa.
- India should widen the discussion dynamics at the IAFS level and bring the private sector and the civil society in the IAFS platform rather than restricting it only to government-to-government interactions.
- It would be best for India if in cooperation with Africa it announces a skill development policy and helps African skill development through quantitative

target setting.

- The MEA can designate the Indian diaspora as unofficial ambassador in its endeavour of soft power export and publicise the good work done in India to mould a framework public opinion.
- India has to accelerate engagement with Africa by injecting blateralism in the diplomatic processes. This will give India an opportunity to have one on one interaction with African nations. For Example, Morroco in the recent times has initiated a moderate islamic programme which is exclusively designed for tackling radicalisation. India can enhance its cooperation with Morroco at this level.
- India has to spend more diplomatic capital to popularize the projects it is funding and executing in Africa. For example, in the recent times, after the outbreak of Ebola epidemic, India has emerged as one of the top donors to Africa but our efforts have not received adequate publicity.
- India needs to evolve a suitable soft policy strategy with Africa that can yield bilateral mutual benefits. For example, India can envisage tie up between Indian Bollywood and Nigerian Nollywood.
- India can improve direct flight connectivity from India with Africa, which remains very poor till date.

2
CHAPTER

India and Mauritius Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Basic Background
- Defence and security diplomacy
- Commercial diplomacy
- Analysis of PM Visit to Mauritius


BASIC BACKGROUND

The relations between India and Mauritius go back to the 1820s. This was the time period when the British began to take workers and labour from India to work on plantations. In 1834, when slavery was abolished in Britain, the labour began to work as indentured servants. There was also a transfer of skilled labour from India to Mauritius at the time when it became a French Colony. The French demanded skilled carpenter and masons, and many Indians began to work under French. Mahatma Gandhi, on his way to South Africa on ship S.S. Nowshera, halted in Mauritius, making it a historic event. In order to recognise Gandhian Contribution to Africa, Mauritius celebrates 12th March, the date when Gandhi launched Dandi March, as its National Day. India, after its independence, opened up diplomatic relations in Mauritius in 1948, much before Mauritius got independence (Mauritius gained independence from the French in 1968). Over a period of time, Mauritius has gone on to become one of the most valuable and strategic partners of India. The importance is due to multiple reasons, which include proximity to sea lanes of communication to foreign trade and tremendous economic investment flowing from Mauritius to India. Mauritius has a very special place in Indian strategic thought and foreign policy. This is clearly reflected by the fact that Mauritius was the only non-SAARC nation to be invited for the swearing-in ceremony of the new Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2014.

DEFENCE AND SECURITY DIPLOMACY

Due to its proximity to sea routes used for trade, India has realised the significance to protect the sea lanes of communication jointly with Mauritius. This has opened up a very deep strategic and defence dimension in the Indo–Mauritius relationship. Considering the strategic significance and geopolitical importance of Mauritius for India, it has over a period of time, invested in enhancing the strategic and defence capabilities of Mauritius. India has deep naval collaboration with Mauritius and regularly undertakes joint naval patrolling and surveillance. India has also taken adequate steps to bolster the counter piracy capabilities of Mauritius by providing it with advanced light helicopters, radar systems and offshore patrolling vehicles. A key component of our defence collaboration is

also India providing training to the police force and officers of the Mauritian armed forces.



India and Mauritius Maritime Security Agreement-2017

In May 2017, Mauritius PM Pravind Jugnauth visited India. In the bilateral talks, India extended 500 Million Dollars Line of Credit to the island state. India has also asserted that as Mauritius is a front line state in the Indian Ocean, it will be the responsibility of India to provide collective maritime security. In order to protect people and ensure economic security, India has agreed to cooperate with Mauritius to prevent conventional and non conventional threats to each other. The Bilateral Mutual Maritime Security Agreement envisages cooperation between the two sides on issues ranging from sea piracy to drug trafficking to illegal fishing and illegal exploration. The National Coast Guard (NCG) of Mauritius has initiated a project for integrated development of its coastal capabilities. The project is called Project Trident. Under the Bilateral Mutual Maritime Security Agreement, India has decided to support the project Trident. During the visit of Pravind, the two sides concluded two MoU's on research and education in marine sciences and technology and setting up of a civil services college in Mauritius.

COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY

The India–Mauritius relation is not just about defence and trade, but also includes an important economic dimension. Mauritius is one of the top investment destinations to India. India's economic relations with Mauritius go back to 1982, when the two countries signed a convention for avoidance of double taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion. The idea envisaged in 1982 was that this convention will ease trouble for NRI investors who want to bring money to India through Mauritius to save tax. The treaty clearly stated that if investors routed their investments through Mauritius, they would be exempted from double taxation due to the treaty being in place. As India liberalised its economy in the 1990s, a lot of investors began using the Mauritius route to get tax exemption. Investors, however, began to take advantage of the loopholes in the treaty. Shell companies over a period of time were established to route in the investment. As these loopholes became prominently visible after 2001 stock market scam, the Indian government initiated negotiations to fix the loopholes. Apart from the incoming FII, India is also one of the largest trading partners of Mauritius. India has also been extending lines of credit to Mauritius for capacity building and infrastructure. Some of the prominent India funded projects include Jawaharlal Nehru Hospital and Gandhi and Tagore Institutes in Mauritius, to name a few. India-Mauritius trade in 2014-15 was worth around \$1.9 billion. India and Mauritius are discussing the possibility of concluding a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation and

Partnership Agreement (CECPA) . The Comprehensive Economic Cooperation and Partnership Agreement (CECPA) will build upon the India-Mauritius Double Tax Avoidance Agreement (DTAA).

Operation Lal Dora and R&AW in Mauritius

During the 1980s, the PM of Mauritius was a pro-India politician named Anerood Jugnauth. He feared a military coup in Mauritius in 1983 by his opponent Paul Berenger. Anerood asked Indira Gandhi for help. The Indian PM, along with other senior officials, planned a military expedition to Mauritius to help Anerood. An army battalion was moved to Mumbai to be sent to Mauritius. But the operation was aborted at the last minute as the R&AW station chief of Mauritius was able to control the crises through intense negotiations and diplomacy, thereby averting not only a military expedition by India at the height of the Cold War but also political chaos in Mauritius. Surprisingly, Anerood Jugnauth was the Prime Minister of Mauritius again from 2014–17.

ANALYSIS OF PRIME MINISTERIAL VISIT TO MAURITIUS, 2015

Considering the strategic significance of Mauritius, the Indian PM visited Mauritius in 2015. Before the PM landed, INS Delhi and INS Sarveshak had already ported in Mauritius. The visit of the PM was a significant one as it touched every dimension of India's relationship to Mauritius, from defence, maritime security to economy to culture. India granted a 500-million-dollar line of credit to Mauritius. The PM committed Mauritius assistance in diversification of its economy by support to oil, finance and ICT development. The most important dimension was that of maritime security. India advocated that all maritime conflicts be resolved through international laws in place. India also made a strong commitment to support security and growth for all in the regions of the Indian Ocean. The Indian PM also commissioned MCGS Barracuda, which is a patrol vehicle built in India and gifted to Mauritius.


India–Mauritius Youth Cooperation 2015 —YUVA

One of the key features of our growing relationship is the rising importance attached to the youth playing the role of a bridge between the two countries. YUVA or Youth United to Voluntary Action is an organisation deeply entrenched in Mauritius, offering innovation through youth exchange. It has mainly focussed on encouraging the youth of Mauritius to focus on social awareness and benefit for all in society. During the PM's visit to Mauritius in 2015, he called upon YUVA, which also signified the growing importance to youth acting as a bridge in the relationship.

A taste of cultural relationship was visible in the bilateral visit when the Indian PM laid foundation stone of the World Hindi Secretariat building in Phoenix, followed by his participation in a prayer ceremony at Ganga Talao, which is a prominent Hindu shrine dedicated to Lord Shiva. The PM also spoke about the enormous contribution of Mauritius

to Hindi literature and how Mauritius has contributed to enriching Indian language and culture.

Various MoUs were also bilaterally concluded which included the MoU on Ocean economy done to deepen security cooperation, MoU on culture envisaging increased people to people contacts for 2015–18 and MoU on popularisation of traditional medicine as core component to boost cultural ties.



India and Agalega Islands—Strategic Asset Development, 2015

The Agalega islands are almost 110 km away from Mauritius, close by to Southern coast of India. The island has a very small population but the presence of Indian diaspora is quite evident. The islands are very strategically located. In 2015, during the Indian PM's visit to Mauritius, the government of Mauritius had granted permission to India to undertake infrastructure development rights on the Agalega islands. As per the agreement, India will refurbish an existing airstrip in Agalega and develop a new jetty. There is a possibility of India installing radars in Agalega. Though the bagging of IDR does not mean that India is going to develop Agalega as a naval base, as a purely strategic investment, this certainly helps India to increase its footprint in the Indian Ocean.

Another crucial aspect of the Indian PM's visit to Mauritius in 2015 was that he was able to successfully give a push to restarting the negotiations for Double Taxation Avoidance Treaty. After the PM's visit, economists and diplomats were back on the table and finally in May 2016, almost one year after the PM's visit, the negotiators were able to push through the deal. The old treaty with Mauritius now stands to be amended. As per the amendment, any investment coming to India now cannot enter without paying a tax on sale of shares if the money is being routed through Mauritius. This amendment and the respective clauses of the treaty do not apply on investment being routed through Mauritius till 1st April, 2017. In fact, investment coming in till March, 2019 also has to pay only half rates. The amendment also aptly addresses the issue of shell companies. Now, any company in Mauritius routing money to India with an operating expenditure of less than 27 lakh rupees shall be designated as a shell company trying to take advantage of the treaty.

Overall, we can safely conclude the relationship with Mauritius is not just historical but also strategic and that, in the near future, the relationship is likely to unfold more deeply as India enhances its strategic footprint in the Indian Ocean.

3
CHAPTER

India and Kenya Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Historical Background
- Commercial Diplomacy


HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Kenya was a British protectorate and a colony since 1895. Due to the presence of the British, a lot of Indians were taken to Kenya during the colonial period. The Indians were taken by the British for skilled work and trade. As India became independent, it established official diplomatic relations with Kenya, though it was more of a continuity from the past as the British had already established an office of the Commonwealth General in Kenya. Kenya became independent in 1963. At that time, the Indian diaspora in Kenya stood at two per cent of the Kenyan population. The best part about our diaspora in Kenya is that it is not only economically well off, but also acts as an important bridge in the relationship between the two nations today.

COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY


Apart from the diaspora links, India and Kenya have a decent trade-based relationship. In 1981, the two countries concluded a trade agreement and conferred the status of most favoured nation to each other. In 1983, the two countries established a joint trade commission to promote bilateral trade. In February 2015, the 7th India–Kenya Joint Trade Commission meeting was held. In the meeting, both nations presented identified themes of bilateral cooperation. Infrastructure has been identified as a key area of future cooperation in 2015. However, the 7th Trade Commission has also envisaged cooperation in agriculture, horticulture and mining activities. India exports pharmacy products, steel, power transmission equipment to Kenya and receives soda ash, vegetables, tea, leather products and metal from Kenya. In 1989, the two countries have concluded a Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement.

In the recent times, the treaty is being renegotiated to make it adaptable to the 21st century trade scenario. India has been also extending lines of credit to Kenya for development and also invites Kenyan students to India for study. A lot of scholarships are given under ITEC and cultural programmes. India also provides a professional course for Kenyan diplomats in India.




Due to the sizeable presence of the Indian Diaspora, a lot of Indian companies are present in various sectors in Kenya, such as power transmission and energy. There is prominent presence of Essar energy and Reliance in hydrocarbons while Kirloskar is in power transmission. There is presence of Doctor Reddy and Cipla in Pharmacy and Tata, TVS and Mahindra in automobiles. There is presence of Central Bank of India, HDFC and Bank of India also in the banking sector. In fact, Bank of India has four branches in Kenya.

In February 2015, an Indian Engineering Expo was organised in Nairobi. A lot of Indian firms have expressed their desire to invest in three core sectors.



Indian companies are keen to explore the pharmacy sector in Kenya since it offers tremendous scope for pharmacy supplies. Firstly, due to improved life expectancy in Kenya, advancement in access to health has opened up a huge opportunity for Indian pharmacy firms. Secondly, Kenya acts as a base to export medicines to the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda and Ethiopia. This again motivates Indian pharmacy players to explore the neighbouring markets. Thus, many Indian companies in pharmacy are hopeful of exploring business elsewhere through Kenya.



The Indian PM's Visit to Kenya in July, 2016

The Indian PM visited Kenya and held talks with Uhuru Kenyatta. India extended 44.95 million dollars line of credit to Kenya for assistance in small industrial development and the textile sector. To strengthen our bonds over healthcare, India has committed to the development of a cancer hospital in Kenya. As Kenya is a maritime state and is also affected by the threats of piracy, the two nations have decided to undertake maritime cooperation. India has committed assistance to Kenya for the development of its economy as also for skill development.

4
CHAPTER

Indian and Mozambique Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Historical Diplomacy
- Defense Diplomacy
- Commercial and Oil Diplomacy
- Analysis of Mozambique President's visit to India
- Analysis of Indian PM visit to Mozambique

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Mozambique was a colony of Portugal since 1752 and was ruled from Goa for 200 years. In 1962, a party called Frelimo Front of Liberation of Mozambique began its struggle against Portugal and finally succeeded. In its diplomatic relations with Mozambique. India has always had cordial relations which have only taken greater heights in the recent times.

DEFENCE DIPLOMACY

Apart from trade and oil based relations, one of the most important areas of our cooperation is defence and maritime cooperation. It was back in 2003 that, on request of Mozambique, India sent naval ships for maritime security in the Maputo coast. India, again on Mozambique's request, sent naval ships for security during the African Union Summit in 2003 and the World Economic Forum meet in 2004. Since then some of our prominent naval ships, like INS - Ranjit, INS- Delhi, INS Deepak and INS – Teg, have been regular visitors to the coast of Mozambique. Mozambique is one of India's four most important partners in ocean economy.




In 2011, India and Mozambique concluded an MoU on maritime patrolling and in 2012, concluded an agreement for joint anti-piracy patrolling. Both these agreements have added more depth to our existing maritime engagement. In August, 2015, the President of Mozambique, Filipe Jacinto Nyusi, visited India. During his visit, both sides concluded MoUs on Cooperation on new and renewable energy. Both sides have agreed to enhance naval cooperation and conduct more hydrographic surveys in the region.




COMMERCIAL AND OIL DIPLOMACY

In 2011, Mozambique discovered natural gas. Many analysts view this development positively. It is now accepted that this discovery of natural gas is likely to transform the economy of Mozambique and give it a much-needed thrust. A lot of Indian firms are already doing business in Mozambique in the Hydrocarbon sector.



In the next four years, till 2019, India is planning to pump more money in the oil sector of Mozambique to convert the natural gas into liquefied natural gas. Once the gas is liquefied, it will be easier to transport it. India's OVL has already purchased 10% stake from Videocon in Rovuma and 10% stake from the US firm Anadarko Petron corporation. In future, India is planning to export the LNG and, once converted into liquefied form, bring the same to India. India is also eyeing Robomo gas reserves in Mozambique for energy security. Both sides, in their MoU, have prioritised research and development (R&D) and technology transfer in solar, wind and geothermal energy.




Apart from this, both have prioritised the establishment of a joint working group on defence cooperation and infrastructure creation.

ANALYSIS OF THE VISIT OF MOZAMBIQUE'S PRESIDENT TO INDIA

While the President of Mozambique was in a state visit to India, he also visited Ahmedabad. It is interesting to note that Nyusi is a IIM Ahmadabad alumni and had


studied there in 2003 when he undertook a management development programme for four months. During his visit to the IIM, he also addressed a conference on the theme ‘Make Africa your Partner’ and showcased multiple investment opportunities in East Africa. He also paid an official visit to Arvind Limited Plant in Santej and the Sabarmati Ashram.

In 2016, as the oil and gas prices have been taking a plunge, India has taken the lead to negotiate the creation of an alliance of gas importers. This has been done to prevent price shocks. The Gas Authority of India Limited is India’s official leader in the negotiations. In June, 2016, a high-level delegation from the commerce and agriculture ministries of India had visited Mozambique. The delegation had been sent to explore the possibilities of the import of pulses. The delegation had also been tabled to explore if contract farming option were feasible in Mozambique for pulse imports. This is primarily done to enhance buffer stock of pulses in India due to rise in pulse prices. As *tur* and *arhar* pulses are grown in Mozambique, there could be future imports to India for the same.




ANALYSIS OF INDIAN PM'S VISIT TO MOZAMBIQUE, JULY 2016

In July, 2016, the Indian PM visited Mozambique and met Filipe Nyusi. The PM began his five-day Africa tour with Mozambique as the first destination.




During the visit, the PM described Mozambique as India’s “trusted friend” and a “reliable partner.” The PM also committed assistance to Mozambique in its public health ventures and assured Mozambique of supply of essential medicines from India. A decision has also been taken to enhance defence training and development as Mozambique forces are provided defence training and development by India. As Mozambique is a coastal

nation, it also faces significant threats due to maritime piracy. As India's trade engagement is likely to increase in future with Mozambique, both nations have decided to cooperate on maritime security and ensure protection of sea lanes of communication. In order to effectively meet the security challenges arising out of threats emanating from Indian Ocean region, both nations have agreed to cooperate on defence engagement.



An agreement on hydrocarbon cooperation has been envisaged. After Qatar and Australia, Mozambique emerges as the third largest natural gas exporter. ONGC has already invested heavy amounts in natural gas sector of Mozambique. Due to severe drought in India in 2014 and 2015, the production of pulses in India has been affected. The demand for pulses has grown while the supply has not been adequate due to a severe price rise. An important achievement during the PM's visit to Mozambique has been the conclusion of an agreement for pulses supply. The government has signed a long-term contract for pulses import from Mozambique. India will encourage Mozambique in pigeon peas cultivation and will import the produce through designated government agencies and private channels. The agreement has been signed for an initial period of five years. To begin with, the government in India will import 1,00,000 tonnes in 2016–17 and double it by 2020–21.



During the visit, the Indian PM also interacted with students of Mozambique who have studied in India at the Science and Technology Park, Maulana. He also interacted with the Indian diaspora settled in Mozambique.

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
India and Nigeria Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Historical Background
- Defense Diplomacy
- Commercial and Oil Diplomacy

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Nigeria had been a British Colony since the 1850s. India, however, established relations with Nigeria as early as 1958, though Nigeria became independent only in 1960. India and Nigeria have a long common struggle against apartheid and colonialism. India had supported Nigeria in its struggle on both fronts. Nehru visited Nigeria in 1962. The relations between both have been cordial despite irregular state visits by either side. Since Nehru's visit, the next high level bilateral visit happened only in 2007 when Dr Manmohan Singh visited Nigeria and concluded the India–Nigeria Strategic Partnership Agreement.




DEFENCE DIPLOMACY

India and Nigeria have a defence based relationship. The components in defence cooperation are those of training and capacity building. India offers training to defence officers of Nigeria at the NDA and the IMA in India. India, at the diplomatic level, has a defence attaché in its High Commission in Nigeria. In 2015, India decided to provide defence hardware to Nigeria to enhance military cooperation.

COMMERCIAL AND OIL DIPLOMACY

One of the most important dimensions in the relationship between India and Nigeria is trade. Nigeria is a resource-rich country and is in possession of a lot of crude oil. India today imports anything between 8–12% of Nigerian crude oil. India exports to Nigeria commodities like pharmacy products, rice and rubber while it imports oil, steel and cashew. Though, at the trade level there is an imbalance as India imports more (crude oil being the factor) than its exports, as the Nigerian economy has embarked upon a programme of diversification, the trade imbalance is likely to be rectified soon. Due to the diversification of the Nigerian economy, tremendous scope for Indian investment in infrastructure, and energy education, financial inclusion and poverty alleviation can be envisaged. To encourage firms to take advantage of the diversification of Nigerian economy, it has offered tax rebates and other benefits to various companies. A lot of Indian firms are already present in Nigeria. Bharti Airtel, Essar and Tata are some firms doing good business. Bajaj has been exporting a lot of automobile units to Nigeria. In August, 2015, Indian High Commission in Nigeria organised a ‘Brand India’ exercise. A lot of Indian companies, like NIIT, Tata, Dabur, Ashok Leyland, and so on, used this forum to showcase their expertise in infrastructure and IT sectors.

As per R. Ghyanahyam, IFS and India’s High Commissioner to Nigeria, there is immense trade potential between India and Nigeria, which can be significantly enhanced if both nations try to guarantee investment protection. In 2017, at the 4th India–Africa Hydrocarbon Conference in New Delhi, India had committed to double its oil imports from Nigeria. Nigeria, in the recent times, has tried to modify its oil selling and contract policies. Before this modification, the buyers of Nigerian oil had to purchase oil from spot markets. The problem of purchasing oil from spot markets was that it was vulnerable to price shocks. Nigeria has now started encouraging term contracts. As per a term contract, a fixed quantity of oil is to be supplied to contracting party at a stable price. Nigeria has also decided to sell oil directly to oil suppliers. In this context of a modified policy architecture, the Indian Oil Company (IOC) stands to gain as it had decided to agree for a term contract import of three million tonnes per annum crude from Nigeria in 2016.



ICT development: As a lot of Indian companies are in Nigeria, one area of potential cooperation is corporate learning, software development and value-added services. As the demand for tele connectivity and internet grows in Nigeria, the Indian corporate sector can enhance the ICT skills of Nigerian population in association with government agencies. This will create a lot of goodwill for India in Nigeria.

Healthcare: In Nigeria, healthcare is a neglected area. The Nigerian government has not yet equipped Nigerian healthcare with the needed capacity. This provides an opportunity for India. More so, in Nigeria there is an attitude amongst people to give preference to anything which is foreign. This attitude is most visible in healthcare. Every month, more than 5000 people on an average fly abroad for treatment. A lot of Nigerians also come to India as treatments in India are cheaper than in the US and Europe. However, the lack of connectivity via direct flights between India and Nigeria creates a difficulty in mobilisation of patients. Thus, two things can be done to leverage the opportunity. First, to take medical tourism to its full potential, we can enhance flight connectivity with daily, regular direct flights and secondly, encourage Indian hospitals to open up hospitals to cater to the market in Nigeria itself (for instance, Apollo hospital has opened a hospital in Nigeria lately).

6 CHAPTER

India and Angola Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Historical Background
- Commercial and Oil Diplomacy
- Analysis of Angolan Agriculture minister visit to India

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Angola was a colony of the Portuguese. Portugal continued to rule in Angola till 1974. After a revolution in Portugal in 1974, its colonial empire crumbled and in 1975, Angola gained independence from Portugal. However, as Portuguese rule ended in Angola, they did not hand over power to any particular political contender. This led to a civil war in Angola in 1975, which ended only in 2002. Due to the UN presence in Angola during the civil war, peace was established by 2002. India, on the other hand, had established diplomatic relations with Angola way back in 1975. However, the relationship could grow only from 2002.

OIL AND COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY


One of the key components of Angola–India relationship is the trade in oil. Angola is a very important country for India’s energy security. Angola is one of the largest suppliers of oil to India. India’s major items of export to Angola include transportation equipments, tractors, agricultural machinery, rice and imports include majorly crude oil. The state owned SONANGOL is the oil regulator and supplier in Angola. Apart from oil, Angola is also rich in diamonds. It is also a leading exporter of diamonds. A lot of Indian firms are also doing business in the oil sector in Angola. Some of the prominent firms include Reliance Oil, HPCL Mumbai and Engineering India limited. Lately, a lot of Indian companies are showing interest in rural and urban housing as the housing and construction industry in Angola is witnessing a boom.

Caminho de Ferro de Mocamedes and the Indian Railways

The Angolan government has initiated a project to rehabilitate and modernise the colonial railways of Angola. It is in this context that India cooperates with Angola. The government of India has provided technical assistance to Angola in Railways on the basis of a study done by RITES, India. India has provided locomotives and coaches to Angola for the route of Lubango to Pedrera. India has provided a 40-million-dollar line of credit for the railways in Angola.

ANALYSIS OF THE VISIT OF ANGOLAN AGRICULTURE MINISTER TO INDIA

In May, 2016, the Angolan agriculture minister, Afonso Pedro, paid a visit to India. He paid a visit to the Punjab Agriculture University and discussed with agricultural scientists the challenges Angola witnesses in agriculture. He not only invited a student delegation from Punjab Agriculture University to visit Angola to explore agro-forestry but also concluded some agreement on potential sectors.



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
India and Seychelles Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Historical Background
- Defence Diplomacy
- Analysis of Indian PM's visit to Seychelles in 2015


HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Seychelles is an island territory comprising of 115 islands. Since 1794, it had been a colony of the British. From 1794 till 1903, Seychelles was administered by the British from Mauritius. From 1903 onward, Seychelles came to be governed as a separate British colony. Seychelles gained independence from the British in 1976. In the same year, India established its relations with Seychelles and opened a diplomatic mission in 1979. Seychelles witnessed a visit by Indian PM Indira Gandhi in 1981.



DEFENCE DIPLOMACY

The most important component of India–Seychelles relationship is defence cooperation, which functions on multiple levels.



India has been providing training to the Seychelles People's Defence Forces (SPDF). The SPDF contingents are regularly provided with theoretical and on-ground training by India. India is a part of 25 nation combined task force established to tackle piracy emerging out of coast of Bahrain. Piracy is also rampant in East Africa and the island states are crucial in the fight against piracy.



India, in its attempt to fight piracy in East Africa, has assisted Seychelles in bolstering its counter piracy capabilities. Seychelles also funds India as a stable and a non-threatening ally for maritime security. India has sent naval ships to Seychelles on its request in 2009 to assist Seychelles's fight against piracy. In fact, back in 2006, India had gifted Seychelles INS Tarmugli, which was inducted by Seychelles as Ps Topaz. India, in 2014, also gifted INS Tarasa to Seychelles which was a ship for naval surveillance and patrolling.



Operation 'Flowers are Blooming' and R&AW in Seychelles

Seychelles was one the most hotly contested territories during the Cold War. The US wanted to establish a military base in Seychelles. Even Russia wanted a base in Seychelles to challenge the USA's military base in Diego Garcia. Seychelles defended its territory very powerfully during that period to ensure that neither of the two powers succeeded in their goal. In 1977, a socialist leader, Albert Rene, gained power in Seychelles through a military coup. Since then, a lot of attempts of coup were made in Seychelles to remove Albert Rene. A most embarrassing situation had emerged in 1981 when a South African secret service agent, Hick Hoare, had landed in Seychelles disguised as a businessman but his plan was unfolded the moment the security agencies of Seychelles discovered huge cache of arms in his check-in baggage. Hick Hoare hijacked an Air India plane AI-707 aircraft and flew to Johannesburg. Finally, to put an end to repeated coup attempts, Albert Rene decided to ask for help from India. In 1986, the R&AW station officer advised Albert Rene that his own Defence Ministry Qgilvy was planning a coup. Albert Rene had a dialogue with the then Indian PM (Indira Gandhi) who handed over the matter to

Admiral RH Tahiliani and R&AW officials. In close conference between Indian navy and the R&AW, it was decided that India would dispatch INS Vindhyaagiri to Seychelles to participate in the National Day celebrations of Seychelles. The plan was that the moment INS Vindhyaagiri would reach Seychelles, it would plant a request to increase its stay in Seychelles due to an engineering defect on board.

The operation was given its code name, ‘Flowers are blooming’. INS Vindhyaagiri reached Seychelles and reported the engineering defect and requested an increased stay, which was subsequently granted. In the next 12 days, during the INS Vindhyaagiri’s stay in Seychelles, the deck of the ship was used for aggressive power projections, conveying to the defence minister Qgilvy the clear consequences of a coup. The 12-day presence achieved the objective and Qgilvy left Seychelles and a coup was averted. Followed by this, in 1989, India established the Seychelles Defence Academy and began to strengthen the defence cooperation between the two nations.

ANALYSIS OF INDIAN PM’S VISIT TO SEYCHELLES—2015

Considering the strategic significance of Seychelles, the Indian PM paid a state visit to the country in 2015. The visit was to bolster the concept of blue economy. India had helped Seychelles to have a complete track of all naval ship movements in the region. The PM also concluded a pact on undertaking hydrographic survey and to provide a three months free visa-on-arrival for citizens of Seychelles to India.

The two nations have, since 2001, established a high level Joint Defence Coordination Committee. This committee is responsible for regular joint military exercises between the two nations. In February 2016, the 7th India–Seychelles military exercises, LAMITYE 2016, was organised in Victoria. The word lamitye, in the local Creole language, means friendship. The two nations undertook anti-piracy simulated exercise.

Infrastructure Development Rights (IDR) of Assumption Islands, 2015

Assumption Islands are islands with an area of 11.74 square kilometres, counted amongst the Aldabra group of islands. These islands are very popular amongst scientists who come to study the giant tortoises at Aldabra islands. India has got IDR for Assumption Islands. India will help in establishing a new jetty terminal, refurbish the airstrip and establish a forward base for the coast guard of Seychelles with all modern facilities. These developments will equip Seychelles with more power to help protect the tortoise species in the region and will also allow India to exert geopolitical influence in the Oceanic region.

Hydro graphic
surveys

2015 Indian
PM visit

Visa on
arrival

Radar for
interception

India also extends lines of credit to Seychelles and had assisted Seychelles in skill training under ITEC. Since 1978, Bank of Baroda has been present in Seychelles. Tata and Ashok Leyland in automobile and Airtel in telecom are common names. Under Ran Africa E-network project, hospital connectivity has been provided for. Approximately eight per cent of Seychelles's population descends from Indians, making our culture and values those that are commonly shared and nurtured.

8
CHAPTER

India and Namibia Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Historical Background
- Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and developments during Indian President's visit

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

India had been an ardent supporter of decolonisation in Namibia. We have already mentioned India's diplomatic efforts to establish the SWAPO to support Namibia in [Chapter 1](#) of this section. India established official diplomatic relations with Namibia in 1990, and have had extremely cordial relations since then.

CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENTS DURING INDIAN PRESIDENT'S VISIT—2016

In 2009, the two countries concluded an argument in civilian nuclear cooperation. Namibia is a signatory of the Treaty of Pelindaba. The treaty establishes an African nuclear weapons free zone. Namibia has the fourth largest reserves of Uranium in the world but being a signatory of Treaty of Pelindaba, it is prohibited to undertake any nuclear commerce with non-NPT signatories. Thus, Namibia has signed a nuclear deal with India but is unable to ratify or enforce it due to obligations under the Treaty of Pelindaba. As per India's outreach to Africa programme, the Indian President paid a visit to Namibia in June 2016. During the visit of the Indian President, cooperation was envisaged in multiple sectors. India has committed to the opening of a centre of excellence in ICT in Namibia. An agreement has been reached on India allowing training to Namibian civil servants. The nuclear issue also came up for discussion during the Presidential visit.

In Namibia, Uranium reserves are held by private players and are not under government control. India is planning joint venture uranium exploration with private players in Namibia. This will help us to explore an alternate route. In October 2016, a team of Department of Atomic Energy from India visited Namibia to explore a joint venture.



9
CHAPTER

India and Ghana and Cote D'Ivoire Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Historical Background
- Analysis of Indian President visit

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

India and Ghana's relations go back to the time of Nehru. A strong relationship was built by cooperation of Nehru and Kurume Nkrumah of Ghana. India has been supporting the development in Ghana over a period of time.

VISIT OF INDIAN PRESIDENT—2016

In June 2016, as per India's outreach to Africa programme, Indian President paid a visit to Ghana. During the visit, the two sides concluded an MoU on visa waiver for officials. A decision has been taken to establish a joint committee to enhance bilateral relations. India and Ghana have agreed to cooperate on exports of gold and cocoa to India and imports of pharmacy products, electronic equipment and telecom products from India. India has been providing lines of credit to Ghana and accessional financial assistance for its socio-economic development projects, like Komenda sugar plant and its fishing sector. Ghana has also expressed interest in exploring clean energy cooperation with India. It has expressed interest in nuclear cooperation as well.

India and Ivory Coast established diplomatic relations in 1979. For Ivory Coast, India is the core country on which it depends on for the development of agriculture, ICT, mining and infrastructure. India also supported Ivory Coast through the Pan Africa e-Network project and under ITEC scholarships. Ivory Coast exports cashews to India and imports pharmacy products and cereals. In June 2016, the Indian President visited Ivory Coast. He was accorded the National Order, the highest honour to a civilian, by Ivory Coast's President, Alassane Quattara.



Vice President of India's Visit to Tunisia and Morocco, May, 2016

The Vice President of India visited Tunisia and concluded pacts on cooperation on terrorism, ICT, and reforms in UNSC. The bilateral trade between India and Tunisia amounts to one billion dollars. Tunisia is a leading exporter of phosphate to India. The two nations have decided to envisage handicraft promotion and student exchange programmes.

The Vice President of India also paid a visit to Morocco. Rising India–Morocco tourism and business interactions are the driving force in our relations. The two nations have concluded an MoU on training of diplomats. Moroccan diplomats would participate in diplomatic training in India. India's CDAT will also be establishing a centre of excellence of IT in Morocco and India will assist in curriculum designing and skill training. Morocco has also expressed interest in India's Aadhaar Project.

10
CHAPTER

India and South Africa Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Historical Background
- India and South Africa Diplomatic relations
- Commercial Diplomacy
- Multilateral Diplomacy
- Analysis of Indian PM visit

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

India and South Africa (SA) share a historic bond. The relationship goes back to the times of British colonial rule of SA, with the British importing indentured labour from India. The most important personality in the relationship is certainly MK Gandhi. It is during his stay in SA that Gandhi developed and practised the technique of Satyagraha that later on became a key component of the Indian National Movement. It is his experience in SA that later on took the concrete shape of Afro-Asian solidarity in the early 20th century.

INDIA AND SA DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

The continued struggle of South Africans against apartheid had two impacts. Firstly, India officially decided to discontinue any diplomatic relationship with SA while apartheid was being officially recognised and practised. Secondly, India widened its global struggle against imperialism and colonialism to include apartheid and raised these three issues whenever necessary in global platforms. Throughout 1940s and 1950s, India continued to push for resolutions seeking to censure SA for apartheid at the UN level and other multilateral forums, including NAM. India also provided monetary support to the Organisation of African Unity Assistance Fund for the struggle against colonialism and apartheid. The relationship has improved only after the formal end of apartheid in 1994 and since then has grown on the basis of past Afro-Asian solidarity.

The improvement in the bilateral relationship can also be analysed within India's larger Africa policy framework (explained in the first chapter of this section). As India needs resources to sustain growth and to project power, SA becomes a crucial player, being one of the most resource-rich nations in the southern part of the African continent. Moreover, all the governments of SA post-1994 have been quite pragmatic and have ensured the development of their country through pertinent foreign policy tools.

COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY

One of the most pragmatic moves has been to include SA in BRICS and align with the

emerging economies than being dependent solely upon the west. The impact of pragmatism is visible on India-SA trade which has gone to reach almost 15 billion dollars at present. There is a huge demand of gold in India, and SA is one of the leading suppliers of gold to the country. Even the Indian private sector is quite keen to make use of SA as a base for sub-Saharan engagements. SA has a well-established financial market system, proper infrastructure and a stringent rule of law. Ranbaxy, Cipla, Tata, Mahindra are just some of the Indian firms to have made SA their base, to name a few. In order to enhance commercial engagement between India and SA, it is important for both to conclude a Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA).

MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY

Since both states are dominant players in the Indian ocean and since gold from SA comes via the ocean route, a potential area of cooperation for the two is piracy, peace and maritime security. SA has a strong navy but somehow is a little reluctant to project power in South East Africa as it feels that Africa lacks a coherent maritime strategy. SA is also reluctant to project power in Horn of Africa region because it believes that the problem of piracy in the area is more due to continuance of the failed state of Somalia. However, to protect its maritime zone, it has participated in joint naval exercises, despite its lack of urge to assert naval hegemonic power. Both India and SA can use Indian Ocean Rim Association as a forum to enhance maritime cooperation. The relation between the two nations is equally strong at the multilateral level. They are both represented at IBSA (India, Brazil, SA) framework and undertake broad cooperation. At the level of WTO and climate change negotiations through the BASIC group, both are known to undertake multilateral cooperation. A peculiar feature in their multilateral relationship is that SA intends to uphold a pan-African position in a majority of these cases, which, at time, strains the India-SA cooperation.




Arab Spring, SA and India and R2P

In 2011–12, India and SA, along with Nigeria and Guinea Bissau were represented in the UNSC as non-permanent members. One of the issues they confronted was NATO intervention against Libya. As the voting progressed, India abstained, while the three African states voted in favour of NATO intervention, clearly making cracks in India-SA multilateral diplomacy visible. The reasons that the Africans state voted in favour was because the UN Resolution 1973 synchronises with Article 4(h) of African Union's Constitutive Act of 2000 which supports collective intervention in a state to put a halt to mass atrocities. On the other hand, India continues to form non-intervention and sovereignty as its ideal policy in such matters of Responsibility to Protect (R2P).

Despite such strains, the relationship continues to grow and India will seek deep economic engagement in the time ahead with SA as its own demand for resources grows at home.

ANALYSIS OF INDIAN PM'S VISIT IN JULY—2016

The Indian PM, as a part of his four nation tour to Africa, in July 2016, visited South Africa and met Jacob Zuma.



In June, 2016, the annual plenary session of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) held its meeting in Seoul. In the meeting, an important agenda was India's membership to the NSG. However, some players, including South Africa, had raised procedural concerns, as a result of which India could not attain the membership in Seoul meeting. South Africa has been an ardent supporter of non-proliferation. Its non-proliferation credentials are so strong that in 1994, when South Africa ended apartheid, it went on to destroy its entire nuclear arsenal. During the PM's visit, an important dimension discussed was South African support to India for NSG. The PM, during his visit, also announced that India's pharmaceutical major Cipla will setup a biosimilars manufacturing facility in the Special Economic Zone of Duke Trade port in Durban and will manufacture drugs for cancer treatment using living organisms. This factory will be established with an investment of 591 crore Indian Rupees and will generate more than 300 science related jobs in South Africa.

11
CHAPTER

India's Outreach to Africa

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Concept of India's Outreach to Africa Programme
- Asia-Africa Growth Corridor
- Analysis of Indian PM Visit to Kenya and Tanzania

Since the coming of the new government in India in 2014, it has given a tremendous importance to reaching out to Africa. India's outreach to Africa began in early 2015 when senior ministers were sent to visit all 54 nations in Africa to invite them to India for the third IAFS in October, 2015. This spectacular diplomatic achievement later also saw India doing away with the Banjul formula. After the success of the summit, the second component of outreach began. As discussed in the previous chapters, the second component witnessed the Indian President and Vice President visiting African nations to strengthen bilateral ties. In the third component, we see the Indian Prime Minister reaching out starting July, 2016.



Thus, through this unique format, India was able to reassert people-to-people as well as government-to-government ties, along with building business link.

Asia-Africa Growth Corridor

At the 52nd Annual General Meeting of African Development Bank in Gandhinagar in May, 2017, the Indian PM, along with his Japanese and African counterparts, propounded the idea of an Asia–Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC). The idea had its origin in the discussion of Indian and Japanese PM in 2016. Under this initiative, a mega sea corridor based on ancient sea routes connecting Africa with India and South East and East Asia is being envisaged. The idea is to create a low cost, environment friendly sea corridor to boost investment, transport, trade and connectivity. India and Japan are going to play a major role in developing infrastructure. The creation of AAGC will be akin to making an investment corridor where Japan will contribute its expertise in infrastructure creation while India will bring its core diplomatic expertise. The priority areas of AAGC include projects related to health, pharmaceuticals, agriculture, food processing, disaster management, skill


development and technology. Some scholars have theorised that the AAGC is a counter proposal to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative or the BRI (explained in detail in [section H, chapter 2](#)). The AAGC is unique in many aspects. In contrast to the BRI, the AAGC is a purely sea based corridor, which means that it ensures a lesser carbon footprint. Secondly, in AAGC, the process is more democratic and consultative as the focus is to assist the African states in the ways they want. Thirdly, the AAGC is a corridor where the private sector will be playing a major role in contrast to the BRI, which will be completely state funded.



Analysis of PM Visit to Kenya and Tanzania in July 2016

The Indian PM visited Kenya & held talks with Uhuru Kenyatta. India extended 44.95 million dollars line of credit to Kenya for assistance in small industrial development & textile sector. To strengthen our bonds over healthcare, India has committed development of a cancer hospital in Kenya. As Kenya being a maritime state is also affected by the threats of piracy, both nations have decided to undertake maritime cooperation. India has committed assistance to Kenya for development of its economy and also assistance for skill development.

During his visit to Tanzania, the PM visited the Barefoot College and also interacted with solar mamas. Solar mamas are trained to provide solar electricity in their villages. The Indian government is providing training to rural women from Africa for solar lighting and entrepreneurship. During his meeting with Tanzanian President John Magufuli, India agreed to provide 92 million dollars line of credit to Tanzania. The money will be used for improvement of water supply system in Zanzibar. India is assisting the country in its water projects and is also presently working on IT in Tanzanian.



End of Part Questions

1. Sustained India-Japan cooperation in Africa can match China's substantial outreach to Africa. Examine this statement in the light of the vision of the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor.
2. The Chinese naval base in Africa is likely to have consequences on India's security interests in the Indian Ocean. Examine.
3. What are the key achievements of India in the continental India Africa Forum Summits?
4. India must have a serious dialogue with African countries on its role in future peace keeping operations in the continent. Discuss.
5. The Third India Africa Forum Summit presented India an opportunity to establish itself as a preferred partner of Africa. Examine.
6. India should build on its strategic ties with Africa, by leveraging both its large market and traditional goodwill. Examine.
7. The African Development Bank has put in place a set of ambitious priorities that can unleash the real potential of India-Africa cooperation. Discuss.
8. A far wider cultural engagement with the continent is necessary to combat the latent racism among Indians. Examine the statement in the light of racial attacks on Africans in India.
9. India's education sector can drive a mutually beneficial human resources exchange to realise Africa's long term goals. Discuss.
10. Indian interests in Africa will benefit from timely implementation of projects. Examine the statement in the light of key hurdles in implementation of projects by India in Africa.
11. India's attitude towards Africa cannot remain imprisoned in the 'dark continent' stereotype. Neither can it be defined solely by the legacy of the colonial era. Our language of engagement needs to create a new edifice defined by an aspirational Africa's quest for a good life. Sketch your argument.

1
CHAPTER

India and Central Asia Policy—Key Drivers of the Relationship

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Background of Central Asia
- Strategic Interests of India in Central Asia
- Strategic Interests of other players in Central Asia
- Challenges faced by India in Central Asia

BACKGROUND OF CENTRAL ASIA (CA)

The background of CA is crucial to understand how India engages with the region. Below I provide a brief account of the history of CA. The history is divided in two parts.

PART-A: FROM THE SILK ROAD TO THE GREAT GAME

CA has always been a prized territory. The history of CA is a testimony to this fact. The importance of the region has been highlighted by the mighty empires of Genghis Khan, Timur Beg and Alexander of Macedonia. In the early Christian era, CA oversaw a magnificent ancient Silk Route. This Silk Route connected the Far East with Europe Silk Route and was dominated by the Chinese. The Chinese influence in the region began to decline by 6th and 7th Century when Islam made inroads into CA from the Arab world. However, even with the Chinese influence in the region in the decline, silkworm agriculture in the Fergana Valley continued. Arabs took over the trade along the Silk Route, Silk Route which now entered a new cultural arena. The region saw the rise of powerful Persian and Turkic empires. The cultural legacy of these two mega empires is visible in the region till today.

The picture in the modern times is relatively different. In 18th and 19th century, the CA region witnessed annexation by the Tsar (monarch) of Russia. One reason why the Tsar was worried about the regions in the south was because of the British Empire in India. The British in India had been very aggressively undertaking consolidation. The Tsar became concerned about the security of his own empire. Thus, for Russian Tsar, the most immediate goal was to ensure that Afghanistan should not fall into the hands of the British. In order to ensure this, Russia began to consolidate its position in CA. In 1865, Russia completed the annexation of Tashkent city and by 1881, the Tsar had consolidated his presence in trans-Caspian region. The competition between the Tsar and British was so intense that CA was actually transformed into a buffer by Russia to use against the British.

Meanwhile, the British also became increasingly uncomfortable and insecure due to the Tsar's aggressive influence. The British perceived the expansionist agenda of Tsar as a potential future threat to their own empire in India. The British fought multiple Anglo-Afghan wars to establish control over Afghanistan. In the process, in the modern times, Afghanistan and CA both unwittingly became buffer states. The British carried out the establishment of a boundary in Afghanistan to keep a check on Russian influence. This boundary, called the Wakhan corridor, created acted as buffer. This entire scenario of the Anglo-Russian rivalry in the region has been termed by historians as The Great Game of CA. Thus, the origin of the Great Game goes back to the 19th Century when the Russians advanced to the region of CA and Caucasus, which was perceived by the British as a threat. The British responded to resist the influence of Russia by establishing a huge network of agents in the frontier areas to gather intelligence against the Russians. The British even tried to make Afghanistan a buffer state, though remained largely unsuccessful. The importance of CA for the British increased in 1904 when Harold Mackinder published an article observing that if Russia is able to position itself in the Eurasian heartland, it would gain power to pivot the region to emerge as a world power.

Theory and Practice of Soviet Rule in CA During Cold War

From 1865 to 1918, CA was under the Russian rule as a colony of Russia. In the inter-war period, as the Red Army became more assertive, CA came under the direct rule of the Soviets. Scholars have often tried to compare the colonisation of Europe with Soviet rule of CA and have asserted that the Soviet rule of CA cannot be compared with exploitative colonialism practices by other European powers. This is so because the Soviet rule in CA saw Soviets investing heavily into education and electricity in CA. The scholars have asserted that the Soviet rule in practice was a mixture of imperialism and state building. Francine Hirsch in his study *Empire of Nations* asserts that Soviets did not follow the simple divide and rule logic, as other imperial powers, in CA. The Soviets introduced industrialisation of CA apart from applying colonial patterns for cotton and energy resources. Oksana Dmitrieva asserts that Soviet-CA relationship is a unique case with no parallel in the world. The CA states were aptly called as patrimonial states (Alexander Cooley) where Soviet maintained authority by giving resources to regional and sub-regional informal institutions (like clan etc.). Such institutions worked so well that even when Gorbachev introduced Glasnost and Perestroika, there were hardly any mass uprisings on the ground. The end of the Cold War saw the CA states transform into now Republics with authoritarian rulers. An immediate absence of interest of any Great Power created new spaces for new ideas. The West led civil society organizations promoted pluralism and market economy while Saudi Arabia initiated the spread of Wahhabism. CA eventually became a new space for propagation of religious agendas. As Russia struggled with its domestic issues, in the post Cold War period, China focused its energies through Shanghai-5 to conclude the pending border disputes with CA. USA, though was interested in promoting NATO in the post-Soviet sphere, but, decided to refrain from the

same in CA. Despite all this, due to the deep entrenchment of Russia during Cold War; in the Post Cold War period, it still remained the major actor by default.

PART-B: FROM THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION TO THE REVIVAL OF THE NEW GREAT GAME

As noted above, at the end of the Cold War, CA states adopted authoritarianism. The states have established complete authority over their media and domestic security structures to ensure that there is no threat to the authority of the one party patrimonial rule. In all the CA states, the opposition is in exile and all threats to the authority are well conflated. Post 9/11, CA became a new hub for the USA's Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). USA concluded fresh flying and refuelling agreements with CA. This gave the CA states new platform to assert their authority by asserting their local rules. The CA states did cooperate with USA but also asserted their dominance by limiting the influence of USA to seek political reforms domestically. The old Great Game got revived once again and was now played, post 9/11, between USA, China and Russia as new actors. Today CA is an area of high geopolitics as great powers try to buy local loyalties of CA states with an intention to block their rivals to gain any geopolitical significance.

Background of India's Relations with CA

India's relations with CA go back to the ancient times. A study of the site of Altyn-Depe, a Bronze age site in Turkmenistan, also proves that Harappa did have interactions with CA as some artefacts of the late Harrapan stage were found at the site. In the 2nd century BC, Aryans from CA began to migrate towards India, and took along with them domesticated breeds of horses. During early ancient and medieval times, it was the Silk Route that connected India with the region. The Silk Route had three branches—the north, south and central. It is the southern branch of the Silk Route that connected CA with India. Thus, the Indian subcontinent was connected with China on one side and to CA on the other side. From the first and second century BCE, we see the major tribal nomadic groups moving via the Silk Route to reach India. Over a period of time, at later stages, through this route came the Sakas, the Parthians and the Kushanas. The Kushanas established a very strong and unified kingdom under them, including large parts of the northern Indian territory. The Kushanas also patronised Buddhism which not only flourished under their rule but also reached other territories like China and CA under their patronage. The cultural impact of Buddhism in the region can still be seen today. The ancient Silk Route thus contributed to cultural exchange and introduced varied elements of other cultures in the Indian subcontinent.



In Persia, during the medieval ages, the great Sasanian empire was the last empire to thrive before the rise of Islam. The trade on the Silk Route in the medieval times began to decline. The Sasanian Empire continued its hostility towards the Romans, and thus, the focus on trade dwindled away. During the medieval times, Islam gradually came to be firmly rooted in CA. Islam also gradually began to trickle into India. This gradual movement of Islam in India did provide an impetus to trade but it never quite reached the same magnitude as that of the ancient times. Indians exported cotton, shawls, dyes and ayurvedic medicine to the region while it imported horses, gold and dry fruits. This revival of trade also established a small segment of the Indian diaspora in CA during the medieval times. Towards the middle of the medieval period, maritime trade with Europe began. The Europeans began to trade with the Far East. During this time period, the Muslims and Persians resorted to strengthening their control over land trade as Europeans began to consolidate maritime trade.




Economic Contributions of the Silk Route to India

The Silk Route brought about a significant transformation in the economic architecture of India. The most visible contribution could be seen in the Kashmir region. From ancient to medieval times, a lot of craftsmen migrated from CA to India and settled down in the region. The craftsmen began to practise embroidery and shared the technology with locals. Over a period of time, the Kashmir region gained prominence in making shawls. Even today, Kashmir continues to dominate shawl trade in India. Irfan Habib, in his book *A People's History of India: Technology in Medieval India, C. 650–1750*, also says that Noria, an ancient water wheel for irrigation which pumped water out of a river, came to India via the Silk Route.

As the Mughal Empire in India began to crumble, India slipped into the hands of the British. On the other hand, the CA region came under the influence of the Tsar of Russia. The British and Russian rivalry led to the unfolding of the Great Game in three different phases. The Russian Tsar had an expansionist outlook but was also concerned about similarly aggressive British expansion in India. In order to keep the British influence in check, the Russian Tsar occupied Tashkent and Khantes. This alarmed the British as to the Tsar's intentions to expand to India, which led them to fight the Anglo Afghan wars. Thus, the first phase of the Great Game oversees the formation of a buffer zone.

The second phase of the Great Game began from 1907 and continued till 1917. This was the time when the buffer areas became grounds for espionage. Agents of Britain and Russia resorted to spying on each other's territories to keep the adversary in check. In the third phase, or the period after 1917, the Russians established a firm control over CA, which gave them access to the vast cotton lands of CA. This land was aggressively used by Russia for sustaining industrial revolution back home. An important thing to note here is that since the time of Tsar of Russia, Russia had gradually come to exert a strong cultural influence in the region. Russians brought along their language while settling in the region and by the advent of modern times, Russian language had become ingrained in Central Asian culture. After the World War-II, Russia or USSR divided the CA region into five states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan) on the

basis of ethnicity, with Moscow controlling the foreign policy of the five states. The USSR did provide India access to CA in the times of the Cold War. India continued to engage with CA through cultural interaction. Indian television and music remained popular in CA during the cold war; however, due to India's non-alignment policy, a very deep relation between India and the Central Asian nations could not evolve.



As the Cold War ended, India evolved a concentric circle approach to foreign policy, whereby it first prioritised engagement with its immediate neighbourhood. At the second level came the extended neighbourhood and last came the great powers. As far as CA was concerned, in the foreign policy pattern, it fitted in the arena of its extended neighbourhood. Thus, CA can be deemed as India's extended neighbour with which India has enjoyed historical and cultural ties.


As the Cold War ended, the five CA Republics gained independence from Russia, giving them the needed strategic and autonomic space to explore relationships with other countries independent of the Russian yoke. India, on the basis of its historical and cultural proximity to CA, now began making overtures again unlock potential alliances. India concluded fresh diplomatic treaties with all the five CA Republics. During the Cold War, the foreign policy of India in CA had been completely directed through the prism of USSR. Finally, at the end of the Cold War, India found the opportunity to engage with the regional states one on one. Domestically, India made a transition from closed to open economy, and also began to feel the need of acquiring resources for sustaining its own economic growth. Thus, CA became all the more significant for India as the region was a highly resource rich one.

But as the CA Republics had just gained independence, one of the foremost concern for India was to ensure that the region should not get engulfed in any form of religious extremism. The threat of religious extremism in CA was very high. During the Cold War period, the USSR and the USA were both engaged in Afghanistan. The territory of Afghanistan saw rise of jihadi elements which were directed against the USSR to contain communism. As the USSR disintegrated, the monetary and arms support to jihadist elements was stopped. There was a high possibility of a spill over of these extremist elements into CA as a majority of the Central Asian states were Islamic. India feared that if CA were to be engulfed by this extremism, it would give Pakistan an edge in maintaining strategic depth against India. Thus, India realised that not only it needed to revive its relations with CA on the basis of historical and cultural linkages but also needed to ensure that the region did not become a security concern for India. India began to realize that its own democracy, secular outlook, and its own multicultural polity are its assets which India can use for promotion in CA as the newly independent Central Asians would look for some role models to emulate. Since CA was a cultural and a religious mosaic of multiple groups, India could use the modalities of democracy, secularism and multiculturalism as core ideals for CA to take lessons from. In 1995, P V Narismha Rao

visited Turkmenistan and reiterated the common cultural legacy of the two nations to re-establish relationships. In his visit to Turkmenistan, Rao unveiled India's Look North policy.



If India were to be able to promote these three goals, not only would it be able to reassert its cultural legacy and re-established its relationship with the Central Asian region, but it would also be able to achieve three core goals.




As time progressed, the security situation in the CA region deteriorated. Afghanistan fell into the hands of the Taliban in 1996. Indian fears were exacerbated as Pakistan recognised Taliban rule in Afghanistan. The extremism from Afghanistan also spilled over into Tajikistan, which saw a civil war take place. From the Pakistani side, there was an aggressive attempt to revive militancy in Kashmir in 1990s. Due to this instability, the immediate neighbours in the region were adversely affected. As the Taliban took control of Afghanistan, India, Russia and Iran supported a group called the Northern Alliance. India built a hospital near the airbase of Farkhor in Tajikistan. The military hospital provided medical assistance to the Northern Alliance. India also used the Ayni air base for the purpose of providing humanitarian assistance and aid. In the process, India–Tajik security co-operations strengthened over bilateral relations. However, as the region was in the grip of extremist forces, assertion of Look North Policy goals became increasingly difficult.

In 1999 India's security vulnerabilities were woefully exposed when IC-814 was hijacked. The situation in the region changed after 9/11. The US invaded Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. The US began to develop airbases and military logistic centres in CA for its global war on terror. India also realised the difficulty in the promotion of the goals planned under the Look North Policy and began to understand that Look North Policy could never be a successful policy to engage with CA. By this time, around 2000–2001, the Indian economy, which had made a transition from a closed to an open economy a decade back had begun to bear fruit. India was in dire need of resources to propel its economic growth. Thus began the search for Indian foreign policy tools which would help it look at CA in a different way.

Why did the Look North Policy Remain Weak?

As outlined above, the deterioration of the security of the region was a colossal concern. The civil war in Tajikistan, the takeover of Afghanistan by Taliban, Pakistan sponsored militancy in Kashmir and support to Taliban were all noteworthy factors. However, many diplomats today agree, that apart from these reasons, India itself did not aggressively prioritise this region at the end of the Cold War. When the Cold War ended, the foremost priority of India was to improve relations with the US to fill the vacuum left by its past proximity to the erstwhile USSR. India also initiated the Look East Policy where the majority of its focus was directed to its Eastern neighbours. India somehow not only neglected to give due attention to CA, but the deteriorating security situation of CA also made India to think of CA from a purely security point of view than from the perspective of any economic significance. Thus, a mixture of all these factors made the implementation of Look North Policy weak.

The presence of US in the region had also changed the regional equalities. The Taliban was defeated by the US and extremism had at least been controlled to a great extent if not wiped out. India's proximity to the US in mid 2000s opened up the way to the nuclear deal in 2005 and NSG-specific waiver for India in 2008 led to a new form of strategic engagement. As the Indian economy began to show signs of growth, India's hunger for resources also began to grow. For India, rebuilding a relationship with CA using different parameters became important. India now realised that in order to get resources from CA, it needed a reorientation of its policy. The new policy had to be based on economic diplomacy. As the region continued to remain fragile, however, India understood that the security component has to remain a part of the new engagement. India also found that the space for economic engagement with CA was very limited by the pre-existing inroads China had made into CA. China had been engaging with CA republics economically since the end of Cold War. Thus, the challenge for India now was to chart out a balanced engagement in CA. In order to do this, the Indian Council of World Affairs undertook a Track-11 initiative called India-CA Dialogue. On 12th June, 2012, the Minister of State for External Affairs of India, during an address (at the first India-CA Dialogue) in the city of Bishkek in Kyrgyz Republic, announced the Connect Central Asia Policy (CCAP). The new policy has the following goals:




The new CCAP emerged as a very broad policy to re-engage with the region. The main thrust of the CCAP is to increase connectivity with CA for energy security. The International North- South Transit Corridor (INSTC) envisaged is a mega connectivity

initiative to improve connectivity with CA and assist them in their own growth. In this regard, there are multiple initiatives under CCAP. The first initiative at the civilian level envisages youth exchange programmers and India providing training to the youth of CA in IT skills. The second initiative is at the level of military collaboration. There are also provisions for joint exercises and counter terrorism exercises. At the bilateral level, as we shall see ahead, there is also a provision of regular intelligence sharing. The CCAP provides India a broad framework to engage with the region.

India, Central Asia and Culture

The scenic beauty of CA has always attracted the Indian film industry. In 1987, Russia allowed India to be the only non-communist nation to open a mission in Tashkent with a jurisdiction over other CA nations. India used it to promote the festivals of India, and regularly held cultural programmes, music, films and dance festivals in CA. Since the 1950s, Indian films have showcased the scenic beauty of CA to its audience.



STRATEGIC INTEREST OF INDIA IN CA

At the time when the Cold War ended, the Soviet control over CA also ended. The CA republics began to assert independence. India took the lead to forge diplomatic ties with the region. During this time period, two important things happened. Firstly, as discussed in the previous section, the security situation of the region deteriorated. The prime strategic interest of India during this time was to ensure that the region does not slip into religious extremism from deteriorating conditions in Afghanistan. Secondly, the other important thing that happened in the region to CA was the influence of China. As the influence of Russia in CA at the end of the Cold War declined, the Chinese stepped into the shoes of the Russians. Since the Chinese economy had made a transition to an open economy under Deng Xiaoping, it had begun to expand and subsequently faced a crunch of resources. China desperately needed resources to sustain the momentum and finally adopted a plan of action based on a long-term policy. Its policy was to first open up relations with CA and remove all irritants. It would then concentrate on integrating the Chinese economy with

that of CA. It would then take steps to ensure sustained resource supply from the region.

While India was engaged with the Northern Alliance and trying to give effect to its Look North Policy, the Chinese began to resolve border issues with CA. As the borders had acted as irritants, the Chinese not only resolved these issues, but also demilitarised its borders with CA. Next, it began to supply the weak CA economies with domestically manufactured goods. In return, China began to take resources from CA. This cemented Chinese presence in the region.

From 2000 to 2010, India firstly continued to exercise its Look North Policy. As US was unleashing its global war on terror and was curbing extremism and fundamentalism in the region, all regional players like India, China, Russia, and the CA republics supported the US in the endeavour since all of them were affected by extremism. India's strategic interests in the region began to evolve. With the launch of Operation Enduring Freedom by the US in Afghanistan, the US succeeded in removing Taliban. In Afghanistan, a democratic polity was established and Hamid Karzai became the first democratically elected President of Afghanistan. Thanks to US support, India began to play an increasingly important role in the nation-building process of Afghanistan. As Indian presence in Afghanistan increased, India also realised that Afghanistan could act as a bridge to connect India with CA.



INSTC (International North–South Transit Corridor)

It is a multimodal transport network of rail, road and water transport connecting India, Iran and Russia. It was initiated in 2000 and was ratified in 2002. India has been very keen on the INSTC as it will help India in integrating itself deeply in CA without Pakistani logistical support. It also helps India counter the one belt one road initiative of China. The trade costs shall be lowered and it will take less time circumventing many regions along the way. In May, 2013, the Indian shipping and Road Transport Minister signed an MoU with Iran to develop charter ports. The construction of the Chabbar port is a step towards the operationalisation of the INSTC. In September, 2015, at a meeting in Delhi, a legal framework for transit and customs had also been agreed upon. The Indian Foreign Trade Policy 2015–2020 also made a pitch for INSTC.



India realised that Afghanistan and Iran are the two focal points for engagement with CA. Afghanistan has no access to sea, which is where Iran steps into the picture. Afghanistan is a land-locked country. But Iran has access to waters and also borders Afghanistan. Since 2010, India has given effect to the–CCAP to strategically reconnect with CA not only for getting resources to sustain own growth, but also to provide CA with an alternative market to China. Today, Indian strategic interests in CA are as follows:



India and CA—Energy Cooperation, Challenges, and Geopolitics

Since the end of the Cold War, energy security has become a key goal of Indian Foreign Policy and India has realised that the successful development of the Indian economy would depend upon access to reliable energy. CA has gained prominence in Indian energy security policy due to historical ties and geographical proximity. India is exploring options of transporting energy from CA through pipelines. TAPI and IPI pipelines are two projects envisaged (discussed in the subsequent chapters). The pipeline diplomacy has two core challenges. First, India lacks a direct geographical access to CA. Geopolitically; one challenge for India in the pipeline diplomacy arises from the intentions of Russia and USA. The strategy of USA is to ensure that CA remains independent and it intends to support new pipelines that reduce the Russian monopoly on energy resources of CA. On the other hand, Russia wants to maintain its energy superpower status and Russia favours linking of Russian energy policies with the policies of CA as it intends to establish a Eurasian Gas Alliance in the long run. The challenge for India is that how it manages the divergent thinking of Russia and USA with respect to the energy sector of CA. Secondly; the pipelines pass through a volatile territory of Afghanistan and Pakistan before entering India, thereby multiplying the security costs. India, in 2017, has shown interest in the extension of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline through Ashkelon Eilat segment where the pipeline will transport oil via Turkey to Eilat port in Israel. India plans to ship the oil to Mumbai from Eilat. This segment of the pipeline will cut the time from 40 to 19 days to transport oil.

Final Analysis

CA is important for India at three levels namely—historical, geopolitical and economic. Since the end of the Cold War, CA has emerged as a zone of geopolitical competition by Russia, China, and USA. India and USA have a shared strategic interest of ensuring that CA does not become an area of influence of any one power. The core interest of India is to ensure that CA does not become a part of the Islamic belt spreading radicalism. To ensure this, for India, limiting the influence of Pakistan in CA would remain a core policy objective. At the security level, India would not want Pakistan to use CA as a territory to maintain strategic depth against India. Some of the diplomats, in interview with the author, also assert that India needs to ensure that USA or China also do not use CA as a region to limit the regional influence of India. India has decided to deepen its security cooperation with CA to keep a check on rising narcotic-terrorism as well. To achieve the same, India is

engaging deeply with Tajikistan and Afghanistan to ensure regional stability. In the quest to seek regional stability, India has cooperated with Russia, USA, and Iran. R&AW believes that the key to regional stability of CA lies with Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang Autonomous Region (XAR). India has been engaging with the Uighurs since the ancient times and till 1950's India also had a consulate in Kashgar. Today R&AW has presence in Bishkek, Almaty, and Dushanbe where vital strategic assets have been established to maintain contacts with the Uighurs. This has given India a big leverage to maintain regional stability. Now India has become a member of the SCO. India will now play an important role in stabilizing the region through the SCO. Thus, to conclude, the core goals of India in CA are energy, culture, and prevention of terrorism to India, maintaining regional stability and explore new export markets. To achieve these, India is adopting a two-point strategy. One, it is engaging with each individual CA state under the CCAP and secondly, is cooperating with regional players to enhance its own presence in the region.



India, its Quest for a Northern Strategy and Failure to Understand the ‘Local Rules’

India has engaged with CA to keep a check on Pakistan in CA and Afghanistan. Post-1998, India has engaged with CA perceiving the area as an extended neighbour in the north and has used the engagement as a tool for asserting its position as a rising responsible great power. Though India and CA states have some common goals that range from maintaining stability to prevention of rise of militancy, but India has failed to appreciate the ‘local rules’ of CA (Alexander Cooley). The issue of Ayni air base in the chapter of India-Tajikistan relation’s chapter ahead will demonstrate that India received a big blow to its regional dream of base politics. The debacle at Ayni primarily happened due to neglect of local rules by India. The failure to understand the way CA states work (their local rules) has led to failure of assertion of a strategy to assert power. This has prevented India to play a stronger role in CA.

STRATEGIC INTERESTS OF OTHER PLAYERS IN CA

USA and its “Freedom Agenda” to Economic Incentives

The relation of US and CA during the Cold War was limited to educational exchanges and technical assistance for projects. The USA has had two-fold interests in CA. Firstly, when CA became independent of Russian control at the end of the Cold War, the USA had helped integrate CA to Europe. The US thought was dominated by the fact that CA can be an effective route to bypass the gas pipelines in Russia. The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline is one such manifestation. Secondly, after 9/11, US has used the geopolitical location of CA to curb extremism by establishing air bases and military logistic bases in the region. The Bush administration favoured strong relations with CA as the region provided the needed access to the US to Afghanistan. The US signed security frameworks with states of CA and also aggressively pushed for domestic political reforms. Though the US has tried to export democracy in the region, it has met with tremendous resistance as witnessed in the Andijon violence in Uzbekistan in 2005 and Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyz Republic. The resentment to interference of USA in domestic issue of CA states led to

eviction of US from the Karshi-Khanabad (K2) base. The US learned a lesson that if it wanted to stay in CA, it had to accept the local rules of CA. The CA states want to preserve their authoritarian regimes. They don't want any power to challenge their domestic power structure. China and Russia too are both comfortable in dealing with such authoritarian regimes and they too would not prefer democracy in CA. Since 2008, the US policy has been not to advise CA states on political matters but continue the security engagement. The opening up of the Northern Distribution Networks (NDN) for withdrawal from Afghanistan has led scholars (Fredrick Starr calls it the Greater Central Asia Project-GCAP of USA) to assert that doing so would be akin to transform the region by reviving the ancient silk road to access Afghanistan. The basic interest of the US is to reduce the influence of China and Russia in CA but it has shown no real interest to assert hegemony in the region. US prefers to engage with India as engaging with India allows US to balance Russia and China.

Russia's Quest for a Privileged Role and Structural Challenges

The Russian interest in the region can be studied through the prism of the Cold War and a vast network of pipelines to supply oil and gas to Europe. For almost a decade after the Cold War ended, Russia remained mired in its own domestic concerns. The absence of a major power player in the region gave China an opportunity to step into the shoes of the Russians during this period. Russia re-emerged as a player after the coming of Vladimir Putin as he began to re-assert authority and aura in the post-Soviet space. After the 9/11, Russia decided to cooperate with USA in the GWOT. Doing so provided Russia an opportunity to enhance its international image in the post-Cold War period. Russia also realized that if USA would knock down Taliban, it would indirectly benefit Russia, as doing so would weaken the terrorists who could create trouble for Russia in Caucasus. Despite a favourable public opinion in Russia about cooperation with USA, the relations began to take a dip when USA began to assert unilateralism (visible in unilateral decisions of the US to initiate the Iraq war and its decision in 2002 to withdraw unilaterally from ABM Treaty) compelling Russia to perceive US as a competitor in the post-Soviet space. Russia, responded to the new competitor through the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), with Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Belarus being its current members and Afghanistan and Serbia being observer states. The CSTO was positioned by Russia as a challenger to the NATO. The economic arm of the CSTO is the Eurasian Economic Community modelled on the lines of EU. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) also provides a similar platform to Russia along with China to keep a check on US influence in CA. Russia certainly does not want US hegemony or interference in CA. After the Andijon Violence in Uzbekistan in 2005, Russia and Uzbekistan concluded a treaty where Russia would provide assistance to Uzbekistan if there were any military aggressions by a third party. This treaty clearly supports the arguments we have evolved for Russian interest in CA. Russia is not interested in reviving its Cold War type rule in CA nor is interested in emulating the French colonial pattern of engagement with Africa but prefers to establish a policy to legalize its regional primacy through CSTO and Eurasian Economic Community. Russia has allowed the states of CA to engage with external powers but is simultaneously cementing its own presence in the region through new blocks. Russia however witnesses a bigger challenge from China than the US in CA. Though initially Russia and China both

decided to cooperate in CA to keep US under check, but Russia was alarmed to see how China flexed its economic muscles to engulf CA into its orbit completely. The rising international profile of the SCO is also frustrating the Russians. A scholar named Stephen Kotkin of Princeton University has asserted that as China is making no compromises in the economic and security agendas of its engagement with CA, there could be a possibility that Russia could emerge as a junior partner of China in the near future. Russia would certainly not like to envisage such a future.

China's Great Leap Westward, Defining a Regional Security Agenda and Splittism Policy

The Chinese follow a very resource-centric policy in CA. However, China also knows that CA is a background for Russian activities, and it therefore cannot assert any hegemony in CA as this may upset Russia. China cooperates with Russia in CA to ensure that Russia is not antagonised. Just as China takes resources from CA, it also does the same from Russia. In 2014, Russia and China signed a long-term gas supply deal. However, the Chinese also have another interest in CA. Way back in 1759, China took over the region of Xinjiang, consisting majorly of ethnic Muslims, and made it a part of China. Since 1759, the ethnic Muslims of Xinjiang, called Uyghur, have resisted Chinese hegemony. In the Inter-War period, the Xinjiang region was called as the East Turkestan Republic (ETR). In 1934, ETR was absorbed by China. The Northern part of the ETR, from 1945-1949 was a satellite area of the Soviets. In 1949, this region too was brought under China and since then China has controlled the region as XAR by following the official doctrine of three inseparable ties. Under the doctrine, China asserts that one minority group cannot live without the other like Han Chinese cannot live without the minorities while minorities cannot live without the Han Chinese. The Chinese government has deliberately increased the population of the Han Chinese in the XAR while using force (the biggest operation being in 1998 under the Strike Hard Campaign) to suppress the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, East Turkestan Liberation Organisation, and Uighur Liberation Organisation. Post-1950s, the Chinese government deliberately increased the presence of ethnic Han Chinese in Xinjiang. This was done to make Han Chinese a majority and Uyghur a minority. This move again met serious resistance from the Uyghurs. After 1979, with the rise of Mujahedeen activity in Afghanistan, the Uyghur resorted to establishing linkages with extremist forces and began to increase violent attacks against Chinese presence in the region. Today, Uyghur militancy remains under control through cooperation with Central Asian states. Xinjiang province is strategically very important for China because it is a testing site for Chinese nuclear weapons. There is an underground nuclear testing facility in Lop Nor. China has also established a base for its nuclear ballistics in Xinjiang. Recent geological surveys have confirmed the presence of oil deposits in the region, making it all the more important for China in the future.

China wants a stable and peaceful CA since it faces trouble in Xinjiang province. The Xinjiang Autonomous Region (XAR) of China borders Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The XAR is a multi-ethnic region having not only the Uighurs but also 55 other ethnic groups. Uyghur militancy in China is a form of Islamic extremism. China understands that an unstable CA can cause a stir in the Uyghur militancy, which will, in turn, destabilize China. Thus, China seeks to neutralise these threats under the umbrella of

SCO. China has also initiated a Go West campaign also known as the Great West Development Programme to modernize XAR. The states of CA remain crucial in the Go West campaign and to contain the three evils. CA, post 2005, once again emerged as a zone of competition. China also is not comfortable in directly working with the West in Afghanistan and has adopted a hedging strategy. China has developed proximity with ISI of Pakistan and through ISI is in indirect touch with the Taliban. This indirect route to reach Taliban gives China a security guarantee of its investments in Afghanistan and a tool to prevent Taliban to play mischief in XAR. CA has emerged as an area of the new Great Game. Publicly US asserts that CA is not the zone of influence of Russia but behind the scene, it has acknowledged to Russia that Russia has ambitions in CA. China has publicly stated that CA is the special sphere of influence of Russia but, on the ground it has created its own rules on security and economic engagement. If CA is the backyard of Russia, the Chinese have started to redraw the fences in the backyard.



Why did China Create SCO?

From 1996 to 2001, Shanghai-5 was used as a tool to resolve issues and demilitarise borders. The discussions in the group were fruitful enough leading to the group to announce, in 2000, to enhance the discussions beyond border issues to include issues related to separatism and extremism. This lead to a new dialogue on multiple security centric issues under a new rubric called the SCO (established on 15th June, 2001). SCO works on the principle of credit attribution as a tool for self-promotion of the image of the organisation. The 9/11 was a game changer for the SCO and China seeing the new norms established by the GWOT, China conflated the agenda of Uighurs (in XAR) and ETIM with Al-Qaeda. This allowed China to cooperate with USA to make a sovereign issue of Uighurs in Xinjiang a frontline in USA's GWOT. But, China also became fearful of rising USA's presence in CA as it felt that a strong USA in CA could choke off energy supplies to CA. China began to believe that US presence in CA could be permanent and it could be used by the US as a springboard to destabilise XAR. China thought that strong US presence in CA is a tool of US to keep a check on China (through XAR). China responded to US game plan in June 2001 by institutionalising the Shanghai-5 to SCO. In June 2002 annual summit, China proposed the creation of Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS) and made it a provision in the charter of the SCO. To ensure that US does not use unilateralism in CA, China, through the Article-2 of the SCO charter asserted that none of the member states of SCO will accept any unilateral interference in internal issues of CA by any external power. In 2005, when Askar Akayev of Kyrgyzstan was ousted by the Tulip revolution, Russia and China perceived such a regime change a handiwork of the CIA of the USA. China perceived that such external sponsored regime changes

and attempts for democratization could act fuel troubles in areas in China witnessing political dissent (namely XAR). The Chinese government even despatched researchers to Kyrgyzstan to study the causes of the Tulip revolution. The 2005 Astana summit of the SCO saw Uzbekistan to evict US from the K2 base (decision taken by Uzbeks on pressure from Russia and China). The US perceived the Uzbek decision as a handiwork of Russia and China to use non-military tools to undermine US policies.



Pakistan and the Torkham Gate, 2016


Pakistan is a key player in CA along with Afghanistan. However, Afghanistan and Pakistan have been having a border dispute over the acceptance of the Durand Line since the last 60 years. In June, 2016, Pakistan decided to install a gate at the Torkham border. This gate restricts the entry of people from Pakistan to Afghanistan to reach CA. Such decisions may help Pakistan in the short run, but in the long run, may end up largely isolating Pakistan as it is restricting its own integration with CA. A regional consensus needs to evolve for Central Asia–South Asia (CASA) partnership, of which Pakistan may consider becoming an active member.

CHALLENGES FACED BY INDIA

Apart from the challenges of extremism discussed at length in the previous sections, there are other challenges, like that of diminished trading practices, that the ministry addressed by launching the FOCUS–CIS programme, with specialised attention to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS countries) including Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Trade has increased with CA due to this programme.



The second challenge is at the level of transport. CA is a landlocked mass. This makes it difficult for CA to connect to international markets as also for India to connect to CA. There is a strongly felt need for land connectivity in CA. The old Silk Route was certainly one option, but the security situation, unresolved border conflicts and prolonged negotiations have compelled India to explore alternative routes to reach CA. India uses these four routes to reach CA at present.



Is Iran the Lynchpin for India in CA?

In 1992–93, in a bilateral meeting, India and Iran established the India–Iran Joint Ministerial Commission, whereby the Indian Commerce ministry agreed to undertake studies to see the feasibility of a route to CA via Iran. Studies found that Iran had a well-defined and established infrastructure in place which could be used for container movement. It had excellent road infrastructure for cargo, a stable law and order system to secure trade and the availability of dedicated freight railway networks. Thus, in 1995, India, Iran and Turkmenistan signed an MoU for rail-road access to CA from India via Iran. Over a period of time, India has invested in the Zaranj–Delaram highway and the International North–South Transit Corridor for engaging with CA via Afghanistan and Iran. There is also CASA–1000 project (Central Asia–South Asia 1000) in which India is not involved. CASA–1000 envisages electricity transmission from Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan to Afghanistan and Pakistan by 2018.

2
CHAPTER

India and Kazakhstan Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Basic background of Kazakhstan
- Origin of Indo-Kazak relationship
- Commercial diplomacy
- Technology diplomacy
- Analysis of PM visit in 2015
- Future areas of cooperation
- Case Studies
- Tea trade in Indo-Kazak relations

BASIC BACKGROUND

The ancient Silk Route connected Kazakhstan and India. The Silk Route passed through the territory of south Kazakhstan, via Shymkent and Zambul regions. As of today, Kazakhstan has a border with Russia and the Caspian Sea and it is a highly industrialised and resource-rich country. It has large tracts of land which are suitable for agriculture and wheat, cotton, apples, walnuts grow naturally in the country. It has huge deposits of oil and gas, along with reserves of uranium, gold and copper. Kazakhstan follows a multi-vector foreign policy with all countries in the world.



Post-Cold War, Kazakhstan has adopted a technocratic model of governance where it established clusters in each zone to boost resource-centric development of the regions.

India and Kazakhstan established diplomatic relations in 1992. For India, Kazakhstan is both geopolitically and geo-strategically significant. It also possesses minerals and oil and gas to drive India's growing economy. In 2009, Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan was the chief guest for Indian Republic Day celebration. India seized the opportunity to conclude a strategic Partnership Agreement with Kazakhstan and also signed a nuclear deal for peaceful civilian nuclear cooperation. The strategic partnership lays down the foundation of Indo-Kazakh Cooperation.



COMMERCIAL AND OIL DIPLOMACY

Kazakhstan is an oil and gas rich country, which is referred to as the Saudi Arabia of CA. Colossal oil and gas reserves are found in Abai and Satpayev reserves in Alikekmola and Kurumangazy blocks. The commercial significance of Kazakhstan for Indian foreign policy can be inferred from the fact that four Indian premiers (P V Narsimha Rao, Vajpayee, Manmohan and Modi) have visited Kazakhstan since the Cold War ended. In 1992, an inter-governmental commission on trade, economic, technology and cultural cooperation was established (IGC). The Indo-Kazakh IGC is an institutional mechanism to promote bilateral trade. In the latest meeting of IGC in 2014, India completed negotiations on oil exploration in Abai Oil block in Kazakhstan. Abai block possesses 387 million tonnes oil. In 2005, India and Kazakhstan have also established a business forum which identifies specific areas to enhance cooperation in the bilateral negotiations under the IGC. The countries have also decided to jointly undertake oil exploration. The oil based relationships with Kazakhstan will now be explored in two ways. Firstly, India may have to participate directly in its future as a sole developer of oil. Secondly, it may also explore oil as a consortium partner. This will enhance the prospects of cooperation to achieve energy security of India. The OVL has set its sight on the Satpayev oil field where it owns 25% stake at present. As far as trade commodities are concerned, India exports pharma products, coffee, textiles, and engineering goods, while importing iron, zinc, steel, sulphur and lime. Prominent Indian firms have presence in Kazakhstan. For instance, L&T has an office in Astana while Tata, Apollo and Punj Lloyd also are present. In 1995, Mittal Steel had acquired Karmet Steel Plant and it is today managed as Ispat Karmet.



India-Kazakhstan and Tea Trade

India was always one of the leading tea exporters to Kazakhstan. However, in recent times, the tea trade has declined. India's overall tea exports have gone down due to quantity and marketing related issues. Poor marketing campaign has been identified as a single most important reason responsible for the declining exports. Some steps have been taken in the recent times to give a boost to Indian teas exports. The Tea Board of India, along with the Indian mission, has organized tea festivals in Almaty and Astana. These kind of measures have, to some extent, strengthened the tea exports but the trade has not yet reached its earlier peak.

NUCLEAR COOPERATION AND TECHNOLOGY DIPLOMACY

There are two aspects to the technology-based relations between the two countries. In 2009, the two nations concluded a civilian nuclear deal. As per the MoU signed between Nuclear Power Corporation of India (NPCIL) and Kazatomprom, Kazakhstan shall be

supplying India with Uranium for civilian use. There shall be cooperation at the level of nuclear medicine and radiation therapy for healthcare. Kazakhstan has the second largest Uranium reserves in the world. This nuclear deal has led to India importing Uranium for its nuclear power plants.

Kazakhstan also has the Baikonur Cosmodrome, a very important space research centre controlled by the Kazakhstan National Space Agency with which the ISRO signed a MoU in 2011 for technology transfer.


At the knowledge sharing level, another area for Indo-Kazakh cooperation has been agriculture. Kazakhstan has made great progress in agriculture. It has achieved record production in wheat but faces severe shortages in milk and fertilizers. India has decided to assist Kazakhstan in white revolution.

ANALYSIS OF INDIAN PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT—2015

In 2015, Indian PM Narendra Modi visited Kazakhstan and gifted Nursultan Nazarbayev a set of books based on religions born in India, which included the stories of Guru Gobind Singh, *Bharabahu Kalpasutra* and *Ashtasahasrika Prajnaparamita* and a Persian version of *Valmiki Ramayana*. The PM paid a visit to the Nazarbayev University and inaugurated the Indo-Kazakh Centre of Excellence in Information Technology.



In 2009, when the Indo-Kazakh nuclear deal was signed, Kazakhstan agreed to provide India Uranium for a period of five years. As per the contract of 2009, the term for Uranium supply ended in 2014. During the prime ministerial visit, a fresh agreement was concluded whereby Kazakhstan will now provide 5000 tons of Uranium to India from 2015 to 2019. At the economic level, India committed its participation in Expo 2017 meet and will cooperate with Kazakhstan in the field of renewable energy. Kazakhstan has joined hands with the universities in India for youth exchange programmed over the next five years and it has identified 26 projects to cooperate upon, including a gas turbine plant and a solar plant. Sectoral cooperation is to be enhanced through cooperation between JSC Invest India and JSC Kaznexus Invest (JSC stands for joint stock company). A joint study group has been established to explore the possibility of a FTA also. At the defence level, the two countries have reached a conclusion to achieve the following.



FUTURE AREAS OF COOPERATION

During the rule of Mughal emperor Humayun, a person by the name of Mirza Mohammad

Haider Dulati was the governor of Kashmir. Mirza Mohammad is not only a symbol of our past relationship but he has been, in recent times, branded in Kazakhstan as a national hero. India needs to use this cultural icon to indulge in cultural diplomacy. Another important area is defence. There are many old, idle and abandoned military industrial complexes in Kazakhstan that India may use for its own benefit. India can explore imparting naval training to the Kazakhstani navy for anti-piracy operations.

3
CHAPTER

India and Kyrgyz Republic Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Basic background
- Origin of Indo-Kyrgyz relations
- Commercial diplomacy
- Defence cooperation
- Analysis of PM's visit in 2015
- Future areas of cooperation
- Case studies
- Medical education and assistance
- Tulip revolution
- Soft diplomacy

BASIC BACKGROUND

Kyrgyzstan is a small yet very progressive republic. Since 2010, it has stabilised as a nation after some initial differences and problems due to the Tulip Revolution from 2004 to 2010. In the years following the end of the Cold War, Kyrgyz has opened up its economy for foreign investment, yet remaining a predominantly agrarian economy. It has a huge gold mine in Kumtor from where gold is exported and is also the third largest producer of mercury in the world after Singapore and China. Kyrgyz is a country that is also very rich in hydroelectricity power potential (HEP).

India and Kyrgyzstan opened up diplomatic relations in 1992. The two nations not only celebrated 20 years of diplomatic relations in 2012 but the first India-Central Asia Track-II diplomatic dialogue also happened to take place in Bishek, where India announced its Connect CA policy for a renewed engagement with the region.

COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY

Kyrgyz Republic has a skilled workforce but needs foreign investment in agriculture, transport and HEP. The leadership in Kyrgyz is progressive and pro-industry and the Kyrgyz currency is also convertible. In 2009, India and Kyrgyzstan concluded an MoU on agriculture and India subsequently assisted Kyrgyzstan in the setting up of a potato procurement plant in Talas. This plant undertakes chips production and gives locals employment. In 2014, the Indian government also gifted a computerised tomography machine to the National Centre for Cardiology and Internal Medicine in Kyrgyzstan.

India has been extending lines of credit for industrial unit establishment and modernisation. Under the Indian credit facility, an oil and diesel filling station was established in Osh. India exports pharma products, tea, and machinery while importing non-ferrous metals, raw hides, and leather. Tourism has been one of the important aspects of our growing relations. India is providing training to Kyrgyz nationals in the hospitality and tourism sector. Kyrgyzstan has regularly participated in the Surajkund fair in Delhi.

Medical Tourism, Education and Assistance

A lot of Indian students in recent years have begun to go to Kyrgyzstan for MBBS education. Moreover, there is a need for recognition of degrees of the two countries bilaterally. Indian students prefer Kyrgyzstan because of lesser costs involved in medical education. India also assisted Kyrgyz with the Mountain Biomedical Research Centre, which had been established with assistance of DRDO. The centre aims to study multiple possible acclimation methods. India has also been providing assistance to establish a super speciality hospital and diagnostic centre in Kyrgyzstan.

DEFENCE DIPLOMACY

There is a JSC Dastan in Bishek and it is the only functional defence production unit of Kyrgyzstan. Dastan was established by the Russians and is producer of naval weapons, rocket systems and torpedoes. Since the 1990s, the Indian navy and DRDO have established relations with Dastan. India also maintains relations with Joint Stock Company ULAN–Torpedo Range (UTR). The Russians had built UTR in 1943 for the production of naval armaments and submarine parts. India has been associated with UTR since 1997 and Indian Navy has both been procuring torpedoes from Dastan and undertaking tests at UTR. The erstwhile Indian Defence Minister, A K Antony, had visited UTR in 2011. The DRDO is presently providing assistance for the redevelopment of the facility.

Tulip Revolution

During the Cold War, Kyrgyzstan was under Russian control. It is a clan-based society where the Soviets had managed to effectively control all clans in a unified set up. Since the end of the Cold War, Kyrgyz has been moving towards a democracy and till date has witnessed two uprisings. Since the end of Cold War, Kyrgyz had been ruled by Askar Akayev. He showed authoritarian tendencies and was overthrown in 2004 by the Tulip Revolution. Akayev was replaced by Kurmanbek Bakiyev. In 2010, Bakiyev was ousted for same reasons as his predecessor and finally since 2011, Almazbek Sharshenovich Atambayev has been in power.

ANALYSIS OF INDIAN PRIME MINISTER VISIT—2015

The Indian PM in 2015 visited Kyrgyz and met Almazbek Atambayev. The PM visited the victory movement in Bishek and paid homage to Kyrgyz martyrs. He also gifted the Kyrgyz President a fine silk hand-knotted carpet. The PM also visited the Mountain Biochemical Research Centre and initiated the next phase of Indo-Kyrgyz cooperation. He


also launched the telemedicine link to connect hospitals in Kyrgyz with Apollo and AIIMS in India.

Soft Diplomacy

Khwaja Syed Mohammad Qutubuddin Bhaktiyar Kaki was born in the city of Osh in Kyrgyz. He popularised the Chishti order and ideology of Moinuddin Chishti in Delhi. He was a very popular Sufi who conveyed a message of universal brotherhood and peace and charity during the rule of Aibak and Iltutmish in India. Continuing this legacy of peace and brotherhood, India played a fine card of soft diplomacy in 2015, and when the Indian PM visited Kyrgyz, he unveiled a statue of Mahatma Gandhi.

FUTURE AREA OF COOPERATION

The first area of potential cooperation is tourism. Kyrgyz is rightly called the Switzerland of the East. India is already providing hospitality training to the Kyrgyz youth. This area can be strengthened in future. India can invest FDI in the hospitality sector of Kyrgyz. Another important area is agriculture. Kyrgyz has a complete ban on the use of fertilizers. They only resort to organic farming. India can share best practices in this regard for the mutual development of both.



4
CHAPTER

India and Tajikistan Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Basic background
- Commercial diplomacy
- Analysis of PM visit 2015
- Case studies
- Indian security interest in Tajikistan—Agni airbase and Farkhor

BASIC BACKGROUND


Tajik is a small Central Asian republic and borders Afghanistan. The strategic importance of the nation is due to its proximity to Afghanistan. India established diplomatic relations with the country in 1994. It is a nation rich in hydroelectric power potential (HEP). During the time of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the strategic significance of Tajik territory for India increased and India played a crucial role in Tajik to support of the Northern Alliance. India established a military hospital in Farkhor and used the airbase at Agni for assistance. As the US withdrew from Afghanistan, the significance of Tajikistan will increase again in future.

COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY

The institutional architecture for commercial diplomacy with Tajik is as follows:



India exports pharmacy products, iron and meat products while it imports aluminium, cotton and essential oils. The trade between the two is mostly suitcase trade. This means that individual retailers from Tajikistan come to India and purchase woollens, leather products and pharma products and go back to do direct retail in Tajikistan. India has been providing lines of credit to Tajikistan for multiple products.




The lines of credit by India has been used by Tajiks for establishment of an IT Centre in Bedil with assistance from C-DAC (Centre for Development of Advanced Computing, India). The monetary assistance is also used for oral polio vaccines and purchase of ambulances.

As Tajikistan is a country rich in hydroelectricity, India's BHEL and National Hydel Power Corporation have been working on HEP plants in Varzob-1 and Sangtuda-1, with some firms, namely Marwis Private Limited and Valpro Group, exploring the oil and gas sector in Shcurab and Fan Yagnob. Tanya constructions have also bagged projects for repairing of air strips of Khujand and Dushanbe.

ANALYSIS OF INDIAN PRIME MINISTER VISIT—2015

In 2015, the Indian PM visited Tajikistan and gifted Emomali Rahman a miniature painting of the tomb of the 17th century Indian poet Abdul Qadir Bedil. For the first time ever, Tajikistan organised a joint event on agriculture to showcase the needs of Tajikistan and forge international partnerships. The Indian PM also participated in the event. The PM also unveiled a statue of Tagore and concluded agreements to cooperate on multiple issues with special focus on agriculture. An agreement to establish computer laboratories was concluded and promotion of cultural cooperation was envisaged.



Indian Security Interests in Tajikistan (Ayni and Farkhor)

In Tajikistan, there is an airbase at Ayni that had been developed by the Tajiks and Soviets. The Soviets used the airbase during the Cold War, but since 1989, it had been left without use. After the hijacking of the IC-814 Indian aircraft, the Indian Government instructed the R&AW to find a suitable airbase near Afghanistan for any eventualities. The R&AW, after its basic study, zeroed down upon Ayni airbase. Tajikistan and Afghanistan share a 1400 km long boundary. In 2002, after a bilateral defence cooperation pact was signed between India and Tajikistan, India began certain developments at the Ayni airbase.



India later on planned to deploy Mi-17 Choppers and Kiran training aircrafts.

The aim was to deploy these aircrafts to train Tajik air force pilots. However, due to certain reasons, in 2007, the Tajik Foreign Minister Harahon Zaripov officially declared that there is no Indo-Tajik cooperation at Ayni. One of the most likely reasons is the intervention of Russia so as to not allow India to have access to the airbase, despite India's having pumped millions of dollars into reconstruction and refurbishment of Ayni. India, during the Taliban rule in Afghanistan (1996–2001), had also established a military hospital in Farkhor. The R&AW had been instrumental in the setting up of the military hospital and succeeded in even stationing some helicopters at the airstrip near Farkhor. As the US launched operation Enduring Freedom in 2001, the hospital was shut down and India opened a new hospital in South Tajikistan in the city of Qurghonteppa.

5
CHAPTER

India and Turkmenistan Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:


- Basic background
- Commercial diplomacy
- Analysis of PM's visit, 2015
- Case Studies
- TAPI pipeline and energy security

BASIC BACKGROUND


India's relations with the Turks go back to the ancient times, with the Silk Route initially connecting the two lands. The Turkman Gate in Delhi remains as a symbol of honour to the Turk soldiers. Turkmenistan is located near the Caspian Sea and its location itself enhances its geostrategic significance due to large tracts of natural gas reserves. Turkmenistan has declared permanent neutrality at the level of foreign policy and even the UN recognises it as a neutral state. It grows cotton and wheat and is a major cotton exporter. India initiated diplomatic relations with Turkmenistan in 1992. In 1995, India initiated a programme to train Turkmenistan's diplomat and since 1996, there has been a track-II dialogue for peace and security.

COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY

The institutional architecture is as follows:




India exports pharmacy products, machines, and plastics while importing inorganic chemicals, raw cotton and synthetics. The fifth IGC happened in 2015 in Ashgabat and the dominant theme was TAPI-pipeline (see case study for details). A lot of Indian companies are into joint ventures in multiple sectors in Turkmenistan.



India has provided education-based support to Turkmenistan. India has provided Akash tablets and has also established an IT centre for IT skill training. ITEC scholarships are also provided to students in Turkmenistan. In 2014, the Indian Council for Cultural Relations organised a ‘Namaste Turkmenistan’ programme as a part of cultural diplomacy.


TAPI Pipeline and Indian Energy Security

In 1995, a private firm named Bridas Corporation floated an idea of a pipeline from Turkmenistan to India. In 2008, the Asian Development Bank conducted a feasibility study and this led to a TAPI framework being signed for export of natural gas from Turkmenistan. The modalities were fine tuned in 2010 in Ashgabat where an intergovernmental agreement was concluded for the supply of natural gas from Daulatabad gas fields to Fazilka.



ANALYSIS OF INDIAN PRIME MINISTER’S VISIT—2015

The Indian PM visited Turkmenistan and met Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow. He gifted Gurbanguly a special handcrafted horse saddle. In Ashgabat, the PM inaugurated a traditional medicine and yoga centre. He also concluded a bilateral defence cooperation agreement. Under this, there shall be regular high level bilateral defence visits between the two nations.



6
CHAPTER

India and Uzbekistan Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:


- Basic background
- Commercial diplomacy
- Tashkent Declaration
- Analysis of PM visit in 2015
- Final analysis of Indian PM visit to CA in 2015

BASIC BACKGROUND

Uzbekistan is located between Amu Darya and Syer Darya, and has a lot of fertile land. Agriculture is the core activity and is dominated by cotton and wheat. East Uzbekistan is mineral-rich, especially in the Fergana valley region. India and Uzbekistan have diplomatic relations since 1991. The two interact in very broad areas ranging from economic interaction to technology to small and medium enterprises (SME). After the visit of Narsimha Rao in the 1990s, cultural cooperation under ICCR has been frequent and a cultural centre has been established in Tashkent. India has an IT centre in Tashkent University. Since 2011, the two are strategic partners.

COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY

In 1992, the India–Uzbekistan IGC was established. The cooperation led to a Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement being signed. India extends lines of credit and cooperates predominantly in IT and pharmacy sector. A lot of Indian firms are present in Uzbekistan.



India exports pharma products, meat, and coal tar while importing fertilizers, silk, pulses, and spices. Uzbekistan is a cotton producer and has been inviting FDI in textiles. An Indian firm Spandex is a big player in textiles. In 2011, the two nations signed an MoU in textiles to promote and enhance cotton production. A visit by former President Dr APJ Abdul Kalam led to signing of Tashkent declaration.



India, on priority, is helping with the establishment of the chemical sector of Uzbekistan. India has also purchased six Ilyushin-78 (IL-78) aircrafts from Tashkent Aviation Production Association.

ANALYSIS OF THE INDIAN PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT—2015

In 2015, the Indian PM visited Tashkent and met President Karimov. He gave Karimov a compilation of the *Khan-i-Khusrau* by Amir Khusrau.



While addressing Indologists, the PM appreciated the completion of 50 years of Hindi broadcasting by Uzbek Radio. The two nations agreed to establish joint working groups on terror. Uzbekistan has also agreed to supply 2000 million tons of Uranium to India. The two sides have concluded an MoU on defence cooperation and cyber security. India has agreed to join the Ashgabat Agreement which was signed in 2011 and is an international transit corridor between CA and Persian Gulf. In July, 2016, India sent its approval to the repository state of Turkmenistan.

FINAL ANALYSIS

In 2015, there have been visits by the Indian PM to all the five CA republics. India has brought the region back into its foreign policy considerations. As the US troops withdraw from Afghanistan, the significance of the region will increase. The prime ministerial visits have conveyed to all these nations the importance India attaches to all of them. An important aspect of the visits was the carefully selected choice of gifts the Indian PM presented his counterparts with. For example, the Turkmenistan head of state, Gurbanguly, is an avid horse rider and is very fond of the Turkman horse breed, Akul Terke. Aptly, the PM gifted him a saddle of leather. In all, 21 agreements were signed during the visits, ranging from connectivity to energy to combating terrorism and defence cooperation. Due to the rise of the Islamic State (ISIS), no doubt security and defence dominated the theme in all countries. Advancement in the TAPI pipeline, Uranium supply from Nursultan Nazarbayev and permission granted to the OVL to drill in Satpayev remain some of the major achievements of the premier visits.

End of Part Questions

1. To what extent does India's Look North Policy help India meet the challenges in CA at the end of the Cold War? Why did the policy fail?
2. Why did India initiate the Connect CA Policy? Outline its key features.
3. How will India be able to stabilize the region of CA as a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation?
4. To what extent does India's CA policy synchronise with the other regional powers?

5. For India its engagement with CA is a litmus test for its global power aspirations. Examine.
6. Outline the broad contours of India's engagement with each Central Asian Republic.
7. What are the major challenges India is likely to witness in its energy diplomacy with CA?
8. What are the fundamental differences in USA's and Russia's engagement in CA? What impact is it likely to have on Indian policy in CA?

1
CHAPTER

India and South East Asia Policy— Key Drivers

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Historical analysis of Indian engagement.
- Evolution and analysis of the Look East Policy.
- From the Look East to the Act East Policy.
- Analysis of key themes in Indian engagement.
- Regional relationships and their dimensions.

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF INDIAN POLICY

The significance of South East Asia (SEA) as a strategic region for India's security matrix was highlighted in 1941 when Japan invaded India by launching attacks during the World War-II. Recollection of these developments compelled K M Panikkar to advance the idea of collective security. Panikkar asserted that India should strive for establishing interdependence with SEA to ensure that it forms a sphere of co-prosperity with India at the centre of that sphere. Nehru always believed that India's geographical location and its power could transform it into the pivot of Asia. When India became independent, a core element of its foreign policy was promotion of decolonisation. India always believed that imperialism not only facilitated economic-cum-political exploitation, but also promoted myriad forms of racism. India also opposed imperialism for strategic reasons. It believed that strategic autonomy can only be preserved if India dealt with states which were decolonised. Only decolonised states would give India an option to preserve autonomy of action in global affairs. India was concerned that even after the World War-II, colonial rule in Asia might continue as before, in which case, India's quest for autonomy of action would not materialise. Thus, after India's independence, it became a strong advocate of decolonisation.

When Japan surrendered the control of Indonesia in 1945, the Dutch attempted to colonise Indonesia. India, along with Australia, took the question of Indonesia to the United Nations (UN) and after four years of intense diplomatic negotiations, the Dutch failed in their efforts. In January 1949, New Delhi organised the conference on Indonesia and forwarded the idea of an independent Indonesia. In February 1949, the UNSC too passed the final resolution for an independent Indonesia, thereby paving the way for the ousting of the Dutch. The issue not only brought India and Indonesia closer, but the two sides developed defence relations, with India beginning to train Indonesian army officers.

Simultaneously, India tried to materialise its decolonisation policy strategically in cases of states neighbouring Indo-China. As per the Geneva Accord on Indo-China, three international commissions of supervision and control with an Indian chairman for each were created for Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. India used its decolonisation policy to seek independence for Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.


India also used its policy of non-alignment to build up relations with SEA. Burma and Indonesia were two states that also supported the non-alignment to ensure their stable existence. The British India had had SEA as its third largest trading partner. When India became independent, it had a decent trade with SEA. India, after independence, adopted an autarkic economic model. As India began to look inward, the South East Asian states began to adopt an export-led growth model. The SEA states began to seek support for industrialisation from the west and the USSR. Thus, due to different economic models, trade between India and SEA began to decline and all complementarities were lost.

As India was a British colony, the British from India took a lot of workers to work in their other colonies. The British had colonised Burma and had taken Indians from South India belonging to Chettiar community to work in rice fields in Burma. The Chettiars constituted a large chunk of Indian immigrants to Burma. Burma, after independence from the British, initiated land reform policy (Burma for Burmans) and passed the Land Alienation Act of 1948. This policy of Burma affected the Indian immigrants and they looked up for support from India. Nehru took up the issue with Burmese PM U Nu at a non-official level. The concerns of the Chettiar community people could not be resolved. As a result, a lot of Chettiars began to return to India. Nehru did not take up the matter officially with the Burmese leadership as he feared losing Burmese support to non-alignment. He thought that if he took up the matter with Burma, it might perceive this as an interference by India in its internal affairs, which, in turn, would have repercussions on Burma's continuance of support to non-alignment. Thus, for India, the strategic concern of Burmese support for non-alignment emerged as more important than the concerns of the Indian immigrant community. A similar issue had erupted in Malaya where a sizeable chunk of Indian community resided. After the independence of Malaya, their government passed multiple legislations that led to discrimination against the Indians. Nehru urged the Indians to display loyalty to their local governments and urged them to integrate with the local masses than raising their voices. He wanted India to be the light of Asia and an interlocutor between the West and Asia. This idea was not received well by the SEA states who felt that end of imperial control by Europe could lead to rise of neoliberalism by India. Nehru's self-proclaimed leadership role in SEA created enormous suspicion amongst SEA states and some smaller states even began to feel that India might try and colonise them.

Due to the adoption of a closed economic model, India was unable to provide any support for the economic growth of Asia. In 1962, after the Sino-India conflict, the SEA began to perceive that India might not be able to provide military security to any of the decolonised states either. Post 1962, India came to be perceived as a marginal player in the region till the end of Cold War. The 1960s saw a further deterioration of ties. In 1965, when India and Pakistan engaged in a conflict, Indonesia supported Pakistan. The alliance of Indonesia with Pakistan came as a big blow to India. In 1964, USA-Vietnam war began and India began to support Vietnam. India criticised USA presence, which was not well

received by SEA states. The states of SEA began to perceive India's hostility towards USA as a part of its alliance with the USSR. In 1971, when India–USSR signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, the SEA fears got intensified further. As India picked up an anti-West fault line, it was completely isolated in 1967 when the ASEAN was created. The ASEAN was made to promote economic integration and has a pro-West tilt. After the 1971 war between India and Pakistan, Iran threatened India that any future attack on Pakistan would lead to retaliation by Iran on India as such an attack on Pakistan would be perceived as an attack on Iran as well. The SEA states began to feel that India was too fixated with war to be a potential player for engagement. In the subsequent period of 1971, when India resorted to military modernisation, it was perceived suspiciously by SEA states. The Indian response to Sri Lanka in 1980s on issue of Tamil minorities and its subsequent military intervention in Sri Lanka heightened the concerns of SEA states that began to feel that if ethnic Indians are mistreated, India may resort to military use. The PM of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, was a friend of Nehru and always favoured a deeper engagement with India and a larger role for India in Asia. He even urged India to test a nuclear weapon to balance China after China tested a weapon in 1964. When Singapore was created in 1965, Lee urged India to train the military officials of Singapore. He wanted India to not only have an Asian Monroe doctrine but favoured a deeper naval engagement of India in the region. However, a struggling India, defeated in 1962 and devastated in a conflict with Pakistan in 1965 (devastated due to domestic problems), had neither the material capabilities nor a strategic vision to achieve the dream envisaged by Lee Kuan Yew.

Manmohini Kaul aptly summed up India's relation with SEA and the ASEAN states by stating that India's relations during the Cold War were a slew of missed opportunities, mistrust, misperception and bungling diplomacy. As the Cold War ended, India began to forge a closer relationship with the USA and began to improve relations with states which were allies and partners of the USA. As India embarked upon a path of open economy and liberalisation, the SEA states emerged a natural choice for India for partnerships. In the late 1980s, China was becoming militarily assertive in the region and its military assertion on Paracel and Spratly islands had created a new sense of fear amongst the states of SEA. China was also exerting a strong influence on the ASEAN and many SEA states perceived it an attempt to dominate the ASEAN. The SEA states and ASEAN members initiated a Look West Policy to engage with India as a potential regional balancer. India responded positively and in 1991–92 announced a Look East Policy to engage with SEA at the politico-military level. India also began to integrate economically with ASEAN.



As India opened up its economy and began to economically integrate with SEA, energy security became the core concern for India. To feed its rapidly growing economy, India began to explore options to import energy from Myanmar. India's OVL began to explore offshore gas fields in Vietnam (the chapter on India–Vietnam relations ahead will elaborate on this). To promote development of India's North East and maintain peace and stability, India has cooperated with both Myanmar and Bangladesh. During the recent visit of Sheikh Hasina in April 2017 to India, the two sides evolved a security-cum-defence partnership. Myanmar and India also cooperated with each other to carry out a surgical strike in 2015. Not only had PM Rao initiated the Look East Policy, but Gujarat also tried to bring India at a centre-stage in the region of Asia-Pacific with his Gujarat Doctrine. Under Gujarat Doctrine, India decided not to insist upon reciprocity in affairs with smaller states in the neighbourhood. The recent attempts to deepen ties with SEA and EA have taken an aggressive push with India's Act East Policy.

In conclusion, we may say that during much of the Cold War era, Indian policymakers ignored SEA. There were many reasons for the failure of India to establish ties with SEA. Initially, the Nehruvian idea to consolidate and establish Asia solidarity failed to take off. As majority of the SEA states feared communism, they showed faith in the ideology of the US. At the end of the Cold War, India's Look East Policy was designed to attract investments from SEA and boost trade through market access. India also began integration with the ASEAN. During the Vajpayee regime, the Look East Policy II brought in a security dimension along with trade. Finally, during the Manmohan Singh era, an FTA was put in place for goods and services. The Modi government has renamed the Look East Policy as the Act East Policy with an intention to seek investments and keep a check on China. To achieve this, there has been a thrust towards deepening defence ties with Vietnam, Japan, Singapore, and Australia with focus on infrastructure creation in Myanmar.

EVOLUTION AND ANALYSIS OF LOOK EAST POLICY (LEP)


In 1970s, the SEA region itself was yet to emerge as an economic magnet. Apart from India's own protectionist policies, Myanmar was a closed economy and Bangladesh did not provide the needed transit. Ideologically too, India differed from SEA. Thus, due to differing priorities, India could not leverage its cultural ties with SEA. Things began to change at the end of the Cold War as ASEAN states adopted a Look West Policy to counterbalance the dominance of China. As India began to look towards the East it realised that its diaspora in SEA is very different from the Chinese diaspora. The economic profile of the Indian Diaspora in SEA was very low compared to the economically vibrant Chinese diaspora and migrants.

India's economic crisis in 1991 and the end of the Cold War led P V Narasimha Rao to give a strategic push to India's engagement with SEA. An all-party consensus too began to emerge to improve ties with SEA based on cultural and spiritual affinities while economically integrating India into the region. Without wasting much time, India decided to recover the loss of the USSR by building up a relationship with the USA and allies of USA in SEA. As India adopted an open economy, India decided to learn the models from SEA. The Rao government officially launched the LEP in 1994 when Rao delivered a lecture during his visit to Singapore. In the first phase of the LEP, India decided to expand


economic ties with SEA and provide an answer to ASEAN'S search for an alternative to China in the grouping.

LEP in Phase-I = South East Asia + Economic Integration

The idea of LEP was to economically integrate with ASEAN. India wanted to attract investments from SEA to facilitate its domestic growth. As India and SEA had historical and cultural ties, and the LEP provided a bridge to the past. India also wanted to stabilise its North East which could eventually be used a springboard to reach SEA. Thus, India under LEP, began to prop up its diplomatic presence in the region.



The LEP of India was further enhanced during the Vajpayee government. Some scholars have called it Phase-II of the LEP. The second phase has focussed on enhancing security partnerships. The second phase also expanded the geographical sphere of India's engagement in the region to include East Asia. A few scholars' views could be helpful in our analysis here.



LEP-II = SEA + East Asia + Security + Economy

FROM LOOK EAST POLICY TO ACT EAST POLICY

As the LEP paid rich dividends, India was not only able to economically integrate itself with the ASEAN but also able to secure an FTA in both goods (2010) and services (2014). The Indo-ASEAN trade reached \$100 billion. In 2011, during her visit to India, Hillary Clinton urged India to not merely Look East but Act East. The suggestion was made at a time when the UPA government was in power. Ideologically, the Congress government was not very inclined towards deep liberalisation. Clinton's suggestion of Act East demanded more action oriented economic integration with SEA and East Asia (EA). Nothing materialised during the UPA regime. In 2014, after the coming of the NDA government to power, the new Indian PM Narendra Modi, at the 12th Indo-ASEAN summit at Nay Pi Taw in Myanmar, announced the transition from LEP to the Act East

Policy (AEP). The basic theme of the AEP was to focus on integration with the ASEAN by improving connectivity with the ASEAN states. India, under the AEP, wants to promote connectivity, cultural ties and commercial ties with SEA and EA. India has invited the Head of the States of all 10 ASEAN Members as Chief guests for 2018 Republic Day celebrations in New Delhi as a part of outreach under AEP.



Under the AEP, India wishes to reinvigorate ties and explore strategic dimensions of its relationship with Vietnam, Singapore, and Myanmar. There is an enhanced focus on connectivity and increased levels of historical interaction. The aim is to have an accelerated engagement with the Asia-Pacific region at a strategic level with focus on transnational crimes, marine piracy, nuclear issues, and freedom of navigation the focus is upon improving connectivity at land, air, and maritime levels. India has contributed to three funds.




One of the core dimensions of the AEP is to also promote people relationships based upon civilizational links of common language, religion, tradition, dress and crafts. If LEP was about improving economic-cum-security relationship with SEA and EA, then AEP is about adding strategic content to the relationship across Asia-Pacific with focus on connectivity, culture and commerce. In 2015, India and Singapore concluded a strategic partnership agreement. India has also upgraded its strategic partnership with Vietnam, Japan and Malaysia.


How does Act East Policy (AEP) Realign Indian Foreign Policy along its Historical Axis Towards the East?

In 2002, Vajpayee gave a lecture in Singapore where he asserted that India's position in Asia-Pacific was a political fact. Modi in 2014 made it a reality by changing the Look East Policy {LEP} (which was centered around ASEAN) to Act East Policy (based on an extended cultural outreach). The AEP is different from the LEP as it focuses on building defense, cultural and economic partnerships with states in the Asia-Pacific region. Brahma Chellany asserts that AEP has enhanced India's external prestige as an integral part of Indo-Pacific region. A key element of the AEP is that India has started internationalizing disputes in the Indo-Pacific region to psychological pressure on irritants (the recent mentions of South China Sea dispute in


bilateral statements between India-USA and India-France is a testimony to the fact). There is a rising consensus that US President Donald Trump may allow China to take charge of the Indo-Pacific and may reduce its own influence in the region. This may lead to India plough a lonely furrow. India has to hedge against this uncertainty by enhancing relations with the states in the Indo-Pacific. The AEP realigns Indian foreign policy along its historical axis towards the East. India is aggressively using the soft tool of Buddhist legacy to reclaim the unique historical leverage.



The North-Eastern states of India have been identified as a launch pad for the AEP. The region is envisioned as a Natural Economic Zone from where economic corridors are to be developed. The idea is to develop infrastructure in the North-eastern states to integrate them with CLMV states.



What makes the AEP different from the LEP is the action component. Under the AEP, India is also investing more diplomatic capital to boost strategic component of relationship with Japan, Australia, South Korea, Vietnam, Singapore and Pacific-rim states. The future of the AEP will depend on how India uses the AEP to develop its North East to act as a springboard for connectivity. We can sum up the policies in the following diagram:



Look East Policy—When?

There has been a serious concern that India never articulated the tenets of the LEP. There has been a criticism that the governments never pronounced or articulated the visions clearly for the public. The Rao government never explained what exactly the

LEP stood for. S D Munni remarks that LEP was never spelled out. Moreover, the way it was carried out suggested that it was neither a reaction to geo strategy nor an articulated response to the post-Cold War period. India's former foreign secretary Salman Haider says that the term LEP was rather an off-the-cuff slogan. He emphasises it was crafted to garner the attention of the media for Rao's trip to South Korea in 1993. In fact, a predominant theory was that Rao coined the term during a lecture in Singapore in 1994. Haider further states that Rao never used the term LEP in the lecture, stating only that Asia-Pacific could potentially emerge as a springboard for India's emergence to global markets. This is why there is no official date for the initiation of the LEP.



RCEP–Is it a Trade Pact that would hurt India?

India is negotiating RCEP with fifteen countries (for detailed analysis-refer to [Section-F, Chapter-2](#) of the book). In May 2017, at the Ministerial Conference for RCEP in Hanoi, a lot of pressure was applied on India to make concessions in goods, services and investments. At the level of trade in goods, India has offered that it will give up the three-tier tariff reduction. Under the three tier tariff reduction proposals, India has offered different coverage of tariffs. For members of ASEAN it is 65% tariff coverage for trade in goods while it is 42% tariff coverage for Australia, New Zealand and China. There is a pressure on India to accept higher product coverage for all trade partners. It is proposed to India that it should accept 92% coverage uniformly for all. India on the other hand has offered 80% coverage (instead of 90% proposed) with 75% for more developed players. There are studies done that show that if tariff cover from 92% to 80% product coverage is accepted, then the dairy sector of New Zealand will decimate the Indian dairy sector. There are pressures on India to push provisions in IPR beyond TRIPS that are likely to have serious consequences on the generic medicine sector in India. As protectionism in the West rises, India needs to make inroads into the RCEP without making compromises on agriculture, IPR and industrial sector.

ANALYSIS OF KEY THEMES IN INDIA AND SEA AND EA

In this section, we shall adopt a thematic approach to India's ties with SEA and EA. We will try to build upon the knowledge from the previous sections of the chapter to broaden our understanding.

Theme 1: Challenges and hurdles in India's integration with SEA and EA

Way back in 1946, in a memorandum to the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) in India, Nehru asserted that India lies at the centre of security in Asia and shall play a larger role in security of SEA. This vision was reiterated later by Lee Kuan Yew, who wanted India to be a balancer of forces in the region. India did take certain policy steps to promote and deepen ties with the region, but the ground reality is that there is a huge gap between what is promised and what is achieved on the ground. The Modi government's shift to the AEP was undertaken with an intention to remedy the existing deficiencies but it also will require some major changes in the policy to get things moving.

In the initial years of the British rule, there was a great enthusiasm amongst the nationalist scholars to establish cultural colonies in SEA as they perceived that the region had once functioned as a cultural progeny of India. Nehru too dreamt of organising a new forum to assert India as a lynchpin in affairs of SEA. Nehruvian diplomacy in Burma, Indo-China, Indonesia, Korean crisis and Vietnam were steps to assert the same, but, all strategies failed to achieve this ambitious pan-Asianism. The LEP and later the AEP are initiatives that have helped regain some of the lost space. India is now negotiating Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) to establish the largest free trade bloc in the world. Yet India's economic interaction with the region has not yielded results because of its stunted domestic growth. The FDI in retail has always met with stiff resistance in this regard. A deeper economic integration with SEA and EA is impacted due to a fragmented internal market of India. The new government in Delhi since 2014 has pushed for domestic reforms. 'Make in India' and GST are landmark achievements. Steps to boost up port infrastructure through the Sagarmala initiative have been launched. India's bureaucratic hurdles and its officials' discomfort with equity from foreign shores has demotivated SEA states. For example, in 1994, Singaporean PM Goh Chok Tong envisaged an alliance between Tata and Singapore Airlines, which could only materialise in January, 2015 with the launch of Air Vistara. The lack of progress in BIMSTEC and Makong-Ganga cooperation have caused much inconvenience. The major reason for lack of progress in the two organisations has been reluctance of India to develop its North-Eastern region. Though the AEP has raised the pitch, progress on the ground is still awaited. At the security level, India's defence bureaucracy has failed to evolve plans to garner resources for the growth of the country. India's oil exploration forays in SEA and mineral trade at foreign policy levels have not been synced with proper security for the sea lanes of communication.

Theme 2: Counter-terrorism Operations between India and ASEAN

The ASEAN, through mechanisms like ASEAN Plus Three (APT), East Asia Summit (EAS) and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), divides the great powers of the platform for dialogue to ensure stability. Apart from other areas of engagement, India and the ASEAN today are cooperating with each other in counter-terrorism. In the period prior to 9/11, terrorism was also an agenda for discussion at a regional forum like ASEAN but only as a priority to be tackled at the national level. The ASEAN states ensured that they refrained from intervening in national strategies of member states. Post 9/11, the ASEAN faced the challenge of unifying all different approaches followed by member state to combat terrorism. On the side-lines of the 7th ASEAN summit in 2011 in Brunei, the ASEAN states adopted a declaration on Joint Action to counter terrorism. Subsequently, in 2011, the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism (ACCT) was adopted. The ACCT delinked terrorism and religion and displayed sensitivities about the dangers posed by terrorism to global peace and security and the development of the region. The ACCT recognises that the ASEAN's existence is not threatened by terrorism but terrorism may impact the long-term goals of the ASEAN. The ACCT also asserts that each sovereign member state may evolve their own laws to tackle terrorism and re-affirms a non-interventionist approach. The ASEAN has scrutinised terrorism as a transnational crime while allowing member states to implement their own approaches. It has limited interaction between the member states on political basis but has facilitated legal and technical cooperation. The member


states meet to strengthen the ACCT while allowing operational parts to be resolved by states. India and the ASEAN signed a Joint Declaration for co-operation to combat international terrorism in Bali in 2003. India, since 2009, has agreed to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) work plan on counter terrorism and transnational crime.



In 2014, the ASEAN had already asserted that the ISIS was a threat not just to the Middle East but to the rest of the world. The future of Indo-ASEAN cooperation lies in how the two sides develop a plan to counter ISIS that affects the stability of both the ASEAN states and India.

Theme 3: Trade Potential between India and ASEAN

India, under its AEP, has asserted that it aims to enhance commercial relations with the ASEAN region. During the Cold War, the main barriers to trade with the ASEAN included India's inward-looking policies and lack of connectivity to promote land trade with Bangladesh and Myanmar. The slow pace of development in West Bengal and Northeast also acted as hindering factors. Thus, lack of infrastructure, connectivity and development at the borders hindered cross-border trade. Though India signed an FTA in services with ASEAN, the situation as of 2017 is that not all ASEAN states have ratified the FTA. It is understood that India could rectify its trade deficit with ASEAN in goods if the agreement on services is ratified by all states as India could capitalise on areas of its comparative advantage (that range from IT to higher education to medical tourism). To take maximum advantage of the trade with ASEAN, India needs to work upon its infrastructure and institutions of governance. To foster trade, India has been extending lines of credit as well. The poor rank of India in the 'ease of doing businesses' too had been a big hurdle to realise its potential—a situation that is now being addressed to redress the mechanisms involved.



Theme-4: ASEAN celebrates its 50th birthday in 2017—An assessment

In 2017 ASEAN completed 50 years of Asian regionalism. When ASEAN was born in 1967, many believed that the organization will not be able to survive, yet it succeeded due to multiple reasons. Firstly, the most powerful binder was the anti-communism policy in the grouping. The five founding members (Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand) of ASEAN were open economies and used open economy as a tool to achieve economic integration. At the end of the Cold War, the erstwhile communist states of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam and Brunei made a transition to an open economy and entered ASEAN. ASEAN received a lot of flak from the West when it engaged with

Myanmar as Myanmar was under a military rule. ASEAN however continued to engage with Myanmar as the core value of ASEAN was that trade and economic integration are good confidence building measures than isolation. It is due to this value of ASEAN that Myanmar was finally able to transition to a democracy. In contrast, the West has isolated Syria and Syria is unlikely to witness such a transformation. Today ASEAN has emerged as a reliable platform for geopolitical engagement in Asia. The success is rooted in Masyawarah and Mufakat (consultation and consensus) culture which has been championed by ASEAN. Today ASEAN has emerged as an integrated single market due to two key things:

1. Legal charter envisaging free movement of goods, services, capital and skilled labor (in 2007).
2. ASEAN Economic Community (in 2015).


In September 2017, a Parliamentary Standing Committee in India headed by Bhupendra Yadav has suggested 69 ways to improve India-ASEAN trade diplomacy. The report asserts that India should allow ASEAN to access Indian markets in leather, pharmacy and textiles. A core recommendation was to increase the economic interaction so that ASEAN can play a major role in enhancing manufacturing sector of India. The committee has asserted that India needs to focus on creating corridor of connectivity and corridor of trade with ASEAN.

REGIONAL RELATIONSHIPS AND THEIR DIMENSIONS


Survey of Security Relationship between India and Thailand

In 2012, India and Thailand celebrated 65 years of diplomatic relations. In 2012, the Thai PM Yingluck Shinawatra was also the chief guest for the Republic Day celebrations in India. For Thailand, India is strategically located as a gateway to South Asia and the core of Thailand's Look West Policy. Indo–Thai relations go back to the ancient times when Ashoka sent a mission to Swarnabhumi to spread Buddhism. This led to a rise of cultural exchanges between India and Thailand. In 1947, the two states established diplomatic ties and Thailand became an integral part of India's Look East Policy. A key regional binder for India and Thailand is the BIMSTEC. The relations have been deep at the economic level between the two states as they signed an Early Harvest Scheme in 2003 that ultimately culminated into an FTA.

The rise of China in the region has altered the security dynamics of the region. The Chinese assertions in the South China Sea and its hegemonic ambitions have become a cause of concern. What is also important is that none of the states wishes to live in a Chinese dominated system as both prefer more freedom and autonomy. For Thailand, China has been a security threat since the World War-II and during the Cold War. In the post-Cold War times, Thailand and China concluded an agreement for strategic co-operation in 2007. The support of China to Thailand in the aftermath of the financial crisis had caused a shift toward strategic cooperation. Since 2007, Thailand has come to recognise the importance of China for the Thai economy. However, the recent Chinese assertion in South China Sea has opened up a new space of co-operation for India and Thailand. Both sides have now explored defence as a hedge against regional uncertainties. In 2012, India and Thailand concluded an MoU on defence co-operation.




The bigger question that arises is whether India can successfully emerge as a security provider to East Asia against the rising uncertainties. India has not used its LEP to bolster security and defence relations as it has preferred a lesser engagement in the security realm. As China and its assertiveness increases in the area, the SEA and EA states expect India to be able to provide security through strategic engagements with the players in the region. The Japanese and Koreans too see India as a net security provider in the region. It is in this context that Indian began to assert its role as a net security provider since 2012 by beginning to use the Indian Ocean as a region to demonstrate its capabilities. As India believes East Asia is also a part of its extended neighbourhood, it has begun using a mixture of soft and hard power along with sustained political, security and economic interaction within the region under its Act East Policy. Under the AEP, India intends to use the existing institutional architecture to deepen ties with the region. The recent AEP signifies India's strategic interest in injecting the strategic dimension into the relationship. India has already enhanced strategic control of its relation with Vietnam, Japan, Singapore and South Korea. Thailand has emerged as the next destination, along with Indonesia, where relations can be taken to a strategic level. India has emerged as a security partner of the region and the AEP will give India a further push to the process as it now possesses a vision and the leadership qualities necessary for network building.



Survey of Future of India-Taiwan Relations


In 1949, India recognised the People's Republic of China (PRC) but not the Republic of China (ROC) {For detailed analysis, refer to the chapter of India and China relationship}. It is not that India offered any position on the issue of Formossa. India believed that it was important to recognise the fact that the PRC had been established. Thus, Nehru recognised PRC and also that Formossa is Chinese territory. As neither PRC nor ROC favoured any international mediation, Nehru also designed Indian policy appropriately and maintained that the civil war of China would end soon and the will of the Chinese people would be abiding. India refrained from playing any conciliatory role in ROC-PRC issue.



During the initial years, as Nehru maintained this policy, leaders of the Hindu Mahasabha, namely N B Khare, and Jan Sangh's Madhok, felt that India had adopted a policy of double standards by not accepting a nationalist Taiwan while accepting a communist China. Post the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict, India and Taiwan began to witness a rise in military and media exchange which today manifests as rising parliamentary exchanges. But in the last 30 years, Taiwan-China relations have improved. A unique feature is that this improvement has not been driven by forces from top down but from bottom up. The Taiwanese businesses have invested heavily in China and as a result, the people-to-people ties have flourished. China has remained adamant on the One-China policy and has maintained that Taiwan is part of China as ROC does not exist anymore.


India does engage with Taiwan, but, under a different nomenclature. In 1995, India established an India-Taipei Association in Taiwan while Taiwan established the Taipei Economic and Cultural Centre (TECC) in India. The two sides don't have diplomatic relations and thus lack an institutional architecture. Today, the bilateral trade stands to be \$8 billion as of 2016. India has received FDI from Taiwan. Taiwan has, however, faced difficulties in bringing FDI to India as in the official documents of India, Taiwan is mentioned as Chinese Taipei and the existing Indian rules that apply to China also apply to Taiwan, with no exception applicable. The continental engineering corporation of Taiwan has been working with the Delhi metro. It has often complained about the repeated RBI clearance it had to get for bringing investments to India. Taiwan somehow receives less support from the Indian political elites and its foreign bureaucracy. It is important for India to rectify this imbalance and boost ties with Taiwan.

In 2014, during the swearing in of Indian PM Modi, the representatives from the TECC were invited. Later in the year, as India initiated its AEP, the two states seem to have developed more potential to enhance ties. Taiwan can become a frontier state of India's AEP. In 2015, the two sides celebrated their 20th anniversary of their relations.



Taiwan has initiated a Go South Policy and under which it intends to establish representative offices in the states of SEA for economic engagement. The Go South Policy intends to use economic diplomacy to boost political relation. The new leadership of Taiwan under Tsai Ing-wen favours deeper economic ties with India. It is under the AEP, that India should try to create an institutional framework that will bolster cooperation with

Taiwan. Under its AEP, India can do great fine balancing of enhancing ties in education, science and economy without upsetting China.



In June, 2016, an Indian delegation landed in Taiwan and concluded an MoU on Air Services Agreement and agricultural cooperation. An India–Taiwan Parliamentary Forum was established to enhance political cooperation. In February, 2017, a Parliamentary delegation from Taiwan, comprising of three women members of Parliament led by Kuan Bi Lang, visited India. The delegation supported Make in India and cooperation for smart cities. Taiwan pledged support to boost tourism and people to people ties with India. There were protest from China in 2017 over the visit by Taiwan's delegation but India dismissed the Chinese protests by asserting that the visits had nothing unusual and had no political meanings attached as such informal interactions are a part Indo-Taiwan engagement.

Survey of Sixty years of India–Malaysia Diplomatic Relationship, 2017

India and Malaysia have historic and civilizational ties. The two sides established diplomatic relations in 1957. In 1993, the two sides concluded an MoU on defence cooperation. Apart from the regular meetings of the defence secretaries of the two countries, the two sides have conducted regular air level and naval exercises. In 2010, the two sides concluded a comprehensive economic cooperation agreement (CECA). As Malaysia is a member of the ASEAN, the two sides also benefit commercially due to the India–ASEAN FTA. The FDI from Malaysia to India is directed primarily in telecom, oil and gas and power plants.

In April, 2017, the Malaysian PM Dato Seri Mohamad Najib Bin Tun Abdul Razak visited India. He addressed a conference of Indo–Malaysia CEO forum. The two sides decided to deepen cooperation in infrastructure, textiles, pharmacy, IT, healthcare, and help in manpower development, data mining, traditional medicine, education, MSME, civil aviation and tourism. To further enhance the India–Malaysia strategic partnership, the two sides have decided to augment cooperation in multilateral affairs and economic issues.



Survey of India and Singapore Relations

The India-Singapore relations began during the Chola period. Cholas named the island

Singapore and established a settlement there. In the modern times, the East India Company used to carry cargo via Singapore to India and it was an important transit route for the British. Singapore was later colonized by the British and governed from Calcutta. Singapore became independent from the British in 1965. In the same year, India concluded a diplomatic treaty with Singapore. India-Singapore relations paced up since the end of the Cold War and in 2005 the two sides concluded a C.E.C.A. In 2015, India and Singapore celebrated 50 years of diplomatic relations. In the same year, Indian Prime Minister also attended the funeral of Lee Kuan Yew. The foundation of the economic relationship between the two is the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) signed in 1994 (with protocols signed in 2011). India exports light oils, nickel and diamonds while it imports styrene, digital processing units and toluene. Singapore is the second largest FDI provider to India. In 2003, the two sides concluded India-Singapore Defense Cooperation Agreement and established a Joint Working Group on intelligence cooperation. Today, the two sides cooperate in defense at the level of maritime security and defense technologies. There have been frequent bilateral army and naval exercises under MILAN and SIMBEX formats. At the economic level, to enhance commercial diplomacy with India, Singapore follows a three-point strategy. Firstly, it encourages private investment to India. Secondly, it collaborates with countries like Japan and South Korea to invest in India and thirdly, India and Singapore jointly explore possibilities of investing together in other countries (mainly Africa, Latin America, and Central Asia). Singapore has complained about bureaucratic hurdles, procedural hassles and lack of transparency as some of the hurdles in commercial diplomacy. In the recent times, under the leadership of Narendra Modi, India has decided to attract global investment to make India a manufacturing hub of the world. Just like China has used Hong Kong as a collaborator to access international investment community, India has decided to use Singapore in the same way to access global finances. India is taking steps to integrate to the global economy by integrating the India Rupee through Singapore to make it an international currency. The RBI has allowed Indian firms to raise Rupee bonds abroad. Such bonds are raised in the local currency and can be settled in US Dollars. Singapore can play an important role to allow India to internationalize the Rupee. This will strengthen the bilateral India-Singapore commercial diplomacy.

2
CHAPTER

India and Australia Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Analysis of historical diplomatic relations
- Commercial and strategic diplomacy
- Nuclear and education diplomacy
- Analysis of bilateral visits

INTRODUCTION

Australia is an erstwhile British colony like India and their relation started unfolding during the colonial period. During the British era, Indian labour was used in the plantations and cane fields in Queensland. The Europe–Australia trade brought India and Australia closer to each other. Since Indian independence, Australia and India have witnessed three distinct phases of relationship. The initial Nehruvian period saw ideological differences separating India and Australia. The period from 1970s till the end of the Cold War saw undulation. Finally, since the end of the Cold War, there has been strategic convergence between the two. Let us examine each phase in detail.

PHASE 1: 1947 TO 1970

India, after its independence in 1947, established a mission in Australia. India had already had its mission opened in 1944, and took this opportunity to convert it to an Indian High Commission in 1947. Afterwards, India adopted non-alignment policy at foreign policy level while Australia remained inclined towards the USA and established its alliance with America very firmly.

Cold War alliance of Australia and the US


The relationship of Australia and US goes back to 1900–1901 when both cooperated for the first time to suppress the Boxer Rebellion in China. The US and Australia fought the World War-II together. In 1951, the ANZUS alliance was formed between Australia, New Zealand, and USA as a treaty for Pacific security. In 1954, when the SEATO was created, ANZUS was brought within its ambit but the ANZUS per se continued to be the bedrock of the US–Australia relation. Even today, Australia continues to be the top non-NATO troop contributor for NATO operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The role of Australia for the US foreign policy has increased in the recent times owing to the Pivot to Asia initiative and Trans Pacific partnerships.

As the case notes, Australia became an ally of the US while India advocated for

NAM. The two nations, therefore, ideologically drifted apart. Moreover, the relations could not flourish as neither of the countries ever featured in each other's strategic calculus. In the initial phases, India decided to be a part of the British Commonwealth without allegiance to the British crown. Australia initially adopted a white only policy while India did not opt for any anti-Asian Policy. Australia supported the US in its Vietnam War and even allowed its territory to be used by the US for docking nuclear ships in Australia. Australia also provided aid to India under the Colombo Plan and supported India in its war against China in 1962. However, the ideological difference and their different approaches to the British Commonwealth prevented the relations to be taken to an advanced level.

PHASE 2: 1970 TO END OF COLD WAR

During this phase, we see domestic political change in Australia (Robert Menzeies was replaced by Gough Whitlam as Prime Minister) which also brought change in Australian international relations. Gough Whitlam intervened successfully to end Australian participation in Vietnam War. He went on to diplomatically recognise China, North Korea and East Germany. In 1971, India and Australia envisaged cultural cooperation. The relationship went on an upswing but it was short-lived. After the Indo-Pak war of 1971 and the subsequent conclusion of the India–Russia Treaty of Friendship, the relationship began to slowdown. The dip in the Indo–Australia relations came in 1975 when Malcolm Fraser, Australian PM criticised India's proximity to the USSR. He also took a dig at India's condemnation of the US base in Diego Garcia and refusal of India to condemn Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean region.



PHASE 3: STRATEGIC CONVERGENCE


As the Cold War ended, a growing cooperative spirit began to emerge between the two nations. Both nations began to recognise shared ideals of democracy and peace. The ending of the Cold War also made India improve its relations with the US and its immediate neighbours. Both countries identified economic cooperation as an area for strengthening bilateral relations. An Australia–India council to promote long term interests in India was established and in 1992, a joint working group on coal was formed. In 1994, a report called 'India's economy at the Midnight Hour' was prepared. The report examined trade and investment opportunities in India and identified areas of future investment for Australia. This report acted as a strategy document for Australian businesses. In 1995, the Australian Trade Minister Bob McMullan visited India and developed government-to-government ties for the institutionalisation of trade. Australia has a unique way of undertaking research to fill the gap in awareness of a target market for future. Thus, the East Asia Analytical Unit in Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade prepared the above

report to guide future action. It also outlined education as a core area and encouraged Australian education industry to tap India on priority as a market for higher education.

The previous phase of undulation gave way for effective convergence of strategic relations after 9/11. The 9/11 again brought the US, Australia and India closer to contain terrorism. However, the relationship after the Cold War was not that smooth and some speed breakers did slow the pace of the unfolding relationship. In 1990, Australia sold Mirage aircrafts to Pakistan at complete displeasure of India. Initially, Australia also showed reluctance to support India at the APEC and UNSC. The 1998 nuclear tests by India saw a deeply negative reaction by Australia. Australia after India's nuclear test withdrew its High Commissioner from India and also halted all ongoing defence and security cooperation as well as trade. The relations saw normalisation only after the Indo-US nuclear deal post 2005. The period post 2005 saw the deepening of the relationship yet again.

COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY

As the diplomatic ties between India and Australia began to normalise, trade as a dimension picked up. India exports to Australia pearls, medical instruments and IT services and imports gold, coal, copper and vegetables.




Australia invests in India through FDI while Indian firms also have presence in Australia. Indian firms in Australia include Sterlite, Reliance, Asian Paints, Adani, NMDC, Tata, ICICI, TCS and JFlex, to name a few. Australian FDI comes to India in services, metallurgical industry, telecom, automobile and consultancy. In Melbourne, Satyam Mahindra has established largest ever product development centre. In 2014, Australia had expressed interest to export resources from Abbot Point Port in Queensland by constructing a rail line to link the port with coal mines. Moreover, Tata Blue Scope Steel has established a Joint Venture for steel use for construction industry.

Adani Group and Carmichael Coal Mine

Carmichael coal mine is located in Queensland. The Government of Queensland, in August 2014, approved a mining lease for Adani. While approving the project, the Government of Queensland took environmental concerns into consideration. The main driving factor was job creation and flow of investment. The Government of Queensland granted three mining leases for an area containing 11 billion tons coal over 160 km area in North West of Clermont. It is a railroad project to establish mining activity, workshops, power lines, pipes to transport 100 tonnes of coal per

year. Once the company starts mining, it will send clean coal to India. However, the clearance has sparked concerns amongst green groups in Australia. The environmental lobby is asserting that the project will damage the great barrier reefs. They also site environmental damage due to dredging and climate change as serious concerns. As of now, the project has become operational.

In 2006, the Australia–India Research Fund was founded with an aim to promote bilateral research in sectors to enhance science based collaboration. In 2014, Tony Abbott donated 20 million dollars for four years to Australia–India strategic Research Fund which had identified five support areas.



Since 2008, both have been undertaking a joint study for a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and have discussed impact of tariff reduction and increased trade in services. The FTA has focused on IT, Telecom, finance and Tourism. In May 2011, the negotiations for CECA began and are still going on.

STRATEGIC DIPLOMACY

Australia in 2012 has announced a white paper on defence. The title of the paper is 'Australia in the Asian century'. Australia says that the centre of gravity has shifted to the Indo-Pacific as the new theatre of commerce and power. Hence, Australia intends to explore opportunities in Asia. The US attempting to rebalance Asia has brought strategic importance of Indian Ocean region to the fore. In this context, Australia has advanced an idea to cooperate with India in the economic area and maritime security and has recognised the importance of a forum like Indian Ocean Rim Association. It has announced in its 2014–15 budgets its commitment to grow its defence spending to 2% of GDP over the decade to curtail new threats in the maritime sphere.

In 2009 India and Australia announced their strategic partnership agreement (SPA) when the then Australian PM, Kevin Rudd, visited India. One important reason is an increased assertion by China in the South China Sea. Both India and Australia felt the need to cooperate at multiple strategic levels to ensure protection of sea lanes of communication.



India-Australia: Partners in Regional Security and Prosperity and AUSINDEX-2017


The Indo-Pacific region is witnessing strategic changes and India and Australia have deep convergences in meeting these emerging challenges. In June 2017, India and

Australia carried out the second edition of joint naval exercise called AUSINDEX in the West coast of Australia. From India, INS Jyoti, INS Shivalik and INS Kamorta visited the port of Freemantle. The first edition of this exercise happened in 2015 in Vishakapatnam. In the second edition, in 2017, the two focused on enhancing interoperability at the naval level. This helped both sides lay down a foundation for a professional culture of future war fighting. Australia and India want to ensure that the dynamic Indo-Pacific region remains a region of prosperity and both sides are able to uphold a rules based order which is challenged by unilateral action of some states (indirect reference to China and its assertion in the region). Both Australia and India are democracies where the leaders are accountable to the people. When democratic principles are translated and applied to foreign policy and international engagement, it gives rise to a rule based international system based on cooperation, transparency, predictability, peace and security. The two sides intend to deepen their security cooperation through the bilateral India-Australia Framework for Security Cooperation (signed in 2014).

A need was felt to establish and conclude an alternative security architecture aimed to balance China's hegemonic oceanic ambitions. Both sides understand that an architecture should be bilateral or regional with no power outside the region but should include US as a net security provider. As China, in recent times, has become excessively assertive, the SPA can have a balancing influence and promote stability.



Thus, the cooperation at strategic level between India and Australia can stabilise the region and both have a shared concern for China in the strategic sphere. But the more Australia undertakes commerce with China and continues to remain a US ally, the more will be the Australian dilemma in choosing a long-term relationship with India.




Why is India Reluctant to add Australia in the Malabar Naval Exercises?

Though India has preferred bilateral engagement with Australia, it has rejected Australia's entry into the Malabar exercises (Malabar is a trilateral naval exercise conducted between India, Japan and USA since 1992, but, Japan became a permanent


member in 2015 only. The 2017 version of the Malabar exercise is explained in the chapter of India and Japan relationship). The reason is that Australia initially pulled out of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (established in 2007 by Shinzo Abe, the Prime Minister of Japan as an informal security dialogue platform between India, Japan, USA and Australia) as it perceived that engaging in such a dialogue could upset Australia-China relations. Australia and China have a deep strategic and economic relationship (with the bilateral trade approximately 60 Billion Dollars between the two). Australia and China also signed a Free Trade Agreement in 2014. India remains concerned about strategic clarity from the Australian side vis-à-vis China. India feels that if Australia tilts more towards China at the strategic level, then by deepening its bilateral engagement with USA and Japan in Malabar, India will be able to counter balance the influence of China. Addition of Australia in the trilateral Malabar, India feels, will not give it any tactical gain on the ground. In the near future, Australia may enter Malabar, but, as of now, India-Australia prefer bilateralism to gain strategic value.

NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY

The India–Australia nuclear issue has always revolved around the NPT. Australia has a lot of Uranium which India needs. However, Australia had been reluctant to supply for a long time on the basis that it was a signatory of NPT while India was not. Australia has always insisted that its nuclear supply would be conducted and in accordance to the NPT and supplies would only be granted to NPT signatories having proper safeguard agreements in place as per the IAEA. As India is a non-signatory to the NPT despite having acknowledged good non-proliferation credentials. If India and Australia had any nuclear commerce, then it would mean that Australia had tried to reward non-compliance to global regimes. However, post the 2005 nuclear deal between India and the USA and Australian support to India at NSG, it has initiated a rethink. In 2011, a joint group announced a policy shift for Uranium exports to India for civilian use. Australia has made it clear that strict safeguards need to be negotiated upon. The change is attributed to economic gain and fear of being isolated as the US, France, Canada have already concluded nuclear deals with India. In addition, Australia has given Uranium to China, which does not have a good non-proliferation record. The diplomatic angle played a very important role.



In September 2014, Tony Abbott visited India and concluded a nuclear deal. The basis of this 2014 nuclear deal was 2005 Indo-US nuclear deal. Australia finally concluded the deal based on Indian commitments in 2005.



EDUCATION DIPLOMACY

Australia has come out with a white paper plan in education that places Hindi as one of the four priority languages along with Chinese, Japanese and Indonesian. Australia aims to equip their children with Asian languages. Australia is promoting higher education and skill development for foreign students. If we compare Australia vis-à-vis Europe in post-study work permit, part time work permit and permanent residency permits, Australia stands positive on all three areas over and above Europe. However, with relation to Indian students, Australia saw some racial attacks in 2010–2012 where Indian students were targeted on Australian territory. Australia subsequently amended its domestic laws to make punishments very stringent for racial attacks. This created the needed impact. Australia has also undertaken a severe crackdown on fake and non-recognised universities in Victoria and other cities making education highly controlled through stringent norms. In 2014, during the visit of Tony Abbott to India, he unveiled the New Colombo Plan for education. Under the plan, 1800 students from Australia will pursue internship and short programmes in India. Australia shall be training Indians in vocational skills to make them job ready in India.


ANALYSIS OF PM'S VISIT TO AUSTRALIA—2014

In September, 2014, Tony Abbott visited India. Australian cultural diplomacy bolstered India's faith the moment he returned idols of Chola dynasty including a Natraja idol and the sculpture of Ardhanariswara. Abbott also gifted a shawl made of Australian wool to the mother of the Prime Minister. During the visit, he concluded an MoU on cooperation in civilian nuclear energy. Australia is now likely to become a long-term Uranium supplier to India. Important steps were taken to boost economic cooperation and enhance defence diplomacy.



At the economic level, Abbott decided to develop a strong strategic partnership in energy security. Energy was crucial item of bilateral talks in 2014. Australia is an energy resource rich country. India also expressed interest in LNG, Uranium, coal and gold. At the education level, the Australian PM announced the Colombo Plan in Mumbai University in 2014, under which, a boost to academic exchanges and youth cooperation would be envisaged as Australia youth would be studying in Indian institutions. Australia has further decided to expand cooperation on the level of higher education. International cooperation is envisaged in G–20, East Asian Summit, APEC and IORA.

The last Indian PM to visit Australia had been in 1986 when Rajiv Gandhi visited Australia. Narendra Modi visited Australia after a gap of 28 years in November, 2014, thereby finally bringing Australia within the periphery of Indian foreign policy vision. He addressed a gathering of Indian diaspora at Sydney's Allphones Arena and urged the diaspora to invest in India. The visit of the PM saw MoUs negotiated. A framework for security cooperation was concluded for defence and maritime security. The framework envisages cooperation in R&D and regular bilateral exercises.



VISIT OF MALCOLM TURNBULL TO INDIA—2017


Australian PM Malcolm Turnbull visited India in April, 2017. The two sides decided to strengthen their bilateral cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. India wishes to use Australia's expertise and finances to support economic programmes in India. India appreciated that the new Colombo Plan of Australia has made Indian students choose Australia as a destination for education. Due to the rising education-based relations, a flourishing knowledge partnership is emerging between Australia and India. The two sides have

decided to strengthen naval cooperation in the Indo-Pacific and work jointly for ensuring a legal maritime order and freedom navigation. In 2014, the two sides had concluded a bilateral framework for security cooperation. The leaders of both states decided in 2017 to broaden the defence partnership by enhancing maritime security. India and Australia will organise an army exercise in 2018. To enhance strategic cooperation, the two have decided to work together on ‘2+2’ format of dialogue where defense and foreign ministers of both states will interact. The two sides will enhance cooperation on counter-terrorism under a joint working group on counter-terrorism. As the Australian parliament has passed the Civilian Nuclear Transfers to India Act, India will receive the first batch of Uranium from Australia by 2019. India has accepted Australian invitation to enhance sports partnership by participating in 2018 Commonwealth Games in Gold Coast, Australia. The two sides are hopeful of concluding a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement at the earliest. India and Australia have decided to take steps to deepen their cooperation at the trade level. During the visit of Turnbull to India, the two sides have established India Economic Strategy for Australia. The strategy will be the key tool used by Australia to enhance commercial diplomatic ties with India. In September 2017, the two sides held Australia Business Week in India (ABWI) and more than 170 Australian businessmen participated in the meeting which happened in six different Indian cities. The Australian businessmen explored business opportunities ranging from health to mining to infrastructure in India. Many Australian business houses are keen to support urban re-designing and smart city creation in India.



Contrarian Play

Since the election of Donald Trump as the President of the USA, a new era of economic nationalism has emerged. Many countries have returned to protectionism and erected walls to restrict entry of outsiders. In the chapter of India–USA relationship, we have already analysed how H1-B category visa issues has impacted the Indian IT sector. Australia has abolished the 457 visa programme. Under the 457 visa programme, the Australian businesses could employ skilled foreign workers for up to four years to meet the shortage of skilled workers in Australia. Under the 457 visa programme, the employers were free to employ any number of foreigners as there was no cap in the programme. The Turnbull administration has replaced the 457 Visa programme with a Temporary Skill Shortage (TSS) visa which would allow Australian firms access to foreign workers in a limited way. As walls turn around us everywhere, India should not fall for the hype of herds but turn the walls into an opportunity. As the future would be such where Indian workers may find it tough to work aboard, India should build up an ecosystem to incentivise foreign firms to relocate to India.



3
CHAPTER

India and Vietnam Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Historical background of diplomatic ties
- Strategic and Commercial diplomacy
- Oil, South China Sea issue and India-Vietnam policy
- Defence diplomacy
- Analysis of bilateral visits


HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The relations between India and Vietnam go back to the second century BC when Indian traders used to sail from India to the Indo-China region. The trade also led to a spread of Indian culture and ideas to Vietnam. The biggest manifestation of Indian culture is visible in Central and South Vietnam where the Champa Temples stand as testimony to cultural diffusion. The two countries also have commonality at the level of a National Liberation movement for independence. During World War-II, both India and Vietnam were able to establish a solid foundation on a common anticolonial plank and non-alignment. During the Cold War, Vietnam adopted communism. As the US–Vietnam war broke out, India showed support and solidarity with Vietnam and condemned US presence in Vietnam. Slogans like, “*Amar nam, Tomar Nam Vietnam, Vietnam*,” were a testimony to Indian solidarity during US–Vietnam war. In June, 1966, India advocated an end of bombing by the US in Vietnamese territory and favoured conflict resolution through the Geneva Accords. The US–Vietnam War finally ended in 1972 with the conclusion of the Paris Accords. India expressed happiness and satisfaction on the conclusion of US–Vietnam conflict by making positive statements on the floor of the house of the Indian Parliament. In 1972, India and Vietnam established ambassador-level relations and opened up diplomatic ties. Post-unification of Vietnam in 1975, India even supported the Vietnamese Cambodian invasion. It also supported the Vietnamese in their War with China in 1979. Both nations signed a bilateral trade agreement in 1978 and the Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (BIPPA) on March 8, 1997. During the Cold War period, India and Vietnam remained committed to each other bound by a common ideology of non-alignment. However, they also had their adverse attitude towards the US as another commonality during the Cold War.

As the Cold War ended, India initiated a new policy paradigm at the economic and foreign policy level. India also made an internal economic transition of open economy. At the foreign policy level, in 1991, India initiated the Look East Policy (LEP). Under the Look East Policy, India decided to integrate itself with South East Asian states.


Vietnam was not only an important South East Asian economy but also became a member of the ASEAN. As under the Look East Policy, India began to initiate a dialogue with the ASEAN, and began to use it as a platform to economically engage with Vietnam. In the Ministry of External Affairs of India, a separate division was created for CLMV countries (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam), which provided the needed impetus to propel Indo–Vietnam relations. As India and Vietnam began to explore the commercial dimension in their bilateral diplomacy, a new feature that came up into the Vietnamese foreign policy was its gradual rapprochement with the US. Due to an increasingly powerful Chinese presence, the US have realised the strategic significance of Vietnam in keeping an eye on China. As the US initiated the rebalancing of Asia–Pacific through its Pivot to Asia Policy, Vietnam found its presence in the new strategic calculus. Vietnam is not only a part of the USA's Pivot to Asia, but is also one of the twelve Trans-Pacific Partnership states. Since the end of Cold War, India–US ties have also improved and the two have even explored a strategic dimension in their bilateral diplomacy. In the context of India and Vietnam, the strategic dimension signifies a strong defence partnership.

If India and Vietnam are developing proximity at the strategic level today, then apart from India's Act East Policy, a common factor has been the US need to contain China. Thus, India and Vietnam relations have transformed over a period of time from being ideological in nature to economic-cum-strategic in nature today. The diagram below captures the shift in Indo–Vietnam diplomatic ties. India's Act East Policy and Vietnamese Look West Policy seem to be converging at the right point to reshape the Asian Balance of Power.



STRATEGIC DIPLOMACY

Whenever two states intend to explore their relationship in a particular dimension, there are multiple diplomatic mechanisms available. For example, the two states can conclude a memorandum of understanding (MoU) or Memorandum of Agreement (MoA). The MoU or MoA are both instruments used to express interest to explore diplomacy in any dimension. The MoUs and MoAs are always sector specific. Another diplomatic mechanism is establishment of a Joint Study Group (JSG)/Joint Working Group (JWG) or a Joint Expert Group (JEG). Whenever a JSG/JWG/JEG is established, a particular diplomatic dimension is picked up to undertake consultations. A JSG/JWG/JEG have multiple actors which are involved in a broad consultative mechanism on the diplomatic dimension selected. Another tool could be a treaty, a convention or a protocol. Normally the ties move in the direction as depicted below.



However, practically, in diplomacy, it is found that countries don't usually follow the three steps chronologically and often jump from one step to the other directly. India and Vietnam signed an MoU on Defence Cooperation in 1995. This MoU led to the conclusion of India–Vietnam Defence Protocol in the year 2000. There are multiple dimensions in the strategic diplomacy between India and Vietnam. India and Vietnam, as per the Defence Protocol, have regular annual interactions at the level of the Chief of Army Staff. Russia has provided MiG-21 aircrafts to both Vietnam and India. India has agreed to provide Vietnam maintenance, repair and overhaul facilities for their MiG-21 aircrafts in India. At the ASEAN Defence Minister's Meeting Forum, India and Vietnamese Defence Ministers have undertaken regular interactions. India also participates with Vietnam in the 17 Nation MILAN exercises. At the level of capacity building, India is also providing 50 ITEC scholarships to Vietnam.

COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY

During the Cold War as India and Vietnam were both closed economies, which rendered the commercial angle in diplomacy pretty weak. The end of the Cold War ushered in a resurgent commercial dimension. India and Vietnam almost undertook economic liberalisation simultaneously. This opening up of the economy in Vietnam was called the *Đổi Mới*. A unique shared feature between India and Vietnam is that both the countries in the post-Cold War era have adopted a socialist economy with a tilt towards capitalism. Vietnam cited lack of finance as a reason that hindered bilateral trade with India. As finance became a hindering factor, India decided to assist Vietnam. When a country needs to boost trade, it can use two instruments, that of a loan or a line of credit. Let us take a hypothetical example. Let's say India decides to give Vietnam a loan of 100 Rupees. In case of a loan, the purpose once defined cannot be changed. Thus, loan at times becomes a rigid instrument. It cannot use the unused amount for any purpose other than the stated purpose. But when it comes to the interest repayment, Vietnam shall pay an interest to India on the entire 100 Rupees even if it hasn't used or been able to use the entire amount. Thus, loan becomes a commerce-centric instrument. That is why another instrument used for promoting trade ties is the line of credit. Now, the nation receiving the LOC has the flexibility to use the money for whatever purpose they want. The nation extending the LOC can recommend to the recipient nation on the potential use of the money but the recipient nation has the freedom to use the money for any purpose. Let's assume Vietnam used the 100 Rupees LOC to buy a machine for the same purpose as stated above. Let's say, that the machine costs 80 Rupees. Now if 20 Rupees is the unutilised amount, Vietnam has the flexibility to use it for any purpose, which isn't true in case of a loan. In a LOC, the interest is always paid on the amount utilised by the recipient state (that is on 80 Rupees). The LOC is a very flexible instrument because if the recipient nation feels that it cannot utilise the entire amount, it has the flexibility to give back the unutilised amount back without the interest. If Vietnam feels that it cannot use the remaining 20 Rupees at all, it can return 20 Rupees back to India without an interest on the same. Since India had the option of extending a loan or an LOC to Vietnam, India chose to grant Vietnam an

LOC. India since the end of the Cold War has given 20 lines of credit to Vietnam. It is due to these lines of credits that the bilateral Indo–Vietnam trade is approximately 8.3 billion dollars. India imports machines, phone components, computers, electronic hardware, rubber, chemicals and coffee while it exports meat, fish, corn, cotton and pharmacy products. India has 93 projects going on in Vietnam totalling about one billion dollars. In 1982, India also extended the ‘Most Favoured Nation’ status to Vietnam. Tata Power is investing 1.8 billion dollars in a 1320 mega war power project in Nha Trang Province. At the level of capacity building, India, in 2007, established a centre for English language training in Technical University in Nha Trang and a centre for Software development in Ho Chi Minh City. India has been taking FDI to Vietnam primarily in the oil, tea and sugar industries. As India and the ASEAN have a FTA, this forum is also utilised by both India and Vietnam to deepen their engagement at the commercial level.

OIL DIPLOMACY AND SOUTH CHINA SEA ISSUE


India’s presence was first detected in 1978 when Petroleum minister K D Malviya had shown interest in oil from Vietnam. Vietnam privatised their oil and gas sector in 1988. Since then, India’s ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL) has been undertaking oil cooperation with Vietnam. To facilitate deeper oil cooperation, India’s OVL has set up a joint venture with Petro Vietnam primarily for oil exploration. Vietnam has invited India into its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf for oil exploration. India is undertaking oil exploration in offshore blocks number 128, 152 and 153. Indian efforts for oil exploration in South China Sea has not been appreciated by China, which has objected to Indian endeavours in oil exploration in the disputed territory. India has countered Chinese claims by asserting that its presence in South China Sea is legal and it falls within the ambit of Vietnam’s EEZ. India has also asserted that its oil exploration in South China Sea is as per India’s maritime interest.




One of the key maritime interests of India as explained in the diagram above is to retain a favourable geostrategic position. India has maintained that its presence in the South China Sea is not to contain China but for its own economic interests, especially that of its energy security needs. As per United Nations Convention on the Laws of the High Seas (UNCLOS), countries in their EEZ can explore oil, mineral resources, living and non-living natural resources including resources under the sea, seabed and subsoil. Vietnam says that by inviting India to explore oil in its EEZ, it has not done anything illegal. In the South China Sea, the executive economic zone of China and others overlap. The Paracel Islands are claimed by China, Taiwan and Vietnam. The Spratly Islands are claimed by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei and Philippines. The Scarborough Shoal is claimed by Philippines, China and Taiwan.

China, since 1953, has been claiming South China Sea through its mine-dash line. In


fact, in September 2015, Rear Admiral Yuan Yubai of the Chinese Navy stated that the South China Sea also belongs to China as the name itself has ‘China’ embedded in it. China has changed its tactics completely and has become extremely assertive in South China Sea. It has made a shift from its earlier strategy of invasions to creation of new facts by confounding, bullying and bribing its adversaries. In 2010, China said that Tibet, Xinjiang province and South China Sea are part of ‘Core National Interests’ of China. China has clarified that Core National Interest signifies that the issue will be significant enough for China to go to war. Despite the fact that China, in 2002, in the 8th ASEAN Summit, agreed upon a Declaration of Conduct to solve issues in South China Sea peacefully with no use of force, its strategy to distort facts continues. Since 2010, China has been converting uninhabited islets into artificial islets to bring it under UNCLOS (examples would include Haven Reef, Johnson South Reef and Fiery Cross Reef). China has been changing the size and structure of the reefs by modifying their physical land features. It has also established airstrips on Paracel and Spratly.



Thus, China’s increasing ability to decide and expand its role in the South China Sea has not only made the region strategically significant but has also compelled India to re-evaluate its approach on the issue.




Thus, keeping in mind the strategic significance of the South China Sea, India firstly feels that the fact distortion strategy of China is similar to the fact distortion strategy it has adopted in Himalayas where it sends army officials disguised as grazers, villagers, and road engineers. In the South China Sea, China has been sending coast guard personal, fishermen and militias to make historic claims in the region. Thus, the changing ground realities visible due to Chinese assertion in South China Sea has made India announce its stand on the issues.



India's Act East Policy has made India more sensitive to the concerns of its ASEAN friends. After the recent verdict in 2016 where Philippines had taken the issue to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), India's stand on the PCA verdict has rightly assumed the moral high ground and is a vindication of India's maritime interests.



India's stand to endorse Freedom of Navigation in South China Sea is a prerequisite for India to meet its rising military ambitions. India has also conveyed to China that if non-proliferation rules cannot be bent for India (for instance, in case of India's membership to NSG) then UNCLOS cannot be bent for China.



From 11-Dash Line to the 9-Dash Line

In 1947, when China took control of some islets in the South China Sea occupied by Japan in World War-II, they created a map with 11-dash line to show them as a part of China. In 1949, the People's Republic of China (PRC) established presence there and the KMT regime fled to Taiwan. Since then the PRC became the legal legitimate representative of China and decided to control the entire maritime claims of the region. As the Republic of China government fled to Taiwan, the PRC government allowed the North Vietnam regime to establish a radar station and a transit point for goods in the South China Sea. This was done on the basis of spirit of comradeship and brotherhood with the communist North Vietnamese regime. In 1957, China ceded Bailongwei island to Hanoi. Thus, the two dashes were removed by China to bypass the Gulf of Tonkin as a gesture to North Vietnam.

DEFENCE DIPLOMACY

In recent times, defence diplomacy has gained significant acceptance in Vietnamese foreign policy discourse. Historically, Vietnam, due to its location, has always been of maritime significance. The western part of Vietnam is hilly, meaning that the people of Vietnam have to majorly look towards east for economic development. The east of Vietnam has access to the sea. Out of 64 provinces in Vietnam, 28 are coastal provinces. As the Vietnamese depend heavily on the sea for oil and resources, the countrymen are very susceptible to the dominance of the sea by foreign powers. Vietnam opened up its economy in 1991 and decided to go for economic modernisation through the establishment of a marine-based economy in 1997. Since 1997, maritime thinking has dominated Vietnam. In 2007, the Vietnamese government adopted Vietnamese maritime strategy 2020. Vietnam has a modest defence budget of 3.6 billion dollars but in 2007, it surprised the world by announcing a 1.8 billion dollar submarine contract (to purchase 6 kilo class submarines) with Russia. This landmark deal led the scholars of IR to analyse the reasons behind the Russia–Vietnam deal. One of the easiest conclusions that the scholars reached was that the deal is due to the fear of Chinese dominance in South China Sea. China, however, is not the only factor that prompted the deal.



As it is clear from Vietnamese maritime strategy that Vietnam wants to achieve a perfect blend of economic and defence development, as each component is deemed crucial to achieve growth in the other. The government of Vietnam adopted a white paper on defence in 2009 where it has identified certain hotspots in Asian Security.



This understanding of hotspots in Asian security in future has compelled Vietnam to undertake a shift.



Thus, Vietnam has clarified that its naval modernisation is linked to its domestic economic development. It does not favour any arms race and has no desire or ambition to develop its navy against any third country. It has, however, kept the option open to cooperate with Russia, Japan, the US, India and Australia to assist in its defence modernisation. It is in this context that India has opened up defence diplomacy with Vietnam. In December, 2016, India and Vietnam agreed on Cooperation in Defence and Cooperation in Peaceful use of Atomic Energy. The India–Vietnam Defence Cooperation


is likely to establish a new Asian Balance of Power. We have also witnessed rising India–Japan–Vietnam cooperation. Japan and Vietnam are cooperating at the levels of cyber security, space and naval modernisation. The security factor pushing the three to cooperate is China. Since 2011, India has faced around 400 incursions from China. There is rising Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean, be it through submarine exports to Pakistan and Bangladesh or sighting of Chinese submarines in the Indian Ocean.

China has also rejected the PCA's 2016 verdict on the South China Sea. The rising Chinese assertiveness in South China Sea is based on Chinese military power. Since 2000, China has acquired 42 submarines while the US has acquired only 13. Though the US President Donald Trump has stated that the number of warships of the US are going to rise in future from 276 to 350, whether this increase will, in any way, help deter Chinese assertiveness is a matter of conjecture. In this situation, if Japan–India–Vietnam cooperate with each other, such cooperation is likely to have a viable potential for the order of Asian security. If China should further increase its assertiveness in South China Sea, Vietnam will get top priority due to its strategic location in the sea. Vietnam is also a strong-willed state as it has defeated France in 1954, the US in 1973 and China in 1979. Vietnam has built up an image of being a grave of big powers. Vietnam also has a capability for exhibiting proportional responses on any provocation. (For instance, Chinese ships in 2016 rammed into Vietnamese ships, and Vietnam immediately reciprocated by counter ramming Chinese ships). The future Asian security order is therefore likely to differ from old Asian security order.



The old system was based on the US centric alliances but over a period of time the bilateral alliances have not flourished. This means that, despite the US being a common ally to South Korea, Australia, Japan and Vietnam, it has not yielded much cooperation between these countries. One factor for the absence of such security cooperation is a lack of US resources to tackle problems in the region.

Thus, with changing ground realities, new alliances have to be built up. These new alliances are emerging as mini-lateral security networks which may culminate as a futuristic collective security centric system.




Thus, a new mini-lateral India–Vietnam alliance at defence level is on the rise in future.



VISIT OF NGUYỄN TẤN DŨNG (VIETNAMESE PM) TO INDIA—2014

In 2014, the Vietnamese PM visited India with a business delegation of around 50 Vietnamese businessmen. He expressed interest to procure Brahmos missile from India. India has already given 18 lines of credit to Vietnam and in 2014, extended additional one-time line of credit of 100 million dollars to Vietnam. Both sides, during bilateral talks, decided to achieve a new trade target of 15 billion dollars in trade by 2020. India has decided to provide 200 additional ITC scholarships. India will also train 500 Vietnamese sailors on how to use a submarine at INS Sathvanaha in Vishakapatnam. Tân Dũng also visited Bodh Gaya as Buddhism is an important connecting factor between the two states. India reiterated that Vietnam is a key pillar of India's Act East Policy.



VISIT OF THE INDIAN PM TO VIETNAM—2016

The Indian PM Narendra Modi visited Vietnam in 2016 and held talks with his counterpart Nguyễn Xuân Phúc. In 2007, both sides had signed strategic partnerships agreements. During the Indian PM's visit, both sides elevated their strategic partnership to the level of a comprehensive strategic partnership. In 2017, the two sides celebrated 45 years of diplomatic relations and the tenth year of their strategic partnership. Vietnam affirmed its support for India's Act East Policy. To enhance bilateral cooperation, the leaders of the

two sides decided to establish mechanisms to enhance cooperation at the level of political parties and legislative institutions on both sides.

India announced five million dollars line of credit to setup an army software park at the telecommunications university in the Nha Trang Province. There were MoUs on cyber security and national security council, counter-terrorism, transitional crimes and disaster management. The two sides, to promote commercial diplomacy, have decided to establish business-to-business contents and work through the Vietnam–India Business Forum. The two sides have identified priority areas of cooperation.



To improve connectivity, both sides have decided to increase direct flight connectivity and even use direct shipping routes. India has committed support for Earth observatory Satellite Tracking System for environmental and science needs of both. The ISRO will establish a satellite tracking system and a data reception centre in Ho Chi Minh City at a price of 23 million dollars. The images are to be used by Vietnam for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance purposes. India will also assist Vietnam with quick impact project funds under the Mekong–Ganga cooperation. India has extended 509 million dollars line of credit for defence and 300 million dollars line of credit for textiles.




India and Vietnam have been strategic partners since 2007 and it has been one of the key agreements between India–Vietnam for cooperation in multiple dimensions of the relations.



Vietnam is the focal point of India's Act East Policy and both sides have agreed to use the framework of the Act East Policy to further strengthen their relations. Larsen and Toubro will work with Vietnam Border Guards for offshore high-speed patrol boats.

Vietnam will use the 100 million dollars line of credit provided by India in 2014 for defence procurements.



To enhance the bilateral economic ties, achieving trade target of 15 billion dollars by 2020 has been declared as a strategic objective.



India's ONGC Videsh Limited in partnership with Petro Vietnam will explore mid-stream and down-stream sectors in oil industry. To boost connectivity and promote tourism, India has urged Vietnam to use the shipping route and air route directly. In 1988, India and Vietnam had agreed to cooperate in Science and Technology. During the Indian PM's visit, pursuant to the 1988 agreement, both sides have decided to explore cooperation in nuclear energy, outer space cooperation and ICT. India will continue to provide English language training and training to Vietnamese diplomats while also providing training under ITEC programme. To encourage the use and knowledge of traditional medicine, the two sides concluded an MoU on health cooperation whereby India has also decided to support Vietnam in the pharmaceutical sector. The members of the Buddhist Sangha of Vietnam have been given one-year scholarship for studying Sanskrit in India. Both sides again urged parties to resolve maritime disputes through international laws and respect international treaties.

4
CHAPTER

India and South Korea Relations


After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Historical background of diplomatic relations
- Trade diplomacy
- Strategic diplomacy
- Nuclear diplomacy
- Analysis of bilateral visits

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In 1929, in a poem, Tagore wrote, "In the golden age of Asia Korea was in of its lamp bearers, and that lamp is waiting to be lit once again for the illumination of the East."

These evocative lines by Tagore clearly reflects the vision of the Republic of India about the Republic of Korea (ROK). The connecting factor between India and ROK has always been Buddhism. Buddhism reached Korea in the fourth century AD. Buddhism was recognised in Korea in the reign of Kim Sosurim. Due to the spread of Buddhism in Korea, Indian and Korean interactions increased. The relations received an impetus in the times of Asoka, the Indian emperor who patronized Buddhism. Asoka is known to have sent iron and gold from India to Korea to establish Buddhist statues there. The interaction declined during the medieval times. With the advent of modern times came colonial rule. Japan colonised Korea and the British colonised India. The relations, hence, could not flourish due to colonial presences in both nations. As the national movement progressed in India against the British, a similar movement in 1920s began in Korea. It was in 1929 when Tagore reached Japan that he penned the lines above. In 1947, the UN Temporary Commission on Korea consisting of nine member states was established to hold elections in Korea in May 1948, with India as the Chairman of the Korean Commission.



India played an important role during the period from 1950 to 1953, with North and South Korea finally accepting the Indian-sponsored ceasefire on 21st July, 1953. India's


diplomacy in 1954 Geneva conference that officially ended the Korean crises was highly appreciated. As the Cold War entered Asian theatre in the 1950s India, announced non-alignment while ROK chose an alliance with the US and in 1953 signed a Mutual Defence treaty with US under the leadership of Rhee Syng Man.

In 1974, India and ROK concluded an agreement on trade, promotion and economic cooperation but the treaty did bear fruit as the two countries differed ideologically during the Cold War. India liberalised its economy during the Rajiv Gandhi era, which finally paved the way for India to enhance engagement with ROK. It was also way back in 1988 that India and ROK signed a Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA). In 1993, P V Narasimha Rao became the first Indian PM to visit South Korea. In 1996, the South Korean President Kim Young Sam visited India and established a joint commission at the Foreign Ministries level to boost bilateral cooperation. During the 1997 Asian crisis, South Korea was affected but after its economy was stabilised in 1999, the then Prime Minister of South Korea, Kin Jong Pil, visited India. The visit was significant as it opened up space cooperation. It was in 1999 that India, through a Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) launch, also put Unibyol or the Korean satellite KITSAT- 3 in a geostationary orbit. In 2004, then-President Roh Moo Hyun visited again and announced long term cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity. The first ever Foreign Policy and Security dialogue envisaging long term cooperative partnership was held and matters related to defence and terrorism and so forth were discussed. To enhance economic cooperation, a joint study group (JSG) was established in 2006. The JSG began to explain the potential of a future Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) between India and ROK. As the negotiations went on, the two diversified into trade, science and technology, IT and infrastructure. Gradually textiles, oil and gas also came up in energy negotiations and economic cooperation. ROK recognised that India has ready availability of cheap and skilled labour. The ROK began to envisage India as an emerging as a destination where the ROK can invest, manufacture and boost exports to the rest of the world. ROK identified, as per the Indian skill set, automobiles and ship building to work upon. In 2005, POSCO steel company concluded an MoU with the government of Odisha for establishing a 12 billion dollar steel plant. This was touted as the biggest ever FDI to India in its history. In 2005, India and the ROK also concluded an MoU on defence cooperation and logistics. In 2009, finally the two concluded the CEPA

In order to increase cultural contact, both have often signed mechanisms to promote cultural cooperation. The India week in ROK and the Korea week in India are organised at the cultural level with unfailing regularity. In 1999, Kimhae city and Ayodhya were declared sister cities. In recent times, the US rebalancing of the Asia-Pacific have got India and Korea closer. Another area of security cooperation between India and the ROK is at the level of nuclear power. North Korea and its clandestine activities have ensured that and India and the ROK will have to intensify cooperation to maintain the balance of power in this context. Keeping this in mind, both India and the ROK have resorted to regular military interactions. South Korea is a pioneer in missiles and class destroyers, which is a new area of cooperation. The economic interaction is increasingly linked to strategic relations.

TRADE DIPLOMACY

During Cold War, India had a closed economy while South Korea had an open economy. When the Cold War ended, India liberalised its economy, which provided an impetus to trade diplomacy. However, it was in 1974 that the trade promotion agreement was signed.




The trade relations have picked up well only at the end of the Cold War. Since 2001, the ROK has been an importer of services while India has emerged as an exporter of services. However, due to a change in demand at the economic level, the merchandise trade in recent times has grown. India exports mineral fuels, stag and ash, cotton and waxes while it mostly imports electronics, nuclear reactors, boilers and iron.

Another crucial connector in the flow of investment from Korea to India are the Korean firms like Samsung, LG and Hyundai that have diversified their business interests in India. As Korea prefers local investments over FDI domestically, there is less potential of India to take FDI to ROK but we do have increasing Korean FDI to India. Events post the 1997 crisis have made Korea more amenable to a more proactive FDI regime. In 1998, they established a Foreign Investment Promotion Act to provide rebates and attract investments. The US and Japan are major contributors of FDI in Korea. India has initiated acquisition of Korean firms to increase its presence in Korea. The Tata group has recently acquired estate in Kunsan while IT firms like APTECH and TCS have also increased their presence.

INDIA–SOUTH KOREA CEPA

The CEPA was concluded in 2009 and came into effect in 2010.



As a result of the CEPA, bilateral trade has increased and India has become a top exporter of IT and ITES exports. On the other hand, India is taking advantage of the high-quality steel and heavy machinery imported from Korea. The CEPA has classified 11,200 tariff lines of Korea and 5200 tariff lines of India which are put under six broad categories for tariff reduction and elimination. As textiles and agriculture are crucial and sensitive to both, they have been excluded. The CEPA has also led to India expanding in telecom and construction sectors, apart from IT.

It also allows movement of professionals, especially at the IT and engineering levels. In 2014, the Ministerial Joint Commission has been represented to India–ROK joint trade and investment promotion commission. Taking advantage of CEPA, Honda has set up a plant in Chennai. LG, Visteon Automobiles and Hyundai have also increased their presence in India. Korean investment in India mostly lies in manufacturing just as Indian

investment in ROK is in services. Indian firms in ROK include Novelise, Tata, Mahindra and Creative plastics.

India and POSCO

In 2005, POSCO decided to establish a steel plant in India. However, the project, since its inception, has gotten entangled in grassroots activism over land acquisition. In 2008, the Indian Supreme Court also gave a green signal to POSCO to acquire land including land in a forest area for steel plant construction. But the project was further entangled in hurdles with the environment ministry and national green tribunals. Due to the ongoing issues, in July 2015, POSCO has announced its decision to put the project on hold citing an internal decision of the management. The project may not be operational as of now but POSCO still continues to be in India.

In July, 2016, India and the ROK decided to launch the Korea + platform to boost trade. In order to promote investment, the Korea + acts as a platform that hosts representatives from Korean industry and energy ministries. In July 2016, the former Korean PM UN Chan Chung, while launching the Korea + platform, emphasised on improving the understanding of culture to enhance economic cooperation between two nations:



STRATEGIC DIPLOMACY

The origin of India–ROK strategic partnership (SP) owes itself to the visit of Roh Moo Hyun to India in 2004. India and the ROK signed a long-term cooperation partnership for peace and prosperity in 2004. In 2010, when South Korean President Lee Myung Bak visited India, the relations were transformed and upgraded to the level of strategic partnership. Over a period of time, both have realised the need to cooperate at the strategic level due to the changing balance of power in Asia thanks to a rising China. The commitment of both for a multipolar and a democratic Asia strengthened their need to cooperate at the strategic level.



The year 2005 saw India–ROK sign an MoU on defense logistics and supplies. This increased the bilateral defense visits. In 2010, both signed pacts on humanitarian assistance and mutual interest in the defense sector. There is a permanent diplomatic post


of a defense attaché in Indian Embassy in Seoul.

NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY


In 2011, India and the ROK signed a nuclear deal. Korea is a market leader and is also building nuclear reactors for the UAE. South Korea has been working on fourth generation fast reactors and is making progress in that area. The ROK wants to build reactors for India but India plans to first undertake nuclear research jointly with the country. It would be important to note that India has adopted a wait-and-watch policy over nuclear commerce with the ROK since 2011 as India wants to witness the success of Korean reactors in the UAE (Korean reactors are already very successful in Jordan). Most of the Korean nuclear technology is indigenously manufactured and Korea has successfully used nuclear diplomacy in its foreign policy amongst global players.

ANALYSIS OF PM'S VISIT TO AND FROM KOREA

In 2014, the South Korean President visited India and signed an agreement on the exchange of classified military information. This clearly reflects the growing strategic convergence between the two nations. Now, sensitive intelligence and defense information would come to be regularly shared. Since 2014, cyber security has emerged as an important dimension. Korea is a pioneer in ship building and naval combat technology and India has expressed interest to cooperate in this regard. The strategic partnership and defense cooperation are destined to lay down a deep future cooperation.



In 2015, the Indian PM visited South Korea and upgraded the relation to the level of a special strategic partnership.



A unique factor of the special strategic partnership is that now the two nations shall undertake a 2+2 dialogue at the foreign and defense ministers' level regularly. Hyundai has decided to work on warship manufacturing. The PM had also paid a visit to Hyundai Heavy industry shipyard, that is, the Ulsan shipyard. He also addressed the diaspora and interacted with the top CEO's of Korean firms, inviting them to invest in the 'Make in India' programme. Both nations have agreed to review the DTAA signed in 1985.

5
CHAPTER

India and North Korea Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Historical background
- Commercial diplomacy
- Analysis of bilateral visits

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The relations between India and Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) are not usual diplomatic relations, though, during the Cold War some commonalities did exist. The origin of the relations goes back to Korean crisis in the 1950s when the Northern part of Korea invaded the South. This invasion by North of South was condemned by the South as also by India. The DPRK joined NAM in 1976 and thereafter requested India to raise the Korean issue at the NAM summit and take up the issue of Korean reunification. India advocated that the Korean issue be resolved bilaterally between ROK and DPRK and that the upcoming NAM Summit of 1977 was not an appropriate forum for the matter. DPRK accepted India's request and trusted upon advice rendered by India. At the UN Security Council, India supported action through UN Security Council resolution (UNSCR)-82 and 83. It is interesting to note India did not support UNSCR-84, which advocated military assistance to ROK against DPRK. India aptly invoked NAM and maintained that it would not ally with any military commitments but would prefer UN action. India had established diplomatic relations in 1962 with DPRK. During Cold War, though North Korea supported NAM, India still preferred nothing more than diplomacy to adopt a hands-off approach in the Korean peninsula due to the looming Cold War politics. In 1988, DPRK Prime Minister LI Gun Mo came to India for a good will visit.

COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY


The trade relations go back to 1974 when India and DPRK concluded a trade treaty and awarded the status of the most favoured nation to each other. North Korea and India have been undertaking trade but it has declined in the recent times as North Korea has come under international sanctions for its nuclear programme. It is facing a severe financial crunch because of dwindling trade. India has been exporting cotton, fabrics, drugs, pharmaceuticals, petroleum and food items to DPRK and importing iron and steel. Another factor hindering trade is an absence of a well-defined trade route through sea as well as the reluctance of banks to guarantee payments and insurances. In recent times, India and DPRK have advanced barter trade with each other. In exchange of steel and manganese from DPRK, India ships shoes, clothes and utensils to DPRK.

India also provides training to the students of DPRK in IT and financial management

through regular student exchange programmes. India has also extended lines of credit (LOC) to DPRK and extends assistance in terms of food items including rice, wheat and also gives blankets, and so on. After the death of Kim Jong-II in 2011, DPRK faced a severe crisis. The year also saw a famine. There was a tremendous food shortage. The then North Korean ambassador to India, Kim Kye Gwan requested India for food aid. Subsequently, India, under the aegis of the World Food Programme, provided food aid to DPRK.

ANALYSIS OF THE RI SU VISIT TO INDIA—2015

In April, 2015, North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Su Yong visited India and met his Indian counterpart. India conveyed an intention to improve bilateral relations. There was a great symbolic change witnessed after Ri Su visit. Ri Su Yong visited to celebrate the North Korean Independence Day. India selected the Minister of State for Home Affairs, Kiren Rijiju, to address the bilateral event. The Indian choice of the minister was well-planned as he belongs to Arunanchal Pradesh and his participation sent a strong message to China to foil its persistent claims on Arunanchal. The Indian minister addressed the bilateral event in which the North Korean flag was also displayed along with the Indian flag. This conveyed its intention to deepen trade and commerce. The gradual change of India's North Korea policy reflects a political consensus building up in India's new engagement. This is also reflected by the fact that India had sent a three-member panel of parliamentary delegation to DPRK in 2013. Since 2000, both nations have undertaken Foreign office consultations regularly. Thus DPRK and India will strengthen ties ahead.



6
CHAPTER

India and Fiji Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Basic background
- Analysis of bilateral visits

BASIC BACKGROUND

Fiji, like India, is an erstwhile British colony. India's relations with Fiji go back to 1897 when the British started importing labour from India to work on the sugarcane fields of Fiji. In early 20th century, a lot of traders from India began to settle in Fiji. The indentured labour system was abolished in 1920. While India became independent in 1947, Fiji continued to be under British rule till 1970. When in 1970 it gained independence, India upgraded the post of commissioner in Fiji to a high commission and opened a proper Indian Mission. In 1971, the PM of Fiji, Ratu Mara, visited India, which was followed by a visit from Indira Gandhi to Fiji in 1981. Fiji, in 2004, established a High Commission in India. In 2005, the Fijian PM Laisenia Qarase visited India and signed agreements on health, tourism, IT and established a trade commission.

ANALYSIS OF PM'S VISIT—NOVEMBER 2014


In November 2014, the Indian PM Narendra Modi visited Fiji in an official tour after a gap of 33 years. The visit of the PM coincided with a newly elected democratic government in Fiji led by Frank Bainimarama after a long military rule. India, in recent years, has assisted the democratic transition in Fiji. It has been a part of a multilateral observer group for democratic restoration. Modi also addressed the Fijian parliament. He announced a 5 million dollar fund for village entrepreneurship and small business development. The PM asserted that Fiji is a hub for India's engagement in the Pacific. India also approved Visa on Arrival for Fijians visiting India. India has decided to assist Fiji in disaster preparedness and disaster management.

Space Cooperation and Mangalyaan

In 2013, the ISRO sent a team of scientists to Fiji for tracking Mangalyaan. As of now, the ISRO has had to be dependent upon the Australian and the US stations to monitor Indian satellites over the Pacific. India decided to work with Fiji in this regard from 2015. In August, 2015, India hosted the second Forum for Indian Pacific Cooperation (FIPC-2) in Jaipur. The 14 heads of states of the Pacific Islands came to India to attend the conference. In the meeting, India offered that space cooperation be

explored and subsequently decided to establish a data collection hub for the Mangalyaan in Fiji for which the ISRO sent a team of 18 scientists to be stationed there. The ISRO wants to establish Fiji as a hub for space technology and intends to establish a permanent tracking station in the country. If, in future, it succeeds in so doing, this would open up the arena of space cooperation and ensure strategic presence of India in the Pacific.

In summation, the FIPC achieved the following:



The India–Fiji engagement by the Indian PM’s visit marks a major diplomatic outreach by India. India has gained space in Pacific Isles community. India now needs to have a proactive, aggressive diplomacy with respect to Fiji and foster development in Pacific Islands.



End of Part Questions

1. Australia and India can ensure that Indo-Pacific remains anchored to a resilient rules based order. Discuss.
2. Malabar exercises have a far reaching geopolitical impact on the Asia-Pacific regional order. Examine.
3. “India needs to take steps to avoid the ‘Thucydides trap’ by ensuring a favorable regional balance of power through cooperation, partnership and short term alliances if needed”. Examine the statement in the light of Indian engagement with states in South East and East Asia.
4. Malabar-2017 demonstrates a shared determination of India, Japan and USA to safeguard a free and open Indo-Pacific order. Examine.
5. For India to succeed in the negotiations of the RCEP, the key lies in driving domestic growth through productivity and innovation than merely emphasizing the rhetoric of low cost labor. Examine the major challenges faced by India in negotiating the RCEP.
6. India’s Act East Policy rightly seeks to realign Indian foreign policy along its

historical axis. Discuss.

7. Buddhist outreach is a key element of India's Act East Policy. Discuss.
8. The deepening of India-Taiwan relations is a mutually beneficial for both countries. Discuss the possibilities in economic and strategic realm.
9. Cooperation with like minded countries gives India more space to emerge as a key regional interlocutor. Examine the statement with respect to India as a pivot in the Indo-Pacific.
10. A deeper relationship with Singapore can ensure that India can use Singapore as a financial hub to internationalize the Indian Rupee and attract foreign investment. Discuss the possibility of India using Singapore as a financial hub and compare it with the Chinese model of Hong Kong.
11. Can India go beyond the diplomatic rhetoric and help Chinese neighbors enhance capabilities to stand up to Beijing? Examine the statement with respect to defense partnerships India is envisaging under the Act East Policy with respect to Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand and Singapore.
12. Is it wise for India to play the Taiwan and Xinjiang card and make China adhere to 'One India' policy? Examine the strategic implications.
13. India's financial aid to Philippines to fight the Islamic State (ISIL) signals a reworking of India's ASEAN outreach and attempts to burnish India's image as a Net Security Provider in the ASEAN region. Examine.

1
CHAPTER

India and Europe Policy—Key Drivers of the Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:


- Historical background and areas of cooperation.
- India's Outreach to Europe Programme and India–Europe FTA issue.

BASIC BACKGROUND

The relations between India and European Union (EU) have been historically cordial, with diplomatic relations going back to 1962. The relationship has evolved only in the period after the Cold War ended. In 1996, the EU and India signed an Enhanced Partnership Agreement, leading to the first summit in 2000 in Lisbon. India is one of the few select countries in the world with which EU has regular summit level meetings. The 2004 summit in Hague was important because it was there that India and the EU decided to elevate the relations to the level of Strategic Partnership, and in 2005 agreed to a Joint Action Plan (JAP). The JAP has laid down the foundation of India–EU Strategic Partnership Agreement. India and the EU have evolved a common platform of interaction, which is, however, not stable when it comes to global forums. For example, both India and the EU have adopted different parameters based on their respective national interests while interacting at the level of climate change, WTO, and so on. Despite these differences, the relationship, otherwise, stands in good stead. This is also because at the bilateral level with France, Germany and the UK, India has strategic partnerships which have added depth to the overall relations with the region.

AREAS OF COOPERATION

The areas of cooperation Indian and the EU have been outlined in the strategic Partnership Agreement and the Joint Action Plan. From the Indian side, there has been an aggressive push for cooperation with EU in areas of technology. The diagram below outlines the broad contours.



India-Europe Free Trade Agreement Issue

The most major area of cooperation remain economic. India mostly exports textiles and imports machinery. Since the time India has adopted an open economy, the relations at the economic level have strengthened. There has been significant Indian FDI to Europe as well. However, the European economic crises in the recent times have led to a slowdown between the two at the level of trade. Since 2007, India and the EU have been negotiating a Bilateral Trade and Investment Agreement (BTIA) or the FTA. However, the BTIA/FTA negotiations have not yet delivered the results as of now. Even up till 2017-18, the BTIA has been stuck on a number of issues and no final agreement has been reached. The tables below give us a better picture of issues confronting the BTIA.

Serial Number	What does EU want in BTIA/ FTA	What is India's position?	Present status (2017-18)
(1)	Reduced tariffs in automobiles, wines and spirits	Reluctant on tariff reduction specially in automobiles	Automobiles sector is under negotiation.
(2)	Higher market access in banking, retail, telecommunications and accounting services	Reluctant to grant market access in banking and retail	Banking and retail are being negotiated.
(3)	Modifications in IPR in Pharmacy	Totally opposed to grant only concession	Deadlock prevails

Serial Number	What does India want from EU in BTIA/ FTA?	What is EU's position?	Present status (2017-18)
(1)	Market Access for fruits, vegetables and fish	Reluctant to all the three to protect the domestic business	Under negotiation
(2)	Freedom of movement of skilled professionals in European service sector	Reluctance on opening up to skilled Indian immigration	Under negotiation

Another core area of cooperation is Science and Technology (S&T). The origin goes

back to 1958, when Germany assisted India with the development of IIT Madras. India is also a participant in International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) project (to be discussed in the subsequent chapters). Under the Joint Action Plan, a Centre for European Studies has also been opened in India. India has also opened Institutions for contemporary Indian Studies in Europe. The level of academic collaboration is also high due to the EU support to India under an initiative for the development and integration of Indian and European research since 2009. The most robust science-based partnership India has is with Germany. A lot of German institutions have academic cooperation with Indian institutions, with Germany also offering vocational training to Indians.

and

India and the EU also have a development partnership where many of the EU nations have been providing aid to India to assist in developmental initiatives. Germany, for instance, has been giving developmental aid to India for energy efficiency and renewable energy while UK, post-2015, has focussed more in technological collaboration. More so, at a macro level, the EU supports India to help it achieve the millennium development goals and at a sectoral level, advances support in health and education sectors.

Terrorism and security are two areas again where India and the EU have tremendous convergence. Both sides want that terrorism, at the international level, be tackled within the larger framework of the UN. India has been a victim of terrorism for a while, and the resurgence of the ISIS in the recent times has led to Europe becoming its latest victim. In 2016 itself, attacks in Paris, Nice, Brussels, and London have made Europe extremely vulnerable to attacks. The European security strategy document clearly outlines the threat India and the EU face at both global and regional levels. At the bilateral level too, India's defence relations with France, the UK, and Germany have improved while Russia remains the top most players for arms supply. Both India and the EU undertakes use of multiple instruments to promote democracy and human rights, ranging from conditionalities in the Official Development Assistance (ODA) to election observer missions, both of which India refrains to use at the international level.

Similarly, at the level of global governance and multilateralism, both India and EU do have convergence in acceptance of an idea of a multipolar world, but have different approaches to engagement with other states. While India emphasises national sovereignty, EU on the other hand is in favour of a rule based multilateralism model. India does not interfere in internal affairs of other nations but EU advocates rules based interference if needed.

India's Outreach to Europe Programme

The Modi government has initiated a new outreach to Europe programme in 2016. The Prime Minister visited Germany, Spain, Russia and France. India has decided to present itself as an attractive partner to Europe. This will allow India to counter China which is trying to reach out Europe through its Belt and Road Initiative. India is trying to position itself as a balancer in Europe. As Trump has reduced the relevance of NATO in Europe by insisting that EU should also contribute to evolve its own security; the Europeans are looking at partners to re-write their destiny. As EU witnesses a new reordering of power

structure, it prevents an opportunity to India. Though China is trying to deepen its engagement with EU due to its economic heft, but, EU may not be comfortable in embracing China due to authoritarian values. At the ideological level, India is well positioned as a defender of liberal values and a counter narrative to China. In this age of uncertainty, India is constructing relations with the Middle Powers in the East and West. The world has changed in the last three centuries. The Anglo-American are looking at their navel while the Hans and the Slavs are constructing a new Eurasian coalition. It is time for India to look beyond Anglo-Americans and the Slavs and embrace Eurasian alliances.



Indian Prime Ministers Visit to Spain and Portugal-2017

Indian PM visited Spain and Portugal in 2017. The visit was a part of India's Outreach to Europe programme. Indian PM visited Spain after a gap of nearly 30 years as the last Indian state visit happened in 1988. The main intention of the visit was to encourage the Spanish businesses to invest in flagship programmes in India. Spain is India's seventh largest trading partner in the European Union. The two sides decided to strengthen the bilateral cooperation in security and defense related matters. The two decided to use India-Spain Business Summit as a forum to enhance bilateral economic cooperation. The two sides signed the following MoU's:-

1. MOU on Technical Cooperation in Civil Aviation
2. MOU on Cooperation in organ transplantation between India's Directorate General of Health Services and the National Transplant Organization of Spain
3. MOU on Cooperation in Cyber Security
4. MOU on Cooperation in Renewable Energy
5. Agreement for Transfer of Sentenced Persons
6. MOU between Foreign Service Institute and Diplomatic Academy of Spain
7. Agreement on visa waiver for holders of diplomatic passports

The PM also visited Portugal. Till now no India PM had ever visited Portugal. India and Portugal bilateral trade has increased in the recent times. The two sides discussed the possibility of establishing India-Portugal International Start-Up hub. The two states are deepening their cooperation in science and technology and marine science and oceanography are emerging as promising areas. The two sides signed MoU's in Space cooperation, Fiscal evasion, Nano technology, Public administration and governance reforms, culture, sports, higher education and biotechnology.

2
CHAPTER

India and France Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Historical background of diplomatic relations
- Commercial diplomacy
- Nuclear and technology diplomacy
- Defence diplomacy
- Rafale diplomacy
- Analysis of bilateral visits

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TILL THE COLD WAR

India and France had a limited colonial relationship during the colonial times, with the French having colonial settlements in some parts of India, like Chandannagore, Yanaon, Karikal, the Coromandel and Malabar coasts and Pondicherry. However, today, it is one such country in Europe with regard to which we have a very well defined foreign policy. The relations between India and France are not just limited to economic interaction but are based on other broad areas of defence, nuclear technology, strategic partnership and global partnership. Diplomatic relations have existed since 1947. The French have been old supporters of India's entry to the UN Security Council. What is equally interesting is that the French have been ardent promoters of a nuclear pact with India. France supports India in NSG and other export control regimes. The relations in the first phase of Cold War had created the foundation of Indo-French relations for post-Cold War period.

The relations of India and France began on a cordial note after 1947. France was involved in Indo-Chinese colonial settlements in 1950s. In 1958, Charles de Gaulle in France decided to put an end to French occupation in Indo-China and by 1962, France had succeeded in its intentions. The legacy of de Gaulle is important as in 1950s, he also ended the French rule in Algeria by signing the Evian Agreement with Algerian National Liberation Front. Though France was not a follower of NAM, de Gaulle did ensure national independence and strategic autonomy in the national decision-making process, independent of the US-UK axis. De Gaulle did take progressive steps independent of the west.

Charles de Gaulle and Strategic Autonomy

De Gaulle recognised China in 1964 during peak Cold War times and even went ahead to initiate a dialogue with Russia. In 1966, the French withdrew from the

military command of NATO. In 1966, de Gaulle also visited Cambodia. His visit to Cambodia came at a time when the US was busy fighting the Vietnam War. While in Cambodia, de Gaulle asserted that a military solution is not a long-term solution in Asia and Asians in no way would submit to Pacific powers. In all the instances above, we see an aggressive assertion of the national independence of France based on the nationalistic feelings of the French. However, certain historians have maintained that French wanted to maintain a strategic autonomy from the west as the French felt insulted on not being invited to Yalta Conference. This approach of strategic autonomy by France resonated well between Nehru and de Gaulle. However, an initial hiccup in the Indo-French relationship came in 1956 Suez Canal crisis when the French, along with the British, resorted to joining Israeli-sponsored planned hostility on Egypt (for details, refer [Section H, Chapter 1](#) in the book). India, during the Suez Canal crisis, stood in opposition to the French for the first time.

After India became independent, one area of Indo-French cooperation that began on a positive note was nuclear research. In 1948, the Department of Atomic Energy in India was established. Homi J. Bhabha decided to look for foreign cooperation. Amongst the foreign players, France was the first with which India opened up cooperation. In 1951, Nehru went to France. This visit was also important as it was a step towards strengthening nuclear cooperation. In 1960s, France helped India establish a heavy water production unit in Baroda. In 1979, the French again helped India with the establishment of a Fast Breeder Reactor at Kalapakkam. After India's peaceful nuclear test in 1974, when other nations suspended nuclear commerce with India, French continued to supply India with fuel for the Tarapur plant and continued the supply till 1992. The 1962 Indo-China conflict saw the French condemning China for its military moves along the border as they chose to side with India. Indira Gandhi, during her tenure as Prime Minister of India, also visited France. Despite the bilateral level visits, the relationship maintained a low profile in the initial years. The breakthrough occurred for the first time in 1980. In 1980, the French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing saw India as a future potential power and in 1981, Giscard's successor, President François Mitterrand, laid the foundation of a successful future relationship during the state visit of Indira Gandhi to Paris.

In 1982, Mitterrand himself visited India, leading to the opening up of a new partnership. Mitterrand encouraged French firms to do business with India but the French firms had an image of Indian markets being based on excessive regulation and state control. The French firms found India a difficult place to do business and thus the governments of both countries began to undertake cultural promotion to gradually ease the process. It was decided that India would promote its culture in France, enabling the French people to know more about India, which would, in turn, open up business collaboration. The era of Rajiv Gandhi in India saw some steps towards the liberalisation of the Indian economy which was viewed very positively by the French businesses. Many French firms began establishing offices in India to prepare themselves for the future. In 1989, Mitterrand visited India again. In order to encourage French businessmen to enter Indian markets, a host of cultural interactions were envisaged. When the Cold War ended and India migrated towards an open economy, the process provided further impetus to the economic relations.


INDIA AND FRANCE SINCE COLD WAR TILL NOW

In 1988, IK Gujral was an interim Prime Minister. He had not been able to prove his majority in the house. Jacques Chirac, despite the absence of a stable government, visited India. Later on, IK Gujral was replaced by a new government headed by Vajpayee. The first diplomatic assertion of India came at the time of the 1998 nuclear tests. After the 1998 tests by India, UNSC condemned India while the US and Japan imposed sanctions on it. But when it came to the French, they did not resort to imposition of sanctions, unlike other powers. This was viewed by India very positively and also ensured that 1998 nuclear test did not emerge as an obstacle in the Indo-French Relations. However, after the nuclear tests by India, a new thinking emerged in the foreign office of France. A small minority group did feel that India should not have crossed the threshold and undertaken the test. However, the majority asserted that it was better to accept India as a de facto nuclear weapon state and initiate cooperation at a civilian nuclear level. The French knew that any nuclear cooperation with India would be difficult till the time there were to be a consensus on ending India's nuclear isolation. Consequently, the French adopted a wait-and-watch policy with a clear tilt towards envisaging a favourable civilian cooperation at the nuclear level in future. After the US negotiated a nuclear deal in 2005 with India, Jacques Chirac decided to engage with India, and in 2006, he declared in favour of nuclear cooperation with India.

Strategic Diplomacy, India and EU

France is a part of the European Union (EU) and the rules of its economic engagement are clearly defined. The EU, as previously discussed, favours deep economic cooperation with India and since 2005, India and the EU have been strategic partners. But what is to be remembered here is that the strategic Partnership between India and the EU does not mention anything about nuclear commerce. This is due to internal issues in the EU itself. Within the EU, at the strategic level, there is an absence of consensus which is not in the case of interactions at the economic level. At the strategic level, due to power differences between players of the EU, they are unable to forge consensus although it is about something that, unlike economic trade, that may touch all of them. It is due to this dichotomy that leveraging strategic autonomy and defining strategic relations with India is tricky. It is in this context that the French, in 2006, envisaged strategic nuclear cooperation with India while the EU in its strategic partnership in 2005 did not.

In fact, Chirac had visited India in 1998, after the nuclear tests and went on to establish a strategic partnership with India. An important dimension that emerged in the strategic partnership agreement was of defence dialogue and defence cooperation. Since then, India and France have held regular dialogues at the defence level. The origin of this strategic partnership lies in a shared common history of the two nations and in France's colonial involvement with India in a limited sense. Even in the post-independence period the French preferred to keep Pondicherry as an expression of the open French culture. The more important connecting factor is the shared democratic values of the nations. Jacques Chirac further visited India in 2006 and signed the nuclear cooperation. The diagram below explains other dimensions.



The coming of Nicholas Sarkozy after Jacques Chirac had ensured the continuity in the Indo-French equations. The high-level visits continued and Sarkozy has visited India twice in his tenure from 2007 to 2012. He was the Chief Guest of the Republic Day parade in 2008 while in 2009, Manmohan Singh went to France as a Chief Guest for Bastille Day. The coming of François Hollande to power as the President of France in 2012 had seen a rise in Indo-French economic cooperation. Hollande was the Chief Guest of Republic Day of India in 2016.



Personal Relationships and Diplomatic Corps in Indo-French Relations

All French Presidents, since the 1980s, have always had a positive stance on engagement with India. What is equally interesting is that the diplomatic support to these Presidents has also at times played a key role. Chirac had a personal interest in Asian and India arts and culture. A diplomat named Dominique de Villepin, in his initial career, had served in India. He later on served as a Foreign Minister and then the Prime Minister of France. Another crucial link in the Indo-French relation was played by Maurice Gourdault-Montagne, who served as diplomatic advisor to Chirac from 2002 to 2007 and had been fluent Hindi, playing an important role in Chirac's decision-making group that took the ultimate steps to the nuclear deal.


INDIA-FRANCE COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY

The commercial link between India and France had been developed to a large extent by JRD Tata. JRD Tata had a unique French Connection. He was born and brought up in France. Later on, he went on to become a bridge of modern Indo-French relations and after his death, he was buried in Paris.

The institutional architecture of the commercial structure is as follows:



Since the 1990s, various French firms have taken up investments in India. Between 2000 and 2015, France has invested around three billion dollars' worth FDI. There are more than 1000 French firms in India with a total stock of around 17 billion dollars. Some prominent firms include Schneider, Alstom, Saint Gobain, Renault, Airbus, Michelin, Vinci, Lafarge, Sanofi Aventis, Danone and an energy firm called Total. Indian firms like Tata, Ranbaxy, and Infosys and TCS are prominent players in France. A lot of small Indian firms in automobile parts and plastics also are doing business in France. In 2016, when Hollande revisited India in January, he identified certain priority areas for commercial interaction.




India-France Cultural Connect

The most important cultural interaction between India and France is the Festival de Cannes. It is a festival where a lot of Indian films are screened. In 2013, Cannes also celebrated 100 years of Indian Cinema. Due to the Cannes festival, the people-to-people connects get established. The ICCR organises festivals in France and regular cultural interactions also happen for promoting deeper understanding. Indology is an important factor in France at present and it focuses on Sanskrit, art, literature and Indian philosophy.

INDIA-FRANCE NUCLEAR AND TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION

As mentioned previously that after India and the US concluded a nuclear deal, it was followed by one with France as well in 2008.




In 2008, India and France concluded an agreement where Areva (the French firm) will work with the NPCIL as per a signed MoU to build 6 European Pressurized Reactors (EPR) for 10,000 MW electricity in Jaitapur to give nuclear fuel to India for 25 years.

Issues at the Jaitapur Plant

The proposed nuclear plant is in Madban village of Ratnagiri District in Maharashtra. The plant has witnessed some protests in recent times. The area on which the plant is to be established is very close to the sea. A lot of fishermen depend upon the sea for livelihood. Once the plant is operationalised, it is expected to release a lot of hot water in the sea. The fishermen fear that this release of hot water will raise the sea temperatures, which would, in turn, affect fishing. The fish catch of Ratnagiri is exported to the EU and Japan. The release of the hot waters will affect their exports. In 2003, the region of Ratnagiri was also declared as a horticulture district and is famous for Alphonso mango. The National Environment Engineering research institute, in its report, has branded large tracts of land as barren land. This is viewed by the locals as dichotomous to the claims of government of Maharashtra. The site of Jaitapur being in a highly seismic zone adds to the existing concerns.

India and France, since 1960s, have undertaken space cooperation and the ISRO has been deeply associated with the French. Since 1981, the ISRO has been using French made Arians rocket facilities in French Guiana.



India, France and the ITER Project

The International Thermonuclear Experiment Reactor (ITER) project was envisaged in 1980s. A final agreement was signed in 2006 at Elysee Palace while it was enforced from 2007. The ITER site is in Aixen Provence in France where India is an


important partner country along with France. The ITER is environment friendly and evergreen due to the fact that it uses nuclear fusion instead of nuclear fission. In a nuclear reactor, the atoms are split and power is generated. When we split atoms, it generates radioactive waste. The nuclear wastes have to be managed. In contrast, the ITER fuses the atoms. The fusion generates waste which is either helium or water. In the project India is contributing in creating the largest refrigerator in the world that would work at minus 269 Celsius. The need for such a refrigerator is a part of the project. In the process of fusion at the ITER, a huge steel frame will be heated to a high temperature and then giant magnets would be used to release atoms that would fuse with the steel frame, generating more heat which would be used to rotate the turbine. The magnets are special super conducting magnets which will operate only when kept cold. The fridge would ensure the same.

INDIA–FRANCE DEFENCE RELATIONSHIP

A crucial bedrock of the Indo–France relation is defence cooperation. India and France undertake large weapon procurement diplomacy. France is a leading supplier of defence equipment to India. It supplies aircrafts, helicopters, surface to air missiles and artillery.



India and France have established joint working groups on terrorism in 2001. There are more than 60 events at various levels of defence interactions between India and France.




At the defence level, what works between India and France is the level of diplomatic and political trust each has on the other. Moreover, although France has been supplying some weapons to Pakistan, it has never tried an Indo–Pak hyphenation. France has always adopted the policy of dehyphenation in defence diplomacy. France also accepts that India has a defence foreign policy of diversification and shall drive its policy as per its national interests. Russia undoubtedly remains a big supplier, but the US, Israel and France are also major partners. France has no insecurity with regard to India's policy of diversification.



Scorpenes

India had signed a pact with a French firm named DCNS for technology transfer to Mazgaon Docks Limited. Mazgaon Dock Limited was designated as the builder. The pact with DCNS included Indo-French collaboration for six Scorpene class submarines. A Scorpene class submarine is known for its stealth features and can be used to launch guided attacks with torpedoes and tube launched anti-ship missiles. In May 2016, Kalvari became the first Scorpene class submarine that went into operation.

An understanding between India and France is that France would not halt spares supply and weapon supply in war, though with respect to the US and Germany, a lot of uncertainty prevails on this point. France understands India's need to go beyond the buyer-seller relationship to the realm of strategic defence partnership. India prefers to envisage joint development and production with players to emerge as a potential partners for the future. France has accepted India's policy of co-production and development of defence equipments.



India-France and Rafale Issues

Dassault is a French firm that manufactures aircraft. Rafale is one such multirole aircraft (MMRCA), which can perform multiple functions. It can perform nuclear deterrence, carry out in-depth strikes and can also function as an anti-ship strike aircraft. The Indian Airforce (IAF) had both heavy and light fleet. In 2001, the IAF decided to procure medium fleet. A major part of the plan was to introduce MMRCA as part of the medium fleet. In 2007, the Defence Acquisition Council started a bid through Request For Proposal (RFP) for 126 MMRCA aircrafts. In the contract to bid for the MMRCA, six manufacturers participated.




The IAF tested the aircraft of all six participants and shortlisted Rafale and Euro fighter. In the final bid in 2012, Dassault won the contract for the supply of 126 Rafale MMRCA. As per the deal, it was decided that 18 Rafale aircrafts will be purchased in a fly

away condition and the rest of the 108 will be manufactured by Hindustan Aeronautical Limited (HAL) in India and France would undertake a technology transfer. The negotiations with Dassault began in 2012 and got completed in 2016. In the four years' interval, the price was being negotiated. In 2016, the earlier plan of 126 Rafale was declared economically unviable and India finally decided to take 36 Rafale jets in a fly away condition. One of the reasons for the delay in negotiations was a disagreement on assembling the aircrafts in India. The offset clauses also emerged as an irritant. As per the defence procurement policy of India, any foreign firm doing defence business with India has to bring some portion of the investment of the agreed amount of the deal back to India for investment here. The policy says that any defence deal above `300 crores by a player means the player should invest 30% of the value in India. During the negotiations, India had been pitching that France has to participate in Make in India and thereby demanded 50% offset clause and also that France establishes two bases for Rafale in India. The French were willing to participate in Make in India but alleged that the establishment of two bases and other helmet related modifications may escalate deal costs and finances. The French are also unwilling to agree to the demand for a 50% offset clause.

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO PARIS—2015

In 2015, the Indian PM Narendra Modi visited Paris and concluded the final agreement for the supply of 36 Rafale jets in a fly away condition. The PM communicated economic concerns as a factor for the watering down of the deal. An agreement was signed between Larsen and Turbo, and Areva to reduce costs of Jaitapur Nuclear Power Plant (JNPP). The cost reduction is to be done by increasing the localisation and local procurement of the equipment.




The PM also undertook 'Naav Pe Charcha' with his French counterpart on the Seine River. In all, many agreements on the core dimensions mentioned above were signed. PM addressed a gathering of the Indian diaspora at the Carrousel du Louvre. The PM gifted France a book called *India and the Great War*, which had been prepared and published by the MEA and included narratives about the contribution of Indian soldiers in Neuve Chappelle, France. The PM gifted Hollande a painting, titled 'Tree of Life'.

Analysis of François Hollande's Visit to India, January 2016

In January, 2016, François Hollande landed in India for a three-day visit and was the chief guest of Republic Day Celebrations. He also visited Chandigarh, Nagpur and Puducherry. He began his visit from Chandigarh where he attended the Indo-French Business Summit. From Chandigarh, he flew to New Delhi to take part in Republic Day Celebrations. For

the first time ever in modern Indian history, the foreign troops of the 35th Infantry Regiment of the 7th Armoured Brigade participated and marched with the Indian forces on Indian soil.



The French firms committed 10 billion dollars' worth investment in India for the next five years in manufacturing and assistance in Make in India. The French Development Agency has earned 60% of its total budget for developmental projects in India. The visit consolidated the strategic partnership and discussions are underway to elevate it to the special strategic partnership level. During Hollande's visit, an agreement was reached to cooperate on terrorism, intelligence sharing and counter-terrorism. Cyber security also emerged as a new dimension of discussion. France has been supportive of India's International Solar Alliance of 122 nations between the Tropic of Cancer and the Tropic of Capricorn announced in the Paris-COP-21. A core component of Hollande's visit was France committing Rupees 22000 cores for five years to the development of solar energy.




During the Hollande visit, the Rafale pact was concluded. The pricing has not been put in the pact. The most significant agreement is at the railways level where France has agreed to produce 800 electric locomotives as part of a joint venture between Indian Railways and Alstom in Bihar (Madhepura). At the space level, the two have agreed to establish a roadmap for JNPP by 2017. They have also agreed on the development of smart cities and France has committed support for the development of Chandigarh, Nagpur and Puducherry. A cultural exchange programme had been planned from 2015 to 2018 and a decision had been taken for India to organise Namaste France from September to November, 2016 and for France to organise Bonjour India in 2017. A Hindi conference had also been planned for 2016 in Paris. France has agreed to work on establishing a Delhi-Chandigarh route for trains at 200 KMPH speed corridor.

CONCLUSION OF RAFALE DEAL

India on 10th April, 2015, finally announced the decision to buy 36 Rafale fighter jets which will boost for India's air power to deter China and Pakistan. In September, 2016, India finally inked the inter government agreement (IGA) and other associated

commercial protocols with France. The Indian government has also cancelled the MMRCA project to acquire 126 fighter aircraft in 2015 citing Indian Air Force's critical operational necessity and the need to cut time and costs to go for direct acquisitions of 36 Rafale aircrafts. As per the new deal with France, France will have to plough 50% of the contractual value back to India as per the offset clause.



4th Generation Technology and design is based on 1980s. They use avionics and basic radars and are used globally.

4.5th Generation Use 4th generation airframe but advanced avionics. Developed in 1990s.

5th Generation Cutting edge stealth technology based on supersonic cruise. For ex, F-22 Raptor of US.

FINAL ANALYSIS

France has emerged as India's most trusted international partner. It is visible in India's decision to allow a French contingent of troops to take part in the Republic Day celebrations in 2016. India has shed-off its isolationism to embrace France as a trusted European partner. Paris is crucial for New Delhi for many reasons. Firstly, US, China and United Kingdom have tilted towards Pakistan while engaging with India. This is something that has not gone down well with India. France, on the other hand, has decided to focus on engaging with India without embracing Pakistan. Secondly, as EU continues to witness troubles (ranging from financial crises of 2007, recent refugee crises, ISIS attacks in Europe, Russian annexation of Crimea, BREXIT and Trump's climate change policy), France is crucial for India to promote a balance of power in the Eurasian landmass. France has been an undiminished power in Indo-Pacific and has decided to enhance the overall capabilities of India. Thirdly, China wants to assume regional and global leadership. India prefers to engage with France to establish a more equitable world order in this new emerging concert of powers. India will continue to strengthen its ties with France in the times ahead.

3
CHAPTER

India and Germany Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Diplomatic history of relations and core dimensions
- Analysis of bilateral visits

INTRODUCTION

India and Germany enjoy very advanced levels of diplomatic relations. Apart from the political visits at the PM level, Germany is also an economic gateway for India to Europe. Germany, after the World War-II, was divided into two parts—the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, or West Germany) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR, or East Germany). India supported diplomatic relations with the FRG and stayed away from recognising the GDR. The reason India recognised the FRG was an economic one. India also felt a proximity in shared visions of nation building, which was a common goal both India and the FRG. To study Indo-German relations, we can broadly outline three phases of interaction and individually analyse each phase.

Phase 1: 1947 to 1972

The German policy of India evolved after India became independent. At the time of its independence in 1947, the task for India was to carefully choose a factor of recognition that would help decide its relations with the FRG or the GDR. As time went by, India diplomatically evolved relations with FRG and decided to put the agenda to recognise the GDR on hold. The reason was because the FRG was the only representative of the German population representing German interests legitimately. India established diplomatic relations on 7th March, 1951.

Hindu-German Conspiracy

During the World War-1, Germany prepared a plot to smuggle weapons from US. Germany wanted to use those weapons against the British Raj. This was the first time when some radical sections of the Indian National Movement made a common cause with Germany through the revolutionary exiles in US and Europe. During the World War-1, Germany found allies in Ghadar party, Bengal revolutionaries, Deobandi's and Hindu Princes. In 1915, a Provincial Government was established by the British in Kabul, Afghanistan. The government was led by Raja Mahendra Pratap Singh who was from Aligarh. Germany decided to bring 20,000 German and Turkish soldiers to Afghanistan and use Afghanistan to attack India in the North West Frontier. Though

the idea of fomenting trouble was naive, it still establishes a collaboration between Indian and Germans in the said period.

A very interesting situation evolved over a period of time. India advocated non-alignment and initially wanted to maintain equidistance from both the FRG and the GDR. Russians mounted increasing pressure on India for the recognition of the GDR. India diplomatically did recognise the FRG. It initially moved away from its policy of advocacy for German unification. Then moved to grant de jure recognition to the GDR and finally recognised the GDR in 1972. By this kind of vacillation in the policy, it did create mistrust in its relation with the FRG but was effectively able to balance Cold War competition.

Nehruvian Imprint in India's German Policy

In order to understand why India recognised the FRG, it is important to study it through the understanding and experience of Nehru. In 1936, Nehru had visited Nazi Germany. In 1938, he visited Spain, which had also been badly affected by war. After both visits, Nehru understood that if fascism and imperialism were to continue, they will pose grave threat to international peace. This made Nehru sympathise with the FRG. He almost perceived the division of Germany as another act of partition, the way it had transpired in case of India and Pakistan, and had sympathy for Germans due to its tremendous impact on them. India and the FRG also had a similar challenge—that of nation building in a democratic state in times of the Cold War. Initially, these were the factors that shaped India's German policy. East Berlin, which was under communist control, was a place where Soviets had essentially established a puppet rule. Since this puppet rule imposed by the Soviet in the GDR was against the policy doctrine of self-determination that India held ideologically close, Nehru decided not to recognise the GDR.

Things began to take a different turn from 1955. The FRG joined the NATO alliance of USA. In contrast, the GDR joined the Russian Warsaw Pact. India did not appreciate these moves. Nehru, in 1956, had delivered a speech in University of Hamburg, where he hinted India's growing discomfort over military alliance and asserted that joining such alliances would, in all likelihood, prevent any possible future unification for the two sides of Germany.

After independence, India was economically weak, but the FRG witnessed tremendous growth due to immense support of the West. India wanted to take assistance from the FRG for economic rebuilding of India and asked the FRG for support. Many economic firms from the FRG began to assist India in the infrastructures sector. The FRG firms played an important role in trucks, road construction and heavy industry. The Rowkela Steel Assistance, envisaged and designed in the Second Five Year Plan in India, saw German assistance (from the FRG), which also assisted India in the establishment of IIT Chennai (then Madras) and provided adequate support at the academic level.

Principle or Political Realities?

The relations between India and the FRG were not going to be completely smooth after, the FRG Chancellor Adenauer's introduction of the Hallstein doctrine in 1955. Named after Walter Hallstein, it was a key doctrine in the foreign policy of West Germany which prescribed that the Federal Republic would not establish or maintain diplomatic relations with any state that recognised the German Democratic Republic (East Germany). As per the doctrine, if any state having diplomatic relations with FRG gives any recognition to GDR, then the FRG would perceive the move as an unfriendly act. This would lead to sanctions being imposed upon the signatory. India was not at all comfortable with this. But as India needed German assistance for the second five-year plan in 1957, when it witnessed a Balance of Payments crisis, it went on to grudgingly accept the doctrine.

Phase 2: 1972 to 1988

In the 1960s, certain domestic imperatives played out for India in a way as for it to recognise the GDR in 1972. In 1966, there was a change in the government in the FRG. Adenauer was replaced by a liberal Kurt Kiesinger (1966–69), followed by Willy Brandt (1969–74). In India, there was simultaneously the rise of Indira Gandhi, post Lal Bahadur Shastri. In 1967, Kiesinger visited India and advocated consensus and cooperation. He decided to tone down the rhetoric of the Hallstein doctrine, paving the way for his Ostpolitik—a policy whereby he introduced a detente in the relations between FRG and GDR. 'Neue Ostpolitik' finally led to the normalisation of relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and Eastern Europe, particularly the German Democratic Republic, beginning in 1969. India welcomed this policy and effectively changed stance in 1972 to recognise the GDR at the diplomatic level. In 1974, Willy Brandt was replaced by Helmut Schmidt. He adopted a pro-China and transatlantic diplomatic policy, thereby reducing relations with India. In the meantime, in 1975, in India had declared emergency. The FRG government severely condemned the emergency as an undemocratic practice which India labelled as interference in its internal affairs. All this took relations between India and the FRG to a very critical level.




India and the GDR Push

It was not only Ostpolitik that brought the change in India's policy back in 1960s in India with regard to the GDR; a new GDR friendship movement was established which exerted pressure on Indira Gandhi to recognise the GDR. It received a lot of support from Leftists. In 1967, India initially allowed a Bureau of State Trading Corporation to be established in Delhi and in 1968, the Bureau was upgraded to a General Consulate. East Berlin also made offers to India for aid which contributed to an opening up of relations between India and the GDR.

In 1960s and 1970s, India also witnessed its own share of domestic crises. In 1965, there was a severe draught and in 1973, the oil crises of the Middle East also created an economic dent in India. The GDR could not be of much help economically as it itself was domestically occupied with its own concerns. In this context, India domestically exercised the option of nationalisation. This led to a lot of German firms to pull out of India. The

economic aid from the FRG also declined. The final blow to India–FRG relations came in 1974, when India tested the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE), which was severely condemned by the FRG outright. However, even though economic relations dipped after the PNE, the subsequent period saw cultural and academic relations continue.



Rise of the Drift with the FRG

It was not just the Ostpolitik of Brendt that motivated India to diplomatically recognise GDR. The 1960s saw the FRG giving effect to American policy in South Asia. In the 1965 Indo–Pak war, West Germany gave arms and economic aid to Pakistan. This was a turning point for India in its relationship with the FRG. In 1971, the FRG once again supported Pakistan. India, grateful for Russian support in the 1971 war, grew closer to the GDR. After 1971 came the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with USSR and subsequent recognition to the GDR. The GDR stood by India and also became the first state in Europe to recognise Bangladesh.


Phase 3: 1988 to Present

The period from 1988 onward was a historic period for Germany. German unification was on cards. In 1988, Rajiv Gandhi visited Bonn. The event of 1988 is rightly recognised as a relaunch of Indo–German relation in 1990. The high-level visits began to increase between India and Germany post German unification. In 2000, India and Germany concluded the India–Germany Agenda Partnership in the 21st Century and signs of strategic partnership began to emerge. As the Cold War ended in 1991, PV Narsimha Rao visited Germany. He participated in the festival of India. In 2000, Vajpayee went on to take the relations to a new level by signing the Strategic Partnership Agreement. The most important dimension of diplomatic relations is commercial diplomacy. Important German firms like Bosch, Chrysler, Bayer and Allianz finance are doing good business in India. Germany is today the second largest investor from EU to India. Germany has raised some factors that hinder India–Germany commercial relations:-

1. Corruption
2. IPR related barriers
3. Absence of legal provisions for business grievances
4. Absence of a framework for investment

If Germany is important for high technology and manufacturing, Germany also recognises Indian talent in Information Technology and advertising. Germany knows that

India has a special significance in contemporary Germany.



Is Germany India's Natural Ally?

India feels Germany is a natural ally and India and Germany are natural partners. Normally, a natural partner is one where India feels that the state may not act as a competitor in marketplace nor in power politics but offers something which India lacks. India feels that Germany is neither a competitor in the marketplace nor in power politics. India feels that Germany has something to offer to India in its quest for geo-economy and development. Germany has surplus capital and technology while India lacks in capital and technology and has human capital worth exporting to Germany. India and Germany have only talked about defence, commerce and culture till now. But, now the two sides in the recent times have embarked upon a new dialogue of grand strategy to change balance of power. Germany is looking for stable partners in the era of uncertainty and India can be a reliable partner.


SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

In 2006, India participated in the Hannover Messe, which is a technology fair where technology participation is envisaged through bilateral investments. India and Germany, in 2006, had concluded a defence cooperation agreement for joint defence training, defence exchange and defence technology transfer. In 2008, India and Germany successfully organized and concluded a bilateral naval exercise. The German counter terrorism police also provide training to National Security Guards of India and in 1994 a G-4 group was formed to reform the UN and Security Council. In 2015, India participated again in the

Hannover Messe and pitched for Make in India.

ANALYSIS OF THIRD AND FOURTH IGC (2015, 2017) AND PM'S VISIT TO GERMANY—2015


The India–Germany Inter-Governmental Consultations (IGC) was established by the strategic Partnership Agreement in 2000. The IGC provides a broad framework for bilateral cooperation. After, the decision to establish the IGC was taken in 2000, the very first IGC followed in 2011 in New Delhi while the second IGC took place in 2013 in Berlin. In October 2015, Angela Merkel came to India to participate in the third IGC. The visit of the German Chancellor coincided with the 25th anniversary of the Fall of the Berlin wall and German Reunification was celebrated as a victory of democratic values. During the third IGC in 2015, Germany decided to add depth to strategic Partnership by enhancing cooperation on security and foreign issues.



The two sides discussed the need to establish a stable global order. The IGC made references to envisaging peaceful solutions in Syria, Ukraine, and Afghanistan. Both jointly made an assertion to envisage freedom of navigation in the high seas. Both sides also decided to jointly work with Iran, especially after the nuclear deal between the US and Iran. A decision was taken to strengthen the joint working group on terrorism and cooperate on cyber security. A new policy planning dialogue has been established between the two to promote bilateral exchanges. Germany has committed support for Make in India, Skill India mission, defence manufacturing and the SME sector. The Indian Railways has decided to explore the possibility of rail modernisation with Germany. During the German Chancellor's visit, negotiations for a DTAA were picked up as an agenda item and a decision was taken to conclude the talks at the earliest. Germany also committed 1 billion Euros for green energy corridors in India—an investment that shall be done through the India–Germany Energy Forum. It has pledged support for solar participation for multiple projects from 2015 to 2020.

Germany has also committed to provide 360 million euro for sustainable urban development and India has decided to use the monetary support for smart city development. Germany has also committed 120 million Euros for the cleaning of the River Ganga. The most significant contribution of the German Chancellor's visit, however, has been an attempt by Germany to assist India in the Make in India campaign. Germany had raised concerns about corruption, lack of skilled labour and absence of a single window clearance system in India. The Indian government has conveyed India's firmness to tackle the concerns raised by Germany. The Indian PM decided to set up a Fast Track System for the German companies in the Ministry of Commerce in India by March 2016. India and Germany decided that, since Germany has competence in high

technology, it will collaborate with India as a lender in the Make in India movement with support at the high technology level. The German SMEs also committed investment of 3000 crore rupees under the Make in India Mittelstand initiative for settling up on manufacturing plants in India.



In April 2015, the Indian PM Narendra Modi had also visited Germany. In Germany, he reiterated 3Ds as the core advantages of India (Democracy, Demography, and Demand). He invited German participation to the Make in India campaign and help transform India into a manufacturing hub. The PM sought German support in low cost manufacturing due to the availability of cheap skilled labour in India. The PM attended the Hannover fair and inaugurated the Indo-German Business Summit. At Hannover Messe, the PM reiterated that Make in India is not just a slogan but a national movement for radical transformation of India, touching every aspect of the Indian Society. He sought German cooperation and participation in manufacturing, skill development, railways, river cleaning and education.

At the fourth IGC in Berlin held in May–June, 2017, the two leaders were expected to clinch a host of agreements and sign MoUs to enhance the strategic partnership between the two countries.

The Indian PM had declared that the two countries would “chart out a future roadmap of cooperation with focus on trade and investment, security and counter-terrorism, innovation and science and technology, skill development, urban infrastructure, railways and civil aviation, clean energy, development cooperation, health and alternative medicine.”

As of now, Germany is the largest trade partner for India in the European Union (EU) and one of the leading sources of foreign direct investment (FDI) into the country.

There are more than 1,600 German companies and 600 German joint ventures in India and the German economic profile supports excellence and expertise that match with India's development priorities of Make in India, Clean India, Skill India, Digital India, Smart Cities, as per the information circulated by the Ministry of External Affairs.

4
CHAPTER

India and Belgium Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Historical background of relations
- Areas of bilateral cooperation
- Analysis of bilateral visits

BASIC BACKGROUND

The relations between India and Belgium go back to the ancient times when India used to import chandelier and crystals from Belgium. During the colonial era, in the 18th century, the Ostend Company came to East and South India for the purpose of trade. A lot of Indians who fought the World War-II did the same on Belgium soil. In modern times, India and Belgium developed diplomatic relations in 1948. Recently, India has attached greater importance to Belgium due to growing economic concerns. This has also manifested in greater number of visits from both sides. In 2013, for the first time, the President of India visited Belgium. During the visit, the President of India inaugurated the Europhilia, an Indian cultural festival where India showcases its culture heritage. In 2013, the fest included 450 events in around a hundred venues. It gives Europe a deep insight of cultural diversity of India. The President of India also concluded a treaty on higher education. Both sides have decided to strengthen cooperation in research. There is a growing convergence of Indian and Belgian interests to promote academic innovation in the twenty first century.




AREAS OF COOPERATION

Between Belgium and India, one of the biggest areas of cooperation is diamond trade. A lot of Indians are working in Antwerp are involved in the diamond industry. However, Indians, in recent times have made attempts to diversify. Belgium has enormous expertise in pharmacy, life sciences and infrastructure. All these three focus areas are those where India intends to explore future bilateral cooperation. India and Belgium also enjoy a unique education-based relationship and a lot of Indians prefer to go to Belgium for higher education.




COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY

The institutional architecture is as follows:



In 1997, India signed a bilateral investment treaty with Belgium known as the Luxembourg Economic Union. Since then there have been regular joint commission (JC) meetings between India–Belgium Luxembourg Economic Union. The 13th JC meetings took place in Brussels while the 14th JC meeting happened in Delhi in September, 2015. In both the JC meets, the two sides decided to enhance cooperation in various areas. The diagram below clarifies this:



In 2015, India and Belgium signed an MOU for port officials training. As Indian businessmen are in Antwerp undertaking diamond business, Antwerp port authority will now organise training for officials of India in Mumbai.

India exports gems, chemicals, base metals and textiles while it imports machinery, plastics and diamonds from Belgium. Indian companies in IT, software and telecom have presence in Belgium while Belgium firms invested in engineering, mechanical appliances and steel manufacturing are present in India.

ANALYSIS OF PM'S VISIT TO BELGIUM—2016

In March 2016, the Indian PM Narendra Modi visited Belgium for an official state visit to as well as to attend the 13th EU–India Summit hosted by Donald Tusk, the President of the European Council, and Jean Claude Juncker, the President of the European Commission. As the visit happened just a few days after a terror strike in Belgium, the PM paid a tribute to the terror victims. He visited the Maalbeek metro station where a bomb had exploded a week before his arrival. In the subsequent meeting in Egmont palace, the PM discussed

the need for a comprehensive convention on International Terrorism (CCIT). He also discussed visa related issues and cooperation in infrastructure. India and Belgium agreed on a mutual Legal Assistance Treaty and an Extradition Treaty. The PM also highlighted the opportunities for Belgian business houses in India and encouraged them to commit FDI in defence, railway and food processing sectors in India. In the meeting with the Belgium Prime Minister Charles Michel, he held discussions on enhancing cooperation in IT, ports, education and tourism. As Belgium is home to around 1500 diamond firms, India's share is high in the diamond trade in Antwerp. Belgium and India are also both part of the Kimberly process began in 2000 as a negotiating platform of diamond producing states to ensure that rebel movements are not financed by diamond purchase. The participating nations have agreed to a certification scheme since 2003. The PM also concluded MOUs on institutionalisation of foreign policy consultation and renewable energy.

India–Belgium Cooperation

In 2006, Belgium PM Guy Verhofstadt visited India and concluded an MoU on Science and Technology. This was followed in 2011 by the establishment of a Joint commission on Science and Technology agreement leading to the subsequent positing of a framework for cooperation. It is interesting to note that space cooperation between India and Belgium has been going on since 1998 and 1998 itself ISRO had signed a MoU with Tech Space Aero. In 1998, Verhart, a software firm of Belgium, signed a contract with the ISRO for launching a 100kg PSLV-C-3, which was subsequently launched later. In 2016, during the Indian PM's visit to Belgium, he activated the optical infrared telescope in Devasthal in Nainital. This telescope was built as a with Belgium's Advanced Mechanical and Optical system.

5
CHAPTER

India and Switzerland Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:


- Basic background of diplomatic relations
- Commercial diplomacy
- Science and Technology diplomacy
- Development diplomacy
- India-EU FTA and Switzerland
- Analysis of bilateral visits

BASIC BACKGROUND

India and Switzerland have a very cordial relationship ever since Indian Independence. A very important point to note is that Switzerland has been a neutral nation whenever India has had conflicts, be it in 1948, 1962, 1965, or 1971. This neutrality of Switzerland has fostered cooperation between the two nations. In 1948, India went onto open its mission in Berne. In 2008, India and Switzerland decided to take the relations to privileged partnership level.

COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY

India and Switzerland trade relations go back to 1851. The Volkart Trading Company began trading between Basel and Mumbai way back in 1851. The firm dealt in cotton. Volcafe began to trade in coffee too. In 1875, it opened an office in India. Some prominent Swiss firms trading before 1947 included Nestle, Geigy and Brown Boveri. As per the articles three and six of the Treaty of Friendship, 1948, both nations went on to advance MFN status to each other. Since the 1950s, many Swiss firms have begun to do business with India.



India exports textiles, garments, chemicals, precious stones and shoes while it imports bullion, optical instruments, boilers, medical appliances, transport equipments and watches. A lot of Swiss firms are doing business in India today which includes Nestle, Brown Boveri Asia, Credit Swiss and Novartis. Prominent Indian firms in Switzerland include TCS, Infosys and Tech Mahindra. Both India and Switzerland have been negotiating an FTA since 2008.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIPLOMACY

In 2003, India and Switzerland signed an agreement called Indo-Swiss Framework on Science and Technology. This led to a collaboration between the two nations in various sciences beginning from 2005. In 2008, the India-Switzerland Joint Research Programme was launched. Switzerland has a scientific advisor in the Embassy in India to promote science cooperation. India has also been associated with European organisation for Nuclear Research (CERN) since quite some time. CERN is the birthplace of World Wide Web and touch screen technologies which are used in smartphones today. India participated in the CERN meetings as an observer member. India had joined CERN in 1992 in its quest to discover universal secrets. In 2009, the Indian scientists urged the CERN to make changes in its criteria for associates' membership. The CERN made the requisite changes in 2010. Since then, Indian scientists have been pushing for an associate membership for India. Being an associate member will open doors for Indian scientists to be trained at CERN. In March 2015, the cabinet committee on security in India granted approval for India to be an associate member at CERN. India will now contribute 50 crore rupees annually to reap associate member benefit. Now India will be able to participate in regular council sessions and Indian scientists can also be appointed members to an advisory committee in the CERN.


DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

Since 1961, the Swiss Agency for Development Corporation has provided aid to India. The aid was stopped only in 2010. Since 2010, Switzerland has continued support for the

global programme on climate change and local governance in initiative and networks in India. Switzerland continues to support India in sustainable development and energy efficiency initiatives. Switzerland also undertakes technology transfer for developmental projects aimed at poverty eradication in India.

INDIA, EUROPEAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT AND SWITZERLAND


In 1960, Stockholm convention established the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA). Those states who did not wish to join the European Community could join EFTA as an alternative, to promote free trade.



Since the 1990s, the EFTA nations have signed FTAs with a vast network of nations like Israel, Jordan, Singapore and South African customs union, and so on. In 2008, the EFTA nations began negotiations with India. On 10th June, 2006, the stocktaking meet of chief negotiators of India–EFTA took place and an economic partnership agreement happened in Delhi. The chief negotiates till now have held 13 rounds of negotiations with the 12th round in November, 2013. Due to the general elections in India in 2014, the negotiations were suspended for a short period. There have been some issues that are complicating the EFTA and delaying its successful conclusions. The participating European nations have been demanding more commitment from India with regard to IPR issues. The striking point is the concept of data exclusivity. A pharmacy company which is into manufacturing of drugs has to prove the efficacy of the medicine. It also has to ensure that the manufactured medicine is safe for use. To do so, a pharmacy firm undertakes clinical trials on humans and animals. The trials lead to generation of data. By generating this data and keeping it exclusive for its use, the company that has innovated the medicine can prevent its competitors from obtaining license to manufacture a low-cost version of the drug. The pharmacy company or the innovator wants to mostly maintain exclusivity of their drug. The EFTA negotiators are stuck here. Firms like Novartis have been demanding data exclusivity while India is opposed to the granting of data exclusivity to these firms. The EFTA negotiates are also asking for mutual recognition for geographical indicators which, under present Indian laws, are not permitted. The negotiations on the above explained issues are going on.

ANALYSIS OF PM'S VISIT TO SWITZERLAND—2016

In June 2016, Indian PM Narendra Modi went to Switzerland on a state visit.



The Swiss government assured their support to India for the cause of Indian membership to the NSG. During the PM's visit, he gave a patent hearing to officials of Novartis, who explained the bottlenecks in the EFTA and raised issues for higher level intellectual properties regime (IPR) protection with the PM. The PM assured higher cooperation and agreed to look into the issues on priority. Swiss pharma firms since long have been advocating strong IPR protection to enhance trade in India.

Switzerland has strict banking laws where they do not entertain sharing of information about any clients and their related information. In October 2015, Swiss authorities committed to India that they will carry out independent investigation into the list of 782 names of HSBC bank clients which were leaked by a former HSBC bank employee, Hervé Falciani. The Swiss government maintains that Hervé Falciani's disclosure of the list of 782 names is based on stolen data, and is thus a breach of Swiss laws. In December, 2015, the Swiss Parliament also gave a green signal to Automatic Information Exchange treaty under which Switzerland has to exchange financial information annually with the participating nations from 2018. During the PM's visit, he urged Switzerland to start negotiations with India to allow India to be a participating state in automatic information exchange treaty. The then Swiss President, Johann Schneider-Ammann, had agreed to send a team of experts from Switzerland, led by the state secretary for International Financial matters, to India, for negotiations.

SWISS PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO INDIA—AUGUST, 2017

Swiss presidents have visited India on three occasions earlier—in 1998, 2003 and 2007. The present President, Doris Leuthard, was on a three-day visit to India in September, 2017, was given a ceremonial welcome at the Rashtrapati Bhavan. The Swiss President was accompanied by senior government officials and a large business delegation of leading Swiss companies.

During her visit, Doris Leuthard held extensive talks, covering the entire spectrum of their bilateral relationship, including ways to boost trade and investment ties. The two heads of states also deliberated on regional and global issues of mutual interest. External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj had also called on the Swiss president and discussed various bilateral issues. Switzerland has supported India in Make in India and Digital India programme. In 2018, India and Switzerland are going to celebrate the 70th Anniversary of India-Switzerland Friendship Treaty (signed in 1948). Switzerland will help India in clean energy skill training, railways, health and culture. Switzerland also

supports in UN Security Council and for NSG and MTCR. During the visit, the two sides concluded MoU's on railway cooperation also.

End of Part Questions

1. India and Switzerland have transformed their diplomatic ties from being ideological supporters to economic partners today. Discuss.
2. With Russia moving closer to China and an unpredictable administration in US, India and EU have much to offer to each other. Discuss.
3. India has presented itself as a defender of global order in EU. Examine the statement in the light of India's new outreach to Europe.
4. India must cement mutually beneficial ties with an evolving EU. Discuss how India must capitalize its diplomacy in Europe on the basis of the ongoing shifts in the global order.
5. France has emerged steadily since the end of the Cold War as India's most trusted international partner. Discuss.
6. India-Germany relations are not just about commerce, they are about a great civilization bonding between a great Asian state and a great European power. Examine this statement analyzing the new India-Germany partnership in the 21st century based on the shared Weltanschauung.

1
CHAPTER

India and West Asia Policy—Key Drivers

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Historical analysis of India's engagement with West Asia
- Look West Policy
- India and the regional security situation in the Gulf
- Conclusion

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF INDIA'S ENGAGEMENT WITH WEST ASIA


India and West Asia (hereafter referred to as WA) have a civilizational link. India has historical ties with WA going back to the tie of Indus Valley civilization, when trade in turquoise, copper and spices were common. Indian merchants were present in WA even before the coming of Islam and the Indian merchants had trade with Mecca. Since 6th century BCE, Indians also undertook trade with Jews, who were the only community to trade along India's west coast. The coming of the British added a new geo-strategic outlook to the Indo-West Asia trade. For the British, West Asia acted as a land bridge to Asia, Afghanistan, Europe and was strategically located with links to the Mediterranean Sea, Red Sea and access to Arabian Sea. The WA politics was influenced by Nationalism in the Arab world, western imperialism and the Zionist movement.

As Zionism emerged, Indian national leaders showed a negative attitude towards the same as they perceived Zionism as an attempt by the Jewish people to colonise the lands of Palestine. As Indians were fighting a nationalist movement against the British, they supported the people of Palestine. Indian nationalists provided support to the Arabs in Palestine who began to organise themselves to fight British imperialism. Nehru believed that India should support Arab Palestinians because the British were exploiting Jews and Arabs by playing the traditional card of divide and rule. On 27th September 1936, a Palestinian day was also observed by the Indian National Congress (INC). Even as all these events were unfolding, the maritime relations between India and WA continued. The East India Company controlled India and the West Asian region through the Persian Gulf Residency (PGR). The PGR, till 1857, remained as subdivision of East Indian Company. After the 1857 revolt in India, the British crown assumed all responsibilities. The British Indian empire subsequently built outposts in the Gulf to safeguard marine trade. The British also supported the Jews as their intention was to continue dominance. The British

used the Indian Rupee in Qatar, Kuwait, Oman and Bahrain. The RBI continued to use the Rupee in the above states till 1959.

Under the Balfour Declaration, the British accepted the demand of the Jews to have a separate state. During the World War-I, the British and the French had concluded a Sykes–Picot Agreement, also known as the Asia Minor Agreement, in 1916 whereby they decided to divide the areas of the Middle East amongst themselves after the war. After the World War-I, under the post war settlement agreements, the mandate system was established. The British got the mandate of Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan, while the French got the mandates of Syria and Lebanon. The British handed over their mandate of Palestine to the UN after the end of World War-II. India, at the UN, during the deliberations of UN special commission on Palestine (UNSCOP), opposed the idea of partitioning Palestine and supported the minority plan. India favoured a unified Federal Arab Palestine with Jews remaining under Arab control. As Palestine was finally partitioned, a separate area for the Jews was envisaged. In May 1948, in the area designated for the Jews, the state of Israel was born.

After India became independent, India followed a two-point policy in WA. It politically supported the Arabs and enhanced support to their leaders who focused on secularism and socialism. During this period, India would often criticise Israel and censure it for aggression in the Middle East. India's non-alignment emerged as the foundation of Indo–Arab friendship. The leaders of Ba'ath party in Iraq and Nasser of Egypt supported Non-Aligned Movement. India also used NAM to support peaceful resolution of Israel–Arab conflicts. India used multiple NAM conferences to support peaceful resolution of the Palestine issue. India supported the Arabs and in 1975 supported a resolution to brand Zionism as racism. After 1967, the Nasser's idea of Pan Arabism began to fail and it gave rise to religious extremism in WA. This gave Pakistan an opportunity to expand its influence in the region. India, however, continued to support anti-colonial and anti-imperial struggles. India's basic purpose was to not only get access to oil from the Gulf, but also reduce the influence of Pakistan in the region. The 1973 oil crisis lead to a subsequent oil boom in WA. This led to the rise of pro-West monarchs like Saudi Arabia, with exceptions remaining. The oil boom witnessed a rise in the migration of unskilled and semi-skilled worker to the Gulf. This allowed India to sustain its relations with Gulf states during the rest of the Cold War.



Throughout the Cold War, India continued its anti- Israel rhetoric while supporting the Arabs. India wanted to support Iraq even during the Iran– Iraq war in 1980s and showed reluctance in condemning Saddam Husain (due to a deep oil based relationship) in 1990s during Iraqi annexation of Kuwait. India always adopted a cautious approach of not becoming overtly judgmental about any nation or any event in the region. It preferred to

support regional and international consensuses on issues rather than taking up any leadership role.


At the end of the Cold War, India realised the significance of remittances from its diaspora in the Gulf. As India embraced globalisation at the end of the Cold War, the Indian Diaspora began to witness a shift. The earlier unskilled diaspora now began to be complemented by a new white collar diaspora that specialised in IT and the services sector. In the post-Cold War era, many Indian firms have established a presence in the Gulf. The Indians offer consultancy services, management services and services in IT and pharmaceutical sectors. As the Indian economy had begun to grow, and India had started buying more oil from the Gulf. India had also realised that the Gulf states were very strategic for India's security needs.

As India looked towards the Gulf for energy security, the Gulf states looked towards India for food security. Initially, after the end of the Cold War, India looked towards the GCC states for trade and business. The subsequent chapters in this section will demonstrate how, at present, India is seeking defense, strategic, political and security ties with the region. As the rising numbers of expats from Gulf are sending remittances to India, the Gulf has emerged as a region of key priority. Today, India has recognised that keeping the Indian diaspora in the Gulf sector is a core policy initiative, especially since 2011, the Arab states are undergoing transformation as the part of Arab Spring movement.




In 2005, Dr Manmohan Singh announced a Look West Policy (LWP) and stated that West Asia is a part of India's extended neighbourhood. He advanced the idea of pursuing economic relations with the Gulf. The subsequent chapters will show that the period post-LWP had India signing a strategic partnership agreement with Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. India also concluded a contract for LNG supply with Qatar and established an investment fund with Oman and an infrastructure fund with UAE.

Another unique feature of India's engagement with the WA in the post-Cold War era is that it has shed-off the anti-Israel rhetoric and has enhanced ties with Israel. At one time, India had even supported the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and was one of the non-Arab states in the world to recognize PLO. After the end of Cold War, in 1993, the USA organised a peace conference between the PLO and Israel at Oslo. As per the Oslo Accords, the PLO and Israel signed a peace deal. As PLO shed off its hostility towards Israel, and India rapidly took this opportunity and enhanced ties with Israel. India was therefore able to initiate enhanced engagement with Israel without diluting its Palestinian cause. India continues to support the Palestinian cause while maintaining ties with Israel. India has realised that West Asia is not a region to display power but to augment power.



LOOK WEST POLICY

The historical analysis proves that India has vital and significant interests in the Middle East. Under the LWP, Manmohan Singh had outlined the need to enhance India's economic integration with West Asia. The region not only had a significant presence of Indian diaspora but also provided India oil for its energy security.



India's LWP has got a new momentum with Narendra Modi's recent visits to the region. As global energy markets witness the turmoil due to shale revolution, the Middle Eastern states are keen to explore dimensions other than oil. In order to achieve this, many Middle Eastern states initiated a Look East Policy and it is in this context that India assumes more significance. Defence has emerged as a new dimension of cooperation. Many of the Middle Eastern states have also valued India's continued quest to support regional stability in West Asia. The subsequent chapters in this section will provide an insight about rising strategic content in the relations on the basis of deepening bilateral ties. Modi has added three new elements to the LWP of India.




Owing to a new vigour and energy attached to the Gulf, the region will now help India to approach hostilities with Pakistan more aggressively. India has successfully entered into the Pakistani space and has taken advantage of the region to promote its national interests. The new mantra of Indian policy today is to Look West and Act East.

INDIA AND THE REGIONAL SECURITY SITUATION IN THE GULF

Since 2011, the region of West Asia has come under the influence of political change

driven by the Arab Spring movement, which has created new challenges for the region. Though India has adopted a hands-off approach with respect to the Arab Spring, it still favours democracy in the region. It is more accurate, perhaps, to suggest that India favours democratic pluralism in Arabia. Over a period of times, as the region has settled and stabilised, India has used the stability in the states to foster strategic relations. India has always maintained a policy balance in the region. The policy makers have realised that the policy balance has served Indian interests well. The Indian policymakers have striven for a fine balance between Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel, while supporting Palestinians. This balancing act has given India a larger space to manoeuvre in the region with ease.



Post-9/11, the region has become volatile. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 led to an instability in Iraq, leading, ultimately, to the rise of ISIS. The support to the rebels in Syria and the recent deployment of the ‘Mother of All Bombs’ by Trump administration in April, 2017 on ISIS fighters has aggravated the crises. Some scholars have started theorising that Syria could emerge as a new battleground of another Cold War situation. Though the core leadership of Al-Qaeda has been largely eliminated, its centre of gravity has now shifted to North Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is in this context of instability that India has realised that WA needs more care than it had so far received.

The Gulf has also emerged as Indian Navy’s primary area of maritime interests. India has learned not to interfere in any state’s internal affairs and limit its influence only to achieve self-interest. India has watched the crises unfold in Syria very carefully. Syria is a secular regime has been under attack from regressive fundamentalists who are funded by the West and its allies. India has favoured UN based crisis resolution than unilateral sanctions. The case is the same with respect to Indian policy vis-à-vis Libya. At the regional level, there are quite a few areas of instability.



As the Arab Spring unfolded, the countries in the region favoured India to be proactive. Many felt that India could now assert its presence keeping in mind its rising

global profile. India however maintained its hands-off approach and did not use the opportunity provided by the Arab Spring to undertake promotion of democracy in region.

Ever since the end of the Cold War, India has faced a dilemma. The Soviet Union collapsed, while Iraq got marginalised. As India entered unchartered water, it had to make serious policy choices. As a US-dominated global order emerged, PV Narasimha Rao got India to shift its politics. In 1992, Rao signalled the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel. India gradually began to prioritise its economic interests, using it as a tool of foreign policy. For India, economic interests matter more than political clout. Even during the recent Arab Spring movement, India has maintained that for India, economic interests are more crucial than political interests.



According to scholar Olivier Roy, who has studied the Arab Spring in detail, it has unleashed a mechanism in the Middle East where Islamism and democracy need each other to survive. He asserts that the rise of Al-Nahda in Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt firstly proves that hardcore Islamist parties have understood that democracy is the only factor that can ensure their survival. They have understood also that only the participation of the people in governance can give them the mandate to survive. However, the experience of Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Nahda has proven that they lack the experience in governing their countries. As the Islamists have risen to power, they have adopted a moderate version of Islam and this, in future, could lead to a separation of religion from civil institutions. At the same time, a strong competition is visible between the Brotherhood, Salafis and Ulemas, ensuring none has monopoly. The Salafi trend, though not well established, poses the additional threat, along with the radicals, of a strong commitment to establish Sharia and the Caliphate. Scholar Abdul Moneim says that when dictators ruled West Asia, the Salafis remained committed to religion. Post-Arab Spring, as a weak state emerged, in some areas (like in Egypt there are 3 to 5 million Salafis), the Salafis started using political parties to fight election to garner power and then discarded democracy once in power.




India looks West and GCC looks East

The core elements of India's engagement in West Asia under Modi government are economy, counter terrorism and defence. At the global level, West Asia is witnessing oil demand from Asian markets than in Trans-Atlantic markets. Due to the fiscal stress caused to West Asian states by Trans-Atlantic markets, the West Asian states are looking at Asian markets not only for oil but also as a security guarantee in the region. This has led to a new form of defence partnership between India and Gulf. The West Asian states prefer India and China as reliable interlocutors than West. As West Asia are witnessing terrorism, they have begun to appreciate the Indian view that states that sponsor terrorism will affect regional stability. The India-UAE and India and Saudi Arabia defence diplomacy is a mutual policy based on look at each

other policy. The failure of the West to emerge as a reliable player has led the GCC to adopt “Look at India” policy. As terrorism, instability, falling oil prices and sectarianism destabilize the Islamic world, India seems to be the best hedge for West Asia.


Thus, according to Moneim, even after achieving democracy, society remains fragile. The Al-Qaeda on the other hand has seen Arab Spring as a blessed revolution as the goal of Al-Qaeda is to ultimately establish a global Islamic caliphate, which will only come to be realised if the Islamists stay in power. Al-Qaeda has perceived the Arab Spring as a long-term strategy. They feel that the confrontation between the liberals and the Islamists post Arab Spring will lead to weak governments who would not deliver, thereby leading to an extremist upsurge benefitting Al-Qaeda. The rise of sectarianism in the Middle East could endanger the stability further.



Under the Modi government, India has decided to support food security in the Middle East in return for energy security. India and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have opened up cooperation in solar technology and Gulf security.



As the region continues to be unfolded by the forces ushered in by the Arab Spring, India will face regional conflict. Keeping these concerns in mind, India is augmenting security cooperation in the region. There is possibility of India emerging as a security provider to the Gulf.



The Great Sheikh and Shale battle and Indian Oil Diplomacy

Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was formed in 1960. It has fourteen major exporters of oil it was founded in Baghdad but the headquarters are in Vienna, Austria. OPEC is an international cartel that coordinates petroleum policies of the 14 states to stabilize the oil prices and ensure supply to the consumers. India has been an old buyer of oil from OPEC states. In the recent times, US discovered shale gas. The discovery of shale was perceived by the OPEC as a threat to oil trade. In 2014, oil minister of Saudi Arabia Ali Al-Naimi advised the OPEC states to take steps to pre-empt US to use shale to grab OPEC markets of oil. So, in 2014, OPEC decided to increase production of oil. As the production of oil increased, the prices of oil began to decrease. as the prices decreased, the OPEC began to offer to its clients huge discounts. Since 2014, India too witnessed benefits out of the OPEC policy. For India, the oil import became cheaper and India was able to save a lot of foreign exchange in oil imports. Such discounts in oil prices by OPEC affected the export revenues of OPEC states. The OPEC government states began to pump money to compensate export revenue losses. This policy of OPEC even hurt the shale industry as the decrease in the oil prices affected the fracking process. In May-2016, Naimi was succeeded by Khalid Al-Falih as the new oil minister of Saudi Arabia. Khalid decided to reverse the policy of Naimi and decided to cut the oil output with an intention to increase the oil prices. But the policy of Kaled was short lived as Russia, an important negotiator, increased oil production. As Russia did not cut the oil production, it succeeded in displacing Saudi Arabia as a core exporter of oil to China. The overall effect of the policy of Khalid did increase the oil prices slightly. This led to rise in US oil production and US began to emerge as an exporter of oil once again. Though Trump visited in Saudi Arabia in 2017 but Saudi Arabia is not happy with US conquering markets of Saudi Arabia. In 2017, Saudi Arabia and Russia have decided to cooperate and continue to production cuts till 2018 to push up the oil prices to take them to around 50 USD per barrel. To achieve this, both have decided to follow 'pump at will' policy. US traders have followed a policy of using capital markets to raise money. US traders have decided to resort to future and options markets to hedge against low oil prices. In this price war, Saudi Arabia and OPEC did not realize that fracking (the method of hydraulic fracturing to produce shale) is a more predictable method than the Wildcatter model of drilling oil (a method of pumping money on the ground to gush out oil). But the bigger issue is that


all such measures are short term only. Does OPEC have a long term plan as states are trying to switch over to cleaner fuels (by 2040, four European states have decided to ban sales of gasoline cars). India picked up the issue of Asian Premium (Charged by OPEC to poorer importers of Asian states) in 2017 during the Vienna meeting. India has asserted for the first time that if security of supplies is not maintained, India can look at new avenues US, Iran and Canada. By 2040, India's oil demand will rise by 150 % and global share will rise from 4 to 9 %. India has started oil imports (shale) from US. This will rectify the Indo-US trade imbalance. India has invested 5 Billion Dollars in shale business assets in US. It will lessen the engagement with traditional buyers if new avenues open up.

CONCLUSION

In West Asia, India sees four distinct historical civilizations—Arabs, Persians, Jews and Turkish—with all of whom India has the privilege of having had distinct relations in the past. For India, there are three broad regions to engage in West Asia. The first is the GCC region. The core dimensions of engagement here are trade, the Indian diaspora, oil and prevention of terrorism. In the second region of Mashreq (Turkey and Central Asia), where trade and connectivity are crucial dimensions. The third is the Maghreb region which is crucial for oil, trade and prevention of piracy.

During the period of the National Movement, India showed solidarity with West Asia, especially in its pro-Palestine policy stance. During the Cold War of 1973, Iran and Iraq emerged as potential oil suppliers. India continued to maintain ties with Israel but there was no diplomatic recognition given till 1992. Thus, during the Cold War, our key policy determinants were based on Arab solidarity for Palestine problem and oil based diplomacy. The basic intention was to garner support of Arabs for the Kashmir issue. Though on this point, India was disappointed many times. At the end of Cold War, India began to bring about a change in its outlook to West Asia. The lukewarm approach of Arabs on Kashmir and their consistent tilt to Pakistan was an important factor motivating India to open up to Israel. Today, despite antagonism from Saudi Arabia and Iran, India–Israel ties have prospered. The energy factor is the new game changer. As India diversifies its economy, to fuel its growth, oil is needed. In this context, the geopolitical importance of India rises further. India and the GCC established a political dialogue in 2003 and began negotiations for an FTA in 2004. India has opened up naval cooperation with the GCC to secure vital sea lanes of communication. A core dimension is the use of soft diplomacy tools like Bollywood and cricket to sustain ties.

The core engagement of India with West Asia–North Africa region is based on geopolitical consideration of energy and security issues.



Gulf losing charm?

Indian Diaspora in the Gulf is an important link in the India and West Asia relations. Gulf is one of the top job destinations for Indians. In 2014, there were 7, 75, 854 Indians in the Gulf. This came down to 5, 07, 296 in 2017. The decline in the numbers is due to a fall in the crude prices and subsequent job losses. This has even affected the inward remittances to India. The oil prices have declined for two reasons. Firstly, the discovery of shale gas in US and second is a global shift to clean energy by consumers of oil. Due to these reasons, Gulf states are re-orienting their strategy. Saudi Arabia has announced Vision 2030. Under the vision, Saudi Arabia intends to increase non-oil revenues, employ less foreigners and more locals and position itself as a global investment powerhouse. India can leverage this investment potential under Make in India to kick start the manufacturing revolution in India. If oil prices remains low, India can divert the surplus resources it is saving in the oil import to spur economic development.

2
CHAPTER

India and Egypt Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Historical Background of India–Egypt Relations
- Commercial Diplomacy
- Visit of Mohamed Morsi to India in 2013
- Analysis of the visit of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to India

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF INDIA–EGYPT RELATIONS

The relations go back to third Century BC when first instance of trade was visible. India and Egypt established a sea trade contact and India undertook trade with Egyptians during the reign of female Pharaoh Hatshepsut. The ancient Egyptians worshipped gods that bore certain resemblances with the ones Indians did. Some resemblance is also seen between India and Egypt in ancient temples, architecture, paintings and sculptures. The mummies in Egypt were wrapped in Muslin cloth traded from Bengal.

However, the ancient diplomatic push was given by Hatshepsut who established a diplomatic mission in India to strengthen the economic trade. India exported silk, medicines, incense sticks in the ancient times. Over a period of time, a spice trade between south coast of India and Egypt began and pepper emerged as a major commodity to be traded. This led to establishment of an ancient spice route. Cairo, during ancient times, became a hub for transport of spices to Europe and the rest of Arabia. The mediaeval times also saw regular diplomatic exchanges between India and Egypt. Since the time that Napoleon invaded Egypt in 1978, the British began to take more interest in the affairs of West Asia. Egypt and India eventually faced a common struggle against British colonialism. In India, as Indian National Congress took the leadership role in the national movement, in Egypt, the nationalist, liberal Wafd party (Hizb al-Wafd, that came into existence in the aftermath of World War-I) under Saad Zaghloul Pasha took charge. During the Indian National movement, India provided tremendous support to the Wafd party and Nehru himself visited Egypt many times. After India became independent, the Indo–Egyptian relationship evolved on the basis of a common historical bedrock. The similarity of views of India and Egypt on the Palestinian question gave both a common ground to forge a similar ideology. India established diplomatic ties with Egypt in 1947 itself.

Egypt (1922 to 2017-18)

Egypt gained independence from the British in 1922. From 1924, the Wafd party took

control of Egypt. Two important Wafd party leaders—King Farouk and his son King Fuad II—continued to rule Egypt till 1952. The year of 1952 saw the Egyptian army led by Ghamal Abdel Nasser, Mohammed Naguib and Sadat Anwar undertake a bloodless coup, known as the Egyptian Revolution. The house of Fuad II ended and Naguib along with Aly Maher assumed power. Naguib somehow was not aggressive in the execution of the reforms programme. In 1954, Naguib was succeeded by Abdel Nasser. Nasser ruled till 1970 when he was replaced by Sadat Anwar. Anwar was assassinated on 6th October, 1981, paving the way for Hosni Mubarak. During the Arab Spring, Hosni Mubarak stepped down after 18 days of demonstration and was replaced by Mohamed Morsi. Morsi's government was, however, not stable, and gave way to Abdel Fattah el-Sisi as the President. Mubarak was later tried and handed a life term for corruption and abuse of power.




After Indian independence, the bilateral visits between India and Egypt continued. In 1952, the then Indian Vice President, S. Radhakrishnan, stopped at Cairo while going to Paris to attend a UNESCO meet. During his visit, both sides agreed to open up cooperation in science and culture. Nehru also visited Cairo in 1953 and 1955. During Nehru's stopover at Cairo in 1955, he met Ghamal Nasser. Egypt never joined any military alliance during the Cold War and maintained relations with India through the prism of neutrality. The Egyptian leadership studied the Indian economy model during the Cold War and replicated the heavy industrialisation model in Egypt. Egypt was also an ardent supporter of NAM, which acted as the most instrumental link between India and Egypt, cementing the logic of positive neutrality. The Nehru–Nasser friendship became the model for our relations and that the two leaders met 19 times in all. Egypt stood by India during the Goa crisis, and Indo–China war 1962. However, after the death of Nehru in 1964 and Nasser in 1970, the warmth of the golden era of Indo–Egypt relations finally ended. The relations continued during Anwar Sadat and Indira Gandhi's era and India continued to support Egypt and Arabs in the Palestinian issue. In 1978, Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel. This decision of Egypt led to its own isolation in the Arab world. But its relations with India still continued. When the Cold War ended, Narasimha Rao and IK Gujral both paid state visits to Egypt. In 2011, India supported the democratic transition in Egypt as a part of the ongoing Arab spring. Abdel Fattah El-Sisi visited India in October, 2015, to participate in the Third Indo–Africa Forum Summit. In 2015, Nitin Gadkari, India's shipping minister, was sent to Egypt as a special envoy of the Prime Minister for the opening ceremony of the New Suez Canal.

COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY

India and Egypt, as noted previously, have had ancient trade based relations. In the modern era, India exports meat products, cotton yarn, fabrics, transport equipment and pharmacy products to Egypt and imports crude oil, petroleum, raw cotton and coal from Egypt.



More than fifty private Indian firms today are conducting business in Egypt. Some of the prominent firms include Grasim India Limited, Aditya Birla Group, a Joint Venture of SCIB chemicals and Asian paints. HDFC and SBI are two banks that are present in Cairo. Gas Authority of India (GAIL) has stakes in Fayoum and Natagas while OVL has discovered oil in North Ramdan concession in Gulf of Suez. Under ITEC programme, India, since 1986, has also been providing training to Egyptian diplomats.



VISIT OF MOHAMED MORSI TO INDIA—2013

In 2013, Mohamed Morsi paid a visit to India to strengthen ties. It is important to understand that since Sadat Anwar's times, Egypt had adopted a pro-western stance in its foreign policy. The Westernism continued even during the times of Hosni Mubarak. However, as Arab Spring ushered in a democratic change in Egypt, the ensuing leadership broadened the outlook. Mohamed Morsi, especially, has directed Egypt to initiate a Look East Policy, with India as a focal point. Morsi, in his visit to India, articulated that under Egypt's Look East Policy, Egypt wants to learn pluralism from India and wants Indian cooperation in strengthening Egyptian democracy. He invited Indian firms to participate in the Suez Canal Free Trade Zone and also asked India to establish a Centre of Excellence in Information Technology at Al-Azhar University in Cairo. Morsi also envisaged a future Strategic Partnership Agreement between the two states. The vision Morsi had set for India was to make Egypt the hub for all its engagement in Africa and West Asia.



Modi, Morsi, El-Sisi and Indian policy

The first democratically elected President of Egypt, Mohamed Morsi, was ousted in a coup and replaced by El-Sisi. On 16th May, 2015, an Egyptian court awarded death sentence to Mohamed Morsi. The new Indian government, led by Modi, has preferred to remain silent on the award of the court. This is very much in line with the Indian policy of non-interference in internal matters of the Arab world. India has followed this policy since its independence.

In 2015, the Indian External Affairs Minister visited Cairo and a decision was taken to review trade, political and economic relations between India and Egypt. Since 2002, India and Egypt have been negotiating a Preferential Trade Agreement. A decision has been taken to speed up the PTA negotiations. During the visit of the Indian Foreign Minister, cooperation has been envisaged in IT, pharmaceuticals, apparel and healthcare sectors. In March, 2015, the Indian Ambassador in Egypt led a delegation of 43 members from 25 companies to participate in Egypt Economic Development Conference and a number of pharmacy and textiles firms expressed interest in business in Egypt.


India–Egypt Cultural Diplomacy

In March, 2016, India established the first India Chair in Ain Shams University in Egypt. This was based on a MOU between ICCR and Ain Shams University signed in March 2016 itself. This India chair will help India to leverage ICT and foster cultural bonds between the youth of India & Egypt. The centre established will be operational from October 2016 & will act as a hub of academic exchanges. India has also organised a “Glimpse of India” programme and has performed Kabeliya Rajasthani folk dance on 67th Republic Day celebrations of India in Egypt.

ANALYSIS OF THE VISIT OF ABDEL FATTAH EL-SISI TO INDIA

The Egyptian President, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi visited India in September, 2016 and reiterated the proximate and close partnership between India and Egypt. The economic trade between India and Egypt in the last 5 years has increased by 60% and the investment

is continuously rising in a number of fields. The President also noted the success of India during the Nile festival which has helped the Egyptians to experience different aspects of Indian culture. On the same lines, ‘Egypt by Ganga’ festival is likely to offer the Indians an opportunity to learn about Egyptian culture. The President sought support from India in helping Egypt develop the SME and IT sectors. The President also envisaged the participation of India in new Suez Canal Project which has an ambitious plan to setup a Suez Canal Development Arc that will act as a bridge between Africa and West Asia. The President sought the participation of Indian investors in making the Suez Canal area an international logistical hub as it will offer Indian investors preferential access to the Arab, African and European markets since Egypt has FTAs with the market.



3
CHAPTER

India and Qatar Relations


After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Historical background of India–Qatar relations
- Commercial diplomacy
- Natural gas diplomacy and recent trends
- Defence diplomacy
- Analysis of the Indian PM’s visit to Qatar in June 2016

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF INDIA–QATAR RELATIONS

Relations between India and Qatar go back to the ancient times. The Harappans in India interacted with the people of the region. In modern times, the relations between India and Qatar emerged due to the establishment of the British colonial rule in India. When the British were establishing their base in India, they undertook trade with Qatar through the ports of Al Bida and Zubra. As the Indian merchants began settling in Qatar, the then Sheik of Qatar, Sheikh Jassim, began to feel alarmed by the rising Indian presence. He felt that the Indians in Qatar were being encouraged by the British and that the entry of Indians in Qatar was a strategic move of the British to conquer the territory of Qatar. As the insecurity of the Sheik grew, he began ordering the killing of Indian merchants in Qatar. As a result of this, many Indians who escaped the Sheik left Qatar and for almost half a century ahead, there was no more trade between India and Qatar.

The relations between India and Qatar finally resumed from 1971. Since 1971, Qatar has been under the control of Al Thani family. It is the number three player in the world for natural gas. In contrast to other states in the Arab world, Qatar fares relatively better in the Human Development Index. Since 1971, India and Qatar have had very cordial and deep relations. There are two reasons for it. Firstly, in Qatar, there is a sizeable Indian diaspora that acts as a bridge in the relations. Secondly, the political leaders of both states enjoy commonality of views on multiple matters of regional and global significance, ensuring a natural convergence. Due to large diaspora, there is a deep presence of Indian culture in Qatar. Qatar has a foreign policy whereby it intends to influence middle eastern politics through assertion of its power to emerge as a regional leader. There are four important dimensions to the relationship between India and Qatar.




COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY

India exports machines, transport equipment and textiles, while it imports liquified natural gas (LNG) from Qatar. A lot of Indian firms are conducting businesses in Qatar. Some of the most prominent Indian firms include TCS, Mahindra, Volts, Simplex and Wipro. There are also Indian banks present, namely, ICICI, SBI and Canara bank, but following the rules of an Islamic state, they do not indulge in retail banking. In 2014, Larsen & Toubro won an infrastructure contract in Qatar and is undertaking construction of the Al-Wakra bypass and the metro rail of Qatar. As Qatar is going to organise the 2022 FIFA cup, a lot of Indian firms are investing in the infrastructure sector there. In 2014, the Indian embassy in Qatar had organised an investment event to garner investment for support to Make in India programme.

NATURAL GAS DIPLOMACY AND RECENT TRENDS

In 2003, India signed an LNG deal with Qatar. As per the deal, Qatar would supply 7.5 million tonnes of LNG per year from 2003 to 2028. Qatar has the third largest natural gas reserves in the world and these reserves are called non-associated reserves. This means that these reserves have natural gas which is independent of oil. The 2003 deal sealed a long term of 25 years' worth LNG supply for India. Subsequently, the government established a joint venture in India called Petronet to execute the deal with Ras Gas of Qatar.




Petronet hired three cryogenic ships to bring this LNG from Qatar. LNG is always brought in a sub-zero temperature in a special vessel. The gas is first transformed into a cryogenic state; it is then exported through a specially designed vessel. Once it reaches the destination, it is regassified. Petronet decided to bring in LNG and regassify it in Dahej, Gujarat.



Under the Petronet-Ras Gas deal, the contract was based on take-or-pay clause. This means that even if India does not take above 90% of the gas from Qatar, it has to pay for the full contract amount. Due to the ongoing global meltdown, the prices of LNG have globally declined. However, the price of LNG supplied by Qatar remained same. This LNG price of Qatar was over and above the global prices. Thus, the domestic users of LNG in India, which primarily included the power and fertilizer industries, began to move towards cheaper alternatives like naphtha and fuel oil. At the 6th OPEC International Summit in Vienna in June 2015, India urged Qatar to reduce LNG prices for India in keeping with global prices. As per the demand made by India, in December 2015, after intense negotiations, Ras Gas revised the price contracts and concluded a new agreement with Petronet to supply LNG to India at a lower price. Earlier India was paying 12–13 USD per MMBtu which is now reduced to 6–7 USD per MMBtu. Due to the shift to cheaper alternatives by domestic players in India, the Indian offtake of LNG slid below the 90% thus violating the take or pay clause. Qatar imposed a penalty of 1 billion US Dollars on India as India's actual offtake was just 68% of 7.5 Million Tonnes per annum. However, in December 2015, at the time of the announcement of new pricing formula, Qatar also waived off this penalty. In February, 2016, India concluded a new pact with Ras Gas which is a new sale and purchase agreement. As per the agreement, starting from 2016, Ras Gas will give one million tonne per annum extra LNG to India to IOC, BPCL, GAIL and Gujarat State Petroleum Corporation. This additional 1 million tonne per annum is given to the four players for onward sale for the remaining period till 2028.

DEFENCE DIPLOMACY


Indian PM Dr. Manmohan Singh visited Qatar in 2008. During the visit, he concluded three MOUs in defence, investments and energy. A very important component of the visit was defence cooperation. In 2008, India actually tried to link energy cooperation with security cooperation. In this linkage India asserted that both nations cooperate on defence dimension to secure energy supply routes.



In November 2015, India's petroleum minister participated in the 6th Asian Ministers Energy Roundtable Conference based on the theme of Energy Justice. The Indian Petroleum Minister urged to put an end to the practice of Asian premium and urged that it be replaced by the concept of Asian dividend. Under Asian premium, the oil buyers in Asia have to pay a little more money to buy oil so that this excess payment subsidises the transportation cost of the consumers of the west. This point has been a decade-old Indian demand to rectify the imbalance.

ANALYSIS OF THE INDIAN PM'S VISIT TO QATAR—JUNE 2016

In June 2016, the Indian PM visited Qatar. During the visit, he pitched for investment from Qatar for the Make in India and Digital India missions. A decision was taken to start an Inter-Ministerial High Level Joint Committee to review bilateral trade and other issues regularly. Qatar also expressed an interest that Indian firms should contribute to infrastructure for the upcoming 2022 FIFA cup. The PM also addressed the Indian diaspora and discussed the issues related to the welfare of the diaspora with the Emir. The Emir of Qatar, as a goodwill measure, released 23 prisoners belonging to India and allowed them to go back. The PM concluded 7 MOUs with Qatar and advocated to increase strategic content in the relations in future.



4
CHAPTER


India and Turkey Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Basic Background
- Commercial diplomacy
- Defence diplomacy
- Visit of Indian PM, 2015
- Visit of Recep Tayyip Erdogan to India, 2017

BASIC BACKGROUND


The relations between India and Turkey go back to the onset of the Medieval era. The relations gained more importance in the modern times, as we shall see ahead. India and Turkey are both modern republics, which creates a suitable base for their friendship. Turkey and India shared some of the same foundations in the 20th century, including certain commonalities dating back to the Ottoman period. In 1912, when the Balkan wars broke out, in order to provide medical assistance, Dr. M. A. Ansari led a medical mission. Similarly, during the issue of Turkish independence, India supported the Turks.



Turkey and Tipu Sultan's Diplomacy

When the British started establishing their presence in India, Tipu Sultan was concerned about British advances in India. Tipu Sultan perceived British advancement as a threat to the entire Islamic faith. He began to seek Turkish cooperation to stop the British menace. He concluded a treaty with Sultan Abdul Hameed of Turkey. As per the treaty, Sultan was to assist Tipu in defence production by sending technicians to India. There was also a diplomatic exchange and Tipu sent an ambassador to Constantinople in 1784. But as Turkey was preoccupied fighting the Russians, who were eyeing the territory of the Ottoman empire, it could not forcefully participate in Tipu's struggle against the British. However, this case does inform us about diplomatic relations existing since Tipu.

The relations between India and Turkey finally opened up after Indian independence. India established diplomatic relations with Turkey in 1948. But unfortunately, due to differing ideologies, the Cold War ripped the budding relations asunder. Turkey became an ally of the US and a member of the US-led alliances, even as India advocated non-alignment. The relations during the Cold War period remained cool and picked up only when it ended. In 2008, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited India while in 2010, Turkish President Abdullah Gül visited India. The Indian PM also recently visited Turkey for the G-20 Summit in 2015.




Turkey and the Kashmir Question

One of the irritants in the Indo-Turkish relations is the Kashmir question. As we saw above, Turkey became an ally of the US during the Cold War. Not only did this alliance cement Turkey's relations with the US, but also with Pakistan as Pakistan, during the Cold War, was also a US ally. After India became independent in 1947, Pakistan declared a war with India in 1948 over Kashmir. As Kashmir was ruled by Maharaja Hari Singh, he initially wanted to maintain autonomy. However, Pakistani forces and tribesmen began to seize the area. This led to Hari Singh concluding an Instrument of Accession with India. India, in order to compel Pakistan to stop hostilities in Kashmir, took the matter to the UN. The UN maintained the argument of peace. India spoke at the UN level of a plebiscite in Kashmir at a later stage when peace prevails in the valley and Pakistan withdraws its army from the occupied region. During the crisis, Pakistan and Turkey struck for a plebiscite. Turkey supported Pakistan and favored a UN resolution in Kashmir. Turkey's behaviour at the time was a reflection of Cold War politics. In the 1972 Shimla Agreement, both India and Pakistan decided for a bilateral negotiation with respect to Kashmir. Only in the recent times did we see that Turkey does not pitch the rhetoric of Kashmir anymore either bilaterally or internationally. Turkey has now become supportive of dialogue.

COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY

The relations during the Cold War were weak but an institutional foundation for trade was laid down even during that time.



The 1970s and 1980s saw gradual institutionalization of structures. In 1983, a Joint Commission on Economy and Technology was created as a follow up to the 1978 agreement. In recent times, regular interactions of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) and the Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey have been going on. Today, more than 170 Indian firms are based in Turkey, ranging from GMR in infrastructure to Reliance to Dabur. A Turkish firm called Fernas is laying down a pipeline in Gujarat. India exports cotton, yarn, organic dyes and imports automobile components, marble, textile machines and carpets. The SBI also has a representative office in Istanbul. Turkish investment in India is seen in construction and textile industry.

India–Turkey Education Relations

Education relations with Turkey have been well established since 1995. India has been deputing a Professor in Indology department in Anhara University for Hindi Language training and teaching. Turkey also sends academicians in Jamia Millia Islamia and JNU in India. India provides support to Turkey under ITEC scholarships. Turkey has expressed interest in exploring relationship in auditor training with India. India has started providing Turkish auditors training at the Centre for Information Systems and Audit in India.


DEFENCE DIPLOMACY

The origin of Indo Turkish defence relations go back to the Cold War. In 1986, the Turkish Prime Minister, Turgut Ozal, had visited India. He advanced a defence cooperation with India at the diplomatic level. An immediate decision was taken to have a defence attaché in the diplomatic missions. In 2002, the AKP government came to power in Turkey. The AKP government decided to enhance bilateral defence ties. In 2003, during the visit of Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee to Turkey, the decision was taken to establish contacts between defence ministries. It was in 2008, during Erdogan's visit to India, that a defence cooperation agreement was concluded. Today, apart from high level defence exchanges,

naval and air interactions and exercises have become frequent.


VISIT OF INDIAN PM—2015

The Indian PM visited Turkey in 2015 to take part in the G–20 Summit. The PM met his Turkish counterpart and garnered his support for the Make in India mission. Both sides also agreed to cooperate to strengthen defence ties. As it was a summit level meet and not a state visit of the PM to Turkey, only a state visit later will showcase the new depth and way forward in the relations. India and Turkey have improved their relations vastly since the end of the Cold War, and considerable credit for the same goes to Ahmet Davutoğlu, the former Prime Minister of Turkey. He has been credited with giving Turkey a pragmatic and vision-oriented foreign policy in recent times. Thus, the diagram below aptly sums our discussion on Turkey.



VISIT OF RECEP TAYYIP ERDOGAN TO INDIA—2017

India and Turkey have historical ties with each other. The two most important connecting factors between India and Turkey are language and culture. The Sufi tradition in India is linked to the Turkish poet, Rumi. Erdogan visited India to strengthen the cultural, economic and political relationship between the two. The Indo–Turkey bilateral trade today is at 6. 4 billion USD. The two sides have decided to take it to 10 billion USD by 2020. In order to promote trade, the India–Turkey Joint Economic Committee will hold regular meetings. The Turkish President participated in a Business Forum along the lines of his state visit, and both sides have identified IT, Pharmacy, health and tourism sectors to boost cooperation.



Warming up a cold Turkey

The core areas of cooperation are economy, trade and technology. Turkey has decided to allow Indian firms in IT and the field of energy to explore Turkish markets. Despite rising economic and cultural depth in the bilateral ties, the two sides may not be able to develop a strategic compact in their relations because Turkey still maintains a special soft corner for Pakistan due to an Islamist agenda they share. This

is clearly visible in the fact that Erdogan called India to launch a multilateral dialogue to resolve the Kashmir crisis. Turkey asserts that India and Pakistan both have an equal right to be a part of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). By asserting this, Turkey joins China's alignment as the same is advocated by China. This policy of Turkey is not particularly helpful for India.

A lot of Indian diplomats have asserted that the Turkish call for a multilateral dialogue on Kashmir is highly uncalled for, as Turkey has not resolved the same concerns in its own backyard. India diplomats argue that 40 years ago, Turkey's invasion of Cyprus has stirred up trouble there, which it is still unable to mitigate due to Kurdish secessionists. Turkey remains one of the three diplomatic challenges for India after Pakistan and China. Turkey has been overtly tilted towards Pakistan irrespective of the leadership in Turkey. Rajiv Gandhi and Vajpayee tried taking steps to end the stalemate, but did not succeed in their endeavours. Present Indian PM Narendra Modi has tried to warm up a cold Turkey because he knows that diplomacy is all about making adversaries into neutrals and neutrals into friends. Modi understands that an application of adroit diplomacy will push the interests of Turkey to synchronise with India. Turkey is looking for partners outside the Middle East to strengthen its economy and Modi knows that India will prove a key player for Turkey in this regard. Thus, India knows that if it is able to bring about a mutual benefit-based partnership with Turkey, it will finally be able to synchronise Indo-Turkish interests and in the long run, help Turkey evolve its position with regard to its alliance to India.

5
CHAPTER

India and United Arab Emirates Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:


- Historical background
- Commercial diplomacy
- Defence diplomacy
- Analysis of the visit of the Indian PM in 2015

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The UAE as a federation was established in 1971 but India's relationship with the region is older than this. A unique factor of the relationship is that there have been regular bilateral visits between the heads of the two states. Different Indian Presidents have visited UAE in 1976, 2003 and 2010. Indira Gandhi visited the UAE once in 1981 while the incumbent PM has visited the UAE lately in 2015. Trade, Investment and manpower are the three common connectors between India and the UAE.

COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY

There are multiple bilateral trade mechanisms to boast cooperation in commercial diplomacy. The diagram below gives a clear picture.



India exports to UAE food items, petro products, metals, stones, gems and jewellery while importing petroleum and crude oil, chemicals, gold and wood products. A lot of Indians have invested money in the UAE and lot of firms have presence there, of which prominent ones include HCL, Larsen & Toubro, ICICI, Indian Oil Corporation, Punj Llyod, Mahindra and the Oberoi group and so on. The UAE has transformed itself into a valuable strategic country with a business-friendly environment. Indian companies prefer the UAE as a route for global supply chains. Also for Indian private players, the UAE is a strategic market as it helps the firms to leverage other middle eastern, west African and Africa markets.




Medical business in India and the UAE

In April 2015, India and the UAE jointly organised the first ever India and UAE medical partnership conference in New Delhi. India used the conference to project soft power and alternative medicine (AYUSH) to be promoted in the Dubai Health Authority. India also organised the participation of expert doctors and practitioners in areas like oncology, cardiology and IVF and so on. India showcased special centres for alternative healthcare. This event was designed and organised to build business-to-business contacts between India and the UAE.

DEFENCE DIPLOMACY

In 2003, India and the UAE concluded a defence cooperation agreement to enhance strategic cooperation. Regular joint exercises between the two nations is a norm. In 2015, three Indian Naval ships—INS-Delhi, INS-Deepak, INS-Tarkash—undertook naval exercises with the UAE. In June 2015, there was also a joint airforce exercise. The defence cooperation between India and the UAE has the following dimensions.



In 2016, in the month of May, Indian Defence Minister paid a state visit to the UAE. There were two aims the minister achieved in his interaction with his counterparts. Firstly, to check the growing radicalisation of youth and to contain the threat of ISIS (Islamic State), the two leaders discussed measures to jointly combat terrorism. A new action plan for India-UAE Counter Terrorism cooperation is being planned. Secondly, as mentioned in initial chapter of this block, the Middle East is in an increasingly fragile state. Not only are there threats from non-state actors but also from civil wars. As a result, the affected Indian diaspora in the concerned regions have to be evacuated in case of eventualities. The Defence Minister in his meet discussed ways as to how the UAE can emerge as a focal point for retrieval of Indian expats from the middle east in future. India plans to make the UAE a hub for all its humanitarian evacuation. Thus, over a period of

time since 2003, India's defence cooperation with the UAE has transformed and deepened. The diagram sums up the transformation and the new additions to the ongoing cooperation.



ANALYSIS OF THE VISIT OF THE INDIAN PM—2015

In 2015, the Indian PM visited the UAE after gap of 34 years. During his visit, he visited a labour camp in Abu Dhabi and interacted with the Indian diaspora. In the UAE, the PM announced start of a new fund called the Indian Community Welfare Fund to assist the Indian community. An online portal called MADAD has been planned for the redressal of concerns of the diaspora. The PM also visited the iconic Sheikh Zayed Grand Mosque. The UAE government also decided to allocate land to help Indians establish a temple in Abu Dhabi. The two sides have agreed for a new security dialogue and for NSA level talks every six months. As there is a two million plus strong diaspora of India in the UAE. It was therefore natural, as a new element of our foreign policy, to address the diaspora. The PM addressed a gathering of the Indian community at the Dubai stadium. A notable feature of the visit was that the leaders elevated the relationship to comprehensive strategic level partnership.



Why the Neglect of 34 Years and now a Strategic Partnership?

The UAE has a very strong Indian diaspora, provides India a lot of energy resources and is a trade partner of India. Yet, the last Prime Ministerial visit to the UAE was undertaken by Indira Gandhi in 1981. One reason for this prolonged neglect is the fact that since the end of Cold War, India's strategic focus became its region of South East and East Asia. The domestic change in its economic paradigm to include a model of globalisation made India more proximate to the US. Due to its overt focus on South East and the US for almost a decade, the neglect of West Asia and specifically the UAE was natural as the energies were focussed on a particular region. Another important factor is that with the change in the economic paradigm at home to an open economy, the Indian foreign policy establishment looked at West Asia only as an oil supplier and not as a strategic partner. The growth of the idea of the strategic significance of West Asia has grown only after 9/11. The previous PM of India, Dr Manmohan Singh, gradually initiated a new push in foreign policy to look towards West Asia as a strategic partner. The incumbent PM has given diplomatic manifestation to the same. This is evident from that the way that the India-UAE relation has now elevated to the Strategic Partnership level.

It is not wrong to assert now that the UAE is India's gateway to West Asia and has acquired tremendous geostrategic and geo-economic significance. The elevation of relations to the strategic partnership level has initiated the new government-to-government partnership.



The Pakistan Question During the 2015 PM Visit


Pakistan has always used the religious affiliation of the Gulf countries to outwit India in the region. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Pakistan enjoyed so much proximity with each other that they were the only three nations in the world who actually recognised Taliban when they ruled Afghanistan. However, after the Arab Spring and the rise of ISIS, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are not taking any chances of a future security threat as it may endanger the monarchies in these states. This was visible in the interaction with the UAE during the Indian PM's visit in 2015 when it accepted the new nature of terrorism. For the first time ever, the joint statement in 2015 affirmed that both sides need to put an end to all forms of state-sponsored terrorism (read as a veiled attack on Pakistan) and dismantling of infrastructure breeding terrorism. This is a huge diplomatic victory for India as it has succeeded in forging a new alliance with the West Asia at an informal level with a bilateral consensus on terrorism. In recent times, the UAE's hostility with Pakistan is emerging on the forefront. The UAE has now acknowledged the threat of terrorism emanating from Pakistan. It has not appreciated the lack of commitment from Pakistan to dismantle terror infrastructures. The UAE has recently joined hands with the US (and is now collaborating with India) to tackle the menace of terrorism. For example, the UAE has granted the US an access to Sheikh Zayed's private airstrip in Baluchistan, Pakistan for carrying out drone strikes. The weak intent of Pakistan to contain terror was also witnessed recently in the case of Yemen crisis when, in 2015, Saudi Arabia—through a ten nation alliance—decided in favour of military action and urged members, including Pakistan and the UAE, to contribute military forces. While Pakistan refused, the UAE did contribute forces. Pakistan ended up upsetting all the member nations, including Saudi Arabia, by its refusal.

Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed's visit to India, 2017

The prince of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed visited India as the Chief Guest of the Republic Day in 2017. The visit signifies the growing proximity between India and the Gulf states. India finds UAE a willing partner to enhance security and economic engagement, while UAE, under its Look East Policy, finds India a natural partner for economic growth. On 25th January, 2017, the two sides concluded a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement (CSP). The signing of the CSP, coupled with recent high level bilateral visits, will now usher in a new role

for India in the Gulf. In recent times, India has been looking toupee to get investments for domestic development. The two sides have agreed to strengthen economic ties. The UAE is willing to invest funds worth \$75 billion to develop infrastructure in India. Firms from UAE in real estate and petrochemicals have come forward to invest in India.

The two sides have concluded an MoU in the field of road transport and highways to enhance infrastructure development. The MoU will facilitate logistical efficiency as well. The two sides decided to deepen their defence engagement to maintain peace in the region. On 18th January, 2017, India and UAE concluded a bilateral maritime education and training agreement whereby they will enhance each other's competencies in the field of maritime security. The two sides have identified the need to promote a culture of inclusiveness and tolerance to counter terrorism. India and the UAE have agreed to promote exchanges of religious scholars to promote peace. The two sides have decided to conclude a white shipping agreement and continue with joint anti-piracy operations. The UAE has shown willingness to invest in defence production, industrial corridors and energy in India.



6
CHAPTER

India and Saudi Arabia Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- India and Saudi Arabia during the Cold War
- India and Saudi Arabia—Delhi and Riyadh Declarations
- Commercial diplomacy
- Oil diplomacy and regional security
- India–Saudi Arabia strategic partnership
- Analysis of the Indian PM's visit to Saudi Arabia, 2016

INDIA AND SAUDI ARABIA DURING THE COLD WAR

Saudi Arabia and India are two players that have the ability to display power when needed in the region neighbouring them. However, both are constrained by regional impediments. In the modern times, Saudi Arabia has been able to stand for the ideological power of religion. One major reason for its success in the same is that Mecca and Medina, the two holiest sites in Islam, are located in Saudi Arabia. India has a large Muslim population and in this context, Saudi becomes important in India's strategic calculus.

India and Saudi Arabia established diplomatic relations in 1948. However, the relations with Saudi Arabia have not been very smooth during the Cold War. In the aftermath of independence, India and Pakistan had a war in 1948. Pakistan was able to garner Saudi support owing to its religious foundation and its emergence as an Islamic state. In 1953, Saudi king Al-Saud visited Pakistan and supported Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. However, Saudi–Pakistan relations deteriorated when, in 1955, Pakistan joined the US alliance brokered by the Central Treaty Organisation or the Baghdad pact. Saudi then used this opportunity to cultivate relations with India. In 1955, Saudi Prince Faisal visited India and later, King Saud also visited the state. In 1956, Nehru paid a state visit to Saudi Arabia. Again, this bonhomie was not long lasting as in 1957, Saudi itself announced a pro-west alliance. Saudi Arabia used its alliance with the US to assert hegemony in the region.


During the early decades of the Cold War, Egypt had propounded an idea of Pan Arabism and Arab unity. However, Saudi began to weaken the influence of Egypt and Syria in the Middle East by using Pan Islamism as a tool. As India was pro-Egypt, a weaker Egypt also meant weaker Indian influence in the middle east. As Saudi succeeded in tilting the balance of power of the Middle East in its favour, it gave Pakistan an increased leverage to side with Saudi Arabia. In 1965, in the Indo–Pak war, Saudi supported Pakistan as Egypt supported India. Even in the 1971 war with Pakistan, the Saudis continued to support Pakistan. Saudi even refused to give diplomatic recognition to

Bangladesh after its creation in 1971. After the 1973 oil embargo, as more money flowed into Saudi Arabia, it gave Saudi the option to undertake aggressive arms race with others. However, three events in late 1970s and 1980s drastically changed the landscape of the Middle East. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Islamic revolution in Iran and beginning of Iran–Iraq war were defining moments of the time.

As Ayatollah Khomeini rose in Iran, it increased the insecurity of Saudi Arabia. The concern of Saudi got further compounded when Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982. India used the opportunity again to patch up with Saudi. In 1982, Indira Gandhi visited Saudi Arabia. But, as the Cold War ended, India's aggressive counter military response to Pakistani-funded extremism in Kashmir in 1990s and the demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1992 kept the strain in Indo–Saudi relations alive.

INDIA AND SAUDI ARABIA—DELHI AND RIYADH DECLARATIONS

As the Cold War ended, firstly India began to initiate warmer relations with the US. In 1998, after conducting the nuclear test, it emerged as a confident player. The power assertion of India began when, by 2000s, its economy began to grow. Tectonic events in the post-Cold War era brought India and Saudi Arabia closer again. The first event of considerable impact was the 9/11 in the US. After 9/11, when the US invaded Afghanistan and Iraq, it created immense tension in Saudi Arabia. Iraq was under Saddam, who was a Sunni. He had kept the neighbouring Iran (a Shia-dominated state) under check. Saudi now feared that after the deposition of Saddam, there would be no more checks on Iran, which would, in turn fuel Iranian hegemonic ambitions. The subsequent rise of a hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Iran strengthened the fears of Saudi Arabia. In order to counter such fears, the then King of Saudi, Abdullah, decided to forge regional partnerships. In 2006, King Abdullah visited India. This visit marked a new chapter in Saudi Arabian foreign policy as Saudi decided to now strengthen its relations beyond the US. In 2006, King Abdullah was made the Chief Guest of the Republic Day parade celebrations. India and Saudi Arabia, in 2006, concluded the Delhi Declaration. This was the first ever comprehensive document bilaterally signed to envisage a deep relationship between the two states. The components are explained below.



As the Delhi Declaration of 2006 opened up the cooperation, Indian PM Dr Manmohan Singh visited Riyadh in 2010. The aim of the visit was to build cooperation on a platform beyond the Delhi Declaration. During PM's visit to Riyadh, not only did he concluded the Riyadh Declaration, but the partnership was now taken to the level of Strategic Partnership. The components are explained below.




COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY

Trade between India and Saudi Arabia has picked up after the Delhi Declaration. India exports meat products, fruits, cereals, wax and iron articles while it imports crude oil, fertilisers and inorganic chemicals. Saudi has also invested FDI in India in sectors like paper manufacturing, chemicals and granite processing. India, on other hand, invests FDI in Saudi Arabia in management and consultancy services, telecom, IT and pharmacy. Both countries have also signed Bilateral Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement and a Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement in 2006. More than 500 Indian firms are in Saudi, ranging from IT to pharma sectors.

OIL DIPLOMACY AND REGIONAL SECURITY

The Delhi Declaration has laid down a foundation for energy security. The aim is to increase oil imports to India. Saudi Arabia has explored evergreen long term contracts for oil supply to India. Since Saudi has long been an oil supplier to India, it also understands the vulnerabilities of the region. The Middle East is a very fragile region and any security for oil supply is a serious issue that concerns all players—both oil buyers and suppliers. As far as the region is concerned, unfortunately, due to the sectarian divide in the Middle East, evolving a consensus on regional security has become difficult. Iran prefers the idea of bilateral cooperation with its suppliers for guaranteeing regional security, though it does not have any successful model worth emulating. Within the GCC nations, there is no consensus. The GCC prefers the international community's engagement which is not agreeable to Iran, which wants to evolve regional security interactions in the region keeping its own national interests in mind. With Saudi Arabia, India has evolved security interaction through the security engagement with West Asia having the following pillars:



INDIA–SAUDI ARABIA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

After the signatures of Delhi and Riyadh declarations as foundational documents and the Riyadh Declaration declaring Strategic Partnership, India and Saudi Arabia are now

working to ensure long term sustainability of the partnership. The Delhi Declaration has laid a foundation of cooperation on terrorism while the Riyadh Declaration has diversified the relations to include space and energy cooperation. Due to the recent global downturn, the oil prices have fallen and as a result, Saudi deficits are necessitating diversification and movement beyond oil. This has created opportunities for India to strengthen its strategic presence and outreach in Saudi. A new dimension of India–Saudi relation that has emerged is cooperation in science and technology. Saudi has announced the setting of 22 Nuclear reactors by 2020 as a priority goal. India has decided to assist Saudi in manpower training, thorium supply, nuclear research and nuclear waste management. The strategic relation which till date were oil based are set to diversify and are likely to have a nuclear component.

ANALYSIS OF THE INDIAN PM'S VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA—2016

The Indian PM visited Saudi Arabia in 2016. His visit signifies the importance of the region for oil, remittances and jobs. During his visit, PM was honoured with King Abdul Aziz order—the highest civilian order that can be accorded by the state. He paid a visit to the Larsen & Toubro workers in the workers' residential complex and heard their thoughts. He gifted King Salman a replica of a gold plated Cheraman Juma Masjid of Kerala as a sign of our ancient relations. The PM also visited a TCS centre where IT training is being given to the women of Saudi Arabia with Indian assistance.




Diaspora Interaction

Wherever the Indian PM has travelled in recent times, he has made sure to address a mega gathering of the Indian diaspora, be it in a stadium in the UAE or massive crowds in the USA and Australia. However, no such thing was visible in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi Arabian law prohibits any assembly of people for political reasons. It is this point of the Saudi law that compelled the PM to visit and address the diaspora at the residential complex. This also gave an opportunity to the diaspora to have a much closer touch with their leader and helped establish a different level of connect.

The scholar Harsh V Pant asserts that the visit did not succeed in dehyphenation (to convince Saudi Arabia to act tough on Pakistan and stop the export of terrorism). He asserts that although the joint statement did assert concerns over rising terrorism and offered condemnation, it felt short to name Pakistan.

During the visit following MOUs were signed.



Labour Issues, reforms between India–Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia has announced labour reforms and has committed to establish a unified standard contract for domestic workers. For female domestic workers, under contract, the Saudi employers have to deposit 2500 US Dollars in the Indian embassy, which is refundable to the employer if there is no issue of abuse or non-payment of salary. There is a new minimum wage of 1500 SR to be paid to the workers. In 2016, the Indian PM gave approval to the MOU on labour cooperation signed one during his visit for the necessary changes and the new format of labour categorisation.

End of Part Questions

1. How does India seek to gain from Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030? What are the options for India in energy and strategic defence partnerships?
2. Turkey must cease India-Pakistan hyphenation for win-win partnerships with India? Examine.
3. Delhi is prepared to complement hardball diplomacy with a genuine effort to expand areas of cooperation with Ankara. Discuss.
4. A strong partnership is taking shape between India and UAE. Examine how it can change India's stakes and status in West Asia.
5. The Joint Statement of India and UAE during Prime Ministers Modi visit reflects changed geo-political realities. Examine.
6. By skewing its policy towards Saudi Arabia in pursuit of short term goals, India runs the risk of antagonising Tehran. Do you think India needs a balanced West Asia policy?
7. As Gulf jobs and remittances decline, India must re-orient the Look West Asia policy to attract investments from the region. Examine the statement in the light of instability in West Asia and opportunities for India.

1
CHAPTER

India and Latin America Policy— Key Drivers

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Basic outline
- Initial phase during the Cold War
- Post-Cold War period
- Final analysis

BASIC OUTLINE

Latin America (hereafter referred to as LA) is an emerging growth pole in the 21st century. It is a vibrant block of nations with which India easily synergies due to its youthful population and a stable polity. India exercises deep cultural influence in LA. The love is seen in arts, dance, philosophy and yoga. In Brazil, yoga is very popular. A normal walk in Brazilian cities will prove that in almost every nook and corner, there is yoga centre. The Indian films resonate very well with the LA population. The view LA has held about India has changed over a period of time. Initially, LA used to view India as a land of magic and mysticism, while today it views India as a rising power and an emerging market economy.

Cultural Symbolism and the FIFA

In July, 2014, Brazil hosted the FIFA World Cup tournament. This event always resonates very deeply with Indians, especially those in Kolkata. During the FIFA cup, the youth of Kolkata showed solidarities to Brazil and Argentina. The Kolkata fans are usually divided into two groups in support of Brazil and Argentina. The reason for Kolkata soccer fans supporting Latin American teams like Brazil and Argentina is that they perceive the ability of the LA teams to defeat European teams as a symbolic triumph over the erstwhile colonists by the oppressed. The victory over Europe is celebrated with much fanfare in Kolkata as it is in LA, clearly indicating the fanciful cultural symbolism.

INITIAL PHASE DURING THE COLD WAR

When India became independent in 1947, the country propounded the idea of non-

alignment in the era of bipolarity. India, in the initial years of its independent existence, faced crises situations due to its hostile neighbours. Thus, firstly, Indian policy, in the initial two decades, focused on curbing the threats emanating from the neighbourhood. Secondly, in this period, India also tried to use non-alignment to reconnect with countries where it had some interaction due to the presence of British in India. During this period, LA as a region was completely neglected. India, under the British, had never had extensive interaction with this region. Also, in the strategic calculus that emerged in the aftermath of its independence, LA never acted as a threat to India. Both these factors to some extent were responsible for a lack of initiative from the Indian side to pitch up the relations. Though India did establish diplomatic relations bilaterally with countries in LA in early 1950s, the tone of foreign policy remained low. For India, execution of the ideas of decolonisation and non-alignment were a priority, but the ideas did not resonate well amongst the Latin American nations. Nehru also visited only one LA nation, that is, Mexico, in 1961, during his term as Prime Minister.

Consequences of Neglect

As India marginalised LA, it faced two consequences for its neglect. The most immediate price was at the UNSC vote on the issue of Kashmir. After the first Indo-Pak war in 1948, when India took up the matter of Kashmir at the UNSC, Argentina recommended that Pakistani armed forces should be allowed in Kashmir even when the UNSC was negotiating a demilitarisation of the area. This instance exposed India to the consequences of its lack of initiative to build up relations with LA. As a learning measure, India prioritised building up relations with all nations to garner support for the Kashmir issue which, till then, were neglected. Secondly, when India used military force in Goa to seek its liberation from Portugal in November, 1961, it led to Brazil showering severe criticism on India as Brazil had sided with the Portuguese on the same. This instance also marked a low point in the relationship.

The improvement in the relationship with LA began to take place in 1960s. The establishment of G-77 and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) brought about a resurgence. The G-77 and UNCTAD challenged the existing global model of development dynamics and gave thrust to south-south cooperation. These two platforms provided India and LA a common base to interact and evolve new development dynamics. As the interaction between India and LA increased, the two evolved mutual interests and this marked a new phase of cooperation moving away from the erstwhile neglect. The cooperation that began then continued to deepen and its manifestation was seen finally in the Non-Aligned Movement. By 1983, at the NAM summit, there was participation of fifteen states from the LA and Caribbean. Initially, the LA nations were not keen on the NAM ideas; however, what brought them into the orbit of NAM was the internal change in NAM itself. The NAM, in 1960s, began to mould itself as a platform to initiate a diversification in foreign policy and gradually increased its global assertiveness. The new-found love of India for LA also had roots domestically in India. In India, in 1960s and 1970s, there was a growing rhetoric to tilt towards leftism. The domestic campaign of Garibi Hatao, nationalisation of banks etc and conclusion of

the 1971 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the USSR championed the wave of Third Worldism and a revisionist agenda for a new dynamic of development. This led to attempts at the international level to establish a new international economic order which consequently brought India and LA closer to each other.


Lack of Leverage in Ecuador

(based on the author's interaction with a diplomat in training of 2016 batch)

In 1984, India closed its embassy in Quito, Ecuador. India cited lack of finances as the reason behind the decision to close down the embassy. However, in July, 1985, some reports began to emerge from Ecuador. This period of 1985 was troublesome period in India due to 1984 Sikh riots and Khalistani extremism. Reports from Ecuador suggested that an Ecuadorian delegation had met Khalistani extremists in London and Ecuador was on the verge of giving recognition to a Khalistani government in exile. India was deeply concerned about the issue. Within few days of India taking up the matter, the Ecuadorian administration announced that the team of people meeting Khalistani leaders in London was a private affair with the Ecuadorian government having no say in it. The issue gradually dissipated but due to the closure of the embassy in 1984 and subsequently weak bilateral relations, India could not exercise any leverage over the issue that was about to challenge Indian sovereignty on an international scale.

POST-COLD WAR PERIOD

India's relations with LA states have improved in the post-Cold War period. The Indian private sector has become an immediate connector in the region. India has improved upon its exports to LA. Today, India exports tons of raw material to LA. This helps LA to use its own private sector to use the raw material import to make finished goods and thus compete at global level and participate in the global supply chain. The trade quantum of India is less in comparison to China, though, a significant difference being that China exports finished goods to LA, while India, as we saw above, provides raw material to LA that gives it an edge to produce its own goods to sell at the global economic level. LA has also emerged as a continent of hope in Indian energy security thought. The Indian PM met his Brazilian counterpart in 2014 when the PM visited Brazil to participate in the BRICS Summit. As the government in India since 2014 has prioritised the development of Indian economy through foreign policy manoeuvring, LA can hold tremendous significance for India ahead.



Why is the Region called Latin America?

Spain and Portugal have been colonial rulers of the entire Latin American region. In fact, Spanish is the most commonly spoken language in the region. Brazil is the only Portuguese speaking nation, surrounded by other Spanish speaking nations. These European languages, namely Spanish, Portuguese, French, Romanian and Italian, are all derived from Latin and this happened majorly during the time of the Roman Empire in Europe. The Europeans who speak these languages are also called Latin people. In the 1860s, the French Emperor Napoleon III was trying to extend his imperial control over the region. It was during the administration of Napoleon III that the term 'Latin America' was coined for the first time to denote the region. That is how the region also came to be known as Latin America. It is widely referred to as the South Americas today.

As the Cold War ended, India attached greater significance to LA nations. India has increased bilateral political visits with the individual nations of the region. This has led to rise in bilateral trade. In 1997, the government initiated the FOCUS-LAC (Latin America and Caribbean) Project. The aim of the project was to enhance the presence of the private sector in the region. Over a period of time, a lot of Indian firms have made their presence felt in the region. Most of the countries in the region, namely Chile, Brazil and Argentina, are rich in oil and copper. They are also all pioneers in agricultural production. India has made its presence felt in not only hydrocarbons but also in IT, corporate governance and the consultancy sector.



Increasing Indian Opportunities: An example of Argentina

In 2010, Argentina imposed restrictions on Chinese goods. Up till 2010, the China–Argentina trade relation never saw any swing. China had been importing a huge amount of soya oil from Argentina, which was its major export commodity. As Argentina imposed restrictions on Chinese goods entering its economy, China, in retaliation, stopped soya oil import. The Argentinean economy was badly affected, and India seized the opportunity and tripled its soya oil imports from Argentina. Thus, India coming to the rescue of Argentina in the soya oil import case bolstered Indo–Argentina ties. Even today, a lot of Indian firms can be seen establishing presence in Argentina.



FINAL ANALYSIS



2
CHAPTER


India and Venezuela Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Basic background
- Commercial diplomacy
- Hydrocarbon and Oil diplomacy
- Crisis in Venezuela and the Oil Sector

BASIC BACKGROUND


Indian and Venezuela have had cordial relations and diplomatic engagement between the two began in 1959. India and Venezuela also celebrated 50 years of diplomatic relations in 2009. In 2015, Venezuela was appointed the next chairman of NAM. Indira Gandhi had visited Venezuela in 1968. The major thrust to the relationship was seen in the post-Cold War era. In 2005, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez Frias paid a state visit to India. This visit bolstered the opening of a new chapter in our relations as it was the first ever visit by any Venezuelan head of the state to India.



The most significant achievement of the visit of Hugo Chavez Frias was the conclusion of an MoU between ONGC Videsh Limited and the Venezuelan State Petroleum Company (PDVSA). The death of Hugo Chavez in March 2013 led to Nicolas Maduro Moros being elected the new President of Venezuela.

COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY

The foundation of their commercial relation was laid down during Hugo Chavez's India visit in 2005. A consultative joint commission meeting mechanism was envisaged. The 1st JCM happened in 2005, in Venezuela while the 2nd JCM was organised in New Delhi, in 2013.



After the 2nd JCM, India has initiated a mechanism to undertake knowledge sharing with regard to white revolution technology (milk). India exports pharmaceuticals, chemicals, petroleum cake, textiles, engineering product, equipments and machinery to Venezuela while its imports crude oils, iron pellet, electrical cables (MEA). Some prominent Indian firms, namely Tata, Ajanta Pharmacy, Sun Pharma and Dr. Reddy are doing good business in Venezuela. Tata is prominently visible with exports of Indica and Indigo cars which are widely used in Venezuela. Pharmacy is very promising sector for investment in Venezuela from the Indian point of view, since there is an acute shortage of medicines in Venezuela. In recent times, Indian players like Cipla have emerged as prominent players and are selling more than 120 different medicinal products. In recent times, the Indian embassy has started playing an important role in boosting commercial ties. Since 2013 it has been organising business promotion events at India House in Venezuela. In recent times, automobiles and textiles have emerged as two key sectors which India has been showcasing at these events. In 2014, the Indian embassy also undertook the organisation of an event to promote the Make in India campaign in Venezuela.

HYDROCARBON AND OIL DIPLOMACY

Before we delve into Indo–Venezuela oil diplomacy, we first need to understand why India needs Venezuela as an oil supplier. During the Cold War period, India was dependent upon oil imports from West Asia. As the Cold War ended, the West Asian region witnessed internal disturbances and slid into chaos. The Gulf War–I and the Gulf War–II severely affected India's oil supply. Furthermore, as the Indian economy made a transition to an open economy, the domestic energy consumption began to increase. As India domestically lacked the supply base itself, it resorted to more oil imports. But as West Asia was already in crisis, and there was an immediate hunger domestically to sustain the growth momentum, India resorted to diversification of its oil import basket. As India decided to diversify its oil imports, its Latin American friend Venezuela entered the picture. India did initiate oil imports from Venezuela in the period from 2000 to 2010 but Venezuela could not emerge as a mega supplier. It's not that Venezuela did not possess oil, but being in the strategic background of the US, Venezuela was left very little surplus after heavy oil imports from the USA. But in the period after 2010, as the US began the discovery of shale, its dependence in Venezuela oil has declined. This situation has favoured India.

Now Venezuela possesses surplus oil. Thus, as India had already executed its policy

diversification, it has an opportunity to buy more oil from Venezuela. Today, Venezuela is our third largest oil supplier after Saudi Arabia and Iraq.

The basic framework for hydrocarbon diplomacy was laid down during the 2005 visit of Hugo Chavez to India. Since then, the OVL has been an important participant in the oil sector of Venezuela. The OVL is present in the Orinoco belt oil field. It also has a joint venture with Venezuelan National Oil Company, with a joint venture firm called Petrol Indo Venezolana SA having been established. The firm is exploring oil in the San Cristobal field. In the San Cristobal field, 40% stake is owned by the OVL. Venezuela had undertaken organisation of an international bid for developing the onshore Carabobo Oil Project in the Orinoco belt. When the bidding process ended, an international consortium of OVL, IOC, OIL, Repsol of Spain and Petronas of Malaysia were declared winners. A lot of Indian firms are also present in oil sector of Venezuela and they also participate in business roundtable conferences between India and Venezuela.



CRISIS IN VENEZUELA AND THE OIL SECTOR

After the death of Hugo Chavez, the Maduro government which took over has been in crisis due to tensions and demands by the opposition, the MUD (Democratic Unity Roundtable). As a result of the conflict between Maduro and the MUD, the political situation in Venezuela has not been stable. This prolonged crisis has now taken a toll on Venezuelan economy as businesses are not keen on investing in a situation of political chaos. Further, due to a global downturn, the demand of oil has gone down and as a result of mixture combination of these two factors, the oil sector has been severely affected.

Vostro Account Mechanism, 2016

As a result of the Venezuelan economic crisis, the Indo-Venezuela bilateral trade has been affected. The Venezuelan importers are not able to pay money to Indian exporters. Now under the new mechanism, when India will import oil from

Venezuela, it will ensure that a certain part of money to be paid to Venezuela will be held by the State Bank of India in Venezuela. There will be a Vostro account where money will be converted into Indian Rupees and kept in a branch of SBI in Mumbai. Whenever India will export goods to Venezuela, the importers in Venezuela will receive the goods and certify the imports and inform the Venezuelan bank to pay to the exporters in India. The Venezuelan bank will now pay the money due to the exporters in India and the SBI in Venezuela will also pass the instruction to SBI in Mumbai who will pay the exporter in India by debiting the money from the Vostro account of Venezuela held by SBI.



India–Venezuela Cultural Interaction

India and Venezuela have deep cultural interactions. In the 2nd JCM in 2013, we saw Venezuela expressing an interest in film industry cooperation. The Indian Council of Cultural Relations regularly organises cultural fests. Dance troops and music groups from India also regularly visit Venezuela. In fact, centres of Sai baba, Brahma Kumaris and yoga centers are also popular in Venezuela. While visiting the Film City in Noida in June, 2016, the government of Venezuela showed an interest and established an association with India to open up bilateral relations in films, arts, culture and media. At the same time, Sandeep Marwah was nominated as the chairperson of the India–Venezuela Film Association.

3
CHAPTER


India and Mexico Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Basic background
- Commercial diplomacy
- Analysis of bilateral visits in 2016
- Future areas of cooperation

BASIC BACKGROUND

The relations between India and Mexico are unique and similar in many ways; for example, sun worship is something which is common to both countries. The relations at present have evolved based upon their existing historical and civilization links. In the post-independence period, Mexico aided Green Revolution in India. There have been bilateral visits between India and Mexico. Mexico provides India with oil, minerals, chemicals and India provides Mexico with pharmacy products, auto parts and vehicles in terms of trade. The last PM visit to Mexico before the latest one in June 2016 was in 1986.




COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY

Mexico follows a very unique foreign policy. It is based on attracting foreign investments in Mexico and using the money to propel domestic growth to take Mexico to the world. This initiative of foreign investment not only makes Mexico a capable player to compete at the global level but also results in job creation. Mexico is also a haven for investors because it has around forty-four trade pacts with different countries in the world, making it a launch pad for investors not only to undertake bilateral trade with Mexico but also countries with which it has trade pacts.

The bilateral trade between India and Mexico is approximately worth 6.5 billion dollars. India exports chemicals, electronic machinery and equipment and pharmaceuticals while it imports oil, fertilizers, iron and steel. To promote bilateral trade, there is an institutional mechanism called the India–Mexico Chamber of Commerce. In 2007, a high level group on trade, investment and economic cooperation was formed. The high level groups, over several meetings and deliberation, have identified the need to ease visa norms between the two to promote trade. Easing of visa norms shall facilitate movement of

people from one country to the other, thereby leading to more business flow. Mexico is also rich in metals like silver and gold, which are both in high demand in India. There is increased Indian investment in Mexico in IT, pharmacy and oil sector.

In 2007, India and Mexico signed a Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (BIPPA). Under the BIPPA, both nations have extended the most favoured nation status to each other. The BIPPA has been signed for an initial ten-year period and has seen increased bilateral trade even as the investment has reached 10 billion dollars in 2015. Due to this BIPPA, India will now be able to have access to American and Canadian markets under the NAFTA.



The Role of the Pharmacy Sector in India–Mexico Relations

The biggest contribution of the Indian private sector in Mexico is to that of the pharmacy industry. A lot of Indian firms and medicine want enter the Mexican markets. There is a reason. The Mexican standards of pharmacy and medicine are highly regulated and the standards are extremely tough to meet. The reason is that the Mexican government, under its healthcare programme, procures around 80% of pharmaceutical products. Mexican standards are similar to standards of Europe and USA. Thus, if any pharmacy player is able to meet the regulatory approvals from Mexico, it can use this approval and directly trade with European and American markets from Mexico. Many Indian firms who applied for trade of pharmaceuticals in Mexico have got the necessary approvals. Prominent Indian pharmacy players in Mexico include Ranbaxy, Solara Farmaceutica, Sun Pharma and so on.



The Indian–Mexico Chamber of Commerce organises regular interactions to showcase business opportunities. The chamber plays an important role in facilitating business by providing information and support systems to boost trade. The two nations also have technology-based cooperation since 1975 in many sectors.




India–Mexico Energy Cooperation

Considering the ongoing global debate on climate change and the use of environment friendly technologies, both nations have synergised on energy cooperation. Mexico has recently undertaken domestic level reforms in its energy sector and has invited foreign investment. It has also opened up its electricity generation market for private players. In July, 2016, an Indian firm, Vega Solar Energy, participated in an energy bid in Mexico. It was selected to supply 740 GWH energy to Mexico. This is the first long-term energy contract bagged by an Indian firm in Mexico. Vega solar will begin operations from 2018.

ANALYSIS OF BILATERAL VISITS IN 2016

In March, 2016, the Mexican Foreign Minister, Claudia Ruiz Massieu, visited India. A decision was taken to review all bilateral ties between India and Mexico in areas of trade, technology and finance. Claudia also inaugurated “MEXICO IS”—a photo exhibition about Mexico—at the Rajiv Chowk metro station.


In 2016, the Indian PM also visited Mexico in the month of June. It was a working visit on the invitation of Mexican President Enrique Nieto. The two leaders have instructed their foreign ministers to prepare for the conclusion of Privileged Partnership for 21st century as a feature roadmap to guide future India–Mexico relations.



Make in India and Mexico


Mexico can be of great help to India in its Make in India project. Way back in 1970s, Mexico became ambitious about emerging as a power player in manufacturing. Subsequently, Mexico launched the “Made in Mexico” campaign. Largely due to the success it achieved in its programme, in the 21st century, Mexico has emerged as an advanced manufacturing country in Latin America. Now, Mexico has a “Moving Mexico Programme”. The Indian PM, while in Mexico in June 2016, made a strong pitch in Mexico for capacity sharing for Make in India.

The Indian PM was taken to a vegetarian Mexican restaurant by Nieto in his own car. The two leaders discussed issues over a meal at Quintail restaurant. The visit of the Narendra Modi in 2016 and visit of Rajiv Gandhi in 1986 to Mexico coincidentally were driven by a nuclear context.



FUTURE AREAS OF COOPERATION

There are a lot of Mexicans today in the USA, and as the debates about Mexican migration rages, a lot of Mexicans are unable to communicate their demand to the administration. The Mexican leadership can learn from India and establish a good connect with their diaspora abroad. India and Mexico can also cooperate in the following areas.



Protection of sea lanes of communication

India can learn effective techniques of border management from Mexico, which has, to a large extent, curbed illegal immigration. India can learn Mexican practices which our forces can implement at Bangladesh, Nepal and Myanmar borders.

4
CHAPTER

India and Brazil Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:


- Basic background
- Commercial diplomacy
- Defence diplomacy

BASIC BACKGROUND


In 1500, a Portuguese sailor, Pedro Alvares Cabral, left Portugal to find India but reached Brazil instead. After a halt in Brazil, he sailed to India and reached Goa. Since then, Brazil became a halt between Portugal and India. Over a period of time, as the interaction between the two countries opened up, agro-cattle cooperation began to take place. Brazil has a lot of bovines that are of Indian origin. For that matter, coconut and mango reached Brazil from India. Surprisingly, Brazil, though a country of immigrants, has the least number of immigrants from India.

When India became independent, it initiated diplomatic relations with Brazil in 1948 by opening up a mission in São Paulo. During the Cold War, due to the policy neglect of Latin America by India, Brazil too got neglected. Brazil witnessed a number of military coups and regime changes from the 1940s to 1994. The only interaction India had during this time with Brazil was at international forums and platforms like UNCTAD and G-77. During the liberation of Goa, the Indo-Brazil relationship also dipped. Things began to improve at the end of the Cold War. Since 1994, domestically, Brazil began to witness some stability after the emergence of democracy. However, Brazil's domestic politics, despite being democratic, was still fragile. In April–May 2016, political upheaval was witnessed once again in Brazil against incumbent President Dilma Rousseff due to the Lava Jato scandal.

India's relations with Brazil have improved only in the post-Cold War period. Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso visited India in 1996. However, the real depth in the Indo-Brazil relations can be attributed to the efforts of President Lula da Silva, who visited India three times—in 2004, 2007 and 2008. From the Brazilian side, Dilma Rousseff also paid a state visit to India in 2012. The visit of former Indian PM Manmohan Singh to Brazil in 2006 became a most important visit as it is on this tour that the relationship got elevated to the level of Strategic Partnership. The incumbent Indian PM paid a visit to Brazil in 2014 on the sidelines of the BRICS summit. The PM participated in the BRICS Summit in 2014 and also met Dilma Rousseff.



In 2006, when Manmohan Singh visited Brazil, the relationship evolved into strategic partnership, which can be further divided into the following components:



COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY

India exports to Brazil manufactured goods, polyester yarn, drugs, chemicals and, in turn, imports crude oil, sugar, soya oil, rubber, aluminium and iron.



India and Brazil have a PTA under MERCOSUR (is a sub-regional bloc whose full members are Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) since 2003. The importance of Brazil can be judged by the fact that it is the largest exporter of food products and has well-established industrial farms, availability of fresh water and abundant raw materials. Despite tremendous potential, the trade between India and Brazil has been unable to flourish due to lack of political will, the immense geographical distance between the two nations and the political fragility of Brazil. Prominent Indian firms in Brazil include TCS, Mahindra, Wipro, Cadila while Brazilian firms in India include Marcopolo, Vale and Stefanini.



Brazil as an Agro Superpower


Brazil has around 850 million hectares of arable land available for agriculture but uses only around 60 million hectares today. There is an inordinate potential for Brazil to emerge as a key player to assist India to meet its food security challenges. An Indian firm called Renuka Industries has been importing a lot of sugar from Brazil. Sugarcane is a commodity that can easily grow in more than 70% of the land that Brazil has. Brazil has a favourable agricultural climate, with enormous

hydropower potential, which can certainly help it emerge as a leader in sugarcane, soya and so on. From Indian point of view, Brazil offers its industries ample opportunities in agro-processing.

At the economic level, TCS has been a leader in Brazil since 2002. The company is based on outsourcing and software production and is also involved in a multimillion dollar project with ABN AMRO bank. Tata is also in a joint venture with Marcopolo to establish a mass rapid transit system in Brazil. Renuka Industries has also established a mega ethanol sugar business in Brazil.

DEFENCE DIPLOMACY

India and Brazil signed a Defense Agreement in 2003 to cooperate in aeronautics and ship building. The agreement also envisages military-to-military contacts and modules of defence training. In 2010, on the sidelines of BRICS and IBSA (a dialogue forum consisting of India, Brazil and South Africa) summits, India and Brazil decided to set up a joint committee on defence cooperation called the India–Brazil joint defence committee. The committee envisaged joint military technology development and arms and defence technology production. The 4th Joint Defense Committee meet happened in 2015.



Though the nuclear issue has been kept out of the ambit of their strategic partnership as of now, Brazil has shown interest in its addition to the same.

ANALYSIS OF RECENT MEETS

The Indian PM Narendra Modi went to Brazil in 2014 to participate in the BRICS summit. On the sidelines of the 6th BRICS summit, India and Brazil concluded agreements to cooperate in remote sensing and environment. The two also decided on defence cooperation. Another important area of cooperation identified was cyber security, which had also found mention in the 6th India–Brazil Joint Commission (IBJC) meet in Brazil. In the 7th IBJC in 2015 held in New Delhi, decision was taken to boost bilateral trade to realise the true potential of the relations. The two have identified cooperation in climate change as a priority area in the 8th IBJC in 2016.

1
CHAPTER

The Concept of Middle Powers

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Concept of Middle Powers
- India and Middle Powers diplomacy

The term middle power is applied frequently in the discourse of international politics. The origin of the term, however, in the modern context, goes back to the World War-I. The initial mention of the terminology is visible in the Paris Peace Conference and the League of Nations with respect to allocation of seats in the League. But the actual usage of the term happened during the creation of the UN after the World War-II. During this period, we see the application of this term to some countries like Canada, Australia, and so on. They used the term middle powers to distinguish themselves from other foreign powers that were relatively small in power and in influence. The application of the term by Australia and Canada was done at the UN level to assert that they would exercise more influence than smaller players in world politics. Although they demanded extra privileges, the great powers refused to grant exclusivity to the middle powers. The term did become popular in the discourse of international governance, but could not come to stand for more assertion vis-à-vis the great powers.

The subsequent period of the Cold War saw some change. The middle powers now began to play a different role and their recognition was based on the ability of a middle power states to mediate on international disputes, their military power, the size of territories and populations they possessed, and so on. Thus, during the era of bipolarity, the middle powers resorted to differentiate themselves from the other two big powers based on the points mentioned above. When the Cold War ended, the term came to be used to signify how a country undertakes diplomacy on soft issues. In the post-Cold War period, human rights, environment, and conflict management have emerged as new concerns. Today, the middle powers use their diplomacy to advocate on these soft issues and the way they address themselves gives them the leverage to distinguish themselves from other powers. Thus, today, we broadly see that middle powers are those that do not possess substantial military power but are still powerful enough to exercise influence in the world using persuasion and cooperation. In our study with respect to the Indian foreign policy in this book, we shall analyse three broad-range middle powers, namely, Britain, Iran and Canada, and their relations with India.

2
CHAPTER

India and the Great Britain Relations

IAfter reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Historical diplomatic relations
- Strategic diplomacy
- Commercial diplomacy
- Analysis of bilateral visits

BASIC BACKGROUND

Great Britain or the United Kingdom (the UK from now on) was India's colonial ruler. As India became independent, the British allied with the US during the Cold War. India advocated for non-alignment and decolonization, which did not augur well with the British. India did not favour joining any military alliances. Thus, at the international level, the two were at loggerheads with each other both politically and ideologically. At the bilateral level, however, both have done well. We shall study the relation as it unfolded in multiple periods and we shall infer how each period had qualitative differences over other periods. When India became independent, the elite in India adopted a very conciliatory attitude to the British. India also committed to join the British Commonwealth. Initially, till the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965, the relations were good and only after the war did the change come when the British position on Pakistan changed. This change in Indo-British relations were visible again when India and the USSR signed a Treaty of Friendship of 1971. As the Cold War ended, a paradigmatic shift was seen in the relations as India brought about a change in its own economy to embrace the liberal order. Since then, we have witnessed a constant rise in trade between the two.

PHASE 1: 1947 TO 1965

When India became independent, it decided to focus on economic rebuilding. The reason for economic neglect was attributed by the leaders of the national movement to the British colonial rule. After independence, another factor that came up was India's assertion for autonomy in decision-making. This was done to ensure that no ambitious imperial power takes Indian sovereignty hostage again. However, during the national movement, as senior Congress leaders interacted often with the British political class, the negotiations for the transfer of power had led to the establishment of personal contacts between Indians and the British, which became an important link in the post independence phase of our relations. The most important issue that came up was India joining the Commonwealth. When India decided to join the British Commonwealth, there was a strong reaction from

the opposition in India. The opposition asserted that doing so would contradict India's non-alignment policy. However, Nehru clarified that India was, firstly, joining the Commonwealth as an independent nation. Secondly, it was not going to accept the British monarch as its head of state but would join the body as an independent Republic. Thirdly, Nehru clarified that India, even after joining the Commonwealth, would continue to maintain its own strategic autonomy in decision-making. Indian diplomats worked tirelessly to change the rules of the game in the British Commonwealth. India ratified the Commonwealth Agreement in 1949 and joined it as a representative after 26th January, 1950.

In the first phase, the next important issue was the linking of economies. Since the 1940s, the British and Indian economies were linked financially. The British had agreed that after the World War-II ends, it would reimburse the money spent by the Indian government in – the war. The amount was about 13 million Pounds, and an agreement was made that the British would return the money from 1947 to 1957. The businesses run by British firms also had to adopt to the new policies of the Indian government. The British firms and their subsidiaries that preferred to stay back faced severe competition from Indian firms and Indian PSUs. The British also continued to provide aid to India, both at the bilateral level and also through the Colombo Plan. The British also provided financial help to India to execute its Five Year Plans. They insisted, however, that India undertake purchases from British firms in lieu of the aid it received. One concern on the foreign policy front that emerged was the question of Pakistan and Kashmir. The British approach was to maintain good relations with both nations and go for UN-based mediation but India was visibly upset with the British for not supporting India. A balance gradually emerged as the British helped India to establish proximity to the Americans.

1965 Suez Crisis, India and British

Egypt gained independence from the British in 1922. However, it still faced regular interference in the functioning of the Suez Canal. Subsequently, Nasser decided to build the Aswan dam and asked for British financial support. The British showed reluctance to support Nasser. This compelled Nasser to seek American assistance but the US was not interested in overpowering its own ally and showed reluctance. Nasser, in return, nationalised the canal and restricted its usage for Israel. Israel, the British and the French, during a meeting Sèvres, France, made up a plan to attack Egypt. As the Israel–Egypt conflict began, the British went on to take control of the canal while French tried to separate Israel and Egypt and mediated to resolve the conflict. The US intervened and ordered complete halt of escalation and withdrawal of the British and French troops from the canal. India condemned the Israelis, the British and the French and showed solidarity with Egypt. This created a low point in Indo–UK relations but the relations did not breakdown completely. Since the 1940s, the British have provided India arms and have continued to do so even after the Suez crisis up till the 1962 Chinese conflict, when the British granted military supplies to India.

After Indian defeat in the 1962 war, India decided to go for defence modernisation. The British and the US saw it as an opportunity to make India lean towards the West. India's focus was on technical support so that suppliers could provide it arms under a license, helping India to diversify its suppliers' range. The Russians offered what India demanded while the British linked supplies to the revival of Kashmir talks with Pakistan. India rejected the British conditionality and went ahead with its arrangement with the Russians, thereby costing the British a supply market.

PHASE 2: 1965 TO 1991


The 1965 war was a game changer. When India witnessed Pakistani infiltration, it retaliated with an attack on Pakistan. The attack affected the Punjab region of Pakistan. The British branded India as an aggressor and began alienating India.



Concerns About the US–British Axis

The period of 1960s was one of global decolonisation. The British lost a majority of its offshore territory. The British came to accept close relations with the US as being in their national interest. India perceived it as Britain's pro-west alliance. Any intervention by the British in South Asia was now perceived by India as Cold War politics and a deliberate design of the British to promote the western cause. India thus became very concerned and cautious of the growing US–British axis.

However, the British and the US coming closer did not mean that the British became a power subservient to the US. In 1966, India faced economic crisis. The US took it as an opportunity to advise India to undertake devaluation and adopt the IMF reforms package. The Bank of England did not toe the US line on this and in fact declined IMF support. It also dissented with the World Bank when it advocated India to go for devaluation. The same disagreements on geopolitical issues began to emerge from late 1960s between India and the British. The Indo-British divergence was especially visible when India signed the Friendship Treaty with USSR in 1971.



Indian Ocean Diplomacy

In 1968, the British decided to reduce its presence in Indian Ocean at the military level. It continued to maintain control on the Chagos archipelago in Maldives territory. In 1966, the Chagos archipelago atoll had been given by the British to the US. The US decided to establish a military base the island of Diego Garcia. The British decided to remove the residents of Diego Garcia to free it up for US use. This move gave US a higher degree of presence in the Indian Ocean. India resented the move strongly, yet British continued to treat India as a friendly power in the Indian Ocean. However, in this period, the approach of the British towards Kashmir changed. The change was visible from 1979 to 1990. The British favoured bilateral negotiations and stayed out of support to either. The British continued arms support and economic aid to India. At political level, Indira, and later, Rajiv Gandhi maintained good politico-diplomatic relations.


PHASE 3: FROM THE END OF THE COLD WAR TILL THE PRESENT

The opening up Indian economy and the end of the Cold War opened up an ocean of opportunities between India and the British. The British seized the opportunity to establish business relations with India. The trade bilaterally increased but is still below its true potential. Indian firms are present in Britain while Glaxo, Smith Klein and Unilever are in India in a big way. In recent times, mergers have paved way for establishment of large conglomerates. Tata has purchased Corus and Jaguar.

Swings at the Diplomatic Level

Relations have improved but stray comments by British officials on Kashmir have been resented by India. In 1997, Robin Cook, the British Foreign Secretary, advocated mediation of Kashmir while Derek Fatchett, the Junior Foreign Minister, advocated a referendum. Both were strongly resented by India. In the recent times, David Miliband, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs from 2007 to 2010, in a visit to India advocated that all extremism in South Asia can be ended if the Kashmir problem gets resolved. India again conveyed displeasure at the statement, calling it an intrusion in its internal affairs.

From 1997, the relations have been more business-centred. In 2004, the two nations concluded a Strategic Partnership Agreement while, since 1995, there has been a defence consultative group formed between the two.




India and UK Skill Partnerships—An Unbeatable Combination

In 2014, India and UK Financial Partnership was announced. The aim of the partnership is to examine priority areas of financial coordination between India and UK. The thrust area is professional financial services industry. UK has decided to commit financial training as a new component of financial partnership. Under this, UK intends to impart work stream professional training for Chartered Accountants and other financial professionals. UK has tied up with India's First International Financial Centre- GIFT City in Ahmedabad to train Indian professionals.

The economic aid has declined since the end of the Cold War. In fact, the rising stature of India in the world has made India an aid contributor. In 2012, a decision was taken to halt the aid programme by the British. By 2015, it had been decided that the British would continue to provide assistance to India at the technical level if demanded. Due to increased economic interaction, a lot of Indians have been residing in Britain. These Indians are given temporary work permits by British. They don't contribute to social security funds and are not allowed to avail the benefits available to citizens, which remains an unresolved issue. The Indian diaspora in Britain is largely a supporter of the Labour party but in recent times, conservatives have made some incursions in the diaspora. An important contribution is of BBC which continues to promote British values to its listeners. The BBC has a well-defined audience in India and broadcasters like Mark Tully have been awarded with Padma Bhushan.


The relations had improved during David Cameron's term as his idea was to approach relations bilaterally rather than taking a South Asian perspective. He also stayed away from intruding on India's internal matters, like the Kashmir issue.



As Cameron has now been succeeded by Theresa May, it is to be seen how she carries forward the rich legacy. Since the UK has aligned closely to the US and India has developed proximity to the US, the UK has emerged as a successful middle power with no strategic rivalry for India.

ANALYSIS OF THE INDIAN PM'S VISIT TO BRITAIN 2015

In November, 2015, Indian PM Narendra Modi visited Britain for three days. He interacted with the diaspora at Wembley and also had a lunch with the British Queen.



A decision was taken to have biennial prime ministerial level summits. The two leaders accepted a vision statement where both decided to cooperate to transform people's lives and focus on education and health. High priority in the vision statement was given to infrastructures and technology with focus on sustainability. Cooperation was envisaged for smart cities and cleaning of rivers and achieving a low carbon economy. Both sides have agreed to cooperating on common threats such as Cyber security and terrorism. A new Defense and International Security Pact was agreed for curbing security concerns.



A joint statement on Energy and Climate Change cooperation was made to ensure cooperation to reduce fossil fuels consumption and focus on clean energy. The two decided to synergise at the international climate negotiation and work jointly for development challenges.




BREXIT and Impact on the Indian Diaspora in Britain

The colonial interaction has contributed to a very diverse Indian diaspora in the UK. The 18th and 19th century saw Parsis, Bengalis and other highly skilled people settling down in Britain. The period of 1950s and 1960s saw the first influx since independence. In 1990s, when Britain faced shortage of skilled personnel, it opened its gates for Indian IT professionals. This led to a huge wave of skilled labour migration to the UK. In 2000, the British government launched innovators visa scheme to facilitate students to get work permits upon course completion. After the recent decision of the British people to BREXIT (Britain exiting the EU), it is likely that the UK will open its border for more skilled migration. As a result of this, the IT professionals from India will face enormous competition. The Indian diaspora at the IT level shall be hit due to BREXIT. Unsurprisingly, many members of the Indian diaspora in Britain voted in favour of the UK to remain as a part of EU.



THERESA MAY'S VISIT TO INDIA

The British PM Theresa May visited India in November, 2016. The visit is significant as May visited India at a time when Britain was struggling to execute the BREXIT. The visit of May to India has helped engineer new dimensions in the relationship that will take India–Britain relations to an all new level. Another important thing to note is that Theresa May had chosen India as the first destination to visit outside Europe. This fact itself speaks about the importance Britain intends to attach in improving ties with India.



During the visit, the two sides decided to identify sectors to boost commercial diplomacy. ICT, critical engineering and healthcare products were identified as areas of cooperation. The two sides agreed to use the India–UK CEO forum to enhance cooperation in the three identified sectors. The issues related to market liberalisation and market access that may arise after Britain's exit from EU are to be negotiated at the Joint Economic Trade Committee (JETCO). The British firms will use JETCO to enhance their businesses with Indian partners.

Theresa May also agreed to support infrastructure development in India. The London Stock Exchange has emerged as a pioneer exchange to raise offshore rupee financing instruments. An agreement to support the development of corporate bond market of India was agreed upon between the SBI and London Stock Exchange group's index business, FTSE-Russell. The private sector in London will contribute 500 million Pounds in the India–UK Sub Fund to support infrastructure financing under the National Investment and Infrastructure Fund. Britain has committed support for redeveloping the Varanasi Railway Station. During her visit, May also committed 20 million Pounds for the Start Up India Venture Capital Fund over and above the 160 million Pounds has already been committed by Britain to fund 75 startups across India. The two sides concluded a MoU on Intellectual Property. May not only appreciated India's membership to the MTCR but also advocated for a speedy entry of India into the Nuclear Suppliers Group. To enhance bilateral defence cooperation, in November, 2015, India & Britain had concluded Defence & International Security Partnership (DISP). During her visit, May committed to support Defence Make in India under the framework of DISP. The defence consultative group has been tasked to chart out more areas of cooperation.



Dark Side of India- Britain Ties

One of the lesser discussed issues between the two states is of illegal immigrants. As per the Home Office of Government of UK, there are more than 1 lakh illegal Indian immigrants in UK. Britain has started putting pressure on Indian government to ensure that Indians who have no right to remain in UK be sent back to India. The UK government has asserted India is not cooperating effectively but, India, on the other hand has argued that the nationality of Individual can be established only when an investigation is carried out by Indian agencies. India has refuted the British claims of non cooperation and has asserted that it is cooperating with UK on the same issue.

3
CHAPTER

India and Canada Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Historical background of diplomatic relations
- Commercial diplomacy
- Nuclear diplomacy
- Energy diplomacy
- Analysis of bilateral visits

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The ties between India and Canada go back to the British era. A lot of Indians had migrated from India to British Columbia during the later parts of the 19th century. Around three per cent of the Canadian population today comprises of Indians and this diaspora acts as a strong bridge between the two nations.



During the Cold War, Canada became an ally of the US while India advocated for NAM. Nehru did visit Canada in 1949 to establish a good rapport with Louis St. Laurent. Initially Canada provided aid to India and during the Cold War, Canadian support for peaceful nuclear purposes acted as an important connector to India. Canada gave a reactor to India called CIRUS (Canadian–Indian Reactor Uranium System). From 1947 to 1955, India and Canada cooperated at the UN level for decolonisation. Canada has viewed India very progressively due to India's democratic credentials. This closeness between Canada and India was due to feeling of Canada being able to act as a bridge between the West and Asia. As historian David Webster says, Canada actually had ambitions of acting as a linchpin in the relations between West and newly decolonised Asia. But as NAM became prominent and as Indonesia and India initiated the NAM rhetoric, the Canadian vision of being a bridge gradually began to collapse. After the 1971 Indo–Pak war and subsequent Indo–Russia Treaty of Friendship (1971) and Indian nuclear test in 1974, Indo–Canada relations took a dip. Canada suspended all nuclear ties with India after the 1974 Indian nuclear test and political ties also suffered during the rest of the Cold War period. The redefining moment finally came in 1996 when Canadian PM Jean Chrétien decided to push the relations to new heights and undertook aggressive re-engagement.


Canada, India and the Colombo Plan

In 1949, after Nehru's visit, India opened up diplomatic relations with Canada. In 1950, Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson visited Colombo and his visit marked the birth of Colombo Plan. This plan was in reality Canadian development assistance. The Colombo Plan was officially called the Colombo Plan for Cooperation for Economic Development in South and South East Asia. The aim of the plan was to fight poverty in the region and this effort was gradually joined by the US and Britain.



Canadian ODA to India

Canada, during the Cold War channelised assistance and economic aid to India via the Canadian International Development Agency. The assistance began from 1951 and was given for fertilizer, food commodities and industrial goods. Since 1985, Canada has adopted a Country Policy Framework (CPF) for India.




Canada has also provided financial assistance to Bihar and Odisha and assisted the MP state electricity board to go for provisional electricity for pro-poor households.

COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY

Trade has transpired between India and Canada since the end of the Cold War. India majorly exports gems, jewelry, garments, textiles to Canada and imports pulse, wood pulp, potash, copper, aircrafts and aviation equipments. The two are negotiating a CEPA which is in the final stages and the 9th round of CEPA negotiations has happened as recently as March, 2015. At the international level, collaboration in the post-Cold War period can be seen in their jointly chairing G-20 where India and Canada are cooperating in financial sector reforms. Two areas where Indian investment is rising in Canada are IT and resources. The diagram below represents the institutional architecture.



A lot of Indian firms are working in Canada in multiple sectors. There is also a CEO's forum that helps in boosting cooperation in selected dimensions.



In recent times, SpiceJet has tied up with Bombardier for supply of next generation turbo airlines while Canada's Mextech ventures will establish a geological under earth station near Girar in UP. At the level of science and technology, both are collaborating in aerospace, photonics, nanotechnology and biotechnology. There is also a growing cooperation in alternative energy.

Foreign investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPPA) and CEPA

In 2010, Canadian trade minister Peter Van Loan launched negotiations for an FTA with India. The recommendation to establish a negotiation forum for the FTA was given by Joint study group (JSG) on CEPA. The JSG was established after the visit of Stephen Harper to India in 2009. The JSG advanced cooperation in goods and services sector. The ninth round of negotiations took place in March, 2015, in New Delhi. The FTA will open access for Canadian firms to position in Indian markets and Indian firms would use the FTA to establish a base in Canada for accessing the markets of NAFTA. Canada is also negotiating a FIPPA with India to protect investments through legal obligations. For example, an obligation could be a mutual legal declaration on how to resolve disputes and settle them. Despite the fact that an India-Canada FIPPA was concluded in 2007, the negotiations, as mentioned above, are going on for its ratification. The issues over investor-dispute settlement mechanisms are holding back the FIPPA. While India wants that a due process of exhausting domestic judicial routes should be done before one approaches tribunals at international levels, Canada is concerned about slow judicial decision-making in India and wants to go to international tribunals without a lengthy judicial approach.

The FTA simultaneously is held back on two issues.




NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY

Leaving behind the past, both countries, in 2010, concluded a nuclear deal envisaging civilian nuclear cooperation. The nuclear deal benefits the nuclear industry of Canada to explore a new market and will also have contribution to the bilateral trade. As relations existed at the nuclear level before 1970s, and as Canada pioneered CANDU (Canada Deuterium Uranium) reactors and India specialised in Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWR), with infrastructure almost similar today, scope of cooperation does exist under the 2010 nuclear deal. Under the deal, Canada has decided to provide Uranium for facilities inspected by IAEA.



Despite the fact that the nuclear deal was signed in 2010, it could not materialise. The Canadians wanted inspection of the material they would give to India. This owes its origin to the lack of trust due to the 1974 issue. But India clearly affirmed that since all civilian reactors are open to IAEA and Canadian support is at the civilian level, adding Canada in the list of inspectors over and above the IAEA was not warranted. Thus, after two years of intense negotiations and diplomacy, an administrative arrangement was agreed upon and all obstacles stand to be removed in nuclear commerce. But India's nuclear liability law continues to act as an irritant. Now, under the administrative arrangement, a joint commission has been established for information sharing. The joint commission on civilian nuclear cooperation held its first meeting in 2013. In 2015, India took a decision to purchase (350 million dollars' worth) supply of Uranium from Saskatoon in Canada.



ENERGY DIPLOMACY

Canada is an energy rich nation and, with India, it has a ministerial level energy dialogue since 2013.



There is also a Canada–India energy forum since 2010. This forum has been established under the MoU on energy cooperation signed in 2010.



The second India–Canada Energy dialogue happened in Alberto in Canada in 2015. Since 2009, the two nations have cooperation in crude oil and India has been importing oil from Canada. Canada is likely to supply LNG to India in future as India is among the top five importers of LNG while Canada is the fifth largest producer. Thus, Canada will provide India oil, natural gas and uranium.

Outer Space Cooperation–Astrosat


The Indo–Canadian outer space cooperation goes back to the 1990s. The Canadian space agency and the ISRO signed an MoU in 2003 for cooperation in satellite communication and remote sensing. Both began to cooperate on ultraviolet imaging telescope. The UVIT is jointly developed and has been used by Astrosat. The Astrosat was launched on 28th September, 2015. The UVIT was gifted by the Canadian space agency to the Indian Institute of Astrophysics. Canada provided three detectors for UVIT and one twin ultraviolet and visible imaging telescope.

EDUCATION DIPLOMACY


Canada is a permanent education destination for Indians. India and Canada signed an MoU to cooperate on student exchange and higher education. The MoU recommended setting up of a Joint Working Group (JWG). The JWG had its first meet in 2013. Canada is an important destination for education because of the demand of skilled people in India by 2022. Canada has a high representation in post-secondary education. Canada has become a member of India’s Global initiative of Academic Networks (GIAN). The GIAN focuses on bringing international faculties of global repute to visit India and bringing global academic perspectives for Indian students.

ANALYSIS OF THE 2015 VISIT OF THE INDIAN PM TO CANADA

The Indian PM visited Canada in 2015 and met Stephen Harper and gave him a painting of Guru Nanak with his disciple Bhai Bala and Bhai Mardana. He visited Gurudwara Khalsa Diwan and the Lakshmi Narayan Temple. He also paid a visit to Air India Memorial in Toronto and in total concluded 16 commercial agreements.



There were 13 MoUs between National Skill Development Council and 13 Canadian colleges for skill development in aviation, textiles, sports, green economy, and so forth. There was also an MoU on higher education and a new alumni network established for those people who studied in Canada and are working in India.




In 2013, it was agreed that Cameco will provide 3.175 million kg Uranium to India till 2020. India on the other hand has extended visa on arrival facilities for Canada citizens visiting India. The two nations have agreed to continue discussions for an early conclusion of the CEPA. The PM has emphasised on sharing of nuclear technology for use and application in society. The Canadian nuclear industry has pledged support for Make in India. Canada has also extended support for the smart city project. Under economic diplomacy, Canada has a global Action Plan and has decided that states holding great promise for Canadian businesses will be given a priority under the plan.



Indian Diaspora in Canada and the Issue of Komagata Maru

The Indian diaspora in Canada has been settled there from the British era. The Canadian territory was a part of the British colonial empire and travel to Canada at the time from India required no visa. There were controls on voting and settlement rights, however. Things did change post-1947. The policy of immigration became liberal since 1962 and Canada invited education professionals for growth and economic development of Canada. A point system was used for entry as per the needs of the Canadian economy, thus leaving many aspirant immigrants out. The point system was replaced in 1967 and since then there has been a rise in immigration to the country. The Indian diaspora in Canada is not a monolithic idea but is diversely spread all over. The Indian diasporic presence in Canada has considerably changed

from 1970s till now.



Komagata Maru was a floating prison and a scar on Indo–Canadian relations. Komagata Maru was a ship hired by Sardar Gurdit Singh to travel from Hongkong to Vancouver with economic migrants. As the ship reached the Burrad inlet on West coast of Canada, the Canadian authorities denied it further port access due to exclusion laws for Asian immigrants by Canada. As per the Asian Exclusion Act, a ship entering Canada had to make a continuous journey from where it had started. Canada had passed Asian Exclusion Act in 1908 to ensure that it became tougher for Asians to enter Canada. The Asians had to make a direct voyage from their point of origin and this was difficult to do so during those times. After the ships reached the Burrad inlet, it was denied entry for two months and was finally sent back. As the ship reached Calcutta, there was detention of some persons on board of Komagata Maru while same even got killed in gunfire leading to violation of basic human rights, which led ultimately to the Budge Budge riots. In May, 2016, on the 101st anniversary of Komagata Maru incident (23rd May, 1914), the Canadian PM Justin Trudeau offered his apologies for the incident on behalf of Canada. This sent a strong positive message of relief to the diaspora and finally helped the descendants of the victims to achieve closure.

4
CHAPTER

India and Iran Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- History of diplomatic relations
- Strategic diplomacy
- Pipeline and oil diplomacy
- Port diplomacy
- Analysis of bilateral visits

HISTORY OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

The relations between India and Iran began in 1950 when they signed a Treaty of Friendship and Perpetual Peace. However, Iran became a part of the US alliance via the Baghdad pact in 1954 and the Cold War separated the budding allies. During the Cold War, Iran due to its affiliation to CENTO, also developed proximity with Pakistan. During the 1965 and 1971 war, Iran provided military assistance to Pakistan. In 1979, there was an Iranian Revolution. This brought Ayatollah Khomeini to power, who established the theocratic Islamic Republic of Iran.

Post 1979, India and Iran began to establish proximity. During the Iran–Iraq war, India remained neutral and continued economic diplomacy for oil imports. In 1983, they established an India–Iran Joint Commission (JC). The aim of the JC was to promote economic cooperation and organise foreign minister level meets. In the 1980s and 1990s, the dialogue on trade and economy continued. In 1993, Narasimha Rao visited Tehran while in 1995, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani visited India. In 2001, Vajpayee and Khatami signed the Tehran Declaration while, in 2003, Khatami, on his visit to India, signed the New Delhi Declaration.

The relation dipped due to the nuclear programme of Iran in 2005–06. In 2005, India and Iran had signed an agreement to supply 5 million tonnes of LNG per year from 2009 and this 32-billion-dollar deal got affected due to nuclear sanctions. In 2008, Ahmadinejad, on a visit to Pakistan and Sri Lanka, halted in India for refueling and this stopover was transformed into a state visit to patch up relations. During the Cold War, ideologies separated Iran and India. After the Cold War ended, firstly the two collaborated with Russia to support the Northern Alliance and secondly, as a resource-rich Central Asia emerged, India began to look at Iran as a gateway to Central Asia. Due to sectarian divide, India decided to use Iran to contain Pakistan. During the US–Iran confrontation, India maintained that Iran had the right to have its own nuclear programme. Things have changed between the two after 2015 when the US and Iran agreed upon a Lausanne framework, better known as the US–Iran nuclear deal. (For details, see [Section-H](#),


STRATEGIC DIPLOMACY

India and Iran's strategic diplomacy is based on the Tehran Declaration and the New Delhi Declaration. The following are the components of the two.



PIPELINE DIPLOMACY

The IPI (Iran-Pakistan-India) pipeline was conceived by a Pakistani engineer- Malik Aftab Ahmed Khan in mid-1950's. In 1989, the project was conceptualized by R.K. Pachauri. Different Prime Ministers in India have followed different approaches to the IPI Pipeline.



Due to US sanctions on Iran, India since 2008 has abandoned the pipeline. However, in 2017, a Parliamentary panel in India has recommended that India should revive the work on the IPI pipeline as sanctions on Iran stand to be removed now. The panel has asserted that India can import 60 million standard cubic meters per day from South Pars gas field from Iran to Pakistan and India. India fears the safety of IPI pipeline passing through Pakistan and India favors that Iran take the responsibility for the security of the pipeline.

INDIA-IRAN AND KASHMIR QUESTION

On 26th June 2017, during the Id sermons, Ayatollah Ali Khomeini equated conflict in Kashmir at par with one in Yemen and Bahrain. It is not the first time Iran has done this as it has made similar statements in 2010 also. Since 1979, Iran and Saudi Arabia have been engaged in a proxy war where both have used religion as a tool to pursue power. India has tried to balance Iran and Saudi Arabia but Iran does not appreciate India's tilt towards Saudi Arabia and the recent utterance of Khomeini must be seen in that context. Iran through the statements has asserted that it is a crucial player in the Islamic world and India cannot ignore Iran. Though India has ignored the provocation by Ayatollah on Kashmir, India needs to rework its economic engagement with Rouhani. For India, Iran remains a strategic economic partner to cooperate in Chabahar Port/ International North South

Transit Corridor.

INDIA AND IRAN OIL DIPLOMACY

India has been buying oil from Iran since the Cold War time. India's ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL) in 2008 discovered gas in Farzad-B offshore field. It is touted as the world's biggest natural gas field in Iran touted to have more than 500 BCM gas resources. In 2009, India established a consortium of Indian Oil Corporation and Oil India Limited. This consortium since 2009 has been trying to secure rights to develop the Farzad-B offshore field. As India is eagerly waiting for the contract, Iran has asserted that India will not be given any preferential treatment for the field. India, which has become upset over Iran's arguments pertaining to the development rights related to the Farzad-B field, has cut down its oil imports from Iran in 2017. India is upset that Iran wishes to auction the Farzad-B field even when India has asserted in 2017 that it is willing to put in 6 Billion Dollars for gas field development and 5 Billion Dollars for establishing a LNG export terminal. India asserts that it expects preferential treatment in the Farzad-B field as Indian firms in 2008 had discovered gas in the field. Iran has rejected the arguments for preferential treatment to India. This is due to the fact that Iranian sanctions have been removed by US. Iran has almost ended its global isolation and is integrating with the world. This gives Iran a flexible muscle to seek highest bidder for the gas field. Russian Gazprom and Chinese National Petroleum Corporation have emerged as new potential players. Iran has been visibly upset with India which allied with US during the sanction period and reduced oil imports from Iran. India has committed 11 Billion Dollars for the development of the Farzad-B field. As per the Indian policy, today only Indian carriers can import oil from foreign countries. India is going to amend the policy to allow a foreign shipping container firm to import oil. India, at the energy security level, is making a shift to gas resources and in the process is planning to hire Very Large Container Carriers (VLCC) from Japan to import gas from Australia, Russia, Iran and Mozambique. Iran is an irreplaceable supply partner for gas. India has also initiated a diplomatic dialogue with Iran to discuss the possibility of Iran-Oman-India pipeline in the future.

INDIA AND IRAN PORT DIPLOMACY

Chabahar port is a part of the regional economic strategy of India. Since the end of the Cold War, Chabahar port is a component of India's Grand Strategy. After 1991, the core objective of Indian Foreign Policy was to seek foreign support for economic development of India, engage with middle and great powers, normalize India's engagement in the neighborhood and raise India's profile in external neighborhood (this is the point where Iran's Chabahar port comes into play) and finally to improve India's international standing. The idea of Chabahar port came up in 2003 when Iranian President Khatami visited India and a deal was signed between the two states. For India, Chabahar port remains the most important tool that can alter the hostile regional geography that India has inherited post partition of India and Pakistan. Post 1947, the partition has deprived India of a physical access to Afghanistan and Central Asia. India and Iran developed an interest in Afghanistan in 1996 when both opposed Taliban and supported the Northern Alliance. Post 2001, India and Iran continued to cement their bilateral relations to reach out to Central Asia and Afghanistan while US encouraged India to reach Central Asia via Pakistan. As Pakistan continued to deny India overland transit access to Central Asia and

Afghanistan, India decided to make a move with Iran. The significance of the Chabahar port for India has gained higher importance after the Chinese announced the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor under the Belt and Road initiative, Chabahar port allows India to bypass the geographical limitations imposed by the partition. In 2016, India-Afghanistan and Iran concluded the Trilateral Transit and Transport Corridor Treaty. Under the treaty, India has committed 500 Million Dollars to develop the Chabahar port and establish railway line infrastructure. The treaty will allow India to access Central Asia and will give a boost to the idea of regional connectivity. Iran also favors India's inclusion into the Ashgabat Agreement. Under the Ashgabat Agreement (Concluded in 2016 between Iran, Turkmenistan, Oman and Uzbekistan), the Persian Gulf will be connected to Central Asia through a direct corridor. Chabahar port for India is not just about access to energy markets of Central Asia but also access to fast growing economies of the Eurasian region and a gambit against history. India may witness some challenges in the endeavor of developing the Chabahar port. Firstly, India has to convince private players to use Iran as a transit route to reach Central Asia than China which is the presently used route. Secondly, to access the future markets of Central Asia and Eurasian region, Indian exports need to become more competitive.


ANALYSIS OF INDIAN PM'S VISIT—2015

The Indian PM visited Tehran in May, 2016, and on the occasion, he presented a 7th century manuscript of the Quran which is attributed to the 4th Caliph Hazzrat Ali to Ayatollah Ali Khameni. The manuscript is written in Kifi script. The PM gifted Hassan Rouhani Ghalib's collection of poetry and a Persian translation of *The Ramayana*. The PM entered into an agreement for the Chabahar port and Ashray Ghani of Afghanistan was also a signatory. India has committed 500 million dollars to establish infrastructure at Chabahar and will extend a road from Chabahar to Nimroz in Afghanistan. A cultural exchange programme has been planned. India and Iran have agreed upon a policy dialogue between governments and think tanks. India will assist Iran in diplomatic training and allow the diplomats of Iran to attend courses in India. Iran has agreed to import steel rails from India for port development and India will assist in constructing the Chabahar-Zahedan railway line. India will further invest in industries in Chabahar Free Trade Zone. India will also arrange for a urea manufacturing unit to be built in Iran. Chabahar to Afghanistan rail connectivity will be provided by Iran. India's ONGC has secured rights to develop offshore Farzad gas fields in Iran.



Impact of US–Iran Nuclear Deal on India–Iran Relations

Iran has achieved success in P5 + 1 (five UN Security Council members, namely, the US, China, Russia, France and the UK, plus Germany) negotiations and has concluded the Lausanne framework in 2015. This will help India in many ways. As the sanctions are removed, India can import energy from Iran without any concerns. India has revived plans for the NSTC corridor and the IPI pipeline. India will assist the Iranian economic revival by working together in aviation, oil and gas, tire, paints and the automobile industry. It will boost IT, pharmacy, sugar and soybean exports of India.



End of Part Questions

1. For India, the development of Chabahar port is a gambit against history. Examine.
2. What are the key challenges India witnesses in port diplomacy with Iran?
3. Examine the core components of India and Britain Strategic Partnership.
4. What is the impact of BEXIT on Indian Diaspora in Britain?
5. What are the reasons holding back the India-Canada Free Trade Agreement?

1
CHAPTER

India and Japan Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Evolution of India's relations with Japan
- Role of Domestic, Strategic and Personality factors
- Commercial diplomacy
- Defense and nuclear diplomacy
- Act East Policy and Japan
- Analysis of bilateral visits

EVOLUTION OF INDIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH JAPAN

Japan and India have an ancient relationship, with Buddhism acting as a common connecting factor. During the era of the ancient Silk Route, Buddhism spread to China from India. From China, Buddhism also spread to Korea and Japan. There was a dip in Indo-Japan relations during medieval times. Yet, the cultural engagement at the level of Buddhism continued.

A proper analysis of Indo-Japan relations can be clearly outlined in the period preceding and following India's independence. During the WW-II, Subhash Chandra Bose formed close ties with the Japanese in his bid to wage a war on the British army. Bose's Indian National Army (INA) was the brainchild of Japanese Major (and post-war Lieutenant-General) Iwaichi Fujiwara, head the Japanese intelligence unit Fujiwara Kikan and had its origins, first in the meetings between Fujiwara and the president of the Bangkok chapter of the Indian Independence League, Pritam Singh Dhillon. Through Pritam Singh's network, the recruitment by Fujiwara of a captured British Indian army captain, Mohan Singh on the western Malayan peninsula in December 1941 also contributed to the cause as Fujiwara's mission was "to raise an army which would fight alongside the Japanese army." After the initial proposal by Fujiwara the Indian National Army was formed as a result of discussion between Fujiwara and Mohan Singh in the second half of December 1941, and the name chosen jointly by them in the first week of January 1942.

The INA's first commitment during the WW-II was in the Japanese thrust towards Eastern Indian frontiers of Manipur. INA's special forces, the Bahadur Group, were extensively involved in operations behind enemy lines both during the diversionary attacks in Arakan, as well as the Japanese thrust towards Imphal and Kohima, along with the Burmese National Army led by Ba Maw and Aung San. The Japanese also took

possession of Andaman and Nicobar Islands in 1942 and a year later, the Provisional Government and the INA were established in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands with AD Loganathan appointed its Governor General. The islands were renamed Shaheed and Swaraj. However, the Japanese Navy remained in essential control of the island's administration. However, Japan's funding for the INA gradually dwindled and the army was forced to pull back, being defeated in crucial battles and finally capitulating to the British army. This was followed by Japan's defeat and eventual capitulation in the World War-II after the US dropped nuclear bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Post-independence, it was in the year 1952 that India and Japan concluded a Treaty of Peace and Friendship, laying the foundation of India's new diplomatic relations with Japan. However, we need to remember that relations between the two during the Cold War were not warm. One of the key reasons was the ideological difference which separated the two. India, during the Cold War, was an advocate of Non-Alignment. Japan, on the other hand, after the World War-II, concluded the Treaty of San Francisco with USA and tilted towards the capitalist orientation as Japan was economically weak and was undertaking economic reconstruction after the war. India supported Japan with the supply of iron ore. In return, India regularly got economic aid from Japan in the form of ODA (Overseas Developmental Assistance, also at times called Official Developmental Assistance). In fact, by 1986, Japan emerged as the largest economic aid donor to India.

During the Cold War, when India faced conflicts with China in 1962 and Pakistan in 1965 and 1971, the foreign policy stance of Japan towards India remained very neutral. The Japanese never supported India, nor supported its opponents, and chose to not take sides. But somehow, Japan being a follower of the US camp in the Cold War, was always uncomfortable with India's tilt to the USSR post-1971. Due to the domestic ferment and problems India had during the Cold War, Japan always perceived India as a chaotic and desperately poor nation, having no potential to be a partner in the near times. Due to successive conflicts between India and its neighbours between 1962 and 1971, South East and East Asian States branded India as needlessly aggressive. In 1967, when South East Asians created the ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations), they did not India to be a part of the group, which also contributed to India's larger exclusion from that part of the world.

However, things did improve between India and Japan after the end of the Cold War. The ending of the Cold War brought about a radical shift in the world policy as also Indian Foreign Policy. India began to improve its relations with the USA. This also led India to improve its relations with other allies of the USA, including its most important partner in the East, Japan. In the first few years in the post-Cold War period, India began improving its relations with Japan but the progress was short lived as in 1998, India carried out another nuclear test and positioned itself as a nuclear weapon state. After the test, Japan became a vocal critique of India at the regional and international level. Japan even went on to cut its economic aid to India. It was natural for Japan to condemn such foreign policy behaviour as it had been the only nation in the world to have witnessed the horror of an atomic bomb attack first-hand. Post-World War-II, Japan has become a very peaceful nation with an acute abhorrence of atomic and nuclear bombs. It perceived the Indian nuclear test as an insult to the growing relationship.

Japan and Pokhran-II

Japan called Pokhran-II a regrettable decision. It also said that the India nuclear test was a challenge to the international community. It condemned India at the G-8 summit in 1998 at Birmingham as well as at the Conference on Disarmament, 1998 and the UNSC session in June, 1998. The UN adopted a resolution urging India to halt its nuclear programme and roll back the development of nuclear weapons. Japan was a key sponsor. Japan observed that a nuclear India would escalate not only a nuclear conflict but a nuclear arms race. As Japan enjoyed protection under the nuclear umbrella of the US, it perceived a new nuclear power as a threat to its own order.

Thus, post-1998, India saw a dip in its relations with Japan. However, the US, which was also initially upset about India's nuclear testing, saw the test as an opportunity to improve its relationship with India at the level of nuclear commerce. This, at a later stage, in 2008, also led to the conclusion of an Indo–USA nuclear deal. The USA also convinced its allies, including Japan, not to be negative about the Indian nuclear tests. Consequently, in 2000, of the Japanese PM Mori Yoshiro conducted a state visit to India. Mori asserted that India and Japan will become strategic partners in future. This visit led to the birth of a new partnership between the two that has continued from 2000 to the present. The beauty of the Indo–Japan relationship has been that it is moving in an upward trajectory reaching new heights which we can now explore in themes ahead.

DOMESTIC FACTORS BETWEEN INDIA AND JAPAN


It is imperative to understand how domestic factors in India and Japan help in leveraging the Indo–Japan relationship for overall development. In Japan, many studies had been conducted which said that approximately by 2050, Japan may be pushed on the verge of zero percent economic growth because of an aging population that is moving towards a demographic disadvantage. To mitigate this challenge, Japan has, in recent times eased up its immigration policies, allowing the entry of skilled professionals. Therefore, this is one area where India and Japan have an interaction as a lot of skilled members of the Indian population are now looking at Japan as a viable option to support Japanese economic growth. Further, with coming of Shinzo Abe in Japan, we have a unique Japanese economic revival happening under a conceptual framework called Abenomics (Abe + economics). Abenomics is a unique blend of fiscal, monetary and structural reforms which Shinzo Abe is aggressively pursuing in Japan. It is again in this context that India and its corporate sector today sees a vibrant opportunity in Japan. This is also coupled with a perception which Japan has of India as a knowledge superpower, while perceiving China to be a cheap commodity superpower. The Japanese ODA is put to use in infrastructure projects in India such as the Delhi Metro, the Delhi–Mumbai Industrial Corridor, the Dedicated Freight Corridor and the Bangalore–Chennai expressway. Thus, at domestic levels, India and Japan collectively complement each other.

STRATEGIC RE-BALANCING AND PIVOT TO ASIA


In this segment, our priority is to see how the USA is acting as a core factor in bringing

India and Japan closer via its Pivot to Asia or strategic rebalancing policy. China has gradually become powerful at the economic level. A strong Chinese economy has given China a muscle to exercise at the level of military. This economic-cum-military strength of China, which has transformed it to a regional hegemony in Asia, has caused some uneasiness in US and its allies in South East and East Asia.

The USA also has witnessed the rise of China in the Asian continent, and now perceives it as a threat to its own global hegemony. Thus, over a period of time, the USA has come to feel the need to contain a rising China by outlining a new vision for Asia. The US perceives Asia as a continent of opportunities. The US has an interest in synchronizing itself with Asia for the purpose of its own domestic growth. But at the same time, it expresses concern for its allies who, it feels, are bullied by a rising China. So, the US also feels the need to support its alliance partners through its Pivot to Asia, which uses a judicious combination of the USA's economic, military, strategic and ideological footprint in the region. A rough design is provided below:



The USA has therefore kept those alliance partners in the ambit which it feels are threatened by China's power. These nations also individually lack the capacity to tackle China. The USA, under Pivot to Asia, undertakes the responsibility of providing this "capacity" (in terms of economic, military, strategic and ideological support) to its allies to contain a rising China. Thus, by virtue of this policy, the US encourages its allies in Asia to collectively come together to nullify a strong China.



The US provides capacity to the state actors and encourages them to improve and deepen relationships. The US is the most important factor in making India–Japan, Japan–South Korea, South Korea–India, India–Australia and Japan–Australia ties tighter and stronger. The US and Japan have been closely associated since the Treaty of San Francisco; the US and South Korea have a mutual Defence Treaty; the US and Australia are NATO allies and the US has also increased its economic and strategic imprint in India post the Indo–US 2008 civilian nuclear deal. All these nations, in some or the other way, directly or indirectly, are close to the US. Thus, today at the systemic level, if India and Japan come closer, it is due to the Pivot to Asia policy. However, it would be wrong to conclude that Pivot to Asia is merely a deliberate attempt on the part of the US to contain China. The US has decided to take advantage of a rising Asia and is investing in new partnership in Asia for its own economic growth. We may conclude that the Pivot to Asia has, at least, made India a partner, if not an ally, of the US but the policy certainly benefits the US more than any individual state actor in Asia.

Role of Personality Politics in India–Japan

That the US is a key factor in India–Japan relations is clearly reflected in the interaction of the heads of state of the two sides when they meet. Foreign policy experts have commented that India–Japan relations area classic example of Prime Minister-driven relationship. In recent times, Manmohan Singh and Modi have both infused enormous political energy in the relations with Shinzo Abe. Both leaders from India have jointly emphasised upon the establishment of a single seamless Asian whole and the creation of an ‘Arc of Freedom,’ leading to an alliance of these two leading democracies. The idea is to establish a seamless paradigm for free movement of navy, trade capital, finance and people between India and Japan.

COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY

As mentioned in the earlier sections, India and Japan had limited commercial ties during the Cold War. The rise in bilateral commercial relations is a post-Cold War phenomenon. However, relations at the commercial level had existed even before World War-II. At the

end of the Edo Era, the Japanese ports were opened for commerce and its trade relations with India began. With the opening of the ports Japanese industries began to import Indian cotton yarn. The trading merchants in Bombay opened more shipping lines with merchants in Yokohama. As the World War-II ended and India became independent, Japan began to export machinery and metal products to India while importing iron ore from India. The imported iron ore was used by Japan to mitigate material shortages it was facing in its domestic steel industry. Though Japan had been also providing Official Development Assistance (ODA) to India, during the Cold War its overall quantum had got reduced. Japan gradually started importing more iron ore from Brazil and Australia than India.

It was in 1981 that India initiated partial economic liberalisation, with the process completed in 1992. In 1984 Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone visited India and doubled the total amount of ODA. In the 1980s, Japan began to import diamond and prawns from India. As the Cold War ended and India embarked upon full economic liberalisation, a new chapter in the bilateral trade opened up. The economic and commercial ties was accelerated in 2011 when the two sides concluded a comprehensive and economic partnership agreement (CEPA). The CEPA gives India access to a 5-trillion-dollar GDP while giving Japan an access to more business opportunities in India.



India–Japan CEPA

In November 2004, India and Japan established a Joint Study Group (JSG) to explore the possibility of a CEPA. The JSG held four meeting from July, 2005 to April, 2006. In December, 2006, it was decided to establish a negotiation mechanism. From January, 2007 to September, 2010, 14 rounds of negotiations were held and in September, 2010, an agreement in principle was arrived upon. On 16th February, 2011 India and Japan concluded the CEPA.

India feels the CEPA is an alliance between Japanese technology and Indian labour force. As per the CEPA, by 2012, for trade in goods 94% tariffs were eliminated between India and Japan on a trade value basis.




During Indian PM's visit to Japan in 2014, the Japanese PM Shinzo Abe committed 35 billion dollars' worth investments to India till 2019. India exports petroleum products, chemicals, fish, clothing and machinery to Japan while it imports, electrical machinery, transport equipments, plastic materials and precision instruments. Japanese FDI to India is mainly limited to the automobile and pharmaceutical sectors. With a red carpet for

Japanese investors under the Modi government, the trade relations are bound to increase in future.

INDIA–JAPAN DEFENCE DIPLOMACY

The origin of the defence diplomacy between India and Japan could be traced back to the year 2000 when Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori visited India and envisaged a global partnership with India. In 2003, during the visit of Japanese PM Junichiro Koizumi to India, the relationship took a positive turn. Finally, in 2007 Shinzo Abe envisaged the confluence of the two seas and establishment of an arc of freedom and prosperity which saw its final culmination in 2014 in a Special Strategic and Global Partnership.



Under the Act East Policy, the most crucial connector between India and Japan has been maritime cooperation. The two sides have a Maritime Security Dialogue since 2013. The most unique feature of this maritime cooperation is that it incorporates not only naval cooperation but commercial maritime activities as well. The maritime cooperation manifests in the US and Australia also acting as core players in the game. Though Chinese assertiveness is a factor in bringing India and Japan closer, both nations are cautious that they don't posture their bilateral maritime cooperation as an anti-China alliance. The defence diplomacy is gaining strength as India is emerging as a strong naval power and is likely to fill the vacuum left by the US in the region. In 2015, India and Japan concluded an Agreement on Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology Cooperation. This agreement will provide India with advanced defence technology for the purposes of research and development. As the Indian defence market opens up, Japanese defence players will see rising presence in India.

India has declared Japan as a privileged market partner in Make in India programme. Shinzo Abe has also proposed a ‘Democratic Security Diamond’ involving Japan, India, the US and Australia. The Diamond shall be the guardian of maritime security from the Indian Ocean to western Pacific. One of the reasons why Japan has proposed the Diamond is because of declining US power in the region. As China becomes assertive and the US witnesses a gradual decline in its power in Asia, Japan intends to fill the void with a partnership with other democratic Asian states. The National Security strategy of Japan announced in 2013 has also included India as a primary driver in maintaining the balance of power in Asia disturbed by a rising China. Japanese scholar Dr Satoru Nagao has stressed that countries in the Indo-Pacific region are in the midst of a security dilemma regarding their maritime projection and are countering this by up scaling production of submarines, which are considered symbols of tackling statist threats. He emphasised that the coastal countries around the East China Sea have increased the number of submarines

in their naval arsenal in the light of the changing power balance between the US and China. Speaking at the conference on ‘India–Japan Partnership in the Changing Asian Strategic Scenario’, organised on March 18, 2016, he further asserted that to mitigate the threat of assertiveness China, Japan should cooperate at the defence level with India, which is also another rising power in Asia.

One of the key areas of identified cooperation is at the maritime level. India has decided to buy 12 US-2 Amphibian aircrafts from Japan. The defence cooperation, while being on the rise, has also brought some concerns. Japan is concerned about its intellectual property in defence technology transfers. India has convinced Japan of its stellar reputation in preventing breaches of intellectual property. Though the US will remain the nucleus of Japan’s security policy, India has emerged in the ambit of Japan as a crucial player for Asian security. Japan mostly follows the USA’s footsteps in its engagement with India. As India and the USA have signed a LEMOA, it is this which is likely to emerge as the next step in Japan–India defence diplomacy.



Malabar-2017—A Concert at the Seas to Avoid the Thucydides Trap?

In 2017, Indian Navy (IN) collaborated with Japan and US too carry out the Malabar exercises. During the Cold War, IN remained isolated due to the non-alignment. Though Soviet Union did provide India with naval hardware, but, no professional interaction happened between IN and Soviet Navy during the Cold War. IN remained clung to the outdated doctrines of NATO. When USSR disintegrated, India lost all inhibitions of non alignment and decided to embrace the post Cold War world order with a new confidence. US dispatched the Pacific Army commander General Claude Kick lighter who proposed US-India military to military cooperation in 1991. India and US did a naval drill in 1992 for the first time. This naval drill led to the birth of the Malabar exercise between India and USA. Malabar provided the IN with new insights into tactics, doctrines and warfare techniques. As the Malabar exercises progressed, Japan entered the scene in 2016 and thereby made Malabar a trilateral format. The naval cooperation of India has moved out of the orbit of non-alignment to enter into the new mutant of non-alignment that is strategic autonomy. Malabar exercises are an attempt by India to avoid a Thucydides trap. Thucydides said that it was the rise of Athens that led to fear in the mind of Sparta, leading to the war. Today the Indian foreign policy, in order to avoid the Thucydides trap is cooperating with Japan and US to establish a favorable regional balance of power. The 2017 Malabar exercise gave an insight to the Indian Navy to benefit from the diverse operational expertise. As China acquires bases in the Indian Ocean and enhances its presence in India’s backyard, the Malabar exercises provide the IN an opportunity to establish a triad which could manifest as a mega trilateral balancer in the region.

INDIA–JAPAN NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY

In November, 2016, at an annual bilateral summit, India and Japan concluded a nuclear deal, which was being negotiated since 2010. The successful conclusion of the deal will provide India access to the Japanese nuclear market as well as their technology. During the negotiation stage, Japan had been insisting that India sign the NPT and the CTBT. India, on the other hand, convinced Japan of its good track record in non-proliferation as well as a self-imposed moratorium on further nuclear testing. India, thus, concluded the deal without being a signatory to the NPT. They have signed an additional document called a ‘Note’ on views and understanding as per which if India violates its self-imposed moratorium, and then Japan has the right to terminate nuclear cooperation with India. The termination of the deal shall not be up-front. There will be a joint security assessment to analyse the reasons that compelled India to undertake the nuclear testing in the first place. This would be followed by a safety assessment where they would determine the impact on the safety of the facility in case supplies are stopped. This would be followed by the clause of right to return. As per the clause, Japan, at its own cost, will seek a return of the material supplied to India. As per the deal, Japan will give a one-year notice to India before ending nuclear cooperation if India tests a nuclear weapon. India has already signed deals with France, Russia and the USA. As a majority of the nuclear parts were made by Japan, in the absence of a deal with Japan, India found it tough to order nuclear technology from the US, France and Russia. As firms like GE, Westing house and Areva have stakes in Hitachi, Mitsubishi and Toshiba, the Indo–Japan deal will now open up business opportunities in India for all of them.

India used the Indo–US nuclear deal as a template while designing the clause related to reprocessing. India has the right to reprocess at sites which are under the safeguards put in place by the IAEA by signing the nuclear deal with Japan. Japan not only has some very advanced nuclear technologies but also is a reliable player as it is known for not imposing additional ties. As the two countries take their relations to global strategic partnership level, the nuclear deal will help the two achieve the dream of Asian G-2.

INDIA’S ACT EAST POLICY AND JAPAN

Not only the two sides have improved their diplomatic and economic ties but improvement is seen in defence and strategic diplomacy as well. India and Japan are now special strategic and global partners. Some of the key drivers of the growing Indo–Japan relationship are changing geopolitical scenarios in the Asia Pacific and the shared bilateral value of democracy between the two. Sushma Swaraj, India’s Foreign Minister, rightly asserted in 2015 in New York during the first India–Japan–US trilateral meeting that Japan is the very core of India’s Act East Policy and a partner of India’s growth in East Asia. India initiated its Look East Policy in 1990s to engage with the tiger economies of the ASEAN. At the end of the Cold War, as the ASEAN expanded and added Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam and Thailand, it’s brought the ASEAN at India’s doorsteps. India began to use this opportunity to cement economic ties in the region. India’s Look East Policy has continued to remain one of the most decorated components of its foreign policy.

Six months after taking office in May, 2014, the Indian PM Narendra Modi, while addressing the East Asian Summit in Myanmar, announced India’s Act East Policy, with

an emphasis upon connectivity, culture and commerce. India seeks to move beyond its ASEAN-centric policy and intends to assert dominance in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. In order to achieve this, Japan has assumed a hegemonic position in India's Act East Policy. Japan too has welcomed India in East Asia and has used multiple instruments to deepen ties with India.



Japan has effectively used multiple 'mini-lateral' forums (as visible in the diagram above) to boost its ties with India. The Quad of G-4 has been used to collectively seek a UN Security Council Seat. Similarly, the Triangular Ministerial Dialogue was used as a mechanism not only to promote public opinion and dialogue but also to foster maritime cooperation. The reinterpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution allows Japan to boost strategic cooperation with India. The amended Article 9 (since September 2015) allows Japan to send military aid to friendly states (that includes India) if they come under attack from another state. This amendment has opened up new avenues of strategic diplomacy between India and Japan. The strengthened Indo-Japan relationship in the backdrop of the Act East Policy is also driven by Chinese assertiveness. Both India and Japan want to ensure that Asian decision making is not hijacked by China but remains committed on the principles of consensus building. The support of the US for India's Act East policy will ensure a consensus-based regional architecture will help in bringing India and Japan closer.

INDIAN PM'S VISIT TO JAPAN AND OTHER BILATERAL VISITS AS PART OF INDIA-JAPAN ANNUAL SUMMITS

The Indian PM paid a visit to Japan from 31st August to 3rd September 2014. During the visit, the two nations concluded the Tokyo Declaration. The two sides decided to strengthen bilateral cooperation through various dialogue mechanisms and to use '2 plus 2 dialogue' involving their foreign and defence secretaries to strengthen security cooperation. During the PM's visit, an MoU to strengthen defence cooperation was signed envisaging bilateral maritime cooperation. Japan expressed an interest to transfer defence technology to India. A joint working group to work upon defence technology transfer of US-2 amphibian aircraft was established. The PM announced establishment of India-Japan investment Promotion Partnership where the two sides decided to double the inflow of FDI to India over the next five years. Japan also decided to invest 3.5 trillion yen ODA to India in specific sectors.


The visit of Indian PM to Japan in 2014 led to the birth of Tokyo Declaration. The two leaders have taken the bilateral relations to the level of special strategic and global partners. At the defence level in 2014, the leaders have further decided that:

- There shall be regular military and naval exercises between the two nations.
- There shall be a trilateral defence meeting between India, Japan and the USA.
- Japan has lifted the ban on sale of products of defence companies they had


imposed upon after 1998 PNE.

- Japan is to sell US-2 amphibian aircrafts to India.

Similarly, Japan has affirmed investments in the ‘Plus Five Segment’, namely infrastructure transport, smart cities, Ganga cleaning, manufacturing and clean energy. Japan shall also be creating Industrial townships in India. The two have decided to name Varanasi as Kyoto’s sister city in the near future. Japan had also been conducting feasibility study on bullet trains in India and has recently announced the initiation of the Ahmedabad–Mumbai bullet train project, amounting to rupees 1.1 lakh crores.




Japan committed to develop Electronics Parks and Japanese-style Industrial Townships in India. Various projects in infrastructure, investment, energy and natural resources were announced.



The Indian PM visited Japan on 11th and 12th November, 2016 to participate in the bilateral annual summit. During the Summit, the two sides concluded an agreement on cooperation in the field of civilian nuclear energy for peaceful uses. An MoU was signed with Japan where Japan in the next 10 years will train 30,000 Indian youth by setting up a Japan–India Institute for manufacturing.



Japanese PM Shinzo Abe visited India from 11th to 13th December, 2015. The two sides reiterated their commitment to work for infrastructure, manufacturing, transport and nuclear technology. An agreement on Transfer of Defence equipment and Technology and an agreement on protection of classified military information were signed. To create an infrastructure that would boost connectivity, the two sides decided to synergise the Act East Policy and Japan's Partnership for quality infrastructure.



The PM paid a visit to Varanasi and took part in Ganga *arti* ritual and Ganga *arti*. Abe announced a decision to build a convention centre in Varanasi. Japan agreed to officially be a part of trilateral Malabar exercise with the US and India. Abe also committed to the development of a high speed rail network in India and the supported sharing of SHINKANSEN trains. Japan is planning to establish a manufacturing deal where it will be a stakeholder in the offset clause.

12th India–Japan Annual Summit-2017

In September 2017, the Japanese PM Shinzo Abe visited India for the Annual Summit. The Annual Summit happened in the backdrop of rising Chinese aggression in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, which has emerged a concern for India and Japan both. Japan was the only country that supported India during the Doklam standoff with China. During the visit, the two countries discussed a Maritime Security Pact and decided to institutionalize a Maritime Security Dialogue to take forward the Maritime Affairs Dialogue (signed in 2013). The Japanese PM officially launched Asia-Africa Growth Corridor and inaugurated the Mumbai-Ahmedabad High Speed Rail (MAHSR) project. The project heralds a new era of safety, speed and service and will help the Indian railways craft a pathway to becoming a global leader in scale, technology and skill. The MAHSR works on an attractive low cost long term financing model. Japan will be providing a soft loan of 90,000 crore Rupees to India at an interest rate of 0.1 percent over

50 years. The re-payment of the loan is to begin after 15 years of receiving the loan. There have been criticisms that such a high speed train in a poverty stricken India is elitist and India can do without it. Such criticism were there even in 1969 when the first ever Rajdhani Express train was launched from Howrah to Delhi. However, leapfrogging technology and development with elitism is unwarranted at this stage. The Japanese PM visited India after the operationalization of the Indo-Japan Nuclear deal. India and Japan envisaged cooperation in the areas of space program. TeamIndus, an Indian aerospace firm (backed by Ratan Tata, Nandan Nilekani and Kiran Mazumdar-Shaw), has joined hands with Japan to launch India's first private satellite in March 2018. The PSLV-XL launch will happen from Sriharikota and will carry a Japanese rover Sorato and Indian rover ECA. The main engines are sourced from Japan's IHI Aerospace and Sorato rover is developed by iSpace Tokyo. The PSLV of ISRO will inject the spacecraft into an orbit 800 KM above the surface of the earth and from there, the spacecraft will set course to the moon by switching on its own engines. When the spacecraft lands on the lunar surface (Mare Imbrium), the rovers would be deployed. The visit of the Japanese PM clearly saw the two sides exploring opportunities in areas where both have complimentary strengths. The space partnership will serve as another plank in the effort to present a counter to Beijing while for New Delhi, it will be a spring board for a bigger role in the global arena. The two sides exchanged a Record of Discussion(ROD) on cooperation with respect to open skies (enabling the two states to mount unlimited flights to each other's countries). Maritime cooperation has emerged as a new area between the two. Historically India has always perceived the Indian Ocean as its exclusive sphere of influence (which China has never accepted) and India believed that no power could challenge its position in the Indian ocean. However, China, due to its aggressive economic growth in the recent decades, has developed a might to challenge the Indian influence amongst the maritime neighbors of India like Pakistan (through the CPEC), Djibouti (the first Chinese naval base in Indian Ocean) and Sri Lanka (as visible in Hambantota port). India desperately needs to counter these but doesn't really have the economic bandwidth to match the geopolitical needs. This is where Japan steps in to assist India (as it gives Japan an opportunity to expand its own influence in the Indian Ocean).

POTENTIAL CONCERNS AND IRRITANTS

In the recent Modi-Abe bilateral meeting between India and Japan in 2014, concerns were raised by both sides. The Japanese people about facing hurdles in India while conducting businesses. They say that Japanese firms do not find it easy to do business in India due to project delays and bureaucratic hurdles. In order to rectify the above scenarios and solve the Japanese grievances, India has decided to undertake two steps. Firstly, the Indian PM assured that on the red tape would be replaced with red carpet for Japanese businessmen and also secondly, requested Japan to send two nominees from Japan to the Indian Prime Minister office to work as representatives of Japan to work in close cooperation with PMO and the concerned ministries here.

India communicated to Japan the need to transform the ODA to FDI (Foreign Direct Investment). The reason behind this was the fact that if India keeps on receiving ODA, then the world will continue to perceive India as a nation dependent upon economic aid, whereas upon receiving foreign investment, India can globally position itself as a favourable investment destination and invite investment from all over the world. Japan in

2014 committed to transform its ODA commitments into FDI and assured India with investments worth 35 billion dollars in the next five years.

India and Japan—Can they be the Next Asian G-2?

During the Cold War, India and Japan could not envisage a strategic relationship due to ideological differences. As India followed non-alignment, it emerged as a big tree that gave no shade while Japan focused on economic reconstruction after World War-II and earned a reputation of an economic giant but a political pygmy. In the post Cold War period, the growing assertiveness of China and the decline of US power in Asia (US under Trump has challenged the two foundations on which its presence in Asia was based upon acting as a market for Asian products and protecting its Asian allies and friends) has prompted proximity between India and Japan as both have realized that they have to fend themselves to tackle an assertive China. Both also fear a possibility of G-2 (US and China) as a new threat. Shinzo Abe has demonstrated capabilities to position Japan as a leading power in Asia while Modi has driven India away from the ideological burden of non alignment to position India as a leading power by building wide ranging partnerships. India and Japan in the recent times have strengthened their bilateral relations at the defense level by concluding agreements for defense technology transfer and maritime security. The bilateral economic cooperation too has got enhanced under the Act East Policy of India and Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure in Asia (EPQI) of Japan. The newness in the India-Japan relationship is a bilateral decision of the two to form a mini-lateral coalition to jointly develop Africa (by pooling human and financial capital) under the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor {with an intention to pose it as a counter to the Chinese OBOR}. A strong alliance between India and Japan will not upset the US as both favor Indo-Japan proximity. But, such an alliance can certainly keep a check on unilateralism of China in Asia and contribute to maintenance of a regional balance of power.

As the depth in the bilateral diplomatic ties enhance, three questions remain:

1. Whether India will enter into an alliance with Japan to promote a stable balance of power in Asia?
2. Whether Modi will overcome the bureaucratic inertia to go for an alliance?
3. Will Japan leave the monogamy of its alliance with US and embrace India?

FUTURE POTENTIAL AREAS OF COOPERATION

Japan being a nation in need of rare earth metals is eagerly exploring the same in China. This, despite the fact that India has a lot of rare earth metals. However, India lacks adequate technology to explore them. This is certainly one area where Japan and India can work jointly in the future.

Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) – Partnership for Sustainable Development and Innovation Development—The Vision?

In the recent times, Asia has witnessed aggressive economic growth. It has provided a tail wind to the global economy. Africa is endowed with demography and an economic potential. In order to connect the aspirations of Asia and Africa, the two have decided to establish an AAGC. The corridor will have four components:

1. Development and cooperation projects
2. Quality infrastructure and institutional connectivity
3. Capabilities and skill enhancement
4. People to People partnerships.

The aim of the AAGC is to develop quality infrastructure to unleash growth through effective mobilization of financial resources. The corridor will align socio-economic development strategies of Asia and Africa and enhance the capabilities and skills through human resource training, skill training, vocational training. The corridor envisages Greenfield infrastructure projects, Joint Ventures with focus on renewable energy and power grids. The people to people partnerships are envisaged by promotion of tourism, education, knowledge facilitation and exchanges amongst the people.

2
CHAPTER

India and the USA Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Historical diplomatic relations
- Defense and nuclear diplomacy
- Commercial diplomacy and Visa related issues
- Education diplomacy
- Analysis of bilateral visits

RELATIONS DURING THE COLD WAR

India and the US today stand to have a strategic partnership, but this was not always the case. It has undergone a tremendous transformation, to understand which, an analysis of their relations during the Cold War is necessary. We begin our study from World War-II era. For the US, in the interwar period, India did not have any economic or strategic significance. As India was then a British colony, the communication between India and the US at an independent level was impossible. It was F D Roosevelt who realised that India can play an important role in the World War-II. According to Roosevelt, India could act as a block to resist Japanese aggression in South Asia and provide the needed resistance for war efforts. In order to ensure that India participates in the World War-II, the nationalist leaders of India were to be taken into confidence. The nationalists stuck to one particular point—that India would support war efforts provided the British give them independence in return. Roosevelt, for that matter, took up the Indian issue with Churchill. The British did not appreciate the US prodding their affairs, which resulted in some tension in the US-British alliance. As far as the US was concerned, it was of the opinion that as the allied powers are fighting for independence and right to self-determination (RTSD), they should also in turn liberate their colonies, who were fighting imperialism for the same reasons.

In fact, the fundamental disagreement over India can be best elaborated if we look at how the US and the British viewed the Atlantic Charter (AC), which was a pivotal policy statement issued during World War-II on 14 August 1941, which defined the Allied goals for the post-war world. The leaders of the United Kingdom and the United States drafted the work and all the Allies later ratified it. The Charter stated the ideal goals of the war—no territorial aggrandisement; no territorial changes made against the wishes of the people; self-determination; restoration of self-government to those deprived of it; reduction of trade restrictions; global cooperation to secure better economic and social conditions for all; freedom from fear and want; freedom of the seas; and abandonment of the use of force, as well as disarmament of aggressor nations. Adherents of the Atlantic Charter signed the Declaration by United Nations on 1 January 1942, which became the basis for the modern United Nations. The Article 3 of the Charter advocated the idea of RTSD. The

Atlantic Charter advocated that all participating allies in war need to ensure that once that war is over, the people belonging to the lost territories after the war will have the RTS. Churchill's view was that this Atlantic Charter point of RTS held exclusively for Nazi areas won in the war. In contrast, for Roosevelt, the Atlantic Charter was a universal proposition and also applied to territories under colonial rule. Thus, for the US, India was a rightful claimant to RTS.

Communication Gap in Indo-US Relations

The lack of communication between India and the US was a crucial missing link. The reason was that India was a British colony. If the US wanted any communication, the communication would flow through the British Embassy in Washington to the Foreign Office in London and then to Indian offices. In order to initiate communication between India and the US during the onset of the World War-II, Roosevelt sent a senior diplomat in 1941 to undertake direct communication with India. The senior diplomat was designated as a US commissioner in New Delhi. In return, a senior Indian civil servant was designated and sent to the US agent general of India. in 1942, Roosevelt sent Louis Johnson, the former Assistant Secretary of war in US administration, as the Personal Representative to India. Thus, Roosevelt expanded the lines of communication between India and the US.

Though Roosevelt tried his level best to convince Churchill about liberating India, after his threat to resign, the US gave up the Indian issue, much to the unhappiness and disappointment of Indians. They were of the opinion that the US should have applied more pressure on its own ally to get a timeframe for Indian independence. The Indian Nationalists resorted to the Quit India Movement in 1942. The Americans did not appreciate this tactic of India and advised that the priority, at the moment, was to cooperate in World War –II. This brought about a slowdown in the relations between India and the US. Thus, for the US, the priority was winning World War-II, which India perceived as secondary, as for India, the primary cause was its own independence from the British.

Role of the US in the Indian National Movement

Since the beginning of the 20th century, the national movement gradually began to be known to the people in the US. Firstly, some Indian students who used to visit the US began to popularise the cause of national movement. Secondly, eminent personalities from India, such as Rabindranath Tagore and Swami Vivekananda, also visited US, which created an awareness about this faraway colonial space in the consciousness of US citizens. However, this was also the time when the US was very favourably inclined to the British and did not take the Indian national movement very seriously. An important role in popularisation of the national movement was played by American missionaries. A lot of missionaries had over a period of time come to India. They prepared reports on the national movement. They also wrote extensively about the dissent that the Indian people had developed against the British government. This

helped in taking the national movement to the educated masses of the US.

As India became independent, a new irritant that emerged between India and the US was the issue of Kashmir. Difference also arose over the question of national priorities. The US advocated military buildup to contain the Soviets while India refrained from the logic of containment with a focus on economy and a stable international order.

Kashmir was the more pressing issue. Kashmir was given an option to join India or Pakistan. It was ruled by Hari Singh, who initially showed reluctance to join either India or Pakistan and began to negotiate a standstill agreement with both. India rejected any standstill agreement while Pakistan accepted the idea of standstill agreement. The acceptance of Pakistan was based on the assumption that a standstill agreement meant that initially, rail, postal, telegraph areas would be with Hari Singh but defence and foreign policy decisions would lie with Pakistan. Pakistan thought that this arrangement would pave way for the accession of Kashmir with them. Hari Singh was not comfortable with Pakistani interference and began to stall the standstill agreement. Pakistan thought Hari Singh was secretly negotiating with India and was therefore beginning to stall the standstill agreement. While all this was underway, communal riots broke out in Jammu. Pakistan thought India would take advantage of the riots and send in security forces and responded with a pre-emptive attack by sending soldiers disguised as tribesmen in Kashmir and began an invasion. As the rebellion of tribals erupted, Hari Singh appealed to India for help, to which Nehru responded and on 26th October, 1947, sent in Indian troops to take charge of Kashmir.

Upon the insistence of the US, India took the matter to the UN. India opined that the UN would urge Pakistan to halt aggression and withdraw forces. In the meantime, India sent an extensive combat operation in Kashmir. By the time Indian troops entered Kashmir, Pakistan had occupied two-thirds of Kashmir. India continued to advocate a diplomatic solution through the UN. The British certainly did not favour escalation and they tilted to support Pakistan out of its own interest. The British, at the end of World War-II, had handed over the Mandate of Palestine to the UN, which had upset the Arabs. The British thought that if they also alienate Kashmir, it would upset equations in the Middle East as Pakistan had just emerged as an Islamic state. Though the British wanted a peaceful and acceptable solution to the Kashmir dispute, they were reluctant to drag the issue further. The British decided to seek US assistance. The US itself was not keen on meddling into Asian affairs and was initially reluctant. However, to respect its alliance with the British, the US began to develop a position similar to the British position on the matter. They also advocated a plebiscite and a political solution. The US even warned India that if India did not cooperate, it could have consequences for the Indo-US relations. India, in contrast, insisted that it did not need goodwill of any nation and it could anyway develop proximity to the Soviets. India resented the Anglo-American axis and perceived the US policy on Kashmir as an extension of the colonial legacy. As the Cold War deepened, the US came to appreciate the fact that the India way was a democratic one and they shared this value with India. They also realised that India is geographically proximate to communist China. The US began to give economic aid to India to target communist China. In the process, when in 1962, the Indo-China conflict took place, the US supported India and even decided at one time to supply military equipment and weapons. However, as China declared a unilateral ceasefire, the delivery of US weapons was not necessitated.

India did appreciate US support but made it clear that it would not support either the US or the USSR and would continue with its non-alignment policy.

However, it is noteworthy that India, under NAM, was not particularly neutral in practice, but was actually anti-US, with a tilt towards the Soviet camp. There were two reasons why India preferred the Soviet Union over the US. Firstly, India was deeply affected due to colonialism. The Indian psyche was so severely affected, that colonialism was not something it would ever admire or condone. When India analysed the past, it established an understanding that the USSR was better than the western imperial powers and their ally, the US, as it lacked any colonial history. Secondly, India appreciated the Soviet model of industrialisation and was favourably inclined to a state-led model as contrast to the free market model of the US. India was, at this point, yet to understand the underside of the kind of oppressive communism practised by Stalin or the conditions to which the satellite states of the USSR were being subjected under the communist regime.

American fears got further exacerbated post-1971. At the strategic level, after the treaty with the Soviet Union in 1971, the USSR extended its security blanket to India against any future military threat. The USSR also continued to give arms to India. During the period of the Cold War, as India adopted a closed economy, it held little appeal for the US. The US could not take up any serious economic engagement due to the different economic model adopted by India. As Indian economy was relatively weak, it could not establish a strong military. The absence of a strong military meant that India did not pose a direct challenge to any interest of the US in Asia. Another factor that added to the neglect of Indo-US relations was Pakistan. Pakistan became an ally of the US (through SEATO—1954 and CENTO—1955). Pakistani territory was used by the US as a military base for the containment of the USSR. The US–Pakistan axis contributed significantly in reducing the scope of India–US. India's worst apprehensions came true in 1971 when Nixon heavily tilted to help Pakistan in the East Pakistan crisis by sending in the USS Enterprise. For many decades, India established a negative perception of the US as it had been an Indian enemy in war. The testing of nuclear weapon in 1974 by India took Indo-US relations to a new low and the two could not evolve consensus on nuclear non-proliferation. The period of the Cold War subsequently remained a low phase in Indo-US engagement.

INDIA AND US DEFENCE DIPLOMACY

Basic Overview

When the Cold War ended, India began to initiate a defence partnership with the US. In 1991, the US army Chief Claude Kicklighter visited India and presented the famous Kicklighter proposals. As per the proposals, defence cooperation between the US and the Indian army was envisaged and an executive steering group for navy (in 1992) and Air Force (in 1993) was to be undertaken. This was followed by Malabar I, Malabar II, and Malabar III naval exercises. In 1995, agreed minutes for the expansion of defence cooperation between the US and Indian defence departments and service-to-service military exchanges were undertaken. In 2005, it evolved into a new framework for Indo-US defence trade, amounting, in recent times to over 9 billion dollars. In 2010, the Indo-US counter terrorism cooperation initiative was launched. It has focus areas like capacity building, mega city policing, cyber security and so forth. In 2013, the Joint Principles for Defence Cooperation was agreed upon to ensure technology transfers and defence trade. A

defence policy group had been established which acts as a guide for defence cooperation between India and the US.

India has purchased eight Boeing P-8-I multi-mission marine aircrafts from the US. In April, 2016, the US Defence Secretary Ashton Carter visited India to boost defence cooperation. The US and India agreed on two pathfinder projects. They will jointly establish the Digital Helmet mounted display and joint biological tactical detection system. There is cooperation on next generation protective ensemble suit for soldiers to be used in nuclear and chemical warfare. The two will also cooperate on mobile electronic hybrid power sources and launch micro drones for surveillance in battlefield. Since 2012, there was a Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) in place and in 2014 came the Indo-US Declaration on Defence Cooperation. During Obama's 2015 visit to India, a Defence Framework for India-US—which had been argued for 10 years, and a joint strategic vision for the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean region—was concluded. The core components of DTTI are Defence Cooperation, R&D, Defence Trade and Co-development of equipments.

In January 2015, the Pentagon established an India Rapid Reaction cell as a country-specific cell for bilateral cooperation with India. The aim is to move beyond the buyer-seller dynamics and go for technology transfers. In March 2016, the US-India Defence Technology and Partnership Act was introduced in the US. This will institutionalise the DTTI and India Rapid Reaction Cell. During the visit of Ashton Carter, the principles of understanding were laid for a Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA). The LEMOA was finally concluded during John Kerry's visit to India on 30th August, 2016, which coincided with the Indian Defence Minister's visit to the US.

In-depth Analysis


The origin of security cooperation between India and US in the modern times owes its origin to the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004. As the Tsunami struck Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Maldives, and other areas, the Indian Navy immediately launched a mega disaster relief operation. This humanitarian intervention of the Indian Navy received support from the US Navy as well. The two decided to work together to provide immediate post-disaster relief. The joint experience gave rise to an emerging bilateral security cooperation which had never been witnessed before. The US appreciated the Indian Navy's swiftness while India appreciated the American Navy's professionalism and logistics. This led the two sides to establish cooperation at the dimension of naval diplomacy with humanitarian applications. The consolidation of this security cooperation is still an ongoing process and the conclusion of the Logistical Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) in 2016 is a step in the same direction. However, we shall also figure out reasons why security remains a weak dimension in the Indo-US bilateral ties. One reason for security being an area of disconnect is how both perceive their global roles. The US, since the end of the WW-II, favours a system where its friend and allies collectively defend freedom and work cooperatively on dimensions of strategic interest. However, India's global aspirations are premised upon its historic greatness and its quest for maintaining strategic autonomy. At the philosophical level, the US favours aggressive changes to strategic situations.

India-US Defence Agreements

Three key issues analysed in the case


India-US Defense sales

Let us now consider the India-US Defence Framework. The first ever step towards defense diplomacy between India and US was seen in 1962 when India had a conflict with China. At that time Nehru, in a letter to John F Kennedy, had sought US military help. The then Foreign Secretary General of India, M J Desai, had conveyed categorically to the then US ambassador to India, John Kenneth Galbraith, that India would seek military aid from the US provided that the US does not insist on alliance formation. The US had agreed to immediately order military supply to be airlifted to India. However, this initial cooperation was perceived by the two sides very differently. The US saw the Sino-Indian conflict as an exercise that would allow the US to explore a common working ground with India. For the Indians, it was limited assistance and much lesser than what they expected, which also eventually was stopped in 1965 when war with Pakistan broke out. For India, the cooperation was insignificant in contrast to Indian cooperation with the USSR. Since the end of the Cold War, both India and the US have steadily improved their security cooperation. However, the difference in the structure of defence establishments in India and the US often create different worldviews, thereby, at times, causing friction in the process of security cooperation. In India, the civilian bureaucrats, often with no experience in national security, have an upper hand while in the US, it's the military officials who have an upper hand in military diplomacy. In 1991, the commander of US Army Pacific, Claude Kicklighter, sent a proposal to the chief of Indian Army General Sunith Francis Rodriguez. These proposals were known as the Kicklighter proposals and envisaged bilateral visits, training and conferences between India and the US. An important dimension also was the participation of India in regional conferences sponsored by the US. A new Defence Policy Group was also established. The approval for the Kicklighter proposals had to come from Indian Ministry of Defence. The clearances came very slowly and painfully. This highlighted to the US, the difference in the Indian approach at the defence level. The next level of defence cooperation came up in 1995 when the two sides concluded an agreement called the Agreement Minute on Defence Relations. This marked a new dimension of strategic cooperation between India and the US. The US officials were again puzzled in 1995 as this deal too was negotiated by the civilian bureaucracy and was again slow in process. After delays in drafting the document, in 1995 finally just a month before the visit of Secretary Perry from the US to India, the document was prepared. It envisaged three broad dimensions for cooperation.




Though a framework had been established, at the time of implementation there was a perceived gap in the objectives that each side intended to achieve. For the Indian civilian bureaucracy, technology access was the core objective while the Indian military envisaged access to specialised courses and equipment. On the other hand, the US officials wanted military contacts with future interoperability as the objective. The defence relations were

further enhanced in 2005 when the two sides concluded a framework agreement where both, for the first time, accepted common interests and shared beliefs in values like freedom, democracy and the rule of law. There was a decision taken to give a public character to the emerging bilateral relationship. The 2005 agreement identified thirteen broad activities that both sides decided to envisage bilaterally. A dimension of cooperation in missile defence was added in the 2005 agreement.



With the coming of the Modi government in 2014, India and the US concluded a ten-year framework agreement for defence cooperation in 2015. What makes the 2015 agreement different from the 2005 agreement is its focus on more areas of cooperation.



The next dimension that again brought out differences between the two sides was defence trade. In 2013, the US Deputy Secretary of Defence, Ashton Carter envisaged a DTI with India. India perceived the DTI as majorly a Defence Technology Initiative while for the US, it was more a Defence Trade Initiative. The initiative was finally called the DTTI or Defence Technology and Trade Initiative.




From the Indian perspective, the core goal of defence engagement with the US is based on transfer of sophisticated military technology from the US to India for supporting domestic development of defence equipments. India believes that any military diplomacy with a foreign state should assist the Indian defence industry to undertake production of technology in India. For India, the maintenance of a credible strategic autonomy is possible only if India develops a capable defence industry domestically. For the US, its defence diplomacy with India is to establish a long-term relationship that would allow both India and the US to jointly address contingencies in the region that may arise in the future. For the US, if India purchases defence products from them and uses their

equipments, then interoperability gets drastically enhanced. For this, the US favours more bilateral military exercises to establish technical interoperability.


Some Indian officials do not share this point of view. India, in recent times, has started positioning itself as a net security provider in the Indian Ocean region as an extension to India's quest of regional supremacy. Indian officials believe that any interoperability with the US will be an unwanted intrusion into sovereign Indian space. Indians favour a one-time transaction over establishing a partnership with the US as they still perceive the US as an unreliable supplier. This is because, as per US laws, the US Congress, even before the transaction is consummated, can block or amend a sale agreement through legislation. A precedent can be cited in the way, after the 1974 nuclear test by India, the US halted fuel supply to the Tarapur Plant despite a thirty-year supply agreement. Though the bilateral Indo-US Defence Trade does not require licensing anywhere, there is a perception amongst the Indian side that the US Arms Export Control Act will act as a burden on defence purchases made by India.



For India, any procurement it makes should have the following:



The US officials also face difficulty in negotiating prices with Indians. Indian Defence Procurement Policies have no concept related to life-cycle costs. The US equipment is costly. While the pre-bid phase of acquiring technology is on, India favour deals on the basis of fixed costs. The US suppliers, on the other hand, assert that they do offer expensive equipment but later, the costs can come down when it comes to contracts for long-term maintenance as they see a product through its complete life cycle. Thus, the US suppliers favour 'life cycle costs'-based bidding while the Indians are sceptical about such moves. Furthermore, India favours more customisation of equipment owing to the broad variety of conditions in which the Indian military operates. The Israeli and French bidders excel in coordination over their US counterparts. India is also very particular in ensuring that bidders meet all specifications at the evaluation stage—even if one specification is not complied with, India rejects the bidder. The coming of Ashton Carter helped in making the US defence system more user-friendly for India. India was brought under the Strategic Trade Authorisation Group of countries, enabling defence trade with no license for a few products. He focused on coproduction at maritime and air levels, which was highly appreciated by India. In conclusion, few broad themes can be outlined here.



The US and India LEMOA

The logistics exchange programme has foundation in the Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum Agreement (COSMOA) and Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for geo-spatial Cooperation (BECA). To facilitate logistics exchange between India and the US, a third agreement called the LEMOA was signed. The LEMOA is an agreement related to cooperation in logistical exchange and troops stationing. For India, the LEMOA has been modified to keep in mind Indian concerns, for instance, the agreement ensures that it warrants no foreign troops of US to be stationed in India. The agreement envisages refuelling and birthing facilities for aircrafts and naval ships without a huge rigmarole of clearances being involved. This will enhance joint cooperation in humanitarian sharing of the two at the defence level.

INDIA-US EDUCATION DIPLOMACY

In 2009, the Obama-Singh 21st Century Knowledge Initiative was launched. It is now a part of the Indo-US Strategic Partnership Agreement. In 2011, the India-US Education Summit was held. It has subsequently held dialogues in 2012 and 2013 and has organised a road trip to promote strategic institution partnership. The aim of the Obama-Singh knowledge initiative were to promote R&D, vocational training and junior faculty development. As of 2016, it has been renamed the Indo-US 21st Century Knowledge Initiative awards. India and US have had Fulbright Programme since 1950 and in 2008, it was renamed as the Nehru Fulbright Programme for science, technology and agriculture. India, under its latest government, is trying to emulate the concept of community colleges in the US to enhance vocational education and skill development in India.

INDIA AND US NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY AND POWER POLITICS

Basics of the Nuclear Deal

In 2008, the conclusion of the nuclear deal served not only as a sign of diplomatic victory but also a turning point in the Indo-US relations. The deal signifies a quantum leap in the relations from suspicion during the Cold War to strategic partnership in the 21st century. The subsequent approval of the deal by the US Congress clearly signifies that the new India-US partnership enjoys a broad spectrum of approval within the US. All these developments have happened despite India sticking to its stand of not signing the discriminatory NPT. The kind of aggression showed by Bush somehow has not been

carried forward by Obama. The Obama regime took up traditional issues related to global non-proliferation around the NPT. However, the Nuclear Security Summits under The Prague Initiative of Obama, along with a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia and new Nuclear Posture Review, had created some discomfort in India not because they are steps for a strong global non-proliferation regime but because they were centred around the NPT and the CTBT which India refuses to ratify.


At a broader level, we need to understand the changing dynamics in Asia. Since the end of Cold War, China has gradually acquired economic and military strength and has resorted to incursions along the Line of Actual Control between India and China. This has increased bilateral tensions. The Indian psyche still is affected with the defeat of 1962 and suspicions about China's intentions remains high. The growing proximity of India and the US is something China is uncomfortable with as the proximity is designed to contain its growth potential. This is not completely wrong as both India and US certainly favour an open Asian order which is not threatened by any regional hegemony. Any country which would prevent any Asian player to access productive gains from other Asian states would not be appreciated either by India or the US. Keeping this in mind, the Indo-US nuclear deal and rising strategic convergence between India and the US would seek to ensure that China does not single handedly dominate the Asia-Pacific and that the region remains free from dominance by any one nation.

In-depth Analysis


One of the key structural determinants of the US-India Entente has been the economic regeneration of India since the end of the Cold War. However, the limitations on a deeper cooperation were placed due to the reluctance of the US to reconcile the nuclear status of India. The 1998 nuclear test by India was a serious jolt to the ongoing regeneration of the relationship. The US did not envisage any comprehensive alternative to the goal of nuclear non-proliferation yet wanted to improve relations with India. The subsequent Jaswant Singh and Strobe Talbot talks set in motion a new phase of bilateral engagement between the two states. As the ties witnessed an upswing, the announcement of Next Steps in Strategic Partnership in 2004 harbingered a new foundation in the relationship. The relationship has flourished in all directions ranging from commercial trade to naval exercises to the recently concluded logistical agreement.



The Bush administration, through the Indo-US nuclear deal, resolved the fundamental obstacle in the transfer of nuclear and high-end technology, thereby enabling India and the US to reach the full potential of their bilateral ties. The international realities have changed since the end of the Cold War. As the US policed the region of Asia and the world, China used the opportunity to undertake economic development. At the theoretical level, there is no consensus amongst scholars on the question of the political supremacy of the US. Scholars do believe that the US is a dominant power but for how long this dominance would last is a concern.



Based on the realist's explanation of the international order, it is believed that the post-Cold War period is likely to be of unstable international order.




As a confrontation between the US and China will destabilise the Asia-Pacific, both sides have resorted to expand their influence. The Pivot to Asia of the US is being matched with the One Belt and One Road initiative of China. The change in the balance of power in the region compelled Bush administration to accept the ground realities and initiate strategic recalibration. The strategy of the US, as visible under Pivot to Asia, is to continue to engage with China and also increase the power of the states in the periphery of China. It is in this context that the US has also decided to reach out to new partners like India in a way never previously envisioned. The US has also always held Japan as a key partner in Asia. As China rises, the proximity of the US, India and Japan is likely to fuel more tensions in the region. The recently concluded India-Japan nuclear deal (2016) is likely to further enhance Japanese position in Asia. The goal that India and Japan are trying to achieve through their cooperation is to ensure that China becomes more cooperative as both view China as a military threat. The recent assertion of China in South China Sea and China defining territorial waters as its core national interest has further increased the fears of the regional states. After China's reluctance to accept the verdict of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2016, the regional states feel that China may block the economic lifeline of the states that have maritime passages. China has also refused to allow India membership to the Nuclear Supplier Group. China's increasing influence in Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Myanmar are attempts to prevent the rise of India as an important regional and global player.

To tackle this challenge, India has decided to adopt a new approach towards the US. The Bush administration, by giving India the nuclear deal, has successfully incorporated India into the global nuclear order and has encouraged India to emerge as a great power in the future. Thus, shifts in the global balance of power have encouraged the US and India


to reorient their foreign policies and the nuclear deal is the most important symbol of this new partnership. Earlier, the visit of Bill Clinton to India in the 1990s had provided a new impetus to the relationship where Clinton and Vajpayee adopted a new vision for the 21st century. A purposeful direction in the Indo-US ties was introduced by the subsequent Bush administration, which began to view India as a strategic ally and refused to look to India solely through the lens of non-proliferation.

In 2005, Condoleezza Rice visited India to push for an unprecedented framework of cooperation with India. This took India by surprise but the Bush administration eventually announced civilian nuclear cooperation with India to help India emerge as a world power. After 9/11, Bush redefined how the US saw non-proliferation. The idea was that some states could not be trusted with nuclear weapons due to their unstable political regime domestically, while states like India, which have an impeccable non-proliferation policy to restore readability at the level of global non-proliferation norms, could be allowed nuclear access. The announcement of NSSP is deemed to be the game changer.



Bush realised that marginalising India would not benefit the nuclear non-proliferation order as he believed that the character of the regime was a more important determinant than a stand on a treaty to decide nuclear technology transfers. A nuclear deal successfully de-hyphenated India and Pakistan and gave India the de facto status of a nuclear weapon state. The change of the administration from Bush to Obama created some uneasiness amongst the Indian establishment. Bush looked at India as a new strategic landscape, while Obama, in his Pivot to Asia, did not look at India as a strategic player. What upset India further was Obama's toying with the idea of G-2 consisting of the US and China, allowing China the leverage to manage its dominance over the Asia-Pacific. What aggravated tensions further was the fact that, during Obama's visit to China, he made a reference to giving Beijing a lever in settling disputes between Pakistan and India.

Obama did, however, try to allay some fears by announcing support to India's candidature at the UN Security Council during his visit to India in November 2010.




At the national level in India, the BJP criticised the deal by advocating that separation of civilian and military installations (as committed by India under the deal) would compel India to incur huge costs. The Left parties which were in a coalition with the government of the day criticised the deal for renunciation of India's long held policy of nuclear disarmament and of non-alignment.



The starker criticism of the deal came from the scientific community. The department of atomic energy strongly resisted the putting of fast breeder programmes under the civilian list. The government worked hard to remove and address the concerns of the scientific establishment. At the international level, India at the time of its deal, had to confront Iran. The US and Iran did not have a comfortable relationship as the US was deeply concerned about the Iranian nuclear programme. India was, on the other hand, reluctant to undermine its relations with Iran although it could not jeopardise a growing strategic partnership that had begun with the US in favour of Iran. India voted against Iran in 2006 at the IAEA voting. India clarified that when India had conducted a nuclear test in 1998, Iran had favoured a UNSC resolution asking India to put a cap on its nuclear capabilities and had urged India to sign the NPT and the CTBT. There are many things about Iran which caused discomfiture to India. India, however, did not turn aggressive towards Iran and maintained that Iran was a great friend to India, while pushing for resolving the Iranian nuclear issue through diplomacy. India used the IAEA and Iran's programme to highlight the role of A Q Khan and of Pakistan as a proliferators state. India sponsored the US/EU-favoured resolution, recommending Iran to be examined as a case by the IAEA. India clarified that its vote was to prevent vitality in the Middle East and had

no relation with Indo-US cooperation.

To place the Indian scientific community, the then Indian PM Manmohan Singh declared in the Indian Parliament that India's Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR) would not be put under international inspections of the IAEA and the FBRs would not constitute elements under the civilian list. India succeeded in this hard bargain with US.



With the bargain successfully undertaken, India signed the agreement on 1st March, 2006, achieving a judicious balance between the energy security and national interests. The conclusion of the 123 agreement (based on section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act) became the touchstone of Indo-US partnership. In the deal, India has not made mention of any provision related to the testing of a nuclear weapon which is likely to impact the deal, but the US President, under the Atomic Energy Act, is bound to ask for a return of nuclear technology if India tests a nuclear weapon. As the deal went through within India, the Congress Party witnessed a lot of trouble in getting ratification due to stiff opposition by the leftist parties who were a part of the ruling coalition government. The ruling Congress party was able to garner support from the Samajwadi Party and was thus able to push the deal ahead even after the leftist parties withdrew their support to the ruling coalition. The deal survived but exposed the opposition that came from within the Congress coalition. Many in the US Congress, on the other hand, did not favour the idea of making an exception of India by providing it with nuclear technology despite it not being a signatory of the NPT. Many believed that a nuclear deal to India would convey to the world that the US lacks commitment to its broad goals of non-proliferation.

The biggest concerns for the US Congress were that such an exception in case of India will open up other states' demands to such technology and would adversely affect the global safeguard of non-proliferation. Under the NPT, there is no such clause where an NPT signatory cannot sell nuclear technology to non-NPT signatories. The Central Intelligence Agency of the US was entrusted with the task of making an assessment of the nuclear programme of India. The National Intelligence Council also gave briefings to the US Congress in the same regard. As the US tried to tackle the dissidents within, the hearing that happened in the US Congress on the issue of the nuclear pact revealed that a majority of the members testified before the House International Relations Committee that such a pact would weaken the overall international non-proliferation regime that the US had spent decades building. On the other hand, Ashley Tellis argued that the deal did strengthen USA's efforts on non-proliferation and a pact with India would enhance the national security of US. The vocal criticism in the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee was outlined by Senator Richard Lugar and he opened his statement by urging to the Senate that India does not have a very satisfying nuclear record. He also made references to Indian violation of bilateral pledges in 1974. He outlined a four-point

benchmark for the US Congress's consent to the pact.



The Bush administration, in its response to the Foreign Relations committee, admitted that the US could not establish a clear cut link if CIRUS reactor had violated US–India contract of 1956 on the use of heavy water. The administration asserted that deriving a conclusive answer to whether the plutonium generated by India happened from heavy water supplied by the US for the CIRUS reactor was not possible. The biggest reason for such criticism in the US Congress and the foreign policy bureaucracy was the reluctance of Bush to consult the two before embarking upon the nuclear deal with India. The Bush administration understood that taking an incremental approach to the deal, in sync with the bureaucracy and the US Congress, would have knocked down the initiative. This is the reason that Condoleezza Rice resorted to the ‘Big Bang’ announcement and compared the deal with India at par with Nixon’s opening to China. However, all opposition was managed when the Republicans lost majority in the Congress and the Senate signed the nuclear deal, thereby culminating in the three-year process.

The US subsequently pressed for an India-specific waiver. The US was able to assuage the NSG members and succeeded in the NSG-specific waiver for India. On 8th October, 2008, the US President signed the US–India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Non-Proliferation Enhancement Act. Great power politics and nuclear non-proliferation are the two competing imperatives of the US foreign policy that created such difficulty in the negotiation of the Indo–US nuclear deal. Both India and the US perceived the deal very differently. For the Bush administration, the deal was a bridge to establish a strategic partnership with India, while, for Indian establishment, it was a mechanism to reach the global nuclear mainstream and a step towards great power status. However, from our analysis of the nuclear deal in this section, we can clearly infer that the Indo–US nuclear deal is not just about nuclear technicalities but the emergence of a new global balance of power which highlights the strategic considerations of great powers related to nuclear non-proliferation. The Bush administration clearly perceived the nuclear deal as a means towards helping India emerge as a global player and therefore, the institutional imperatives of the non-proliferation regime were once again trumped by the global political realities.

The major issue of disagreement on the Indian side was related to India’s nuclear weapon programme. Indian PM Manmohan Singh assured the Parliament that the Indo–US deal in no way affects Indian deterrence potential. India made it clear that the core issues while negotiating the 123 agreement that had to be taken into consideration were as follows:



As intensive negotiations happened on these core issues, the terms of 123 agreements were finally accepted. The US agreed to assist India in the development of a strategic fuel reserve and ensure uninterrupted supply of nuclear fuel. India was allowed to establish a new facility subject to the IAEA safeguards to reprocess the spent fuel from the civilian reactors. The US president, as per the Atomic Energy Act of the US, remains bound to seek complete return of nuclear material in case of any violation, but the Indo-US deal did not make any reference as such for the same. However, the US would not hamper or create any hindrance in the growth of the nuclear weapons programme of India. In fact, India undertook aggressive diplomacy to ensure that if India tests a nuclear weapon, the US would not suddenly stop supplies of fuel and technology and demand a return, but would analyse the circumstances that led India to test the weapon. The plan to separate eight reactors for weapon or military use would now allow the use of domestic Uranium ore reserves for these separated reactors. This would allow the eight reactors to produce fissile material needed for credible minimum deterrence. The nuclear deal was basically viewed as an instrument in reshaping the Asian balance of power rather than affecting non-proliferation architecture. However, since the nuclear weapons programme was brought under the aegis of the IAEA, the nuclear deal has overall strengthened the global nuclear non-proliferation order.

India and the US—Nuclear Negotiations

Here we shall endeavour to delve into the negotiation behaviour of the two sides and explain the differences between the two points of view.

The origin of discord between Indian and the US at the nuclear level goes back to the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). As explained earlier, the NPT was adopted on 1970 and stated that the states which had tested their nuclear weapons before 1st January, 1967, would be called Nuclear Weapon States while the other states would be called as Non Nuclear Weapon States. As per the treaty, the NWS would not only retain their arsenals but would not help NNWS to develop nuclear weapons. Also, the NNWS joining the NPT shall agree to ‘full-scope safeguards’. The NNWS would not develop any nuclear weapons and would place before the IAEA all their nuclear material. The placing of such material before the IAEA would act as a guarantee by the NNWS to keep their commitment.


Initially a High Technology cooperation group was established in the era of the George W Bush Junior’s administration. The aim was to agree upon principles that would expand exports from US industries. The group and the principles adopted were agreed upon after intense negotiations between the US under Secretary of Commerce, Kenneth Juster, and the Indian Foreign Secretary, Kanwal Sibal. The agreement spelled out possibilities of the export of dual-use technologies from the US to India. In 2003, during

further negotiations, the US presented Next steps in Strategic Partnership to India. In January, 2004, a basic framework for the NSSP was announced.



In 2003, the tenure of Kanwal Sibal as the Foreign Secretary ended. General elections were held in India. As a result of this, the NSSP negotiations witnessed a slowdown. India was of the opinion that the US was ignoring deeper nuclear cooperation with India under the NSSP. The coming of the UPA government in 2004 led to renewed push. J N Dixit was appointed the new National Security Advisor by PM Manmohan Singh. J N Dixit wanted a complete transformation in the Indo-US relations. He picked three Indian Foreign Services officers to work with him at the task. They were Ronen Sen, IFS, S Jaishankar, IFS (now Foreign Secretary) and Raminder Jassal, IFS. The Indian side sent a list of thirty issues to the US to be considered. These issues represented an ambitious push from India. Initially, the US negotiators rejected the list and asserted that for them, the NSSP is the agreed framework. Dixit had instructed the Indian negotiations not to return until negotiations on the list were initiated. Finally, in September, 2004, the US began to pick up issues from the list and began addressing them. This unfolded a new dimension in the Indo-US diplomatic negotiations. Taking advantage of the progress, in March, 2005, the US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice visited India and agreed to start nuclear negotiations. On 25th March, 2005, the White House announced that the US is going to help India emerge as a major player in the twenty first century. Both sides decided to conclude the agreement by mid-July, 2005, during the visit of Manmohan Singh to the US.

India appointed Shyam Saran and the US appointed Nicholas Burns as key negotiators. Both sides initiated intense negotiations through an aggressive yet restrictive diplomacy. During the visit of the Indian PM to the US in July, 2005, an announcement regarding nuclear cooperation was finally made. To resolve further issues, the Indian side resorted to an intense campaign of advocacy. Normally, the Indian MEA does not allow its officials to undertake direct advocacy with parliamentarians of another country. But this time, an exception was made by the MEA officials. More importantly, many officials even visited constituencies of various members to establish a direct contact.



India and Issues Related to the Nuclear Liability Law

When India and the US concluded the nuclear deal, to operationalise it, India had to ratify the convention on supplementary compensation on nuclear damages and also prepare a

nuclear liability law. Subsequently, India prepared the Civil Liability of Nuclear Damages Act (CLNDA) in 2010. The aim of the CLNDA is to ensure that in case of a nuclear accident, the victims get quick compensation without having to prove negligence by operator or supplier. The liability was capped at 1500 crore rupees. However, there are two issues raised by equipment suppliers in CLNDA. The first issue of CLNDA is section 17B, which states that in India, the plant operator in India, that is, NPCIL, under section 17B, can claim compensation from the supplier of equipment if it claims that the nuclear accident that happened was due to faulty equipments or material supplied by the supplier. The second issue is related to section 46. As per this section, the accident victims can sue both operator and material supplier over and above the amount capped. Now equipment suppliers, which are foreign players, say that these clauses (section 17B and section 46) put the supplier in a vulnerable situation and unnecessarily drag them into open-ended criminal action and tort law compensation. The suppliers say that the operator and not the supplier has to identify defects and get them rectified and in case of the failure of the operator to do so, the operator is to be held liable. The suppliers also say that India's CLNDA violates the Paris Convention of 1960 and the Vienna Convention of 1963 as well as the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damages (CSC).

The government has tried to give some assurance to the suppliers by saying that as per section 7 of CLNDA, if the liability exceeds 1500 crore cap, the central government will establish a nuclear liability fund to protect the suppliers from any claims made by the operator. However, suppliers have pointed out that section 7 of the CLNDA still does not protect a supplier from claims made by accident victims under the law of torts. In 2015, the US president Obama visited India. During the visit, the two sides finalised administrative arrangements to execute the nuclear deal. This was built upon the India PM's visit to US in 2014 when a contact group to implement the deal had been established. After the successful completion of negotiation in the contact group, India agreed to establish a nuclear insurance pool formed by General Insurance Corporation of India (GIC) and 4 different PSUs, which will contribute 750 crore out of a total of 1500 crore while the government will contribute the rest of the amount. The insurance pool will provide cover to suppliers under section 17 of the CLNDA. Now under the pool, the operator and suppliers will become partners in risk management rather than eyeing each other as adversaries. The compensation amount is three hundred million in special drawing rights (SDR) and CLNDA has capped maximum liability for an operator to 1500 crore rupees. In case if value of SDR increases and goes beyond 1500 crores, the government would bridge the amount. On 12th June 2015, the General Insurance Company of India has launched the Indian Nuclear Insurance Pool with a capacity of 1500 crore as envisaged under CLNDA.

India and the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC)

The Paris Convention Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy was established in 1960 and aims to limit liabilities to a fixed amount in case of nuclear accidents. The Vienna Convention also relates to liability related matters in case of

nuclear accidents. The third is the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damages (CSC) that came up in 1997 and aimed to not only establish a global liability regime but also to ensure that in case of a nuclear accident, the victims get increased amounts of compensation. Now if a country wants to join CSC, it has to be a part of the Vienna Convention. The CSC has a clause which says that if a country is not a party to Paris or Vienna Conventions, it can still become a part of CSC if it establishes a national law which synchronises with the CSC provisions and its annexes. On 29th October 2010, on this basis, India signed the CSC on the basis of its CLNDA. The Indian CLNDA is in compliance with the CSC and its annexes and India finally ratified the CSC through an Instrument of Ratification and became a state party to CSC on 4th May, 2016.

INDIA AND US COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY

Basic Overview

The US–India trade has picked up in post-Cold War times. In 2005, the two established a Trade Policy Forum. It was a dedicated forum for economic and multilevel engagement. The US exports nuclear reactors, precious stones and electric machines to India and imports pharmaceutical, pearls, precious metals and mineral fuels. At the services level, India exports business and consulting services and technical services. Multibillion dollar FDI comes from the US to India in terms of business to Microsoft, Dell, Oracle, IBM, Harley Davidson, Ford and so on. The US has complained repeatedly about selective access available as in many sectors in India, FDI are not permissible. At the level of pharmacy, IPR is a key issue. The US wants easy IPR access and data exclusivity (explained in the chapter on India–Switzerland relations) to which India is opposed.


To promote technical cooperation in 2003, an India–US High Technical Cooperation group was established. The US continues to assert that India lacks the requisite regulatory, legislative and bureaucratic apparatus to ensure sensitive technology is not given to rogue nations. In 1974, the US had launched a generalised system of Preference Programme and India is a beneficiary developing country in the programme. The US feels that GSP preference to India should be removed as India no longer needs it. Since 2009, India has been advocating for a bilateral investment treaty as a step towards an FTA to gain investment. The FTA negotiations were delayed as both India and the US decided to update their model bilateral investment treaties (BITs). India has adopted a new version in 2015 while the US replaced the 2004 model in 2012. In 2015, when Obama visited India, the joint statements advocated renewal of negotiations for the FTA. When the Indian PM visited US in September 2015, he again emphasised on an early conclusion of the BIT. The problems related to delay also owes to differences between India and US BITs. In the US, the BIT has a provision for most favoured nation (MFN) status which is missing in the Indian BIT. This means that under the international law, if a US firm in India is discriminated against, it shall have no remedy available. Further, the Indian BIT excludes compulsory licensing from the treaty. These issues are at the root cause of the delay.

In-depth Analysis

From 1946 to 2012, India has received 16 billion dollars' worth economic aid from the US. More than 50% of this aid has been food aid. Yet, the aid relationship between India

and the US had inauspicious beginnings. In 1949, Nehru paid his first state visit to the US. Domestically, at that time, India was suffering a famine and severe grain shortage. Instead of India directly asking for food aid from the US, Nehru dropped hints about the willingness of India to accept an offer. The US awaited a proper request. Nothing came out of the visit. One of the peculiar behaviours of Indian foreign policy mandarins is that they never ask for aids directly, which reflects a distaste for asking. However, with repeated failures of monsoons and successive famines, in December, 1950, the Indian Ambassador to the US, Vijaylakshmi Pandit, requested the US to supply two million tonnes of wheat. The US conveyed to India that such a proposal would require Congressional approval. As the Congress was debating the matter, India conveyed to the US that it needed assurance that no conditionality would be imposed on wheat supply and the aid would not affect India's foreign or domestic policy. Further, the US would not interfere or influence the sovereign domains of India. The US, however, asserted that it would observe the distribution of the wheat they would donate. On 11th June, 1951, a bill authorising 190 million dollar was approved by the US Congress as a long-term loan to be released for India.

The next line of Indo-US offensive came up in 1965, when India witnessed a severe famine and food shortage. India requested 10 million tonnes of food grains under the two-year food aid programme. This time the US President Lyndon Johnson announced a 'short tether policy'. As per the policy, Johnson stated that all food aid shipments to India would require his personal approval. India found the policy very offensive. The US began to insist that India undertake aggressive agricultural reforms. To work out an agreement, the Indian Agriculture Minister, C Subramaniam, held meetings with his American counterpart in Rome. India agreed to a very intrusive programme by November 1965, and brought changes in its agricultural policy.



Though Johnson was happy with the reforms that India made and subsequently eased out the wheat shipments, the experience of India to have gone through such intrusion was extremely taxing. Though Indira Gandhi had publicly thanked Americans for their aid and assistance, she categorically advised C Subrahmaniam that India should ensure that it never had to beg for food grains ever from the US. India learned through the food aid negotiations that it is difficult to accept any foreign control over the usage of domestic resources.

In 2009, India and the US started negotiating a treaty to protect foreign investment that flows from one state to the other. The negotiations were slow because both sides updated their model BIT template in 2015, replacing the 2003 template. A BIT protects the investments of the investors by allowing them extra rights against unlawful actions of host states and thereby boosts investors' confidence, leading to more FDI. As per the 2003 BIT of India, the treaty offered investors fair and equitable treatment based on reasonability

and due process. The 2015 treaty has replaced it with customary international law. Now the investment by an investor shall not be subjected to any measures that violate existing customary international law. The Indian BIT of 2015 grants full security and protection to the foreign investors and their investment. More importantly, the BIT clearly states that the state will not discriminate the foreign investor from the nationals of the host state and shall not act in a discriminatory manner against foreign investors. The new BIT also talks about the provisions related to expropriation. According to the provisions, any investment shall be done with adequate compensation and under due process in accordance to the laws of the host states. The compensation shall be in freely convertible currency on the basis of the market value.

Under the new BIT, for dispute resolution the investor needs to exhaust all local remedies available in the state upto five years. The investors get a choice to arbitrate disputes either under International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) arbitration rules or the additional facility rules of ICSID or the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) arbitration rules. However, India not being a party to ICSID convention, the ICSID arbitration rules mechanism shall not be available to the investors. The new BIT does not mention the need for the ‘Most Favoured Nation’ status tag for each other. There is no provision for an umbrella clause which means there is no requirement to observe contractual obligations by the parties. An absence of the umbrella clause means that the domestic courts may not pursue claims as there are no direct contractual obligations involved.

As mentioned earlier, India and the US have been negotiating a BIT since 2009. Due to delays, a lot of competitors have established their foothold in the Indian markets. The Modi government at the centre has declared a need for 1 trillion dollars’ investment in the infrastructure sector. If India and the US conclude a BIT, this is one area where US firms will stand to have an edge over other competitors. A future BIT can also lead to a grand collaboration between India and the US in retail and business services sector. The stringent environmental and labour concerns in the USBIT are irritants perceived by India. One reason why India and the US have not been able to conclude a BIT till date is because of the issues related to investor-state arbitration. India’s emphasis in the new BIT, as stated earlier, is that the investor should first exhaust local remedies in the state upto five years. The US firms are not very enthusiastic about this provision due to a fairly poor image of Indian legal system as being overstretched.

The Indian BIT does not bring taxation within its purview. The US firms are of the view that an absence of such a provision enhances the tax leverage in the hands of the Indian authorities. Moreover, the Indian BIT has no mention of matters related to the insurance of compulsory license (CL) and in the absence of the same, the US firms would not get the power to sue an Indian firm for issuance of CLs or revocation of IPR.

The two nations have differing perceptions on IPR despite both being compliant to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement of WTO. The matter was aggravated in 2014 when the US trade representative put India under priority watch is under the ‘special 301’ report. The US stated India has inadequate IPR protection in IT, pharmacy and publishing industries. The US also alleged that India is a major source of counterfeit drugs. India has not been pleased with this

allegation since it is a generic drug exporter, and such an allegation could hurt the country's global image. Since 2012, patent disputes have emerged as a sticky issue because India has refused the US firms the right to patent, due to firms resorting to evergreening. Evergreening means that the company makes a minor amendment to its already patented product and seeks to expand patent life further after a minor modification. India has invoked section 3(d) of the Indian Patent Act often.



In order to resolve the IPR issue, a high level working group has been established under the India-US Trade Policy Forum. As the negotiations progress, India should focus on protection of its national interests. India needs to give some space to the principle of eminent domain where, in public interest, the state can subordinate the IPR of private entities. The working groups should lay down a set of boundaries in case of 'eminent domain' being used for health-related issues. In March 2017, the Indian Foreign Secretary visited the US. During the visit, he raised issues related to the H1-B visa. He also spoke about the safety of Indians in the US. During the visit, the Foreign Secretary emphasised upon an early conclusion of the BIT and assured that the resolution of IPR issues would be taken up on priority.

INDIA-US VISA RELATED ISSUES

The US government has the provision of an H-1B visa. It is a non-immigrant visa for temporary workers. It is given for select special occupations. The issue is that in the US, if a company like an IT firm cannot find a skilled US worker, it can attract skilled workers under the H-1B programme. The US population is sceptical about the majority of the jobs being given to outsiders as they allege that firms hire from abroad to cut costs as labour is cheaper if imported and this undermines the employment to US citizens. Indian citizens are one of the largest H-1B users in the US. In 2015, the US administration under Obama signed the Consolidated Appropriation Act 2016. As per the law, the visa fee will be increased and the rise in cash flow to government coffers will be used for financing Obama's healthcare and biometric tracking system. The hike in the fees is going to offset IT and BPO exports of India.

With the coming of Donald Trump as the new US president, India and the US have had some irritants in their bilateral diplomacy. The H-1B visa issues have emerged as one of the greatest sources of friction between the two countries. An employer has to apply for an H-1B visa for the employee with the US immigration department. At the same time, there is one L-1 visa category which is an inter-company transfer category where the foreign worker can be temporarily transferred to the US in an executive or marginal position in the office of the same employer or its branch or subsidiary. Donald Trump has advocated changing the immigration system of the US and has asserted to make it more merit-based. The main logic of merit based immigration is to ensure that the immigrants entering the US are highly skilled and contribute to the American economy. The goal of


the new system is to have less low skilled immigrants.

In March 2017, the Trump administration decided that the government shall not undertake fast track processing of H-1B visa applications from 3rd April, 2017, for the next six months so that the US immigration authorities can analyse the H-1B extension applications of visa holders whose visas are on the verge of expiry. India has been an aggressive advocate of a fair and a rational approach to be adopted on visa related issues. India's Foreign Secretary S Jaishankar had conveyed to the US lawmakers to treat the H-1B issue as a trade and service matter than treating it as an immigration issue. The private US firms can pay a premium of 1225 US dollars per application. The payment of the premium ensures that the immigration department expedites the H-1B application and processes it in 15 days in contrast to the normal process of six months. The government of US has now stopped this practice. Under the Obama administration, a new H4 visa programme was launched that enabled the spouse of the H-1B visa holders in the US to undertake jobs in US. Trump administration has signalled a roll back of H4 visa as well.

The Trump administration placed the High-Skilled Integrity and Fairness Act of 2017 in front of the House of Representatives. The legislation has advocated for a market based allocation of visas. The legislation introduces mechanisms where companies can attract foreign talent by making it mandatory for a H-1B visa holder to have a minimum salary of 1,30,000 USD. This figure is double of what existed since 1989, that is, 60,000 USD. The legislation thus reduces the incentive to outsource jobs yet allowing an option to outsource jobs if the company expresses a willingness to pay. The legislation intends to promote fairness in hiring skilled workers globally by removing the per country cap for immigrant visa policy. To plug the loopholes in H-1B and L-1 visa programmes, the H-1B and L-1 visa reform acts were also envisaged.

In January 2017, the Protect and Grow American Jobs Act envisaged an increase in the minimum salary of H-1B visa holders and removal of the master's degree exemption.

The H-1B reforms will affect Infosys, TCS, Wipro, and so forth. More so with the hike in the minimum salary for visa holders, the smaller firms may find it difficult to incur costs, thereby affecting their growth. The profitability of the Indian IT sector would be affected as profits were maintained on the off shoring model. India has officially conveyed its concerns without taking up the matter through diplomatic channels. Indian firms in the US have now started recruiting domestic Americans as per the new requirements.



ANALYSIS OF INDIAN PM'S VISIT TO THE US, FROM 2014 TO 2017

The Indian PM, since 2014, has visited the US five times. The first meeting happened in September 2014 when the PM went to the UN General Assembly meeting. In September, 2015, the PM visited the Silicon Valley in the US. In March 2016, the PM again visited to participate in the Nuclear Security Summit and in June 2016, there was a state visit. In the September 2015 visit, the Strategic Dialogue between India and the US launched in 2009 was transformed into Strategic and Commercial Dialogue. The most significant factor of the visit was to garner US investments for Make in India to have a revive the Indian economy.

On the sidelines of economic diplomacy, as analysed above, defence cooperation was also intensified. India has begun the import of sensitive defence technology. Both have used the bilateral meetings to assert Freedom of Navigation and Protection of Sea Lanes of Communication. New collaborations in energy, science, environment, space, education and counter-terrorism has opened up. The PM also used the visits to reconnect with the Indian diaspora.

India and the US have moved beyond Joint Statements to announce Vision Statements. This has brought the needed octane to push the relations. On invitation of the US Congress House Speaker, Paul Ryan, the PM addressed the US Congress in June, 2016. To promote cooperation in sustainable development and clean energy, the two have agreed on establishing a Partnership to Advance Clean Energy (PACE). This will help envisage cooperation in air quality, transport fuels, climate financing, and so on. To resolve IPR issues, a high level group on IPR has been formed, which will work with Indo-US Trade Policy Forum.

Analysis of Indian PM Visit to USA-2017 (Path to a Low Velocity and a High Inertia Relationship)

In June 2017, Modi visited USA. The Indian PM could have met Trump on the sidelines of G-20 Summit in Hamburg, Germany in July 2017 but the Indian establishment thought that such a meet would have happened at a multilateral setting while Modi preferred to go for a bilateral meeting. During the meeting, Modi tried to push the idea that in the era of

America First policy of Trump, India is the best opportunity for USA. Since the nuclear deal between India and USA, USA has understood that India can be a testing lab for new ideas where new partnership can be built without an alliance between the two states but mimicking some characteristics. The Indo-US ties have remained consistent and predictable with an upward swing. For Modi, the visit was to urge the same continuity and consistency as under Trump, White House administration has been a little chaotic and assertive that no state should take old deals for granted in the future. At the end of the meeting, there was a joint statement between the two leaders. For the first time, India and USA have asserted that the two sides are working shoulder to shoulder against terrorism with reference to cross border terrorism. The US has designated Hizbul Mujahideen leader Syed Salahuddin as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT). The joint statement mentions that Pakistani territory should not be used to launch terrorist strikes on other states. During the Obama administration, the two sides had come up with a Vision Document for Asia-Pacific. In 2017, during the meeting of Modi with Trump, the two sides for the first time used the term called Indo-Pacific. The meaning both sides tried to convey through the term Indo-Pacific was that India and USA are both democratic stalwarts and responsible stewards of the Indo-Pacific region. The joint statement also made mentions of freedom of navigation in the seas and peaceful resolution of maritime disputes as per international law. Though USA asserted in the joint statement that India was a major defense partner, there was absence of support for Make in India and co-production (in sync with America First policy of Trump). The two sides decided to establish a new format of 2+2 dialogue for enhancing the diplomatic relations. Under this new 2+2 dialogue, foreign and defense minister's of the two countries will carry out interaction and place the strategic and security relationship on a new center-stage. The 2+2 dialogue provides India and USA a new vehicle to discuss bilateral issues. Though India and USA have more than 60 bilateral institutions to discuss issues; US is concerned about the chronic failure of India to use their potential. US asserts that bureaucratic inertia, legal issues, suspicion by India of motives of US and lack of clarity by India on what India seeks from the Indo-US strategic partnership limits the overall diplomatic interaction with India. At the political level, India feels, that there is lack of a clear vision by US for diplomacy initiatives in Asia. In September 2017, India and USA also held a military exercise called Yudh Abhyas at the Joint Base Lewis McChord in US.



Why US tag of a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) for Salahuddin matters?

Mohammad Yusuf Shah or Syed Salahuddin is the chief of Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) and has been operating in Kashmir region. The US under Executive Order 13224 places persons or groups in the category of Specially Designated Global Terrorist. When such action takes place, any group placed in this category is called a Foreign Terrorist Organisation while the individuals are designated as Specially Designated Global Terrorist. Doing this categorization cuts the financial support for the group. The Office of Assets Control of USA blocks the assets of such individuals and groups. For the first time ever, a Kashmiri terrorist has been designated by US as a global terrorist which means now that Salahuddin is not just a threat to India but to

the entire world. In contrast, if an individual is designated as a terrorist by the UN in the UN Sanctions list (what India has been striving for in the case of Masood Azhar), then such a sanction will be considered a non partisan global sanction.

3 CHAPTER


India and Israel Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Basic Introduction
- Phase-1: 1922 to 1947
- Phase-2: 1948 to 1956
- Phase-3: 1956 to 1974
- Phase-4: 1984 to 1991
- Phase-5: 1992 till today
- Analysis of bilateral visits

INTRODUCTION

India's relations with Israel have undergone tremendous change since the end of the Cold War. However, the origin of India's Israel policy goes back to the early 1920s. A very unique dimension of the Indo-Israel relationship is that although India recognised Israel in 1950, two years after its creation, it did not establish full diplomatic relations. This stance of India of recognising Israel but not giving it the privilege of full diplomatic relation is a unique instance in the diplomatic history of the world. However, as the Cold War ended, the Indian government in 1992 established diplomatic relations with Israel and became one of the last non-Arab states to accord the privilege of full diplomatic relations to Israel. The entire chapter will explore the Indo-Israel relations in five different time periods. The diagram below represents the time periods and key actors of each time period.



PERIOD 1: 1922 TO 1947: CONFLICTING NATIONALISM: THE GRADUAL FORMATION OF INDIA'S ISRAEL POLICY

India's relations with West Asia and Palestine are historical and can be traced back to almost 2500 BC. The people of Indus Valley civilisation have traded with the civilisations of Mesopotamia. There had also been practices of maritime trade since many centuries

which led to the settlement of Indian communities in the Arab world. During the medieval period, the continuity of relations with West Asia was visible during Mughal rule in India. During this period, Jewish traders from the Middle East traded gold, silver, precious stones with India. The onset of European colonialism saw a rise in migration of Jews from the Middle East to India. As the European powers began colonisation of Asia and the British commenced with the colonisation of India, Jewish immigrants began to move from Iraq to Surat in Gujrat. Some Jews from Iraq also settled down in Bombay. These Jews from Iraq undertook manufacturing and commercial activities in Gujrat and Bombay. Thus, India's relations with West Asia are deeply rooted in its past, which is also indicative of the need of a strong future relationship with the entire block.

As the political control of the British became firmly established over India, the British rulers not only took up the Indian trade routes in West Asia, but also began to establish British protectorates and buffers in West Asia to keep other competitor colonial powers at bay. The British viceroy in India was tasked with the responsibility of controlling the West Asia region. The first thing that the British did was to safeguard West Asia from the French, German and the Russians. In order to achieve this, the British associated themselves with the affairs of the West Asians and also stationed British residents in the region. The British initially had a simple goal—that of safeguarding the maritime frontier of India. Consequently, they occupied Cyrus in 1878 and Egypt in 1882. As the World War—I ended, the consolidation of colonial powers of West Asia was given effect through the Mandate system. The Mandates of Iraq and Palestine were to be governed by the British, who resorted to using administrators from India to run the affairs of the Mandates. In fact, to suppress any potential opposition to the British rule in the territories, the British also used the Indian army in these areas.

The presence of the British in West Asia led to the British being involved in the Ottoman empire—a fact that was exploited by the Indian National Movement to solidify its criticism of British interference. This also made the nationalists in India realise that the people of West Asia also have a same common enemy. Thus, the period after World War—I led to Indian leaders considering the region anew, giving early roots of India's West Asia Policy. Moreover, the position of Nehru and Gandhi on the Palestinian question had considerable influence on India's Israel policy after Indian Independence. Gandhi initially developed his views about Jews and Zionism through his early interaction with Jews in South Africa, whereby he developed a substantial understanding of Jewish nationalism and their demand for a national home. Though he sympathised with the Jews for their horrific persecution in Germany and other European nations, he did not find much legitimacy in the demand of Jews to establish a national home.


In the initial years after the World War—I, Gandhi insisted that Palestine should not be a Jewish state but should remain under Muslim control. There were two reasons for Gandhi to espouse this view—first, Gandhi had kept domestic Indian Muslim community and their participation in the national movement in mind while forming his opinion; and second, Muslims had ruled Palestine for many centuries and it would have been a wrong strategy on the part of the British to accede to Zionist demand for the creation of a homeland in Palestine. He clarified that he believed Christians and Jews should freely go and worship in Palestine but should not acquire any sovereign jurisdiction over Palestine. But after the dissolution of Ottoman Empire, Gandhi argued that Zionists should not nurse

territorial or political aspirations but rather, realise the Zionist ideas internally and spiritually. Gandhi also was very critical of Zionist cooperation with the British to achieve their demands of a national home as India was fighting British Imperialists. Indians began to perceive Zionist cooperation with British as Zionist intention to colonise Palestine. However, during this period, the Jewish Agency for Israel continued to work in close association with Gandhi and kept him abreast of the developments in Zionist political thought and goals.

Nehru, who became the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of India in the immediate period after Indian independence, was also opposed to the idea of a national home for Jews but did develop affinity with socialist Jewish leaders. The first reference by Nehru to the issue of Palestine can be seen in 1933 when he wrote a letter on the issue from a prison to Indira. In the dialogue, Nehru appreciated Jewish achievements and their contribution to the improvement of living standards of Palestinians through modern industry. He did not, however, support the cause for a Jewish national home. He also did not appreciate the Zionist cooperation with the British for a colonisation of Palestine as he held forcible colonisation to be morally and ethically wrong. Nehru favoured the idea of a united Palestine and not one divided by religion. Nehru articulated his views on the Palestine in a different manner. For Nehru, the Palestine issue was a fight by the Arabs against British imperialists. Nehru inferred that the Jewish issue was a deliberate creation of the British—similar to the divide and rule tactic of British in India—where the British pitted Jews against Arabs in Palestine. Nehru was extremely moved by the plight of the Jews in Germany and Eastern Europe, and after witnessing their persecution first hand during his visit to Central Europe in 1938, he advocated asylum for Jews in India.

The unity in India over the Khilafat question gave India a lead to engage with the leadership of Egypt and Syria. India began to take positions on the Arab Palestine issue and criticised British interference in Ottoman territory after World War—I. The period of late 1920s saw Congress taking a stand in public support of Arab nationalism. Broadly, India perceived the Palestine struggle as a larger Arab struggle against imperialism. In 1937, when the Peel Commission report recommended the partition of Palestine, the INC, in its 1938 Haripura session, condemned the partition scheme and extended sympathy to the Arab cause. The INC was sympathetic to Jewish persecution in Central Europe but did not favour any partition or support for a separate home for Jews. It continued to perceive Zionism as a deliberate British design, and an ideology largely sponsored by the West.

India played a key role in supporting anti-imperial struggles in Syria, Egypt and Palestine and expressed solidarity with their nationalist struggles while refraining from quoting any Jewish organisations. India abstained from developing relations with any Zionist movement as it intended to promote a secular outlook of nationalism.



The INC in India maintained a policy in favour of Arabs while the Muslim League had severely criticised the Zionist movement. The aim of the INC was to show solidarity with Palestine Arabs as also to reassure the Indian Muslims on which side they were. However, the INC and Muslim League differed in the sense that the INC was supportive to Arabs but was not hostile to Jews like the Muslim League was. The Muslim League vehemently opposed the creation of a Jewish Palestine and had also condemned the Balfour Declaration in 1917. Subsequently, when the Peel commission report came and advocated partition of Palestine, India still resorted to showing solidarity with Arab Palestinians. The Muslim League again condemned the report of Peel Commission. The policy of Muslim League on Palestine did exercise influence on the policy of the INC. Due to strong pro-Arab manoeuvring by the League, the INC also decided to align its views. Both parties aimed to make their presence felt within the Muslim community of India. The INC also organised pro-Palestine demonstrations to establish its alliance to the Palestinian cause. The INC, through its policy, made it clear that division of Palestine on religious grounds could not be allowed.

The issues in West Asia and Palestine also gave India an opportunity to establish its alternative foreign policy views which were different from the British policy. Thus, initially as we saw that INC followed pro-Arab, pro-Islamic policy up till Khilafat movement but later, after riots and dismemberment of the Khilafat, began to advocate a secular-nationalist Arab view.

PERIOD 2: 1948 TO 1956: REALITY CHECK? RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL AND LIMITS OF INDIA-ISRAEL RAPPROCHEMENT

After the conclusion of the World War-II, the British handed over the Palestine Mandate to the UN. The UN established the UNSCOP (UN Special Committee on Palestine), of which India was also a member. In 1947, New Delhi organised a conference of the Asian Relations Organisation called the Asian Relations Conference (ARC). In the conference, both Arab and Jewish delegations were invited. This was in sync with the earlier policy of the INC that had evolved support for Arab Palestinians, with conciliatory accommodation of Jews. A 10-member delegation of Jews headed by Samuel Hugo Bergmann, also known as the Hebrew University delegation, participated in the conference. Ironically, the Arab states declined to participate owing to Jewish invitation and this gave an opportunity to the Jews to present their case to India. During the ARC, the Jewish delegation again presented their idea of partitioning Palestine for

accommodating Jews, which did not resonate well with the Indian leadership.

Through the ARC, India also undertook a fine foreign policy manoeuvre by maintaining that Palestine belonged to Arabs, but simultaneously showing sympathy with the Jews. When the British placed the Palestinian issue before the UN General Assembly, Nehru appointed Asaf Ali as the Indian representative to the special session at the UN. Asaf Ali was instructed that he should not commit India to any situation that may affect India's relations with other nations but ensure that India would support the termination of the British Mandate of Palestine. Nehru asked Ali to play a cautious game as India wanted to support Arabs but not upset Jews as doing so would consequently affect India's relations with Western powers. The idea was to remain friendly to both the parties. The UNSCOP presented a final report in September 1947. The majority of members supported partition of Palestine but India, Iran and Yugoslavia advocated a Federal Palestine with both Arabs and Jews as a part of the territory. Thus, India continued to stick to its pre-partition policy of supporting Arabs and accommodating the Jews.

As the partition plan won at the UNGA, it was clear that the partition of Palestine was inevitable. The question before India was what to do once a Jewish state in Palestine was born. On 14 May, 1947, Israel as a state was born and both the US and the USSR recognised the existence of Israel. The task for Israel now was to seek diplomatic recognition from the world. It decided to seek the same from India too. On 17 May, 1948, Israeli foreign minister, Moshe Sharett, sent a letter to Nehru seeking diplomatic recognition of Israel from India. The Indian established decided not to make any hurried decision and adopted a wait-and-watch policy. In August 1948, H V Kamath enquired about the Indian position on Israel in the Constitution Assembly debates where Nehru reiterated the wait-and-watch stance.

There were two important reasons for India to adopt a wait-and-watch policy. The first was that after Israel got created, hostilities broke out in the region and the situation turned rapidly volatile. Secondly, the Indian Muslims had gone through the traumatic experience of partition and making a statement on Israel was not warranted at this stage. Further, during this period Pakistan began to establish proximity with Arabs to ignite the idea of Pan Islamism which they could use against India in Kashmir. However, during this period, Indian diplomats all over the world kept interacting with Israeli diplomat. Israel had become a reality in the international system and there was a growing pressure on India to recognise Israel. On 11th May 1949, UNGA decided to vote on the question of Israel being made the 54th member of UN. India voted positively on this question. India later, however, voted against the motion at the time of Israel's admission to the UN. India clarified that State of Israel had not been formed by virtue of negotiations but by armed struggle and the Indian stand was in sync with its earlier stand of support to Palestinians. But when Israel got accepted as a UN member, it kindled a reconsideration of Israel by India. Nehru, during his visit to the US in 1949, had met with Israeli diplomats and also conveyed to them that as the UN has accepted Israel as a member, India is moving in the direction to recognise Israel which as a question could no longer be postponed.

Between 1948 and 1950, Turkey and Iran too had recognised Israel. There was a direct pressure on India to recognise Israel as it could no longer play the domestic Muslim population card. Nehru announced India's recognition of Israel in February 1950 in a

statement made in the Parliament. But this declaration was verbal. Neither were there any official document that recognised Israel nor was any step taken to establish diplomatic ties. Finally, on 17th September, 1950, a press communiqué was issued to recognise Israel after 28 months of requests from Israel. India thus removed the main obstacle in the recognition of Israel. The delay in Indian response was attributed to the diplomatic backlash India may have had to face from the Arab states. India clarified that the recognition to Israel in no way meant a change to Israel–Palestine policy of India and that it would continue to promote Arab cause.

Other factors played a role in the diplomatic shift undertaken by India. India, through the recognition of Israel, made it clear that its support to Arabs was not unconditional and that India did expect reciprocity. India did not appreciate Egyptian vote at the UN against India on the issue of Hyderabad and its abstention at the UN vote on the Korean issue.

Even though India had recognised Israel, it did not lead to the establishment of diplomatic ties instantly. India made a distinction between legally recognising Israel and the political act of establishing diplomatic relations. India made the right choice in maintaining a balance in the diplomacy related to West Asia. In September 1951, a consular office was opened in Bombay and F W Pollock was made honorary Consular Agent of Israel to India. Israel perceived all these steps to be important because it was surrounded by countries which had declared war on it. Israel was isolated by its neighbours and the only option for Israel was to engage with the West.

In Asia, Israel perceived India as a springboard to the other part of the world. However, the subsequent Suez crisis of 1956 took the relations to a low point. India condemned Israeli aggression, with Nehru branding the military operation of Israel on Egypt as a clear, naked act of aggression. India resorted to a recognition-but-no-relationship policy with Israel in this period. This open-ended foreign policy to pursue relations with both Arabs and Israel gave India the need to stay in touch with the region without complicating relations with anyone in the evolving strategic circumstances. An Indian Friends of Israeli society was formed and it continued to interact on various occasions. This was no doubt appreciated by Israel but the society had a limited influence on foreign policy.

PERIOD 3: 1956 TO 1974: CRISES AND DEBATES: CONTESTATION AND REVISION OF INDIA'S ISRAEL POLICY

The subsequent period after the 1956 crisis saw a change in Israel's attitude towards India. Israel was unhappy with India for not extending full diplomatic relations. Israel realised the need to improve relations with the West were more crucial than with Asia and India. Israel did invite Nehru in 1960 but he declined the invitation as such a visit at this juncture could complicate matters. In 1963, in the Parliament, India clarified that due to less consular work between the two states, it is not appropriate to establish diplomatic missions with Israel. After the death of Nehru in 1964, Shastri continued the Nehruvian legacy with regard to India's Israel policy. In 1964, India accorded recognition to the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). India continued cooperation with Israel in the field of technology and agriculture.

During the 1962 Indo–China conflict, India asked for military assistance from Israel

and it agreed, considering that this may provide an opportunity for Israel to put in place diplomatic ties with India. In January 1963, top level officials of Israel and India had a meeting and this became the first ever proper contact between the two forces. The coming of Indira Gandhi saw a resurgence of the hardcore pro-Arab policy. In March 1966, Israeli President Zalman Shazar, while on his way to Nepal, requested a 24-hour halt in India. The MEA requested the halt to take place in Calcutta and somehow no official greeting of the Israeli head of the state took place. This reflected the absence of depth in the relations.

In the Six-Days War in 1967, India blamed Israel for escalating conflict and showed support to Egypt and the Arab states. In the 1965 India–Pakistan conflict, Pakistan succeeded in garnering the support of Arabs. The only Arab state standing with India was Egypt, which offered mediation in the Casablanca Summit of Arabs in September 1965. India had again requested for Israeli assistance for heavy mortar and ammunition. Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir was non-committal, but Prime Minister Levi Eshkol sent shipments of ammunition to India. Despite the support, no steps were taken by Shastri regime for modifying Israel–India ties. However, the lack of Arab support during 1965 war for India and outright support to Pakistan led the opposition in India to heavily criticise India's West Asia Policy. In 1966–67, the Arab–Israel conflict began again, with the situation becoming volatile along the Syria–Israel and Jordan–Israel border. India was affected when, in 1967, Egypt asked the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) to withdraw from Egypt controlled areas near the border. India was a significant contributor to the UNEF. But due to Israeli aggression, many Indian UNEF officials and soldiers had died. India, at that time, was a non-permanent member of UNSC and again condemned Israel for escalation of conflict and strongly objected to the pre-emptive attack of Israel on Egypt.

The opposition in India blamed the Indian government for supporting Arabs without reciprocity and stated that India should not favour Arab world as they supported Pakistan. There was a gradual rise in India of this new orthodoxy which was not anti-Israeli but lacked assertion as they were out of the power structure. As Israel expanded its territory in 1967, India advised that Israel should follow UN Resolution 242 and go back to pre-1967 borders. However, the government toned down the anti-Israel rhetoric and began to attribute its pro-Arab policy to energy and economic considerations. India also began to use UN Resolution-242 as a new benchmark for Indo–Israel rapprochement. After the creation of R&AW in 1968, India opened up lines of communication with the Israeli Mossad and thus began intelligence cooperation. The R&AW officers in Geneva acted in collaboration with Mossad and collection of intelligence on Pakistan and thereby began a new phase of cooperation, albeit low in tone.

In August 1969, the Al Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem witnessed a fire. The mosque is the third holiest site in Islam after Mecca and Medina. The Arab states blamed Israel for lack of protection of Islamic sites and Saudi King Faisal called for the convening of an Organisation of Islamic countries (OIC) Conference. The criteria was that only countries that have Muslim majority population or a Muslim head of State would be able to participate. Pakistan long used the OIC as a forum to propagate anti-India feelings related to Kashmir. India decided to participate in the OIC meeting planned in Rabat in September 1969. With no official invite coming despite an expression of interest by India, India insinuated that the OIC had been neglecting the interests of Indian Muslims. India also lobbied with Egypt and Indonesia, who convinced Faisal to allow an Indian delegation to

allow the representation of minority Muslims of India. Pakistani President Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan decided to walkout of the Summit on 23rd September since India had garnered the support of Algeria, Egypt, Sudan and Libya. Morocco and Saudi Arabia convinced Yahya Khan to attend the last session after it was agreed that India would not be a part of last session. The final declaration by the Islamic Muslims condemned Israel for its actions.

The issue caused public embarrassment for India but the government tried to justify its participation asserting the need to block Pakistan from using the OIC for its anti-India propaganda. The Arabs again stood by Pakistan in the 1971 conflict and showed inadequate appreciation of the refugee crisis India faced. In contrast, Israel supported India and recognised Bangladesh. In 1973, when the Yom Kippur war started with Egypt and Syria attacking Israel, India blamed it on Israel, citing its refusal to vacate territories captured in 1967 as a cause of Arab frustration, leading to aggression.

The period after 1967 saw lesser reliance of India on Egypt as a focal point of relations in the Arab world. India shed off its past inhibitions and began to engage with both Iran and Iraq. Both of them emerged as crucial suppliers of oil for India. India's relations with Iraq picked up at other bilateral levels also apart from oil. Economic and energy interests ensured that India's Israel policy did not veer completely away from UN Resolution 242.

PERIOD 4: 1984 TO 1992: SETTING THE STAGE FOR CHANGE: FROM ESTRANGEMENT TO ENGAGEMENT WITH ISRAEL

In 1980, Indira Gandhi came to power. In 1979, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and all Arabs condemned it. India did not condemn the Soviet invasion owing to proximate ties with Soviets but to prevent ostracisation from Arabs, India immediately granted full diplomatic status to the PLO and allowed it a mission in New Delhi. When Israel objected to Indian criticism of Israeli attack on Iraq in 1981 and Lebanon in 1982, the Israeli counsel Yossef Hassin, who had criticised India, was expelled. This again took Indo-Israel relations to their lowest point. However, in the second half of the 1980s, India witnessed a change in political leadership as Rajiv Gandhi was elected as the Prime Minister of India on 24 December 1984. Rajiv Gandhi, educated at Cambridge University, signalled a fresh Indian approach towards Israel and though unable to reverse the traditional Indian pro-Arab foreign policy completely, initiated a number of moves in favour of Israel. He also held a meeting with Shimon Peres, his Israeli counterpart, at a UN session in 1985.

The PLO was based in Lebanon. When Israel attacked Lebanon, the PLO's headquarters moved to Tunisia. In 1985, Israel bombarded the PLO offices in Tunisia. India condemned the Israeli attacks. In October 1985, the UNGA session began. The Arabs sponsored a resolution for seeking the expulsion of Israel from UN. India abstained at the vote. Later, India allowed an Israeli vice counsel back in Mumbai. Rajiv, in 1987, allowed the Israeli Tennis team to play in India at the Davis cup. This event became a diplomatic move much appreciated by Israelis who, since 1960s, had not been granted visas by India to attend sports events. Later the government allowed the Israeli consulate to have jurisdiction over Kerala. However, events like the Palestinian Intifada and domestic problems in late 1980s did not allow Rajiv Gandhi to manoeuvre the foreign policy completely in favour of Israel.

After the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, the Congress staged a comeback, with Narasimha Rao as Prime Minister. Rao formed the government in a coalition and was not constrained by the Muslim vote bank politics of the Indian National Congress. In 1990-91, Rao steered the Indian foreign policy based on regional and domestic developments. In 1990-91, there were internal divisions in the Arab world related to the Gulf War. In the Kuwait crisis, PLO supported Iraq while Arabs supported Kuwait. Saddam Hussein too sided with PLO to position himself as a leader of the Palestinian cause. The support of PLO to Iraq led to isolation of PLO in the Arab world. Domestically in India, the economy needed a push and USA was the only country that could give India the needed financial muscle. India understood that the US financial assistance is tied to India opening up its relationship with Israel. The Madrid Conference and Oslo Accords at the end of Cold War created a ripe situation for India to bolster its ties with Israel. After the PLO brokered negotiations with Israel at the Madrid conference, conjecturing the possibility of PLO-Israel rapprochement, Rao invited Yasser Arafat, the head of PLO, to India. Since 1987, Pakistan had been using the US trained Afghan Mujahideens to create unrest in Kashmir. India began to suppress this externally sponsored insurgency in Kashmir, Pakistan successfully used the OIC forum to internationalize the Kashmir conflict by highlighting the human rights violation by India in Kashmir. OIC even decided to send a fact finding mission to Kashmir which was strongly protested by India. India asserted that Kashmir was an internal conflict of India and OIC had no jurisdiction on an internal issue related to India. India felt that its pro-Arab policy during the entire Cold War did not serve any strategic support to India for Kashmir. On 23rd January 1992, in a cabinet meeting, discussions on diplomatic relations with Israel were undertaken. In July 1992, India extended the consular relations to full diplomatic relations and Ephraim Duek presented his credentials to Indian President as the first Israeli Ambassador to India. India asserted that there was an economic logic to India's improved ties with Israel. India wanted to use the scientific and technical expertise of Israel for its domestic development. The change happened in 1992 because Narsimha Rao was convinced that a rehaul of our West Asian engagement was long due. The domestic political repercussions no longer guided our policy now. The realisation that India can gain from security relations with Israel by engaging strategically, also acted as a factor.

Core reasons that compelled India to make a shift in its Israel policy are:

1. The stand of OIC on Kashmir issue.
2. Internal divisions within the Arab world on the ongoing Gulf War.
3. Jordan (Madrid Conference-1991) and Egypt (Camp David Accord-1978) had already signed a peace treaty with Israel.
4. PLO and Israel initiated peace talks in 1993 in Oslo leading to the tectonic Oslo Accords.
5. Indian economy needed a push from USA which made financial assistance as a precondition to rapprochement with Israel.
6. India needed a defence partner (which USA eventually became) after the disintegration of the Cold War and demise of the USSR.
7. China too gave diplomatic recognition to Israel at the end of the Cold War prior to West Asia peace talks, thereby making a shift in its own policy of Cold War.

PERIOD 5: 1992 TO PRESENT: FROM PRUDENT RAPPROCHEMENT TO THE NEW STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP AND DE-HYPHENATION—THE CONSOLIDATION OF INDIA’S NEW ISRAEL POLICY

Rao opened up diplomatic relations with Israel but preferred to have a low-level engagement, which analysts attribute to the Congress government’s desire to not compromise Muslim votes. He allowed only two cabinet ministers of his government to travel to Israel. The government resorted to a cautious approach of allowing the private actors and bureaucracy to be used to clearly identify areas where both would cooperate. India also clarified there was no change in Palestine policy and India would continue to support Arabs in the Palestine issue. Indian government instructed J N Dixit to make a case to Ambassadors of Arab states about India’s Palestine policy. Dixit asserted to the individual diplomats that India expected reciprocity from Arab states in cases of issues pertaining to Pakistan. Post 1991, India decided to embark upon a journey to focus on self-reliance in military technology. In this context, Israel became a core partner for India as it had vast experience in the Military Industrial Complex it had established in collaboration with the West. Israel had technology which they had developed indigenously and therefore was not bound by End User Licensing Agreements (EULA). Israel too expressed willingness to work with India through joint ventures. Though the relationship between the two states did pick up, but, remained short of a genuine strategic partnership.



R&AW and MOSSAD—The Secret Link

The link between the two intelligence agencies goes back to 1968 when R&AW was created. India has cooperated with Mossad to get vital intelligence about radical Islamic groups. The Field Officers of R&AW (equivalent to agents of other intelligence agencies) are trained by Mossad today. The two agencies have collaborations in assassination squads and counter terrorism operation at a covert level. In 1976-77, Moshe Dayan and Mossad even trained Indian Field Officers of R&AW to carry out air strikes to destroy the Pakistani Kahuta plant where Indian R&AW had found out secret nuclear enrichment done by Pakistan to develop a nuclear bomb. Till today, R&AW and Mossad continue to enjoy a deep covert relationship in different parts of the world.

After 1991, as India adopted the policy of diversification in defence industry, it began to forge a new alliance with Israel. Israel not only had a large military-industrial complex but through arms support in 1962, 1965 and 1971, had proven its mettle. Moreover, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Indian defence industry’s reliance on Soviet equipment became a factor since Israelis had developed special skills in upgrading Soviet era equipments. Thus, both defence and economic ties between the nations improved. Even though a strong case was made for defence deals with Israel, the Indian government decided not to publicly talk about the same. In 1998, when the BJP came to power, there were high level visits from India by L K Advani (Home Minister) and Jaswant Singh (Foreign Minister) to Israel. In 2003, Israeli PM Ariel Sharon visited India. The BJP

government added the needed strategic depth in the relations and opened up a chapter of defence diplomacy thereby envisaging a military and ideological alliance to contain terrorism. In 2003, India purchased 14 Million dollars' worth light ammunition, electronic warfare equipments and UAVs from Israel. Post Kargil war, both sides began cooperation in border control and counter-terrorism exercises. Israelis gave India night vision technologies and laser guided missiles and UAVs for high altitude surveillance and imagery, along with Barak-I missiles. The two sides signed MoU in agriculture, trade, high tech agriculture demonstration, health care, industrial research and development. They have also been negotiating an FTA for a long time. There is a Joint Working Group on Terrorism and Israel has supplied India with Phalcon AWACS system as well. At the defence level, Israel has also provided India with searcher UAVs, Heron-I drones, M-46 field guns, Phalcon AWACS, Spyder anti-aircraft missiles, radars and so on. Israel too is keen on engaging with India as Israel asserts that Jews in India have not been victims of anti-Semitism (unlike in Europe). In 2017, during the visit of the Indian PM to Israel, the two decided to take the relationship to a strategic level.

India and the Davis Report, 2015

In 2014, during an assault on Gaza, Israeli firing killed more than 2000 Palestinians, following which the UNHRC tasked Mary McGowan Davis with the investigations on Israeli war crimes. The report found out that highest levels of officials in the Israeli government were involved. The report was submitted to the ICC. The ICC, in August 2014, refused action as Palestine was not a member of the ICC. In April 2015, Palestine became a member of the ICC. The issue was taken up again and India abstained from voting along with Kenya, Ethiopia, Paraguay and Macedonia. India abstained as it is not a party to the Rome statute, it asserted that it follows the same policy of not voting for a resolution which is country-specific. However, though the Indian stand could be right in its own way, it is important to note that China is not a party to the ICC either and still chose to vote in favour of censuring Israel.

ANALYSIS OF VISIT OF THE INDIAN PRESIDENT TO ISRAEL AND PALESTINE

The Indian President visited Israel in October 2015 in the first ever Head of State level visit to Israel. The President was honoured by Al-Quds University and was hailed as the 'Knight of Peace'. He decided to strengthen cooperation in agriculture, defence and technology sectors. There were MoUs in Avoidance of double taxation, culture, academic and student exchange. The Hebrew University conferred the President an honorary doctorate. The President garnered support for Make in India. Both sided agreed to strengthen cooperation in security and counter-terrorism. During the visit, Israel backed India's entry to the UN Security Council as a permanent member. He was also given the rare honour of addressing the Knesset.



The Indian President also visited Palestine. During the visit, the President reiterated the Indian support to the Palestine cause. Indian President made it clear that there was no change in India's Palestine Policy.




During the visit to Palestine, the President of India asserted that India would continue to follow the three core dimensions of its Palestine policy. He asserted that there would be a new road map established to engage with Palestine. The future framework of Indian engagement with Palestine was also announced by the President.



The President also inaugurated the India–Palestine centre for Excellence in ICT with a satellite centre in Ramallah. The President also hoped for the successful completion of Techno-Park in Ramallah. The President announced setting up of an ICT chair in Al-Quds University. The President also announced additional 100 ITEC scholarships for the Palestinians. He further inaugurated the Jawaharlal Nehru secondary school at Abu Dees.

VISIT OF THE PRESIDENT OF ISRAEL TO INDIA

The President of Israel, Reuven Rivlin, visited India from 14th to 21st November in 2016. The visit laid down the foundation for the celebration of 25 years of diplomatic relations, to be completed in 2017. During the visit, the Israeli President committed to improve relationship in agriculture, defence, trade, academics and youth exchanges. The two sides identified micro-irrigation in drought prone areas and water management as new area of future cooperation on priority. Israel supported India's Make in India, Digital India, Skill India and Smart Cities projects and the Israeli President assured that Israeli companies will assist India in its flagship programmes. The two sides also decided to strengthen their cooperation to fight terrorism and extremism. A decision was taken to broaden defence cooperation by adding dimensions of defence production and manufacturing in the bilateral relationships. The Israeli President also visited Chandigarh and inaugurated Afro-Tech 2016 while he also visited the Indo–Israel Agriculture Project Centre in Karnal. The most important dimension of the visit was the focus on agricultural cooperation.



Analysis of the Indian PM Visit to Israel, 2017

Indian PM, Narendra Modi, visited Israel (becoming the first Indian PM to do so) and decided to shed off Indian policy of keeping relations with Israel low profile. During the visit, the two sides decided to take the relationship to a strategic partnership level. The important dimension that India conveyed through the visit was that it has de-hyphenated Israel and Palestine in the Indian foreign policy without abandoning the Indian support to the Palestinian cause. The de-hyphenation was clearly visible as the Indian PM skipped a visit to Palestine. The two sides signed strategic pacts worth 4.3 billion Dollars and decided to setup a 40 million Dollar India Israel Innovation Fund to augment bilateral research and development in different fields. Cyber defence has been identified as a priority area of joint research. A key area of cooperation is agriculture and water management. India is a water stressed nation with annual per capita availability of water being less than 1500 cubic meters. Israel is also a water scarce nation with per capita availability of water less than 200 cubic meters, yet, is an agriculture exporter to the European Union. In future, the two sides decided to explore the possibility of a future nuclear deal. The two sides have decided to sign the following agreements:

1. Setup India-Israel Research and Development and Technology Innovation Fund.
2. Plan of cooperation regarding atomic clocks.
3. MoU on Geo Synchronous Earth Orbit and Low Earth Orbit optical link.
4. India-Israel Development Cooperation- 3 Year work programme in agriculture from 2018 to 2020.
5. MoU on electric propulsion for small satellites.
6. Cooperation in utility reforms.

4
CHAPTER

India and Russia Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Historical analysis of diplomatic relations
- Defense diplomacy
- Nuclear and Energy diplomacy
- Commercial and Strategic diplomacy
- Analysis of bilateral relations

DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

The foundation of the India–Russia relations were laid during the Cold War era. After the Cold War ended, the initial years of Boris Yeltsin's rule were not smooth. Otherwise, India and Russia have had a relationship which has nurtured as friction free in the last many decades, with both nations having a strategic vision about each other for many years. In the post-Cold War period, the relationship is strong but lacks direction, though officially, in 2000, India and Russia became strategic partners, reiterating a special and privileged partnership when Dmitry Medvedev during his visit in 2010. Russia, however, is not comfortable with the growing Indo–US proximity. During the Cold War, defence ties were the most important elements of our relation. In the post-Cold War era, the US, France and Israel have emerged as direct competitors to Russia in providing defence supplies to India. In 2012, the two nations celebrated the sixty-fifth anniversary of diplomatic relations and reaffirmed their cordial bilateral relations.

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS UPTO INDIA'S INDEPENDENCE

The origin of Indo–Russian ties in the modern era can be understood through the colonial prism. The period of early nineteenth century saw the Russian Tsar expand to Central Asia. The British perceived this as a threat to the sovereignty of the British Indian empire. The British were now determined to halt Russian advancement beyond Central Asia. In order to stop the same, the British started the Anglo–Afghan wars. The primary aim of the wars was to make regions near Afghanistan a buffer to protect the British Indian territory. The ultimately unfolding of the Great Game by the British and Russians would accept the British as the paramount power in Afghanistan. When the Russian and the British agreed to respect each other's interests, the Great Game concluded with the Anglo–Russian Convention of 1907. This revolution and the subsequently established Soviet Russian state distanced Russia from India. The leaders of early Soviet Union were not keen on supporting the Indian National Movement. The Russia leaders thought that the Indian national movement against British colonialism is a bourgeois-led movement and did not have a strong revolutionary potential. They felt that a strong revolutionary impulse was

needed for fight against imperial rule, which the Indians somewhat lacked. Further, as the Indian National Movement progressed, Russia got busy with their own internal concerns, as a result of which, up until the very end of World War-II, India and Russia had very limited interaction.

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS FROM 1947 TO 1962

When India became independent, it adopted the policy of non-alignment. The NAM tried to maintain ideological neutrality in the exciting era of bipolarity. In the initial years of Indian independence, up to 1953, Stalin was not very keen about India. Stalin did not appreciate the non-aligned posturing of India and perceived Indian leaders as capitalist lackeys. Things did change after the death of Stalin in 1953, and there were two issues at the global level where Soviets and Indians found space to converge. The first was Indian protest at the UN about its decision to extend the Korean War north of the 38th parallel. The second was Indian support for the People's Republic of China to enter the UN. However, what actually acted as a factor compelling India to tilt towards the Soviets was the US. In 1954, the US established the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), an alliance initiated by the US for South Asia and South East Asia. In 1955 came the Baghdad Pact for West Asia. India began to perceive these two alliances as an attempt by the US to encircle India. India also condemned American support to Pakistan with arms as it brought the Cold War at India's doorstep. The situational changes in Asia also compelled the Soviets to view India in a different light. After the death of Stalin in 1953, with the coming of Nikita Khrushchev to power, Soviets began to view India favourably as a counter balance in East-West confrontation. India also responded to the changing Soviet posturing. India offered strong condemnation of Anglo-French aggression of Egypt during the Suez crisis but did not up the rhetoric in the case of Hungarian invasion by the Soviets.

The period of Nikita Khrushchev did not witness any significant tilt of Soviet to China. Nikita Khrushchev favoured the improvement of ties with the US while Mao tried to criticise it and tried to promote his own image as a sole representative of revolutionary movements. This difference between the Soviets and China led to Soviets favouring India during the 1959 Chinese aggression. After the 1962 war, the Soviets gave an aggressive push to defence ties with India. After 1962, India adopted the path of defence modernisation. The Soviets decided to use it as an opportunity to build ties with India before any western country could fill this strategic space and emerged as the topmost defence supplier for India by the late 1960s. In the 1965 Indo-Pak war, India appreciated the role of the Soviets during mediation through the Tashkent Declaration. This also led to India and Russia's convergence on global issues like the Vietnam War and Czechoslovakia. This period saw strengthening of bilateral defense ties.

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS DURING THE COLD WAR

Though the Soviets did support India in 1959 when the Chinese adopted a hard-line position on the border, in 1962, during the Sino-Indian war, the Soviets stood along the Chinese theory that the border between India and China is a colonial legacy. To rectify this tilt, the Soviet Union, post the 1962 war, gave support of arms to India which helped a lot in the 1965 war. Gradually, in the early 1970s, the world again witnessed tectonic shifts, the most important of which was the US tilt towards China. This was perceived by the

USSR as a threat to them. These events again led to mega regional shifts. In the 1970s, the US explored options of undertaking rapprochements with China, India began to fear a Beijing–Washington–Islamabad axis. Henry Kissinger did not send positive vibes to India and tried to make it clear that an Indo–Pak conflict could also come to involve China. India acted hastily. Since 1969, India and the USSR were negotiating a diplomatic and strategic engagement. India speeded up the negotiations and in 1971, concluded a twenty-year India–Soviet Treaty of Peace and Friendship. The treaty gave India the needed strategic support from Russia in any eventuality of conflict. Shipments of arms began to arrive from Russia to India. After the creation of Bangladesh towards the end of 1971, the India–Russia treaty acted as a great strategic stabiliser for India and the region as it deterred any Chinese or American intervention unfavourable to India.

The Soviets also vetoed the UN resolutions that advanced that India and Pakistan undertake a ceasefire. Soviet support successfully helped India to neutralise the external threats and helped it safeguard its territory. After the 1971 war, when India conducted the nuclear test in 1974, the Soviets did not condemn it and, in fact, went on to support India with the supply of heavy water for the nuclear programme which got halted when American and Canadians took back their supplies. India, on the other hand, also showed outright support to the Soviet Union. In 1979, when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, India at that time in the UN General Assembly abstained from voting which had advocated that Soviets stop military intervention in Afghanistan. Domestically, within India, cutting across party lines, all parties had an understanding that relations with Russia were serving the Indian national interest and thereby needed to continue. Thus, during the entire Cold War period, the USSR supported India in development and arms and also provided strategic support at both global and regional levels.

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AFTER THE END OF THE COLD WAR

The era of Rajiv Gandhi and Gorbachev saw internal policy adjustments in both nations. Due to these adjustments and the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet territory, the relations suffered. The coming of Boris Yeltsin in Russia saw Russia undertake rapprochements with the West again, which, in turn, affected the Russian tilt to India. However, in January, 1993, Boris Yeltsin visited India and concluded the twenty-year Indo–Russia Friendship and Cooperation Treaty. In 1989, when Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, it not only paved way for the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan but also, due to Pakistani support to extremists in Afghanistan, succeeded in creating a rift in Kashmir. From the 1990s began the rise of Kashmiri extremism. Problem erupted in 1996 when the Taliban took over Afghanistan. India and Russia, along with Iran, began to support the Northern Alliance. This convergence of interests of India and Russia in Afghanistan from 1996 paved way for warming up of bilateral relations, ultimately cultivating in Strategic Partnership in 2000.

The rise of China in the post-Cold War era today is something that is adding that additional push to the contours of the India–Russian relations. Bilaterally, the strategic partnership agreed upon in 2000 has been elevated to special and privileged strategic partnership in 2010. One of the key drivers of our relationship in the post-Cold War period is our assertion for a multipolar world. The resurgence of Russia in the world to project itself as an independent pole in the international system suits India as it will prevent any

form of unipolar assertion by either the US or China. The second driver of Indo-Russian relation is the convergence of views about regional power play. Russia is comfortable with a strong India in South Asia while India would prefer an independent Russia at the global level as it would give India more space to manoeuvre its strategic policy. The third and most important driver of our relationship with Russia is that in India, there is very little obligation to deepen ties with Russia in contrast to the US. It has been felt that Russia has served Indian national interests well and would continue to do so. However, the challenge for India is how it would find a balance between growing Indo-US proximity and support to Russia if Russia continues to resort to more nationalistic assertion as witnessed under Putin.

DEFENCE DIPLOMACY

The defence diplomacy began between India and Russia after 1962. The defence relation has persisted over a period of time and has become bedrock of mutual trust. More than 70% of Indian defence equipment today is of Russian origin. These weapons have also proved their worth at a time when India needed them in conflicts. During the Cold War, to save forex, the two sides have used Rupee-Rouble agreements, which significantly contributed in helping India save forex. India, in 1980s, resorted to a twin policy of diversification and domestic industrial development in defence. Russia helped India with technology transfers. At the end of the Cold War, there was a global decline in arms trade but India and China remained top importers. The priority for India in the post-Cold War period was to ensure that it had a reliable spare parts supplier.

Crisis of vast military industrial complexes of the Soviet and their failure to sustain at the end of the Cold War led India to seek alternative routes. India explored the possibility of Israel and France, along with the US, acting as potential suppliers. In the first decade following the end of the Cold War saw Russia trying to consolidate its military industrial complexes. However, one concern did remain. Indian armed forces complained about problems in spare parts and issues in the maintenance of Russian equipments. Part of the blame is on Indian defence and foreign policy negotiations that failed to develop a deeper perspective on the life cycle of products. When they were negotiating projects, agreements on product life cycle needed to be taken care of. At times, we ended up taking some equipment which became obsolete after a few years and its production plants also shut down, thereby making spare parts availability a huge concern.

Russia created the Rosoboron export in 2000, which is a state intermediary body that monopolises arms export. India raises the issue of support after sales at almost all India–Russia Intergovernmental Commissions on Military-Technical Cooperation (IRIGC–MTC) and this platform helps us to resolve our issues. Despite certain concerns, India continues to have a robust defence cooperation with Russia as the arms have proven their mettle and majority of our arms are of Soviet origins, which have come to be well accepted in the Indian military circles. Since 2007, the two are working on developing a fifth-generation combat aircraft. The MIG-35 has had India embark upon a mega defence modernisation programme. The offset clause invoked under our defence procurement policy would now warrant more Russian assistance and Russia has not shied away from helping India develop Indian military industrial complex. Russia and India continue to have bilateral exercises and Russia continues to support us for supplies of multirole

transport aircrafts, combat aircrafts, including an aircraft carrier admiral Gorchakov inducted in the Indian navy in November 2013 as INS Vikramaditya.

INDRA-2017

India held an international drill with Russia in 2017. India dispatched around 350 soldiers with anti-submarine warfare and aircrafts for Indira combat exercise in Vladivostok. In the Indra-2017, India deployed assets from army, navy and air force for the first time making it a tri-services operation in an integrated theatre. The exercise facilitated knowledge of each other's doctrines, tactics and procedures.

Russia and India will continue to have joint development of weapons and continue to interact through institutionalised mechanisms of cooperation. India is undertaking domestic production of Brahmos missile, T-90 tank and Sukhoi aircrafts. Indian reliance on Russia will not decrease despite diversification and delays in projects because Russia remains committed to defence technology transfer, which India feels it needs for the development of its domestic defence industry. Russia, similarly, will not reduce its dependence on India as India acts as the biggest testing ground for Russian weaponry. As China goes on to supply arms to developing nations in future, it will try to undercut the Russian influence, thus necessitating Russia to stay with India so as to be able to use India as a springboard to other developing markets despite an Indian tilt to the US.

Thus, both use defence cooperation to enhance their overall diplomatic engagement. Russians also continue to provide economic aid and cooperate with India on a case-to-case basis.

India–Russia Space Cooperation

Indo–Soviet space cooperation began in 1960s. In 1963, with UN assistance, India launched a satellite from Thumba equatorial launch site. On 19th April 1975, India's Aryabhatta was launched on a Soviet Kosmos–3M rocket from Kapustin Yar range. In 1979, Bhaskara-I was launched from Kapustin Yar range once again. In 1984, Indian astronaut Rakesh Sharma visited space in the Soyuz T-10, which was an issue of great political prestige for India. Today, Russia is the most important strategic space power for India. In 1992, Russia agreed to provide India cryogenic rocket engines but due to India being a non-signatory to MTCA at that time, the deal was later suspended. The sudden suspension of the deal came as a serious setback to Indian space programme. Russia, however, agreed to give KVD-1 engines to India. At the end of Cold War in 1994, both countries signed a space cooperation agreement and have been working in collaboration over GLONASS and the Indian Moon Mission.

NUCLEAR AND ENERGY DIPLOMACY

Energy stands to be one of the most promising areas of cooperation between India and Russia. Russia is an energy supplier while India has a huge demand of energy. As India is

a net importer of energy, Russia is in a strategic position to cooperate in this regard. India has been importing coal and oil from Russia and in future it might also look for import of gas. Russia has tremendous amount of oil in East Siberia. Both China and Japan are keenly interested in importing East Siberian oil through a pipeline. This pipeline route via Kozmino Bay could also be explored by India. If India collaborates with the Chinese One Belt One Road initiative, it will give India access to rail and road networks in Mongolia and Daqing, a route that will be used by Russia to export oil to China. The OVL already has a 20% stake in Sakhalin-I and is in a joint venture in Sathalin-III with Rosneft. More OVL participation will be required to meet India's growing energy needs.

India–Russia nuclear cooperation goes back to 1960s. In 1961, India had concluded research and development agreements with Russia in Hungary for the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (RAPS). India concluded a contract with the USSR in 1976 for supplying of heavy waters. During the Cold War period, Russia also supported India by supplying fuel at Tarapur in 1982 and in 1988, agreed to help construct reactors and supply light water for reactors at Koodankulam after Pokhran-II.

In October 2013, Russia succeeded in operationalising the first unit of the reactors at Koodankulam but the construction of subsequent units have been delayed and India's nuclear liability law related issues (explained in the chapter on Indo-US relations) have acted as constraints.

COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY

The trade during Cold War between the two was based on the Rupee–Rouble agreement. The foundation of this agreement was dismantled in 1992, which led to a decline in trade. Today, the two have created the India–Russia Inter Governmental Commission on Trade and the India–Russia Forum on Trade and Investments, which are core institutional mechanisms available to oversee trade. There have been regular interactions of CEOs through the India–Russia CEO's council. The trade target has been 30 billion dollars by 2025, when the bilateral trade at present is only around 8 billion dollars. Russia–China trade is at 66 billion dollars, with a target to take it to 100 billion dollars. A major reason for weak India–Russia trade is an over dependence on arms trade. Although, in recent times, oil has picked up, yet logistical constraints have prevented the trade from flourishing.

There are no direct overland trade routes possible today, though the International North–South Transit Corridor (INSTC) will try to establish that connectivity. Moreover, inadequate information about business potential and poor knowledge of Russian language act as barriers. It is necessary to replicate the arms development and production models between India and Russia in the commercial and economic sectors also. The economic relations also suffered when the Supreme Court, in 2012, declared 2G licenses in telecom as null and void after Russian AFK Sistema had teamed up with Shyam Telecom Services. India is negotiating a CEPA with Eurasian Economic community presently on railways, fertilizer production and aircrafts construction.

The Indian PM also held an interaction with CEOs at the Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum. It has been decided that India will be a participating country in the International Industrial Exhibition in 2016 and Russia will be at the India

Engineering Sourcing Show in 2017. A joint study group has been studying the possibility of an FTA and both sides affirmed to early conclusion and preparation of a report. A special notified zone at Bharat Diamond Bourse is to be created soon to promote diamond trade. Russia has decided to setup six additional reactors for India and agreed to undertake localisation of equipments to promote Make in India. India expressed hopes for cooperation in natural gas in fields at Gydan Peninsula and Gulf of Ob. To promote cooperation in science, both sides have agreed to work together under the framework set by the Arctic Council with the Russian Scientific Centre in the Spits bergen Svalbard archipelago. A couple of MoUs on space cooperation and Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS) have been signed.

INDIA–RUSSIA RELATIONS IN THE 21st CENTURY

In this section of the chapter we shall build upon the previous sections to undertake an analytical survey of various themes of the bilateral ties that will help us map out the broad spectrum of the relationship. We shall adopt a cohesive approach and delve into three core themes, that are defence, trade and connectivity.

Theme 1: Analysis of Defence Diplomacy

India and Russia continue to deepen their defence engagement through bilateral arms trade. Quantitatively, India remains at the topmost position when it comes to defence imports. In absolute terms, despite competition from Britain, France and the US, Russia remains the top defence supplier to India. The Indo–Russia defence ties have also witnessed a transformation to a model of cooperative production on shared risk partnership from the erstwhile model of a supplier–consumer relationship. Russia has, in fact, over a period of time, favoured more technology transfer to India to assist India in augmenting its capacities.



In the 1990s and early 2000s, the Indian side placed multiple defence orders from Russia that ranged from Talwar class frigates under Project 11356 to MiG-29K shipborne aircrafts. Indian demands spearheaded a culture of innovation in the Russian defence industrial complex to cater to advanced needs. Indian requirements of defence products made Russia technologically more productive as it enabled in creating a system of innovation that pushed Russians to produce half a generation more advanced equipments. There was an overall improvement in Russian aviation and missiles technology industries. This development was taken positively even by Russian defence corporate houses as it enabled them to establish long-term strategies to meet Indian requirements. The Russian corporate houses in the avionics industry used Indian orders as a springboard to spearhead

innovations in engines (thrust vector controls) and radars (phased m-array radars).

The Indian Navy ordered 45 MiG-29K shipborne fighters. As Russia began to meet Indian requirements, the Russian Navy too began to show a positive interest in next generation ship borne fighters, clearly proving that Indian requirements had a multiplier effect on Russian armed forces too. The Chinese too were not very far behind in importing Russian technology. However, the Chinese imports were not only lesser in value but also in quantity as China favoured to import only those technologies that it could clone in China. Uniquely, the cooperation with India led to no possibility of creation of unlicensed clones whereas such possibility continues to remain high for transfers done to China. This Indo-Russian cooperation today sees its manifestation in the form of a newly emerging cooperative model where Russia intends to jointly work with India in production of military hardware. The recent ongoing project of fifth generation fighter aircrafts and military transport aircrafts is a testimony to the fact.

In recent times, the Indian establishment has undertaken a policy of diversification allowing other players in India defence industry as well. It has gained momentum in the recent times. India, with its growing economic clout, has drifted towards the purchase of high priced niche products. The recently concluded Rafale deal (explained in the chapter of India-France Relations) proves the point. The US too has emerged as a serious competitor to Russia. In this context, for Russia to remain competitive, it has to explore next generation weapon system market.




Theme 2: Analysis of Commercial Diplomacy

Although defence and nuclear energy are two core dimensions of the diplomatic ties between India and Russia, economic cooperation has the potential to unleash a new era in the bilateral relationship. The current bilateral commercial diplomacy is to the tune of 10 billion dollars, with a target of reaching 20 billion dollars by 2020. One of the core features of Indo-Russian trade has been the presence of state enterprises mediating their interactions in each other's territories. This has had a positive effect because the Russians are more comfortable in dealing with Indian state officials due to such ties existing since the Cold War era. Furthermore, it has led to India and Russia explore relations in various dimensions ranging from national security to investment intensive technologies. In the post-Soviet decade, not only have Indian companies evolved business interests in Russia, but several Russian firms have also tied up with state governments in India to promote joint ventures.



One of the key barriers to India–Russia trade is geographical distance between the two nations and the lack of direct connectivity. Distance and logistics are not barriers in India–Europe or India–China trade relations, for that matter. Surprisingly, logistics and distance barriers are eclipsed when it comes to items of national security (nuclear energy, space and defence). Despite the barriers, India has been able to penetrate Russian markets for exports of textiles, yarn, and food stuff and pharmaceuticals. Another hindering factor in the commercial relationships is lack of awareness about commercial opportunities in each other's territory. At times, even sudden changes in legal regimes and taxation structures have affected the firms. Sistema of Russia has faced such issues due to legal regime changes in India while India's ONGC has faced issues due to taxation levies. The Intergovernmental Joint Commission as a forum has been used to raise such issues. India is paying attention to the Russian idea of establishing the Eurasian community. There is considerable progress in the recent times on development of the International North–South Transit Corridor (INSTC) which will facilitate connectivity between Indian ports and mainland Russia.

A very peculiar feature thus observed in India–Russia trade relationship is that the relation is more like old relatives who have warm feelings for each other in their hearts and not in actions and the moment either side receives a new relative, its the new relative who gains more attention. Information vacuum stands to be one of the most crucial barriers in these bilateral relationships, which can be easily mitigated with establishment of media outlets that would advertise the business potential in each other's country. There is also a problem of lack of experts in the two countries to facilitate trade. During the Cold War, the erstwhile USSR had trained experts who had business knowledge of individual countries as good as the local businessmen of the concerned state. In the post-Cold War Russian Federation, this element is missing. Its impact is visible in the bilateral trade ties between India and Russia. Despite India having major influence in the field of IT, hardly any IT firms have presence in Russia. The same is true from the Russian side as well. Despite India being fourth largest consumer of energy globally and Russians being pioneers in oil and gas, Russian energy firms are not that active in Indian markets. Custom barriers play a very crucial role in acting as trade barriers. Russians have set price controls for imported goods. Every good exported to Russia has to pay custom duty, leading to price rise. The price rise happens over and above the minimum price set, thereby creating complications. Bureaucratic delays on both sides at times lead to financial losses for private contractors. Absence of support by banks in financing bilateral exports on both sides acts as a hurdle in bilateral trade cooperation.



Russian investors have tremendous amount of capital to invest. India should cash upon this opportunity and promote Indian brands and products in Russia. India can, in future, explore joint business manufacturing in the Eurasian Union. Kazakhstan, for that matter, offers a competitive environment which is investor friendly to manufacturers. Attempts should be made to understand each other's culture as it will facilitate trade. A dedicated investment fund can be created where Russia can use the fund to support Make in India and Smart City projects. Thus, India and Russia do have the potential to boost their economic cooperation and make it as strong as the political cooperation.


Theme 3: Transport Connectivity—The Strategic Dimension



Defence, security, energy and technology are the core issues that dominate the discourse of India–Russia Strategic Partnership while issues related to connectivity and accessibility are yet to find mention. The INSTC is an attempt by Russia, Iran and India to boost transport connectivity amongst themselves and the Central Asian states. The INSTC links the Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, and Caspian Sea to the Russian Federation. Studies by various transport experts have proven that the INSTC could provide multiple benefits to all players, especially to Russia and India.

The INSTC, which had been initially envisaged by Russia, Iran and India today has eleven member states who also wish to reap economic benefits from the proposed corridor. Strategically speaking, the INSTC has multiple benefits for India. The first is that the corridor provides India with viable surface transport connectivity to the Eurasian region. A study by the Iranian Ministry of Road Transport suggests that the corridor will reduce transport costs by 30% and shall provide a 40% shorter route as compared to the route passing through China and Europe to reach Russia from India.

With the Sagarmala initiative of India and the India–Myanmar–Thailand highway, the corridor will connect Europe and Russia to the ASEAN states. From the Indian point of view, the INSTC and India– Myanmar–Thailand highway could transform India into a potential transit hub. India also gains from the corridor strategically as it helps India bypass Pakistan and reach Europe via Iran (also helps reach Afghanistan via Iran) and market goods easily. Despite such a great potential, the ground reality is that the container traffic from India through Astrakhan has not reached its full potential. There are lots of factors that constrain the full utilisation of the corridor.



ANALYSIS OF INDIAN PM VISIT TO RUSSIA, 2015

The Indian PM Narendra Modi visited Russia from 23rd to 24th December, 2015 to participate in the bilateral annual summit. The last time the Indian PM met his Russian counterpart was on the sidelines of BRICS summit in Ufa in July, 2015. During the visit of the PM, he addressed a joint group of Russian and Indian CEOs as well as a gathering of ‘Friends of Indian Community’.



Russia has committed its support for the Make in India initiative. The two sides have agreed to emphasise upon investments for facilitating high technology initiatives.

A joint study group to establish a Free Trade Agreement between India and the Eurasian Economic Union held its first meet in Moscow on 31st July, 2015. The two sides have decided to enhance multi-modal connectivity through the International North–South Transport Corridor. Russia has committed its support for the speedy implementation of Koodankulam Nuclear Power Project. India has decided to explore the possibility of LNG supply from the Gydan Peninsula and the Gulf of Ob. At the level of cooperation in education and science and technology, the Tomsk State University and IIT Mumbai have been nominated as coordinators under the Russia–India Resource Centre initiative. The two sides will promote cooperation in High Performance computing education system and research methodologies. To enhance cooperation in the information sphere, UGTRK and Prasar Bharti have concluded an MoU for news exchange. A tripartite MoU has been signed between OJSC ‘GLONASS’, Glonass Union and the Centre for Development of Advanced Computing to integrate Russian and Indian Satellite navigation systems. India and Russia have agreed to strengthen cooperation amongst the anti-narcotics agencies while also deepening their interactions on counter terrorism and prevention of extremism. The two have agreed to closely cooperate with each other to maintain stability in Afghanistan.



22nd India–Russian Intergovernmental Commission Meeting, September 2016, New Delhi

The intergovernmental commission meeting acted as a preparatory meeting for the India–Russia Annual Summit held in Goa in October 2016. During the meeting, the focus was to strengthen cooperation in the spheres of trade and investment and expand cooperation in the oil and gas sector. A consortium of Indian Oil and gas firms along with Gazprom have established a joint working group to establish an energy bridge between Russia and India through gas pipelines. A major theme of discussion in the meeting was connectivity. The two sides reiterated implementation of the INSTC project and Green Corridor for custom facilitation. The two sides espoused the idea of creating dedicated freight railway corridors. India is aggressively working with Russia and supporting it under the Pharmacy 2020 programme. Wockhardt and Pharmacy ECO are jointly producing insulin under the same programme.



End of Section Questions

1. Discuss the Domestic factors bringing India and Japan closer?
2. How is Pivot to Asia bringing India and Japan closer to each other?
3. “Indo-Japan naval cooperation is an attempt to avoid the Thucydides trap.” Discuss.
4. Discuss the core dimensions of Indo-US Defense diplomacy.
5. “Indo-US Nuclear deal is an attempt to balance China”. Do you agree?
6. “India has de-hyphenated its Israel-Palestine policy.” Examine the statement in the light of Indo-Israel relationship.
7. Discuss the core dimensions of Indo-Russia nuclear and energy diplomacy.

1
CHAPTER

India and Pakistan Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Diplomatic history during Cold War
- Diplomatic history since the end of Cold War
- Analysis of Kashmir Problem
- Nuclear diplomacy
- Jihad as a Grand Strategy of Pakistan
- Wullar barrage dispute
- Kishanganga dispute
- Indus Water Treaty Issue
- Conclusion and final analysis

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE RELATIONS AND A BRIEF UNDERSTANDING OF CORE BILATERAL DIPLOMATIC ISSUES SINCE 1947 TILL END OF THE COLD WAR

India and Pakistan, since their inception in 1947, have had sharp rivalries with each other. The conflict between the two has vacillated from a clash of national identities to territorial disputes. In the twenty first century, the two have become lethal nuclear rivals of each other. Peter. T. Coleman rightly pointed out that 95 per cent of the most serious disputes in the world can be resolved, but India and Pakistan come under the irresolvable 5 per cent. The relations have always been locked in a vicious cycle. They begin with much optimism and fanfare but soon get engulfed by uncertainties, generating complications that lead to the suspension of dialogue, only for the cycle to continue again with a fresh round of optimism the next time. Though the acquisition of nuclear capabilities by both countries have prevented a major conflict, small-scale conflicts like Kargil crisis of 1999 did take place. General Monty Palit has rightly stated that, over a certain period of time, the Indo-Pak relations have become, in a sense, a sort of communal riot disguised in armor. Both sides today have a perception that the other side sought to inflame the conflicts.

In the initial years after independence, in the 1950s, the death of Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan led to the military strengthening its influence in Pakistan. Over a period of time, Pakistan developed a semi-alliance with the USA by becoming part of the CENTO and the SEATO. Pakistan always wanted a western security guarantee for itself against India but could not succeed in the same. During the 1950s, due to intense wariness of a communist

China and the Sino-Russian relationship, the USA also provided economic and military aid to India to ensure that India does not fall into the Soviet trap. The commonality of having the USA in the region as an intermediary for both states paved an opportunity for India and Pakistan to work upon the Indus Water Treaty, 1960. The US's support to India and India's defeat at the hands of the Chinese in the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 were two factors that resulted in Pakistan deciding to instigate unrest in Kashmir in 1965. The US, consequently, became disillusioned with both and suspended its aid of military hardware to both India and Pakistan. This allowed the Soviets to step into resolve the stalemate, leading to the Tashkent Declaration after the 1965 war.

Things changed in 1971 when the East Pakistan war (Muktijuddho) broke out and India succeeded in helping slice away East Pakistan, thereafter known as Bangladesh. India's R&AW played a very successful role in the covert operations carried out, demonstrating the capability to create a new state. The USA supported Pakistan to the extent that it now decided to create trouble for the Indian army. The USA feared that the newly victorious Indian army could attempt to invade West Pakistan, thereby depriving the US of a base to contain the Soviets. The USA not only entered into a rapprochement with China but ended up colluding with Chinese intelligence to create unrest in India. The USA-Pakistan-China axis led to the birth of insurgency in India's North-East and the Khalistan problem. This successfully diverted the attention of the strong Indian army to two different ends of the country. This, in the long run, ensured the survival of West Pakistan.


In West Pakistan, which had, by then, become Pakistan, the dominant region was that of Punjab. The Punjab in Pakistan also had the largest share in the Pakistan army. This aligned the centre of military power in Pakistan. Post-1971 till almost the end of the Cold War, India never perceived Pakistan as a serious rival. But, from the 1990s, the situation changed. As Pakistan began to sponsor unrest in Kashmir, India began to again perceive Pakistan as a source of regional destabilisation. Matters got more complicated after both sides acquired nuclear capabilities. The two states have developed a repeatedly reinforced paranoia about each other. Pakistan is determined that even if it cannot win in Kashmir, it would continue to support extremism in the valley to bleed Indian resources. In the recent times, India too has harboured a similar view with respect to support to Balochis to bleed Pakistan. Over a period of time, certain views have evolved. Today, the Jamaat-i-Islami in Pakistan believes that Pakistan has to emerge as the forerunner of an idea of Islamist awakening, and such an awakening would also absorb Indian Muslims. The Indian RSS continues to believe that Pakistan as an independent state is an unacceptable entity and a civilisational challenge to the existence of India. There has never been a serious attempt to build up ideological and cultural ties between both states and due to the absence of goodwill, and the two have not been able to promote intraregional integration in goods, capital and ideas for the same reason.

Krishna Kumar aptly states that the two sides have an iron curtain that prevents them from building a pool of common knowledge about each other. The two sides, since Nehruvian times, have taken steps to normalise relations, only to have the talks hardly yield positive changes in the relations. During the 1990s, the foreign secretary level talks began but failed to achieve anything as the Kashmir problem became a precondition for dialogue. Vajpayee initiated the concept of composite dialogue, which also failed to yield

results despite the fact that the composite dialogue was to be on all subjects concerning the two, ranging from water issues to travel to Sir Creek. The composite dialogue got suspended after the 26/11 Mumbai attacks in 2008, only to be revived again as a ‘dialogues’ in 2011. The 2011 talks began without the precondition of any particular item but still failed to achieve any breakthrough. The intense rivalry between the two today is visible at the SAARC level and their interactions with the Islamic world. If Pakistan prevented India from joining the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) then India excluded Pakistan from the BIMSTEC. Though, in the recent times, social networking platforms have led to the people from the two states establishing a connect, this connect has not yet to permeate to the level of a cross-border alliance between the two states.

We now turn our attention to a brief analysis of some of the core conflicts between India and Pakistan. Both sides feel that fear, hatred and a sense of persecution are the key drivers of the conflict. The conflict not only revolves around the disparity in size between India and Pakistan—Kashmir, water issues and the Siachen glacier issue also constitute the three core geostrategic issues affecting the two. The complexity of the conflict has been certainly aggravated by presence of nuclear capabilities and Islamic extremism. A study of Indo–Pak trade tells us that immediately after the Partition, the two states reached an all-time high in trade. The bilateral trade dropped in 1950s and after 1965, the figures fell to abysmally low levels. In 1956, the two sides had agreed to provide the MFN clause for goods trade with each other. The agreement on the MFN clause however could not be concluded till 1970s.

A study by Nisha Taneja and Eugenia Baroncelli has found that India and Pakistan collectively constitute 90% of the GDP of the region and peace between the two states could yield a 405% rise in trade at the bilateral level. It is important to note here is that both states have a collusion of interests on items of international trade, signifying the possibility of a tacit cooperation in existence between the two states. Instead of using this to leverage South Asian integration, ironically, the South Asian states have explored the global markets of North America, Europe and China. The intraregional trade in South Asia is so low today that, at times, it is described as inverse regionalism. Weak trade facilitation mechanisms, protectionism, lack of transit facilities and mutual suspicion are major factors in deterring trade practices. Though there is a call for the expansion of bilateral Indo–Pak trade, some Pakistani firms do fear that Indian firms could dominate Pakistan if free trade is facilitated. However, many in Pakistan do believe that the opening up of trade between the two states could lead to greater material gains for both. The two states together have a great potential to emerge as a net exporter of ferrochrome to the world. Indian companies have the potential to export trucks, tires to Pakistan as the same commodity is imported by Pakistan from third countries via Dubai.



Apart from trade, conflicts related to water issues have played a role in the Indo–Pak

relations. Brahma Chellaney is of the opinion that future wars in Asia could be driven by issues related to water itself. In undivided India, when water issues used to crop up in the Punjab region, the British government used to resolve such issues through semi-judicial commissions. After the Partition, the localised disagreements on water issues were transformed into conflicts of an international nature. In 1947, the division of Indus, Ravi, Sutlej, Chenab, Jhelum and Beas were taken up at the level of an inter-dominion conference but no concrete solution came up. As there was no success in resolving issues related to water at the inter-dominion conference, India demanded financial reparation if any allowance was made to Pakistan. In 1950, in response to Indian request for finance reparation, Pakistan demanded delimitation of waters through International Court of Arbitrations. India summarily rejected any third-party intervention to resolve the bilateral water issues.

In 1951, an American expert, David Lilienthal, published an article discussing the development of the Indus Basin through financial contributions by the World Bank. The director of the World Bank, Eugene Black, convinced India to allow the World Bank to work as a conduit for a possible agreement related to the Indus Basin between India and Pakistan. Nearly ten years later, after long-drawn negotiations between both sides with aggressive assistance from engineers and technicians, on 19th September 1960, an Indus Water Treaty was born. The uniqueness of the Indus Water Treaty is that it was a treaty not negotiated by diplomats but by engineers, with the World Bank becoming a non-political signatory to the treaty. The treaty was designed in a manner that it focused more on developing the Indus Basin than merely allocating water, with the emphasis being on increasing the productive capacity of the Indus Basin. The World Bank acted as an agency to facilitate economic upliftment and did not resort to the resolution of political disputes between the two sides.

In 1978, there emerged another issue on the Salal Dam. India had built the storage dam some 64 kilometres away from the Indo-Pak border on the Chenab River. Pakistan objected to the construction of the Salal Dam. In 1978, after negotiations, India decided to lower the height of the Salal Dam and assured Pakistan that the dam would be used only for generation of power. This agreement was hailed by the international community. In 2005, Pakistan again objected to India's 450 Megawatt Baghliar Dam constructed on the Chenab River. Pakistan invoked provisions of the Indus Water Treaty and sought arbitration from the World Bank. A neutral expert was appointed for arbitration. The verdict was announced in 2011 in favour of India. The Pakistani ISI took the decision of the verdict as a snub to Pakistan. They began to promote militant organisations to bring about a shift in their tactics. The Pakistan based militant organisations initiated mass protests in Pakistan alleging that India is resorting to water terrorism. A new wave of anti-India sentiment had been generated by Pakistani organization all over. India has never flexed its muscles on water issues with Pakistan as such moves are tantamount to illegality, but the diversion of waters by India is one of the established nuclear red lines stated by Pakistan. The water issues between India and Pakistan have still remained a national issue in each country and neither of the sides has explored larger environmental concerns due to climate change to emerge in the policy discourse. The water related issues between the two states will always generate emotionalism as there is no regional level institution today that can capably solve the problem.

The other significant problem is the lingering Kashmir issue. When the Partition of India and Pakistan happened, the British failed to integrate Kashmir into either of the states. Both the states subsequently developed a feeling that massive injustice had been done to both parties. Kashmir, thus, became a political issue in the bilateral domestic politics of India and Pakistan. The civilian and military leadership of Pakistan used the Kashmir crisis to divert public attention from the task of nation building in Pakistan. One reason why the Kashmir issue has not been resolved till date is because initially, during the Cold War, the USA and the USSR saw Kashmir as the symbol of a systemic struggle between the East and the West, exploring no avenues for resolving the issue through a regional solution framework.


During the Cold War, India thought that it has provided a political solution to the Kashmir problem through Article 370 and the Simla Agreement of 1972. However, the truth is that even till today, under the leadership of Modi, India has not been able to evolve an effective strategy to deal with the Kashmir problem. Pakistan has always resorted to a violent approach of forcefully snatching away Kashmir and the wars in 1947–48, 1965 and 1971 are a testimony to the fact.

In 1984, the Indian R&AW came to know that Pakistan had purchased specialised clothing for very low temperatures for its army from a supplier in London. The R&AW alerted the Indian army and during their one of the operations, the army found a Pakistani expedition team in a place near Siachen. Before the Pakistani expedition could resort to any adventurism, India occupied Siachen. India considers Siachen strategically crucial. The Indian army, since then, has favoured a policy of status quo on Siachen while it is the only issue where Pakistan seeks an agreement. The strategic significance of Siachen for India is control of the Karakoram region that Pakistan and China have expanded into, under the pretext of developing a Karakoram highway. India feels that its presence in Siachen can keep the China–Pakistan activities under check. The roots of the Siachen occupation for India, thus, are not embedded in topography but the higher geopolitics of the region.

After the 1962 war, as India was defeated, Pakistan witnessed the military weakness of India and decided to teach India a lesson. They chose Sir Creek in the Rann of Kutch, which exists between Sindh and Rajasthan, as a possible weak spot. Though Pakistan made a military attempt, it was unsuccessful and it later decided to submit the matter to a foreign mediator. In 1968, a three-member commission was formed. India favoured Yugoslav and Pakistan favoured Iran, while the UN appointed a Swede to the commission. The final judgment of the commission gave some territory to India and some to Pakistan. Both sides gained some territory but also lost territory. Both sides faced political consequences for the settlement and India became determined not to resort to outside mediation in future.

After independence, most of the leaders in India had proposed the creation of Pakistan. Opposition arose due to the fact that Pakistan became a Muslim state in contrast to the secular Indian state. Nehru was the chief proponent of the stated idea and believed that the Western states had exacerbated the problem by giving Pakistan economic and military aid and had taught Pakistan to coerce India. Nehru had even hoped that Pakistan would collapse but that did not happen and eventually, the two sides got mired in a new

strategic landscape where neither they were at war nor could become peaceful neighbours. Though the economic liberalisation of 1990s fuelled another tool that could be used to foster ties, nothing concrete worked out at the level of normalisation. Manmohan Singh and Modi have tried using the commercial stick, but it has still not found any resonance in Pakistan. Indian officials feel that a number of attempts were made to resolve the conflicts with Pakistan but the record has been mixed and normalisation has not been achieved.



Despite these efforts made by various Indian PMs till date, the imprint of the past and geopolitical calculations of Pakistan's relations with the West, China and Russia, coupled with a possibility of nuclear escalation, have remained some of the key obstacles to efforts of normalisation. All along, India's efforts to initiate normalisation has met with provocation and escalation from Pakistan.

During the British era, they perceived the area that later became Pakistan as strategic for the Raj because Pakistan acted as the North West bulwark in the efforts to contain Russian ambitions. After the Partition, as India wanted to stay away from the Cold War politics but Pakistan, by an alliance with the USA, brought the Cold War right to the doorsteps of India. At the end of the Cold War, the Western support for Pakistan dipped and India took advantage of the leverage by shifting its strategy to economic liberalisation to foster relations with the USA.

After 9/11, USA again began to revive the idea of engaging with Pakistan to tackle Islamic extremism. Since India too supported the idea of USA's global war on terror, both sides, India and Pakistan, were now with the USA. This made India uncomfortable yet again. However, though the US has brought India and Pakistan together to cooperate with each other, the process has not yielded any significant dividends. Though both states have nuclear weapons and have ruled out a possibility of a fully-fledged nuclear war, they have resorted to continuing a sub-conventional war by using the ISI and the RAW. Only a few options remain in bringing about normalisation. One is that both sides resort to a 'do-nothing' approach. India has largely followed the idea of 'masterly inactivity' for many years. The other option is transforming the ties through economic means and economic integration. India also exercises the following options to manage Pakistan.



The Pakistani establishment has a feeling that India has never accepted the idea of allowing Pakistan to exist as a state. The Pakistanis believe that India wants to militarily crush Pakistan. Pakistan uses an analogy with Israel to explain India's position with respect to itself. Pakistan feels that both Pakistan and Israel were created by communities who perceived an impending threat of persecution by a majority state as they constituted a minority. Both remained under threat from neighbours. Pakistan feels that after the Partition, the Hindus wanted to take revenge by attacking a minority-constituted Pakistan. Pakistan further maintains that to meet this threat, both countries (Pakistan and Israel) used a common strategic policy of building up of alliances with the West as a security guarantee. However, Pakistan alleges that neither Israel nor Pakistan got adequate support from the West for their security (Pakistan uses 1971 crises as an explanation), which compelled them to go nuclear for their own security and survival. In Pakistan, the army had dominated its national security and foreign policy discourse since the 1950s. This is the reason that in Pakistan, the army has an upper hand in dictating diplomacy with India. The Pakistani army feels that the R&AW has entrenched itself deeply in conflicts internal to Pakistan and has unleashed an inner leviathan in Pakistan to destabilise it from within.

Since its inception, Pakistan has sought to build a link between its religious identity and its geostrategic location. For Jinnah, Islamic Pakistanis, being followers of monotheistic Islam, were naturally more allied to the monotheistic Christians than Hindus. Using the religious angle, he favoured a deeper alliance with the US. Jinnah articulated that only monotheistic people could resist the Soviets in the world. Jinnah asserted that Hindus and Indians could not be trusted in the fight against communism and advocated that Hindu Indians were more sympathetic towards Soviets. Jinnah tried to market Pakistan as a Muslim Israel to America, which shared the same values and same god. Pakistan, therefore, succeeded in developing a nexus built upon religious values with the USA to tackle a godless communist Russia.



After having a brief glimpse of some of the conflicts and basic perceptions of India and Pakistan, we now turn our attention on the mechanisms and tools that can help us explain their conflicts. In the section ahead, we attempt to view the same by analysing the Indo-Pak relationship since the end of the Cold War.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE RELATIONS AND A BRIEF UNDERSTANDING OF CORE BILATERAL DIPLOMATIC ISSUES SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR

In our attempt to understand the bilateral relations of India and Pakistan, we have argued in the previous section, that the Indo-Pak rivalry began immediately after the Partition over Kashmir. Just prior to Indian independence, there were two categories of states under the British. Firstly, there were states of British India and secondly, there were the Princely States. The concept of Princely States was that such states could enjoy nominal independence under the British Raj provided their defence, foreign policy and communications were managed by the British. At the time of independence, based upon their demography and location, a Princely State could either join India or Pakistan, as was announced in the provision by Lord Mountbatten.

Kashmir posed some difficulty because it was a Muslim majority state ruled by a Hindu monarch, Maharaja Hari Singh. Initially, Hari Singh was reluctant to join either India or Pakistan. Meanwhile, Pakistan launched a campaign by sending its troops disguised as tribesmen to forcefully annex the state of Kashmir. A revolt against the rule of Hari Singh was fomented by Pakistan. Hari Singh had his own fears. He never wanted to accede to Pakistan as he feared that a Muslim state of Pakistan would soon integrate the Muslims of Kashmir thereby relegating him to a minority status. He also had similar concerns for India, as he thought that if he acceded to India, a socialist Nehru would strip him of the privileges he enjoyed. As Pakistani tribesmen reached Kashmir, Hari Singh panicked and began to make frantic requests to India for help. India, led by Nehru, decided to assist Hari Singh only if he acceded to India. Once Hari Singh signed the instrument of accession, thereby acceding Kashmir to India, Indian troops landed in Kashmir. The troops were able to stop the onslaught by Pakistani forces but by then, one-third of Kashmir had fallen into the hands of the invaders. Nehru, heeding the advice of Mountbatten, referred the case of Kashmir to the United Nations in 1948.

After enormous negotiations, discussions and resolutions at the UN level, the body advised a ceasefire agreement on 1st January, 1949. Consequently, a new Ceasefire Line was created in Kashmir. As the time went by, the Kashmir issue got embroiled in Cold War politics with the UN passing some critical resolutions over Kashmir. UN asked India to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir to determine the wishes of the Kashmiri people while urging Pakistani troop withdrawal from the region. Pakistan refused troop withdrawal and India did not follow up with the UN recommended action, citing the alleged refusal of Pakistan to comply first.

In 1962, India had a border conflict with China. After its defeat in the conflict, it decided to upgrade its military with assistance from the USA and the UK. The British and Americans too used this opportunity to induce bilateral dialogue between the two states. The US sent its Secretary of State, Dean Rusk to persuade Nehru to initiate a dialogue

with Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. From 1962 to 1963, though there was dialogue between the two sides, nothing favourable was achieved. As the talks between the two could not yield any results, it motivated Pakistan to launch yet another offensive in 1965.

The 1965 war was a military stalemate. The USA did not want to be involved in the resolution of conflict between the two as the previous US attempt had not yielded any result. This allowed the USSR to broker peace after the 1965 conflict through the Tashkent Agreement as it saw the bleak US interest as an opportunity to expand its Asian influence. The declaration stated that the Indian and Pakistani forces would pull back to their pre-conflict positions (pre-August 1965 lines), no later than 25 February 1966. Further, the nations would not interfere in each other's internal affairs, economic and diplomatic relations would be restored, there would be an orderly transfer of prisoners of war, and the two leaders would work towards improving bilateral relations. The Tashkent Agreement led to maintenance of status quo by the two sides.

Another conflict between India and Pakistan happened in 1971, which originated in the domestic political exigencies in Pakistan. In December 1970, Pakistani held a general election. As per the result, the Awami League (led by Sheikh Mujibur Rehman) won the election in East Pakistan while Pakistan People's Party (PPP) swept the polls in West Pakistan. The PPP and Awami League began negotiating a power sharing agreement but by March 1971, the two reached a more severe deadlock. The Awami League protestors, on failure to reach a power sharing agreement, initiated a massive protest to seek autonomy. The Pakistani army began to suppress the Awami League supporters in Dacca city from March, 1971. As the suppression continued, the supporters of the Awami League began to leave their country and started a migration to the Indian state of West Bengal.

As this refugee influx began, India took up the issue diplomatically. As the matter was being negotiated diplomatically, India's R&AW began to design a plan to invade East Pakistan and break it away from the control of West Pakistan. The RAW began to train and support the Mukti Bahini movement. The Mukti Bahini movement was a liberation force trained for covert capabilities. Witnessing renewed unrest, on 6th December 1971, Pakistani Air Force launched strikes on Indian air bases in North India. India perceived the attack as an attack on the sovereignty of India and decided to militarily retaliate. The Indian forces entered deep inside East Pakistan and captured around 90,000 Prisoners of War (POWs). India subsequently supported Sheikh Mujibur Rehman and succeeded in seceding East Pakistan from the West. Bangladesh was finally born out of the conflict.

The crushing defeat of 1971 came as a big blow to Pakistan. The attention of the world subsequently diverted due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the Kashmir issue became dormant till the end of the Cold War. After East Pakistan seceded, the US and China began to use Pakistan to create troubles for India. The CIA of USA, along with Pakistani ISI, began to create unrest in Punjab by supporting extremism in the form of the Khalistan movement. Indian army at that time was led by General K. Sundarji. To intimidate Pakistan, Sundarji chose the state of Rajasthan to launch a massive military exercise codenamed as Operation Brasstacks. Sunderji was interested in using the Brasstacks to test newly built radars by India. The sheer magnitude of the exercise, involving around 1,50,000 soldiers, generated anxieties in Pakistan. The Pakistanis too responded with their own military exercises, codenamed as Sledgehammer and Flying

Horse.

As the situation became tense and appointed to the build up for a future war, the Soviet and US diplomats and officials of CIA and KGB swung into action and began to work with R&AW and ISI officials to reduce tensions. As the crises de-escalated, in an interview to Kuldip Nayar, Pakistan's Abdul Qadeer Khan resorted to nuclear signalling by arguing that Pakistan was on the way to have a nuclear weapon. Rajiv Gandhi authorised the nuclear scientists of India to begin work on Indian nuclear bomb. As the crisis defused, General Zia died in a plane crash in 1988 and subsequently, under US pressure, the Pakistani army decided to go for elections, with Benazir Bhutto assuming power.

Bhutto began to initiate a new round of dialogues with Rajiv Gandhi but as the military in Pakistan began to create unrest in Kashmir from 1989, the newly launched peace process was jeopardised. The ISI of Pakistan began to launch a massive rebellion in Kashmir. The initial Indian response was to suppress it with an iron first. This inflamed the local sentiments and gave the ISI an opportunity to take advantage of this newly created fault line. As the crisis in Kashmir began to precipitate, India warned Pakistan that any attempt to enhance infiltration in Kashmir would result in conflict. In 1990, the USA again stepped in to defuse tensions. The crisis was temporarily defused but the attempts at infiltration from Pakistan did not end. India switched its tactics to maintain order in Kashmir, and eventually, Pakistan resorted to the use of proxy terrorists in Kashmir to initiate a proxy war.

The test of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan in 1998 led to a new dimension of conflict. The US and other powers tried hard to persuade India and Pakistan to roll back their nuclear weapons programmes, but their efforts failed. Scholars were divided about the future of the relationship at the time. Some believed that the acquisition of weapons would lead to strategic pessimism and would reduce the possibility of escalation while others argued that Pakistan, being a revisionist state, could provoke a status quo power like India with its nuclear weapons. This is a classical security dilemma because, theoretically speaking, if in a situation of international anarchy, both states are endowed with nuclear capabilities, then it could be only used as a defensive tool and not an offensive one. Thus, a state is compelled to respond to the choice of the other state to acquire such military capabilities. This counter-action leads to a spiral of hostility in the system. A status quo state may not undertake any steps but a revisionist state may wish to during about territorial changes and may construe the moves of a status quo power as a sign of weakness. This perception of the revisionist power then enhances its vision.

We also further need to understand that in Pakistan, the military dominating the policy discourse is rooted in its history. When India became independent, it resorted to the use of democracy and brought the army within the control of the political executive. In contrast, Pakistan, after its creation, failed to create elements of democracy. Nehru sought elections while Jinnah continued to rule as an unelected Governor General of Pakistan. As Jinnah died in the early years, the constitutional experiment was overtaken by the first military coup in Pakistan in 1958. Pakistan began to resort to the use of its military to quell civil disturbances and maintain order. The army gradually began to develop a bigger hand and began to emerge as a dominant player.

Due to differences in politico-military relations of both states, the foreign and security priorities were contemplated differently and this often brought the two on a collision course. However, as the two armies, prior to independence, were trained under the British umbrella, it is interesting to note that the two sides used old strategies in the conflicts of 1947–48, 1965 and 1971. Many efforts have been made to resolve the crises and resort to negotiations but such attempts have failed to deliver results. The newly elected Indian PM, Narendra Modi tried to break the ice by inviting Nawaz Sharif to his swearing-in ceremony in 2014. In December 2015, the PM made an unscheduled surprise trip to Lahore. However, the subsequent Pathankot, Pampore and Uri attacks led to the suspension of dialogue once again. Let us now turn our attention to analysing Kargil conflicts, the Kashmir issue, Operation Parakram and the process of composite dialogue. We shall begin with the Kargil conflict.

As mentioned, in 1998, India and Pakistan tested their nuclear weapons. In order to defuse rising tensions, Indian PM Vajpayee, initiated a dialogue by visiting Lahore in February, 1999. Vajpayee launched a new bus diplomacy between Amritsar and Lahore. During his meeting with Nawaz Sharif, Vajpayee launched a series of confidence building measures (CBMs).



The visit of Vajpayee to Lahore was a watershed event. Vajpayee also visited Minar-e-Pakistan where he publicly asserted that a stable Pakistan is in India's interest. This was the most important statement ever by an Indian head of the state on Pakistani soil, as Vajpayee endorsed the idea of the existence of Pakistan, which had been a long-standing concern for Pakistan. The Minar-e-Pakistan was chosen as a venue to announce this because it was the same place where the Lahore Declaration was passed to establish Pakistan in 1940. Vajpayee appointed a journalist, RK Mishra, as an interlocutor for the dialogues on the Kashmir crisis. Nawaz responded by appointing Pakistani diplomat Niaz Naik. For the first time, India decided to bypass official diplomatic channels for talks on Kashmir as Vajpayee, by appointing RK Mishra, injected new blood into the negotiations.

As the dialogue was brought back on track, it got abruptly suspended as from May, 1999, as the Pakistani army intruded into Kargil and launched an offensive. The Indian forces launched a mega counteroffensive and were able to drive off the intruders by mid-July. Pakistan had launched intrusions in Kargil assuming that Indian army would be busy in counterinsurgency in Kashmir and would not be in a position to respond appropriately. The Pakistani army also assumed that the Indian side would not resort to any escalation as there could be nuclear threat. The most important Pakistani assumption was that USA would step in and resolve the conflict swiftly. All these assumptions were flawed and they exposed Pakistani weakness. However, none of these things materialised. At the end of July, the end of military operations finally concluded the fourth Indo–Pak war in 1999. The new atmosphere of trust and good will was abruptly interrupted due to the Kargil episode. Vajpayee was deeply pained by the breach of trust by Pakistan.

The Northern Light Infantry (NLI), armed with surface-to-air missiles was the

Pakistani force that penetrated inside the LoC and occupied Indian favoured posts which were vacant. As per an agreement between the two, during the winter months, both states had earlier decided to withdraw troops from forward posts. Pakistan occupied the vacant Indian posts and occupied Batalik, Turtuk and Dras in Kargil. In May, 1999, the Indian Air force (IAF) launched Operation Safed Sagar, which was a sustained air strike meant to support the ground troops and was aimed to flush out regular and irregular troops of the Pakistani Army from vacated Indian Positions in the Kargil sector along the Line of Control. This air strike came as a big blow to Pakistan as it was never a part of the planned calculations. The innovative airstrikes by India also caused an extremely detrimental psychological impact on Pakistan who found extremely difficult to retaliate. The IAF used innovative bombing mechanisms to cause landslides and avalanches. A massive strike by IAF on a logistical camp in Muntho Dhalo in Batalik sector caused havoc for Pakistan as it was the sole supply depot for the forces of the Northern Light Infantry Regiment (NLI).

By the end of July, 1999, the intruders were completely driven out from the unoccupied posts. Pakistan, alarmed by the Indian response, immediately sought to seek partial de-escalation and an end to air and ground strikes from India. In the course of conflict, diplomatically, China favoured a neutral stance but the ground reality was different. Musharraf had visited Beijing during the hostilities. China also kept supplying armament to Pakistan to sustain the war while the Chinese army enhanced patrolling and troop presence on the Sino-Indian border when the conflict was underway. During the crisis, Sharif went to the US and met Clinton on 4th July, 1999 in the belief that the US support would help control the crisis. However, Sharif was surprised and shocked to his core when Clinton asserted that the conflict had been initiated by Pakistan and that they had no right to violate the sanctity of the LoC.

As the crisis ended, Pakistan yet again learned a hard lesson. Vajpayee initiated a dialogue with Pakistan again in 2001. He favoured meeting Musharraf at a probable multilateral meeting. However, LK Advani insisted that Musharraf be called for a bilateral meeting. In May, 2001, the Agra Summit took place, which again failed as no headway was made on issue Kashmir and cross border terrorism from the Pakistani side. However, it was decided that Vajpayee and Musharraf would again meet on the sidelines of the UNGA session in September, 2001. Due to events around 9/11, the meeting was cancelled. Pakistan came under tremendous US pressure to sever its ties with the Taliban. India on the other hand, allowed the US to use Indian military base to launch military action on the regime of Taliban in Afghanistan. The USA preferred to go for Pakistani bases than Indian bases because of closer proximity to Afghanistan. On 1st October 2001, after the Jaish-e-Mohammad launched an attack on Kashmir assembly building, the Indo-Pak relations deteriorated yet again. Things came to a head after the attack on the Indian Parliament on 13th December, 2001.

The analysis of the Kargil conflict clearly proves that the major agenda of Pakistan behind launching the Kargil conflict was to exploit the cleavages within India over Kashmir. Despite Pakistani provocation, India continued to resort to dialogue with Pakistan. The hard-line approach of the Pakistani military, trying to exercise deeper control over Pakistani politics and diplomacy, failed to achieve peace with India. The decision of the Pakistani army to resort to covert activities yet again proved that Pakistan favoured a territorial change, strengthening the argument that a revisionist state like

Pakistan will continue to challenge a status quo power like India.

Kashmir is so central to the domestic politics and identity of Pakistan, that despite its failure every time in war over Kashmir with India, it is not willing to abandon its claims. In fact, it has continued with a range of proxy pressures on India. Pakistan has always felt that its existence is incomplete without Kashmir and has tried to ensure that the Kashmir question remain alive forever. India, on the other hand, has always believed that the unrest in Kashmir is partially due to the recalcitrant irredentism of Pakistan and partially a law and order issue. The Indian government has not been successful in realising or addressing the domestic causes of discontent and alienation of the Kashmiri population. This policy followed by India till now, even under the Modi era, has failed to address the deep-seated discontent in the valley. Whenever these deep-seated factors responsible for discontent stir up unrest in the valley, Pakistan further steps into sow more discord and stokes the crisis. The Indian strategy is again to resort to the use of force and this reinforces the alienation and causes more antipathy towards India amongst the Kashmiri people.

The Indo-Pak relationship took a severe plunge in December 1999 when IC-814 was hijacked and taken to Kandahar. The IC-814 was a routine flight from Kathmandu to Lucknow. The hijackers landed the flight in Amritsar before it reached Lahore. India, at that time, lacked any contingency plan to deal with such crises. The negotiations led to the release of Maulana Masood Azhar, Mushtaq Ahmed Zarg and Ahmed Umar Syed. This was followed by attacks by terrorists on Amaranath Yatris in 2000. Despite these issues, Musharraf was yet again invited for a dialogue in 2001. The talks again did not occasion in any material success as Musharraf wanted to accomplish some tangible progress on the Kashmir dispute in a single meeting. Some R&AW officials present in the one-on-one Musharraf–Vajpayee meeting also stated that no success could be achieved in the talks because Pakistan refused to accept its support to terrorists and insisted only on solving the Kashmir issue while India favoured discussions on issues unrelated to Kashmir. Senior R&AW official asserts that LK Advani, present in the meeting, pressed for the addition of Pakistan involvement with terrorism as part of the final communiqué while Vajpayee and Jaswant Singh favoured that Musharraf be given a leeway on Kashmir without such insistence as demanded by Advani.


On 13th December, 2001, while the Parliament was in session, terrorists of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) stormed the Parliament complex in New Delhi and began to fire indiscriminately. The Indian security officials swung into action and eliminated the terrorists. After the Parliament attack, there were calls for strong military action on Pakistan. The Indian government, however, resorted to coercive diplomacy. India broke off existing diplomatic ties with Pakistan and recalled its ambassador (High Commissioner of India). India closed its airspace for civilian aircrafts of Pakistan while sending Indian jets at forward positions. The army was asked for a timeline for a possible strike on Pakistan. The Indian army stated that any substantial operation against Pakistan would require a minimum of three weeks. In the meantime, Musharraf went public and announced a host of measures to ensure that none of the terror groups use Pakistani soil to wage terrorist attacks against any state. Such announcements in public made it all the more difficult for India to launch a military offensive. India finally made a choice to mobilise its forces along the international border on the West and keep the IAF ready all times. As the tensions escalated, the US, led by Bush, immediately

resorted to defusing tensions.

India resorted to public display of anger. Vajpayee and the then Army Chief asserted that time had come for some action. Despite all this, the army never resorted to any cross border surgical strikes. This could not happen because by the time the Indian forces had reached the international border, lot of time had elapsed and Pakistani forces too were adequately beefed up. Apart from the possibility of a nuclear escalation, the USA too had been pressurising for restraint. Due to mounting pressure from the US, both sides began a phased withdrawal. India, despite troop mobilisation under Operation Parakram, did not use force against Pakistan.

Indian analysts and R&AW officials assert that Operation Parakram was successful as it was able to raise the issue of Pakistani sponsorship of terrorism at the global level. However, no structural change ever happened in the Indo-Pak relationship after Operation Parakram. Due to enormous pressure on Pakistan from the US, Musharraf finally declared a unilateral ceasefire with India along with LoC in 2003. The Indian army, on the other hand, began to search for a new doctrine. In fact, senior officials in the army assert that since the Kargil War, the army had been looking for options to fight a limited war with Pakistan under the nuclear umbrella. This process accelerated in the aftermath of the Parliament attack. This led India to toy with the idea of the Cold Start doctrine, as a doctrine for limited war. Under the Cold Start doctrine, it has been decided to break the large ‘strike corps’ into division sized integrated battle groups, which, with thorough speed, will resort to rapid mobilisation. Such mobilisation will resort to swift manoeuvre over Pakistan and capture a limited strip of land through air, ground and naval action. Such captured territory is to be used as a bargaining chip with Pakistan.

In 2002, Kashmir witnessed elections. After the elections, in 2003, Vajpayee visited Srinagar and announced fresh dialogues with Pakistan. In 2004, the Vajpayee government was replaced with the government of Manmohan Singh. Manmohan decided to carry forward the idea of composite dialogue. Manmohan stressed the idea of negotiating with Pakistan as he strongly believed that India would not be able to position itself as a global player if it remained mired in conflict with Pakistan. The diplomatic ties were re-established and a process of normalisation began.



The Manmohan Singh government carried forward the legacy of composite dialogue even in its unilateral decisions. It decided to reduce troop presence in Kashmir and decided to help in establishing a channel for negotiations with Kashmiri separatists. The back-channel diplomacy launched by India was led by Satinder Lambah. It resulted in start of Srinagar–Muzaffarabad bus service. Musharraf paid a one-day visit to India and attended an Indo–Pak cricket match. However, a crisis erupted again as terrorists struck

the Srinagar–Muzaffarabad bus service. The negotiations continued in 2006 and Manmohan even offered a new treaty of peace, security and friendship to Pakistan. However, Pakistan responded to the offer of the treaty by asserting that Kashmir remained their central question. The peace process was derailed in July, 2006, when LeT cadres orchestrated the Mumbai blasts. The LeT organised bomb blasts in local trains in Mumbai. The peace process moved at an extremely slow pace after the blasts. In September, 2006, the two sides established a Joint Mechanism for Investigation and Countering terrorism. In December, 2006, Musharraf announced a four-step package approach for the Kashmir problem.



In 2007, Pranab Mukherjee visited Pakistan and continued the discussions. In February 2007, the Samjhauta Express was bombed. As the Samjhauta Express bombings were not done by any Pakistani group, the talks continued. Investigations had found Hindu terrorists responsible for the blast. In February, the Pakistani Foreign Minister visited India and a nuclear pact to reduce nuclear risks was concluded. The ousting of Musharraf had somewhat put the composite dialogue in jeopardy but it was the Mumbai blasts (26/11) in 2008 that altogether halted the peace process. Pakistan had a new civilian administration led by Asif Ali Zardari. After the Mumbai attacks, India resisted any military action as it feared that the Zardari regime was still nascent and if India militarily retaliated, Pakistan would resort to escalation as the army was cornered in Pakistan. Further, upon retaliation, India would have been branded as an aggressor, affecting its moral international standing for an attack on Pakistan that would, in any case, serve little strategic utility. Subsequently, under intense pressure, the Zardari government resorted to some cosmetic actions by detaining leaders of LeT and JeM. The Pakistanis favoured resumption of the composite dialogue once again but the Indian side declined the request. The Manmohan Singh regime did make more attempts to normalise ties with Pakistan but the Pakistani military dominated its diplomacy and did not allow any major changes on the ground. As mentioned earlier, even Modi tried to break the ice with Pakistan, but terrorist attacks in Pathankot, Pampore, Uri in 2016 and Kupwara in April 2017 have again led to the suspension of the composite dialogue.

Our analysis of the Indo–Pak relations thus far proves a few things. Pakistan has adopted a two-point strategy on Kashmir. It asserts, firstly, that they are fighting for the rights of Kashmiri Muslims. Pakistan insists that it has any control over non-state actors in Kashmir. Our analysis also points out, secondly, that all regimes in Pakistan have continued with the policy that Kashmir is the core central issue and that Pakistan would rest only when it succeeds in taking Kashmir from India, suggesting that Pakistan would remain a predatory power. India today, under Modi Government, has understood that it has to face a revisionist state called Pakistan.



July 2014, Modi decided to resume dialogues with Pakistan. However, his government made it clear that Pakistan should not meet any separatists as doing so would lead to the suspension of talks. In August, 2014, Pakistani High Commissioner Abdul Basit had a meeting with Kashmiri separatist Shabir Shah, leading to India suspending the talks. In 2014 and 2015, Pakistan undertook repeated ceasefire violations. Despite this, Modi made a surprise visit in December, 2015 to Lahore. This again ignited the hope of a fresh dialogue. But the subsequent attacks in 2016 in Pathankot, Pampore and Uri and the one in Kuparada in 2017 have brought the dialogue to an end. The awarding of death sentence to Kulbhushan Jadhav and refusal to grant him counsellor access (despite such a provision permitted by the Vienna Convention) in 2017 have added new irritants in the relationship at the bilateral level. However, in May 2017, the International Court of Justice has put a stay on the execution of Jadhav.



Jaw for a Tooth—29th September 2016 Surgical Strikes the Case of India's Loss of Virginity

On 18th September, 2016, there was an attack on an Indian camp in Uri in Kashmir. The assessment of R&AW suggested a Pakistani hand in the attack. Till now, India had been exercising a policy of strategic restraint and had never wanted to escalate conflict with Pakistan but the Uri attack had crossed all thresholds. India could have instructed R&AW for a covert strike in Pakistan, but, post-Uri, there was a rising discontent amongst the Indian population, who demanded that India give a befitting response. India responded by, firstly, deciding not to attend the SAARC summit in November, 2016, planned in Islamabad. Regionally, Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Bhutan stood with India and decided to back out of the SAARC summit. Then started a diplomatic policy of isolating Pakistan. Internationally, India began to persuade foreign firms and states not to engage with Pakistan. Domestically, India began to threaten Pakistan by asserting that India would resort to creation of more dams on the Indian side of the Kashmiri Rivers. On 29th September, 2016, India's Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) summoned the journalists for a news briefing where Indian army DGMO Ranbir Singh announced that the Indian army had carried out surgical strikes on terrorist launch pads along the LoC.

The Indian strike was well planned. A few days before, the government instructed R&AW to activate its cells in Pakistan. The R&AW assets in Lahore, Islamabad and Muzaffarabad were activated. On the night of 28th September 2016, the Indian forces along the LoC launched artillery fire. The launching of artillery fire was done with an intention to divert and distract the attention of the Pakistani army. Around 100 Special Forces from India's Parachute Regiment crossed the LoC. The

forces crossed the LoC at around four different places almost 4 kilometres inside the Pakistani side of the LoC. The Indian forces launched heavy firing and destroyed approximately six launch pads across the LoC. Since 1971, India, for the first time struck on the other side of the LoC and gave a strong response to Pakistan's anti-India activities.

INDIA-PAKISTAN AND THE KASHMIR DISPUTE—AN ANALYSIS

During the British times, Kashmir was one of the states under British suzerainty. In 1946, the memorandum of the Cabinet Mission to India defined the status of such states. As per the Cabinet Mission plan, once the British paramount ceases, the crown would no longer hold paramount power and such power would be transferred to the states. There will be an end to political arrangements between the states, crown and British India. The state will fill the void by establishing a relationship with India, Pakistan or would remain independent. Two instruments, namely, Instrument of Accession and a Standstill Agreement were proposed by Mountbatten. Jinnah interpreted that, as per Cabinet Mission Plan, the situation post lapse of paramount would be such that states would gain independent status of being sovereign in nature. Congress, through a resolution on 15th June, 1947, held that on lapse of paramountcy, the will of the people of concerned states would be required to ascertain their choices as lapse of paramountcy did not tantamount to the independence of a state. With this interpretation, the Congress raised objections when the Maharaja of Jodhpur began to negotiate an accession with Pakistan. India insisted its interpretation in case of Junagadh. A referendum on Junagadh happened and its population voted in favour of India. Kashmir was ruled by Hari Singh. In September 1947, there was a communal trouble in Poonch province in the state. Simultaneously, Pakistani tribesmen had started pouring in and had unleashed a campaign of carnage in other areas reaching up till Srinagar. On 24th October, 1947, Hari Singh requested arms and troop support from India to stop the Pakistani-sponsored menace. As Hari Singh had not acceded either to India or Pakistan, troops from India could not be sent. Mountbatten asserted that the accession should be determined by a plebiscite after the tribesmen have been driven out of Kashmir. Nehru accepted the views of Mountbatten.

Mountbatten contended that as India has not signed a formal accession treaty with Kashmir, if it sends troops to Kashmir, Pakistan would do the same and this may lead to a war. It was decided by Nehru to inform Hari Singh that only if Hari Singh acceded to India would there be any troop commitment. Nehru, however, clarified that such an accession is conditioned and once law and order is restored, the will of the Kashmiri people about their future would holds acrosanct. Hari Singh signed the instrument of accession and sent a letter to Nehru to that effect. In the letter Hari Singh stated that Kashmir had signed a standstill agreement with Pakistan. As per the agreement, Pakistan provided postal and telegraph services in the state. Hari Singh also complained that Pakistan had put a lot of pressure on him and one of the pressure tactics was the tribal raids. He wrote that in this emergency, instead of allowing Pakistan to destroy his state, he preferred concluding an instrument of accession with India. The Indian government accepted the accession and decided to provide military help to Kashmir. Pakistan immediately declared that the accession was an act of fraud and it summarily rejected the accession.


The challenging of the legality of the accession by Pakistan was an unsound political move. Indian policy was clear—it was aimed at driving out invaders from Kashmir. Once law and order would be restored, there would be a plebiscite under the observation of UN. Mountbatten urged Nehru that an international agency like the UN can ensure impartiality in the plebiscite. On 15th January, 1948, India argued in the UN that after normalcy prevailed in the state, there would be a plebiscite under the auspices of the UN. The UN subsequently established a UN commission for India and Pakistan with power to exercise mediatory influence. As the UN commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) came to the subcontinent, there arose disagreements over de-militarisation in Kashmir. In 1949, India included representatives of Kashmir in its Constituent Assembly and worked on Article 370. Pakistan immediately raised objections to the same. India clarified that as its Constitution was being discussed, the Kashmir region could not be left out. However, India asserted that the inclusion of representatives of Kashmir did not change its position on ground. India assured that after the plebiscite, if Kashmir decided to go the other way, its representation in the Indian parliament would automatically cease. India further clarified that the instrument of accession was conditional on a plebiscite but was legal.

The Indian Constituent Assembly debated about an Article 370 (which was debated as Article 306A) to give representation to Kashmir till conditions conducive for a plebiscite were created. The UNCIP yet again made an attempt under McNaughton's leadership to create a conducive condition for plebiscite by advocating demilitarisation. However, the UNCIP failed and the UNSC terminated the UNCIP in 1950 and appointed Sir Owen Dixon as the UN Representative to the Security Council. Owen Dixon again proposed the idea of a plebiscite after demilitarisation. In 1951, the Indian government supported the creation of a Constituent Assembly of the state of Kashmir which would frame its own Constitution but India clarified that it remained committed to a plebiscite and against forced marriages. The Constituent Assembly of Kashmir adopted a Constitution for Kashmir on 17th November, 1956. The Constitution declared that Kashmir was an integral part of India. Though Pakistan objected to this provision, India clarified that the legality of Kashmir's accession to India (as happened in October 1947) could not be challenged but that did not change India's position of a plebiscite to allow the Kashmiris to determine their future, provided conducive conditions are created. India alleged that the Pakistani invasion of Kashmir and the subsequent Pakistani membership of SEATO and Baghdad pact in 1953 and 1954 had not created a condition conducive for a plebiscite. India also alleged that Pakistan had not withdrawn its troops on the other side of the ceasefire line. India, by 1960, began to assert that it would not accept international mediation and would resort to a bilateral dialogue with Pakistan over Kashmir but continue to support plebiscite. India advocated a shift of treating the Kashmir problem as a world question to treating it as a domestic issue.

When Pakistani tribesmen had invaded Kashmir, the UNCIP was instructed to work jointly with the two states and create a condition conducive for a plebiscite. To immediately halt the hostilities, the UNCIP, through negotiations, helped India and Pakistan sign an agreement in 1949 in Karachi. As per the Karachi Agreement, a ceasefire line was drawn as a temporary arrangement to divide the line between Kashmiri territory left with India and Pakistan occupied Kashmir which they called Azad Kashmir. The Pakistani army decided to take over the operational control of the Pakistan occupied

Kashmir and stationed its troops in the region. India had alleged that this troop presence of Pakistan was one of the reasons why a condition conducive for a plebiscite had not been created. The ceasefire line came into effect from 1st January, 1949.

India alleged that the stalemate over Kashmir could not end and a plebiscite could not happen as Pakistan did not withdraw its troops from the PoK which was a necessary condition for restoration of peace leading to a future plebiscite. As time progressed, in 1965, Pakistan launched another conflict with India. The India army gave a befitting response to Pakistan. In the subsequent Soviet brokered negotiations a Tashkent Agreement was concluded and both sides agreed to maintain a status quo. In 1971, in the war with East Pakistan, as explained in the previous section, India yet again gave a serious blow to Pakistan by slicing off Bangladesh from its control. After the 1971 war, India and Pakistan signed the Simla agreement in 1972. Under the Simla Agreement, Pakistan diplomatically paved way for recognition of creation of Bangladesh. Under the Agreement, the ceasefire line established by the Karachi Agreement of 1948 was redesignated as Line of Control (LoC).



Under the Karachi Agreement, the demarcation in the North at point NJ9842 was not clear. The two sides had no disagreement in the glacier area as the terrain was uninhabitable. In 1970s, Pakistan undertook expeditions in the region near NJ9842 in an area called the Siachen glacier. India too launched an expedition in the Siachen glacier. Pakistan eventually made an attempt to occupy the glacier. In 1984, Indian army, under Operation Meghdoot, thwarted Pakistan's efforts and successfully occupied the Siachen glacier.


Under the Simla Agreement of 1972, as mentioned above, the ceasefire line was now renamed as LoC and thereby the tenure of UNMOGIP to maintain peace on the ceasefire line came to an end. The Simla agreement of 1972 gave India an opportunity to put the conversion of the Kashmir issue from an international to a bilateral issue on paper. In 1972, under the Simla Agreement, Pakistan agreed to resolve Kashmir bilaterally without any third-party intervention. Though India gained at this point in 1972, however, critics point out that India lost an opportunity in 1972 to make the LoC as an international border. Due to lack of clear demarcations, firing across the LoC continued from the Pakistani side in 1980s, 1990s and 2000s.




The Simla Agreement of 1972 could not solve all the problems and proved unable to stabilise Kashmir. Since the 1950s, Sheikh Abdullah's National Conference (NC) was in power. In the period from the 1950s to the 1980s, he was dismissed many times only to be reappointed again. In 1987, Kashmir held elections. After the death of Sheikh Abdullah, Farooq Abdullah, his son, decided to form an alliance with the Congress for the elections. In the 1980s, various social and religious organisations who wanted to resolve the Kashmir issue peacefully formed Muslim United Front (MUF). The MUF too wanted to use the 1987 elections to put forth Kashmiri grievances peacefully at the legislative forum. Farooq Abdullah won the elections. The MUF alleged that the elections were rigged, after which the MUF candidate Mohammad Yusuf Shah was imprisoned. This led to mass protests in the valley.

A Pakistani militant outfit leader Syed Salahuddin too fuelled the protestors through his group, known as the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), which had been originally founded by Muhammad Ahsan Dar. The HM group mobilised Abdul Hamid Sheikh, Ashfaq, Majid Wani, Javed Ahmed Mir and Yasin Malik and formed the Jammu and Kashmir liberation front (JKLF). As the MUF cadres were suppressed, they began to cross over to Pakistan for support. In 1979, the USSR had invaded Afghanistan. To contain the Soviets, the USA began to take help from Pakistan. The CIA had provided arms, ammunition and money to the ISI to train Mujahideens to fight the Soviets and create an enormous amount of resistance to the Soviet rule in Afghanistan. In 1989, as Soviet rule ended, Pakistan's ISI started developing confidence about the fact that a successfully trained Mujahideen campaign could also be launched in Kashmir.

The 1987 elections and the suppression of MUF had given Pakistan a fertile ground to fuel unrest in the valley. After the elections of 1987, when MUF cadres reached Pakistan for support, the ISI began to train them with arms and ammunition. In 1993, 26 social and religious organisations united to form the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC). The APHC began to raise the call for the independence of Kashmir. The USA too had given tacit support to APHC leaders in India and it was financially backed by the CIA. As the JKLF received support and training from Pakistan, in 1989, they attacked a Hindu Kashmiri Pandit, Tika Lal Taploo. The assassination created tremendous fear amongst the Kashmiri Pandits. The HM too vocally began to assert that Kashmiri Pandits immediately leave the valley. Kashmir, which had been home to Sufi Islam and Hinduism, who had always coexisted peacefully, witnessed communal crisis. As violence against the Hindus unfolded in the valley in 1990, the central government decided to appoint Jagmohan Malhotra as the new governor of Kashmir. The exodus and ethnic cleansing of Kashmiri Pandits continued in the early 1990s as the ISI succeeded, through JKLF and HM, in arming the local population and inciting revolt against the Indian state for the sake of Kashmiri self-determination. From 1990 to 1994, the Indian security forces launched a massive campaign against the insurgents and terrorists in the valley. The Indian forces launched a ruthless campaign to suppress the insurgents with an intention to break the organisations from within. By 1996, HM and JKLF were severely weakened.



The Lashker-e-Taiba (LeT) had been created by Hafiz Saeed and was active against the Soviets through Jihad in Afghanistan. Through the support of the ISI, the LeT started turning its attention towards Kashmir from the 1990s. The ISI successfully transformed the LeT into a proxy group against India. The LeT is ideologically linked to the Ahl-i-Hadith interpretations of Islam. Since 1990s, the ISI of Pakistan launched a campaign that sought to infiltrate Kashmir with the Ahl-i-Hadith ideology. The Ahl-i-Hadith interpretation is interlinked with the Wahabism school of Islam, which is one of the most orthodox and stringent forms of Islam practised in the world. Since 1990s, attempts have thus been made to Wahabise the Kashmiri society, which has always practised a softer, Sufi ideology-oriented Islam.




Through a dedicated department known as the Joint Intelligence North (JIN), the ISI began to provide support to separatists and terrorist groups to encourage infiltration into Kashmir. They carry out clandestine activities in the Kashmir region. In 1990s, to counter the ISI campaign, R&AW stepped in and launched Operation Chanakya. The R&AW began to form 'political cells' in Kashmir to counter the separatists. In South Kashmir, Kuka Paray alias Jamsheed Sheraji, in association with R&AW formed, the pro-India counter-insurgency outfit called Ikwan-ul-Musalmeeen. The Ikwan group neutralised Pakistani groups in South Kashmir. Jamsheed was in reality a member of state assembly of Kashmir. R&AW created factionalism within the Hurriyat where Kuka Paray played an instrumental role in creating factional split within APHC to encourage moderate leaders.

The R&AW also created the Muslim Mujahideen to neutralise Pakistani groups in 1990s. In 2003, the R&AW also succeeded in creating a split in HM. The basic idea of Operation Chanakya was to neutralise ISI groups using Indian counter-insurgency groups.

All this while, ISI fuelled their campaign of spreading Wahabism in the valley and also initiated an attempt to introduce the idea of slicing off Kashmir from India to be controlled by Pakistan. By 1996, there was public disillusionment over ISI-sponsored violence and its attempts to Wahabise Kashmir. The R&AW and Indian forces aggressively ended the terrorist campaign in the valley and violence was drastically controlled by 1996. As the ISI received a setback, they initiated a new campaign of violence with a new tactic. In the period from 1999 to 2002, the ISI resorted to a new *fidayeen* phase of the campaign. The idea was to attack army camps, zero down on targets and terrorise the Kashmiri population. The logic behind ISI sponsored *fidayeen* attacks were to cause a psychological blow to the Indian forces, Indian people and the Indian state. The ISI now used Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad for the campaign. This period saw the Kargil intrusions and an attack on the Indian Parliament. India pointed out Pakistan's role in the Parliament attacks and initiated Operation Parakram. Under intense pressure from the USA, Pakistan acquiesced to the dismantling of Taliban infrastructure.

The hostilities between India and Pakistan along the LoC and the international border had increased between, 2001–2002. In 2003, to de-escalate the rising tensions, the two sides concluded an agreement to maintain a ceasefire. As per the agreement in 2003, both sides would maintain peace and tranquillity on either side of the LoC and allow completion of fencing of the LoC. In 2005, India and Pakistan agreed not to develop new posts and defence works on either side of the LoC. The period post the ceasefire agreement in 2003 saw a sharp decline of violence and tranquillity had been achieved in Kashmir again.



The period from 2001-2002 onwards saw a resurgence in Indian economy. The benefits did not percolate evenly everywhere. As the situation became normal by 2008, another controversy created a storm. In 2008, the Indian government, along with the government of Kashmir, decided to undertake a land transfer of 99 acres to the Sri Amarnath Shrine Board (SASB). Such a land transfer immediately assumed a communal dimension and Hindu–Muslim violence broke out. After intense and heated debates, the government decided to stall the transfer to the SASB. However, the political parties had already begun to believe that Islam was under threat in Kashmir and violence unfolded. As an atmosphere of unrest prevailed, certain events in 2010 sparked massive protests. In 2010, the Indian army carried out an encounter of terrorists in the Machil Sector in the district of Kupwara. Investigation found that instead of militants, the army had killed civilians living in Rafiabad area in the fake encounter. A month later, in June 2010, during a police crackdown, some innocents were killed in the Srinagar area by the police. This

led to massive protests. The protestors began to pelt stones at the security forces. The protestors demanded the Indian troops to ‘quit Kashmir’. The ISI saw an opportunity to revive their support to the protestors in the valley. The R&AW found evidence that the ISI had begun to use social media platforms to mobilise the Kashmiri youth against India. The ISI reinvigorated their idea of liberating Kashmir from India.

The Indian government announced measures to curtail tensions. Apart from an all-party meeting, the government decided to appoint inter barters with Kashmir. The army, too, brought the perpetrators of Machil fake encounter to task.


However, an understanding of deeper dynamics of protestors and stone pelters point out different factors for the uprising. Apart from the anger against the security forces, the protestors were also frustrated due to lack of employment as there were no jobs for the youth, with instances of violence arbitrarily perpetrated by security personnel alienating Kashmiri youth further. The ISI took advantage of such alienation to instil the ideology of Wahabism and radicalism amongst the youth, exhorting them to enrol for Jihad. As the situation turned to normalcy, again sparks erupted. In 2013, the government hanged Afzal Guru. His hanging for his role in the Parliament attack caused a massive unrest in the valley. In 2015, the PDP decided to form a government in Kashmir in alliance with the BJP. The people of the valley did not favour such an alliance. The angered the youth and certain sections of the youth again found solace in extremism.

Burhan Wani was a classical example. He joined the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM). The HM, adequately supported by the ISI, aggressively used the social media for radicalisation and indoctrination. The HM made him the commander of South Kashmir. His youthful age and sincerity found immense resonance amongst alienated Kashmiri youth. On 8th July, 2016, the Indian armed forces killed Wani in an encounter. His death led to an upsurge in the valley. Lakhs of people attended his funeral. The ISI and HM, through social media, instigated the youth to resort to stone pelting against the Indian forces. The Pakistani army’s ceasefire violations and the ISI’s social media-led mobilisation from 2016 to 2017 have led to massive unrest in the valley yet again. Prem Shankar Jha has called the 2016 unrest in the valley as a Kashmiri intifada. Stone pelting in 2016–17 has emerged as a cult in Kashmir. This radical suicidal stone pelting, in the face of pellet guns and other armed forces ammunition, is an outcome of Pakistan-sponsored radical Wahabi indoctrination amongst the youth. The ISI of Pakistan, according to R&AW, has earmarked 1000 crores to be given to groups in Kashmir to create stone-pelting led unrest. The R&AW found that in 2017, during by-elections for Lok Sabha from Srinagar and Anantnag, the ISI had deliberately created a fear psychosis amongst the population to deliberately have a low voter turnout. After the by-elections, ISI resorted to a massive international campaign to highlight the low voter turnout.

The R&AW has found that Pakistani strategy is to instigate Kashmiri youth to obstruct forces and pelt stones at them, which will inevitably lead to forces using fire upon youth. The more youth are killed, the more it would alienate the Kashmiri population further from India. Such alienation will provide the ISI to activate HM and other groups to radicalise youth by preaching Wahabism. The radicalised Wahabi youth would resort to Jihad to create more unrest in the valley.

A lot of suggestions have been put forward for resolving the crises. The most

important, however, is that the government should address the alienation of the Kashmiri youth and bring them into the mainstream society. There should be immediate job creation and political mobilisation of the youth and efforts should be taken to connect the youth to the political processes in the country. Pakistan too needs to stop ceasefire violations. Alienation of the youth, coupled with anger, has led to a serious crisis in Kashmir today. Radical Islam and Wahabism too has affected the youth who have moved away from the system. Taking advantage of the void created by the failure of institutional mechanisms by the state and the central government's side, Pakistan is back in the valley with a vengeance.



Pakistan has to give up its territorial ambitions over Kashmir and cease all support to non-state actors in the valley. By establishing a conducive condition, a possible solution could be achieved. India, on the other hand, has to rectify its policies and initiate an immediate dialogue and political solution for the Kashmir crises. Till the time Pakistan continues to fuel unrest in Kashmir, R&AW will continue to resort to a similar strategy in Pakistan territory of Baluchistan and FATA region.

INDIA AND PAKISTAN AND NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY

In the previous sections of the chapter, we have analysed the complex Indo-Pak relationship since partition. In 1998, the two also tested their nuclear weapons. A new combustible mixture has emerged due to the nuclear option. The international community has always had serious concerns about the future of India and Pakistan as both have fought violent and bloody conflicts in the past. What also added to international concerns was the refusal of the two to renounce their right of acquiring nuclear weapons. All such international concerns got aggravated in 1998 when both tested their weapons. There are different views that have erupted on the impact of regional security in the post-test period.

Let us have a look at the optimistic view. In India, this view is propounded by Sumit Ganguly. He opines that the leaders of India and Pakistan are interested in their national survival. Both leaders realise that either party has adequate capabilities to inflict harm on its adversaries. Thus, if there is a crisis, both sides would strive to exercise caution with an intention to ensure that crises are not escalated to the nuclear level. This, as per the deductive logic propounded by Thomas Schelling and Kenneth Waltz, would lead to the prevention of escalation of conflict to a nuclear level and would bring about stability.

Ganguly adds further details to his argument. He observes that the Partition has had a profound impact on both India and Pakistan. Pakistani leadership continues to feel, despite losses inflicted upon them in 1965 and 1971, that Kashmir is an unfinished agenda. Though, since 1971, the South Asian region has not witnessed a war it has witnessed

limited conflicts in 1999 and Pakistani sponsored ethno-religious insurgency in Kashmir. It is well accepted that the overt acquisition of nuclear weapons in 1998 has played an important role in preventing escalation of conflicts, including the Kargil intrusion, into a fully-fledged war. Despite further escalation of tensions during 2006 Mumbai attacks, then the 26/11 attacks and recent attacks in 2016 and 2017 from Pathankot, Pampore, Uri and Kupwara, both sides have exhibited restraint and have not violated thresholds. Ganguly asserts that Pakistan may resort to a proxy war but knows its limitation. Pakistan knows that if it initiates any conventional conflict with India, India too would resort to retaliation and this could push both towards a war. India, however, has followed a mixture of resolve and restraint. It has given Pakistan substantial responses to Pakistani provocation. Yet the nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan would remain a robust tool to avert full scale wars in future.

There is also a pessimistic view advanced by S. Paul Kapur. Firstly, the pessimists agree with the optimists on the fact that if players have nuclear weapons, they would behave strategically and strive for international stability. Instead of challenging the optimistic school on this account, the pessimists argue that organisations which are given the responsibility to manage nuclear weapons could go rogue and indulge in destabilising strategies. For pessimists, organizational pathologies would short circuit the adoption of stabilising strategies. Paul Kapur adds further that if a state acquires nuclear weapon, it may create incentives for a state to create destabilisation. He observes that there could be a possibility that there is a weak state in the scenario, say, which is not satisfied with the territorial boundaries with a neighbouring strong state. The neighbouring strong state is a status quo power with stronger military while the weaker state may position itself as a revisionist state. The weaker state may want to alter the boundaries to seek a boundary favourable to itself but knows that if it resorts to a conventional conflict against the strong state, the strong state would inflict heavy damage in retaliation and thereby, the weak state prefers to live with undesirable boundaries. Kapur asserts that acquisition of nuclear weapons will change the scenario. Let's say that the weaker state acquires nuclear weapons. Now, through them, the weaker state has tried to overcome strong state's conventional military might with actuation of nuclear arsenal.

Now let's assume that the strong state threatens the weaker one with a military catastrophe. The weaker state, to mitigate the threat by the stronger state, could launch a nuclear strike. On first strike by the weaker state, the stronger state could resort to massive and unacceptable retaliation. But, the stronger state, in such a scenario, would not prefer to launch a full-scale attack or resort to a conventional war against a weak for the fear of nuclear escalation. The strong state may resort to strategic restraint and at times, if needed, resolve to a limited extent with no possibility of crossing the nuclear threshold. If the weaker state develops the understanding that the stronger state would exercise strategic restraint, then, it may embolden the weaker state to resort to tactics to attempt to alter boundaries because it would know that the stronger state would not employ its full military power in its response to the opponent. More importantly, the weaker state may try to indulge in destabilising behaviour due to availability of diplomatic incentives for itself. The weaker state may provoke the adversary. Such provocation will push the stronger state to respond, which could push the conflict towards nuclear escalation. As the tensions rise, the international community would intervene. Such intervention to defuse crises

could lead to a territorial settlement that may prove profitable for the weaker state. The weaker state would eventually, through international intervention, seek to get a territorial settlement that it may not have been in a position to get bilaterally with the stronger state. Thus, the weaker state could also deliberately resort to provoking the stronger state to push crisis towards nuclear escalation.

If the provocation by the weaker state increases, there could be retribution by the stronger state. If the weaker state, after provocation, say happens to alter the boundaries by capturing some territory, it could invite a strong action from the adversary. The stronger state may not only inflict tremendous harm through a conventional military attack but may try to breach the nuclear threshold. The conventional military attack by the stronger state could be stronger than what the weaker state could anticipate. There could be a possibility that the response by the stronger state could weaken the weaker state's nuclear controls. To prevent such a possible fear, the weaker state could hand over its nuclear launching authority to the armed forces with a hope that if the stronger state retaliates, the nuclear command does not lose the ability to respond. Thus, apart from just the organisational pathologies, the insulation from full scale retaliation and possibility of international intervention can also lead to destabilising behaviour. Therefore, a dissatisfied state with a weaker military could acquire nuclear weapons to cause destabilisation. This is a situation of strategic pessimism which advocates that having nuclear weapons will not always lead to rational calculations but, at times, can create incentives to cause destabilisation and escalation.

Now, let us apply the two views in the context of the nuclear weapons of India and Pakistan. Though, India and Pakistan tested their weapons in 1998, but the idea of acquiring such weapons goes back to the 1970s. After India defeated Pakistan in the 1971 war, in 1974, it demonstrated its capabilities through a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE). The Pakistani defeat in 1971 war and subsequent Indian PNE brought about a major shift in Pakistani strategic thinking and it began working on the development of its own nuclear weapon. The development, in a covert manner, continued by both states in 1980s. By the end of 1980s, the two had capabilities to develop their weapons at a short notice.

The reasons that drove India to explore the nuclear option were different from Pakistan's. India failed to get international security post Chinese nuclear test in 1964. This led Shastri to authorise a Subterranean Nuclear Explosions Project (SNEP). The SNEP later in 1974 manifested as PNE. Indira and Rajiv Gandhi played important roles in the development of India's nuclear capabilities. For Pakistan, on the other hand, the trigger was their defeat in 1971. Pakistan understood that only a nuclear weapon could help them overcome the threat of the conventional superiority of India. If we apply strategic pessimism here, then some more factors can help us understand Pakistan's bid for the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Pakistan was not happy with the partition in 1947. It wanted to alter the boundaries with India. After Kashmir signed the Instrument of Accession with India in 1947, Pakistan tried to alter the boundaries through 1947–48 war and 1965 war. With the Pakistani territory of East Pakistan also lost in the form of an independent state (Bangladesh) in 1971, Pakistan realised that it would not be able to fight a war with India over Kashmir ever again. But, Pakistan did not give up the cause of Kashmir fully. It decided to challenge territorial boundaries in Kashmir after it acquired capabilities that could alter the strategic situation. This compelled Pakistan to acquire

nuclear weapons. As the acquisition of weapons was going on, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and subsequent mujahedeen campaign by the US gave Pakistan a new idea on how to resort to a proxy model to alter the status quo in Kashmir. As the Cold War ended in 1989, bolstered with arms, training and knowledge from the mujahedeen campaign, coupled with a capability to produce a nuclear weapon at a short notice, Pakistan unleashed proxy insurgency in Kashmir in 1989. Pakistan began to realise that it could use the nuclear option if India resorted to a conventional attack upon Pakistan due to provocation in Kashmir. Pakistani strategic elite clearly knows that it can continue to support insurgency in Kashmir as the acquisition of nuclear capabilities has neutralised the Indian option of conventional conflict with Pakistan.

Therefore, as the Pakistani side began to support insurgents in Kashmir, the Indian side immediately enhanced its security presence in Kashmir to suppress the insurgents. The Pakistani side responded by enhancing their presence along the international border. Indian side responded by deploying armoured units from the international border till the LOC. As the crises escalated, Pakistan feared a full-scale attack from India while India feared an attack on Kashmir. To defuse the crisis, the US government sent its Deputy National Security Adviser Robert Gates to the region. The Gates Mission succeeded in defusing the crises by warning Pakistan that in case of an attack from India, it would be defeated. As the crisis deescalated, both sides announced normalcy again.

One view which explains why the two sides did not go for a war in 1990s is the view by Sumit Ganguly. According to him, despite massive infiltration by Pakistan in Kashmir, India exercised caution because it was aware of Pakistan's nuclear capabilities. In 1965, when Pakistan had undertaken infiltration, Indian troops had crossed over the ceasefire line and destroyed the assembly points used by the infiltrators in Pakistan. In 1990s, when this massive infiltration happened again, the Indian side enhanced force presence at the LoC but did not undertake any forceful measures. The Indian officials at that time offer a different perspective. They argue that India never wanted to escalate the 1990 crisis into a war as India did not perceive the situation at that time volatile enough to occasion a full-fledged war. The then Indian Foreign Secretary SK Singh stated clearly that assuming that the 1990s crisis could lead to war is a mere conjecture. According to this logic, then the 1990's crises that happened in the backdrop of nuclear weapon did into stabilize but created a possibility of destabilization as witnessed in Pakistani support to insurgents in Kashmir.

Again, in 1998, Pakistani army men carried out an intrusion in Kargil. They crossed over the LoC and entered into the Indian side. When the Indian side observed these intrusions, in 1999, Indian forces carried out an intense air and ground offensive and drove out the intruders. As the Indian side had suppressed the insurgency in Kashmir by 1996, the international attention on Kashmir too began to decline. Pakistan wanted to make an incursion in the region again without harming vital its security interests of India. The prime intention of making an intrusion in Kargil was to slice off a part of the National Highway IA as doing so would make it difficult for India to supply logistics to the Indian troops in the Siachen glacier. India launched an offensive to dislodge intruders but ensured that neither the ground troops nor its air force crosses the LoC. India exercised tremendous restraint. Pakistan thought that its nuclear capabilities would prevent an Indian conventional response and also the international attention in case of crisis between two

nuclear armed players would be beneficial to Pakistan.

The optimists argue that the nuclear weapons in the context of Kargil prevented escalation. However, the Indian officials argue differently. Indian Army Chief during Kargil conflicts, VP Malik, asserts that India did not cross over the LoC as it wanted international support and had cared for the world's opinion. Even G Parthasarathy asserts that India did not cross the LoC to ensure that the world would accept that Kargil had happened because of Pakistani provocation. Indian response was rooted in self-defense. VP Malik further states that as the political leaders wanted the forces to eject the intruders, they exercised fluidity and flexibility by granting the forces the authorisation to cross over the LoC if need be. He asserts that there was no nuclear threat in the picture and if the tactical operation did not go well, India could have crossed the LoC. Even Brijesh Mishra asserted that if army would have requested the need to cross over the LoC and the political leadership would have accepted the request if circumstances had necessitated thus. According to the official view, crossing the LoC would not have triggered any nuclear backlash from Pakistan.

As the crises of Kargil ended, new situations erupted and now the Indo-Pakistan conflict was at an all new level. India demanded that Pakistan hand over terrorists responsible for attacks on India, failing which India would strike Pakistan and snatch their territories. In January, 2002, Pakistan declared LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammed illegal and banned their activities. Musharraf asserted that Pakistani territory would not be used against India by terrorists. The US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, visited India to assure India of serious steps taken by Pakistan to dismantle terrorist infrastructures. India, in the wake of visit of Colin Powell, decided not to strike but did not remove its forces from the borders. In May, 2002, Pakistan ambushed Indian troops in Kulachak in Jammu. India decided to attack Pakistan from Rajasthan across the LoC and seize territory and destroy Pakistani forces. Consequently, Musharraf assured the world that Pakistan would permanently end infiltration. The USA Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, visited India and assured India once again of Musharraf's pledge. India began to withdraw the plan and decided to end Operation Parakram.

Why did India not resort to attacking Pakistan despite escalation of conflicts in 2001–2002? One view is that the nuclear weapons prevented any serious conflict escalation and India exercised restraint. The other view is that Indian officials did not feel the need to attack Pakistan as they believed that Operation Parakram had delivered the desired results. Indian officials observe that there was no point attacking Pakistan because they received assurances from the US that Pakistan would dismantle its terrorist infrastructure. They further clarify that their goal was to ensure that terrorism does not emanate from Pakistan and Operation Parakram and USA assurances achieved this goal.

Since the stand-off, the two sides have not witnessed any form of major crises escalation. India's use of coercive diplomacy has sent a strong message to Pakistan. The future relations post 2001–2002 have taken a different turn. The US has de-hyphenated India and Pakistan and has, over a period of time, bolstered Indian capabilities. It has given India a nuclear deal in 2005. The US is now working with India to strengthen its defence apparatus through the Indo–USA DTTI (explained in the chapter of India and USA relationship) and the LEMOA. Pakistan, on the other hand, has tilted towards China,

which has been attempting to bolster Pakistani economic capabilities. Nuclear weapons have played a considerable role in crisis prevention strategy. Nuclear weapons have played a considerable role in crises prevention strategy. Despite Pakistani provocations in the form of 2006 Mumbai train attacks, 26/11 attacks in Pathankot (2016), Pampore (2016), Uri (2016) Kupwara (2017), Krishna Ghati (2017); India has resorted to a strategy of diplomatic isolating Pakistan and on provocation, has followed a mixture of resolve and restrain.

There is, however, an alternative view that suggests that post 9/11, Pakistan started taking steps to dismantle terrorist infrastructure within its territories, which led to a serious backlash by the terrorist groups against the state of Pakistan. Many terrorist group nurtured by Pakistan have evolved a sense of betrayal by the Pakistani regime. As a result of this, such groups have gradually turned against the Pakistani establishment. In recent times, Pakistani diplomats have globally started voicing a concern that Pakistan too is a victim of terrorism. As the terrorist groups have organised themselves in NWFP, FATA and Baluchistan region, the attention of the Pakistani army has been diverted from Kashmir to maintain internal security. Thus, Pakistan is finding it extremely difficult to fight along three fronts, namely, a proxy war against India in Kashmir, a combo of Al-Qaeda-Taliban and internal groups resorting to aggression against Pakistan. Pakistan has been now started alleging that India's R&AW is funding terror groups in Pakistan. India has, on the other hand, summarily dismissed such allegations.

India has also decided to inflict harm upon Pakistan for their provocation through the Cold Start doctrine. Under this doctrine, India, on Pakistani provocation would inflict harm upon Pakistan, capture their territory to use it as a bargaining chip in the post-conflict period and yet the depth of the incursion by India under the Cold Start will not be intense enough to trigger a nuclear response by Pakistan. Pakistan has, in the recent times, brought about a shift in its attitude. It has started using Kashmir as a launch pad to attack other Indian cities like Varanasi, Lucknow, Ajmer and Hyderabad and so on. This gives Pakistan not only the option of deniability but a brilliant strategy of showcasing the disgruntled Indian Muslims and their suppression to the world.

ANALYSIS

Our discussion in the preceding section has proven that the Pakistani nuclear weapons are India-specific. The potential motivation for Pakistan to develop nuclear weapons began with its perceived asymmetry with India in conventional warfare. The response of the USA in not fully supporting Pakistan outright in the 1965 and 1971 wars aggravated Pakistan's fear that the US would not be able to function as a long-term security guarantor. The secession of East Pakistan in 1971 made Pakistan perceive India as an existential threat. It therefore decided that acquisition of nuclear weapon would provide it with a tool to face India equally. For Pakistan, the nuclear weapons are not just a response to conventional superiority of India but also a tool to ensure the stability and survivability of Pakistan. Though India advocates a No First Use (NFU) policy, Pakistan has stated that it does not have any confidence on India's NFU and they have, therefore, not accepted the NFU as a viable policy.



Pakistan's idea of strategic deterrence is based upon the logic of developing conventional capabilities first. Pakistan believes that developing conventional capabilities will help them ward off a conventional attack from India. Based on this logic, Pakistan has sought to buy the F-16 fighter jets from the US. This is driven by the logic that Pakistan should not allow India to exploit any Pakistani faultlines—from sub-conventional to conventional to nuclear level—as this may endanger the security of Pakistan. Pakistan further believes that if India ever resorts to a full-scale conventional attack, Pakistan would resist the same through conventional preparedness, but, if the survivability of Pakistan is under a threat, then it may exercise a nuclear option.



The four conditions are not officially mentioned by Pakistan. In fact, they believe that the essence of deterrence is ambiguity and some amount of uncertainty will create dissonance amongst Indians about the extent they can push Pakistan. Pakistan deliberately favours a stability–instability paradox as a central element of their security competition with India. The stability–instability paradox is an international relations theory regarding the effect of nuclear weapons and mutually assured destruction. It states that when two countries each have nuclear weapons, the probability of a direct war between them greatly decreases, but the probability of minor or indirect conflicts between them increases. To aggravate matters further, Pakistan strives for developing a large nuclear stockpile. Pakistan believes that the Indo–USA nuclear deal, the NSG waiver for India and a potential NSG membership for India will allow India to buy uranium globally and use its own uranium for its weapons programme, which might contribute yet again to an existential threat to Pakistan. This has compelled Pakistan to explore the idea of developing an offensive deterrence posture.

Nuclear weapons by Pakistan have allowed them an umbrella to facilitate a proxy war in Kashmir. Pakistan has also developed an understanding that because of its nuclear weapons, it can continue to resort to a proxy war, and if conflict escalates, international intervention will pressure India not to wage a war against Pakistan. Such international intervention legitimises the Pakistani idea of inflicting a low intensity conflict on India. Pakistan also knows that even if the US and others may become critical about Pakistan, no power would abandon a freelancing nuclear power like Pakistan for the fear of a nuclear

conflict in Asia and the possibility of proliferation of nuclear weapons to terrorists or other rogue states. Thus, today, it is not a nuclear capable Pakistan that deters India, but an ambiguity that allows Pakistan to indulge in the risk-seeking behaviour of supporting terrorists and proxies. The nuclear weapons offer a shield to Pakistan's adventurism and offer them immunity in the long run. Pakistan uses terrorism as a rational strategy as it is designed to generate security and survivability for Pakistan. This kind of militancy has been nurtured by Pakistan to hide its domestic, economic and political weaknesses and the state uses it as a tool of asymmetric warfare (through non-state actors) to confront India. Nuclear weapons, its augmentation of conventional forces and use of militant proxies today form a combined grand strategy of Pakistan. Therefore, jihad today forms a core of grand strategy of Pakistan.

JIHAD AS A GRAND STRATEGY BY PAKISTAN

The origin of Pakistan's practice of training insurgents could be seen as early as the 1950s when the US and Pakistan came together to tackle the USSR. The US had provided the Pakistani army training in guerrilla tactics and the Pakistani army realised that such a tactic could also be used against India. In time, Pakistan developed the idea of guerrilla warfare in Kashmir. The approach was carefully articulated. The army began to take advantage of the terrain in Kashmir. It provided support to dissenters, used the civilian support to fuel hatred and used their loyalties for launching anti-India attacks. Pakistan began its guerrilla campaign from 1947. It has nurtured this non-state actor led guerrilla warfare action to keep itself ready for a 'day after' nuclear attack, also if need be. More importantly, Pakistani has used the guerrilla non-state actor tactics to transfer a culture of Wahabism in the Kashmir valley. From 1960s, Pakistan began to work upon a model of gradual infiltration. For Pakistan, infiltration is a strategy entailing minimum casualty and maximum results. Pakistan began to toy with the idea of sending religious zealots and fundamentalists as part of the infiltration campaign. For Pakistan, infiltration began to emerge as a concept of conflict of the future. Pakistan today effectively uses infiltration tactic in Kashmir. Every year, since 2003, despite a ceasefire agreement in place, Pakistan has resorted to ceasefire violations. The ceasefire violations start routinely from September–October every year from the Jammu region. Pakistan resorts to firing and mortar shelling. This diverts the attention of the Indian forces to protect the population affected. Pakistan then uses this diversion of the Indian forces to infiltrate terrorists across the LoC, a process that gets completed in November. From December till June, the area remains under snow. The non-state actors in Kashmir thereafter resort to guerrilla warfare tactics. This is a classical diversionary tactics Pakistan has nurtured to wage low intensity conflicts against India. They applied this tactic for the first time in 1947 when they sent tribesmen to Kashmir and they continue to do the same till today.

OTHER DISPUTES BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN

One of the major disputes is about the Wular barrage or the Talbul Navigation project on Jhelum River in Kashmir. The dispute goes back to 1984. India wanted to establish a barrage at the mouth of the Wular Lake on Jhelum River. that the project entailed the creation of a 439 feet long and 40 feet wide barrage which would store 0.30 million acres feet of water which would make the river navigable during summer season. Pakistan had taken the matter to Indus Water Commission (since 1986) as it alleged that the Wular

barrage violated the Indus Water Treaty of 1960 and the creation of the barrage would be used by India as a geostrategic weapon to restrict water supplies to Pakistan. India uses the term Tulbul Navigation Project while Pakistan uses the term Wular barrage to refer to the project. Since 1986, there have been negotiations between the two sides to resolve the dispute, but it still persists.

Let us turn our attention to Indus Water Treaty. Before Partition, the water of Indus River the Indus system was jointly used by India and Pakistan. After the Partition in 1947, the two sides concluded an inter-dominion accord where it was decided that on annual payments from Pakistan, India would release a sufficient amount of water to Pakistan. It was decided in the inter-dominion accord that the two sides in future will negotiate a permanent solution. In 1951, the former chairman of Tennessee valley authority, David Lilienthal visited the region and recommended joint operation and development of Indus basin. Based upon the idea propounded by Lilienthal, the then chairman of World Bank Eugene Black convinced India and Pakistan to negotiate a settlement for water sharing. The meetings began from 1954 and finally concluded in 1960 with Indus Water Treaty (IWT) signed between Nehru and Ayub Khan.

The Indus basin has three eastern flowing rivers (Sutlej, Beas and Ravi) and three western flowing rivers (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab). As per the INT, 1960, India got control over the Eastern Rivers while Pakistan got control of Western rivers. India, however, as per the IWT was allowed to use the water from the western rivers for the purpose of consumption with restricted use of the river water for storage. On the western rivers, except for specific cases, India was not to build storage and irrigation systems on the rivers. In the IWT, if there were to be a disagreement between India and Pakistan, there was a provision to seek mediation and arbitration. As per the Article XII of the IWT, a modification is permissible when both parties agree for the need of the same. To make sure that neither of the parties is violating any of the provisions of the IWT, the treaty provides for a Permanent Indus Commission (PIC) where there would be one commissioner appointed by India and one by Pakistan. Whenever a project is initiated by one party, it has to share the information with the other party. If there is ever a dispute, first there are to be bilateral talks. If talks fail, the aggrieved party can seek third party (neutral party) intervention.

Jhelum is a west flowing river, one of its tributaries in Kishanganga. The Kishanganga in Pakistan is called Neelam river. India authorised the National Hydropower Corporation to establish a dam named Gurez on the Kishanganga River. To generate electricity, the National Hydropower Corporation envisaged the creation of a 20 kilometre long tunnel to divert water. The water through the tunnel could be diverted through the tunnel to generate 300+ Megawatt electricity at Kishanganga hydroelectric plant (KHEP) in Bonar Nallah. Pakistan objected to the KHEP project alleging that the diversion of the water will reduce the availability of water Pakistan requires for the Neelum–Jhelum hydropower plant and thereby also reduce the original share of river water due to Pakistan under the IWT by 15%. Thus, in 2010, Pakistan approached the International Court of Arbitration (ICA). The ICA gave a final decision in December, 2013. As per the ICA, Pakistan will need at least 9 cubic metre per second water flow in the river which shall be maintained by India and India would be able to, after ensuring 9 cubic metre per second flow in the river, go ahead with KHEP project.

Pakistan had also raised four design related issues at the ICA, but out of the four, only one was settled while the rest could not be settled at the bilateral level between the two. In June 2013, India initiated a new 850 hydropower station to be constructed as the Ratle plant on the Chenab River. Pakistan raised objection to the Ratle plant and took up the issue for arbitration by the court of arbitration at the World Bank. Pakistan, on 19th August 2013, requested the World Bank to constitute a court of arbitration. India, as per the IWT, had to respond to the request on 19th October, 2013. On 4th October, 2013, India requested that a neutral expert be appointed. If a state requests a neutral expert be appointed, then such a request has to be accepted immediately. The World Bank, however, chose to sit on India's request. On 19th October, 2013, when the Pakistani request matured, the World Bank advocated both the setting up of a court of arbitration and appointment of a neutral expert. India objected to the proposal, observing that it would complicate the process. India threatened that it may not participate in the court of arbitration as it had requested for a neutral expert's appointment which had to be accepted immediately, but it was not. The World Bank exercised a pause to the two processes and urged the two states to find an alternative resolution mechanism. The matter was taken up at the level of the Permanent Indus Commission. After the Uri attack happened in September, 2016, India decided not to hold the PIC meetings with Pakistan till it stopped funding terrorists. However, in March 2017, the suspension was lifted and the possibility of an agreement is awaited in future.

CONCLUSION OF THE RELATIONSHIP

Jinnah is the founding father of Pakistan. He always wanted a relation between India and Pakistan that would be similar to the US and Canada. Today, seventy years later, such a union is a distant dream. The two countries have fought four bitter wars and are nuclear armed players now. If the two sides are not engaged in an outright war, then both are in a state of cold war. In the last few years, the two seem to have been following a unique mechanism. The leaders of the two states normally meet on the side of any global summit (Modi met Sharif on the lines of Ufa Summit in 2015). Both announce that official level talks have resumed. Modi, in December 2015, also paid a surprise visit to Lahore. The moment talks are announced, in a short span of time, there is a Pakistan-sponsored jihadi attack against India (Pathankot air base attack, January 2016) and the dialogue breaks down. Apart from a jihadi attack, there could also be a ceasefire violation along the LoC, which is a condition sufficient for the talks to break down. Then starts a phase of allegations. India accuses Pakistan of state sponsorship to terrorism (India recently also provided evidence of Pakistani mutilation of Indian soldiers in Krishna Ghati in May, 2017), while Pakistan accuses India of creating destabilisation in Pakistan. The talks derail and later are resumed yet again with the same fanfare, only to be broken again.



The seeds of discord were laid down extremely deep at the time of Partition.

Congress never accepted the Partition. They always held the idea that the two sides would eventually unite due to a shared culture and heritage. However, for Pakistan, India not accepting the Partition was an attack on its identity, nay, its very existence. It is an enduring theory of Pakistan's leaders that India wants to absorb Pakistan. Though India has taken many steps to assuage such concerns, they have had a limited impact upon Pakistan. Even after the 1971 war, India through the Simla Agreement in 1972, accepted that Pakistan can exist as a neighbour of India. But, as there was no pressure exerted upon Pakistan in 1972 over the permanent resolution of the Kashmir issue, they took it as an opportunity to keep the Kashmir issue alive.

Recent statements by RSS leaders in 2017 of an '*akhand Bharat*' have again revived Pakistani suspicions. Pakistan, till today, feels that Kashmir is its jugular vein, serving as a unifying agenda since Partition. Pakistan continues to use irregular warfare through proxy groups to destabilise Kashmir as it harbours a feeling that it can continue to bleed India through this low-intensity conflict practised through indoctrinated religious zealots. Pakistan ideologically radicalises its proxy groups through the inflammatory 'Ghazwa-e-Hind' hadith. Groups created by Pakistan wage a war against India in the delusional belief that India and Kashmir belong to the territory promised to them by Prophet Mohammad. Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan interprets Ghazwa-e-Hind as also including Pakistan, and thus resorts to terrorist strikes against Pakistan with an intention to free Pakistan from US influence. In time, it is expected that Pakistan shall also become aware of the dangers of fuelling religious extremism in its neighbouring territory. Peace between India and Pakistan is possible only if Pakistan gives up its ambition to seek territorial readjustments, disconnects its support to terrorist groups and extends a genuine hand of friendship. Such a friendship has the potential of changing the course of not only Asia but the world.

2
CHAPTER

India and China Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Diplomatic history
- Tibet Issue
- Border problem
- Pakistan factor in Sino-Indian relations
- Commercial diplomacy and Nuclear diplomacy
- Analysis of bilateral visits and recent standoffs

DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF INDIA–CHINA RELATIONS


When India became independent, three broad events influenced the formation of India's China policy. In 1949, there was a revolution in China and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was formed, establishing the People's Republic of China (PRC). The newly established PRC accepted the Leninist–Stalinist style of state administration. The CCP immediately removed the buffer of Tibet which acted as a barrier between India and China by forcefully annexing Tibet to China. As we also know, the early 1950s was a period of decolonisation. As new countries were born in the region, the question that emerged was what role would India and China play in this newly emerging postcolonial world order. The anxiety was about how India and China would behave in the era of bipolarity.

India propounded its NAM ideology as an ideology of the decolonised world and used this to position itself as a third force in the era of bipolarity. However, India realized that success or failure of its position in a new international order will depend upon the support or opposition to its efforts by China. India observed China unfolding very cautiously. In the early 1950s, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) was aggressively moving in the Tibetan region and trying to expand infrastructure there to incorporate it in the PRC. The British had always maintained Tibet as a buffer, and its annexation heightening Indian concerns. This acted as an important factor in our Chinese policy formulation. Nehru wanted to win the support of China to ensure that this gave us the leverage for implementing our world view as envisaged. Nehru believed that an East led by India and China could guide the world morally at a time when the Western thought process was being guided by polarized ideological underpinnings. This view also brought Nehru close to the idea of establishing proximity to China.

Patel Factor in China Policy

Nehru's idea was based on cooperation than containment. Vallabhbhai Patel, in contrast, had been a keen advocate of a more cautious approach. He sensed that China's moves need to be carefully dealt with. Patel advocated for a military build-up for India and creation of roads near the China border, along with other vital infrastructure. He even favoured US cooperation to balance China if needed. But his death in 1950 gave Nehru the steering wheel of India's China policy and Nehru could not be challenged by anyone thereafter.

During the initial period, India advised China not to undertake aggressive occupation of Tibet and insisted that it would continue to follow the British policy to engage diplomatically with Tibet, continuing with small missions in Lhasa and Shigatse. Nehru was not in favour of any US cooperation to contain China as he found it to be a Cold War tactic. In 1954, India and China came out with an agreement on Tibet. In the agreement, India agreed to recognise Tibet as a part of China and decided not to continue any special rights as inherited from the British in Tibet. The agreement contained the famous Panchsheel.



However, the bonhomie over the Panchsheel began to fade away when the border issue began to erupt and subsequently, by 1959, the relations began to collapse. The Nehruvian dream of cooperation with PRC to write new rules for the Asian continent was now crumbling. All the support India extended for rapprochement with China came crashing down. The warmth post-1954 agreement that manifested as Hindi–Chini in early 1950s was based on two pillars. Firstly, it was believed that supporting China would restrain from militarising Tibet; and that, secondly China would cooperate with India to ensure that they rewrite the rules of a newly decolonised Asia.

Why did the partnership dwindle away? To understand this, we need to look at some international events. In 1953, Stalin died and was succeeded by Nikita Khrushchev, who attempted to steer the Communist Party of Soviet Union (CPSU) to undertake peace with West. This created a strain between Khrushchev and Mao in China. Mao started insinuating that Khrushchev was misleading the revolutionary movements and it was the responsibility of CCP and CPSU to provide true leadership to the Soviet Union. This view of Mao also manifested in Afro–Asian rivalry with India. India had considerable influence in Africa, with Nehru constantly pitching for aggressive non-violent and non-revolutionary policies. According to Mao, this created a misleading effect on African leaders, who were being influenced to fight for freedom in a non-violent way and he advocated that revolution was the only way ahead. The 1962 Indo–China conflict gave Mao the needed push to sustain his African campaign of revolution and he succeeded in tilting many African nations towards the revolutionary ideal. This resulted in tensions in India, as India began to perceive that China had already embarked upon a divergent and different path of violence and revolution which precluded any possibility of cooperation and ideological convergence.

KPS Menon on China and Tibet

KPS Menon was India's first Ambassador to China. In his autobiography, he states that Nehru wanted to support the independence of Tibet. Menon explained that the Nehruvian policy to support the independence of Tibet was a British policy he continued. However, it needs to be said that the British never exactly supported the independence of Tibet from China. The British favoured Tibetan autonomy and British influence in Tibet. Thus, in this autobiography, Menon used the independence of Tibet as a term which here signified the same as autonomy and not actual independence.

During the period of the 1950s, when China began to consolidate its position in Tibet, the US, through its CIA, covertly supported Tibetans. This largely synchronised with the US policy to contain a communist China and the disgruntled Tibetans gave the US enough reasons to send in the CIA to undertake covert activities. The CIA's support of arms and equipment convinced Mao that India-US-USSR trio was collectively conspiring against China. The policy stance of India preferring that China not build up military infrastructure in Tibet aggravated Mao's fears. In March, 1959, there was a massive Tibetan uprising as a result of which, Nehru extended support to the Dalai Lama and also adopted a sympathetic attitude towards Tibet's cause. The Dalai Lama and his followers were given refuge in Dharamshala. This convinced Mao that India was responsible for the 1959 uprising. In 1950, the PRC and the USSR had signed an alliance treaty where it was agreed that both would always support each other. However, in 1959, the USSR declared neutrality. This affirmed Mao's belief of a possible India-US-USSR axis to contain China in Tibet.

Tibet, India, China and Border Issues

Tibet was independent even in the era of the Qing dynasty in China. It remained independent after the White Lotus Rebellion from 1796 to 1806. When Qing dynasty collapsed in 1911–12, Tibet proclaimed its independence. The China–India border is actually a Tibet–India border. In 1913–14, the British and Tibet signed the Simla Agreement, where Henry McMahon proposed the drawing of borders according to a proposed plan. After the treaty was signed, the McMahon Line was drawn to demarcate borders. However, all Chinese governments subsequently till date have refused to accept the Simla Agreement, and in extension, the validity of the McMahon Line, insisting that Tibet had always been a part of China, with no authority to sign treaties independently with foreign powers. The McMahon Line demarcated the Eastern Indo–Tibet border but there was no such frontier in the West in 1947. India continued to claim Aksai Chin as apart of India in the western sector despite having no administrative or military presence in Aksai Chin. China used the Aksai Chin territory, which was a part of Dogra kingdom in Kashmir, in 1950 to invade Tibet. Further, in 1953 India consolidated its position in the Eastern Sector by controlling Tawang which was a territory south of the McMahon Line. After the

Panchsheel agreement in 1954, the MEA was informed of the need to have a new map with Aksai Chin in western sector declared as a part of India and in the eastern sector along McMahon Line. However, the new maps were not to have references to any line and ensure that India left no undemarcated territory. China did not object to Indian cartographic stance and Nehru took it for granted that no opposition from China essentially signalled their acquiescence to the border arrangement.

In 1957, China established a road in Aksai Chin. This road was vital to take infrastructural equipment and logistics from PLA to Tibet. As this road was established, it created a storm. In 1960, Zhou told Nehru that China would give up its claims on Arunachal if India gives up claim on the Western sector. Nehru rejected the proposal, aggravating Zhou's fear that India wants to undermine China's control of Tibet.

Zhou subsequently also refused to recognise the McMahon Line as the boundary between China and India despite his initial willingness to do so if India was willing to give up claim of Aksai Chin. Subsequently, from November 1961, Nehru began to encourage Indian troops to go upto high altitude regions to assert their claim. Unfortunately, the military build up lacked high altitude training, and was short of adequate logistics to sustain presence in the terrain. Nehru rejected a compromise settlement and began a hard-line forward policy based on weak military support. The Chinese finally retaliated aggressively in October 1962 in the eastern sector. This led to a Chinese move deep inside the Indian side almost up to Brahmaputra plain. After one month of aggression, the Chinese declared a ceasefire and maintained status quo. The ambassador level relations broke in 1962 and was finally only revived in 1976.

After the defeat of India came a sea change in our domestic politics. In India, the public opinion saw the 1962 war as a betrayal by China over all support and friendship extending by India. The Indian leadership, in the post war period, assumed a realistic stance over an idealistic one to deal with China. India began to build up its military aggressively.

Up until Indira Gandhi, India's China policy was based on the premise that the resolution of the border issue was the only thing that could take the Indo-China relation forward. Post-1962 saw growth in the proximity between India and the USSR, and on the other hand, in the proximity between China and Pakistan. During 1960s, the Russia-China hostility, which owed its roots to the Khrushchev-Mao conflict, further increased and the resultant tilt of the USSR to India culminated in the 1971 USSR-India Treaty. In 1971, as India and USSR came closer, the US decided to cooperate with China to contain the USSR and punish India. In 1971, the Indo-Pakistan war saw a mega shift. The US began to undertake rapprochement with China while the India-USSR nexus strengthened and automatically brought Pakistan and China closer to keep an eye on India.

Things did improve in 1976 when ambassador level relations were restarted and the Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua visited India and agreed to restart talks on the border issues. In 1986-87, Rajiv Gandhi introduced a new change in the Sino-India policy. He firstly dropped the precondition that the border issue was a pre-requisite for bilateral talks. He favoured improvement in other dimensions of relations on an assumption that cooperation in other areas would create a positive and conducive environment for border talks. In 1988, he visited China and decided to launch a Joint

Working Group (JWG) on the border issue. The Deng Xiaoping era too had dropped the revolutionary spirit of Mao and favoured a market oriented economy. This too played an important role in the new Sino–Indian rapprochement. Many events at the end of the Cold War fostered Indo–China cooperation. In 1989, when USSR began to disintegrate, there were protests in China that challenged the CCP rule in China. The CCP resorted to military strength crush them, resulting in the suppression and massacre of the mobs at the Tiananmen Square. This dented the Sino–America relations. Moreover, the fall of communism, Berlin Wall and the independence of the satellite states of the Soviet Union made the survival of CCP uncertain. The CCP, out of its need for survival, initiated a good neighbourhood policy to build up relations with India. The Russian Federation succeeded the USSR and refused to play a dominant role in South Asian affairs. As the Cold War ended, India lost the power backup of the USSR and as the Gulf War–1 progressed, it created financial crisis in India as it choked its remittances from the region. India and China began to develop proximity mutual understanding for their own survival. China wanted India not to internationalise the Beijing massacre while India conveyed to China that it would support the Chinese ideology of opposing any western interference in internal affairs.

Border Issues at End of the Cold War

India did not participate with the West to isolate China after the Tiananmen Square massacre, where troops with assault rifles and tanks killed at least several hundred demonstrators trying to block the military's advance towards Tiananmen Square. The number of civilian deaths has been estimated at anywhere from hundreds to thousands. India used the opportunity to patch up with China. As the JWG established by Rajiv Gandhi on border issue moved ahead, in 1993 and 1996, India concluded separate confidence building measures (CBM) to reduce confrontation and tensions. In 2005, arrangements on political parameters and guiding principles for the settlement of the Indo–China boundary question were signed. In 2013, another positive step that was taken up was the border defence cooperation agreement (BDCA). However, in the recent times, China has resorted to increased investment in border infrastructure and has collaborated with Pakistan over the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor. The simultaneous Border infrastructure built up by both in recent times has become a source of tension due to rising transgression and incursions.

Coming of Vajpayee marked another shift in India's China policy. The Vajpayee government was based on promise of realism. The Indian administration wrote to the US to clarify India's need to undertake the nuclear test, clearly pointing out to the threat to India's sovereignty being the reasons. The Indian communication was leaked in the US and as the contents pointed to the threat from China's proximity being an important reason for Pokhran-II, it led to a fall in Sino–India relations. In 1998, after Pokhran-II, the US and China came out with a Joint Statement that declared that India should abandon nuclear weapon acquisition and sign NPT and became a non-nuclear weapon state. The subsequent Talbot and Jaswant Singh talks brought to force the threat India genuinely faced from China and convinced the US of the threat India genuinely witnessed from

China. The US agreed not to align with China against India and help India become a global player. The India diaspora in the US and the Indian economy's wealth generating potential also acted as factors in the Indo-US rapprochement. The subsequent strategic posturing of the US and nuclear deal with India alarmed China. As Chinese realised the potential of the growing US-India proximity, it dropped the 'punish India' rhetoric over India's 'Chinese threat' theory and began to create its own space in Indo-China relations. In 2005, China and India signed a Strategic Partnership agreement. China accommodated Sikkim as a part of India but welcomed India at regional level by including it in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), whose member India became in August, 2016. The basic reason for this new found conciliatory approach of China was to ensure India does not become a hedge against the alliance between China and the US.

NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY BETWEEN INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS

After the Sino-India war, at the global level, to defuse the Cuban missile crisis, came the partial test ban treaty (PTBT) in 1963. India signed the PTBT thinking it would help the diplomatic posturing of India in the context of a long-term disarmament policy but China refused its ratification. In 1964, China tested nuclear weapons and opened the nuclear dimension in security confrontation. India subsequently tested its nuclear weapon in 1974 but still shied away from developing further nuclear weapons. In 1998, India finally conducted nuclear tests and became a nuclear weapon state. The rationale forwarded by Vajpayee was Chinese threat and its clandestine support to nuclearise Pakistan. India effectively stated that the Chinese threat was the reason for India to go nuclear even when China, in contrast, had not resorted to citing the India threat as a reason for its own nuclear weapons programme.

To understand the issue better, we need to revisit the Cold War. During the Cold War, what compelled China to go nuclear was the US and the Soviet Union having weapons. At any point of time even during that period, China never hinted it would use nuclear weapons against India. India, in contrast, believed that China could use the threat of nuclear weapons to coerce India and it is the nuclear weapon that had given China an international status that it may use to undermine India's attempt to increase its prestige amongst Asia and elsewhere. China further clarified that its nuclear weapon status is based on minimum creditable deterrence and also announced its 'No First Use' policy, thus nullifying the threat that India had envisaged. The nuclear threat to India, however, got aggravated when in 1971, the USS Enterprise reached the Bay of Bengal. Thus, keeping these threats in mind, India resorted to increasing its own power which led to Pokhran-I in 1974. But even after 1974, India discontinued the urge to go fully nuclear as it felt that the demonstration of capabilities was more important than using them.

China went nuclear in 1964 but joined the IAEA in 1985. In this two-decade period, the media did prop up the issue of China proliferating to Pakistan. After China joined the IAEA in 1985 and the CTBT in 1996, it became an advocate and supporter of non-proliferation. However, the world is suspicious about China's claims due to its activities from 1964 to 1985 with respect to Pakistan, Iran and North Korea. Though China has accepted military ties with Pakistan, it has maintained that it has not given any ballistic missile capabilities carrying nuclear weapon to Pakistan. Despite Chinese refusal to accept that Pakistan had received nuclear weapon assistance from China, the international society

continues to hold China responsible for proliferation to Pakistan. India has perceived all Chinese support to Pakistan at the military level, especially at the nuclear weapon level, as part of a strategy particularly designed to contain India. All these factors compelled the Indian strategic community to move in favour of Pokhran-II.

It is noteworthy, however, that China was merely one of the many important factors, not least of which was India's ambition to position itself as a great power and its domestic political compulsions. However, China took the Pokhran-II as part of an anti-China rhetoric. In fact, Vajpayee's letter to Clinton accentuated the Chinese threat theory as Vajpayee had clearly mentioned that what compelled India to conduct a nuclear test was the fact that it shared its borders with a nuclear weapon state that had indulged in aggression against India in 1962. Though China was not directly mentioned, it was a fairly unambiguous insinuation.

Many in China had believed that India had a right to conduct a nuclear weapon test and there could have otherwise been no reason for China to oppose it until India's 'China threat' theory came to light. Consequently, officially China strongly condemned India's Pokhran-II and declared that India had resorted to immaturely blaming China for its urge to go nuclear. China said that it was never a threat to India as it had stated that it would never use nuclear weapon against non-nuclear weapon states. China also stated that India wanted to establish dominance over South Asia and its nuclear weapon test was a gesture to that effect. Thus, the Chinese threat theory became a major irritant in the relations as China clarified that a pre-requisite for a healthy relationship was an absence of fear from each other.

However, after Pokhran-II, India did take steps to revive talks with China. India committed that dialogue was the only way out and even invited China to revive dialogues. In 1999, an Indian mission reached China and subsequently Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan agreed to take note of things. In June, 1999, Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh went to China to resume talks. That was the time India succeeded in patching up with the US, France, Russia, with China realising it was being isolated and hence, gradually softening its position. In September, 2000, India sent two naval ships on a goodwill visit to China. Thus, both realised the need to increase goodwill visits to foster mutual understanding. An Indo-China Eminent Persons Group was established. Considering the fact that India too has announced a 'no first use' policy, there is a high possibility that there will never be a nuclear conflict between India and China. However, China continues to be reluctant to accept India as a nuclear weapons state as it does not want India to emerge as a great power in its own neighbourhood. China observes that granting the status of a nuclear weapon state to India would jeopardise the international community's efforts for non-proliferation as it would be tantamount to admitting India's entry in the global nuclear order despite it being a non-signatory to the NPT and the CTBT. Even today, China is confident of its nuclear superiority over India and is concerned with a rise of Indo-US cooperation because of the possibility of the US using India as a hedge against China.

BASICS OF TIBET ISSUE IN INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS

Despite the fact that India recognised Tibet as a part of China, it continues even today as an issue that has precipitated a culture of distrust. China insists that Tibet is an internal

matter and India should clarify its own intentions with regard to the Tibetan policy since it continues to support and shelter the Dalai Lama. China feels that this move breached the Panchsheel agreement. India continues to officially support that Tibet is a part of China as recognised in 1954 but, ironically, still supports the Tibetan government in exile in India as Tibet can give India the required leverage against China.

In 1951, Tibet and China signed a 17 Point Agreement and China agreed to grant autonomy to Tibet. But after the 1959 uprising, the degree of autonomy dwindled, with India subsequently allowing the Dalai Lama to establish a Tibetan government in exile in 1960 became an irritant. The primary aim of China policy is to reduce the influence of the Dalai Lama in Tibet. The Dalai Lama is the religious head of Tibetan people and China did initially have a dialogue with Dalai Lama. Since 1993, however, China suspended dialogue on the pretext that the Dalai Lama had been adamant on splitting Tibet from China. China continues to insist that Tibet has been a part of China since the Yuan Dynasty (1271–1368) and has branded the military operation to invade Tibet in 1950 as an exercise of peaceful liberation. Tibetans, on the other hand, hold that before the 1950 Chinese operation, Tibet was independent, and that, in Yuan Dynasty period, China and Tibet had established a priest–patron relation which in no way implies that Tibet became a vassal of China. The Dalai Lama has adopted the process of challenging China on three grounds.



BORDER ISSUE IN INDIA–CHINA RELATIONS

Till the end of the 19th century, the Tibetans preferred to stay in isolation. The Tibetans, in their beliefs and customs, are different from the Han Chinese, with the Dalai Lama acting as the spiritual head of the Tibetans. The Dalai Lama, both the spiritual and political head of the Tibetans, never owed any allegiance to the Chinese emperor like the rulers of Korea and Vietnam did. In 1717, there was an invasion launched by Dzungar tribesmen on Tibet and the Chinese armies entered Tibet to drive out the invaders. The Chinese emperor stationed a military governor in Lhasa after the defeat of the invaders. The Chinese emperor also began to post commissioners, known as 'Ambans', in Tibet during the 18th century. The Tibetans were instructed to respect the position of the Ambans. Though the Chinese did not attempt any annexation of Tibet, neither did they assure Tibet of its complete independence. Till the end of the 19th century, neither did the Tibetans attempt any engagement with the outside world nor was it encouraged by the Chinese.

The study of Tibetan history can be said to have originated in the year 1895. It was in 1895 that the 13th Dalai Lama Thubten Gyatso attained maturity and took up the title of the head of Tibet. For mysterious reasons, the earlier Dalai Lamas, for nearly a century prior to 1895, failed to attain maturity and used to pass away. Due to this, the Tibetan rule was under the control of Regents. The Tibetans were immensely dissatisfied with the rule of Regents because of widespread corruption during their rule. In 1890, the British and the

Chinese concluded a treaty for trade via the Sikkim–Tibet border. The treaty signed did not include the Tibetans. This increased the anger of the Tibetans, who destroyed border markers planted by the British in protest. The Tibetans asserted that Chinese and British could not conclude a trade treaty that involved the borders of Tibet without negotiating with the Tibetans. In 1893, a convention was signed by the British and the Chinese to enable duty free movement of goods to Tibet via Yating in Chumbi Valley. This increased the Tibetans' ire even further. At this juncture, Thubten Gyantso realised that Tibet would need support of a third power to enjoy true autonomy, which would be restricted till Tibet remains sandwiched between China and Britain.

Thubten looked to Russia to support. Thubten had his own teacher, Agvan Dorzhiev, a Khori-Buryat Mongol from Siberia, to play the role of his mediator with Russia. The period from 1898 to 1901 saw regular visits by the team of Thubten to the court of Tsar Nicholas II in Russia. These regular interactions between the Tibetans and Russians generated tremendous suspicion in the minds of the British and the Chinese. In 1899, in Indian Viceroy, Lord Elgin was replaced with Lord Curzon as the next Viceroy. Curzon was a person who harboured an enormous hatred for the Russians and was extremely alarmed when apprised about the visits between Tibetans and Russians. Initially Curzon sent letters to Dalai Lama to establish contact with the Tibetans but his letters were sent back to India without having been opened. Curzon decided to send a mission led by Francis Young husband to Lhasa. The mission was sent to inform Lhasa to implement the 1893 trade convention properly. The idea was that the mission will proceed upto Khamba Jong and meet the Tibetans but the mission did not reach Khamba Jong. The British, instead, forcibly moved to Gyantse and from there to Lhasa by 1904.

By the time the British reached Lhasa, Thubten and Dorzhiev fled the city. Young husband's mission concluded with a new treaty with the Tibetan Regent which got the British access to all the trading marts. As per the treaty, a British Regent would be stationed in South Tibet to continue the enforcement of the earlier treaty of 1890. The most important point of the treaty signed by Young husband was that the Tibetans were no longer authorised to conclude third party treaties, including with China, without approval from the British. The British signed the treaty with the Tibetan Regent but neither designated Tibet as a new British protectorate nor established its presence in Tibet. The British promoted a unique concept where they asserted their influence on Tibet while allowing China to maintain a low level of administrative presence. The British ensured that Tibet enjoyed some amount of autonomy as well. China took the opportunity of the 1904 Lhasa convention and decided to conclude an Anglo–Chinese convention in 1906. In the 1906 convention, China asserted that it would not allow Tibet to enter into treaties with any third state and that the British would have to accept the conditions as well as agree that they would not annex or interfere in Tibet. The British agreed and concluded the convention. In 1907 there was an Anglo–Russian convention signed where Britain and Russia agreed not to negotiate with Tibet alone without the presence of Chinese intermediaries.

Since the Dalai Lama and Dorzhiev had already fled Tibet, the entire Tibetan population came under the control of the Chinese Ambans. This also led to an increase in Chinese presence in Tibet. The perception of the Chinese of the 1906 and 1907 conventions was that both Britain and Russia agreed to allowing Chinese supremacy in

Tibetan region. The Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa in 1909, but by then, the Chinese had aggressively taken over the control of Tibet, forcing the Dalai Lama to again leave Lhasa for India.

The period from 1824 to 1826 saw the Anglo-Burmese wars, which concluded in Assam becoming part of the British Indian Empire. The British extended their presence in Assam by undertaking tea plantations on the hill slopes of Assam. As the number of tea plantations in the area increased, the British had a direct conflict with tribes of Assam. In order to end the conflict between the British and the tribals, the British concluded not only various agreements with the tribal groups but also created an inner line system and outer line system. Through these inner and outer line systems, the British ensured that their trade convoys to Tibet were protected. However, the British soon became quite alarmed by the rise of Chinese presence in Tibet and also feared a possible Russian annexation. The Chinese were even planning to establish a road link from Tibet to Assam and were also present in the Lohit Valley region. The British not only feared Chinese advances, but were also uncomfortable with the idea of extending their presence in the frontier areas till Tibet as that might have brought them into conflict with the tribals.

The British tried to resolve their dilemma after the events of March 1911. As per the previous inner line and outer line agreements, the British were to have their presence restricted to the inner line areas only. The British were not allowed to undertake expeditions in the outer line areas which were reserved for the tribes. In 1911, a British officer Noel Williamson crossed the banks of Dihing and entered into the outer line areas occupied by Abor tribe. This led to massive retribution from the Abors, leading them to massacre Williamson's entire team. The British decided in favour of a prompt retaliation but decided to take this as an opportunity to carry our survey into the area as well. The British plan was to survey and carry out explorations to forestall Chinese designs and conclude the finalisation of the Sino-Indian boundary. Another event that strengthened the British policy was the fall of the Qing dynasty rule in Peking. The fall of the Qing Dynasty led to the rise of a Republican government. As the Qing dynasty collapsed, there was also a mutiny in Tibet, leading to the collapse of Ambans in Tibet and the Dalai Lama's return to Lhasa in 1912.

Taking the advantage of a weak central government in Peking, the British now acted on the goal of keeping the Chinese and Russians out of Tibet while ensuring that Tibet remains autonomous as a state and acts as a buffer between India and China. The British began to play their cards through the British minister in Peking, Sir John Newell Jordan. Sir John Jordan shot off a memorandum to Peking in 1912 that asserted that Chinese officials were interfering in the administration of Tibet in a violation of the Sino-British convention signed in 1906. Jordan further asserted that British did recognise the suzerainty of China in the Tibetan region but China had no right to interfere in the internal affairs of the Tibetan administration. Through the memorandum, the British told the Chinese to remove their troops from Tibet and conclude a fresh agreement on Tibet. In 1913, China accepted the offer for fresh negotiations. On 23rd May, 1913, the British invited China to conclude a tripartite agreement to settle the Tibetan question. By extending the invitation, the British shrewdly granted Tibet equal status to British and China. The Chinese did protest on this but without success.

The British appointed the Foreign Secretary Sir Arthur Henry McMahon as the chairman of the conference of the three parties. The conference began in Simla on 13th October, 1913, with Ivan Chen as the Chinese representative and Lonchen Shatra as the Tibetan representative. At the outset of the conference, McMahon unveiled his plan. As per the plan, the British favoured the division of Tibet into Outer Tibet and Inner Tibet. The region of Outer Tibet as envisaged was the region bordering India and the British proposed that the Chinese will have no influence in the region as Outer Tibet will act as a buffer state dependent upon the British for reasons of autonomy. As the negotiations began, the Chinese objected to such a division of Tibet. On the other hand, the British had gained the confidence of Lonchen Shatra and were adamant to go ahead with their proposal by concluding a bilateral agreement with the Tibetans. On 3rd July, 1914, McMahon and Lonchen Shatra concluded a bilateral agreement while Ivan Chen insisted that the Chinese would not accept any bilaterally concluded agreement between Tibet and Britain.



By drawing a red line as per the Simla agreement, the British added another 50, 000 sq. km. territory to the British Empire. The Sela pass and Tawang region (in present day Arunachal), along with the trade routes Lhasa via Assam, were added to the British territory. A major part of the territory added by the British to the British Empire in India was controlled by Tibet. Tibetans agreed to demarcate the new boundary via a red line provided the British would maintain the private estates of the Tibetans in the new boundary. The Tibetans insisted that they would have problem in accepting the new border if Tso Karpo and Tsari Sarpa (the two sacred places for Tibetans) did not fall under the Tibetan territory. McMahon agreed to the two conditions and sent the copies of the new maps with red lines from Isu Razi Pass to Bhutan to Lonchen Shatra. The British, through the agreement, achieved their strategic objectives regarding the Tibetan frontier. The subsequent period saw Tibet enjoying autonomy without any interference from Russia, Britain or China.

After the first Anglo-Sikh war in 1845–46, the British won the possession of Kashmir. The British did not directly administer Kashmir but handed over its administration to Gulab Singh. Gulab Singh was a Dogra chieftain and he established the Dogra rule in Kashmir that continued till 1947. The British, while handing over Kashmir to Gulab Singh, made certain provisions under the Treaty of Amritsar. The British noted that the eastern boundary of hills and region east of Indus were being transferred to Gulab Singh but the purpose of the transfer would be defined separately, after a separate survey by the British commissioners. By this provision in the Treaty of Amritsar, the British

accepted the fact that the eastern boundary of the kingdom of Kashmir was not defined. The British, not to upset the Chinese, maintained the ambiguous boundary in the east and did the same in north and west of Kashmir. The reason for the British attempts to establish any boundary in the eastern side of the territory held by Gulab Singh proved futile was because the British, earlier through two boundary commissions, had failed to establish a boundary. The Chinese asserted that the frontiers had existed since ancient times and needed no demarcation. The British considered an ancient boundary passing through the Karakorum ranges.

For the British, the Karakoram acted as a natural border. In 1865, Johnson carried out a survey of the region and prepared a map. In the map, Johnson showed the areas from Shahidulla, Aksai Chin to Kunlun ranges as a part of the Kashmir region. This map depicting the above regions was published in 1868. Only after the publication of the map by Johnson did the world get to know about the Aksai Chin region. In fact, it is important at this juncture to understand the reasons that could have motivated Johnson to incorporate the frontier upto Kunlun as part of Kashmir. In 1864, Yakub Beg of Kashgar had rebelled the Chinese and established the Kashgaria Kingdom. During his rebellion, the forces of Gulab Singh had assisted Yakub Beg and even built a fort in the Kashgar region. While undertaking the survey Johnson gained an impression that the frontier of Kashmir till the Kunlun ranges belonged to Gulab Singh, compelling him to redraw the map. After the publication of the maps of Johnson, the surveyor general of India, Colonel Walker, disowned them by asserting that Gulab Singh had no rights over the areas depicted in a map by Johnson.

In 1877, the Chinese army defeated Yakub Beg and captured the region of Kashgaria and renamed it Sinkiang. The British now feared that the Russians could move down further and control the entire Central Asia. The British feared that such a move would bring the Russians very close to the British frontier. To keep the Russians out of North Kashmir, the British established a military post in the Gilgit region. In 1892, British took over the control of Hunza and Nagar region in North Kashmir and the states remained under the British till 1947. However, the attitude of the chief of Hunza was of a veiled nature as the chief yielded Hunza's allegiance to Kashmir a well as to China. In 1899, the British minister in Peking, Sir Claude MacDonald urged the British minister in Kashgar, Charles Macartney, to propose a solution to the ambiguous boundary of Kashmir with China. The Macartney–MacDonald Line was proposed as a line for demarcating the boundary in which a recommendation was made to surrender the British rights over Hunza and offer China possessions of Tangambush, Raskam, Shaidulla and Aksai Chin. This proposal was sent to China and instead of responding, Peking decided to remain silent on the Macartney–McDonald line. The line had the potential to settle the dispute once and for all but China did not respond to the same.

In 1911, the Chinese revolution occurred and the Chinese central government collapsed. The British feared that Russia might revive its territorial aggression again. Thus, Lord Hardinge proposed that Kunlun range be made a watershed to the frontier of Tibet to prevent any Russian designs. But in 1917, the regime of the Tsar in Russia also collapsed. The absence of a strong regime in Russia and China gave the British the needed relief. Our discussion helps us to understand that the British used their policy to fix and re-fix the frontiers to suit their best strategic interests. The British resorted to cartographic

aggression as per their own changing needs.

While India became independent in 1947, China, during this time, was facing a violent civil war. Tibet saw the Chinese civil war as an opportunity to assert its autonomy. The Indian government, through a correspondence, informed the authorities in Tibet that all treaties signed by the British are now to be managed by its successor, the Government of India. Tibet, instead of merely acknowledging the correspondence, wrote back to Nehru that Tibet would like India to return the Tibetan territories in Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and Ladakh. India replied to Tibet about the fact that no change on the ground was possible till a new treaty was concluded. Zhou Enlai used this correspondence between Tibet and India to prove that the Tibetans had conveyed their displeasure with the McMahon Line.

The Chinese civil war finally came to an end in 1949, when the communists defeated the armies of Chiang Kai-shek and the People's Republic of China (PRC) was established by Mao Tse Tung. The Mao government in 1950 announced that People's Liberation Army (PLA) of China should work to ensure the 'liberation of Tibet'. In 1950, the PLA entered Tibet through Szechuan, Chamdo and Sinkinagh or Aksai Chin. It is at this juncture that India sent a diplomatic note to China asserting that it should respect Tibetan autonomy under the framework centred around Chinese suzerainty. China wrote back a strongly worded response to India asserting that the Tibetan issue, being a domestic issue of China, would be resolved by China as per the Chinese laws based on Chinese sovereignty.

The Chinese brought about an end to the Tibetan issue in 1951, when a seventeen point Sino-Tibet Agreement was concluded which asserted that Tibetans are one of the nationalities living in China since historical times. India too, after the Sino-Tibet agreement, relinquished the dream of working for Tibetan autonomy. But Nehru continued to take steps to improve India's ties with China. India even supported China for a seat to the UN Security Council. In 1952, China informed India that it was willing to discuss all inherited rights and issues, including the Tibetan case, though negotiations. This was a great opportunity for India to negotiate with China so that the McMahon Line be accepted as the border. However, Nehru thought that if India were to bring up the issue of McMahon line, there is a high possibility of China rejecting the line as, since 1914, none of the Chinese governments has ratified the Simla agreement. Nehru apprehended that if Chinese rejected the McMahon line, they would insist on fresh negotiations, which may not be favourable to India. Thus, Nehru decided that India would not raise the border issue at the talks. In 1954, India and China concluded the Panchsheel agreement and there was a note exchanged by the two along with the agreement where India agreed to withdraw its military presence from Yating and Gyantse and ended all the privileges it had inherited from the British under the erstwhile Simla agreement of 1914.

In the Panchsheel Agreement, India accepted Tibet as a region of China. To understand why India did not raise up the border issue with China in these talks, we need to take a look at some facts here. In 1954, when China invited India to discuss issues, it said that the convention would be "to discuss specific problems relating to inherited rights." India, since 1951, had been administering the territories up to the McMahon line. China had raised no objection to the same. Thus, the McMahon line certainly did not fit

the criteria of ‘specific problems’. More so, as it was China that had invited India for the talks, if it had objections to the McMahon line, it could have raised the issue too. As China did not raise the issue at the talks, it proves the fact that the Chinese accepted the defacto border. In fact, by the clause, ‘mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty,’ China signalled an acceptance of Indian presence till the McMahon line. On the other hand, China was shrewd in not raising the border issue deliberately as it was constructing a road through the Aksai Chin and if the border issue is opened up, India would get wind of the road that China needed at any cost to reach Tibet.

Nehru was satisfied with the agreements and the Panchsheel led to his emergence as a great statesman. His dream of a proximate relationship with China was now materialising. Little did Nehru know that his actions would lead to a crisis in future. In 1950, the Survey of India published a map of India. In this map of India, the boundary with China in the Eastern sector was aligned as per the McMahon line but this boundary was marked as ‘undemarcated’. Similarly, the Indo-China boundary in the Western and Middle Sectors was called ‘undefined’ and a colour wash was used. After the visit of Zhou Enlai in June 1954 to India, Nehru, in July 1954, communicated through a memorandum that the old maps were to be withdrawn. He asserted that India should now publish new maps with no reference to be made to any ‘line’ in the north and north-east frontiers and the frontiers with China should be firmly set. He further observed that India should also establish check posts along the entire frontier, even in disputed areas, as the check posts act as symbols of the Indian frontier along the border. Thus, through the memorandum, Nehru asserted the Indian stand clearly—India’s borders were non-negotiable as they were fixed.

In 1954, when the Survey of India came out with the new maps, the words ‘undemarcated’ and ‘undefined’ used in the maps of 1950 had been dropped. The boundary in the East was firmly established as per the McMahon Line while the Western and Central boundaries saw a firm line and the removal of the colour wash. The map also showed the boundary of Kashmir based on the Johnson Line of 1865 and showed Aksai Chin region within Indian territory. Even though the Johnson Line in 1865 had shown Aksai Chin as part of Kashmir, the British had never claimed the territory. The Macartney-MacDonald Line of 1899 also had the Aksai Chin region within the Chinese territory. The pre-partition map of India too defined the region with an undefined boundary. The British, till 1947, maintained that the Sino-Indian border in the Eastern sector is based on the McMahon line, but left the Western and the Middle sector boundary undefined. This was a unilateral attempt by India to claim Aksai Chin on the basis of the Johnson Line.

Unfortunately showing the Aksai Chin region unilaterally sowed the seeds of a future conflict. India published new maps in 1954 on strategic reasons to remove all ambiguity and maintain India’s territorial integrity. After India published these maps, China did not respond, but eventually did publish their own maps showing Aksai Chi and North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) in the Chinese territory. In October 1954, when Nehru visited China, he took up the issue of Chinese maps showing Aksai Chin and NEFA as part of China with Zhou Enlai. The Chinese responded that the Chinese maps were old maps and belong to the Kuomintang Regime and the PRC had not revised those old maps yet. As India had established new check posts as symbols of Indian frontier, China issued a formal complaint to India. China complained that Indians have carried out transgressions deep inside the Chinese territory by establishing checkpoints inside China. India replied

asserting that the Indian check posts were well within the Indian Territory and not inside China. India and China accused each side of violating the Panchsheel agreement. In the middle sector, India insisted that the boundary line was centred through the Himalayan passes while China asserted that the passes were located in their territory.

The border issue finally opened up after reports of China constructing a road from Sinkiang to Tibet via Aksai Chin surfaced. In fact, in 1952 itself, an Indian trade agent, Lakshman Singh Jangpangi, stationed in Western Tibet, had informed New Delhi about the road construction. It was only in 1957 when China announced the completion of the road that it sent alarm bells ringing in Delhi. In 1958, an Indian army patrol was sent to determine the exact coordinates of the road. The army patrol was captured by the Chinese and released later after enquiry by the MEA. In 1956, the Dalai Lama had visited India and desired to put up a stay in India. Nehru insisted the Dalai Lama to put up his stay in Tibet itself. In 1958, Nehru accepted the invitation of the Dalai Lama for a visit to Tibet but on Chinese insistence, the visit was postponed and Nehru went to Bhutan instead. Nehru went to Bhutan via Tibet but was not allowed to visit Lhasa due to an uprising by Khampha tribesmen. The gradual discontentment of the Tibetans against the Communist Party of China's rule in Tibet was rising. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the USA had been assisting the Tibetan insurgents. China began to believe that the CIA had taken India into confidence to create trouble in Tibet and India was supporting Tibetan insurgents in their quest for autonomy. All this deepened the mistrust between India and China and sowed the seeds of discontent in the bilateral ties.

In 1958, China protested with the Indian mission that Kalimpong was being used by India and CIA for subversive activities in Tibet. India replied to China asserting that Chinese observations were based on a complete misunderstanding as India had not allowed the CIA to infiltrate and destabilise Tibet as alleged by China. In 1958, the Chinese magazine named *China Pictorial* printed a Chinese map on pages 20 and 21 showing NEFA, areas of the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh, large portions of Ladakh and the Tashigang area of East Bhutan as Chinese territory. Immediately, Indian MEA sent a note to China informing them of Zhou Enlai's earlier assurance that these were old maps from the KMT regime. India insisted that China make the necessary corrections in the maps and clearly demarcate frontiers. Two months later in 1958, the Chinese responded asserting that the maps shown mention old border and a survey was needed and only after a survey of the Chinese boundary could changes be made on the map. Till then, the old maps would continue to demarcate the borders. This reply was a big blow to Nehru who had asserted that Indian frontiers were fixed and were not open for negotiations.

Nehru decided to take up the matter directly with Zhou Enlai. In December 1958, he wrote letter to Zhou and reiterated the concerns mentioned above. He took up the issue of the Chinese magazine showing a Chinese map with NEFA as part of China. At this juncture, Nehru's priority was to get the Chinese accept the McMahon line as the boundary. In response to the letter of Nehru, in January 1959, Zhou Enlai replied asserting their views on the border issue, and observing that the Sino-Indian border had never been demarcated formally and expressing tremendous dissatisfaction in the way India had unilaterally demarcated borders, showing Aksai Chin as part of India despite China asserting that they needed time to revisit old maps. China also asserted that the McMahon line was a British creation and the Chinese did not accept the line as legal, which

forwarded doubts on the demarcations. China, therefore, indirectly conveyed that they were willing to take positive view on McMahon line on the condition that India was willing to show an accommodating attitude in the western sector.

Meanwhile in March 1959, the Tibetan uprising had reached its peak and this forced the Dalai Lama to leave Lhasa for India. The Indian government's policy, prior to coming of the Dalai Lama, was to provide medical assistance to sick refugees at the border of India without permitting them to cross over. In case of the Dalai Lama, the government decided that an exception can be made if a request for political asylum arises. in 1959, the Dalai Lama left Lhasa and entered India via Tawang. He was allowed to rest at Bomdila and from there was moved to Mussoorie. The Chinese were, by then, of the firm opinion that India had stage managed the entire escape plan of the Dalai Lama to India.

Another incident in 1959, aggravated the conflict. This time the issue arose in a place called Longju in the NEFA region. In 1959, Captain Adhikari of Assam Rifles was instructed to establish a military post at Longju, which was a territory claimed by both India and China. In order to establish a symbol of authority, Captain Adhikari was conferred a red coat and was appointed as the village headman. Captain Adhikari then sent a patrol team out in the vicinity. Observing this, the Chinese side also increased their patrolling. India too intensified its patrol in the region. This angered the Chinese and they attacked the Indian post at Longju. With limited resources, Captain Mitra was sent to recapture the post of Longju and he succeeded in capturing a post six miles south of Longju at Moja. On 8th September, 1959, Nehru received a letter from Zhou Enlaimaking the Chinese positions on the border question clear. In the letter, the Chinese stated that they were not a party to this 1842 treaty concluded by Tibet and Kashmir, nor had they ratified such a treaty. Therefore, they would not agree to any demarcation there. China also stated that they had not agreed to the Macartney–MacDonald Line of 1899 either. They maintained that boundaries in the western and central sector were never demarcated and never delimited formally. The Chinese also clarified that the McMahon Line was illegal because the Chinese did not recognise the Simla Agreement and the McMahon Line was nothing more than an imperialist design of the British. In fact, China not only declared the McMahon line as illegal but also condemned Indian troop advancements upto the frontiers and pointed out that India had illegally occupied Longju, Khinzemane and Tamaden. In the letter, China insisted that India should withdraw its troops from the frontiers immediately.

The letter of Zhou Enlai in September, 1959 clearly denotes a shift from the Chinese approach outlined by them in the letter to Nehru in January, 1959. China had now hardened its stand and had made no mention this time of acting with prudence on McMahon Line as mentioned earlier. Nehru made a reply through a letter to Zhou Enlai in September, 1959 itself. In his response, he asserted that India had not illegally occupied Longju and Khinzemane but clarified that when India found Tamden located in the north of the McMahon Line, the Indian agencies withdrew from the post. Nehru asserted that to remove the troops from Longju, both sides should respect the historical frontiers till future surveys. Domestically, Nehru tried to delink the Aksai Chin question from other border issues and favoured that the Aksai Chin issue not be brought up when other border issues were discussed. He preferred to maintain status quo on Aksai Chin region. He asserted that if Chinese transgressed into the Indian territory, the Chinese should be told to retreat

and India side should not fire unless fired upon.

After the Sinkiang–Tibet road was discovered, in 1959, a proposal was made by the Intelligence Bureau to setup more posts in the forward areas of Ladakh region. During deliberations in January 1959, the Army Chief and the Foreign Secretary rejected such a proposal as it may have antagonised the Chinese even further. In February, 1959, Mallick, the IB chief, persuaded Nehru to open the posts, to which Nehru agreed. The posts were finally setup by October. This provoked the Chinese and on 21st October, 1959 an Indian army patrol led by Havaldar Karan Singh suffered massive losses and were ambushed in Kongka La by the Chinese. There was a huge public uproar in the Parliament after the news of ambush of Indian soldiers came to light. In November, 1959, Zhou Enlai wrote a letter to Nehru urging him to maintain status quo till a future settlement. He urged that the two sides should try to withdraw their troops 20 kilometres each from the actual control position along the McMahon Line. Nehru wrote back a letter to Zhou Enlai asserting that in the Eastern and Middle sectors, no side should send border patrols to forward areas but also insisted that the Chinese retreat from Longju, assuring China that post Chinese retreat, the Indian side would not occupy Longju.

On 7th December, Nehru received the response from Zhou Enlai. Zhou firstly rejected the Nehruvian logic of treating the Western sector separately as he observed that the Western sector region is of great significance to them as the Sinkiang–Tibet road passes through it. Zhou also sent an invitation to Nehru to meet at Rangoon on 26th December, 1959 for talks. Nehru rejected the invitation due to his prior commitments. This was followed by visits of President Eisenhower and later, Nikita Khrushchev, to India. In February 1960, Nehru invited Zhou Enlai for talks to which Zhou Enlai responded by accepting the request and stated that starting 19th April, he would visit India for a seven-day duration.

As Zhou arrived in India, a series of one-on-one negotiations began, where he declared that China was willing to take a realistic attitude on the McMahon Line despite it not ratifying the Simla convention. China said that they would adopt a policy on McMahon Line with India as they did for Burma provided India showed accommodative behaviour over Aksai Chin in the Western Sector. India insisted on Chinese withdrawal from NEFA and Aksai Chin and asserted that China recognise Aksai Chin as Indian territory. India further declared that it would not accept the offer of the barter of the acceptance of the McMohan Line in exchange for Aksai Chin. As the negotiations were reaching a deadlock, Zhou offered that the two sides accept that there was a dispute on the line of actual control held by the forces of both countries and till a permanent settlement evolves, neither should make territorial claims and hold up to the line of actual control. To maintain tranquillity at the border, Zhou stated that both sides should discontinue border patrolling. India rejected Zhou's proposals as it stated that they would not accept placing all the three sectors on an equal footing, because India wanted the three sectors be discussed separately. The talks broke down with no agreement by either side.

Zhou was disappointed because Chinese were willing to demonstrate a practical attitude to the McMahon Line. They had accepted the boundary with Myanmar almost on the same alignment as the McMahon Line itself. They expected India to be similarly pragmatic in their approach to the Western sector. Zhou expressed great shock over India's

insistence on Aksai Chin which historically it had never occupied, nor was of any strategic importance to India. The Chinese always felt that the Indian claim on Aksai Chin was to undermine the Chinese influence in Tibet.

In early 1961, the Intelligence Bureau began to inform the government that the Chinese were building up check posts in the Western sector. The IB reports suggested that the check posts were being built up by the Chinese in areas also claimed by India in the Western sector. This aggression by the Chinese was based on the new maps they had published in 1960. In These new maps, the Chinese claimed Sirijap and Spanggur lake. Such claims were not made by the Chinese in the maps they had issued in 1956. By staking such claims in the 1960 maps, the Chinese brought an additional 5000 sq. km. of Indian Territory within their ambit. In February, 1961, Nehru asserted in the India Parliament that India would not resort to any form of adventurism but would prepare itself for action if the situation warrants.

Some scholars observe that what China was doing in the Western sector in the period 1960–61, especially in Aksai Chin, was similar to what India did in the NEFA region in early 1950s. This point may not be right because India first declared in the Parliament that the border in the Eastern sector is the McMahon Line. After this declaration, India went on to establish the civil administration in NEFA. In both cases—that of declaration of McMahon Line and establishment of civil administration—China did not object. Thus, the act the Chinese were committing in the western sector in 1960–61 completely disregarded Indian sensitivities and was completely unilateral act. Witnessing the Chinese policy on the border unfold, on 2nd November, 1961, a meeting happening in the Prime Minister's Office in Delhi, where it was decided that India would establish forward posts in the areas claimed by them. This job would be entrusted to the Indian army. It was designed to irritate China by ensuring that if the Chinese created one post in one area, India would go onto do the same at other places. The idea was that China would not undertake any physical contest if India demonstrated the counter capabilities of establishing posts.

India, however, was well aware that logically it would not be able to sustain these posts owing to the superior military strength of the Chinese. After the 2nd November meeting, the government issued new direction to the effect that firstly, in the Ladakh region, Indian forces would undertake a forward policy and go to far areas and establish posts. The idea was to ensure that the Chinese should not be allowed to establish posts in the region but all this is to be done without involving any physical clash with the Chinese. The government ordered, secondly, that in the Central Sector, a similar forward policy was to be executed and gaps at the frontier were to be covered by posts. It was decided to concentrate military presence close to the forwards posts which would be activated if there be a need at a short notice. Thus, the Indian strategy was to deploy troops in forward posts in the Western sectors primarily to forestall Chinese advancements while in the rest of the area, the forces were to occupy border positions. However, the Indian army did begin the establishment of the forward posts but did not establish adequate supply lines and logistics for assisting the forward posts in case of any eventuality.

The basic promise of India's forward policy was that if India established its post in areas where China had no posts then Chinese would not establish their posts or destroy the Indian posts. The directives issues in November 1961 had notified that India would first

establish logistical stations that could provide all the needed support and then the army would establish smaller forward posts. However, as we noted earlier, the army began the establishment of forward posts without establishing logistical stations as envisaged in the directives. On 5th December 1961, the Army headquarters communicated to the comers of the Western and Eastern command to establish forward posts in Ladakh and dominate any Chinese posts in the region claimed by India. Ironically, this directive issued by the Army HQ was never a part of the directives agreed upon in the 2nd November meeting. What was all the more ironical was that the Army HQ did not inform the commanders to establish logistical stations to assist the forward posts despite they being categorically asserted in the meeting on 2nd November. Further, the Army HQ began to issue directions limiting forward posts in NEFA region despite the 2nd November directives limiting forward posts establishment to Western and Middle or Central sectors only.

All this had a disastrous impact. It is widely believed that if all the directives of 2nd November meeting were implemented without any alterations, then probably the 1962 conflict would have never happened. In early 1962, the Western Command began to execute the forward policy. But the posts were nothing more than ‘penny posts’ as hardly any logistical supplies could be provided to them. Since October 1959, the Chinese had not undertaken any further patrols. But on witnessing the Indian posts coming up, they informed the higher authorities, taking no other action. Non-action from China led India to increase the pace of setting up of Indian posts. In April 1962, alarmed with rise in the pace of India establishing its posts, China decided to resume patrolling from Karakorum to Kongka Pass. Mao ordered that PLA resort to armed co-existence strategy. In this strategy, the PLA was asked to counter-encircle the posts established by India. This was a step to out-manoeuvre India.

In May, 1962, in the north of Daulet Beg Oldi, an incident took place. India had established a post near the Chip Chap River. China encircled the India post, forcing the army to seek permission for withdrawal from the post from Army HQ. The Army HQ directed that India should retreat. After encircling the post, the Chinese retreated. India thought that the retreat from the Chip Chap River post means that China will not attack India as it did not attack the post. In July 1962, the Indian Army not only established a post in Galwan Valley in the Western sector but also dominated the Chinese post in Samzungling. The Chinese began to aggressively encircle this post. The post was manned by Gorkhas from the Indian side. The Chinese tactics were menacing and intimidating India communicated to the Chinese Ambassador in Delhi that if China does not stop its aggression, Indian troops may open fire. The Chinese retreated but cut off land supply routes to the post. The Galwan Valley episode nullified the entire premise of India’s forward policy as the aggressive tactics used by China negated the long-held logic that China would not attack the Indian posts.

Unfortunately, the China’s retreat from Galwan Valley was perceived by Nehru differently. It reaffirmed his belief that China would not attack Indian posts. After all these episodes in the Western sector, the Western Command pleaded to the Army HQ to suspend the forward policy and work on strengthening logistics stations to maintain the already established forward posts. The Army HQ did not agree and were of the view that the Chinese would not attack Indian posts.

Things were not smooth at the diplomatic level either. The Panchsheel agreement signed in 1954 was valid only for eight years. It was about to lapse on 2nd June, 1962. There was a clause within Panchsheel where either of the side could seek extension of the agreement. China, on 3rd December, 1961, informed India that it wished to negotiate a fresh agreement. Instead of India using this opportunity to douse the rising tensions at the border, it instead communicated that an essential criterion to start negotiations would be to reverse the aggressive policies manifesting at the border. As India insisted that border issue be a pre-condition to start fresh negotiations for a new agreement, nothing concrete worked out and the agreement lapsed on 3rd June, 1962. After the agreement lapsed, China closed their trading marts in Calcutta and Kalimpong while India closed its marts in Gyantse, Tarung and Gartok. Calcutta and Kalimpong provided important routes for China to supply necessities to Tibet. The refusal of India to extend the agreement in 1962 was perceived by China as an attempt by India to squeeze their Tibetan supply lines. Since 1959, the Eastern sector was tranquil as the Chinese had stopped patrolling in the forward areas. But the decision of the Army HQ to launch the forward policy in the NEFA flared up the tranquil border.

In June 1962, the Indian army established a forward post on the south bank of Namka Chu River and the post was named as Dhola despite the fact that the post was located in Che Jong and Dhola was a mountain near the post. This post led to Chinese protests. Thought the Chinese had not objected to Indian presence in the areas south of McMahon line despite China not accepting McMahon Line, China insisted that particular Indian post was in the north of the McMahon Line and was thus in the Chinese territory. India insisted that its post was in the south of McMahon line and not the north as alleged by China and was in proper Dhola region. The GOC of the 4th division in the Eastern sector suggested that this post be relocated to Thagla Ridge. By the time the Army HQ granted permission, the Chinese established their presence at the Thagla Ridge. The Chinese were offended by Indian post and patrolling in the region where, through correspondences, Nehru had assured that India would never build posts.

As India set up post on south of Namka Chu River, on 8th September, 1962, the Chinese troops crossed the river and began encircling the post. The post in-charge on the Indian side, in a panic, sent a message to the Battalion HQ's that 600 Chinese soldiers had encircled the Indian post. It was later determined that the number of soldiers was only 60. However, to seek support immediately, the officer in-charge had sent frantic messages, unwittingly inflating the situation. India too immediately stationed additional troops and decided to hold the Dhola post. The army began to move towards Lumpu Choksen as it was designated as the first line of defence. The priority was to hold ground in Tawang and ensure that there was no vacuum in Tawang. The movement to Lumpu proved disastrous. The T-Brigade of the army was to establish a fresh Brigade HQs at Lumpu Choksen. Ironically, the location chosen was extremely unfavourable to India as it lacked even road connectivity. It was believed that the T-Brigade would evict the Chinese from the presence they established in Thagla Ridge and would put a stay at Dhola.

The spark came on 13th September, 1962. In Namka Chu, 9 Punjab had taken up positions. The Chinese made a loudspeaker announcement in Hindi to the effect that Indians had entered the Chinese territory and not only should they retreat but a civilian official was to be sent for exact boundary location identification. The advice was ignored

by India and the two sides sat eyeball-to-eyeball for several days. On 20th September 1962, a Chinese soldier attacked an Indian post using a grenade, leading to injuries on the Indian side. The government made the decision to evict the Chinese from Namka Chu. The 4-Corps was given the responsibility to execute the task. On 9th October, India dispatched a strong patrol to Tseng Jong, which was in the north of Namka Chu, and was a territory claimed by China. The Chinese were a battalion strong in Tseng Jong and attacked the Indian patrol vehemently. The entire premise of the forward policy was shattered.

The head of the 4-Corps left for Delhi from Namka Chu and convinced the leaders in Delhi that with existing logistics, evicting the Chinese from Namka Chu would be impossible and pleaded for the Indian withdrawal from Namka Chu. However, a decision was taken not to leave Namka Chu. Nehru, on way to Colombo, informed the press that India had ordered the army to evict the Chinese from Indian territory. This statement of Nehru was published domestically and globally and was perceived as an ultimatum to China. China used this statement to brand India as an aggressor. The Chinese knew about the Indian decision to evict them from Namka Chu and Dhola posts. They were disappointed to witness India's violation of the 1959 assurances of no patrolling on the borders of the Eastern sector. All these compelled Mao to a conclusion that a fierce and painful military lesson had to be taught to India. The Chinese ordered the PLA to plan a detailed operation in the Eastern sector. This theatre was used for the conflict as the Chinese supply lines were well established.

The Chinese launched an attack on 20th October, 1962 in the Eastern sector at Namka Chu from Tsangdhar side, west of Namka Chu and across the river. The Chinese troops acted swiftly and launched high thrusts at Namka Chu. By 22nd October, the Chinese converged at Tawang through Bumla, Khinzamane and Namka Chu. By 24th October, the Indian troops retreated from Tawang to Sela Pass. The Chinese successfully converged at Tawang. On 20th October, the Chinese began an offensive in the Western sector through heavy mortar firing. They even attacked the Galwan post. On 24th October, Zhou wrote a letter to Nehru urging for a peaceful settlement on the border issue. He urged that till both parties agree to a peaceful settlement, both should ensure that neither of the sides undertakes patrolling upto 20 kms of the Line of Actual Control (LAC, as LAC acted as the traditional line customarily dividing the two sides. India immediately responded to China, replying it was always in favour of peaceful settlement but was surprised by Chinese use of the term 'LAC'. India further stated that if China was indeed serious about peace, then it should halt the hostilities and retreat to the positions held by the Chinese prior to 8th September, 1962. Zhou wrote back to Nehru on 4th November, and clarified that LAC was the line as existed between India and China on 7th November, 1959, defined by the McMahon line in the East and the traditional customary line in the Western and Middle sectors. Zhou refused to accept the Nehruvian proposal of reverting back to position held prior to 8th September.

Nehru rejected all proposals of Zhou and remained stuck to his demand. Diplomatically China was supported by the entire communist bloc and as far as India is concerned, not even the non-aligned states supported it. By November 1962, the Chinese had captured Sela, Dirang, BomdiLa and were at the foothills not far from Tezpur. Nehru realised the gravity of the situation and understood that if something extraordinary was not

done, then Kashmir and Assam would both fall into the hands of the Chinese. Nehru frantically requested help from the USA. President Kennedy, in response to India, had a USA aircraft carrier sail for the Bay of Bengal, while a squadron of USA air force aircrafts also reached India. China declared a unilateral cease fire on 21st November, 1962 and decided to retreat to positions 20 km behind the LAC.

The unique aspect of this cease fire declared by China was that it did not demand the same by India. China, however, maintained that its forces may strike back if Indian troops continued to fire and did not retreat post cease fire. Nehru decided not to impede the implementation of the cease fire agreement but questioned the concept of the LAC. The western aid to India came along with the string that India would resume a dialogue with Pakistan on Kashmir. India accepted condition. As the USA and the UK got involved in the region, China took the lead to conclude negotiations with Pakistan on the Sinkiang–Kashmir border dispute. On 2nd March, 1963, Pakistan and China concluded an agreement for the Sinkiang–Kashmir border. With the declaration of the Chinese cease fire, the conflict at the border finally came to end in November.

ANALYSIS

The problem with the demarcation of borders had begun since the British times. The British, in order to safeguard the British Indian Empire, resorted to the establishment of buffer states. The buffer states established functioned as economical tools to manage the imperial security. The concept of buffer states originated from the time when in 1880s, the rising Russian empire acted as a threat to the British presence in South Asia. The British ensured that the buffer remained a protectorate. The British made sure that the buffer not only remained free from any extraneous influence, but also continued to be guided by British policy. Ironically, neither Tibet nor Afghanistan ever became buffer states for the British.

The British annexed Kashmir in 1846. The Treaty of Amritsar that governed the annexation ensured maintenance of balance of power in the region. The Afghans and Russians were subsequently kept under check. After the First Anglo–Sikh War and the Treaty of Lahore, the British acquired sovereignty of Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh and handed them over to Gulab Singh for control provided that British supremacy was acknowledged. Gulab Singh got the territories but was not allowed to alter the limits of his territories, which only the British reserved the right to do. The British, as we have noted earlier, did make attempts to resolve the boundary disputes by making attempts to fix the boundary but the insecurity of the Chinese prevented any fruitful agreement. The Johnson line showed Aksai Chin plateau in the Kashmir territory, and was used by India after independence to claim Aksai Chin.

In 1899, the Macartney–MacDonald Line proposed a solution to the Western sector. The British urged the Chinese to renounce their claims over Hunza and in lieu, receive the Chinese part of Ladakh called Aksai Chin. The region of Aksai Chin was shown as a part of Ladakh by many Chinese maps. Since the British feared that the occupation of Kashgar by Russia would be a threat to imperial security, they somehow wanted China to relinquish its sovereign rights over Hunza. In fact, today, the LAC, the claim line by the Chinese and the Macartney–MacDonald line all coincide with each other. In 1896, John Ardagh also proposed a line based on a strategic adoption of the already proposed Johnson

line. The Ardagh Line drew the boundary in the crest of Kunlun and ended up incorporating Karakash River and territories up to Yarkand River. The British were unable to establish a firm boundary in the Western sector as China remained evasive. The Huztagh–Karakoram acted as a natural frontier. The boundaries in the Western sector thus remained undefined.

For the British, the Eastern sector was a forgotten frontier and yet the British had interests in the region. In 1769, Nepal saw an internal conflict between Newars and Gurkhas. The British, in the conflict, supported the Newars. The Gurkhas succeeded in replacing the Newars and established a Hindu Kingdom. The Gurkhas closed down trade routes between Nepal and Tibet, which were used by India to reach Tibet. This led the British to search alternative routes to Tibet bypassing Nepal via Bhutan and Assam. The defeat of the Newars opened up subsequent conflicts between Gurkhas and the British. The Gurkhas were not happy with the British for their support to the Newars. The year of 1814 saw the Anglo–Nepal War which culminated in a British victory. The British concluded the Treaty of Segauli with Gurkhas and gained access to Tibet via Kumaon and Garhwal region. Since 1775, the Gurkhas were constantly attacking Sikkim. In 1817, as per the Treaty of Titalia, the British and Sikkim agreed to a system where Sikkim would get British protection and allow trade till Lhasa. The Treaty of Titalia also gave the British a platform in Sikkim to keep an eye on the Gurkhas from the east. In 1861, the Treaty of Titalia was replaced with a new treaty, giving the British a bigger say on using Sikkim to govern Tibetan trade and policy.

In the 1920s, the Ahom Kingdom in Assam became weak. Perceiving this as a golden opportunity, the Burmese expanded to garner influence in the region. The British moved swiftly and Anglo–Burmese War broke out in 1824, leading to the British defeating the Burmese. In 1826, a peace treaty was concluded between the Burmese and the British at Yandabo where by British gained Assam. The presence of the British in Assam saw its expansion till Lohit Valley. Presence of coal and petroleum, along with tea plantation potential and a strategic route to Tibet, made the British realise the potential of the area. The British did not interfere with the tribes in the region but did consolidate the presence over the entire North-East.

In 1901, the British again developed a fear that Russia could reach up to Lhasa and create trouble for the British. However, as noted earlier, the Chinese refused to ratify the Simla convention as they were angry not only due to arbitrary demarcations by McMahon but also due to the fact that Tibet acquired the status of an equal power. The British, surprisingly, did not publish the texts of the Simla convention of 1914 till the year 1937. In 1907, the British and the Russians had agreed that neither of the parties will negotiate with Tibet on their own without the presence of a Chinese intermediary because the British always accepted Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. The signing of the Simla convention could have angered the Russians. The British thereby decided to keep the Simla convention text under wraps.


In 1937, the British published the Simla convention and used the McMahon Line to show the boundary. A per the Simla convention, India had acquired the Tawang region in 1914 but the Indian flag was hoisted in Tawangonly in 1951. India moved into Tawangin 1951 exactly at a time when the Chinese had moved into Tibet. The British had never

established their control in Tawang up till 1951 and adhered to the fact that the British frontiers existed till south of the McMahon Line. In 1943, the Governor of Assam had felt that establishing control in Tawang may be tantamount to a forward policy which may not be appreciated by the Tibetans. In 1947, Tenzin Gyatso, the Dalai Lama, had written to the Indian government claiming that Tawang was a part of Tibet. The Dalai Lama later on gave up the claim but the Chinese, since then, have been claiming Tawang by referring to the comments of Dalai Lama.


It must be clarified that a boundary is a line demarcating sovereign states on a map. However, a frontier is a tract or a zone that separate two states that are sovereign. The Sino-Indian conflict at the border is defined by the Himalayas that has always acted as a frontier. The core of the dispute is about the exact places through which the boundary should pass in the frontier zone, that is, the Himalayas.

It is noteworthy that India has no historical claims to Arunachal as Indian presence in Arunachal is merely a British legacy. Nor do Chinese claims hold true for Arunachal. The Monpas of Tawang are ethnically different from Tibetans, and are in fact, non-Tibetans. In fact, it would also be important for us to clarify at this juncture that Tibet, historically, was neither independent nor an integral part of China. The rulers of China always considered Tibet as an area in the periphery that had potential to act as a springboard for possible invasions in the mainland. It was in mid-seventh century that Chinese influence found presence in Tibet when there was a matrimonial alliance between a Tibetan ruler and a Princess of Tang dynasty. The political status of Tibet remained non-existent till Ding Dynasty (1614) came to power.

The initial period of Ding Dynasty saw a priest-and-patron relationship between China and Tibet. In 1728, the Chinese introduced the concept of Ambans and the period subsequent to 1792 saw a tight control by China over Tibet. The Ambans were given powers equivalent to the Dalai Lama as per the 29-point decree issued by the Chinese emperor in 1792. The Chinese still believe that the 1792 decree gives them the power to exercise influence in choosing the Dalai Lama. In the recent times, the Chinese have adopted an aggressive strategy to integrate Tibet with the mainland. This includes a plethora of infrastructure projects in Tibet and increasing the number of Han Chinese in the region to change the demography of the Tibetan area. Soon, the Han Chinese will become majority while Tibetans would be a minority in Tibet, which will then dilute the overall cause of Tibetan autonomy. Despite China-Dalai Lama negotiations since 2002, nothing concrete has evolved till date.




India–China border is divided into various sectors. The Middle sector is relatively peaceful, unlike the Western and Eastern sectors. In Western sector, India alleges that China has occupied part of the Kashmir region and also an area given in 1963 by Pakistan to China, along with the Aksai Chin area of Ladakh occupied as Xinjiang. In the Eastern sector, China insists that the 90,000 square kilometre Arunachal Pradesh is part of China and refuses to accept the McMahon Line.



The border dispute, as explained, led to China launching a counter-forward policy and attacking India in 1962, inflicting a humiliating defeat on India. The Indian diplomat, Vasant Vasudeo Paranjpe, aptly described Chinese advances when he remarked that the PLA went through Indian army in 1962 like knife through butter. In November, 1962, China declared a ceasefire and went 20 km behind their 1959 position. The tensions got further aggravated with Chinese nuclear tests in 1964, with continuing border skirmishes observed upto 1967.

Breakthrough was achieved in 1979 when Vajpayee visited China to resume talks. However, the talks were not fruitful. Deng Xiaoping advocated a package deal under which India was to maintain status quo in Western sectors while China would accept the McMahon Line in the east. India rejected the deal and advocated a sector-by-sector approach. Indian policy post-1962 gradually transformed and the solution of border dispute became a precondition to talks. From 1981 to 1987, despite dialogues, nothing except maintenance of tranquillity was achieved. When Rajiv Gandhi assumed power in 1988, he established a joint working group on the boundary question and dropped resolution of border dispute as a precondition. In 1993, an agreement on maintenance of peace and tranquillity along the line of actual control was signed and it became an

important confidence building measure (CBM).



One-for-one Cutback vs. Adjusted Ratio Formula


The CBM agreement of 1993 talked about undertaking troop reduction. Till 1993, the understanding was that China has more troops in Tibet than India has on the entire border. China had two personnel for each one from India. China said in 1993 that as a CBM it would go for a one-for-one cutback but India said that geography of Tibet favours China and in any eventuality, China can send troops far more quickly than the Indian side. So, the Indian side advocated for an adjusted ratio approach. India said geographically steep terrain and logistically constraints on Indian side need to be taken into consideration. Therefore, both finally agreed to mutual and equal security and decided to cut troops' numbers mutually.

In 1996 came the agreement on confidence building measures in the military field along the LAC in India–China border areas. This was called the 1996 CBM agreement.




Conflicts were certainly avoided by the 1993 and 1996 agreements, but a solution on the border issue did not emerge. The border CBMs were badly affected in 1998 due to Pokhran-II and its attribution to the China threat theory. The JWG was also suspended and was resumed only in April 1999 as the 11th JWG meet took place in Beijing. The focus again shifted to clarify the locations through which the LAC passes and in 2000, at the 12th JWG, both sides decided to exchange maps with each other to identify the LAC. India and China exchanged 595 km maps of the Middle sector to this effect. The optimism shown by India Post Exchange became so high that Indian leaders began to advocate that by 2003, both sides would also exchange maps on the Western sector. The Chinese side saw this as an attempt by India to go beyond consensus and cancelled the subsequent map exchange. China understood that India was trying to gain advantage in the border talks through map exchange and advocated the Indian side to exercise patience with regard to there solution of border disputes.

Since 2002, China began to advocate mutual understanding and mutual accommodation. Mutual accommodation meant gives and takes to resolve border.




Recently, many studies have been undertaken on Chinese negotiative behaviour. The studies say that China can negotiate fast if it has a favourable solution in sight, but delays and advises patience in case it senses an unfavourable solution for itself. In case of Central Asia and Russia, China solved borders quickly, while with India it knows that the border dispute has little or no possibility to be resolved in terms favourable to itself. Consequently, there is a kind of freeze and the conspicuous lack of any sense of urgency. In 2003, Vajpayee, to give further push to border negotiations, launched a Special Representative talks Mechanism (SRM). In SRM, the negotiations were to be conducted by a higher political representative who would explore a framework solution. The focus had shifted to identify common principles for resolving the border issues.



The aim was to negotiate on a sector-by-sector basis and announce an agreement when all sectoral difference were resolved. Sikkim, as an issue, persisted till 2005. China had always questioned the status of Sikkim and its merger with India. China maintained Sikkim could be resolved only as a part of package deal but soon realised that if it continues to hold the Sikkim rhetoric, India would open up the Tibetan issue. In 2005, during Wen Jiabao's visit to India, the Chinese presented a new map showing India with Sikkim as a part of India. In 2006, they opened Nathu La pass but incursions continued to be an issue. China claims Tawang saying it was a part of Mongul district and sixth Dalai Lama was born in Tawang. China has courted trouble in the Eastern sector by refusing IAS officers of Arunachal visa, saying residents of Arunachal need no visa to visit their own country. Even today China maintains the same policy. On 23rd October, 2013, during Manmohan Singh's visit to China, he concluded the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA). Due to regular tailing and patrolling of the LAC, the forces do come face-to-face and at times, this has been found to raise tensions. The BDCA specifically avoids the tailing, and is a strategic investment at the cost of a tactical sacrifice.



Thus, today, even under the Modi government, the border negotiations go on, and are carried out on the same framework.



PAKISTAN FACTOR IN SINO–INDIA RELATIONS

China and Pakistan's friendship has proved an all-weather friendship over time. In fact, despite the distinctive ideologies of both states during the Cold War, China followed Kautilya's Mandala theory with Pakistan. During the Cold War, both helped each other but relations have evolved into a deeper understanding since the era of Deng Xiaoping. As Chinese economy grew, it began to realise the need to have proximity with all the neighbouring nations for resources. Since the end of the Cold War, China does not use Pakistan against India and is largely interested in a stable South Asia. China today favours peaceful resolution of disputes between India and Pakistan and prefers hands-off approach in any conflict. China accepts its deep relation with Pakistan but maintains that the Sino–Pak relation is not particularly an axis against India. China has clarified that the Sino–India relations have nothing to do with Sino–Pak relations. However, India remains deeply concerned about Chinese supply of arms to Pakistan.

China says its arms sale to Pakistan is based on an economic logic to make profit and is not meant to act against India and has reiterated that it is even willing to sell military equipments to India if needed. The military balance is still in Indian favour as the US and Russia provide better arms to India. India, on the other hand, feels that China is arming nations around India to bring Pakistan on a strategic parity with India and maintains that Chinese weapons are used by Pakistan against India. India continues to feel that the Sino–Pakistan arms trade would impact the regional balance but China insists it would not. Chinese relations with Pakistan also give China the chance to make easy inroads into the Islamic world and can help keep China's Xinjiang extremism under check. China has resorted to persuading both India and Pakistan to exercise restraint. However, India expects China to advise Pakistan to stop its adventurism. During the Cold War, on Kashmir, China supported the position of Pakistan to hold a plebiscite but in the post-Cold War era, it refused to intervene on behalf of Pakistan and advocated bilateral negotiations. China fears if Kashmir gains independence, it may inspire Xinjiang extremists to seek the same. China says Kashmir is a colonial legacy and is an important Indo–Pak issue and since its sovereignty has been undefined by British, dialogue is the only way out.

INDIA AND CHINA—COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY

In order to promote trade, there are various institutional mechanisms available.



The initiation of financial dialogue owes its origin to 2003. It was in 2005 when an MoU was concluded and the financial dialogue was launched. The 7th financial dialogues were conducted in 2014 in New Delhi. In the 8th financial dialogue envisaged in 2016, it was decided to upgrade the talks to finance minister level. However, owing to recent events related to India's membership at the NSG and its opposition by China, the 8th financial dialogue, that had been planned in June 2016, finally happened in August, 2016.

India exports cotton yarn, copper, petro products and iron ore while importing telecom equipment, hardware, and industrial machines. Various Indian banks have presence in China while Indian firms like Tata, Binani cements, Bharat Forge, TCS and NIIT, and so on, are present in China. Indian firms are primarily in IT, pharmacy, refractories and laminated tubes industry. The strategic and economic dialogue is a mechanism for macroeconomic and strategic issues of cooperation, with infrastructure, energy, environment, high technology, railways and power generation being core areas of interest.

India is an importer of Chinese goods but there is a trade imbalance as our imports from China are more than the exports. India has an edge in pharmacy, agro-bovine meat industry and textiles industry. India is seeking better market access to rework the trade imbalance. Chinese FDI to India is very less, and is surprisingly lower than the FDI India receives from Poland and Canada. It's not that the Chinese are not interested to invest in FDI in India. However, the Chinese investments are more in resource rich areas of Africa and Central Asia, in oil and gas sectors, to fuel Chinese domestic growth. As India too is an energy importer, there is less possibility that Chinese FDI will rise in India in the near future. China does complain about red tape and delays in security clearances in India for Chinese projects while India complains that China gives preferences to its state undertakings, restricting Indian corporates' market access. We should not be overtly fixated with trade imbalance with China as India has a trade deficit with 16 out of top 25 trade partners. Due to a weak manufacturing sector, India is unable to produce goods to meet domestic demand and ends up importing heavily. Though India has a trade deficit with China roughly ranging from 54% to 56% its deficit is 90–91% with Iraq and 82–82% with Switzerland.




Sumdorong Chu, Operation Falcon and Exercise Chequerboard

Sumdorong Chu (S-C) is called Sangduoluo in China. In 1985, India established a

post in S-C, which, in turn, upset China. China perceived it as an attempt towards the adoption of a forward policy by India in neutral areas. In June 1986, there was a Chinese intrusion and India lodged a protest against it. India stated Chinese undertook an incursion in Thandrong pasture near Zimithang circle of Tawang, which China refused to accept. In June 1986, the 12th Assam Regiment noted intrusions and structure creation, including a helipad built by China. As the pressure mounted in India to seek redressal, India offered a solution to China by advocating that if China withdraws from S-C by winter of 1986, then India in next summer would not reoccupy S-C and maintain pre-1986 position. China refused the offer and stayed in S-C throughout the harsh winter. India, subsequently, under Operation Falcon, airlifted the 5th Mountain Division of the army to Zimithang. The tensions increased further in December, 1986, when Arunachal was endowed with a full statehood in India. In the spring of 1987, India and China went face-to-face in the S-C region. In May, 1987, the Indian Foreign Minister went to China and from August 1987, troops moved back, finally leading to a joint working group on border.

Analysis of Visit of Xi Jinping to India, 2014

Xi visited India in 2014 and displayed an exceptional comfort in diplomatic outreach. He took a stroll with the PM on the Sabarmati river bank in Ahmadabad and also sat on the floor to try the *charkha*. China decided to contribute 20 billion dollars in investments in India and agreed to cooperate in infrastructure, energy, rail cooperation. A new five-year economic and trade development plan was established and discussions on border and visa issues were taken up. Ahmadabad and Guangzhou were declared sister cities. China has agreed to work on the Bangalore–Chennai–Mysore train corridor and assist in establishing a rail university in India.



China and India on India's NSG membership: Policy Post Mortem, Seoul, 2016

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was formed after Pokhran-I as a group to contribute to non-proliferation guidelines established for nuclear exports and nuclear related exports. India wants to be a member of NSG to ensure access to export markets. In 2008, the NSG gave a waiver to India, but as a member, India gets a better legal status and also ends up instilling confidence in suppliers. In the June, 2016 Seoul plenary session, India applied for membership.



China, at the Plenary, objected to India's entry to the NSG and raised procedural concerns; such as the fact that India is neither a signatory of CTBT nor of NPT. However, China is also not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), of which India is a member, the whole issue of membership came down to a quid pro quo bid. China objected stating the NSG is based on the NPT, of which India is not a part, and thus, pushed back the Indian case. The Indian membership now depends upon diplomacy and cooperation with China.

ANALYSIS OF INDIAN PM'S VISIT TO CHINA—2015

The Indian PM, Narendra Modi, visited China in October, 2015. He set aside the regular protocol and paid a visit to the ancient Xian city. China took care of the arrangements in Xian city. During his stay in China, PM remarked that China itself is holding back improvements in the bilateral process. The PM has taken steps to connect to Chinese citizens through Weibo, which is a platform to connect to China. He was present at the Temple of Heaven for a yoga ceremony in a display of soft power. PM interacted with the Chinese business community and has assured the Chinese corporate class of a personal touch to expedite processes on their investments into India. Due to the global economic meltdown and its impact on labour markets, the Chinese corporates have begun to look towards Indian markets. The PM assured China that Indo-China partnership can be successful if China gains access to Indian institutions and proposed that border issue be resolved as a strategic issue. To reduce mutual suspicion and enhance cooperation, a sustained campaign of communication through frequent exchanges at top leadership level has been envisaged. Both sides have decided to bring states and provinces on a diplomatic exchange platform by establishing a State Leaders Forum which first met in 2015 to promote people-to-people ties. A consulate will be opened by China in Chennai and India in Chengdu. There have been naval exercises planned, namely PASSEX and SAR. The two sides have identified sectors like pharmacy, IT, textiles, and agriculture to facilitate trade and use strategic and economic dialogue as a mechanism to boost trade. As per the India–China Cultural Exchange Initiative, 200 youth are to be exchanged for cultural activities. A new India–China think tanks forum and a high level media forum has been established. Future cooperation is planned in nuclear cooperation, public health, traditional medicine and smart cities.

The Dalai Lama's Visit to Arunachal Pradesh (2017) and Implications

In April 2017, the Dalai Lama visited Arunachal Pradesh. The visit drew sharp reaction from the Chinese side. China stated that India has been using the Dalai Lama deliberately to upset Beijing. Officially, the Chinese government conveyed to India that such visits by Dalai Lama to disputed territories in Arunachal Pradesh will affect the bilateral ties. China asserted that the implications of the Dalai Lama's visit to Tawang could unleash a new low in the bilateral relations. China considers Tawang as a part of 'South Tibet'. It feels that visit of the Dalai Lama to 'South Tibet' or Tawang could incite the Tibetans. This is because the Tawang region is an important centre for Buddhist activity and the Dalai Lama's visit to the region could complicate the balance. China has an uncomfortable relationship with the Dalai Lama and feels that he is a separatist whose prime intention is to create unrest in Tibet to seek an autonomous state. China has always harboured a feeling that India has been supporting the Dalai Lama to create unrest in Tibet. The year 2016 had not gone very well for India and China. The two nations remained locked over China's repeated attempts to block the Masood Azhar issue and India's entry to the NSG. Towards the end of 2016, China upset India further by signalling its go-ahead to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which passes through disputed territory. The central government led by Modi had not bent to Chinese pressure. It allowed the Dalai Lama's religious visit to Arunachal Pradesh. The Indian government's policy clearly signals the diplomatic cards India can play against China. Ironically, the Dalai Lama has visited Arunachal earlier in 1983, 1997, 2003 and 2009 as well. China has been creating a diplomatic ruckus over such visits. What has irritated China in 2017 was that during the Dalai Lama's visit to Arunachal Pradesh, India's Minister of State for Home Affairs also accompanied him to Tawang. India has insisted that the visit of the Dalai Lama is purely religious and no political meaning should be attached to the same. China, on the other hand, enquired why, if the Dalai Lama's visit was purely religious, would an Indian Minister accompany him. The Indian foreign ministry too has stated that the Dalai Lama is a religious figure and the Indian government has nothing to do with visits related to revered religious personalities. A deeper analysis of the visit clearly signifies that the visit of the Dalai Lama is used by India to keep China in check. If China continues to press for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and block India's membership to the NSG, then India would have the option to exercise the following diplomatic measures.



What motivates China to assert itself in Arunachal Pradesh is based in the

region's history. In Tawang, there is a monastery called the Galden Namgye Lhatse. It was founded in 1680 by Lama Lodre Gyatso on the wishes of Ngawang Lobsang Gyatso, who was the Fifth Dalai Lama. The Tawang monastery is the seat of Karma-Kargyu sect and China knows that the Chinese legitimacy on Tibet will remain incomplete till it controls the Tawang monastery. This is the reason that China considers Tawang and Arunachal Pradesh as a part of Southern Tibet.


INDIA AND CHINA-DOLAM STANDOFF (2017)

In order to understand the standoff, a brief idea about the geography of the region is crucial. The diagram below needs to be kept in mind.

Geography and Geopolitics

- The issue between India and China happened in the Dolam plateau (which is in Doklam area), which is different from the Doklam plateau (which is located 30 Kilometers to the North East of the Dolam Plateau and is called Donglang by China).
- The Sino-Indian standoff happened in a tri-junction where borders of Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet meet, which itself is disputed.
- The Sino-Indian boundary in Sikkim (not a part of India-China Line of Actual Control), though settled, is not demarcated on a map.
- The disputed claims on the tri-junction are based on the individual interpretation of China and India on the basis of 1890 Calcutta Convention.
- The disputed tri-junction is claimed by India at a place called Batang La while China claims the tri-junction at 6.5 kilometers to the South of Batang La at a place called Gymochen.
- In 2012, under the Special Representative Talks (SRT) mechanism, India and China decided to maintain status-quo in this disputed area to their competing claims and resolve the dispute in consultation with Bhutan.
- A ridge line runs from the Batang La in the North to Gymochen in the South where there is a pass known as the Doka La. One ridge line, 500 meters high, runs eastward from Batang La till Amo Chu river while the other runs eastwards from Gymochen to Amo Chu river and is called the Jampheri ridge.
- In the center of the two ridges is 89 square kilometers bowl called Dolam plateau. Indian Army has a post in Doka la. The Batang La is the de-jure border while Doka La is the de-facto border.
- China has a motor able road called state highway S-204 which comes from Shigatse in Tibet to the north-east of the Nathu-La at a point called Yatung.
- From Yatung to Assam are unmelted roads that come to Doka-La which is a 20 kilometer long Class-5 Track (capable of carrying a load vehicles like a jeep, etc.).
- At the end of 20 kilometers point of the Class-5 Track in the Dolam plateau, near Doka La, is a turning point (barely few hundred meters away from an Indian Army post in Doka La) from where vehicles can reverse and traverse back.

Now see the diagram and analyze the geography carefully.



Heart of the Issue

On 16th June 2017, a Chinese road construction party, consisting of some 100 men with earth moving equipments, came to the turning point and started surveys to extend the road towards Jampheri ridge. Seeing this, the Indian Army troops at the camp from Doka La came down in the Dolam Plateau near the turning point (in the territory of Bhutan) and formed a human chain, preventing the Chinese to make the road and the standoff began. Subsequently, the Indian and Chinese troops (PLA's 6 Border Defence Regiment Unit-77649) established tents in the area. India asserted that the creation of the road alters the status-quo of 2012 (as established by the SRT) and if China created a road to Jampheri ridge, it would reduce the distance of China to access India's chicken's neck by 50 kilometers. Doing so would not bring China in India's artillery range but it will affect India's offensive deployments in the area.

Three Warfare Strategy

As the standoff continued, China insisted that Indian troops withdraw from Dolam plateau (as it belonged to Bhutan and was not a territory in dispute with India) and go back to Doka La while India insisted on pre 16th June 2017 position (and decided to stay in the area to assist Bhutan as per Article 2 of India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty). As the two sides got embroiled in an eyeball to eyeball confrontation, India began to build up troops along the Line of Actual Control fearing that China could open up a new front elsewhere. At the same time China unleashed a psychological warfare with a strong verbal barrage driven with a motive to back off Indian troops unilaterally. This Chinese approach was very much in sync with Chinese Three Warfare Strategy (comprising of media war, psychological war and legal war) developed by Chinese Central Military Commission in 2003 and reinforced in 2010. For India, the idea was not to back off (despite the fact that India for the first time was in the territory of a third nation-Bhutan, making this standoff different from the standoffs in Depsang in 2013 and Chumar in 2014, both of which happened on Indian territory) as doing so would have affected India's credibility in the neighborhood and

ASEAN region where it is trying to position itself as a Net Security Provider.

Quiet Diplomacy Trumps Shrill Nationalism—Throwing All Aces

After a gap of 72 days, both sides diplomatically defused the crises by an agreement where both mutually decided to disengage the troops from the region and re-establish the status quo ante. Indian troops have retreated to Doka La but continue to occupy the vantage points on the top areas of the ridge while China has decided to halt the road construction activity but will continue to patrol the region. Both sides have moved out ‘under verification’ and China has agreed to ‘make adjustments with the situation on the ground’. Xi Jinping demonstrated maturity while defusing the issue and succeeded in saving the BRICS Summit in Xiamen (where Indian PM eventually met the Xi) while also succeeded in safeguarding his reputation for the 19th Congress of the Communist Party.

Salami Slicing

An analysis of the Dolam standoff proves that China again resorted to Salami Slicing (a term coined by Hungarian Communist Matyas Rakosi in 1940’s and in military terminology known as cabbage strategy) to make territorial grabs in the Himalayas (similar to its previous grabs of Aksai Chin, Tibet and Paracel Islands). Salami Slicing means a strategy of carrying out small actions in a clandestine manner that eventually accumulate into a larger action. China, to execute Salami Slicing, initiates territorial claims by staking claims to a territory. Then, carries out an intensive propaganda of all three types (in sync with Chinese Three Warfare Strategy) at all platforms (domestic and international) to claim the territory. The propaganda by China is so intense that it positions the territory in concern as a ‘dispute’. Then China uses all its diplomatic and military might to resolve the dispute by avoiding a forceful intervention.

Rationale (do-and-be Damned, don’t-do-and-be Damned)

Xi Jinping masterminded the standoff to punish India for its OBOR Lèse-majesté by weaning Bhutan away from India but eventually ended up in a situation of ‘do-and-be damned, don’t-do-and-be damned’ quandary. Though the Sino-Indian standoff is resolved, positioning India as a mature and responsible status-quo power, India created a template for other countries to check China. India needs to strengthen its critical border infrastructure, demarcate maps on settled sectors of the border and resolve pending border disputes with China to avoid future standoffs of this nature ahead.

CONCLUSION AND FINAL ANALYSIS

Even though the two sides have tried to infuse new diplomatic blood to resolve various issues, the amount of distrust between the two remain alarming. The two sides remain locked in a security dilemma with each other. Any move by either in the neighbourhood at the security level is perceived by the other as a threat. The recent irritants between India and China over issues related to India’s membership to the NSG and Masood Azhar are a testimony to the strain. China, too, has continued to assert its territorial claims and has used strong words to criticise the Dalai Lama’s visit to Arunachal Pradesh in 2017. This is coupled with its rising incursions and transgressions into the Indian territory at the Western, Eastern and Central sectors. Though, for a long time, China never perceived India as a threat, the recent proximity between India and the USA after the civilian nuclear

deal (2005) and the signing of the LEMOA (2016) has set alarm bells ringing in China. China has responded by encircling India through the Belt and Road initiative and the erstwhile String of Pearls strategy. India has responded to all this through its reinvigorated Act East Policy and Project Mausam and Project Spice Route.

Since India's defeat in the border conflict, the foreign policy diplomats and political class in Indian has developed an immense amount of negativity towards China. India has to understand that China has its own national interests and that, at the international level, is not interested in demolishing India. It is merely pursuing its own strategic interests to achieve the status a great power.

However, not everything seems absolutely hopeless. The Joint Working Group on border issues, talks of special representatives, elevation of border talks to the level of a strategic dialogue and a hot line between the two heads of the states clearly signify convergence. It is, in fact, at the international level where India and China converge more. The unipolarity of the USA and terrorism are two concerns that both nations share equally. The forums of WTO and Climate Change have seen proximity evolve between China and India. At the energy level too, both, being energy-hungry states, have decided to cooperate rather than compete with each other. The growing convergence at the international level is constrained by the nuclear dimension. China does not discuss nuclear diplomacy with India as it feels doing so may be a defacto acceptance of India's status as a nuclear power. The Chinese harbour the feeling that the 1998 nuclear tests by India were allowed by the USA as it would alter the balance of power in Asia by helping India to go nuclear. The Indo-USA nuclear deal was also perceived negatively by the Chinese, who believe that the US is attempting to use India as a balance to China.

To tackle a powerful China, India needs to evolve more sophisticated tools of diplomacy. India needs to clarify its national interests and aggressively pace up its economic and military might. India should evolve a coherent national strategy and identify the diplomatic tools needed to execute the same, and should engage successfully with its neighbours in a way so as to prevent a firm Chinese foothold in India's backyard.

End of Section Questions

1. Examine the possible alternative foreign policy approaches for India with respect to Pakistan.
2. To what extent did 'Confidence Building Measures' have reduced unpredictability in India-Pakistan relations.
3. "Pakistan uses Jihad as a Grand Strategy." Examine this statement with respect to Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan.
4. How far is India's forward policy responsible of Sino-Indian conflict of 1962?
5. Discuss briefly the approaches of different Indian Prime Ministers on Sino-Indian border issue?
6. "India's quiet diplomacy trumped shrill nationalism of China". Examine this statement in the light of Sino-Indian Doklam Standoff (2017)?

Section F

International Institutions and Global Groupings

[Chapter 1 United Nations—Envisaged Role and Actual Record; Specialised UN Agencies—Aims and Functioning; and the Debate on need of UN Reforms and Case of India](#)

[Chapter 2 Other International and Regional Agencies and Forums—Analysis of their Structures and Mandates](#)

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CHAPTER

United Nations—Envisaged Role and Actual Record; Specialised UN Agencies—Aims and Functioning; and the Debate on need of UN Reforms and Case of India

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Origin of UN
- Basic precepts of UN
- Concept of R2P Diplomacy
- India and R2P Diplomacy
- Key elements of India's multilateral diplomacy
- Indian intention to acquire a permanent membership seat of UNSC
- India's climate change diplomacy
- India and WTO Diplomacy


ORIGIN OF THE UN

The origin of the UN can be traced back to the period of enlightenment in the eighteenth century which inspired the concept of rationality in the conduct of international affairs. The manifestation of this rationality culminated in the birth of first, the League of Nations, and then of the UN much later. The age of enlightenment gave birth to modern liberal democratic nationalism and introduced concepts like democracy and international law. In the period preceding the eighteenth century, the international relations between states were based upon mutual treaties to maintain peace and force as an instrument was used only when any principle of a treaty was violated. The hierarchical imperial administrations maintained public order through dominance. As discussed in earlier sections, the Peace Conference of Westphalia in 1648 was the first instrument of modern times that established the idea of balance of power. The Westphalia Conference addressed issues related to the reorganisation of Europe after the conclusion of the Thirty Years War. The Peace of Westphalia was followed by another landmark event—the Vienna Conference in 1814–15, where the participants of the Conference aimed to serve peace to the world by organising regular meetings of the Great Powers. The Vienna Conference or the Concert of Europe ultimately established a peaceful Europe. It initiated the System of Congress in European affairs where consultation was used as a mechanism to resolve disruptive rises.

Though the Concert of Europe had helped in supporting international cooperation, yet the first World War caused a serious disorder to the existing system. At the end of the World War-I, the USA entered the club of the great powers. Woodrow Wilson, the President of USA, in his famous ‘Fourteen Points’ speech¹, envisaged the creation of a new body called the League of Nations. The basic aim of League was to strive for collective security and eliminate chances of a future war. The formation of the League as an international body made sense because there had been tremendous bloodshed during the World War-I and world leaders at the time were determined to establish a world organisation to prevent another conflict on the same scale. In 1919, at the Paris Peace conference, Wilson tried to include the clause detailing the establishment of the League of Nations as part of the Treaty of Versailles. The Covenant for the League of Nations finally came into force on 10th January, 1920 and the League held its first meeting in Geneva.



The USA, which had proposed the creation of the League in the first place, did not join the same as the USA Senate had refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles. The entire cause of League of Nations got diluted because of the absence of the USA as a power in the League. Over a period of time, the League as a body became ineffective and inoperative. The Atlantic Charter of 1941 planted the seeds for a future global organisation for ‘general security’. In 1942, the foundational declaration of United Nations (UN) was announced. The term UN was coined for the first time by Franklin D. Roosevelt. The new organisation was envisaged under the Atlantic Charter and it advocated the idea of general security and not collective security as envisaged under the League of Nation. Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin laid the foundation of the new body called United Nations (hereafter referred to as the UN) at 4.50 pm on 24th October, 1945. A total of 51 original members (or founding members) joined that year. Fifty of them signed the Charter at the United Nations Conference on International Organisation in San Francisco on 26 June, 1945, while Poland, which was not represented at the conference, signed it on 15 October, 1945.



BASIC PRECEPTS OF THE UN

As mentioned in the previous section, the UN emerged as a second attempt by the world to create a new inter-governmental organisation (IGO) after the creation of League of Nations.




India is a founder member of the UN as it was one of the parties which signed the charter establishing the UN in 1945 in San Francisco. The UN presently consists of 193 sovereign member states that have equal representation in the UN General Assembly. The UN is the world's largest intergovernmental organisation, ahead of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. The UN can suspend a member if a member violates the UN charter. No country has ever been suspended from the UN till date. The UN has not achieved universality because Vatican City and Taiwan have not become members of the UN till date.

The criteria for admission of new members to the UN are set out in Chapter II, Article 4 of the UN Charter:

1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgement of the Organisation, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.
2. The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

A recommendation for admission from the Security Council requires affirmative votes from at least nine of the council's fifteen members, with none of the five permanent members (see details on the next page) using their veto power. The Security Council's recommendation must then be approved in the General Assembly by a two-thirds majority vote.



The primary responsibility of the UN, which lies in maintaining global peace and security, rests with the Security Council (SC). The UNSC has five permanent members namely, USA, UK, France, Russia and China. The five permanent members have special voting rights. This special voting right, which they may also exercise against or for each member, is called Veto Power. Using a veto power, any of the five member states can defeat a decision. Abstinence from a voting by a Permanent Member is not tantamount to the use of veto. While solving international disputes, the Security Council has the responsibility to take decisions. In order to maintain peace and security, the Security Council can setup fact finding missions, observation missions and may even advocate a case for mediation, conciliation and assistance.

CONCEPT OF RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (R2P)

The functioning of the UNSC is not open to the public. The global community is apprised of the decisions of the UNSC through announcement of briefings. What goes into the

making of these decisions by the five permanent members is not disclosed. Knowing how UNSC takes decisions is crucial as it is the sole global body vested with the authority to determine if a threat to international security exists or not.

Indian diplomat Hardeep Puri asserts that at times, UNSC decisions have been perilous interventions causing more destabilisation in an already volatile situation. According to Puri, who has served as the Permanent Representative of the UN when India was elected to be a non-permanent member of the Security Council in 2011–12, the recent interventions in Syria and Libya have been perilous. Puri moreover insists that the perilous and unnecessary interventions in Iraq have led to the rise of non-state actors and terrorist groups like ISIS. Such interventions are largely made on the logic of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) to prevent genocide and seek support at the humanitarian level.

Since the end of the Cold War, the idea of preventive diplomacy has emerged in the form of R2P. Some scholars who have analysed the R2P have developed a view that it's a code that gives the international community unbridled powers that often lead to interference in the internal affairs of nation states. Such scholars feel that R2P could be a phenomenon that could potentially give rise to a new era of colonialism. The main idea of preventive diplomacy is to cure the conflicts before they emerge in their fiercest forms on the international scene. The term Preventive Diplomacy was used for the first time in 1960s by Dag Hammarskjöld, who was then the Secretary-General of the UN. He proposed that the basic idea of preventive diplomacy was to keep local conflicts outside the superpower rivalry and prevent the two superpowers from escalating conflicts. Though the view of Hammarskjöld was relevant during the Cold War period, it lost its relevance during the post-Cold War era due to the absence of active rivalry between power blocks. A new approach in the post-Cold War times was propounded by the sixth Secretary-General of the UN, Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992. According to Boutros Boutros-Ghali, preventive diplomacy was not only about preventing disputes that already exist from escalating into conflicts, but about taking action to prevent a dispute itself from arising. The idea was based upon the logic of common good of the entire humanity.

The eighth UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, also asserted that preventive diplomacy should involve all the stakeholders to strengthen UN partnerships between all regional and international actors. He emphasised that any preventive diplomacy, when applied, should be under the larger umbrella of the UN Charter and should not violate the sovereignty of a state.




We need to keep in mind that preventive diplomacy is not concerned with solving every problem in the world, as it is a special response in a situation which warrants interference to avoid escalation into any form of violence. It may not even always prevent a conflict, but as a tool may promote peace by preventing escalation of the conflict. According to the Article 51 of the UN Charter, if there is an armed attack upon a state, the

state can resort to use of force in self-defence while informing the UN Security Council immediately. The Article 51 further asserts that the Security Council can also initiate steps to restore peace and security in the international system. Under the chapter VII of the UN Charter, the determination of the existence of a threat to the world peace would be taken only by the UNSC and under Article 41, steps would be taken to maintain peace without the use of force. However, under Article 42, the UNSC is empowered to use air, sea or land power to restore peace through blockades and operations. A lot of questions remain unanswered. The most important question is on what criteria the UNSC would get to decide that an issue in a state is ripe for international intervention and is not an internal matter.

There are, however, international situations where a concept like the R2P actually helps. The idea of R2P is that a state actor should take steps to protect people and if a state, in some extreme scenario, is unable to protect its people, then the responsibility to protect its citizens falls upon the international community. The R2P was endorsed by the UNGA in 2005 and UN Resolutions 1694 (in 2006) and 1894 (in 2009) also affirmed the same.

The states are quite worried as some have developed a feeling that R2P would be used to interfere in the internal affairs of a state and may lead to regime changes.



INDIA AND R2P DIPLOMACY

When India became independent, Nehru steered India's Foreign Policy in the era of the Cold War. Nehru asserted that India would determine its own destiny by remaining independent in its decision making at the foreign and domestic policy level. This led Nehru to promote the idea of Non-Alignment. During Nehruvian times, India evolved the principles of non-interference and non-intervention. However, in 1971, when Indian troops helped slice off East Pakistan, India cited the logic of right of self-defence provided under Article 51 of the UN charter (as explained above). Though India favoured a weak Pakistan in its strategic interests, the subsequent international condemnation by the international community on India's response in 1971 put India on toes again.

India also intervened in Sri Lanka through UNPKF in 1987 with the consent of the Sri Lankan government, but ended up paying a heavy price for its intervention. India learned a valuable lesson—that of not resorting to military intervention if the two parties have irreconcilable differences. At the global level, whenever India has engaged at UN level, it has favoured the idea of using non-violence as a tool of conflict resolution. This idea to resolve conflicts through non-violence is promoted by India even outside its regional sphere. In fact, India's Sri Lanka episode of 1987 (explained in detail in the chapter of India and Sri Lanka relationship) has convinced Indian policy makers that using force to impose a social change in the society will yield no results.

India has clearly understood that in a situation of international anarchy, the states, by having an interaction with each other at all the levels, can still resolve differences through dialogue. India's political perception of not viewing the world in completely black and white is rooted deep in its psyche. This perception owes its origin to 2000-year-old Indian epic called *The Mahabharata*. India often dictates openness, tolerance and non-violence to all states as a value irrespective of a domestic regime. India does not have an issue if a society is not democratic as India feels it's a domestic choice of a state to have its own systems of governance.


In 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) prepared a report on R2P. India, during the initial phase of evolution of the concept of R2P, showed some scepticism. India, initially, did not even send official representatives for a discussion. The reason India did not officially participate in ICISS was because ICISS was a NGO and India normally does not officially interact with NGOs by sending its diplomats. More importantly, the Indian perception about R2P was that it was largely, as explained and discussed by the ICISS, just a new name for humanitarian intervention where Western states wanted to resort to some sort of force to achieve their own interests. All these years, India had formed a group called G-4 in 2004 with India, Brazil, Japan and Germany, and used the G-4 to advocate for UN reforms. As the debate on R2P progressed, India initially stated that it would not accept right of humanitarian intervention or idea of military humanism in any form, as was under discussion. In fact, India's Permanent Representative to the UN at that time asserted that only a reformed and enlarged UNSC should be authorised to undertake any decision on any such issue and that it should also include the regional organisations. India constantly exhibited recalcitrant opposition to the idea of R2P in the initial years. The initial document of the R2P followed the idea of coercive solidarism². However, as there was a staunch opposition to the idea, the idea of 'consensual solidarism' was added by replacing the idea of coercive solidarism. However, two events in the times ahead brought about a shift in Indian perception of the R2P. Let us have a look at the two events.

In 2007, the military Junta of Myanmar suppressed peaceful protestors. All western states condemned the suppression and even resorted to sanctioning Myanmar. India, on the other hand, stated that such issues were domestic issues of a state and that India would remain neutral to its neighbour's internal squabbles and continue to engage with Myanmar. In 2008, Cyclone Nargis caused heavy devastation in Myanmar. India immediately resorted to an engaging approach of closed door diplomacy and provided immediate relief supplies.

Similarly, in 2009, as the Sri Lankan civil war was in its final stages, India maintained a diplomatic rhetoric of no harm to the civilians (this was due to domestic political compulsions and the upcoming elections in 2009), but refused any sort of intervention in the affairs of Sri Lanka.

These two instances of 2007 and 2009 gave India an option to evolve its position on R2P. In 2009, when the UNGA debated the R2P, India asserted that it favours the idea that protecting its citizens is the sovereign responsibility of the state. India supported the pillar-1 of the R2P. India also supported the idea that weak states would be provided international assistance to prevent conflicts from escalating. India, thus, also supported

pillar-2 of the R2P. India showed resistance to the idea of international humanitarian intervention in case a state failed to protect its people. India asserted that this measure should be used as a last resort and only exercised on case specific basis. India maintained that if international humanitarian intervention is used (as a last resort) it should be used in compliance with the charter of the UN and regional organisations operating in the region of intervention should be consulted. India, therefore, supported Pillar-1 and 2 and conveyed its disagreements over Pillar-3.



In 2010, India was elected to the UNSC as a Non-Permanent member for two years. India witnessed its first challenge in February 2011 when the Libyan crises took place. The UNSC passed a resolution (Resolution number 1970) urging for an immediate halt of violence and advocated that the Libyan case be referred to the ICC. India voted in favour of UNSC resolution 1970. As the situation in Libya worsened, the UNSC passed another, more stringent, resolution (Resolution 1973) and urged the member states to take all possible actions to protect civilians. India abstained in the vote of UNSC Resolution 1973 as it stated that there was no clarity on the ground situation in Libya and the action advocated under UNSC Resolution 1973 violates Libyan sovereignty. The NATO immediately launched operation ‘Unified Protector’ in Libya. India vocally criticised the NATO operation as, when the NATO began its operations, it began to fund the rebels for a regime change. India was alarmed to see that instead of focussing on making peace on the ground, NATO was making no attempts for a ceasefire. India asserted that the way the UNSC resolution 1973 was adopted and implemented on the ground brought a bad name to the idea of R2P. India began to press the idea that there needed to be a broad debate upon the third pillar and the circumstances in which it will be used. Brazil also promoted the idea of Responsibility While Protecting (RWP) and India advocated that R2P should be anchored in RWP. India further asserted that imposing the idea of a regime change from outside is a dangerous path to be followed.



In October 2011, the Syrian crisis became the second area of contention for India. India again abstained from voting in the case of Syria as it did not want a ‘second Libya’ situation to be perpetrated in Syria. India emphasised that it would favour a dialogue in Syria and not a threat of sanctions as advocated by the West. India, during its tenure as a non permanent member of the UNSC, succeeded in getting statements passed that not only condemned the Syrian atrocities on civilians but proposed a negotiation and a national solution amongst the parties in the civil war. In February 2012 and July 2012, India supported two more Resolutions which favoured a regional attempt by the Arab League to find a solution and use of non-military sanctions on the Syrian regime led by Assad. The

analysis of Syria and Libya clearly prove that India favoured its own interpretation of R2P rooted in its own historical past. Our analysis of India's behaviour from 2005 to 2012 on R2P shows that India does not want to be a power that obstructs but instead wishes to be an emerging player that shapes international norms, while preferring to play a rule based game.



KEY ELEMENTS IN INDIA'S MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS IN FOREIGN POLICY

India has realised that multilateral forums offer India necessary platforms to exercise global influence. India always attaches greater importance to global organisations as it helps in measuring the rise of India as a major player in the international system. Indian diplomats also consider postings in the global organisations as prestigious as it enables them to inculcate some serious negotiation-related skills in themselves. In the initial period of the Cold War, India used to be a rule taker at the global level. Since the end of the Cold War, India has shifted its position to that of a rule maker today. Keeping in sync with growing Indian capabilities and a rising international profile of India, India has decided to partake in the exercise of shaping norms today. What puts Indian diplomats in a place of advantage in international organisations is their proficiency in English and deep knowledge about the history of core issues vested in the international scene. Instead of formal training, Indian diplomats work upon building their historical knowledge database by working with senior diplomats and such skill comes handy in international organisations. Many countries in the world, at different times, have appreciated this quality in Indian diplomats.

At the international level, Indian diplomats strive to act as a bridge between conflicting parties. A unique feature of Indian diplomacy at the multilateral level is that they may refuse firmly to accept a deal which may be unfavourable to India. This aspect of India's policy is visible at forums discussing climate change, trade and nuclear deals like NPT and CTBT and so on. Due to such a behaviour, at times, India often puts to risk the support of powerful countries that may have helped her play a larger role in shaping norms at the global level.

India's traditional multilateral policy began from the way it rallied countries under the rubric of non-alignment and G-77. These groups were used by India to reject the ideas propounded by the West against the interests of the participants. The non-aligned states and G-77 collectively worked as a coalition in the UN to block any initiatives that might hurt the interests of the coalition. At the end of the Cold War, non-alignment became more of a forum. India gradually began to shift to seek solidarity with smaller groups that could advance Indian interests. As India searched for smaller groups, it remained confined to developing states only. According to Aruna Narlikar, the coalition was not issue-based but still a bloc-style concept (we will elaborate this in the next chapter). India has, however, found it difficult to obtain recognition for new groups. India, for instance, found it difficult

to establish a group called ‘Development Agenda Group,’ comprising of twenty-two states. India has, in the meantime, launched a massive bureaucratic campaign for a permanent seat to the UNSC. In fact, whenever there has been a state visit of any leader, India makes the pledge of support by the visiting Head of the State as a part of the Joint Communiqué. Despite support pledges from USA, UK, France and Russia, India has not been able to succeed effectively. In fact, India has become a part of the G-4 to seek a coalition-based support for a permanent UNSC seat. One of the important reasons for these unsatisfactory results till date regarding the campaign is the lack of a powerful push from the Indian political leadership and relatively less resources available to the diplomatic corps for the campaign. India, in the last two decades, has become unsuccessful in mobilising foreign states, based on compelling arguments, to push for India’s candidacy at UNSC. Also, there has been no realisation amongst the P-5 states of anything of India’s inherent power structures that may compel them to add India in the group. The P-5 has still not had the feeling that the absence of India at the P-5 states may have led to a missing link in adequate representation of all states equally in the world.

The bureaucratic lethargy was visible in 2006 when Shashi Tharoor entered the fray to be appointed the UN Secretary General. Tharoor lost out to South Korean Ban-Ki Moon as Indian foreign bureaucracy could not powerfully assert at the level of closed door negotiations with all states in the world while South Koreans made Ban-Ki Moon’s appointment one of the core priorities of their foreign policy. In 2007, India rectified the shortcomings in Tharoor’s campaign when it came to the appointment of a Secretary General of Commonwealth of Nations. India’s MEA and political leadership launched an elaborate and a massive campaign that saw Kamlesh Sharma sail through.

In the sections ahead, we shall see that in the recent times, whenever the Indian premiers have taken a personal interest in multilateral diplomacy, India has witnessed more instances of success. Now, let us turn our attention to the aspect of India and its diplomacy with the UN.

INDIA AND THE UN

India has played a key role in the creation of the UN. An Indian delegation was present at the San Francisco conference in 1945 and was represented by C P Ramaswamy Mudaliar, Feroz Khan Noon and V T Krishnamachari. While the discussions were going on in the conference, India proposed that instead of UNSC ‘electing’ six non-permanent members, it should ‘appoint’ the members on criteria like their population, the industrial capacity of the state and so forth. India also asserted that six members be ‘appointed’ to the UNSC to participate in the discussions of the UNSC without a right to vote. Though India’s suggestions were not accepted, India also raised concerns over veto powers.

India became one of the founding members of the UN. As India began to engage with the UN as an independent country, it first focussed on decolonisation. India believed that the UN, as a platform, could be used to expedite the process of decolonisation of the world and this would also provide India an opportunity to showcase its global leadership at a world platform. Throughout the period of the Cold War, India began to use the UN platform for spearheading disarmament and solicited the support of UN for development. The 3-D formula of India at the UN (Decolonisation, Disarmament and Development) worked well for India. In the previous chapters of the book, we have argued the basic

tenets of India's decolonisation policy (see chapter of India–Africa Policy—Key drivers) and India's disarmament diplomacy (see chapter of India's Nuclear Foreign Policy). Since the end of the Cold War, as Indian economy began to improve and as India began to emerge on the world scene as a new economic powerhouse, it began to seek greater participation in the UN, especially the Security Council. By this time, India's perception about UN had begun to alter after India's experience at the UN level with respect to the Kashmir problem (see chapter of India–Pakistan relationship for an in-depth analysis). Initially, India had perceived the UN as a platform for international peace. However, due to the way the Security Council dealt with the Kashmir problem, India began to realise that the UNSC would act predominantly under political pressure from the bigger powers while resolving disputes which would be based upon the ideological tilt of the parties involved in the dispute. By the 1960s and 1970s, especially after the experience of Kashmir, India began to feel that bilateralism would be more befitting to Indian interests than multilateralism. However, at present, India has been seeking reforms in the UNSC. India aspires for a permanent seat at the UNSC. In 2015, an Intergovernmental Negotiation adopted a formal document at the UN for UN reforms. A text based negotiation process has been launched for reforms of the UNSC from 2015.



China has been one of the primary hurdles in India's accession as a permanent member to the UNSC. China does not want to share the status of being the only Asian power in the UNSC with India. More so, although India has received vocal support from USA, UK, France and Russia for its permanent candidacy to the UNSC, these powers have been quite reluctant to undertake UNSC reforms to add India. There is a general perception that the powers intend to maintain a status quo in the arena of international relations. Also, as permanent membership to the UNSC requires two-third majority of the UN General Assembly, seeking a consensus on the same shall be another challenge for India. Some permanent members of the UNSC have argued that India's contribution to the budget of the Security Council does not match its claims to be at the higher table. However, with the beginning of text-based reforms since 2015 for the first time in the modern history of UN, the situation has reignited hopes for India's permanent candidacy once again.

INDIA'S CLIMATE CHANGE DIPLOMACY

The debate of climate change owes its origin from 1970s. The UN Conference on Human Environment was held in 1972 in Stockholm. Twenty years later, in 1992, the world achieved consensus to establish UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change). Over a period of time, the UNFCCC along with IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) worked out some dedicated scientific research on the issues relating to global warming. The newfound euphoria for climate sciences culminated in the birth of the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol however ended in 2012 (as its compliance period was from 2008 to 2012) and since then the leaders

of the world have been struggling to come out with a new successor agreement. In the same time period however, the leaders of the world were able to achieve a consensus on Montreal Protocol to tackle issues pertaining to depletion of ozone layer. India has participated in the global climate change diplomacy since the 1980s. India was one of the most forceful voices in 1972 at the UN Conference on Human Environment that was held in Stockholm. India asserted that the fixation of the western world on industrialisation and aggressive economic growth has been the most important reason for rise of environmental concerns at the global level. Indira Gandhi at Stockholm emphasised that over-consumption of resources in the West was a major cause for the degradation of environment. She refuted the claims of the West that exploitation of natural resources by developing world was the major reason for the environmental mess. Indira asserted the right to development of the developing world as a strategy. She advocated that the Western world provide assistance to the developing world in its quest for development as they were responsible for the injustices perpetrated upon the third world due to colonialism and imperialism. In 1988, the UN asserted that climate change is a common concern for mankind and decided to setup an Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to deliberate upon the issue of climate change. The UNGA, in 1989, urged members to establish a ‘framework convention’ to address climate change. In 1992, this led to the birth of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Rio at the Earth Summit. India was a part of the intergovernmental negotiating committee which negotiated the conduct of the convention. India understood that climate diplomacy could affect its national interests and hence, became a part of the climate change negotiations. India began to outline its position on climate change, that the GHG emissions were majorly caused by the developed world as the emissions of the developing world were minuscule in comparison. India also said that as developing world will have to work to remove poverty and undertake development, their GHG emissions would rise. Therefore, in this prevailing scenario, a legally binding target upon the developing world could not be advanced. India advocated that any convention in future should establish a bridge of technology transfers from the western world to the global south to help them meet developmental challenges. India advised that an equitable solution to tackle GHG emissions is that the developing world reduce their emissions per capita and converge them with the per capital emissions of developing world.



At the CoP-1 in Berlin in 1995, India advocated that Annex-I parties accept legal targets to reduce emissions in a time bound manner through a protocol. India succeeded to get the idea of ‘differentiated responsibilities’ endorsed in the Berlin Mandate. India, during CoP-3 negotiations in Kyoto, pressed for the removal of any voluntary commitments for developing world. The CoP-3 agreed upon the same but introduced mechanisms like Joint Implementation, Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Emissions Trading and so on. Over a period of time, India accepted that it would ensure (through a voluntary pledge) that its emissions do not exceed the emissions of the developed world. In the Bali Action Plan, India successfully ensured that its domestic

measures for mitigation are not placed under external scrutiny as doing so would have violated India's sovereignty. In 2008, India announced its National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC). India pledged that it will resort to mitigation actions domestically and by 2020, would voluntarily reduce India's emission intensity by 20–25% of its GDP. India follows a two-point strategy. It has joined hands with the G-77 to ensure that no legally binding commitments are imposed on developing states. It has also worked with the BASIC group (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) at the global level. When the Modi Government came to power in 2014, India continued with the same policies as it had espoused earlier. India is still following a bilateral policy to garner financial and technical support for clean energy, its recent deals with France and USA (as explained in the respective chapters) are testimony to that fact. India in the recent times has shown a great resolve at the Paris Agreement of Climate Change. The Paris Agreement focuses on developing the capabilities of developing countries to combat climate change in sync with their national priorities that each state has to define under the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs). India has announced its INDCs and is trying to play a crucial role in global climate debate. When Donald Trump assumed the Presidency of US in 2017, he passed an order withdrawing US from the Paris Agreement. This provides India yet again an opportunity to lead the global climate negotiations.



India's INDC Targets (Source—Press Information Bureau)

Under its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDCs), India has indicated that it will achieve about 40 percent cumulative electric power installed capacity from non-fossil fuel based energy resources by 2030 with the help of transfer of technology and low cost international finance including from Green Climate Fund (GCF). The contributions under INDC have to be achieved by 2030.

India has set renewable power deployment target of 175 GW by the year 2022, which includes 100 GW from solar and 60 GW from wind energy.

The revised Tariff Policy, notified by the government on 28 January, 2016 has several provisions aimed at accelerating deployment of renewable energy in the country, including, inter alia, provisions for (a) 8% solar Renewable Purchase Obligation (RPO) by the year 2022; (b) Renewable Generation Obligation on new coal/lignite based thermal plants; (c) bundling of renewable power with power from plants in case of fully depreciated power plants whose Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) have expired; and (d) exemption of renewable energy from inter-state transmission charges. The Government has also issued guidelines for long-term growth of RPOs for non-solar as well as solar energy.

INDIA AND WTO

Before the World Trade Organisation (WTO) came into existence in 1995, there was a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). India was one of the members of GATT but could not achieve much success as GATT was dominated by the quad of Canada, USA, Japan and the EU and was a rich man's club. Before the WTO was born, the world witnessed heavy protectionism. There were tariff barriers which were imposed by states that restricted trade but, when the WTO was formed, its primary focus was removal of

tariff barriers to integrate the economies of all nations in the world. The WTO came out with 19 agreements (with each having an annexure) to achieve its objectives.

In 1986, multilateral negotiations began under the Uruguay round. The negotiations under the Uruguay Round ended in 1994, with a recommendation to create the WTO. Uruguay Round advocated that there shall be a gradual reduction of tariffs and a timeline to dismantle Multi Fibre Agreement (MFA) which governed the textile trade under the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) as well as the Agreement on Agriculture (AOA). Though the process to dismantle the tariffs competed by 2005, textile products still continued to have high tariffs. When the WTO was formed, it advocated non-discriminatory free trade through negotiations by ensuring predictability and transparency in global trade. The WTO came out with an Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM), which, in turn, came out with three product categories. Under the Red category, if one state gave a subsidy on a product for its manufacturing and then exports it to the other state, then the importing state can ban the import of the product. A state in this case, under the Amber category, can either invoke countervailing duties or report to the Dispute Settlement Mechanisms (DSM) of the WTO. If the product falls under the Green Category, no action can be taken by a state. Under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) a state could resort to setting Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary (SPS) measures and create Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreements. Under the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement, states, by establishing domestic laws, need to ensure stringent punishments for copying intellectual property rights and take steps to prevent piracy.

As India integrated itself through the WTO, its trade began to increase. As the MFA was scrapped under the ATC of WTO, India also witnessed a textile boom. As developing countries faced difficulties to implement the agreements of the WTO, they began to seek concessions. A new round of negotiations began in Doha in 2001. The negotiations were called the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). As the DDA negotiations began, India raised concerns over the Special Safeguard Mechanisms (SSM), which was essentially a tool that would allow developing countries to raise tariffs temporarily to deal with import surges or price falls. Issues related to Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) too emerged in the DDA. During the DDA, the developing countries asserted that they had not been granted sufficient trade concessions, while developed countries argued that developing countries have not eliminated tariffs in agriculture and services sectors. During the DDA negotiations, the developed countries advocated that through a Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA), the developing countries should open up their markets. Due to many differences between the developed and developing states at the DDA, the negotiations collapsed.

After the failure of Doha negotiations, to make a breakthrough on agriculture subsidies and SSM, the next debate began in 2013 in Bali where again issues related to agriculture erupted. The Bali negotiations decided to focus on TFA as it would facilitate border trade. For India, the priority with respect to TFA was to clarify that if it was unable to fulfil some complicated provisions of TFA, then it should not be made to go through proceedings related to dispute settlements. As the USA realised that TFA could again become an issue with the developing countries, if they started making concessions in agriculture. The issue in agriculture was of stockpiling and challenging stockpiles of

developing states. Members at the WTO agreed that if a developing country maintained a stockpile over 10% of its agricultural produce, then it could be challenged by other WTO members. But the WTO said that for a certain length of time, the developing countries, in order to provide food security to its population, can maintain excess stockpile (over 10% limit) without any member challenging the decision. The issue was to decide what interval would be allowed for such a limit to remain unchallenged by other member states. India wanted unlimited and indefinite timeframe while the USA favoured a two year ‘peace clause’. After intense negotiations, it was agreed by the Ministerial Decision on Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes that a four-year peace clause will be followed and the TFA has to be concluded and implemented. However, when the Modi government came to power in 2014 in India, it asserted that it would not accept the agreements related to TFA and public stockholding as they are against the interests of India. India asserted that a new agreement should be worked out where stockholding restraints are removed for developing countries and they be given an indefinite exception. Later, in 2014, during a meeting with Obama, Modi announced his support for the Bali Agreement with a tighter language and the Bali Agreement was then taken to the next step.

Many negotiators theorise that India always adopts a hardline policy in trade negotiations as it always suffers a feeling that any blanket trade treaty may put India in a disadvantage. Thus, India has this culture of resorting to either a flat-out refusal or, at times, taking a long time to negotiate. However, India also has to understand and consider the consequences of the costs involved with such an attitude on other member states in the times ahead.

Amrita Narlikar says that when India negotiates for trade, it favors to work with hybrid coalition of states. These hybrid coalitions are issue centric (like agriculture etc.). Amrita argues that India adopts a distributive, demandeur and a naysaying strategy that have legitimacy of process or equity of outcomes at the heart of negotiations.

1. Fourteen Points is a blueprint for world peace that was to be used for peace negotiations after World War I, elucidated in a January 8, 1918, speech on war aims and peace terms by US President Woodrow Wilson.
2. Solidarism is the social theory of a combined solidarity of interests.

2
CHAPTER

Other International and Regional Agencies and Forums—Analysis of their Structures and Mandates

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- India and the ICC
- India and the ICJ
- India and the G-8
- India and the G-77
- India and the G-20
- India and the GCC
- India and BRICS
- India and BIMSTEC
- India and IORA
- India and Nuclear Security Summit
- India and the Multilateral Export Control Regimes.
- India and the APEC
- India and the RCEP
- India and the Mekong Ganga cooperation
- India and the ASEAN
- India and SCO
- India and SAARC
- India and World Bank and IMF

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, we shall attempt a brief analysis of India's diplomatic strategy as practiced with various international organisations. We shall first have a brief look at the features and chief characteristics of the organisations and then proceed to analyse how India has dealt with the organisations.

INDIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (ICC)

The idea to have an International Court to prosecute and try leaders who were accused of international crimes was proposed for the first time in 1919 at the Paris Peace Conference by the Commission of Responsibilities after the World War—I. However, no such court

could be established at that time. Similar proposals were made even after World War-II, as well as in the early 1990s, during the Cold War, but three events gave a strong push for the idea again in the late 1980s and 1990s. Firstly, in 1989, the PM of Trinidad and Tobago AN.R Robinson proposed the creation of an International Court to deal with issues related to drug trafficking. After the proposal of Robinson, an International Law Commission (ILC) was tasked by the UNGA to draft a statute to establish a Permanent Court. Secondly, atrocities in Yugoslavian wars by the armed forces of Yugoslavia led to the formation of an International Criminal Tribunal for trying cases related to the former Yugoslavia in 1993. Thirdly, following the genocide in Rwanda, an International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was established in 1994.

When these tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia were established, there was a need felt to have a Permanent International Criminal Court. In 1994, a final draft for the establishment of International Criminal Court (ICC) was prepared by the ILC. The ILC urged the UNGA to convene a conference and negotiate a treaty to establish a statute for the court. The negotiations began to draft the statute and continued till 1998. The UNGA organised a conference in Rome to finalise the treaty that would act as a statute for the ICC. Subsequently, the Rome Statute of the ICC, or simply, the Rome Statute as it was commonly called, was adopted and the ICC was formally established, after ratifications by member states, on 1st July, 2002. The headquarters of the ICC is in The Hague, Netherlands. The ICC prosecutes those who are responsible for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity and is the court of last resort which intervenes only if a national authority could not prosecute the ones responsible for the crimes stated above.

Till date, India has neither signed nor ratified the Rome statute and is not a party to the ICC. India has raised a lot of objections to the Rome Statute. India feels that under the Rome statute, the ICC has been subordinated to the UNSC and such subordination would result in political interference by the UNSC in the decisions of the ICC. As per the Rome statute, India states, the non-state parties that go to the ICC can be bound to the UNSC by the ICC. This, India feels is a violation of the Vienna convention, because under the Vienna convention if a state has not accepted a treaty, it cannot be made to forcibly accede to it (veritably the exact same point of objection that India has in case of the CTBT). India feels that the Rome statute has given extraordinary powers, in this regard, to the UNSC. Moreover, India takes issue with the fact that the Rome statute has refused to accept terrorism and use of nuclear weapons as crimes under ICC, as proposed by India. India has also raised objections to the definition of "war crimes" under Article 8 of the Rome Statute as it has included in its ambit "armed conflict not of an international character". India feels this provision could be used against India by other states by making a case for Kashmir where India asserts it is tackling state sponsored terrorism by Pakistan. India, thus, has not signed or ratified the ICC and remains an observer to the ICC.

India and the International Court of Justice (ICJ)

The origin of the ICJ can be traced to the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ). During the World War-II, the PCIJ began to lose its relevance and was later succeeded by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The UN Charter in San Francisco established the ICJ in 1945. The ICJ is in The Hague, Netherlands and it has 15 Judges who belong to different nationalities. The ICJ helps in settling disputes between two conflicting states on

the basis of international law. It also looks into legal matters referred to it and gives advisory opinions. The ICJ can only be approached by member states of the UN as private individuals and entities are not permitted to take up the matters at the level of ICJ. When a state may take up a matter at the ICJ, it can take up a case of an individual person with respect to another state in concern. It is on the basis of this point that India in 2017 took up the matter of Kulbhushan Jadhav (an Indian national, in custody of Pakistan, arrested by Pakistan on 3rd March, 2016 in Mashkel area of Baluchistan on spying charges). Pakistan had arrested Jadhav in their territory and asserted that Jadhav was sent by India's external intelligence agency (R&AW) to create destruction of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor. Jadhav was arrested on the charges of espionage and terrorism. India and Pakistan are both signatories to the Optional Protocol of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR), 1963. India has sought consular access to Jadhav many times while Pakistan has rejected the same every time. Jadhav was further tried in a military court in Pakistan and in April, 2017 was awarded death sentence. As both India and Pakistan are signatories to the VCCR, India subsequently took up the matter to the ICJ. The ICJ has the jurisdiction to hear disputes if an aggrieved party asserts that there has been a different interpretation on the VCCR by the other party involved in the dispute. India in May, 2017 requested ICJ to apply provisional measures to ensure that Pakistan does not execute Jadhav. Under the provisional measures, ICJ under article 41 of the statute of the ICJ, it can issue injunctive directions. The article 74 of the ICJ has given powers to the President of the ICJ to issue ad-interim directions when matters related to provisional measures are brought up. Under article 74(4) of the ICJ Statute, the ICJ President issued orders to Pakistan to ensure that it does not execute Jadhav for the time being. India had put up to the ICJ that if Pakistan executes Jadhav, there would be irreparable damage caused to the rights which are claimed by India. The ICJ while ordering ad-interim relief to India in May 2017 asserted that Pakistan by denying consular access to India has violated the human rights of Jadhav despite it being a signatory of VCCR.

INDIA AND THE G-8

In the 1970s, the western world received an oil shock (see the chapter on 'Issues in the Middle East' for details). Due to 1973 oil crisis, the non-communist states witnessed inflation in their economies. In 1975, the industrialised and capitalist countries came together and decided to address ongoing concerns in their economies. In 1975, the USA, the UK, France, West Germany, Italy and Japan established a group of six countries (called the G-6) to address concerns related to economy. In 1976, Canada joined the G-6, making it the G-7. In 1998, Russia too joined the G-7, transforming it into the G-8. We need to remember that the European Union (EU) is also a non-enumerated member to the G-8. Officially, to join G-8, there is no formal membership criterion. A cursory look at the members profile suggests that the members are advanced industrialised economies. G-8 is neither an institution nor does it have any secretariat. However, it does hold annual summits. One of the most important values of G-8 countries is that they are believers in democracy. In this regard, Russia was a special exception. In 2014, when Russia made advances on Ukraine (explained in the chapter on 'Issues in Europe'), the G-8 countries decided to suspend Russia from the group as its actions were not perceived in line with democratic value propounded by G-8. In the 43rd G-7 summit in 2017 (which happened in

Taormina, Sicily, Italy), the Tunisian president Beji Caid Essebsi was a guest invitee.

Neither India nor China has been a part of the G–8. There is a growing perception that the G–8 (G–7 as of now) is anachronistic as it lacks participation of states like India and China, along with Brazil, South Korea and Mexico and so on, that have long surpassed the GDP of the G–7. Some scholars observe that absence of these countries of the developing world was an impetus to formation of BRICS as a platform. India asserts that being the largest democracy in the world, it has a rightful claim to be a part of the G–8.

INDIA AND THE G–77

When the first session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) ended in Geneva in 1967, seventy-seven countries came together to establish an intergovernmental organisation called G–77 in the UN to use it as a platform to collectively promote the economic interests of the Global South. The idea was also to use the platform to promote South–South cooperation. India has been one of the founding members of the G–77. India has been playing a leadership role in advancing the interests of the developing world through the G–77 at the UN. In the recent times, the G–77 has played an important role in climate change negotiations. India and China and G–77 have forcefully demanded that developed countries should provide adequate finances to the developing countries to tackle climate change. India has been negotiating at the climate change level with G–77, the Like Minded Developing Countries (LMDC) and the BASIC group of countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China).

The G–77 and India have achieved some impressive feats globally. They have been able to assert that each individual sovereign state has sovereign control over its resources. They have also successfully asserted that the global wealth distribution should be equal. India has asserted under the G–77 umbrella that wealth should be reallocated on the principles of equality and equity. This has been India's core policy point even in the climate change negotiations. India has also asserted that all states, and more importantly, all developing countries need to have equal participation in global economic affairs. These points, stressed by India through G–77, also form a part of the basis of the G–20. However, the G–77, being a loosely knit organisation with no permanent research institution for propaganda, has a weak international response. In the climate change talks, many of the G–77 players have been found having differing positions and thereby G–77 has not been able to emerge as a united front.

INDIA AND THE G–20

With a focus on global economic governance, in 1999, the governors of the central banks of twenty states came together to promote international financial stability and established the G–20. The G–20 was basically formed as a group of 20 emerging market economies and developed countries to promote discussion on policy issues pertaining to global economic governance. The G–20 held its first summit in 1999 in Berlin. The major difference between G–20 and G–8 is that G–8 only focussed on developed countries while G–20 has a broader participation with emerging market economies part of the group. The chairmanship of G–20 is Rotational, with one nation annually getting the chair. India has been a member of this powerful economic club. In 2019, India shall hold the chair of G–

20. The G–20 has no formal voting criteria. In the recent G–20 summits in 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017, India has advised that the global economic surplus wealth should be deployed for development of infrastructure. India, in the recent summit of G–20 in Hamburg in Germany in 2017, has also proposed that surplus wealth should be used to develop efficient energy technologies. In the 2017 summit, the G–20 nations congratulated India for taking steps to make it easy to do business in India. In the 2017 summit, India forcefully argued on issues related to terrorism. India asserted that states supporting terrorism should not be allowed to be a part of G–20 and sought early conclusion of the UN Convention on International Terrorism.



In the 2017 Germany G–20 summit, India offered strong resistance to protectionist measures adopted by the states. India has pitched for free movement of labour and capital amongst the states to bolster up the global economy. India has further pitched for stronger action at the level of tackling black money and terrorism. A new element in India's diplomacy at G–20 has been to pitch for poverty eradication.




The G–20 is an excellent forum for interaction between developed and emerging market economies, but India has, over time, raised some concerns about the organisation. India believes that, in the era of global economic slowdown, if nations resort to quantitative easing due to injection of cash, in the advanced economies, the capital flows become volatile and the developing countries, in cases such as these, should be given a right to resort to capital control measures. India has also pointed out that although G–20 has spearheaded a discussion on reforms of global financial architecture, the progress has been slow. India has stated that having the US Dollar as a reserve global currency has exposed the vulnerabilities of a systemic risk during crises. Thus, India asserts that a possible solution here for the G–20 could be to explore widening of the SDR basket and add more currencies.

INDIA AND THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL (GCC)

In 1981, Saudi Arabia, Oman, the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar came together to establish an intergovernmental regional politico-economic block called the GCC. The GCC emerged as an alliance of six Gulf States to promote economic interaction. Western scholars believe that GCC is based on a foundation of a common security concern but the scholars of the GCC nations insist that it is a platform for economic, cultural, political and scientific integration. There was a proposal in 2011 to establish a Gulf Union and transform the GCC into a tight economic and military union. The proposal has met with

certain objections from some member states. The GCC has also been negotiating a common currency named Khaleeji but the progress on the same has been slow.

India's relations with GCC has been on since 1947. Initially, as mentioned in the chapter of 'India-West Asia Policy—Key Drivers,' India politically supported GCC and other states in the region during Cold War. By the end of the Cold War, as India's dependence upon energy from the Gulf increased, India began to hold the GCC as crucial for its energy security. In earlier chapters, we have mentioned that India decided to sign oil-based partnerships with Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar. India realised that it can leverage its historically good political relationship with the GCC to develop energy security partnerships. As India's oil trade increased in the post-Cold War times, a lot of Indians began to work in the Gulf States as professionals. The post-Cold War times have witnessed a shift from blue collar to white collar Indian presence in the GCC states. In the recent times, India has realised that as the trade with the region enhances, it not only needs to protect the sea lanes of communications but also ensure safety of its diaspora in the GCC. India, due to these two reasons, has started observing the region through a strategic lens. This is also visible from the recent high level bilateral visits. India has not only decided to establish a strategic petroleum reserve with the UAE but has added defence relationships as a new element in its interaction with the GCC. The GCC states have cooperated with India in the region as they feel that India's engagement with GCC at economic, political, security and strategic level will enhance India's global profile. A declining US presence in the region also provides India the space required to boost its economic and strategic footprint in the GCC.



In the recent times, the perception of Gulf States about India has changed. The GCC no longer looks at India merely as a supplier of cheap goods and labour but a stable democracy and a vibrant regional economy with highly skilled manpower. This change in perception of the GCC has contributed to their realising the need to build up strategic partnerships with India. As the GCC states have begun to look east, it has found synchronisation with India's attempt to link west. The GCC, however, has been insecure about India's developing proximity with Iran and Israel. Pakistan, too, plays the Islamic card to assert to the GCC that India is an anti-Muslim state and therefore remains an irritant in the deepening India-GCC ties. Despite these issues, India has successfully decided to enhance strategic and defence partnerships with the GCC. Today, India has added dimensions beyond oil in its outreach to the region. India has committed support to GCC in dimensions like food security, IT, Pharmacy and consultancy services.

INDIA AND BRICS¹

In 2001, an economist with Goldman Sachs undertook an econometric analysis and asserted that by 2050, the economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China would constitute the largest economies of the world. In 2006, on the margins of the G-8 Outreach Summit at St. Petersburg in Russia, the BRIC leaders (all countries except South Africa) held a meeting and formalised the BRIC group. In 2009, the first BRIC summit was organised in

Yekaterinburg, Russia. In 2010, it was decided that South Africa would be added to the group. In 2011, in the 3rd Summit in Sanya in China, South Africa participated and the organisation formally became BRICS from BRIC.

Initially, the idea of BRICS was to use it as a platform to engage upon economic issues but over a period of times, BRICS summits have started discussing issues ranging from trade, health, technology, agriculture and so on. In 2016, India chaired the eighth BRICS Summit and the meeting was held in Goa. The eighth BRICS Summit shall be discussed in sections ahead. In the very first BRICS Summit, there was a severe criticism of Bretton Woods's institutions over their failure to reform their structures and processes and give a voice to emerging market states. India asserted that the existing global financial architecture is dominated by the West and does not give adequate voice to the emerging market economies. In the sixth BRICS Summit in Fortaleza, Brazil, in 2014 through the Fortaleza Declaration, the BRICS members decided to establish the BRICS Bank or the New Development Bank. The NDB became operational from 2016, with its headquarters in Shanghai, China. The NDB shall provide loans to states to manage BOP crises and for projects related to infrastructure and sustainable development.



K V Kamath is the first President of the BRICS bank or the NDB. What makes the NDB different from the World Bank and IMF is the fact that here, infrastructure has been identified as a priority sector by the BRICS. The NDB has prioritised areas like education, healthcare and women rights etc, which are issues that all BRICS member face today. In 2016, the NDB had issued 3 billion Yuan bonds in China to finance projects related to clean energy. In 2017, NDB has decided to issue Masala bonds worth 300–500 million Dollars for projects related to rural drinking water and infrastructure (Rupee denominated bonds that are issued outside India are called Masala bonds). In 2017, the BRICS members also decided to launch their own credit rating agency in future. As mentioned above, India held the chair for the eighth BRICS Summit, held in Goa. The theme was building responsive, inclusive and collective solutions. The BRICS-BIMSTEC Outreach Summit was held in Goa in 2016.



During the eighth BRICS Summit, India also signed MoUs with Brazil on agriculture, pharmacy, investment cooperation, facilitation treaty and assisted reproductive technologies. At the end of the Summit, a Goa Declaration was adopted. The Declaration reaffirmed a number of state commitments to tackle terrorism, advocate UN reforms, facilitate economic and investment partnerships and use policy tools to achieve inclusive growth. The ninth BRICS summit in 2017 happened in China.

INDIA AND BIMSTEC²

In June 1997, a meeting was organised in Bangkok and Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka and Thailand decided to come together to establish an economic cooperation under the banner of BIST-EC. In December 1997, Myanmar joined the economic cooperation and the group now called BIMST-EC (Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Thailand Economic Cooperation). In 2004, after Nepal and Bhutan were admitted to BIMST-EC, the name of the organisation was changed to BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation). The first BIMSTEC Summit happened in 2004 in Bangkok. The permanent secretariat of BIMSTEC is in Dhaka and 32 per cent of the cost of construction has been borne by India.



Since 2004, the member states have been negotiating an FTA. India has been pushing for an early conclusion of the FTA as it will facilitate trade in goods and services. Despite a Framework Agreement for the FTA in place since 2004, the FTA has not become operational as issues persist on agendas like negative list, rules of origin, custom agreement and dispute settlement mechanism. Scholars assert that if India and Thailand can take some FDI to other BIMSTEC members, the investments can act as a push for the FTA. India, under its Act East Policy, has prioritised infrastructure development and if India succeeds in developing infrastructure in the north-east states, it can act as a springboard for deeper integration and connectivity with BIMSTEC. India has realised that BIMSTEC will be a bridge between South Asia and South East Asia. Today, India has initiated steps to boost connectivity and investments to promote regional cooperation through BIMSTEC. In April 2017, the Indian government has approved the MoU with BIMSTEC to establish an interconnected BIMSTEC grid. The creation of the grid will facilitate power exchanges across borders by member states and will help in development of regional networks for electricity supply. In the recent times, India has decided to shift away from Pakistan, which has emerged as an irritant in regional cooperation at the level of SAARC, to deepen ties with BIMSTEC.

BCIM Corridor

In the 1990s, an economic corridor between India, China via Myanmar and Bangladesh was proposed by Bangladeshi economist, Professor Rehman Sobhan. According to Sobhan, such a corridor would enhance trade and growth and contribute to reduction of poverty in the region. Sobhan's idea saw material action in the Kunming Initiative which evolved into a regional forum for BCIM states. In 2013, in a meeting between Manmohan Singh and Li Keqiang, the BCIM economic corridor (BCIM-EC) finally saw. The entire BCIM zone was perceived as a sub-region where connectivity between South Asia, South East Asia and China was envisaged. As the sub-region has high resources but poor connectivity, the corridor will promote economic integration. Though the Modi government has shown enormous interest in the corridor, some challenges exist. There is no clarity whether the BCIM-EC should purely be economical in nature or widen to include cultural and people centric activities. People in India's North-East and Myanmar have raised concerns about the environmental impact of the BCIM-EC. More so, there is a dilemma of whether BCIM-EC be promoted as a regional and geopolitical initiative or whether local communities along the borders should be used as stakeholders for benefit sharing under a sub-regional arrangement. How BCIM-EC works out in tandem with the Chinese Belt and Road initiative will be something to observe in the future.

INDIA AND THE INDIAN OCEAN RIM ASSOCIATION (IORA)

The Indian Ocean is one of the most important trading routes of the world. In order to promote social, economic and political cooperation amongst the states in Indian Ocean region, in 1995, an Indian Ocean Rim Initiative was launched. Subsequent to this, in 1997, the Indian Ocean Rim Association-Association for Regional Cooperation (IORA-ARC) was formed. Today, the group, with 21 member states (including India) also has seven dialogue partners and is called IORA.



In 2013, India held the chair of IORA where the name of the organisation was changed from the earlier IORA-ARC to the present IORA. India also identified that the need to use the IORA to facilitate maritime safety and security in the Indian Ocean was the most pressing agenda at hand. In the 14th IORA ministerial Meeting in Australia in 2014, the idea of blue economy was made a priority agenda for the IORA. The basic concept of blue economy encompasses the use of marine resources in a sustainable manner. It envisages an oceanic environment and sustainability link. In the Jakarta Summit in 2017, an Action Plan for the next five years and Declaration on Preventing Violent Extremism and Countering Terrorism were adopted. India offered the idea that member states should undertake hydrographic surveys and coordinate activities of Maritime Domain Awareness, and should also establish an Information Fusion Centre.

INDIA AND THE NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT

President Obama, in 2009, identified nuclear terrorism as an important security challenge of the world. This was announced by Obama in a speech delivered by him at Prague in

2009. Subsequent to the speech, in 2010, a Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) (a three-summit series) was organised in Washington DC. The aim of the NSS is to ensure that the nuclear related material does not fall into the hands of non-state actors and the world does not witness nuclear terrorism. In the 2012 Seoul NSS, the concept of gift basket diplomacy was announced. It is a mechanism used in multilateral diplomatic negotiations where some participants can push progress on identified issues without achieving consensus at multilateral negotiations. Another unique concept of NSS was ‘House gifts,’ where one country too could make a unilateral commitment to achieve nuclear security envisaged. India has participated in the NSS since 2010. It has contributed one million Dollars in the Nuclear Security Fund and a Global Centre of Excellence for Nuclear Energy Partnership (GCENEP) has been established. In the 2016 NSS, which was the last summit in the series of the Prague Initiative, India decided to contribute an additional one million Dollars to the Nuclear Security Fund. India has agreed that IAEA will remain the central agency in nuclear security and that it will organise a workshop on international Physical Protection Assessment System in India. India feels that participation in the NSS is an important duty for India to showcase to the world its nuclear credentials.



INDIA AND THE MULTILATERAL EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES

The Australian Group (AG), Zangger committee, Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) are the five multilateral export control regimes. The WA seeks to ensure that states do not end up exporting conventional arms and dual use technologies and goods that could ultimately land up in the hands of terrorists. It ensures that countries to which such exports are made protect such transfers and ensure that exports do not cause destabilisation. To join WA, a state has to be a producer and exporter of items that are mentioned in the control list of WA. India fulfils this criterion to join WA. As per WA, a state intending to join WA should ‘adhere’ to NPT. As the rules don’t mention that a state needs to be a ‘party’ to NPT, India meets all such criteria despite not being a party to the NPT. By being a part of WA, India can contribute to world peace and international security. The membership to WA also increases India’s probability to access items under the WA control list. India will also be able to identify, at the global level, the items that are active threats to international security.

The AG is an initiative of Australia that came up in 1985 after the use of chemical weapons by Iraq in the Iran–Iraq war. The AG focusses upon preventing the proliferation of biological weapons and their export to rogue state and non-state actors. India has a

thorough and an elaborate export controls system over chemical agents having potential use in a chemical war (dual use). India wishes to be a member of AG. By being a part of the AG, India can have a say in the international chemical and bio-technology commerce.

In 1987, the G–7 countries decided to establish an informal political group to ensure that states do not proliferate missiles and related technologies. This group was called MTCR. The MTCR is not a treaty but an understanding amongst partners to ensure non-proliferation of missile technologies, software and to attempt to control the exports of the same to countries. The aim is to ensure that there is no proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). By identifying and restricting exports of technology and equipment, it ensures that a state is not able to construct a delivery system to launch WMDs. A special emphasis is placed on rockets and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) which are designed for carrying a payload of at least 500 kilogrammes and a range of 30 kilometres. The organisation follows a set of guidelines and an MTCR Annex. The Annex has a list of items whose exports are to be controlled. The highly sensitive and less sensitive items are categorised into Category-I and Category-II. Joining MTCR is a voluntary subscription and since there are no legal obligations, the partners have to act with restraint and responsibility to export items to ensure that exports do not lead to proliferation. France is the regime's first point of contact but MTCR has no secretariat and a decision to join the MTCR requires a consensus of its existing members. India applied for membership to MTCR in June 2015. In October 2015, at the Rotterdam Plenary meeting, no progress could be achieved. India again presented its case by highlighting its non-proliferation record. India asserted that it has a strong control system under a list called SCOMET (Special Chemical, Organic, Materials, Equipment and Technology). On 27th June, 2016, at the MTCR point of contact meet in Paris, India was accepted as the 35th member of MTCR. In October, 2016, at the Seoul Plenary meet, India participated as a member. Now India is obliged to follow a no-under cut policy. India has to ensure consultations with other MTCR members before granting license to export any MTCR item that has been notified as denied by another partner pursuant to MTCR guidelines (as mentioned on the MTCR website). The membership to MTCR will enable India to buy missile technologies from other states.

The NSG was created in 1974 and met in 1975 for the first time. NSG is a group that has come up with guidelines to ensure that member states do not sign nuclear deals with other states where signing of such a deal could lead to proliferation of nuclear weapons. The group is a high table of states that frame rules governing nuclear commerce. In order to strengthen the global nuclear non-proliferation order, India wishes to be a part of the NSG. However, as India is not a member of NPT, China and Pakistan have objections to its enrolment. Pakistan has stated that India's becoming a member of NSG will mean that it shall have access to fissile material for its civilian reactors. Consequently, it will have more material for its military reactors and thus, as per Pakistan, inducting India into the NSG will fuel an arms race. China has observed that the accession of India to NSG should be norm based, meaning that if an exception is made for India (that India being a non-signatory to NPT still joins NSG), then the same exception should be made for others. China wants the same exception for Pakistan. There is a growing feeling that, since China is not a member of MTCR, it wants the US to support Chinese membership to MTCR in lieu of Chinese support for India's membership to the NSG. By being a member of the

NSG, India's nuclear regime will have a stronger legal foundation and would also give India an option to set rules related to nuclear commerce. India will, by being a member of the NSG, be on a firmer footing to propose trade of plutonium for India's thorium based reactors, thereby providing far greater energy security to India. India can also produce export-worthy nuclear equipments, have greater access to uranium abroad, boost Make in India as well as adopt efficient nuclear energy, by being a member of the NSG.

INDIA AND THE ASIA PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION (APEC)

The origin of the APEC can be traced back to the period of economic integration of South East and East Asia. In 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was formed. ASEAN states began to develop deep trade with Europe and in 1979, began trade with China. Economic interaction was the key goal of the ASEAN states. In 1980s and 1990s, the EU was formed. This affected the ASEAN–Europe trade. As the US consolidated the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), this further dented the ASEAN's trade practices. In 1989, Australia suggested the creation of the APEC as an Asian version of an FTA comprising of North East Asia, South East Asia and the Pacific Rim states. Similarly, even Malaysia proposed an East Asian Economic Group (EAEG). In 1989, Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke met his South Korean counterpart and mooted an idea where ministers could meet to enhance regional economic cooperation. In November 1991, a Seoul Declaration was adopted that announced the scope of the APEC. The APEC was to promote trade, technology transfers and promote growth. The first APEC summit happened in 1993 and decided to focus upon liberalisation and economic trade. The APEC has 21 member economies today, and India wants to join the economic community called APEC as it wants to undertake trade promotion within the economies of the Asia-Pacific.

Initially there was opposition to India's membership to the APEC as some members initially raised objections about India's economic reforms and its engagement with the WTO. In recent times, a lot of members feel that as India has undertaken economic reforms and it should be allowed to be part of the APEC. Many feel that India's maritime strengths and its clout as a balancer will help the APEC. Currently, India holds the position of an observer state in the APEC. The US too, has favoured India's accession to the APEC as a member. If India becomes a member of the APEC, it will be perceived as a serious economic power in Asia Pacific and this will help in India's negotiations at the level of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)³. Apart from improving trade volumes, joining the APEC will facilitate India's domestic growth and lead to job creation. The main reason as to why India is not yet a member of the APEC is geography. Geographically, India is not part of the Pacific region. Some APEC members also have reservations about India's high custom duties and stringent rules for FDI. India is not keen on shedding off protectionist measures prevalent in its domestic economy, which has not gone down well by other member states. Over a period of time, if consensus evolves, India might enter the APEC club.


INDIA AND THE REGIONAL COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP (RCEP)

The 10 member states of the ASEAN and six other states (including India) are negotiating a new FTA called RCEP. The RCEP is a comprehensive agreement on goods, services, investments, economic and technical cooperation and dispute resolution. The idea is to have the ASEAN in the driver's seat to negotiate a new economic regional architecture which will improvise the ASEAN FTA. India has been a key player in negotiating the RCEP because it provides India a platform not only to strengthen and complement the existing India–ASEAN FTA, but it also allows India to use its Act East Policy to boost its economic relationships in the region. More importantly, through RCEP, India will be able to integrate itself into the regional production networks of participating states. This will gradually allow India to be a part of global value chains and thereby boost its economy. As the economies are maturing as sophisticated manufactures, there would be a higher demand for service providers, and in this regard, India, which enjoys an edge in IT-enabled services, will gain as Indian firms will get easy access to new markets.

However, Indian tariff barriers have emerged as a source of discontent. In recent times, the RCEP states have urged India to completely eliminate tariffs as the RCEP states are not comfortable with the tariffs set by India. India also has to boost its MSME sector as its capabilities have to be augmented to survive the trade flows envisaged. Even non-trade issues, like labour and environmental concerns, have emerged. After the decision of Donald Trump to abandon the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in 2017, the RCEP has gained strategic significance for China. India's worries over the RCEP have increased as India fears that China, through RCEP, would be able to pump cheap commodities manufactured in China into India and this would endanger the manufacturing base that India intends to develop under its 'Make in India' programme. India also fears that after the RCEP is concluded, due to advanced expertise of the region in areas of pharmacy and textiles, these two sectors (where India too has an edge) in India would be impacted due to severe competition. There are emerging trends now that show that China may exclude India from the RCEP and go ahead, but, this only remains an assumption as India's good relations with ASEAN may not allow China the leverage to remove India from the RCEP altogether.

INDIA AND THE MEKONG GANGA COOPERATION (MGC)

India, in order to enhance relations with states in the Mekong region (namely Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam and Thailand), had formed the MGC in 2000. Under the Act East Policy, India has decided to integrate India's North East with Mekong region.



INDIA AND THE ASEAN

Though India and the ASEAN has been dealt with in detail in the chapter of 'India–South

East Asia relations—Key drivers,’ here we shall attempt to present an analytical snapshot of the relationship between India and the ASEAN states. India’s relations with South East Asia (SEA) saw a major boost at the end of the Cold War. India announced a Look East Policy (LEP), which was, at the very best, a circumstantial policy. At the end of the Cold War, India witnessed certain critical circumstances that posed a significant challenge to its foreign policy. The Soviet Union disintegrated; Indian economy faced severe crisis while Pakistan triumphed in the Mujahedeen campaign in Afghanistan. As there was complete uncertainty in the world, India decided to reduce this uncertainty and build relations with the US its allies in SEA and East Asia (EA). In this context, India announced its LEP where the core priority for India was to build relations with the ASEAN. Narasimha Rao made economic cooperation under LEP a major foreign policy priority for India. Starting from being a Sectoral Dialogue Partner in 1992 to finally concluding an FTA in Goods and Services with the ASEAN in 2014, the trajectory captures the impressive integration of India with the ASEAN.


India also forged BIMSTEC and the Mekong Ganga Cooperation as sub-regional groupings to reach out to the ASEAN. In the recent times, India’s Act East Polity (AEP) is a connecting bridge between India and SEA and EA. The Indian Prime Minister, while launching the AEP, asserted that the ASEAN is central to India’s AEP. Though the LEP began with a thrust on economic cooperation with the ASEAN, the AEP has added the needed strategic perspective in the engagement. Today, India is engaging with ASEAN at the levels of security, terrorism, urban renewal, piracy, climate change and so on. The Indian participation in the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) plus forum (comprising of defence ministers of the ASEAN, China, Japan, India, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, the US and Russia) provides a forum to cooperate on issues ranging from maritime security to medicine to peacekeeping operations. Under the auspices of the ASEAN, India is also engaging with the East Asian Summit (EAS) that provides a platform to work upon issues ranging from education to energy to connectivity. The Indian presence in the ASEAN has now led India to negotiate the RCEP where the focus is on trade, facilitation and economic integration. The AEP has announced that connectivity, culture and commerce (3 Cs) shall be priorities for India. The Indo-ASEAN relations still have some constraints. Many ASEAN states feel that trade with India has still not reached its full potential as tariff barriers and bureaucratic delays from the Indian side have slowed down the process. The ASEAN states have raised complaints about lack of fulfilment of commitments announced by India in infrastructure and connectivity. India faces three key challenges in deepening trade and integration with the ASEAN. The first is connectivity, which the AEP proposes to bridge in the near future. Second are tariff barriers, that ASEAN states cite as a key hindrance on the Indian side to deepening of trade. Third is lack of a vision to boost trade. The ASEAN states argue that India needs to prepare a concrete roadmap on how it intends to integrate with the ASEAN states at the level of trade.

INDIA AND THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANISATION (SCO)

At the end of the Cold War, the five Central Asian Republics broke away from the USSR and became independent. A lot of Uyghur Muslims lived in Central Asia (CA). China

thought that the Uyghurs in China may begin to link with Uyghur's of CA and create unrest in Xinxiang province in China. In 1992, China, along with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, began to negotiate a security pact. After 22 rounds of negotiations, a group called the Shanghai-5 was established in 1996. The aim of Shanghai-5 was to undertake confidence building measures and demilitarise borders. In 1996, a Treaty of Deepening Military Trust in Border Region and an Agreement on Confidence Building in Military Filed in Border Areas were signed. In 1997, a Mutual Reduction of Armed Forces in Border Areas Agreement was concluded. In 2001, Uzbekistan joined the group and it was renamed as SCO to emphasise its role as a body for regional cooperation.

China, through SCO, wishes to fight the three evils of separatism, terrorism and extremism. The SCO decided to establish a Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure in Tashkent. India joined SCO as an observer state in 2005. In the year of 2011, a Memorandum of Obligation of SCO was approved to allow non-member states to join SCO as a member. India applied for membership. Initially, China was reluctant to add India to the SCO but Russia favoured the induction of India as a regional balancer. In the Ufa summit-2015, India and Pakistan were admitted as members. India has viewed SCO positively and wanted to use SCO to play a bigger role in CA. India feels that SCO being an Asian body will allow it to connect to CA and enhance its economic and security relationships in CA. India feels that SCO can be used as a regional platform to contribute to peace in Afghanistan. As a member, India can use SCO to augment its Connect Central Asia Policy and enhance connectivity and commerce with CA.



INDIA AND THE SOUTH ASIAN ASSOCIATION FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION (SAARC)

In the chapter detailing India and its neighbourhood policy—key drivers, we have analysed that since the times of Nehru, India favoured a deeper engagement with its

neighbours. In 1980s, Zia Ur Rahman, the former Bangladeshi President, came up with an idea of knitting the South Asian (SA) states under a group. Initially, India viewed the proposal cautiously as it thought that such a body would be used by the SA states as an opportunity to resort to India-bashing. India also thought that if it does not accept the proposal, this move would be perceived by the SA states as an attempt by India to scuttle a mechanism for regional cooperation. India, keeping these concerns aside, in 1985, decided to go ahead and join the SAARC. It was formed in 1985 with India, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Maldives. In 2007, Afghanistan joined SAARC as a member. The SAARC wanted to promote economic cooperation amongst members and help each member facilitate economic growth, thereby contributing to the alleviation of poverty. Each member state was to respect the territorial integrity of others and no interference would be tolerated in each other's internal affairs. It was decided by members that SAARC as a forum will not be used by any member to raise any contentious and bilateral issues as such issues had to be resolved on a one-to-one basis.

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a renewed thrust towards regionalism but SA has not witnessed the same despite the presence of SAARC. Many believe that it has ended up in becoming a 'talk shop'. SAARC has had some achievements—for instance, the states have agreed on a Regional Convention of Suppression of Terrorism; there is a SAARC Audio Visual Programme; in Dhaka, a SAARC Agriculture Information Centre exists and the members have agreed upon a social charter for poverty eradication and development of human resources. In 1993, the South Asia Preferential Trade Agreement was finalised (yet to be operational). The fundamental reason for the weakness of the SAARC as a platform is trust deficit amongst its core members. Unresolved border disputes and trade barriers erected by each member state too have contributed to weakness of the organisation as a whole, as well as its inability to achieve its goals. Scholars assert that a perpetual cold war between India and Pakistan has fuelled mistrust. For Pakistan, Kashmir remains an irritant for SAARC to flourish while India cites terrorism sponsored by Pakistan as a reason for the mistrust. The member states have viewed the borders more as security threats than a conduit for people-centric engagements. As India is one of the largest members of SAARC, other members perceive any initiative by India as an intention on India's part to assert hegemonic ambitions. Such perceptions are further cemented because of different political beliefs in the neighbourhood. There are three structural impediments in SAARC. The first flows from the SAARC charter. The charter mentions that steps would be taken to promote growth and self-reliance. But the ground reality is that these steps have not been institutionalised. Secondly, SAARC has concluded a lot of agreements and conventions but implementation on ground amongst states has been poor. Thirdly, SAARC bodies also prevent meaningful interactions as these bodies have not contributed to the removal of suspicion and mistrust.

For any form of regional cooperation to succeed, there are three necessary conditions and some sufficient preconditions. Regional cooperation can be successful if states, first of all, renounce violence. This renunciation leads to the birth of a pluralistic, secure community. Then, there should be an agreement that no state will question each other's territorial integrity, as doing so leads to possible conflict. Lastly, if there is a dispute, then it needs to be resolved mutually. The Charter of the SAARC has all these three necessary conditions. The charter, as mentioned above, asserts that states will not use force, not

interfere in each other's affairs and shall advocate for peaceful resolution of conflicts. However, Pakistan has not commented upon the non-use of force. Pakistan has always asserted that if political differences are not resolved (namely, the Kashmir issue), then there can't be any meaningful cooperation. For Pakistan, SAARC is just another platform for furthering the cause of Kashmir. Despite the 1972 Simla agreement between India and Pakistan also asserting that the two shall resort to bilateral mechanisms to resolve disputes, Pakistan is often keen on bringing foreign powers into dispute resolution.

Geographically, since the ancient times, there is a belief that South Asia constitutes of a single compact unit and a common geographical space where people, culture and ideas have freely moved. India has always believed that SAARC, as a platform, can be used to gain the erstwhile geographical space and fuse SA yet again into a compact unit. This is the reason why India lays so much emphasis upon connectivity with its neighbours (the recent BBIN-Motor Vehicle agreement is testimony to this). The rest of the South Asian states however perceive it differently. Pakistan feels that the Indus River separated its territory from SA and makes it closer to West Asia. Nepal feels that it has always had a separate existence while Sri Lanka too feels that it has had its own trajectory of historical evolution. India's neighbours find it tough to reinforce the idea of recreating the unity of past, favouring instead a unity of equals. It is for this reason that despite SAARC, Pakistan and Bangladesh are reluctant to allow their territories as routes for transit. India, through SAARC, visualises a homogenisation of the region while the other members see it as hegemonisation and resort to measures leading to dehegemonisation. Due to such differences of perceptions amongst the members of the SAARC, the body has almost been pushed into a morgue. Many steps were taken by Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh to revive the SAARC, but the perceived mistrust continued to hamper any meaningful interaction though.

The coming of Modi was seen as positive sign. In his swearing-in ceremony, he invited all the SAARC leaders and tried rehabilitate SAARC relationships. Modi launched India's Neighbourhood First Policy in 2014 and SAARC was destined to play a central role in the same. Modi attended the 18th SAARC summit in Kathmandu, Nepal, in 2014. He asserted that India would take all steps to remove the cynicism and scepticism associated with the SAARC. He proposed that a SAARC Union be formed where there is free flow of trade, people and investments. As things progressed from 2014, the recent cross border terrorist strikes on Indian soil from Pakistan in 2016 brought the engagement to a halt. The 19th SAARC summit was scheduled in 2016 in Islamabad. After the attacks at Uri in India, India decided to cancel its participation in the Summit. Citing Article X of SAARC charter, Pakistan has postponed the SAARC summit. India has also realised that its conflicts with Pakistan would remain an obstacle to regional integration. India has thus recognised that it needs to adopt a policy of 'SAARC Minus one.' It has spearheaded regional integration with like-minded countries. The BBIN-Motor Vehicle Pact, India's thrust to re-energize BIMSTEC and a possibility of a future Bay Bengal Community or BOBCOM are shining examples of India's new 'SAARC Minus one' diplomacy. In order to ensure that the rest of South Asia and India move ahead, in May 2017, India resorted to stratospheric diplomacy and gifted its neighbours a SAARC satellite. In order to ensure that rest of South Asia continues to integrate, we have now started witnessing a new form of sub-regional cooperation. This will go a long way in reviving the SAARC once again.

INDIA AND WORLD BANK AND IMF

The World Bank was formed in 1944. It was then called the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). The idea initially was to support economies devastated by the World War-II with economic aid. It began to shift to reconstruction from development. In 1956, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) was formed and it began lending to private firms of developing states. In 1960, when the International Development Association (IDA) was formed, it began to focus upon poverty eradication amongst the poorest countries in the world. In a bid to connect the needs of developing states with the financial resources of the world, the International Centre for Settlement of Industrial Disputes (ICSID) and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) were launched. India is a member of World Bank, IBRD, IFC, IDA, ICSID and MIGA. The World Bank is assisting the Indian government through the country partnership strategy (2013–1017) with a vision of faster and more inclusive growth. The focus is on reducing poverty in the special category states by supporting projecting of state governments with priority for integration, transformation and inclusion. India is one of the largest recipients of loans from World Bank with projects ranging from Prime Minister Gram Sadak Yojana to Social sector initiatives to dedicated freight corridor funded by the bank. In the recent times, the NITI Aayog has been undertaking monitoring and evaluation of the World Bank projects in India.

In 1944 itself, at the Bretton Woods Conference, along with the IBRD, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was established. India has been a founding member of the IMF and since 1993, has never taken any financial assistance from the IMF till date. By 2000, India had repaid all the loans from IMF. IMF works on the concept of quotas. The Executive Board decides the quotas of states based upon inner tariff barriers and GDP. The voting rights are automatically higher if a state has a higher quota. After the USA sub-prime crises, a process of quota reform was spearheaded by the developing countries. However, we need to remember that for any IMF reform, nations collectively with 70% quotas have to vote in favour of the reform. In December 2015, after approval from the US Congress, the quota reforms were executed. India's quota share has increased from 2.3% to 2.6% now and this pushes India into top 10 members of the IMF.

End of Section Questions

1. Discuss the evolution of responsibility to protect doctrine and outline the key elements of India's diplomatic stance on R2P.
2. India's relationship with UN has witnessed multiple swings. Examine this statement in the light of India's multilateral diplomacy policy.
3. Why does India want to be in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)? What are the objections raised by China and Pakistan?
4. What is ICJ and how is it different from the ICC?
5. Is it apt to assert that the ICJ is a toothless body as the West influences its decisions?
6. "While the direction of the ICJ on the issue of Kulbhushan Jadhav certainly favour India's stance, but the order is nothing more than a stop-gap measure." Examine this statement in the light of the relief sought by India in the above case.
7. India's emphasis on the need to counter terrorism and strengthen inner Asian

regionalism reveals a pragmatic diplomatic approach at the SCO. Examine.

8. The rise of stratospheric diplomacy is an interesting feature of India's SAARC diplomacy. Discuss.1.

1. Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa

2. Bangladesh India Myanmar Sri Lanka Thailand Economic Cooperation

3. Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is an initiative to link the ten ASEAN member states and the group's Free Trade Agreement partners, Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand.

Section G

India and Security Policy, Cultural Diplomacy, Economic Diplomacy and Nuclear Foreign Policy

[Chapter 1 India's National Security Policy](#)

[Chapter 2 India's Foreign Policy and Terrorism](#)

[Chapter 3 Indian Foreign Policy, Aerospace and Outer Space Diplomacy](#)

[Chapter 4 India and Science and Technology Diplomacy](#)

[Chapter 5 India's Maritime Foreign Policy Strategy](#)

[Chapter 6 India's Foreign Economic Policy](#)

[Chapter 7 Oil Diplomacy and India's Energy Diplomacy](#)

[Chapter 8 Indian Diaspora](#)

[Chapter 9 India's Nuclear Foreign Policy](#)

1
CHAPTER

India's National Security Policy

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- External and internal threats
- Asymmetric war and Pakistan policy
- Limited war and incursions
- Pathankot, Pampore, Uri and talks
- Sino- Pakistan axis
- China's One Belt and One Road initiative and India
- North East insurgency and naxalism
- Threat of ISIS to India
- Human and Material capability strategy
- Deterrence through denial strategy
- Maritime conflict with China
- India's Blue Economy Strategy
- Pakistani asymmetric defense capability
- India's response to Pakistan
- India as USA's hedge against in doctrine

To understand India's national security doctrine, it is important to understand the politico-strategic setup of India. Apart from this, the two other factors that have played an important role in India's security policy are British colonial rulers (and their heritage) and the impact of the Partition on India. Nehru certainly has had the biggest imprint on the security policy of the initial years. The external threats for India have remained the same over time while the internal threats have evolved as a part of our unfolding political discourse. At the external level, an important threat to India is that of Pakistan. India has fought four wars with Pakistan (1948, 1965, 1971 and 1999). Since the 1980s, Pakistan has resorted to asymmetric warfare in Kashmir. However, since Pakistan has now acquired nuclear weapons, the possibility of a full-fledged war has diminished because both are nuclear players. Pakistan has resorted to limited incursions in the past few decades. This kind of limited incursions are visible all over and a classical case is that of the Kargil War of 1999. India has always tried to engage with Pakistan through dialogue despite the 2001 Parliament attack and 2008 Mumbai attacks. However, the rapprochement has been severely affected due to the ongoing limited war.

To understand India's national security, we also have to understand the concept of National Interests. The origin of the term national interests goes back to the 16th and 17th

century. Charles Beard has studied the history of the concept in his book- The idea of national interests. He asserts that the idea of national interests emerged parallel to the idea of nation states. The older terms like ‘will of the Prince’ were now replaced with terms like vital interests and national interests. Such terms were able to mobilize the will of the public very effectively. A scholar named Joseph Frankel also agrees that the origin of national interests goes back to the period of the 16th century. He asserts that the ancient Greek city states confused politics and metaphysics. Such confusion prevented the origin of the concept of national interests in the ancient times. In the medieval times, the world was majorly feudalistic. That kind of world again prevented the rise of the concept. In the 21st century today, though the term national interest has become very fashionable, still, there is no global consensus on an exact definition for the same. For India, its national interests are the core values of the Indian society. India’s national interests include the welfare of Indian people, protection of its political beliefs and its national way of life. India’s national interest is its self-preservation. India intends to achieve these national interests through maintenance of territorial integrity. Today India witnesses conventional and sub-conventional threats that have slowed down its economic growth. India however knows that to maintain territorial integrity, a dominant defense force is required. The defense forces of India have tackled the proxy wars (from Pakistan) and other external threats and insurgencies. However, India still lacks a coherent defense and a security strategy or a policy document. There are two reasons why India’s National Security strategy document is missing. Firstly, in India there is a lack of consensus at the political level on what exactly are the internal and external threats India witnesses. Secondly, the government is unable to develop a coherent strategy to address the core security problems. Thus, it clearly reflects that the core problem is a lack of consensus on what exactly constitutes problems in national security. Keeping in mind this, we have to remember that the 21st century has changed the concept of war. Now full-scale wars are unlikely to happen. A new dimension of war in the 21st century is limited, intense and short wars that will involve all dimensions from air, land, water, space, cyberspace, electro-magnetic spectrum to psychological war. India needs to gear up to these challenges as it is witnessing such conflicts. The recent India-China stand-off in Doklam is a classical example of psychological war.

In the recent times, with the coming of the new government in 2014 in India, a full diplomatic outreach was envisaged to open talks again but the Pathankot air base attack in January, 2016 and the June, 2016 Pampore attack have once again stalled talks. In September, 2016, Pakistan again violated ceasefire and attacked a base of army soldiers in Uri. As a consequence of Uri attack, India decided to cancel any ongoing talks with Pakistan. The Indian government also announced the decision to isolate Pakistan globally. India used the UN General Assembly platform to condemn Pakistan for sponsoring terrorism. In the General Assembly debate in September 2016, India highlighted the role of Pakistan in sponsoring terrorism and also branded it as a state trying to destabilise South Asia. India also presented the human rights violation undertaken by Pakistan in the Baluchistan region of Pakistan at the UN. Due to the Uri attack, India also conveyed its decision of its refusal to participate in the SAARC summit in Pakistan in November, 2016. As a response to the Uri attack, on 29th September 2016, the Indian army retaliated against Pakistan by crossing over the Line of Control and carrying out a surgical strike using the special para forces of the army inside the Pakistani territory to eliminate the terror launch

pads on the other side of the Line of Control. This is the first time since 1971 that the Indian army had crossed the LOC to carry out a surgical strike in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (POK) region. This has gone on to add a new dimension in the management of Pakistan.

In the security policy of India, China is widely recognised as our second external threat after Pakistan. India, after independence, initially did not perceive China as a threat. During the Nehruvian era, India focused on rapprochement but 1962 changed the equation between the neighbours. Subsequently, in 1963, Pakistan also gave a territorial chunk of Pakistan occupied Kashmir (POK) to China, which led to the formation of a new Sino-Pak axis becoming a threat to India. From 1964, as China tested nuclear weapons, these nuclear weapons of China pulsated as a new threat to India. India and China have tried to resolve border problems without any success till date. China also continues to deepen engagement with Pakistan through its One Belt One Road¹ initiative and String of Pearls² Strategy. China also continues probing operations on the border and to raise issues with India due to its having granted Dalai Lama sanctuary. It also refuses to reconcile India's status of a nuclear weapon state.

Domestically, India has firstly witnessed insurgency in the North East and secessionist movements in Punjab. While the problem related to the North Eastern states has been brought under control to some extent through concessions and dialogues, the Punjab problem needed military intervention. India, at the domestic level, has also witnessed Maoism owing origin to land appropriation issues. Over a period of time, Naxalism has become one the biggest internal security threat for India. Evidence has also been found pointing to state sponsored violence by Pakistan in an attempt to cause social unrest in India.

India has, over a period of time, built up human and material capabilities. At the human resource level, India has a superior military and a paramilitary force. The superiority can be judged by the fact that India provides military training to a host of nations in the world. At the level of material capabilities, the dependence upon foreign suppliers is high and domestic indigenous production capability is relatively slow. More attention needs to be paid on domestic military industrial complexes.

To tackle China, India's national security strategy is to create deterrence through denial. India has deployed trained and specialised mountain personnel along the entire border with China. It has upgraded road and other military infrastructure to establish a base. For instance, India has upgraded an Airstrip in Tezpur, Assam, enabling take off and landings of Sukhoi Su-30, a twin-engine, two-seat super manoeuvrable fighter aircraft that India imports from Russia. A 90,000 strong mountain strike corps are stationed in the region. In August, 2016, the NDA government had given a green signal to the deployment of Brahmos missiles in the Indian North Eastern region. All these initiatives are planned to ensure denial through deterrence. For effective deterrence, India has invested in long range missiles to project power. The competition from China in the Himalayas is weak and is now emerging at new places. The new theatre of action is maritime conflict in the Indian Ocean where China, through the maritime Silk Road initiative, is increasing military and naval presence and building up economic cum security ties in the region. India's response to the naval assertion by China is to nurture closer cooperation with the US, Mauritius,

Seychelles, Japan, and so on. This newfound naval cooperation with Africa under the rubric of Blue Economy of India gives India the needed muscle. India has also deployed its navy with Vietnam in South China Sea for protection of sea lanes of communication (SLOC), denying China any space for assertion. This it is another form of denial exercised by India. To tackle the external threats from China, India needs to develop a strong naval strength. A strong navy can not only browbeat China, but also act as a strong deterrent. India has to remember that its security horizon extends from the Strait of Malacca to Hormuz. USA has a strong naval presence in the Middle East but the persistent Shia-Sunni conflict in the region has made it more volatile. Due to the shale gas revolution, USA's presence in the Middle East will decline. This gives India an opportunity to extend its umbrella to provide security. For this, a strong navy is mandatory. The growing India-US proximity has created a perception in China that USA could use India as a Pivot to contain China. Thus, China has been compelled to economically engage with India. But, the Chinese economic engagement is based on a belief that India favors status quo at the border level. India has to assert to China that it will not be enmeshed with the economic logic of boosting trade at the cost of tranquility at the border. India has to convey a strong willingness to resolve the pending border dispute. In the wake of recent Doklam crises, India needs to develop critical military infrastructure at the border level on the immediate basis.

At the level of Pakistan, despite overwhelming evidence of Pakistani state involvement in terror strikes on Indian soil, India has managed to stave off an all-out war and instead use diplomatic channels to undertake dialogue. In 2013, when Nawaz Sharif was elected, hopes of dialogue increased. But in Pakistan, the military continues to dominate the foreign and security policy and does not favour balance in Indo-Pakistan relations. However, the asymmetric military capabilities of Pakistan at present and its inability to match the military capabilities with India in the future acts as a source of frustration for Pakistan. This asymmetry has caused insecurity in the Pakistani military, which sponsors terrorism and uses terrorist groups as proxies against India. India continues to remain vulnerable through coastal and border levels with Pakistan—gaps from where terrorists usually infiltrate. India does not resort to a retaliatory strike strategy or even a pre-emptive strategy for Pakistan as the basic criterion of the Indian national security doctrine is to negotiate with Pakistan through dialogue. Moreover, Pakistan has stated clearly that if India resorts to conventional attacks, Pakistan would resort to nuclear escalation. This is the reason India invests in ballistic missile defence capabilities to stop any nuclear escalation.

At the international level, India still does not aggressively try to build alliances with the US. One reason is that, despite India's pointing out of evidence of Pakistani involvement in symmetric warfare against India, the US continues to engage with Pakistan. This confuses the Indian National security apparatus as to whether there is at all genuine interest from the US in the matters of any potential strategic cooperation. To that extent, however, the recent deepening of Indo-US cooperation signifies US acceptance of India as a strategic hedge against China.

Our national security doctrine, as clear from the discussion in the chapter, is a mixed bag. There is an absence of coherence in strategy as different approaches are used against different threats. India certainly needs a more coherent doctrine for future.

Can India and US Emerge as Strategic Powers

No definite answer can be provided for this question. After 2014, the US's decision to withdraw from Afghanistan came. India, which had considerable politico-economic presence in Afghanistan, has since wanted to see what steps the US undertakes to contain Pakistan and ensure that Pakistan does not allow the entry of Taliban to counter India in Afghanistan. India is not officially a part of the Pivot to Asia³ policy by the US, but unofficially supports the agenda as it would not like to antagonise China. India also has adopted a wait-and-watch policy to see how the US reacts to the technology transfer agreement between France and Russia. Thus, the USA's post 2014 Afghan–Pakistan policy and its response to technology transfer by European powers will make India decide upon its future course of action as far its relation to the US is concerned.

A future national security strategy for India should include the core elements as mentioned below:

1. Maintaining territorial boundary at all levels from air to land to sea.
2. Ensure security of the Indian coastline from aggression and infiltration by state and non-state actors.
3. Early resolution of boundary issues pending with Pakistan and China by investing political and diplomatic capital.
4. Protect India from cyber attacks by developing offensive cyber capabilities.
5. Developing covert capabilities (under R&AW) to tackle ISI in Pakistan
6. Emerge as a Net Security Provider from West Asia to East Asia with special emphasis on prevention of destabilization in the neighborhood.
7. Achieve domestic self-reliance in defense production by 2025 and seek to evolve a proactive strategic culture.

1. The Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road, also known as the Belt and Road Initiative (B&R) and The Belt and Road (B&R), is a development strategy proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping that focuses on connectivity and cooperation between Eurasian countries, primarily the People's Republic of China, the land-based "Silk Road Economic Belt" (SREB) and the oceangoing "Maritime Silk Road" (MSR). The strategy underlines China's push to take a larger role in global affairs, and the desire to coordinate manufacturing capacity with other countries in areas such as steel manufacturing. It was unveiled in September and October 2013 in announcements revealing the SREB and MSR, respectively. It was also promoted by Premier Li Keqiang during the State visit in Asia and Europe. It was the most frequently mentioned concept in the People's Daily in 2016.

2. The String of pearls is a geopolitical theory on potential Chinese intentions in the Indian Ocean region. It refers to the network of Chinese military and commercial facilities and relationships along its sea lines of communication, which extend from the Chinese mainland to Port Sudan. The sea lines run through several major maritime choke points such as the Strait of Mandeb, the Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Lombok Strait as well as other strategic maritime centers in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, the Maldives, and Somalia. The term as a geopolitical concept was first used in an internal US Department of Defense report, "Energy Futures in Asia." The term has never been used by official Chinese government sources, but it is often used in Indian media.

3. This was a policy announced by Barack Obama whose main objective is to shift its attention to East Asia as the epicenter of world affairs, so as to "strengthen...bilateral security alliances," to "expand...trade and investment," to "forg[e]...a broad-based military presence," and to "advance[e]...democracy and human rights" in the region, among other things.

2
CHAPTER

India's Foreign Policy and Terrorism

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- 9/11 and globalization of terrorism
- Threats faced by India
- India and CCIT
- India's international approach to terrorism
- India's regional approach to terrorism
- India at 70th anniversary of UN
- India and good vs. bad terrorism
- Changing security situation in Kashmir and the road ahead.

India has been fighting terrorism since the 1990s in Kashmir. India felt that 9/11 was a key event as it took the importance of the menace of terrorism at the international level. India had always tried to highlight the issue of terrorism at global platforms, but, the consensus has developed only after 9/11.



The Indian response has been to largely garner collaboration at the international level to curb terrorism. India has developed strong relations with Israel, Russia, Iran, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to fight terror. India has also resorted to raising the issue of state sponsorship of terrorism by Pakistan internationally and has also supported the Comprehensive Convention for Combating International Terrorism (CCIT).

In the Nuclear Security Summit, 2016, India has supported the theory of the existence of a link between international terrorism and clandestine proliferation and has advocated the need to weaken the link by information sharing, national laws and multilateral and bilateral cooperation amongst enforcement agencies. At the regional level, the Indian strategy to fight terrorism has been mainly set through forging cooperation and alliances with other countries. At the international level, our strategy is to diplomatically present

evidence to world leaders about Pakistan's sponsorship of terror elements operative in India, which will in turn put pressure on Pakistan. India strives to globally work with other countries to arrive at a consensus for a definition of terrorism, and with the rise of new threats like ISIS, India has constantly pitched for the finalisation of CCIT at the earliest stage. In the 70th anniversary meet of the UN in 2015, India again pitched for a collective effort to contain terror. India has always maintained that there are no good or bad terrorists, as all terrorists and their ideologies are equally harmful. This is the reason by India has refrained from negotiating with the so-called good Talban in Afghanistan. In the recent times, in 2016, China recently refused to ban Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) chief Masood Azhar and induct him in the UN terror list as being a sponsor of Pathankot air base attack of 2016. India objected to China's opposition and demanded close cooperation. India continues to advocate for CCIT and international community's determination to defeat terrorism.



China and Masood Azhar Issue 2016

In January 2016, the Pathankot airbase was attacked. The Indian agencies held JEM responsible. India in February 2016, moved to the sanction committee of UN and proposed the addition of JEM founder Masood Azhar as a terrorist. India advocated the inclusion of his name in 1267 committee⁴ list. The inclusion would mean that Pakistan and others would have to take steps to ban Azhar and his travel and freeze all his assets. The meeting in February happened with 15 members in council, which included China. The 14 members in the meeting favoured the inclusion, but China refused to blige. China decided to hold the issue on technical grounds. China did the same in June 2016 for Zaki Ur Rahman Lakhvi, who was the mastermind behind the 26/11 Mumbai attack. For India, the Chinese decisions were incomprehensible as JEM had already been listed as a terrorist group by the Sanctions Committee of UN since 2001. China offered no reasons except stating that such things like listing of individuals need to meet certain requirements. This case clearly signifies a lack of global consensus to tackle terror. In August 2016, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi visited India. India again took up the issue of Masood Azhar with Wang Yi.



Indian Ocean- Rising Ambitions of China, its Security Implications on India and the Indian Response to the Samudra Manthan

In the recent times, China has expanded its footprint in the Indian Ocean(IO from now). It has recently established military bases in Africa. China asserts that the bases are to assist China in recuperating and seeking supplies. China has realized that to become a leading maritime power, it has to establish a firm position in the IO. This approach of China has alarmed the strategists in India who feel that a rising Chinese naval presence in IO could lead to a new security dilemma between India and China. John. F. Morton in his study has asserted that IO will remain the most significant region in the world in the times ahead due to economic growth in the rim states and rising demand of oil.

The importance of Indian Ocean for India can be judged from the points below.

1. India's half seaborne global trade happens through the IO.
2. Nearly 65% of world's oil is located in the IO.
3. Nearly 35% of global gas reserves are located in the littoral states of the IO.
4. Instability in the Middle East to Piracy in Africa and rising competitive pressures to fuel economic growth by demand of oil.
5. Nearly 90% of India's global trade happens through the IO.

As the Indian economy grows, India would need to ensure unhindered access of energy and goods from the region. India's entire developmental process depends upon the region of IO.

To tackle threats ranging from piracy to terrorism arising from the sea, India has decided to exert more influence in the IO. Indian strategists have asserted that IO is India's backyard and Indians draw inspiration to assert in the IO from Alfred Mahan. Mahan asserted that which ever power controls IO would eventually maintain hegemony in Asia. K.M. Pannikar too asserted the need for India to be dominant in IO. Even though there has been an intellectual consensus of India's role in the IO, the civilian political leadership in the post independent India have not adequately responded to make India a predominant maritime power. In the initial years, the focus of India was to tackle territorial threats from Pakistan and China. The naval modernization got majorly neglected. India was unable to equip the navy with the needed offensive punch to project power. Throughout the Cold War, Indian strategy was to push out extra regional naval powers from IO and ensure that IO remains a 'zone of peace'. This made India's littoral neighbors quite apprehensive about India as they perceived that India's behavior is in sync with its own intention to dominate the IO region. Since the end of Cold War, India has recognized the importance of naval modernization and naval power projection. In the recent times, India's desire to modernize its navy is also driven by threat assessments done by R&AW which asserts that India could witness sea borne attacks by terrorists. Keeping these challenges in mind, India has announced its own version of maritime doctrine. The doctrine asserts that India must look at the naval security as an arc extending from the Gulf to Malacca as an area of legitimate interests. India has embarked upon an attempt to enhance naval capabilities to achieve the objectives said above. China in 2006 in a Defense White Paper has announced that Chinese needs to enhance their defensive and offensive naval capabilities to maintain strategic depth in the IO. Thus, for India, China remains the biggest competitor in the IO. China is preparing its navy to assert itself as a regional hegemon and a future superpower. China is driven by an urge to assert to India that it needs to remember that IO cannot be a backyard of India.

China is trying to tell India that it also has a responsibility to ensure a stable, peaceful and a secure IO. China has established a submarine base in Sanya in South China Sea. The Sanya base has underground tunnels to hide submarines and is merely 1200 nautical miles away from Malacca waterway. The Indian strategists feel that the base in Sanya is an attempt by China to consolidate its presence and control in the Indian Ocean and may restrict the Indian freedom to maneuver in the region. A recent attempt by China to boost its presence in the IO can be seen in the Chinese

attempt to construct the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. All these, along with Chinese strategy of String of Pearls have affirmed to India that China is making all attempts to control the global energy jugular. India has decided to respond to China through a trinity strategy. India has firstly started undertaking naval modernization. This is an attempt by India to enhance its naval capabilities. Secondly, India has started using its navy as a tool of diplomacy. India is diplomatically undertaking joint naval exercises and port visits to friendly states. Thirdly, India has positioned its navy as an effective tool to provide instant disaster relief missions. This trinity strategy is adopted by India to position itself as a Net Security Provider in the IO region. India has joined hands with USA, Japan and Australia to shape up the strategic environment of the Indian Ocean in the near future. Doing all this is likely to position India as a medium power. A medium power is one that has a great economic potential with rising military potential. The situation of 21st Century in the IO of power competition between India and China is akin to 20th Century power competition between the US and Japan in the Pacific.

Changing Security Situation in Kashmir and the Road Ahead

Since 8th July 2016, Kashmir has become volatile after the elimination of Burhan Wani, the HM commander of South Kashmir. The elimination of Wani has seen not only a rise in the recruitment of more militants but also a spike in terror attacks in the valley. Pakistan wants Kashmir on religious grounds only. However, Kashmir practices a distinct form of Islamic culture that is quite different from the Pakistani propagated Islamic culture. The blend of Islam in Kashmir is called Kashmariyat that accepts all religions along with Islam. The strategy adopted by Pakistan is to destroy this Kashmariyat and impose a Saudi funded fundamentalist Wahabi Islam. Pakistan intends to polarize the society and exclude other faiths and thereby eventually break up Kashmir. Pakistan has received initial success by driving out Kashmiri Pandits. Wajahat Habbibullah asserts that India too has focused less on the demands of the Kashmiri people and has been more reactive than being proactive. Though Pakistan has tried to undertake polarization, but, the polarization strategy of Pakistan has not met with much success as Kashmiri people have rejected the Pakistan attempts to polarize Kashmir. Since 2014, the Indian government has adopted a hardline approach. This has led to elimination of many prominent militant heads. Though Pakistan does enjoy a limited constituency of support in Kashmir through the separatists. But, the government decisions to raid the Separatist parties (by N.I.A. in 2017) for financial support from Pakistan has thwarted the Pakistani attempts to provide money to the separatists. . In the recent times, there is a threat of the ISIS that has developed a thrust towards sub nationalist insurgencies like Kashmir problem. ISIS has declared Pakistan as apostate that has allied with western powers and resisted Sharia. Thus, ISIS has got a new opportunity to present itself as an alternative to Pakistan in Kashmir. Many disgruntled cadres of Pakistani sponsored militant groups have picked up an affinity to the goals of ISIS as it helps them establish their cults in Kashmir. Zakir Musa, the successor of Burhan Wani, has quit HM to establish an Islamic State of Jammu and Kashmir. He has succeeded in uniting

Kashmiri Taliban and Harkat ul Mujahideen.

Some of the key objectives Pakistan intends to achieve with respect to creating trouble in Kashmir are as below:-

1. Pakistan wants to usurp Kashmir to revenge its defeats.
2. Pakistan wants to take a revenge for the 1971 war.
3. Pakistan wants to impede India's growth by fomenting security troubles for India
4. Anti-India rhetoric gives Pakistani army an edge over civilian political structures.
5. The Pakistani strategy is in sync with Chinese strategy to destabilize India
6. Pakistan continues to use the nuclear bogey with India
7. Pakistan continues to internationalize the Kashmir dispute
8. Pakistan wants to alienate Kashmiri people from India

To tackle the external threats from Pakistan, India needs to establish a coherent strategy with the following points below.

1. The government needs to ensure that all intellectuals, officials and politicians are put on the same footing with respect to the issue and speak the same language ensuring a common intellectual understanding.
2. A separate ministry of J&K affairs to manage issues can be established.
3. A strong surveillance needs to be done by Intelligence Bureau on the separatist leaders and their source of financing to ensure Pakistan does not support them to cause street violence.
4. India should continue to engage with civilian leadership of Pakistan with an intention to reduce the influence of Pakistani army in India-Pakistan relationship
5. India should use 'hit to hurt' policy at the Line of Control for any Pakistan sponsored terror attacks on the Indian soil.
6. India should carry out covert operations in Pakistan to eliminate heads of Lashkar and other terror groups.

Some specific points need to be kept in mind while tackling Kashmir problem.

- Kashmiri people are very sensitive. There is a need to adopt a therapeutic approach. The Kashmiri people have witnessed a lot of trauma due to ongoing crises since 2016. There needs to be a healing therapy.
- The government can establish an interactive forum to bring together all the segments of multilayered Kashmiri society.
- The PDP party favors soft separatism. It means that they allow opposition forces to voice their concerns. The separatists should be encouraged to come within the democratic mainstream. Dialogue is the only way out.
- At the administrative level, the government needs to focus of job creation and horticulture sector. The horticulture sector, which is the mainstay of the economy, has been damaged due to instances of insecticide strains.
- The government also has to address the issues related to missing persons. Every month, on the 10th, the Association of Parents of Disappeared Persons holds meetings. After proper investigations, the issues pertaining to missing persons needs to be closed. Such meetings don't allow the wounds to heal.
- At the law and order level, there is a need to keep a watch on the usage of

Track-2 funds used by R&AW and IB.

- The security forces need to be more proactive with sadbhavna (perception management) programs.
- The government, in collaboration with the civil society, needs to initiate a counter narrative campaign to de-radicalize the youth

1. The Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee (officially Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities) was established on 15 October 1999, pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1267.

3
CHAPTER

Indian Foreign Policy, Aerospace and Outer Space Diplomacy

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Role of air power in foreign policy
- Air power as coercive instruments
- Air power to achieve national interest
- India's space programme and INCOSPAR – 1962
- Aryabhata and Bhaskara

In the modern times, as diplomacy has evolved, the concepts of national interest and state sovereignty have become important. For a state to defend national interest, military power is the key. Twenty first century diplomacy includes facets of military power, which is used as a primary tool of foreign policy. For most of the states, the two key national interests are security and economic interest. The economic interests are pursued through diplomacy. In recent times, geo-economics is the ongoing theme in international affairs due to the advent of globalisation. The strength of geo-economic influence, which today, is exerted through diplomacy, was, in the 20th century, exerted through the practices of colonialism and imperialism, achieved by military force. India, however, has always treated economic and military diplomacy separately. We have never perceived military diplomacy as a tool of foreign policy despite it having helped us at various times to achieve foreign policy goals. India has already used its military forces in the UN peace keeping missions for promoting peace and international security as envisaged by the Indian Constitution under Article 51, and has even, at times, used air power and naval power when needed. Several powerful states actually actively use military power as foreign policy intervention—for instance, the US has used air power in combat and non-combat roles to supplement US foreign policy goals. For that matter, there is a growing realisation of use of air power in foreign policy.

Airlift 1991 – Kuwait

A huge number of Indians have been living and working in Iraq and Kuwait. In 1990s, the number was close to three lakh Indians. In 1991, as the Kuwait war broke out, India's top priority, that aligned with its national interest, was to bring its people out of the war zone. India transported its citizens to Jordan and organised an airlift of more than a lakh people. This airlift signified the role of airpower and its importance vis-à-vis the foreign policy goal of protecting the Indian diaspora.

Apart from using air power to secure national interest, at times it can be used to achieve military victories. In this sense, air power is envisaged as an instrument of coercion. It may be also used to ensure that conflict does not escalate or even be used to defeat the enemy at a strategic level.

Airpower in 1971 War

In the 1971 war, as the Indian forces entered East Pakistan, the US carrier Enterprise was found sailing towards the Bay of Bengal. India understood that if the US carrier reaches East Pakistan, it may use airfields of East Pakistan to further complicate Indian policy choices. The Indian Air Force resorted to heavy attacks on East Pakistani airfields, rendering them unfit for the US to use the airfields. This gave India an edge over Pakistan.

The two cases above prove that airpower is an important instrument of foreign policy. It can be used to advance the national interest of the nation. India has also taken the issue of air power seriously and the recent Rafale deal (as discussed in detail in the Chapter on India and France) signifies the growing importance in diplomacy.

The space race between the US and the USSR began in 1957. During the Cold War, for many countries, initiating a space programme was difficult due to financial reasons. India's drive to establish a space programme goes back to 1958–59. India understood that space research can be of great use in agriculture, education and industry. India also felt that space is an area that offers international cooperation. The government of India, in 1961, decided that the Department of Atomic Energy would conduct space research for peaceful use. An Indian National Commission for Space Research (INCOSPAR) was established in 1962 for outer space research. The basic goal of India was to become a self-reliant player by developing indigenous space technology and participate in International Cooperation by contributing to areas of serious research and technology.

Metrological Rocket Sounding¹ and India

INCOSPAR planned the establishment of a meteorological rocket sounding initiative, with the cooperation of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the independent US federal agency responsible for space research as well as aerospace and aeronautics research. As the cooperation was about to commence, the UN Commission on Peaceful Use of Outer Space decided to extend UN support for International Sounding Rockets in critical locations. India's location was close to the geomagnetic equator and it began to ask for UN support. Due to positive assistance received from the UN and other states, a Thumba Equatorial Rocket Launching Station (TERLS) was established in 1962.

After the death of Homi Jehangir Bhabha, the leadership came to Vikram Sarabhai and he successfully enunciated the Indian Space Programme and outlined the socio-economic goals to be achieved through special satellites. As India embarked upon self-

reliance in space during the Cold War period, countries like the US denied rocket technology to India as it was widely apprehended that any rocket technology transfer to India could bolster its ballistic missile capabilities. India did still manage to succeed in other areas. The thrust was mainly on domestic research and development. India achieved success in small rockets and satellite communication as well as in two-stage sounding rockets. As the space sector began to grow in India, in 1972, a new space commission was established which handed over the entire gamut of space research to the Department of Space (DOS). The DOS was placed under the Indian PM and had to report to the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), which was established in 1969. The new duo of DOS and ISRO created a specific satellite Aryabhatta (launched in 1975) and Bhaskara – I (the first experimental remote sensing satellite built in India, launched in 1979) and Bhaskara – II. The satellites collected data on telemetry, oceanography and hydrology. Russian support in both projects was pivotal. The period from 1980s onwards saw India begin to achieve a status of respect in space activities.

1. A sounding rocket, sometimes called a research rocket, is an instrument-carrying rocket designed to take measurements and perform scientific experiments during its sub-orbital flight. The rockets are used to carry instruments from 50 to 1,500 kilometres (31 to 932 mi) above the surface of the Earth.


4
CHAPTER

India and Science and Technology Diplomacy

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- S and T in diplomacy
- Core dimensions involved
- Social media and Indian public diplomacy
- Libya, India and Twitter
- Maldives virtual embassy
- Indian public diplomacy

The origin of science and technology (S&T) diplomacy dates back to the Cold War. It was during the Cold War that the USA and the USSR leverage technology to empower their military and use it to achieve foreign policy goals. Moreover, with the nuclear arms race, the need to ensure non-proliferation of nuclear weapons can be seen through various denial regimes that emerged to supplement the idea of S&T diplomacy. The post-Cold War period has seen the rise of developments in IT that has again enhanced the need of technology-for-growth by nations. As IT advancements supplements the drive of globalisation, there will also be increased need of cyber space protection. With the digitisation of data by states, a majority of economic processes are becoming IT controlled, and cyber war is now a new paradigm of war. This is the reason why, over a period of time, IR, which began as a study of war and diplomacy, has gradually incorporated S and T as a tool of diplomacy.



Soft Power and Diplomacy

In 2012, as the Arab Spring unfolded in Egypt and mass mobilisation was witnessed at the Tahrir Square, the Indian Embassy decided to celebrate Gandhi's anniversary by using social media. The Embassy launched a poster contest on the following theme: "Did you see the Gandhian spirit at Tahrir Square?" This way, using the social media, Indian diplomacy successfully integrated Gandhi with the Arab Spring and

saluted the spirit of the participants at Tahrir Square.

India has taken the concept and application of S&T diplomacy in the post-Cold War period by leveraging IT. It uses aggressive public diplomacy to establish connect with various actors. Social media is a core strategy used by India in its S&T diplomacy.

The Department of Public Diplomacy of MEA also successfully used Twitter to evacuate Indians from Libya in 2011, which proved to be a great success. Twitter was used for evacuation, planning and information sharing. Thus, India has shown how it can use S&T as a tool for public diplomacy. Due to advancements in communication, diplomacy has evolved dramatically in the 21st century. In 2007, we saw Maldives unveiling the world's first virtual embassy. This advancement clearly proves that the diplomacy of the future needs to take IT very seriously. The concept that has emerged in India in public diplomacy is that the state should use its foreign policy tools to directly connect within its target audience. The aim is use of innovative mechanisms to reach multiple actors. For example, social media is used to connect to the young population. Public diplomacy reflects a growing connect of diplomacy to the private sector, NGOs, and so on. This ensures two-way communication and interaction. Public diplomacy has emerged as a key tool to project India's positive attributes at the right time and right place and serves our national interests well.

5
CHAPTER

India's Maritime Foreign Policy Strategy

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Indian Ocean as a new theatre of conflict
- Chinese Malacca dilemma
- UNCLOS-1 and Geneva convention
- India and Geneva convention
- India and territorial waters
- Seabed commission
- India's Maritime Zone Act
- Formation of zones
- Establishment of coastal guard
- UNCLOS- 3 meeting 1973
- Five zone concept of UNCLOS
- Artificial Islets and UNCLOS
- India and UNCLOS drift
- Indo – Pacific the new normal
- ASEAN security community
- ASEAN regional forum
- MILAN and IONS
- Indian navy power projection

India perceives China as an external threat and the new theatre of this external threat by China is playing out at the maritime level. As China and Pakistan continue to deepen their engagement, India needs strategies to checkmate China, and it is at this level that maritime foreign policy strategy is necessary. India can leverage its position in the Indian Ocean and its good relations with the South East Asian States and Africa to undertake maritime assertion. The significance of Indian Ocean rises for China as it trades with Afghanistan, Middle East, and Africa and Central Asia. The more resources China gets from these regions, the more trade happens via the Indian Ocean route, which may emerge in future as a new theatre of conflict. As Chinese ships doing maritime commerce pass through straits of Malacca, this is also the coordinate for India to have an assertive presence.

The Strait of Malacca connects Indian Ocean (IO) to South China Sea and is 900 km in length and is also a prominent trade route between East Asia and West Asia-Europe. A

considerable quantity of oil passes through this region. The problem of piracy in the Malaccan Strait is rampant but aggressive patrolling along the region has ensured reduction in incidents. India, since 2006, is instrumental in fighting piracy here. Since Andaman and Nicobar islands are close by, the Indian navy has built an unnamed aerial vehicle patrolling base. The Chinese look at the Strait of Malacca as the ‘Malacca dilemma’ as majority of oil for China comes via this region. The Strait of Malacca is the king of the Indian maritime chessboard.

When India became independent, it extended sovereign rights over the continental shelf without mentioning the depth or distance of the territories. Gradually by 1956, it claimed a ‘fisheries zone’ upto 100 miles away of territorial waters. At the international level, the US and the USSR were negotiating the width of territorial waters but were not able to reach consensus. In 1958, the first UNCLOS meeting adopted a codified law called the Geneva Convention, which accepted freedom of navigation of the seas and sovereignty of a state in territorial sea. It worked to adopt immigration rights for contiguous zones but the first UNCLOS could not evolve consensus on the issues regarding the width of territorial waters and economic fisheries zones. In 1960, the second meet of UNCLOS was held, in which there evolved the idea of having territorial waters up to six miles. It was also proposed that an additional six miles beyond territorial waters be considered as economic fisheries zone, but a two-third majority could not emerge and eventually this idea failed once again.

In the first UNCLOS meeting, India proposed that any warship should get authorisation from the state. There was no consensus on this issue in the UNCLOS meeting and the proposal, therefore, could not be added. Consequently, India refused to ratify the Geneva Convention, which emerged after first UNCLOS meet. In 1967, as Pakistan extended its territorial waters from three to twelve nautical miles, India also did the same on 12th September, in the same year. During the 1960s, as the technologies progressed, the nations began to use modern technology to explore oil and gas in the sea bed. This advancement in seabed technology led the countries to take steps to safeguard their interests. Some advanced nations deployed submissions with ballistic missiles. This compelled the UN to find a solution. In 1968, the General Assembly established a Seabed Commission of 42 UN members to discuss how nations can peacefully use the seabed. In 1970, a Declaration of Principles was accepted whereby the areas of seabed and resources in the seabed were to be considered the common heritage of humanity and the seabed and resources were declared to be subject to a global regime through a treaty. This was the time when the Indian government had authorised the mining of polymetallic nodules from the seabed and had also discovered oil and gas in Bombay and Andaman Islands. On 25th August 1976, India passed the Maritime Zones Act. The act stated that upto 12 nautical miles would be territorial waters, 24 NM would be contiguous zone and upto 200 NM would be EEZ and to enforce its compliance, the government established coast guard as an armed force of the Union of India in 1978. The Indian coast guard was to enforce the act and assist the fishermen in distress, in addition to providing back upto customs in anti-smuggling activities and prevention of marine pollution.


In 1973, at the global level, began the third meeting of UNCLOS or UNCLOS-3. India participated in UNCLOS-3 and proposed ‘Freedom of Navigation’ and free mobility of naval ships. It also advocated the idea that Andaman and Nicobar Islands be declared as

archipelago islets. India further advocated division of waters as per its own maritime zone act. The UNCLOS-3, after negotiating for nine years, adopted the draft of UNCLOS in 1982. It adopted five zones, as given in the table below:

S. No	Zones	Area	Rights	Indian Agencies
1.	Internal waters	Within	Full sovereignty	Law and order agencies
2.	Territorial waters	0 to 12 NM	Full sovereignty	Marine police and coast guard
3.	Contiguous zone	12–24 NM	Full sovereignty	Coast guard, customs and CISF-Marines
4.	Exclusive economic zone	24–200 NM	Mining, fishing and oil exploration only	Indian Navy
5.	High seas	200 NM and above	Open zone	x

India was included as a pioneer investor for seabed mining. Most of what India advocated was agreed in the UNCLOS-3 declaration. But there was an opposition to the idea of notifications being needed by foreign warships in the territorial waters of a foreign state. Moreover, Andaman was not accorded the status of an archipelago as UNCLOS-3 granted the status only to those islets which had a distinct political entity. This was done to ensure that off-lying islets are not used by states to restrict freedom of navigation. The UNCLOS-3 also held that 500 metres around any artificial island should be a safety zone. India's proposal for a bigger buffer area was not accepted. India has, since then, peacefully concluded agreements with Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Thailand and Maldives and Indonesia over a period of time.

The region of Asia Pacific played an important part in the Cold War due to strategic formation of alliances. The post-Cold War period saw a rise of the Indo-Pacific, which was known in the west as Asia-Pacific. After the Cold War ended, as Asian economies began to rise, the new geopolitical term used for the region changed to Indo-Pacific. Over a period of time, the dependence of the US on oil from west Asia declined and with discovery of shale it is bound to decline further. The US has realised the need to focus on domestic shale rather than imported oil, but continues its presence in Indian Ocean with a new priority.



The US considers the Indo-Pacific as a strategic region and India a lynchpin in the scheme. Meanwhile, the ASEAN security community aims to establish peace and a just order and ensure that all members are at harmony with each other and the world. With


rising Chinese assertion in South China Sea and defiance of China of the international tribunal's award over South China Sea dispute between China and Philippines in July 2016, the significance of ASEAN security community will rise. In 1991, the ASEAN Regional Forum was established, with India as its member. The forum assists the ASEAN security community. India is increasing its role in the ASEAN and has deepened engagement with its neighbours under the Act East Policy, while attempting to make its presence being felt deeply in the region.

In 1995, India undertook the MILAN exercises in the region. China is not a part of MILAN but it has other 17 nations from the Asia-Pacific. The aim of MILAN, undertaken by the navies collectively at Port Blair, is to gather and learn from each other about strategies for combating piracy and drug trafficking. This platform enables India to explore its power projection capabilities in collaboration with others. India, in 2008, organised the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS). It is a forum where littoral states of the Indian Ocean come together to discuss regional maritime issues. As of now, 28 states are a part of IONS. Since 1992, Malabar exercise has been undertaken between India and the US at different locations in the world. India's cooperation with Singapore takes the form of a bilateral joint exercise called SIBMEX (Singapore–India Bilateral Maritime Exercise). Due to India's warm and cordial relations with Japan, the JIMEX (Japan–India Maritime Exercise) has also been held since 2012.




India's Blue Economy, Blue Diplomacy, Blue Water Navy, Sagarmala and Mausam

The government of India has taken gradual steps towards a blue economy. The idea of establishing a blue economy is to sustainably use marine resources for growth. The main aim is to always use the oceanic resources for human welfare. The major oceanic resources are minerals, oil and gas. The blue economy strategy envisages use of innovation by state and private sector for the utilisation of the resources of the oceans for social welfare. The core principle is that of sustainability and offering green shoots.




In 2015, the Indian government launched Sagarmala to develop port infrastructure. The government intends to develop ports so that backward and forward linkages can be established for growth. The idea is to initiate a port-led development.



In April, 2016, the government released a National Perspective Plan identifying coastal Economic zones envisaging a synergy between a dedicated freight corridor, National Highway Development Plan and SEZ. The Sagarmala will also support the Make in India Programme.

In 2015, the 1st IORA Ministerial Blue Economy conference was organised by the government of Mauritius where it identified core areas of cooperation with IORA for fisheries, ocean energy and shipping and military exercises. The first ever Maritime India Summit (MIS) happened in 2016. Around 42 nations that participated in the MIS engaged to support Sagarmala. Investment to the tune of INR 80,000 crores was generated in the form of business in Portland Development Sector (as reported by PIB, Government of India). The shipping ministry showcased around 250 projects for maritime and infrastructure development in Indian ports. This gave a thrust to the achievement of the vision of Dr B R Ambedkar on developing waterways for the prosperity of poor. Not only was India able to forge new maritime alliances for port development, but the MIS also showcased India's Maritime heritage through a museum which displayed 5000 years of India's rich maritime heritage from the Indus Valley Civilisation up until now.

India's project Mausam is a combination of strategic and cultural dimension. It aims at establishing cultural links with countries where ancient sailors sailed for trade. It is implemented by the Ministry of Culture and the Archaeological Survey of India. The aim is to connect to the 10 maritime states and re-establish communication to enhance cultural value sharing and focus on understanding national cultures of other states though maritime interaction.



The Indian navy aspires to be a blue water navy. A blue water navy is capable of projecting power and operating in oceans far away from its domestic territory. It requires naval capabilities of aircraft carriers. The blue water navy can travel globally and display incredible power and force. India has been acquiring capabilities to emerge as a blue water navy in future. As of now, Australia is the only Blue water navy in the region with India, South Africa and Saudi Arabia as aspirants.


6 CHAPTER

India's Foreign Economic Policy

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Core actors in India's Foreign Economic Policy
- Sketch of evolutionary stages
- Idea domination and change model
- Phase 1 – 1947 to 1966
- Phase 2 – 1967 to 1974
- Phase 3 – 1974 to 1990
- Phase 4 – 1990 till now


India's Foreign Economic Policy (IFEP) has developed over a period of time during the Cold War. The Indian Prime Ministers at the helm have had a deep imprint in moulding the IFEP. The national leaders ended up creating and evolving the present IFEP by analysing the interaction of economic actors and politics. As the state of India progressed domestically, its interaction with its external environment increased, leading to several encounters that left an imprint on its economic foreign policy.



Before we attempt our study of IFEP, we must understand how ideas and the state interact to create economic leverage. A state develops certain national interests, which must necessarily include an economic component, depending upon the present circumstances of the state's domestic affairs. For instance, when India became independent, the domestic principle in our state made it mandatory to opt for a closed economy and undertake import substitution. This idea of this domestic economic paradigm continued till 1975. However, by 1975, it was clear that the results of this strategy of import substitution was not what India had envisaged for itself. Consequently, the idea from 1975 to 1990 was to adopt an export-led growth strategy. This period was followed by an opening of Indian economy to complete the cycle of integration with the world. Thus, state policy architecture and its ideas shall always dominate economic foreign policy at all times.

In India, change in the economic paradigm is brought about by ideas and crises. In

1991, by when import substitution strategy had clearly failed to bear fruit, the Balance of Payments (BOP) crises paved way for a change to export oriented liberalisation and globalisation-based strategy.




Thus, if we need to understand the interests of the Indian state, we need to perceive the core ideas of the state that are dominating at the moment. Secondly, the Indian state expresses a unique behaviour of getting from the world what they need on the basis of the ideas/goals they have set for themselves. When the Indian state adopted closed economic model, it exploited the global actors to get resources for its import substitution model. When, in 1990s, it adopted globalisation, it advocated for investment, heavily promoting sympathy for its own concerns.

Now, let us try to apply the logic derived above in the four phases outlined further ahead.

PHASE I: 1947 TO 1966

This period is where India undertook limited global exposure at the economic level. The state pursued the ideology of non-alignment and import substitution. The idea was to maintain independence in foreign policy decision making and have engagement with those who can support us in import substitution. India engaged with both the US and the USSR in this regard. Both nations, in different ways, supported import substitution.



After the death of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel in 1950, Nehru took the decision to incline the Indian state towards state intervention. The Second Five Year plan in India and the passage of the Industrial Development and Regulation Act 1958 laid the foundation of import substitution and a closed economy. As the idea of import substitution dominated, despite multiple ups and downs, ideational changes were not entertained. For instance, after the Second Five Year Plan was launched in 1956, a BOP crisis emerged. India still resorted to channelling resources to sustain the plan that posed challenges to an open economy. The World Bank tried to push India to undertake liberalisation, but India resorted to even more import substitution after 1966. Since the dominant idea behind this

policy was not unjust, India did not displease any power between 1950 to 1955.

The US, in fact, provided 500 million dollars in aid to India in that period. Nikita Khrushchev, who visited India in 1955 and appreciated its Second Five Year Plan, announced an aid for heavy industrial development. The USSR also provided assistance for the Bhilai Steel Plant. Perceiving the strong USSR support to India, the US began to fear that India might be sorely tempted to join the Soviet Camp, and consequently, from 1957 onwards, it increased its aid to India. In 1960, the US provided 800 million dollars in aid and low-priced wheat under PL-480 for tackling food shortages in India. As wheat came under PL-480, it eased out immediate shortage concerns we had but the bigger issue was that India had neglected its agriculture and had inclined too much towards rapid industrialisation.

The decade of 1960s did not augur well for India. The war of 1962, then of 1965 were followed by successive droughts in India. Perceiving the dire situation, the US began to use aid levers to push India to open its economy. The US not only urged India to open its economy but also to increase spending in agriculture and undertake a devaluation of its currency. India perceived it as interference deemed that the idea of US to open Indian economy was not a best choice at that moment. It did, however, found the idea to increase spending in agriculture to mitigate drought and establish balance between agriculture and industry to be profoundly logical, and therefore continued with import substitution with a focus on agriculture. India laid the foundation for Green Revolution to achieve self-sufficiency in agriculture. Thus, this phase proves what we observed earlier. Only when India is convinced of the total failure of an existing policy does it bring change, else the idea continues.

PHASE II: 1967 TO 1975

Two factors dominate this phase. The first is India's growing proximity to the USSR in this period. The reason for this proximity is India's search for a security guarantor. The 1971, the conclusion of the India–USSR Treaty of Friendship fulfilled the space hitherto left unoccupied by India's security dilemma as the USSR emerged as its primary security guarantor. This led India to explore an option for barter trade with the USSR to curtail forex. India also resorted to strengthening of the idea of import substitution. India opened up to the deal to have arms in exchange for wheat with the USSR at the barter level. The second factor was the strengthening of import substitution infrastructure saw the passage of the Monopolistic and Restrictive Trade Practice (MRTP) Act 1969 to regulate companies worth over 200 million Indian rupees or more. It also saw the passage of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) in 1973, aimed at reducing permissible equity in a firm owned by a foreign entity to 40% from the then-existing 51%. This phase also saw the nationalisation of banks. Consequently and naturally US aid dipped but proximity to USSR increased.

PHASE III: 1975 TO 1990

During this period, a gradual understanding began to emerge about the failure of import substitution delivering the needed results. A need for change was keenly felt. The government began authorising studies. The studies, which claimed that the utility of import substitution was declining and the FDI and the private sector were needed for the

economy to progress further, played a role in hastening the shift being planned by the government. If we observe this phase carefully, we may see the merging ideational shift in Indian policy making. Some autonomy was given in select sectors like IT and Pharmacy and the MRTP was amended to take 200 million Indian rupees to one billion Indian rupees. However, the ideational change in the government and its policy making was muting some resistance. The government was preparing for controlled liberalisation and for the participation of foreign investment but domestic industrial class continued to hold enormous privilege and power. Apart from internal issues, the external environment towards late 1970s was not conducive as the détente between the US and the USSR failed when the latter invaded Afghanistan in 1979.

India's refusal to condemn Soviets for the Afghan invasion distanced India from the US and as the USSR got more and more preoccupied with Cold War politics, it could not provide India the needed leverage for change. Thus, despite domestic changes emerging in the form of ideas, the Cold War and domestic irritants posed immense problems in the execution of those reforms.

PHASE IV: 1990 TILL NOW

The situation in 1991 brought India at a veritable tipping point. Domestic factors like opposition from industry did not allow reforms to proceed. Moreover, as the USSR collapsed, India witnessed another BOP crisis again in the same year. The India state took the opportunity to bring the needful reforms. The fall of the USSR gave India not only in option to open up to the US and its allies but also do away with the anti-market rhetoric and go with a market order with maintenance of its own domestic autonomy. India began to open up with the US at the trade level and finally opened its economy. India also engaged with the ASEAN, Japan and South Korea. In fact, India began to reduce receiving economic aid and instead began to give out aid.



Strategic Consequences of India's Economic Performance vis-à-vis Indo-Pak Relations

During the Cold War period, especially from 1950 to 1980, when India had a GDP growth rate of 3.5%, Pakistan surprisingly had a six percent growth. However, despite a higher GDP growth rate, India neutralised Pakistan effectively during armed conflicts. Things began to change by the end of the Cold War. Pakistan slipped to 4% growth as India rose to 6% in 1990s. India began to make improvements in Human Development while Pakistan dwindled. The economic divergence in the two has compelled the strategic communities to de-hyphenate the two countries in the region. As the economic situation of India improves, it will be able to strengthen its military while the opposite will happen for Pakistan. Pakistan spends more of its budget on defence, without having a strong economy. The strategic calculus will change and it will shift the regional power dynamic. Pakistan tried neutralising its economic slide by adopting nuclear weapons and resorting to cross-border terrorism. In the long run, as Pakistani economy declines, it will not be able to sustain the cross-border terrorism campaign either. India foresees that this would compel Pakistan to

normalise relations with India while it takes time to focus on rebuilding its economy. India, in the meantime, has increased bilateral regional integration to reap rich benefits and hopes that a day will come when the only remaining impediment to complete regional integration will be Pakistan, which will, in turn, compel Pakistan to normalise relation and undertake cooperation again.

7
CHAPTER

Oil Diplomacy and India's Energy Diplomacy

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:


- Indian sources of energy
- Energy as component of foreign policy
- The strategy of diversification
- Burmah, cultex and standard vacumn
- British impact on oil foreign policy
- Socialization of oil sector
- Russia – Ruble agreement
- Domestic development of refineries
- OVL assets acquisition strategy
- Oil diplomatic outreach policy
- Gas and LNG imports
- Nuclear research and fuel supply


In India, a number of energy sources are used. Each source has an individual ministry for developing that specific energy source. Key sources include coal, oil, gas, hydropower and nuclear power. India imports oil, coal, gas and uranium. India being dependent on oil that is largely exported from outside means global factors shall impact India's Energy Policy (EP). After the end of the Cold War, as India adopted an open economy and as its growth rate increase, the energy consumption also increased. The domestic sources could no longer meet the increased consumption, forcing India to import more oil and thus making energy security an essential component of Indian foreign policy. The collaboration between domestic bureaucracy, foreign policy practitioners and political executives began to give shape to the strategies to achieve India's energy security. To achieve energy security, the government has adopted diversification of energy supplies as a primary policy. It has also resorted to the use of Indian firms, including the PSU ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL) to invest in overseas oil and gas ventures.

The oil policy India followed after it became independent was based on its colonial legacy. The imprint of British policy was at its maximum on oil policy. The oil that used to come to India also controlled by the US firms Caltex and Standard Vacuum. During this period, a majority of the refineries were owned by western firms and oil to these refineries came from Iran, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia and Kuwait. From the 1960s, India established institutions for a socialist economy and developed proximity to the USSR, which led to a

change in its oil policy. India had issues with foreign refineries and suppliers. As per a contract with the USSR in 1960, India imported Russian oil. The Indian government decided to build PSU refineries with help from the USSR and Romania, and signed Rupee–Ruble agreement for payments.

The western companies were not allowed to increase their influence and expand in India and 1976, the Indian government succeeded in nationalising of Burmah–Shell and Caltex, thus ending the reliance on western firms. India also began to continue oil imports from the USSR and West Asia. As the Cold War ended, India opted for a liberalised and open economy and began needing more resources as its domestic consumption began to increase. Consequently, India began to import oil from Africa and South East Asia. To enhance energy security, OVL was given permission to purchase assets abroad to undertake oil exploration. The OVL began to become prominent in Sudan, Vietnam and Sakhalin. An aggressive Indian diplomacy, coupled with support from political executives and domestic bureaucracy began to secure energy for India. The OVL today has exploration and oil development going on in Libya, East Timor, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Nigeria and Brazil. The OVL also competes with China in bids internationally. Good historical relations between India and a majority of these countries worked in India's favour. In 2006, India signed an agreement with China where both have decided to not to compete but cooperate in overseas oil asset acquisition. There has been an extension of diplomatic outreach to all oil producing nations by India. However, at times, due to limited resources and delayed government response, the OVL loses bids to others, otherwise having achieved tremendous success. India, in recent times, has also taken steps to emerge as a net exporter of petro products by augmenting oil refining infrastructure in its territory. This helps save foreign exchange and boost petro product exports. Shale has emerged as a new resource in India's energy security matrix and India has decided to import it from US.





Oil has always dominated the Indian energy industry but off-late, gas has also become important. India has been dependent upon foreign suppliers for gas. It imports gas as LNG while the Department of Atomic energy makes efforts in indigenous production in the field of nuclear energy. Canadian-Indian Reactor Uranium System (CIRUS) and CANada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) dominated the initial years of Indian nuclear research. After India's Pokhran-1 testing in 1947, the NSG and NPT created embargos of any foreign supplies to India. For the Tarapur plant, however, the US continued its support till 1982 and the French agreed to supply fuel beyond 1982. China and Russia supplied fuel for Tarapur till 2001. In 1988, Russia also decided to agree to supply India with two 1000 Mega waltz Light Water reactors but Russia's collapse in 1989 prevented the agreement from materialising. The agreement was finally executed in 1998 and rector construction began in 2002 and finished by 2012. Due to the testing of Pokhran-I and II, the embargos were still in place and India was prohibited to import Uranium. The domestic nuclear programme, therefore, could not achieve its aims. In 2005, as the US-India nuclear deal progressed, the embargo was lifted and NSG trade restrictions came off in 2008. Since then, the doors of nuclear commerce have been open for India.

8
CHAPTER

Indian Diaspora

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Introduction
- Concepts and terms
- Historical analysis of the Indian Diaspora
- Indian Diaspora and the world
- Indian Diaspora in the Caribbean Islands
- Indian Diaspora in Africa
- India Diaspora in South East Asia
- Indian Diaspora in Europe
- Indian Diaspora in North America
- The Diaspora in Australia, New Zealand and Fiji
- Indian Diaspora in West Asia
- Ensuring the security of the Indian Diaspora
- Recent schemes, initiatives and programs
- Is Indian Diaspora—An Untapped Asset Globally?
- Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (PBD)
- Film diplomacy and soft power play

INTRODUCTION


This chapter introduces the readers with concepts related to the diaspora, specifically the India diaspora. The chapter begins with the study of different terms and concepts associated with the study of diaspora. It then proceeds to a historical analysis of the Indian diaspora (hereafter referred to as ID). After analysing the pre-1947 and post-1947 trends in diaspora, the chapter will further proceed to discuss the settlement of the Indian diaspora in Africa, Caribbean islands, Australian, Americas and Europe. The chapter will also discuss government policies and strategies related to the ID and recent initiatives. There will be studies of certain famous precedences set by India to protect its ID as well.

CONCEPTS AND TERMS

Migration is a movement that takes place from one place to the other, and it can also take place from one country to another. **Immigration** is when a person comes to a foreign country as a permanent resident. **Emigration** is the act of settling in another country away from the home country. As per the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, a **Non-Residential Indian (NRI)** is a person who has an Indian passport but stays outside India

for business, employment, vocation for more than 182 days in a year. A **Person of Indian Origin (PIO)** is one whose parents or grandparents were Indian citizens by virtue of naturalisation. If an Indian citizen marries a foreign citizen, the foreign citizen married to the Indian citizen shall also be hold the status of a PIO. The indentured labourers taken by the British to foreign states from India settled in those lands and their off springs in subsequent generations are now known as PIOs. If an NRI becomes a citizen of another country, he will hold the status of a PIO. A **Person Resident in India (PRI)** is an Indian citizen who is a citizen of India but may go abroad for a certain period for education purpose or medical treatments.

The entire phenomenon of human migration is presently captured in a term called ‘Diaspora’. Diaspora originates from a Greek word that meant scattering or dispersion (of seeds). It was first used in the 6th century BC to explain the Jewish exile from Babylon and later to describe the population of Jews living outside Palestine. Diaspora therefore signifies a movement and a spread of people outside their homeland. Earlier, such migration used to be in search of food, shelter and resources. In the post-World War-II period, the migration was brought about with the movement of labour to the industrialised countries for jobs, and in search for better quality of life. The most recent trend of migration is influenced by globalisation and the demand of skilled expertise as well as large scale political instability in certain regions of the world which occasions frequent refugee crises.



HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE INDIAN DIASPORA

The first ever recorded migration of Indians abroad is during the time of the Greek and Mesopotamian civilizations. In the second century AD, during the reign of Kanishka, a group of people migrated from India to Eastern Europe. During the Chola period, people from the Chola kingdom migrated to South East Asian states as they had a powerful navy. Many Indians began to settle soon in the regions comprising of present day Indonesia and Malaysia. During the British times began the first wave of migration, which is referred to as ‘Old Diaspora’. In 1833, the British abolished slavery and initiated the indentured labour migration system from India to meet the labour demand. Under the indentured labour migration system, the labourers would enter into a contract for five years to work in a plantation or a factory. The labourers, as per the contract, would be paid in cash and kind. After the expiry of the five-year period, the labourers could either leave and go back home or conclude a fresh contract. If the labourer decided to go back home, then he would have to testify before a magistrate that he was indeed ending his existing contract. From 1834 began the export of bonded labour from India to the African states. This was also replicated by the Dutch and the French, which in turn led to a mass movement of Indians to other nations. The workers from India were mostly taken to do plantation work. The labour was taken mostly from Bihar and the United Province to Mauritius, Suriname,

Trinidad and Tobago and Fiji. From Punjab and Gujarat, the labour was mostly sent to Guyana and East Africa. The indentured system was abolished in 1916. This old diaspora constituted of 60% for the ID abroad and was majorly a pre-World War-II phenomenon. During the Indian National Movement, delegations of Congress leaders comprising of CF Andrews, Shastri, Kunzru and Gokhale would travel abroad to check the conditions of Indian workers abroad and used to bargain for better conditions for the workers.

A section in the Congress wanted to safeguard the economic interests of the ID in Britain. During this period, there was mass mobilisation of the ID in Mauritius and Fiji, and consequently, the ID gradually began to be absorbed in local governments of these states. In some countries, the sections of the Indian community also pushed for Indian Independence. In 1927, a foreign policy document prepared by Nehru advocated that Indians in foreign countries should adapt themselves to local countries and not seek special positions or provisions for themselves. The core idea propounded by Nehru was that the ID should cooperate with the natives and support the anti-colonial struggles of their host countries. Nehru advocated that the interests of the natives should be paramount during the process.

The post-independence period witnessed the rise of a new wave of migration known as the ‘New Diaspora’. A lot of Indians in the second phase began to move to the USA, Britain, Australia, Canada and Western Europe. After the Second World War, Britain had formed a commonwealth immigration policy whereby citizens of commonwealth nations could work and live in Britain. This led to the movement of lot of skilled workers and students from India, and other commonwealth states, to Britain. The period of the 1960s also witnessed phenomenon of double migration by the ID. During this decade, many newly independent African states initiated policies that affected outsiders. In Kenya and Uganda, there were anti-Indian discriminatory campaigns and this led the Indians to migrate from Africa (as well as the Carribbeans and Fiji) to Europe, Australia and North America. In the 1970s began a movement of the ID to the Gulf states. This happened largely due to the oil boom which resulted in the movement of semi-skilled workers to the Gulf States to assist Arab citizens. However, the ID in the gulf enjoys the status of mere second class citizens. In the post-1990s period, globalisation led to a software boom, leading the US to introduce the concept of H1-B visas. A US firm, under H1-B visas, could hire the citizen of a foreign state if the citizen had a special occupation and set of skills. The software boom led to a huge wave of Indians entering the US as highly skilled workers in the IT industry.

Since independence, Nehru had been of the idea that if India supports the ID abroad, it would lead to more harm than good for India. He deliberately favoured a policy of disassociation as he wanted the ID to serve native interest in their respective host nations. India also followed a policy of dissociation during the Nehruvian period because it lacked the infrastructure and resources to meet the concerns and address the issues of a diverse and expansive Indian diaspora abroad.


The period from 1950s to 1960s witnessed a period of active dissociation. The core advice to the diaspora during this time was that they adapt to their host countries and become active agents of host countries. Nehru advised the ID to identify themselves with the locals. Whenever the ID was in crises, they failed to elicit help from the Indian

government. Thus, the Nehruvian period witnessed the suppression, subjugation and even marginalisation of the ID. The overall policy till 1962 was that the ID should adjust to the countries they reside in, even at great cost to themselves. Post 1962, the policy forwards ID began to change. In 1964, during Indira Gandhi's tour of Africa, she did emphasise that the ID be loyal to their local communities but also began to address the ID as ambassadors of India. The policy of India Gandhi was showing a shift away from the Nehruvian policy of active dissociation. When Indira became the PM in 1966, the shift from dissociation began to visible as the ID was gradually brought into the policy discourse.

There was also a further visible shift in the policy in 1970s, when there was an oil boom in the Gulf. Due to this, a lot of low income Indian workers began migrate to the Gulf to work in the oil services and construction sectors. These Indian expats began to send foreign remittances back home. The moment the money started flowing to India, the government began to improve the banking system to ease out the repatriation of foreign exchange. The government also took up issues related to the welfare of the workers with host countries, primarily to protect the Indian workers from exploitation. In 1980s, the rise of IT-based diaspora, that got fully established in 1990s in the USA, UK and Canada, also saw a rise in remittances back home. At the end of the Cold War, as India witnessed economic growth, it began to accept aid from the cash rich NRIs abroad. The Indian government convinced the cash rich NRIs to park their funds in branches of Indian banks abroad and rallied to have them invest their money in the industries in India. As India brought about structural reforms in the economy, the ID too began to show faith in the future of the Indian economy, began to push their money into India. The government also embarked upon a proactive association with the diaspora abroad. The NRIs were allowed by the Rao government to invest in stock markets and established industries. As India's priority was to usher in economic resurgence, the proactive diaspora policy began to focus more on the NRIs than on the old diaspora.

The association with the old diaspora continued to be cultural in nature while with the new diaspora and the NRI, it became more economic and political. As the BJP government came in 1998, they brought about a radical rehaul in the Diaspora policy. Their focus was now not only on transfer of investments and assets but on using the diaspora as an instrument to make India a global power. The LM Singhvi committee was appointed during the BJP rule, which led to birth of a host of new initiatives of which the Pravasi Bharatiya Diwas (PBD) and Pravasti Bharatiya Samman (PBS) were the most notable developments. The concept of PBD was launched in 2003 and has continued since then. The UPA government also initiated multiple policies for the ID during their rule from 2004–2014. A new women's helpline, a legal helpline for the Diaspora in distress and various MoUs to safeguard Indians abroad have been their initiatives. The coming of the new government in 2014 has brought the diaspora back to focus. The Modi government has gauged that the Diaspora is an important tool for economic development and has an important role as international influencer. The Modi government has made the diaspora a key driver of the Indian foreign policy. The various chapters of this book leading up to this chapter have also elaborated upon Modi's diaspora policy. To recap quickly, PM Modi addresses the diaspora in foreign countries to inform them about the programmes in India where the diaspora can be stakeholder in India's development story. He usually addresses the diaspora in a huge gathering to convey to the host countries that

there is a sizable chunk of Indian population in most nations, and that they are taken care of, they will, in turn take care of the local politicians in the elections.




Brain Drain in Modern Times in India

Brain drain happens when there is an abnormal one-way flow of highly skilled workers to advanced nations in search of better paying jobs, eventually leading to their resettlement in those countries. India has witnessed it in the case of the USA where skilled IT workers go to work with firms and eventually settle there. It is a loss to the parent country. The brain drain is majorly applicable in case of engineers, medicine practitioners and scientists. In India, lack of jobs and a stimulating research culture has bolstered the brain drain. Though brain drain explains the interdependence of all societies, the home country suffers as the skilled workforce settles aboard in large numbers. For the host country, it is a brain gain.

INDIAN DIASPORA AND THE WORLD

Indian Diaspora in the Caribbean Islands

The islands from Mexico to Panama are known as Caribbean islands. Initially, the islands were under Spanish control. The Spanish were ruthless and were mainly interested in draining the resources of the area. The major economic activity in the area was plantation work and slavery was therefore quite rampant. The Indians were taken to the Caribbeans as part of the indentured labour system. As the islands gained independence from their colonial masters, the region became a strategic backyard for the USA, leading to a transformation of the region's economy from plantation work to industrialisation. As the nature of the society began to witness change, the ID also evolved and began to adapt to anew, modern way of life. The ID realised the significance of education and educated the younger generations. The period from 1880 to 1914 also saw multiple strikes by Indian plantation workers, leading to an assertion of their identity and thereby giving birth to a new kind of political activism by the ID.



Indian Diaspora in Africa

There exists a considerably large ID in Africa, with most of it settled in Mauritius. Most of the Indians had reached Africa under the Indentured Labour System. Indians were taken to work in forests in East Africa to lay down railway lines. A lot of migrant Indians were also free passengers who were mainly traders from the West coast of India, especially Gujarat. The Indians faced difficulties in Kenya and South Africa and the India government did attempt to provide covert and overt support to the ID whenever needed.

In 1946, when South Africa had initiated segregation and discrimination of Indians, the Indian government took up the matter at the level of UN not just for Indians who were discriminated against but for all communities that became victims of racial discrimination. Nehru, in other parts of Africa, recommended integration of the ID with the African cause but maintained a different policy towards the ID in South Africa where there was outright support. With reference to South Africa, India tried to merge the issue of apartheid and Indian discrimination. India, post-independence, solicited economic support from all sources except South Africa, and Nehru decided to break up diplomatic ties with the former over racial discrimination. In East Africa, the ID had visibility since ancient times. As the ID in East Africa mainly comprised of the trading community, it was visibly a rich diaspora. During colonial times, the British followed a nativity policy, thereby debarring the PIOs from any form of power sharing. In 1967, the government in Kenya initiated a process of Kenyanisation of the economy which affected the Indian as well. The Indian government encouraged the Indians in Kenya to apply for local citizenships. The government instructed the Indian diplomats stationed in Kenya to help PIOs get integrated, to which the ID in Kenya showed a lukewarm response. The government launched an Africa–India development cooperation to help the Indian community in Kenya get economic support. India also faced a similar issue in Uganda when Idi Amin decided to outlaw outsiders from Uganda. Amin gave a 90-day ultimatum period for the outsiders to leave during his ongoing war of liberation. India, by diplomatically taking up the issue with Idi Amin, ensured that the Indian settlers with Indian passports would be given compensation for their business and properties held in Uganda. In Mauritius, the ID is a majority. Since independence till today, India has used the ID in Africa as its goodwill ambassadors.

India Diaspora in South East Asia


The Indian diaspora is well represented in Singapore, Thailand and Philippines. The ID in South East Asia (SEA) comprises of NRIs, PIOs and stateless Indians. Some are affluent while others are striving for affluence. The local leaders of ASEAN states trust the ID, thereby ensuring that the community plays a positive role in the development of SEA.

In the chapter entitled ‘India and South East Asia Policy—Key Drivers’, we have discussed about the eviction of Indians belonging to the Chettiar community from Burma. As more Indians were evicted, the space was filled by the Chinese migrants. The inaction of India in Burma, which stands in complete contrast with the proactive stance of India in case of Sri Lanka, also became counterproductive. In the post-Cold War period, India brought about a shift in its ID policy in SEA. India realised that its diaspora in Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia, is placed in strategic sectors like trade, investments, engineering and textiles. The Sindhi community is dominant in manufacturing in Philippines while Punjabis are dominant in money lending. Singapore has a mixture of Tamils, Malayalis, Gujaratis and Punjabis who range from being in trade to civil services to education to pharmacy. The Sikhs and Sindhis are dominant in Thailand in textiles, IT and real estate.


Indian Diaspora in Europe

Imports of spices, ivory and so forth, via other countries, do find a mention in the Old Testament of the Bible. King Solomon was gifted many spices by the Queen of Sheba from India. There is evidence of the *Panchatantra* being translated in the 6th century BC in Latin, Spanish and Italian. India came in contact with Europe during the 15th century, when trade was undertaken via the sea route. Vasco da Gama was a Portuguese explorer and the first European to reach India by sea. His initial voyage to India (1497–1499) was the first to link Europe and Asia by an ocean route, connecting the Atlantic and the Indian oceans and therefore, the West and the Orient.

Da Gama’s discovery of the sea route to India was significant and opened the way for an age of global imperialism and for the Portuguese to establish a long-lasting colonial empire in Asia. Traveling the ocean route allowed the Portuguese to avoid sailing across the highly disputed Mediterranean and traversing the dangerous Arabian Peninsula. The sum of the distances covered in the outward and return voyages made this expedition the longest ocean voyage ever made until then, far longer than a full voyage around the world by way of the Equator. With the advent of the colonial era, the Indian movement to Europe saw an upswing. In the initial year of the Cold War, the aggressive nationalism in Africa led to the migration of Indians to European states. The ID in Europe amounts to nearly eight per cent of the total population of Europe with majority of it concentrated in Britain.



The ID in EU settled close to the capital cities and industrial towns than in the hinterland. After World War-II, another wave of professionals working in IT, construction, medicine and engineering migrated to Europe. In 1990s, the European Union imposed restrictions leading to the entry of only teachers, nurses and scientists. From early 2000s, the migration of IT professionals have again been on the rise in Britain.



Indian Diaspora in North America

There is a strong ID in Canada in Toronto and Vancouver. The ID in Canada is majorly the Sikh population. The Sikhs in Canada consider the non-Sikh Indian community in Canada as outsiders, asserting the religious-regional bias. The ID in Canada is politically influential as they have a strong presence in the political and bureaucratic setup. In the USA, the ID is composed mainly of the educated and professional class. The presence of the ID in the USA has increased from 1970s, when amendments were made to local laws allowing entry of trained skilled personnel. A scholar named Jenson has argued that the migration of skilled labour to USA has led to a brain drain in India. In 1990s, there were more amendments in US laws allowing US firms to build up human capital capabilities of USA and this gave the USA firms an option to open up the US labour market for Indians. The H1-B, a non-immigrant visa, also facilitated the transfer. Indian immigration to the US has been majorly in the professional category, including executives, administrators and managerial staff. Ethnic balancing of the population is, however, a concern that, at times, leads to hate crimes against ID.


The Diaspora in Australia, New Zealand and Fiji

Australia, an island continent and a former British penal colony, shares the shores of Indian Ocean with India and acts as a bridge in the movement of people. In the 18th century, Indians began to migrate to Australia, which was then known as 'New Holland'. Later, traders from Gujarat, Sindh and Punjab also landed up in Australia. A lot of Anglo-Indians in the post-1947 period have settled in Australia as well. In 1958, the Migration

Act allowed settlement rights to Anglo-Indians from India to Australia. The ID is largely involved in sugar plantations, taxi driving, and security. These days, the number of members of the ID working in IT, health, medicine and academics is also on the rise. In New Zealand, in the 20th century, a considerable number of Indians worked as halal slaughterers in the meat packaging industry. Presently, New Zealand has a skilled diaspora of professionals, doctors, geologists and academicians. The ID in New Zealand is settled mainly in Auckland and Wellington. In 1879, the indentured labours were taken by British to work as coolie labours in the sugar and cotton plantations of Fiji. Later, Gujarati traders began trading in cotton cloth while the Punjabis, as per a study by Pacific Studies scholar Ronald Gordon Crocombe, began work in transport and money lending. In 1970, when Fiji gained independence, the Indian in Fiji accepted Fijian nationality. In the present day, Indians dominate the political system of Fiji and contribute to national development.

Indian Diaspora in West Asia


India-West Asia relations go back to the ancient times that led to the birth of trade and cultural ties. The presence of Indians in the Gulf goes back to pre-Islamic times. During the medieval times, the merchants from India traded with the Gulf. Studies point out that Vasco da Gama had noted Indian presence in the port of Chiraz. In the 17th and 18th century, India traded with Iran through the land route. The trade extended upto Central Asia. The coming of the British in India saw a large number of Indians settling down in the Gulf region, especially in Muscat and Bahrain (due to a thriving pearl fishing industry). In 19th and 20th century, pearl finishing was a dominant activity but when it gradually declined, Indians shifted to general trade and goods in ports from India and Europe. Since the discovery of oil, Indians have been actively working in the oil sector. The oil boom of the 1970s led to another major flow of migrant Indians to join the oil sector in the Gulf. As the political conditions of the Gulf witnessed a swing from 1990 to 1998, there was a general decline in number of Indians in the Gulf. About 70% of the ID in Gulf is from Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana and Tamil Nadu. There is also some presence of the ID in Israel. The ID in Israel is in specialised agriculture work.



ENSURING THE SECURITY OF THE INDIAN DIASPORA

India has always ensured that its expats in conflict zones are evacuated safely whenever

the need be. The situation of Indians in Kuwait (1990), Lebanon (2011), Yemen (2015) and Sudan (2016) are a testimony of the fact. The Modi Government, as mentioned previously, has adopted a very aggressive diaspora policy. The Modi government has not only ensured the evacuation of the citizens when in need, but has directed the officials the MEA to address issues of diaspora on priority.



Talking about NRI interests does not upset foreign states but speaking about the interests of ethnic Indians who are no longer Indian residents may be viewed by a foreign state as an intrusion. Immense care needs to be taken at this level because addressing such sections could lead to risks at the bilateral diplomatic level. In 2007, when Malaysia used strong-arm tactics on Indian minorities, many Indian politicians made critical comments, leading to an intense backlash from Malaysian politicians. The PIOs have lived in territories abroad for a long time but have still been unable to completely integrate with host nations, which are, in turn, struggling with accepting citizens from a non-western country. The host nations are still making attempts to reconcile with their citizens' national identities. In such circumstances, the PIOs have to be exceedingly loyal to the states they reside in since any possibility of the PIOs displaying multiple loyalties could be detrimental to their own interests. For example, when PM Modi attended a public event in Singapore, the government of Singapore mandated that only NRIs attend the event and not ethnic Indians in Singapore. In the recent times, the security of the diaspora is a concern. India's R&AW collects intelligence upon potential threats to the Diaspora abroad. To secure the Diaspora, steps at the military level are also taken.



Some recent operations to evacuate Indian citizens are analysed below:

1. Operation Sukoon: It was one of the largest evacuation operations done by the Indian Navy since the Second World War. In 2006, Hezbollah attacked Israelis by launching cross-border raids. The Lebanese demanded release of the Lebanese prisoners from Israel. Israel responded to the cross-border raids by launching a full scale invasion of Lebanon. This led to the 2006 Lebanon war. Due to this, around 2200 Indians, Sri Lankans and Nepalis in Lebanon got affected. The Indian government directed its Navy to launch the evacuation. The Navy pressed into services INS – Brahmaputra, INS – Betwa, INS–Shakti and INS–Mumbai.

2. Operation Safe Homecoming: It was launched in March 2011 to evacuate Indian citizens stranded in Libya during the Libyan civil war. The Indian Navy and Air Force were used to establish an air and a sea bridge. Due to the Libyan crisis, around 18,000 Indians were affected. INS –Mysore, INS –Aditya and INS – Jalashwa, along with Air India aircrafts, were pressed into service for citizen evacuation from Tripoli.

3. Operation Raahat: In 2015, Saudi Arabia launched attacks on Houthi rebels in Yemen. As the hostilities intensified, the Indian government decided to evacuate around 5000 Indians trapped in Yemen. During the crises, Yemen became a no-fly zone. India used Djibouti to evacuate its citizens. The operation for evacuation began on 1st April and was successfully completed on 11th April, 2015.

4. Operation Sankat Mochan: In 2016, a hostile war broke out between Sudan and South Sudan. As a result, around 600 Indians in South Sudan and the Indians settled in Sudan got affected. The Indian Air Force was pressed into service to evacuate the Indians.

RECENT SCHEMES, INITIATIVES AND PROGRAMMES

Indian Community Welfare Fund: This is a specialised fund established to assist workers in distress. The Indian Missions abroad will use the contingency fund for worker welfare.



Mahatma Gandhi Pravasi Suraksha Yojana: It was launched in 2012 to enable Indian workers to get life insurance. The scheme also encourages workers to save money for pension.

Pravasi Bharatiya Bima Yojana: It is a compulsory insurance scheme for Indian workers with ECR (Emigration Check Required) stamped on passports.

Know India Programme: It is a three-week programme for Indian expatriates in the age group of 18-26 years. One Indian state partners with the central government and the expatriate youth are introduced to Indian culture, education and so on. The youth is then made 'Youth Ambassadors' for Indian Culture.

Study India Programme: It aims to connect expatriate youth to educational institutions where the youth come to undertake short courses in India. The cost of the programme is borne by the Indian government along with 50% of the airfare of each participant.

Scholarship Programme for Diaspora's Children: Under the scheme, there is provision for scholarship for engineering, law and science education for children of the Indian Diaspora for higher education.

Overseas India Youth Club: An initiative to keep the overseas youth in touch with the development of India by India Youth clubs abroad.

Tracing Roots Scheme: Under the scheme, an Indian Diaspora family can get its roots

traced in any state in India on provision of paying a charge for the facility.

E-Migrate: The Indian government has launched an online platform for foreign employers who wish to recruit Indian citizens. The foreign employees need to register in the online registration system as the registration once done shall be inspected by Indian missions abroad. The employers can use the platform to recruit Indian workers by giving them permits. The advantage of this system is that the worker will be informed about the terms and conditions online before employment.

Madad: If Indian citizens living abroad wish to file any consular related grievance, the new website launched by the Indian government called Madad maybe used as a platform. The portal will act as a grievance redressal mechanism, allowing the ID greater accessibility and reach. The authorities would now be more accountable and would have to resolve grievances more quickly and in a time-bound manner. The portal will use Red, Amber and Green colours, signifying the official stand on the complaints.

Indian Diaspora—An Untapped Asset Globally?

The Indian diaspora has penetrated well into a range of countries with qualifications ranging from doctors, engineers to entrepreneurs. However, India has still not been able to capitalise upon this asset by taking advantage of the human and financial capabilities of the diaspora for the long-term development of India. The biggest area of our failure has been to create policies to halt the flow of spill workforce from India to other states. We have also not been to capitalise upon the diasporic workforce to make India into a global hub of knowledge that can act as a magnet for the diaspora of other nations. Our diaspora constitutes 2% of the total population but has a wealth approximately equal to one trillion dollars. It is this wealth that we tap for our domestic development. There is an immediate need of policy focus to attract the high achieving group of our diaspora. There is exodus of Indian students abroad for skill education. These students, post their education, stay back and this causes further brain drain. India has to take steps to reverse the brain drain into a brain gain. There is immediate need to create an ecosystem in India where we are able to attract the diaspora of other states.



Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (PBD)

Mentioned in the chapter earlier, PBD was launched in 2003 as a platform to appreciate the access of knowledge, skills and expertise of the Indian diaspora. India

organises the PBD from 7th to 9th January every year. The date selected is significant as it was the very same date in 1915 that Gandhi returned to India from South Africa. For those who cannot attend the PBD, the government organises regional PBD in New York, Singapore, Hague, Durban, Mauritius, Toronto and Sydney.



In 2017, PBD was held from 7th to 9th January 2017 in Bengaluru, on the theme of 'Redefining the Engagement with the Indian Diaspora'. The event commenced with a Youth PBD. The 36-year-old Vice President of Suriname of Indian origin, Michael Ashwin Adhin, was the chief guest. Dr Antonio Costa, the Indian origin PM of Portugal was officially the chief guest of the 19th PBD in 2017. A unique feature of this event was that 14 states of India had put up exhibition stalls during the event. More than 4,000 delegates participated in the event from all over the world. For the first time, in 2017, a mobile app to update the delegates on information related to the key programmes during the PBD was used. The Pravasi Kaushal Vikas Yojana was launched by the government on the occasion. It is a scheme for skill development for youth who wish to seek jobs overseas. The aim is to provide the Indian youth with skills which are in demand abroad. Once trained, the youth would find it easy to migrate to another country where the skill gained is high in demand. Visited Advanced Joint Research (VAJRA) scheme was also launched. The aim of the scheme is to allow NRIs to participate in research in India. The Science and Engineering Research Board will implement VAJRA.

Film Diplomacy and Soft Power Play

Soft power is the ability of one country to persuade another country to do the things it wants without using any form of coercion and force. India has decided to unveil a mega strategy of film diplomacy to boost India's soft power credentials. India has decided to collaborate with people in the entertainment field at the global level, for instance, during high profile film festivals such as the Cannes Film Festival, held annually in the resort town of Cannes on the French Rivera. India has initiated intense cultural diplomatic level negotiations with foreign states to sell the Indian processes in digitisation of films. India wants to take advantage of its young workforce in the IT sector to emerge as a global consultant in production, distribution and consumption of general entertainment.

9
CHAPTER


India's Nuclear Foreign Policy

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Why did India opt for nuclear energy?
- Nuclear institutional architecture of India
- Origin of foreign collaborations – atoms for peace and Canada
- Three stage nuclear program and energy seduction
- Nehru, NAM and Indian nuclear weapons
- Thorium Nitrate case and US tilt to Pakistan
- Creation of IAEA and India on Plutonium and IAEA
- India and Pugwash conference and shift in policy
- India and PTBT and impact of Chinese refusal of PTBT
- India and Disarmament at ENDC in 1965
- Coming of NPT and Indian behavior to NPT
- The option – Hawks and Contingency hawks
- The factors leading to rethink and Pokhran – 1 (1974)
- Approach of Desai and nuclear continuity
- India and special sessions on disarmament
- Pakistani urge and four options of India
- India's missile development and MCTR formation
- Conference on disarmament and India - 1993
- India's and NPT Review conference – 1995
- India and CTBT and Indian refusal
- Pokhran – II and nuclear weapon state
- Indian nuclear doctrine and strategic stability and
- The Realist Foundation of India's Nuclear Strategy

The Indian nuclear issue can be traced back to the time of Nehru. Nehru had exercised tremendous influence on India's nuclear thought and policy. He laid down the foundation of India's nuclear programme and its nuclear behaviour. The person other than Nehru who created a deep imprint on the Indian nuclear programme was Homi J. Bhabha. In 1939, Bhabha came back to India to establish the Nuclear Research Institute. He sought financial assistance to further Indian nuclear research and to establish a nuclear research project from the Sir Dorabji Tata Trust. He was able to convince him about the role that nuclear technology could play in the development of modern India. In 1945, the Tata Institute of

Fundamental Research (TIFR) was established, with Bhabha as its director. He based his idea of nuclear technology and energy resources on the basis that as India would progress, there would be a demand for more energy and India's conventional energy resources would not be able to adequately meet that demand. Thus, nuclear energy as an alternate and affordable option needed to be developed. In order to explore the nuclear option, nuclear reactor technology had to be understood and built upon. The government, after independence, established an institutional architecture for further nuclear research.



After India became independent it began to seek assistance from foreign nations. In 1956, the British helped India to build the Apsara reactor. In 1955, Canada provided a 40 megawatt reactor which used natural Uranium and heavy water. The heavy water was provided by the USA under a partnership called CIRUS. India chose Canadian reactors because India possessed very limited foreign exchange and uses this limited foreign exchange to purchase the only affordable reactors which Canada offered. Canada further attached a no-strings policy including on hour the Plutonium was to be used. The Indian scientists, by 1960, created fuel rods and used them for the first loading of CIRUS in 1960. The use of self-made fuel rods gave India the claim to use the resultant Plutonium for future use. In 1958, a plant named Phoenix was established at Trombay to extract Plutonium. The US, under Atoms for Peace, had declassified the procedure to reprocess Plutonium, a technique that India used at Phoenix to produce its first weapons-grade plutonium in 1964.

In 1958, the government adopted a three-phase power production plan. India would first take assistance from Canada and develop Uranium-fuelled reactors. As these reactors would operationalise, they would generate Plutonium as a by-product. In the second stage, India would develop reactors which would use Plutonium and burn Plutonium with Thorium. The burning of Plutonium and Thorium would create Uranium (U-233). In the third stage, India would use U-233 burn, burn U-233 and Thorium to produce more U-233 and energy. The foundational ideas that dominated our development discourse after independence were a heavy industrialisation model and import substitution. It was believed that this model would push India to the next stage of growth. In this model, nuclear energy was to have a core role in providing electricity. Nehru and Bhabha had a confluence of ideas at this level as they both agreed that nuclear energy can take the country forward and help in achieving its developmental goals. Thus, Indian policy makers understood that nuclear energy can be an alternative to conventional energy and can be produced at a cheap price to achieve socio-economic goals. This plan of using nuclear energy for the stated purposes was institutionalised in the Second Five Year Plan.




Indian Security and Nuclear Policy

The Indian Atomic Energy Act was modelled on the act that created British Energy Generation Limited. The British Act advocated tremendous secrecy over nuclear materials and the nuclear programme overall. India openly advocated for peaceful use of nuclear technology and yet the bill was adopted upon conditions of stringent secrecy on the lines of British act. The matter was raised in the Constitution Assembly Debates (CAD) by Dr B P Sitaramayya and S V K Rao. Both advocated the need for clarification about whether India could at all apply secrecy even for the peaceful programme or whether India should harbour intentions of running a secret military programme. Nehru, under pressure, conceded in CAD debate on 6th April, 1948, that he did not know how to distinguish between a civilian and a military programme. In fact, S L Saksena argued that India should and must have nuclear weapons to prevent war. Nehru, while addressing both the CAD and the Parliament, agreed that India needed nuclear energy for peaceful purposes whereas Saksena asserted that the association of atomic energy and nuclear weaponisation is unavoidable. However, Nehru certainly did not clampdown the option for subsequent heads of state to establish the initiatives for nuclear weapons and intimately linked nation building to power assertion.

India and Baruch Plan – 1946

India used the time period of 1946 to oppose any restraints in the use of nuclear technology for peaceful use. In 1946, the US had proposed Baruch Plan (propounded by Bernard Baruch). The aim of this plan was to ensure the relinquishing of international control of weapons to the UN. After Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as the Cold War emerged, two groups emerged in the US.




India perceived the Baruch Plan as an extension of the imperialist ideology and reacted to the idea of international ownership at the UN General Assembly and stated that all nations have a right to explore nuclear technologies for peaceful use.

An amendment was made for the Atomic Energy Act 1962. The act reiterated the Nehruvian commitment of using nuclear technology for peaceful purposes only. Nehru had formed the core policies of nuclear energy in this regard.



The invention of the Hydrogen bomb in 1954 not only helped India develop and refine its attitude to disarmament but also laid the foundation for India to oppose nuclear weapons.



In the subsequent time period, Bhabha began to establish links with France, Britain and US and initiated cooperation on reactor design and theory. The aim was to develop mastery for research reactors.



Thorium Nitrate Case

In 1953, India decided to ship an export to China containing Thorium Nitrate, which is used as nuclear fuel. As the US was providing assistance to India under Atoms for Peace at the nuclear level and this support was domestically governed by the Mutual Defence Assistance Act of 1951, it created some issues. The US Act said that if the US supplies any nuclear materials to any country, then the recipient country cannot trade materials given by the US with Soviet satellite states or the USSR. The US, therefore, opposed India's bid to sell Thorium Nitrate to China. India asserted that it is not bound by US conditions or laws. Later, a compromise took place and the US allowed the existing shipment be sent to China.

As time progressed, the Thorium nitrate issue (as seen in the case above) added some strain in India-US relations and the US thereafter began to cement its alliance with

Pakistan. However, even as the US did so, Eisenhower assured India that the US would ensure that Pakistan does not use its aid against India. The US also gave further assurance to India that it would be ready to give military assistance to India but in 1954, after the SEATO was created, India politely turned down the US request, thereby asserting its sovereignty.

In 1953, Eisenhower, in the UN General Assembly announced the launch of Atoms for Peace initiative as also the subsequent establishment of the IAEA to assist other nations in peaceful use of civilian nuclear technology. Though India was sceptical of the IAEA, it continued to pitch for total elimination of nuclear weapons and advocated nuclear technology be only used for peaceful purpose. It also advocated that no country should dominate the IAEA and all countries should be allowed to have a full say in its functioning. The IAEA decided to establish tight safeguards over nuclear materials given to states. One of the points was Plutonium generation. The IAEA asked that Plutonium generated by states be given to IAEA, which would, in turn, allow some quantity to be kept with a country for non-military use. Bhabha opposed this policy and advanced that it was an inalienable right by a state to retain Plutonium or any other fissionable material. Ultimately, India won on this point at IAEA. A decision was arrived at that such safeguards would not affect socio-economic development of a country and India retained its right to have Plutonium for future use.

In the meantime, after the Cuban missile crises, the US, the USSR and Britain decided to work towards the reduction in nuclear escalation. In 1963, they drafted a Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (PTBT or LTBT). India found PTBT a favourable draft. The PTBT asserted that there shall be complete prohibition on underwater, atmosphere and outer space nuclear testing. India ratified the PTBT, thinking that the PTBT is a step towards complete disarmament. However, China refused to conclude the PTBT, which aggravated tensions in India. In 1964, Nehru was succeeded by Shastri after his death and in the same year, China conducted a nuclear test in Lop Nur. Bhabha attended the Pugwash Conference in Udaipur in 1964. He presented that a country like China having nuclear weapons can threaten India, and India had to either go for development of a nuclear weapon or collective security. Two things emerged here. Firstly, India was trying to articulate a collective security pact with the US or the USSR for security guarantee, which especially became more relevant post 1962. Secondly, India explored the option of going nuclear. At the Pugwash conference, Bhabha gave a clear understanding of the problems lying ahead for India with a nuclear China around and effectively presented a likely course of action for India. Post-1962, India embarked upon military modernisation and sought support in defence modernisation from the US and the USSR. The USSR agreed to help India and provided the MIG-21 fighter jets to India.

The first nuclear test was conducted by China on 16th October 1964. A six-week debate in India from 16th October 1964 to 27th October 1964 brought a major shift in the Indian nuclear thought. After the nuclear test of China in 1964, days later, a pitch by Jan Sangh and Samyukta Socialist Party to allow India to possess nuclear weapons began. The debate saw tremendous pressure being exerted from the opposition parties. Though Shastri continued to follow Nehruvian line, he also continued to accelerate military rebuilding of India. As domestic pressure grew, Shastri, on 27th November, 1964, announced the authorisation of subterranean nuclear test in the Parliament. The period till 1965 saw


Indian scientists debating costs and financial implications for the same. Bhabha also believed that a nuclear India would serve as a triumph for the third world and would strengthen democracy in Asia. The initial idea of a security guarantee could not work out as the US continued with its alliance with Pakistan and India's own non-aligned credentials would not have favoured an active relationship with either the US or the USSR. The 1965 Indo-Pak war created a wedge between India and the US. In 1965, India presented a five-point proposal to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Commission (ENDC), which had been established in the same year to negotiate a nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). India was one of the eight non-aligned nations, along with five the US allies and five Russian allies that were part of the commission. India, at the ENDC, advocated that all 18 nations freeze nuclear weapon production and halt production of delivery systems, which would be the only move that would ensure that Non Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) would not go nuclear. India also clarified that a security guarantee could not deny nuclear weapons to NNWS and that only a total disarmament by Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) can give assured satisfaction to NNWS. India also pitched that a global approach to disarmament is needed. On 24th January 1966, Homi J Bhabha was travelling to Vienna on Air India flight number-707 (flight was from Mumbai to New York). The CIA of U.S.A. had planted a bomb in the cargo panel of the flight. The bomb exploded mid air and the plane crashed into Mont Blanc mountains in the Swiss Alps. In authors interaction with a senior government officer serving in R&AW, the CIA had given the task to its officer named Robert T Crawley. The CIA wanted to eliminate Bhabha as he was the brain behind the Indian Nuclear bomb.

The ENDC was followed by the NPT in 1967. The NPT as a treaty stated that the world will be divided into NWS and NNWS. The NPT said that the countries that have tested a NW (nuclear weapon) before 1st January, 1967 were to be called NWS. The countries that had not tested a NW before the date fixed were thereafter labelled as NNWS. The NPT stated that NWS would not increase their nuclear arsenal and would undertake gradual disarmament. The NNWS, on the other hand, would not procure nuclear weapons. The NPT clarified that there shall be a review of NPT 25 years from the date of its enforcement. The NPT also said that in order to prevent any diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful to military use, the states party to the NPT will accept the IAEA safeguards.

However, after looking at the draft, India refused to sign the NPT. India asserted that NPT is a discriminatory treaty which had divided the world into nuclear haves and nuclear have nots. India held that this distinction in the treaty is highly arbitrary in nature. India also said that the NPT as a treaty was unfair because it placed no obligation on nuclear weapon states to destroy their nuclear weapons and the gradual disarmament advocated therein was nothing more than an eyewash. The NPT had set no time frame for complete disarmament and it was clear that the gradual disarmament advocated was not to happen in the foreseeable future unless a timeline was adhered to. India clarified that under the NPT, if NWS were allowed to have a nuclear weapon, it would be a threat to India. Based upon these reasons, it refused signature to NPT. The NPT was opened for signatures in 1968 and finally enforced in 1970. The NPT created an impression that the emerging powers would not be allowed to have nuclear weapons and the monopoly over nuclear weapons was being legitimized by the superpowers.

Core pillars of NPT and Shortcomings of the NPT


It is imperative for us to clarify certain concepts related to the nuclear non proliferation treaty and provide a glimpse of the nuclear fuel cycle. The NPT is based on certain core pillars. They are explained in the diagrams below:



An explanation of the nuclear fuel cycle is warranted in this regard. The diagram below will help.




The Uranium that exists in nature is extracted from the ground. The naturally occurring Uranium is called the Uranium-238 isotope. In this isotope, the fissile material, that is Uranium-235, is about 0.7% is just enough to sustain a nuclear reaction. Since Uranium-235 only constitutes a meagre percentage of the fuel, more amount of fissile material is required. The naturally occurring Uranium is leached using chemicals to prepare the yellow cake. The transformation of yellow cake is brought about using Uranium hexafluoride gas. As the concentration of Uranium-235 increases, it becomes ready for generation of nuclear energy. The enriched Uranium is grinded into power form. The powder is further processed to produce ceramic pellets. The ceramic pellets are put inside the fuel rods to power the reactor core. After the usage of Uranium-235, Uranium-238 and Plutonium thus generated are then kept in the spent fuel pool separately. The Plutonium and Uranium-238 are then further reused thereby competing the fuel cycle.



For a period of time, the countries that had nuclear weapons enjoyed a wider political clout than the states that did not possess such weapons. The nuclear weapons also provided the 'haves' an insurance against attacks and unbridled power in the international system. This generated a sense of insecurity that eventually compelled some states to secretly build up an insurance policy by acquiring nuclear weapons. Iraq and North Korea, in 1990s, were able to acquire nuclear weapons. In 1991, the US used the context of the Iraq–Kuwait war to invade Iraq. Post the Iraq–Kuwait conflict, the UN resolution 687 forced Iraq to declare all nuclear facilities and allow IAEA inspections. The subsequent creation of the United Nations Special Commission was given power to eliminate the weapons of mass destruction that Iraq possessed.

At this time when Indira Gandhi was in power as the Prime Minister of India, there were again calls for the nation to establish a nuclear weapon arsenal. However, India restricted itself to peaceful nuclear use only. Stephen Cohen remarks that the period of the late 1960s in India at nuclear level was called 'the option'.



Indira Gandhi focussed largely on domestic economy. As the NPT unfolded, India aptly understood that NPT intends to augment nuclear apartheid. Certain events also furthered India's urge to think about nuclear weapons. Firstly, in 1971, India and the USSR signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which gave India Soviet support. Secondly, after 1971 Indo-Pak war, the US undertook a rapprochement with China and also helped China get a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. In December 1971, when the Indo-Pak war in East Pakistan broke out, the US dispatched USS Enterprise in Bay of Bengal to support Pakistan. This made India rethink its post war situation.




India conducted a subterranean nuclear test at Pokhran in 1974. It is also known as Pokhran-I or a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE). Considering the fact that it was a subterranean test where sub-criticality was not achieved, India could not proclaim itself as a NWS.


After Pokhran-I, the US and Canada suspended all support to India and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was formed in 1975. A London Club is also formed. Both groups are formed to isolate India. Domestically in India, emergency was imposed, which was followed by the Janta Party government in 1977 led by Desai till 1980. Desai reviewed India's nuclear policy.



By the time Indira Gandhi came back to power in 1980, reports of Pakistan having acquired nuclear capability were going around. The United Nations General Assembly, on the request of the developing countries, launched a special session on Disarmament (SSOD) in order to achieve global disarmament. The first SSOD meet happened in 1978 and reaffirmed the need for disarmament. At the end of first SSOD, the General Assembly established a Disarmament Commission comprising of all UN members. The second SSOD happened in 1982 but failed to establish consensus despite an urgent need for disarmament. The Third SSOD in 1988 also failed to establish a consensus.



Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, then head of state of Pakistan, acquired Saudi Arabian financing for nuclear weapon. The most important reason for Pakistan's going nuclear was India's already having done so. Pakistan perceived its nuclear capability as a bargaining chip in the Kashmir in future. Indira Gandhi in the Parliament accepted Pakistan's right to go nuclear but maintained that India had an edge on "all aspects" over Pakistan.




Indira Gandhi adopted a wait and watch policy. Though reports do suggest that she planned to test nuclear weapon in 1982, when US satellites captured images of the nuclear test preparations by India, the idea was immediately dropped. In 1983, India launched the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP) to establish five guided missiles (Nag, Trishul, Akash, Prithvi and Agni). After India tested Prithvi in 1988, the

MTCR was established. During the times of Rajiv Gandhi, Pakistan continued nuclear weapon development. As Pakistan had opted for a military programme since beginning of their nuclear programme, the money was judiciously used and, unlike India, did not divert the resources for civilian use.

As the Cold War ended, the NPT review conference was slated to happen in 1995. Clinton revived the goal to have a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The end of the Cold War also saw the Indo-US rapprochement. In 1993, the Conference on Disarmament (COD) began. India participated in the COD and pitched for complete disarmament. The COD culminated in 1996 in a draft of the CTBT. The CTBT firstly banned all forms of nuclear testing, including underground testing which, as an option, had been left open by the PTBT. The CTBT made allowances for computer simulation for improvement. Under Article 14 of the CTBT, it went on to assert that all countries of the world which had nuclear technologies were to mandatorily agree to the CTBT. A subsequent list of 44 nations was prepared which also included India. In 1996, India refused to sign the CTBT. India asserted that the name of the treaty was faulty and that it should be called Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and not Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as it was banning nuclear testing even while keeping an option of computer simulation open for bomb improvement. India also asserted that the Article 14 of CTBT violated international law as no treaty can compel a state to sign a treaty which the state had not intended to sign. India urged for removal of Article 14 and also refused to sign CTBT for its lack of commitment to complete disarmament. The NPT review conference of 1995 also decided to continue the NPT in the same format without any change and advised no more reviews in future of NPT. Thus, in 1996, India refused to ratify both the NPT and the CTBT both. In 1992, IAEA had also come out with a safeguard agreement and had stated that only full scope countries be entitled to get technology.

Perceiving the trend of discriminatory global practices, India conducted Pokhran-II in 1998. From 11th May to 13th May, India carried out nuclear tests in an underground format. After Pokhran-II, India announced that sub criticality had been achieved and proclaimed itself as a nuclear weapon state. India also brought about a self-imposed moratorium on further nuclear testing and subsequently announced its nuclear doctrine. India pledged that it would maintain a No First Use Policy. It accepted the doctrine of Minimum Credible Deterrence. This meant that India clarified it was not necessary for us to keep our nuclear weapons in the state of readiness all the time and the mere possession of nuclear weapons was sufficient to create the needed deterrence. However, India, in its nuclear doctrine, clarified massive and unacceptable retaliation on first strike. India also stated that the use of chemical and biological warfare on India or its armed forces anywhere in the world would mean that India would retain the option to retaliate with a nuclear strike. The nuclear command of India is under civilian political leadership headed by the Prime Minister.



India and Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons-2017

In 2017, at the UN Conference meeting in New York, countries have agreed to a Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. It is the most comprehensive treaty ever that places a ban on nuclear weapon related activities from developing to testing to stockpiling and usage of the weapons. India, along with US, UK, Russia, China, France, Pakistan and North Korea, decided to abstain from the negotiations. India even abstained from the voting process. In the Explanation of Vote by Amandeep Singh Gill, IFS, India's Permanent Representative at the Conference of Disarmament (COD), India asserted that Geneva based COD is the multilateral negotiation forum for disarmament. It asserted that the negotiation treaty does not address the expectations of the international community regarding prohibition and elimination of the nuclear weapons. India argued that it favors a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention under the COD that focuses on the three pillars- Prohibition, Elimination and Verification. India asserts that verification at the international level is the key to elimination of nuclear weapons at the global level. The negotiated treaty, India asserted, did not talk about verification provisions.

THE REALIST FOUNDATION OF INDIA'S NUCLEAR STRATEGY

The end of the Cold War has brought about a radical shift in the nature of the international system. In the post-Cold War times, we witness new threats in the world ranging from limited wars and territorial disputes to terrorism. It is not wrong to assert that the post-Cold War times have pushed the international system into an age of uncertainty. The uncertainty has been compounded by the asymmetry in the security structure of the world where states having no nuclear weapons at present want to acquire them in any whichever way possible to ensure that the ones having the same do not stand to gain any security leverage.

The discussion in the chapter has clearly proven that since independence, the pursuit of nuclear capabilities has been at the heart of India's governance. India, through its nuclear weapon, intends to achieve a credible minimum deterrence. The nuclear doctrine of India has declared the policy of no first use. Despite various threats, India since Pokhran-II, has refrained from expanding its nuclear arsenal or even adopting a nuclear posture that could destabilise the region.

India, however, needs to be cautious about changing ground realities. China and Pakistan have both modernised their nuclear arsenals. The fact that Pakistan is developing

tactical nuclear weapons has emerged as a new security concern for India. As China gives effect to the power transition theory, it will expand its nuclear arsenal further. China and Pakistan are also deepening their cooperation on nuclear balance in the region, which is not reassuring because of the deliberate ambiguity cultivated by Pakistan in its decision of not having published a comprehensive nuclear doctrine. In future, regional rivalries and a desire to resort to military intervention will push more states globally to acquire nuclear weapons. The debate during the Cold War period had also revolved around complete disarmament, which, more than ever, seems a distant dream. In the post-Cold War times, we see no hurry by the nuclear haves to reduce or cap their arsenals. A new round of activism has come up now that advocates for ‘Zero Nuclear Option’. The countries not having nuclear weapons are sceptical that the nuclear haves are using the global zeros discourse to forsake the nuclear ambitions of the have-nots. In this context of uncertainty, India should strategically evolve its responses. India has to emphasise upon the survivability of its nuclear arsenal. If nuclear arsenals in our immediate neighbourhood expand, India should develop second strike capabilities. India should focus on developing maritime nuclear capabilities as this will enhance our security presence in the Indian Ocean. At the global level, India should continue to participate in the non-proliferation initiatives and should take up a leadership role to speak out on issues that motivate and compel states to acquire weapons. We should portray to the world that the key drivers of insecurity and rivalry propel states to seek a nuclear umbrella.

As India is vulnerable to nuclear terrorism, it must build up strong surveillance capabilities at border points with Pakistan. The same capabilities need to be upgraded at airports and seaport levels. As Pakistan has a history of nuclear proliferation, India should amend its nuclear doctrine and clarify the actions it might contemplate if nuclear weapons from a state are stolen or misappropriated. This will ensure that Pakistan cannot claim helplessness if it ever deliberately assists terrorists to go nuclear in future. An important area to work upon by India should be nuclear disaster management. To prevent any aggressive retaliation from our side, India needs to strengthen nuclear forensics. This will enable us with abilities to identify the source of launch of nuclear offensive. Seeking of US cooperation in the area of nuclear forensics can help. India, today, still stands for complete disarmament and favours the zero nuclear option but knows that complete disarmament of nuclear weapons is a chimera till the time that nuclear weapons remain the currency of power in the international system. India, to advance the goal of complete disarmament, can now promote a global No First Use Treaty at the international level as a part of its new disarmament diplomacy. In this way, it may remain committed to the goal it stood for since independence without compromising its own security. A key question remains in the mind of the readers. India has a nuclear weapon it tested in 1998 through a series of tests. Why does India have a No First Use policy? The answer lies in the nuclear doctrine of India.

The situation at the end of the Cold War was very different. Pakistan and China has not only developed nuclear weapons but were collaborating with each other to proliferate them in Asia. India on the other hand, at the end of the Cold War, was a state that had tested a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion way back in 1974 under the NPT. Since 1974, India had already faced a nuclear threat thrice (twice from Pakistan and once from the US on behalf of Pakistan through US enterprise in 1971). By 1998, it was clear that the nuclear

weapons had become a core currency of power in the age of uncertainty. India stated that it would not be the first to use the weapons as their prime role is to deter states that had the potential to blackmail us. However, India clarified that on first strike, it will resort to massive and unacceptable retaliation against the adversary state. This was India's concept of credible minimum deterrence. India's nuclear posture is defined not by the number of weapons in its total arsenal but how it will inflict damage on an adversary as a retaliatory strike of First Use by others.



The core purpose of India to have nuclear weapons is to have them for national security in a world of anarchy and blackmail. India has not acquired its nuclear weapons to rectify military imbalances or assert regional superiority, but serve the purpose of deterrence.

Since 1998, after India acquired these weapons, no state has resorted to blackmailing India or used any nuclear coercion against India. As India has resorted to a mixture of no first use and assured retaliation, this policy has served the India's nuclear strategy but has some direct implications on the nuclear posture of India. For deterrence to be successfully achieved, India needs to match war heads with equal numbers of missiles as possessed by the adversaries to make the threat of retaliation credible enough. There is a possibility that in this scenario, the adversary would test Indian space below certain thresholds of nuclear escalation. In such instances (as happened in 1999 in the Kargil conflict) the logical strategy is not counter force targeting whereby the military structures of enemies are targeted but to resort to counter value targeting where the assets of the opponents are targeted. In this scenario, the Prithvi missiles with a range of around 350 km are effective instruments of deterrence.

However, debates have arisen about the efficacy of the NFU Policy. Some scholars assert that the Indian NFU is a pious hope without covering other Nuclear Weapon states. In this case, assuming that India might shift to first use policy, the question arises, would it serve any purpose? Answer is no. Because a first use policy does not prevent blackmailing threats and more so, is destabilising in nature. In this case, India's NFU is at least deterring the use of weapons of NWS. There could be a situation, however, where a NWS could threaten India with a nuclear strike and an assessment by India could establish that the threat was imminent. In this scenario, would India resort to a first strike? The nuclear doctrine is silent on this. Thus, Indian NFU and its deterrence have provided the needed protection to India. India lives in a neighbourhood which is heavily nuclearised. The policy of keeping the nuclear option open, since in 1950s, has enabled us not only to weaponise but keep these nuclear threats at a bay. The nuclear choice of India may have been couched in moral terms but has been expressed in realistic terms.

CONCLUSION

India undertook a nuclear test in 1998. This testing by India was a challenge to the global disarmament framework. The Indian test ended the Cold War security system and forced

the forced the world to move towards a re-evaluation of global non-proliferation system.

India has always linked its domestic security with the nuclear disarmament at the global level. India has always asserted that nuclear weapons pose a security threat as they are instruments of coercion and therefore India has pressed for a nuclear weapons free world. To seek the elimination of nuclear weapons, India has favored a multilateral forum like Conference on Disarmament (COD), which India wants, should develop an effective and verifiable treaty to end nuclear weapons. The Indian goal has been complete universal disarmament since the end of World War-II. In 1963, when PTBT emerged, India supported the same as it felt that PTBT would be a step to end the ongoing arms race between USSR and US. But, PTBT fell short of all expectations for India. The world moved from PTBT to the NPT. As NPT tried to institutionalize the hierarchy at the nuclear level; India rejected the NPT too. Though India maintained a civilian nuclear program from 1948, but the Indian strategic security environment was challenged when China tested its nuclear weapon in 1964. This Chinese test compelled India to undertake SNEP in 1974. Through the 1974 SNEP India conveyed its strategic resolve to preserve global strategic autonomy. Post 1974, India embarked strategic ambiguity and this effectively served India's security interests. India, even post 1974, asserted that it would favor global disarmament and focus on economic development. This strategic ambiguity served an effective deterrent to China while it also thwarted any Pakistani attempt to overtly seek nuclear capabilities. More so, such opaqueness also did not challenge the global non-proliferation order. India continued to favor universal disarmament during Rajiv Gandhi's tenure as he proposed the famous Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan on Disarmament (in 1988) seeking complete disarmament by 2010. In 1995, in the NPT Review and Extension Conference the world again lost an opportunity to reassess the NPT. Their decisions to indefinitely extend the NPT led to India assert that the world has decided to postpone complete disarmament forever. India thought that the Nuclear Test Ban Committee that was tasked with the responsibility of drafting the CTBT could rectify this anomaly. But as the draft of the CTBT emerged in 1996, the draft did not show any affirmative commitment on global disarmament. India rejected the CTBT by asserting that the CTBT tried to legitimize the nuclear weapons as a privilege for a few and also presented no timeframe for complete disarmament. During the CTBT negotiations, India for the first time had asserted that India needed to have a strategic flexibility till the time countries in and around India don't relinquish their nuclear weapons (with special emphasis upon the clandestine Pakistan-China cooperation and the nuclear bazaar of Pakistan). India eventually conducted a nuclear test in 1998 and ended the ambiguity. Post 1998 nuclear test, India decided to engage with nuclear powers after assuring the concerns of the world by announcing its nuclear doctrine. Since then, India has concluded a host of nuclear deals for nuclear commerce (with most recent one with Japan in 2016). In 2015, during the visit of President Obama to India, the President exercised his executive powers to remove the final hurdles in the Indo-US Nuclear deal. As per the Indo-US nuclear deal, US would monitor nuclear material that India would purchase from any third country. But, President Obama, during the visit, rolled back this clause. The two sides established a nuclear insurance pool to assure suppliers in case of nuclear accidents. Thus, in the conclusion, it would not be wrong to assert that India has successfully found its way into global nuclear order based on its own terms and has come a long way as a responsible nuclear power from being a nuclear pariah.

End of Section Questions

1. What are the implications of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor on the Indian Security?
2. How does India manage China by using Deterrence Through Denial strategy?
3. Discuss the various mechanisms used by India to tackle terrorism internationally.
4. What is the role of airpower in diplomacy?
5. How can air power be used to achieve national interests in foreign policy?
6. Examine the core elements of India's Public diplomacy.
7. Discuss Indian diplomacy while negotiating at the United Nations Convention of Laws of Seas.
8. Is Indo-Pacific the new normal in contrast to the Asia-Pacific?
9. What are the core actors in India's Economic Foreign Policy? Examine the evolutionary stages through the prism of idea domination and change model.
10. "India's energy security policy has witnessed a major policy shift at the end of Cold War." Examine this statement by explaining the major shifts in the energy security diplomacy from Cold War to the Post-Cold War?
11. What are the shifts in India's engagement with its diaspora since Nehruvian era?
12. In the recent times, security of the diaspora is an important foreign policy goal of India. Highlight the major operations undertaken to protect the diaspora in the recent times.
13. Is the Indian Diaspora a globally untapped asset? Discuss.
14. What are NPT and CTBT? Why has India refused to sign NPT and CTBT?
15. Indian disarmament policy has changed post India's nuclear testing in 1998. Discuss the major shift in the Indian disarmament diplomacy.

Section H

International Issues and Current Trends

[Chapter 1 Issues in the Middle East](#)

[Chapter 2 Issues Related to China](#)

[Chapter 3 Issues Related to Indian Foreign Policy](#)

[Chapter 4 Issues Related to Europe](#)

[Chapter 5 Issues Related to USA](#)

[Chapter 6 Issues Related to Nuclear Diplomacy](#)

[Chapter 7 Issues in Global Politics and International Foreign Policy](#)

1
CHAPTER

Issues in the Middle East

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Origin and history of Islam
- Dominant ideologies
- Israel and Palestine conflict
- Arab Spring, Syrian crisis, Libyan Crisis and Kurdish problem
- Origin, rise and spread of ISIS
- Turkish coup and Qatar crisis
- Final analysis of the Middle East

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this chapter is to acquaint the readers with all issues in the Middle Eastern part of the world. The chapter introduces the reader to core concepts, terms and dominant ideologies operating in the region and then makes an attempt to analyse the recent problems, ranging from the Israel–Palestine conflict to the Arab Spring, Syrian crisis, Libyan crisis, Kurdish problems and the ISIS.


ISLAM—ORIGIN, SCHOOLS AND SCHISM

Islam is associated with the Prophet Mohammad. Mohammad was born to Abd Allah IbnAbd al Mattalib (Father) and Aminah (Mother). He was raised by Abu Talib, who belonged to the Banu Hashim clan of the Quraaysh tribe. Mohammad was a worker and he married Khadijah. In his mid-forties, he took retirement. During his prayers at the Mount Hira cave, he received revelations from the Angel Gabriel, which was the God's message transmitted to Mohammad. This became the foundation of the religion today known in the world as Islam. Mohammad faced a lot of difficulties to convince people about the revelations of God but he succeeded in creating the foundation of Islam.

After the death of Mohammad, the issue of succession arose. Mohammad belonged to the Quraysh tribe which had descended from Banu Kinahah tribe from Khuzaiman. Thus, the successor of Mohammad had to be selected from Quraysh tribe itself. After the death of Mohammad, Abu Bakr became the new successor. Abu Bakr established the Caliphate institution and became a Caliph after Mohammad. Nearing his death, Abu Bakr desired that Umar be his successor as the Caliph. Umar established a committee of six to decide his successor. The committee arrived at a unanimous decision that the Caliph after Umar should be chosen from the six members. The Committee chose two successors—Uthman and Ali. During the times of Umar as the Caliph, Islam was growing into a huge empire. The growing empire needed a Caliph who would be a military politico genius-like

Uthman, while Ali was a religious man. Ali was also the son-in-law of Mohammad. Uthman belonged to Umayyad clan which was a wealthy clan and eventually succeeded Umar as the caliph. Ali, who had been sidelined, did not appreciate the idea of Uthman as a Caliph as Ali advocated that caliphate should be held by someone hailing from the lineage of Mohammad. Thus, there was a growing rebellion against Uthman as a Caliph.

During the reign of Uthman and Umar, Islam had spread outside Arabia to Egypt, Syria, Palestine, Iraq and Persia. However, after a few years, Uthman was killed by Egyptian Muslim rebels. After the death of Uthman, the Caliphate now came under Ali who ascended the Caliphate as the fourth Caliph.



Ali faced a lot of challenges as a Caliph. Many people felt Ali was ineffective in punishing the killers of Uthman and some even suspected Ali's involvement in the murder. Uthman's cousin Muawiyah was a member of Ummayid Clan and the governor of Syria. At the time of Ali's reign, Muawiyah claimed the caliphate for himself. Ali refused to accept Muawiyah as a Caliph and advocated the need to get Islam back to the ethical path. A group of people called Kharijites, who first appeared during the time of third Caliph Uthman, were followers of Ali. However, over a period of time, as Ali began to bargain with the Ummayids, the Kharijites felt that Ali had betrayed them and subsequently assassinated him. Meanwhile, after the death of Muawiyah, his son Yazid succeeded him as a Caliph and defeated Hussein at the Battle of Karbala, marking the full schism in Islam. Ali was succeeded by Abu Mohammad Hasan ibn Ali and the successors of Ali came to be called Imams, while the Ummayid and Muawiyahs adopted a Caliphate monarchy. The period of Ummayids saw a dynastic rule. In 638 AD, the faith was split into two main sects namely, the Shias and Sunnis. The Sunnis believed that the leader of Islamic faith should be elected from among the successors of Prophet Mohammad while the Shias believed that the leaders have to come from the descendants of the Prophet.


After the death of Yazid, there was again chaos about the succession. By now Islam had spread all over the Arab and Middle Eastern world. There were two main tribes in Syria—Qays in North and Kalb in South—who rallied around Marwan Ibn al Hakam. Ibn Al Zubayr established a Caliphate in Arabia while Al Muktar established a Caliphate under his leadership in Iraq. Marwan I was succeeded by Abd al Malik who was succeeded by his son Al – Walid, who spread Islam from Arabia all the way up to France where, in 736 AD, he was stopped by the Franks of France. The last Marwani Caliph collapsed and was succeeded by the Abbasids led by Al Abbas.

The Abbasids came to power in 750 AD and remained in power till the Mongol invasions in 1258. Abbasids also bought non-Muslim boys and brought them up like


Sunnis. They were soldiers for Abbasids and were called Mamluks. In counter to Abbasids rose the Fatimid who formed a Caliphate in rivalry to Abbasids in North Africa, Sicily, Palestine and Syria. To expand influence, they used the Dawa (missionaries) and used education to spread ideas and principles of their school of thought. The Fatimids declined due to promotion of a doctrine not acceptable to Sunni Muslims. The Fatimids wanted the allegiance of the people to Fatimid Caliph Imam which did not go down well with Sunnis.

Meanwhile, Abdur Rehman of Umayyad established his rule in Cordoba in Spain. By 720, a Moorish control was established in Andalusia in Spain but the state collapsed a little later. There was also a revivalist group of Ahmohads had established their Caliphate in Morocco were led by Ibn Turmat, who advocated strict monotheism but the Almohad Caliphate declined due to the rise of fanatic Almohads. Thus, during the time of Abbasids, multiple caliphates sprung up. In 1517, Selim-I made Egypt a part of Ottoman territory and this saw the rise of the Ottoman Caliphate which lasted till 1924, when it was abolished leading to the birth of Turkey. In modern times, in Nigeria, Usman dan Fodio had established Sokoto Caliphate in 1804 while in lieu of Ottoman Caliphate came Sharifian caliphate. There have also been two non-political Caliphates, namely the Sufis and the Ahmadiyyas. In June 2014, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi of the Islamic state of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) gave a fresh call for establishment of a Caliphate once again.

The Shia Muslims on the other hand believed that Ali was the first Imam and Abu Mohammad Hasan ibn Ali was the second. For Shias, the eleventh Imam was Hasan Al Askari. Today, amongst the Shia Muslims, one school of thought believes that Hasan Al Askari had no surviving sons but another sect called the Qatiyyas believes that Mohammad Al Mahdi is the son of Hasan Ali Askari and he is in hiding somewhere and shall come to guide the Shias.



Broadly speaking, Muslims are divided into four branches, namely Shias, Sunnis, Kharijites and Quaranists. The faith witnessed a split in 632 which led to birth of two largest sects called Shias and Sunnis. The Quaranists are those who hold Quran to be the authentic source of Islamic faith and reject different recorded oral traditions or Hadith. The Shias and Sunnis are further divided into various sub-groups. The diagram below will clarify the schools.



ISLAMIC IDEOLOGIES—WAHABISM, SALAFISM, MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, BAATHISM AND ALAWIS


Wahabism and Saudi Arabia

Sheikh Mohammad Ibn Abd Al Wahab is the founder of Wahabism. Al Wahab was born in 1703 in Nejd in Central Arabia. At the age of ten, Al Wahab learned Quran and found a lot of discrepancy in what was mentioned in Quran and what was being practised in reality. Al Wahab noticed people deviating from the path advocated in Quran by worshipping saints and tombs, which were practices that were completely against the Quran. He began to preach the ideas of Quran which went against the existing practices of people. In 1724, Al Wahab went to Basra in Iraq and found many followers and sympathisers in Basra, amongst whom were several prominent persons. However, he was asked to leave Basra. In 1727, Al Wahab came back to his village Uyayna in Nejd from Basra. In his village Al Wahab again began to preach his ideas which were not appreciated by the ruler of Nejd who ordered him into exile. Al Wahab reached a small emirate in Arabia by the name Diriya. The king of Diriya was Mohammad Ibn Saud. As Al Wahab preached in Diriya, he began to increase his followership. This was not appreciated by Ibn Saud who wanted Al Wahab to leave Diriya but Ibn Saud's wife, being a follower of Al Wahab, convinced Ibn Saud to let him stay in Diriya.

Al Wahab's ideology was based on monotheism. In this book *Kitab at-Tawhid*, Al Wahab explains that Muslims should only follow Allah and those who believe in one God are true Muslims. He said that all others who are Muslims but believe in practices other than Allah and monotheism live in a state of Jahiliya. Al Wahab demanded conformity to one God or Caliph and advocated that the true followers of unity and monotheism, who are the chosen ones, can eliminate non-true Muslims like Sufis and Shias, and so on. When Al Wahab preached these doctrine in Diriya, Ibn Saud saw in these doctrines a grand design to enforce conformity, gain acceptance and expand his empire in other


emirates of Arabia. Ibn Saud began his territorial expansion and conquest over other emirates of Arabia on the pretext of the enforcement of Wahabi doctrine and gave birth to a unified Arabia which was now called Saudi Arabia (derived from the name of Mohammad Ibn Saud).

After the death of Ibn Saud, his successor Abdal Aziz also used territorial expansion and violence to ensure the spread of Wahabi ideology and this is how, after the unification of Saudi Arabia, Wahabism emerged as the core ideology of the ruling state and ruling family. Abdal Aziz established an army of people named Ikhwan to spread Wahabi ideology through forced coercion. The members of Ikhwan used to slaughter people who did not conform to the Wahabi ideology. The Ikhwan soldiers used to wear black clothes, raise black flags, wear a black robe to cover their faces. It is this Ikhwan spirit which is visible in ISIS today. In the period during the World War-II, the US and Saudi Arabia developed an alliance whereby the US would buy Saudi oil in return for money, arms and ammunition and Saudi was allowed to export Wahabism in the Middle East to gain hegemony in Middle East. Saudi used the money to provide training to west Asians and also provided support to extremists who would seek conformity. The ideological underpinnings of the ISIS, Taliban and Al Qaeda trace their roots to Wahabism. Post the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the CIA revived the Ikhwan spirit, leading to the formation of the Al Qaeda and Saudi Arabia used it to expand its influence and hegemony while the US used the ideology and its armies to contain the Soviet.




Salafism

Salafism is a world view that looks at the religious questions of Islam. When Prophet Mohammad was alive, he used to preach and hold sermons regularly. There were people who used to listen to Mohammad who would then spread the knowledge they heard from Mohammad by word of mouth. The words of Mohammad to those people who had the privilege of listening to him became a part of the Sunnah. This knowledge of Mohammad or Sunnah was handed over to the successive generations. Salafis are those people who believe that the best way to follow Islam is to follow what these generations learned. For Salafis, those generations of people who listened to Mohammad followed the purest form of Islam and they believe that it's that form of Islam that needs to be followed today. Thus, Salafism is a reform movement aimed at direct emulation of Mohammad, the initial generation, the first few who followed Mohammad. Salafism is a movement which wants to go back for purity of Islam. There have been scholars of Salafism in the modern times who advocate use of Jihad (a holy war) if needed to follow Salafism.



Muslim Brotherhood (MB)

The Muslim Brotherhood emerged in Egypt as a resistance movement against foreign presence. After Napoleon's invasion of Egypt, the territory subsequently fell into the hands of Western powers. As the western powers began to increase their influence in Egypt, it saw erosion of Islamic values in the society. It is in this backdrop that Hasan al Bana emerged on the scene and established the Muslim Brotherhood. Hasan al Bana began to follow a grassroots mechanism to promote Islamic values. He began to focus on issues like health, education and other humanitarian issues. His aim was to establish a direct touch with people of Egypt. He used this grassroots platform to popularise his version of Islam and preached the need for Sharia and a Caliphate as guiding forces in society.




As the Muslim Brotherhood has established a strong mass base in Egypt, it emerged powerfully on the political scene of Egypt after the Arab Spring in 2011. The MB accepts Islam with modern components and is therefore more pragmatic and accommodating than both Salafism and Wahabism. Saudi Arabia does not support the MB as it advocates the establishment of a Caliphate which endangers Saudi Monarchy and their dynastic rule. Thus, Saudi Arabia prefers to support the Egyptian military over the Muslim Brotherhood.


Baathism and Iraq and Syria

During the World War-I, Europe was looking for allies in the Middle East. A British spy T E Lawrence promised Faisal I of Iraq that if he supported the British in the war, after the war he would be rewarded with Mecca, thus earning Faisal's support for the British. The British, along with the French, concluded the Sykes Picot Agreement secretly. The

agreement was about the division of the Middle Eastern territory post-World War-I. The aim of the agreement was to serve oil needs of Britain and France from the Middle East after the War. As the World War-I concluded, as per the Sykes–Picot Agreement, the territory was divided. The British rewarded Faisal with Iraq.



As Syria was under French Control, the Syrians fought against the French and finally gained independence on 17th April, 1946. After Syrian independence, many new parties were born and one such party was the Baath Party in 1947, which was renamed in 1953 as the Arab Socialist Baath Party.




In 1958, on lines of Arab unity, a United Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria was formed but due to the dominating personality of Nasser of Egypt, in 1961, the United Arab Republic broke up. In 1963, the Baathist party, through a coup in Syria, established the Syrian Arab Republic. After the Arab Israel War of 1967, the Syrians lost Golan Heights to Israel and became a weak state. Taking advantage of a weakening Syria, in 1971, Hafiz al Assad administered a coup and became the Syrian President through a subsequent referendum. He continued to be in power till 2000 when he was succeeded by his son, Basher al Assad.

Alawis and the House of Assad

Alawis are Arabic people living in the Jubal al Nusayriyah Mountains of North West Syria. They are known as Nusayrias and are a sect similar to Shias. Post-1970s, the Alawis, the largest Syrian minority group, had formed a government in Syria. The Alawis believe that every human being begins as a star in the sky. The human beings fell on the Earth when they disobeyed the sky God. Thus, a man has to be reborn several times to find a place as a star again. The Alawis consider people of other faiths as animals and believe that Earth is a home for Alawis and other animals. Their religion is extremely secretive with no mosques but they celebrate all Persian and Christian festivals and have adopted modern dressing. The Sunni Muslims feel Alawis are non-Muslims and treat them with utter contempt.

On the other hand, in 1968, in Iraq, Al Hasan al Bakr of Baath party undertook a coup which was followed by another one in 1978 by Saddam Hussein, who established a military rule in Iraq. Thus, Syria, which had Sunni majority came to be

ruled by a Shia minority while Iraq, under Saddam Husain, was a state of Shia majority being ruled by a Sunni minority.



ISRAEL AND PALESTINE ISSUE

When the Industrial Revolution began in Europe, it also brought about the spirit of nationalism amongst the Europeans. The British and the French emerged as two major European powers. After the unification of Germany by Bismarck, even Germany emerged as a strong power. This period of nationalism in Europe also was a period of colonisation. In fact, colonisation of the world had begun by European powers after geographical discoveries and industrial revolution. The British and the French resented the rise of Germany as they perceived it as a serious competitor.

The later part of 1880s saw alliance formations in Europe which ultimately culminated in the World War-I. Germany formed an alliance with Austria, Hungary and the Ottoman empire while the British had formed their own alliance with the French. The Ottoman territory would be disastrous even for the British and French as they used the oil from the territory for industrial activities back home. As the World War-I broke out, in 1916, the British and the French signed the Sykes–Picot Agreement. Also known as the Asia Minor Agreement, the agreement had the British and the French decide the division of the Ottoman territory amongst themselves after the World War-I. As the war ended, the British and French emerged victorious and Germany, Austria–Hungary and the Ottomans lost. The victorious powers of the World War-I now decided to curb German ambitions and also divide the Ottoman territory. The establishment of the League of Nation, the Mandate System and the Balfour Declaration gave effect to the ambitions of victorious powers. The British got the mandate of Iraq and Palestine while the French kept Syria and Lebanon as mandates. In order to curb German ambitions, the Treaty of Versailles was designed and signed in 1919. As per the treaty, the Germans were not allowed to maintain a strong military and its resources were to be shared with victorious powers like Britain and France. The prime intention to inflict harm upon Germany was to ensure that it does not recover enough to act as a threat to Britain and France again. It also severely limited Germany's colonial ambitions.

The wars also created a sense of nationalism in the Jews. The Jews were also inspired to have their own national home in the land they believed had been ‘promised’ to them by God. Theodore Herzl, in 1896, established the World Zionist Organization in Basel in Switzerland as a political movement to take Jews from Europe to Zion. (Zionism subsequently emerged as a political movement of Jews; Zion or Jerusalem is where the temple mount is located in Palestine). The basic idea of Theodore Herzl was that first, rich European Jews would go to Palestine and purchase lands and over a period of time, other Jews would go and settle in Palestine. Zionism, which emerged as a political movement, ended up being a movement to colonise Palestine. As the number of Jews in Palestine began to increase, the move was not appreciated by the Arabs. After World War-I, as the Mandate of Palestine had come under British control, the Arabs complained to the British

about the rising number of Jews in Palestine. The British subsequently controlled the entry of the Jews into Palestine but did not impose a complete halt. This sowed the seeds of the Arab–Palestine disenchantment.


During the inter-war period, Germany began to defy the Treaty of Versailles and also began to uproot the Jews in Germany. Hitler blamed Jews for the problems of Germany and in 1940, unleashed the horrific Holocaust as a ‘final solution to the Jewish Problem’. The mass massacre of Jews led to a wave of deep sympathy for the Jewish people all over the world. America also convinced its ally Britain to allow entry of one lakh Jews from Europe to Palestine and ease the entry restrictions. As more number of Jews began to enter Palestine, it upset the Arabs in Palestine. The situation in Palestine was very volatile. As the Jews and Arabs fought for the claim of Palestine, the UN was created as a successor to League of Nations on 15th May, 1947. The British decided to hand over their mandate of Palestine to the UN for deliberation. Subsequently, the UN established United Nations Special Commission on Palestine (UNSCOP). The UNSCOP deliberated upon the Palestinian issue. During the UN debates, one group advocated that Arabs have been controlling Palestine but Jews also have a rightful claim on the territory and therefore, the territory of Palestine should be partitioned for Arab Palestinians and Jews, creating a plan which came to be known as the Majority Plan. On the other hand, the other group advocated that there should be a Federal Palestine and Jews can be accommodated in a unified Federal Palestine without the need to partition. Thus, this group created this plan which came to be known as the Minority Plan.

On 29th November 1947, the UN voted on both the plans. As per the vote, the Majority Plan received the maximum votes. The Palestine territory was to be partitioned and it was decided to establish an Arab Palestine and a Jewish Palestine while keeping the city of Jerusalem under international control. As per the decision of the UN, with support of the US, on 14th May 1948, the Jewish Palestine got established on the demarcated territory and Israel, as a state, was born. However, the Arabs failed to establish Arab Palestine on the demarcated territory. In 1948, after the creation of Jewish Palestine or Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Egypt and Jordan collectively attacked Israel. This led to the first Arab–Israel war in 1948. The UN immediately stepped in and by 1949, an Armistice agreement was achieved. From 1919 to 1956, there was truce in the region but in 1956, Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal and prevented Israel from accessing the Suez Canal. This led to a Tripartite Agreement between Israel, Britain and France in Sevres, France after which, Ariel Sharon of Israel attacked Egypt and captured the Gaza strip and Sharm el Shaikh.

The subsequent intervention of US to diffuse the crisis led to peace again. But the Suez crisis firstly led to a big blow to the supremacy of Britain and France while boosting the image of Nasser in the Arab world. The awakened Arab world began to ponder as to why the Arabs could not succeed in establishing the Arab Palestine. The Arabs realised that it was because they lacked an organisation like the Jews and recognised the fact that splinter groups advocating for Arab Palestine have to be brought under a unified umbrella. In 1964, the Arabs established the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The PLO emerged as an organisation of the Arabs fighting Israel military for supremacy in the Palestinian region. Britain, France and Israel, along with the Americans, condemned the creation of PLO in 1967. Egypt was mobilising its military units along the Sinai and also

closed the Gulf of Aqaba to Israel. This war lasted for six days (also known as the six days war) and Israel captured the Gaza strip from Egypt.

Israel also took the West bank from Jordan and Golan Heights from Syria after the war. Arabs took the matter to the UN, urging UN to compel Israel to vacate the occupied territory and go back to accept the borders that existed before the 1967 war. The UN passed the UN Resolution–242, urging Israel to vacate the territory and immediately resort to holding of borders as existed before 1967. The state of Israel refused to comply to UN orders. The refusal of Israel to comply to UN resolution 242 came as a big shock to the Arab world. The PLO subsequently became more radical to tackle Israel.



The factional group called Fatah was one of the most radical groups which began to gain popularity for its aggressive stance to Israel. In 1969, the leader of the PLO, Yasser Arafat, became the head of the PLO and began to vouch for an armed struggle against Israel. The Arabs continued to support the aggressive tactics of the Fatah, which now dominated the PLO. On 6th October, 1973, as the Jews were busy celebrating the holy festival of Yom Kippur, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq and Libya attacked Israel. This took Israel by surprise, but with support of the US, Israel succeeded in defeating each Arab participant. Subsequently, the Arab countries of OPEC imposed an oil embargo upon the US. The efforts of the Nixon administration led to the uplifting of the embargo by 1974 but also caused an upward spiral of oil prices. For the first time, the global financial balance of power tilted in favour of the Middle East. The US responded domestically with Project Independence (a project for energy security) and also decided to use the comfortable situation to advocate for peace. Post the oil embargo, PLO also shifted its original maxima list position of advocating for liberation of Palestine under Israeli control to advocating the two states theory. It pressed for the creation of Arab Palestine in the Gaza strip and West Bank.

The US sensed an opportunity in this changed stance and in 1978, invited the Arab nations for talks at Camp David. The PLO rejected the call for talks organised by US. However, Egypt, led by Sadat Anwar, responded positively and went ahead with the talks. The Camp David Talks of 1978 led to the Israel–Egypt Peace Treaty and Egypt agreed not to use violence against Israel while Israel agreed to more autonomy for Palestinians, with the possibility of sovereignty in future. However, the Israel–Egypt rapprochement was denounced by the Arab world and the PLO. Despite a breakthrough at Camp David talks with Egypt, there was no big achievement overall as the PLO did not participate while Israel refused to give effect to the UN Resolution–242. The frustration amongst Arabs for their failure to make Israel vacate territory and the intense disenchantment in Palestinian people led to the first Intifada. The first Intifada culminated with rise of Harkat-al-Muqawama al-Islamiya (HAMAS), led by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin.




Hamas emerged as an organisation in Gaza strip and vowed to eliminate Israel by force. At this time, the response of the Fatah was different and it proposed that as an organisation, its focus would remain on establishing the Arab Palestine in Gaza strip and West Bank.




As the Cold War ended with the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1989, the US emerged as a superpower. In 1991, the US invited the Arabs again at Madrid as a follow up to the Israel–Egypt Peace Treaty. In the Madrid conference in 1991, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and some influential Palestinian people participated, although the PLO had not been invited as a representative of the Palestinian people. The only success of the Madrid Conference was the Israel–Jordan Peace Treaty. Syrian insistence on reclaiming Golan Height delayed the Syria–Israel truce. Israel did propose, however, that it would hand over Golan Heights back to Syria if Syria concludes a Peace Treaty. The talks with Lebanon in Madrid could not proceed as Iran exercised influence on Lebanon, through Hezbollah. The US followed up the Madrid talks of 1991 with the Oslo Accords in 1993. For the first time in the history of the Middle East crisis, the US succeeded in bringing Israel and the PLO at a common platform for talks. HAMAS continued with its military position and therefore was not a part of Oslo talks. The Oslo talks saw the ‘Land for Peace’ proposals. It was decided that Israel would undertake a phased withdrawal from Gaza strip and West Bank while the PLO would accept the existence of Israel and would do away with idea of using force against Israel. It was agreed that PLO would establish a Palestinian Authority (PA) which would act as a political entity to govern Gaza strip and West Bank.

Israel was to vacate Gaza Strip and West Bank by 1998. The PLO, in the meantime, had also established the PA. The rise of a right wing government in Israel by 1998 created an issue. In 1998, the Israeli government refused to vacate Gaza strip and West Bank. Subsequently Israel’s Ariel Sharon visited the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem (the third holiest site in Islam after Mecca and Medina) and this move provoked the Palestinians. This provocation manifested as the Second Intifada in 2000. The Second Intifada caused heavy violence in the region again.



The volatile situation came under control in 2003 when Ariel Sharon announced the Disengagement Plan. Israel agreed to vacate Gaza strip and West Bank by 2005. However, in 2004, Yasser Arafat died and was succeeded by Mohammad Abbas. In 2005, Israel vacated Gaza strip and West Bank and elections were organised on behalf of the PLO. Both PA and the HAMAS decided to contest elections. The US and its allies extended their support to PA in the election. As the results of the election were announced, it stunned everybody as HAMAS won the election in Gaza Strip while Fatah won a few seats in the territory of West Bank. This sowed the seeds of subsequent Fatah–HAMAS conflict.

In 2007, after the talks, HAMAS and Fatah formed the National Unity Government (NUG) where HAMAS was led by Khaled Mashal and Fatah PA by Mohammad Abbas. The violence still continued due to ideological differences. The NUG collapsed in June 2007, after which the HAMAS took control of the Gaza Strip while the Fatah took over the control of West Bank. As Fatah enjoyed the support of the US, in 2014, it succeeded in making Palestine a non-member state of the UN and in 2015, a member state of International Criminal Court. Hamas as an organization continues to deploy military tactics and remains committed to eliminate Israeli military. In December 2016, US abstained at the Security Council resolution related to a resolution sponsored by New Zealand on the settlement issue in the Palestinian territory. This was the first time in the history of creation of Israel that US, instead of supporting Israel, abstained from a resolution and came down heavily on Israel. For a long period of time, the Obama administration and Benjamin Netanyahu had been on opposing ends with each other. There had been some critical differences over the perception of the Iranian nuclear deal (of 2015) by both US and Israel. Obama administration favoured a positive attitude to Iran, which was not the case with Israel. The long pending disagreements were a major factor in the recent decision of US to abstain from voting at the UN Security Council.



INDIA'S PALESTINE POLICY

Since the Indian National Movement, India has been positively inclined towards Arabs India and has rejected Zionism. India believed Zionism is a colonial movement of the

Jewish people to try and eventually colonise Palestine. India did not harbour any negativity towards Jewish people, but it rejected the ideology of the Jewish people to colonise Palestine. After India became independent, India recognised the creation of Israel at the UN, yet extended no diplomatic relations with Israel. In the 1956 Suez crisis, India blamed Israel for escalating conflicts. After the 1967 war, India favoured the UN Resolution 242 and advocated that Israel vacate the territory captured in the 1967 war. In 1974, India allowed the PLO to establish an office in New Delhi and also accepted the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian People. In 1981, Yasser Arafat paid a state visit to India. Post the Oslo Accords of 1993, India has supported the Fatah or the PLO or the PA. India does not support the HAMAS. In 2015, at the UN Human Rights Council vote against Israel on war crimes in Gaza, India abstained along Kenya Ethiopia, Macedonia and Paraguay as the resolution related to International Criminal Court to which India is not a signatory.

ARAB SPRING, SYRIAN CRISIS AND LIBYAN CRISIS

Islam, after its origin, has spread as an ideology or religion to places as far as France. Islam had a lot of interaction with different cultures all over the world. However, after 1453, the fall of Constantinople coupled with subsequent Renaissance, Reformation, Enlightenment and Industrial Revolution saw the rise of Christianity in Europe. The rise of Europe was perceived as the rise of Christianity by Islamic scholars. This time also coincided with the beginning of imperialism. The western intrusion in the body politic led to a new discourse. Many scholars of Islam sensed a feeling of defeat and began to introspect. Some believed that the reason Christianity flourished was because of advancements in science (fuelled by the Renaissance and geographical discoveries) while others believed it was because of military superiority. Some Islamic scholars advocated deep introspection within and presented an idea of going back to pristine Islam as they felt that Muslims have deviated from their true faith.

The early modern period also saw a strong control of Western powers over the Middle East. Initially, it was by the British and the French who wanted a control over the Middle East for oil to sustain the Industrial Revolution. The World Wars also led to redrawing of the boundaries of the Middle East, done in a manner to suit the imperial interests. This territorial demarcation at the end of World War-I created a deep sense of resentment amongst the Arabs. The period after World War-II and the Cold War saw the US emerging as a new power. The Cold War period in the Middle East witnessed a rise of military dictators and dynastic dictators (as in Saudi Arabia). The oil boom post-1973 and the oil embargo again financially strengthened the dictators but the financial benefits did not percolate to the Arab citizens. The population at large was still left out and felt humiliated to see how their leaders (authoritarian rulers) co-opted by the West. The Arabs were also aggravated with creation of Israel in 1948 and subsequent loss of Arab lives in military conflicts with Israel in 1948 and 1967.




One answer that emerged for Arabs during the Cold War was to reassert the influence of Islam, with which came the invocation of Jihad. The US, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan played a key role. The US used Jihadis to contain the Soviet influence in Afghanistan while Saudi Arabia spread Wahabism through Jihad to urge for a return to pristine Islam. The Salafist Jihadism that emerged during the Cold War was perceived as the first response to regain control over destiny. Thus, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the US used Islam to mobilise it as a weapon to tackle communism. However, they rapidly lost control over the monsters that they had bred and fed. This precisely happened in the form of 9/11 attacks. Post-9/11 we saw the US invasion of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). The subsequent period also saw a rise of Islamophobia in the Christian world. The Arabs again were fatigued with increased violence and consequences caused by the Holy war or Jihad. It was now well accepted that radicalism was not the answer. There was a huge intellectual vacuum felt by Arab citizen who had legitimate grievances against their leaders and realised that violence certainly was no answer. What contributed to more frustration in the Arab world was a series of Arab Human Development Reports that emerged from 2002 onwards till 2009.

All these Arab Human Development Reports pointed out to lack of social development of Arab citizens. These reports also contributed to a deep sense of loss of dignity amongst the Arab people. The common Arab citizen was frustrated due to brutal suppression by their leaders, high prices of commodities, rising unemployment and rampant corruption.

The spark came from Tunisia in December 2010 when a street vendor, Mohammad Bouazizi, self-immolated himself due to suppression by Tunisian police. Self-immolation in Islam is a forbidden act as it is believed that a person indulging in immolation will find no place in heaven. This act of self-immolation became a political statement leading to mass agitations in Tunisia against Ben Ali, who promptly ordered his forces to militarily suppress the protestors. The military forces refused to act on orders. This ultimately led to his downfall. The revolution that happened in Tunisia was called Jasmine Revolution because jasmine is culturally important for Tunisians—in the month of December, a lot of vendors in Tunisia sell jasmine flowers. The Tunisians appreciate the purity and the scent of the jasmine. It was called Jasmine revolution as the idea was to purify Tunisia and clean it up from the corrupt government held by Ben Ali. Due to this Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia, on 20th January 2011, the Democratic Constitutional Rally, the party under Ben Ali was dissolved. On 1st March 2011, the Nahdah Party in Tunisia was legalised to contest future elections. Ben Ali was convicted for embezzlement of public funds even though he has lived in exile in Saudi Arabia since his ouster. The unrest from Tunisia spread to Egypt. Egypt, since 1980, was under the rule of Hosni Mubarak. The protestors occupied the Tahrir Square in Cairo to demand the ousting of Hosni Mubarak. Post Arab Spring, Egypt witnessed a power tussle between Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian army.

In 2011, the protestors also protested against the Muammar Gaddafi regime in Libya who refused to leave the Libyan scene. Libya then subsequently saw a NATO intervention which led to a forced removal of Gaddafi. Libya became the first state that underwent Civil War after the Arab Spring. After Gaddafi, Libya has fragmented into multiple groups all of whom assert power today. The regime of Gaddafi at least had kept all factions under

control but post Gaddafi, Libya has slipped into a civil war and the crisis in Libya still continues. The conflict in Libya is about wealth and power. After the removal of Gaddafi, the society which has got fragmented has seen the rise of local militias. The militias are controlled by tribes which have been asserting dominance over resources. In 2012, the General National Congress was elected but each major city still has a dominant militia. The GNC elected in 2012 had to give power to House of Representatives in 2014 which has not happened yet.



The Arab Spring has seen protests against Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen and also against the ruler in Bahrain. In Morocco, King Mohammad VI has agreed to transition. Elections have happened. People want the monarchy to stay in Morocco as well as in Jordan.




Why is the Revolution in the Arab States called Arab Spring?

Spring is a new season when normally the ice melts, winters end and new beginnings happen. The term at political level was first used in 1968 in Prague when it achieved political liberalisation. The winter in political connotation signified a controlled society with a high degree of oppression exercised by a ruler and no freedom for the people. The spring signified a change from the winter. This is what was signified by the Arab Spring that began in December, 2010 in Tunisia.

Syria became independent in 1945 and became an Arab Republic in 1991. As explained earlier, Syria was under the control of Assad. The Arab Spring created protest even in Syria but Assad refused to leave the scene. This has plunged Syria into a situation of civil war as the opposition favours his removal. This issue of the Syrian conflict has become all the more complex with foreign participation. In September 2016, apart from existing players, Turkey has entered into the Syrian conflict as a new player.




Russia supports Syria as Russian Black Sea bases are not very far away from Syria and Syria is an important nation in Russia's West Asia Policy. The civil war in Syria has caused enormous damage to its civilian population which has led to the population to seek refugee outside Syria. The year of 2015 saw a colossal refugee crises when people began to leave Syria for Germany, Greece, Sweden and Turkey.



INDIA'S POSITION ON ARAB SPRING


India has followed a pragmatic approach and has evolved its view on a case-by-case basis. India has advocated the policy of non-enmeshment in sectarian conflicts. Broadly, India has followed hands-off approach of not interfering in internal transition. As some countries have slipped into civil wars post Arab Spring, one priority that has emerged in the Indian foreign policy is the protection of Indian expats in this region. A bigger concern for India has been to protect the sea lanes of communication to sustain oil supplies. Our policy is now to engage with West Asia at the level of security and defence. Broadly, as the Arab Spring favours democracy and has a secular outlook, India favours the changes brought about by it in the Arab World.



KURDISH PROBLEM

Kurds are indigenous people belonging to the Mesopotamian plains. The problem of Kurds goes back to the period of World War-I. After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the World War-I, many Kurds wanted a separate state called Kurdistan. The idea was to

unify all Kurds spread in the Middle East.



The Treaty of Sèvres in 1920 also advocated a new Kurdish state to be established. As the Ottoman Empire disintegrated after World War-I, the Treaty of Lausanne demarcated the boundary of Turkey and created Turkey as a modern state without the mention of Kurdistan. However, the Kurds, since then, have been fighting for an independent state. The Kurdish people have no common dialect but belong to a common race and culture and a majority of them are Sunni Muslims. In the years since 2014, the Kurds have been in news due to attacks on the Kurdish people by Islamic State (ISIS).


In 1978, Abdullah Öcalan, a Kurdish nationalist leader, established the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and proposed to fight for Kurdistan as an independent state in Turkey. Till 1990s, The PKK indulged in an armed struggle and demanded the independent state. However, since the end of the Cold War, the PKK has dropped the idea of an armed struggle and has been advocating more cultural and political autonomy. The PKK has been in negotiations with Turkish government and the latest round of talks happened in 2012 where the Turks and PKK have established a ceasefire. In July 2015, as the ISIS-related violence on members of PKK increased, the PKK blamed Turkey for all attacks on their members. The Turks, in relation, launched a synchronised war on terror on PKK and ISIS. Turkey alleges that the PKK has been adamant on the secession of the Kurdish region from Turkey through armed struggle and thus labels it a terrorist organisation.

Kurds in Syria have established a Democratic Unity Party (PYD) which fights in Syria not for an independent Kurdish state but for more autonomy in the local democratic administration in Federal Syria. In 2004, after the Qamishli uprising in Syria, the PYD formed People's Protection Units (YPG) in Rojava or the area of Syrian Kurdistan. In 2014, when the ISIS attacked Syria, the YPG repelled the ISIS.

In Iraq today, around 15–20% of the population is Kurd. The Kurds, historically, have enjoyed maximum rights in Iraq. In fact, in 1946, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) was formed by Mustafa Barzani. Barzani wanted more autonomy for the Kurds in Iraq. In 1958, the Kurdish nationality was recognised by the new Iraqi constitution, but Barzani advocated self-rule which was not acceptable to Iraq. In 1961, Barzani launched an armed struggle. To diffuse the situation, the Iraqi government offered an autonomous region in 1970 but the deal failed. In 1974, there was a split in KDP which led to Jalal Talabani establishing the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The KDP and PUK have repeatedly tried to share power but tensions between the groups have prevented any such endeavour. After the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, a coalition called Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) was setup in 2005 in Dohuk, Ibril and Sulaimanya. The KRG has been primarily an advocate of autonomy for Kurds. They have members belonging to the Kurdish

nationalist guerilla organisations called Peshmargas. In 2014, when the ISIS attacked Iraq in the North where Kurds reside, the KRG sent Peshmargas to fight. Since February 2016, Mustafa Barzani's son, Massoud Barzani, the current leader of the KDP, has been an advocate of a referendum and the demand for the referendum was forcefully forwarded again in January, 2017.

There also exists a small group of people in the Middle East called Yazidis. They are among the world's oldest minorities and are a monotheistic people. Yazdis and their faith originated thousands of years ago, with roots in Zoroastrianism. They follow a blend of Islam and Christianity. In the recent years, due to attacks on Yazdis by ISIS, the minority group is in danger. The ISIS has labelled them devil worshippers and have called for their eradication. The Yazdis are almost on the verge of extinction. Today, they live near the Sinjar Mountains in Iraq. The Yazdis are non-Arabs and non-Muslim minorities.



ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA (ISIS)

The latest challenge that has emerged in the Middle East is of the Islamic State (henceforth referred to as the ISIS). To understand the origin of the ISIS, we need to trace back to the period of the Gulf War-I. In 1990, when the first Gulf War began, in Iraq, Saddam Hussein used chemical and biological weapons against his adversaries. The US supported Kuwait in the war but as the war ended, it failed to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq. As the UN imposed sanctions against Iraq and isolated it, it was believed that a weak Iraq under Saddam Hussein would lead to a palace coup against Saddam and there would be a subsequent regime change.

In 1998, the US passed a law signed by Clinton authorising 97 billion US dollars to replace the regime of Saddam with a democratic regime in Iraq. The task was entrusted to the CIA. However, the 9/11 attacks changed all equations. In 2001, the US President was empowered with the Authorized use of Military Force (AVMF) to declare a war upon Afghanistan and Iraq for which the US President would not require authorisation from the UN Security Council. This led to the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and of Iraq in 2003. After the end of Gulf War, the UN had instructed Iraq to remove and dismantle all its chemical and biological weapons. Iraq had not complied with the directions of the UN. In November, 2001, the UN Weapon Inspector Hans Blix informed the Security Council that Iraq is in possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction. On 20th March, 2003, after failure of Iraq to dismantle the weapons of Mass Destruction, the US invaded Iraq and launched operation Iraqi Freedom.

Saddam was captured in December, 2003 and hanged subsequently after court's verdicts. After Saddam's capture, the ground was prepared in Iraq for democratic elections. Before we move further, we have to keep a few things in mind. Firstly, the Muslims living in Iraq are Shia and are in majority. Secondly, Saddam was a Sunni Muslim. The situation in Iraq under Saddam was that Shia majority nation was controlled


by Sunni minority and a Sunni leader. When the US invaded Iraq, the US was determined to side with the Shias as they constituted the majority. This created an inherent sense of betrayal and a rising number of Sunni extremist groups who unleashed violence and chaos in Iraq. One such prominent group was Jamat al Tawhid Wa-i-Jihad (JTWD). It was founded in 1999 by Abu Musabal-Zarqawi in Jordan. Al-Zarqawi developed proximity to Al-Qaeda's Osama Bin Laden in due course of time. In 2004, the JTWD performed *bay'ah* and joined the Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). The commonality of Al Qaeda and JTWT in Iraq was the deep anti-Shia sentiment.

In 2006, Al-Zarqawi took steps to bring other pro-Sunni, anti-Shia groups fighting in Iraq under a uniform banner and succeeded in knitting the organisations under Majlis Shura-al-Mujaheeden (MSM). Al Zarqawi was killed in the same year in a US air strike. He was succeeded by Al-Masri, with the Al-Qaeda in Iraq now transformed into Islamic State in Iraq (ISI). Abu Ayyub al-Masri announced that the new goal of ISI was to capture the territory of Iraq which had passed into the hands of Nouri Al Maliki (the Shia ruler who assumed power after elections in 2005 in Iraq). Al-Masri clarified that the goal of ISI is to establish Sharia in Iraq.

The ISI began to capture the lands of the Anbar province in Iraq where Sunni disenchantment with Shias was very high. The US forces in Iraq in 2007 began to take help of Sahwat al Anbar to tackle ISI. As the US used Sahawat al Anbar, they began to successfully wipe out ISI. In 2010, al-Masri died and was succeeded by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Al-Baghdadi began to rework the structure of Islamic state of Iraq. He decided that the group needs to broaden its thinking and reach. Al-Baghdadi repositioned the group, shifted base to Syria and renamed the group as the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL). The shifting of ISIL in Syria upset the Al-Qaeda in Syria fighting against the Assad government and they decided to split from ISIL. Al-Baghdadi, on 21st June, 2014, announced a new goal of ISIS or ISIL, that is the establishment of a Caliphate once again in the Islamic world, followed by its establishment in rest of the world later. Al-Baghdadi, on 29th June, 2014, designated himself as the Caliph Ibrahim. ISIS has vowed affiliation to the Salafi-Jihadi ideology.

Is the War against ISIS India's War?

In 2016, a counter terrorism conference was held in Jaipur, India. It witnessed participants from 25 states that discussed issues related to the ISIS. In the conference, Indian Foreign Secretary S Jaishankar asserted that India favors a 'whole of the world' approach to counter terrorism. This was asserted in response to the question that should India under the Global War On Terrorism (GWOT) contribute forces to contain ISIS? The theoretical explanation of the GWOT is that it perceives that the threat to all states is uniform in nature. This logic is in sync with the goal of the ISIS that is to establish a global Islamic caliphate. Indian Foreign Secretary asserted that if the need be, India could contribute to troops to contain ISIS at the global level, but only under the UN Flag. The Indian foreign policy believes that the GWOT will be India's war only when the terrorists who wage a war against India are perceived by other states as a threat too.



Should we Defeat or Contain the ISIS?

ISIS has created a spectacle of violence on the basis of legitimization by religious texts to radicalize people. Despite knowing that there is no balance of power between the military strength of ISIS and its adversaries, it still uses publicity tools and strategic weapons to terrorize enemy states. The goal of ISIS is to create hegemony of terror using the strategic concepts of core and periphery. The core goal is to establish a caliphate while the periphery is the rest of the world. ISIS feels that if it cannot expand the core (that is establish a caliphate), it will attack the periphery (that is attack the countries in the world). This is a new tactic in global jihad and is very different from the jihad propagated by Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda waged an asymmetric warfare with mercy of other states (like Taliban in Afghanistan) on rest of the world without establishing a proto-state of its own. On the other hand, ISIS has established a proto-state in areas from where they carry out the attack on the periphery. The major issue in the fight against the ISIS is that the states are concerned about tackling the periphery and not the core. For Syria, the goal of Assad regime is to ensure the survival of Syria than defeat ISIS. For the Kurds in Iraq and Syria, their goal is to prevent the ISIS to capture their territories. For Iraqi army, the goal is to protect the Shia lands in Iraq. Saudi Arabia and Turkey don't wish to see ISIS expand further as they feel that ISIS has weakened the strategic depth of Shia Iranians. Thus, the real question is that, is the world really serious about defeating ISIS or the aim is to only contain ISIS within own territorial limits.

CRISIS IN YEMEN

Yemen is an Islamic nation with 65% Sunni and 35% Shia population. It is a fertile territory which also receives adequate rainfall due to its mountainous terrain. The

population of Yemen is relatively poor as the natural resources of Yemen are declining. Historically, Yemen had a Zaydi Mutawakkilite kingdom from 1918 to 1962 which ended with the reign of Mohammad-al-Badr. The conflict in Yemen is primarily between Houthis and Abdabbuh Mansur Hadi. Houthi's belonged to a Shia sect called Zaydis and were organised as the Jund Ansar Allah.

The problem in Yemen began for the first time in 2004 when Hussein Badr-al-Houthi began an uprising against the Ali Abdullah Saleh government in Yemen. The root cause of the uprising was the demand by Houthi for more autonomy with an aim to protect Houthi Shias from cultural invasion by Sunni Muslims. This conflict lasted from 2004 to 2010. In 2011, as the Arab Spring gripped the entire Arab World, the Houthis participated against the Saleh government, which was being led by Abdabbuh Mansur Hadi as a de facto head. In 2012, Abdabbuh Mansur Hadi came to power. In February 2014, National Dialogue conference happened in Yemen. In the conference, Houthis also participated. The conference spoke about dividing Yemen into a federation of six regions. The Houthis opposed the idea, saying that with the forming of such a federation, violence shall begin all over again. Houthis, being Shias, receive support from Iran and at present, control Northern Yemen and the capital Sana. In the southern part of Yemen, since 2007, there has been a secessionist movement called al-Hirak or South Yemen movement which also poses threat to Yemen's sovereignty. In the south-east part of Yemen, Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula and Ansar-al-Sharia are active as Sunni extremists. As there are Indians in Yemen, the Indian government has stationed naval ships—INS-Sumitra, INS-Mumbai and INS-Tarkash in on standby for any immediate evacuation in future. The conflict, at the regional level, can be perceived through the prism of the Shia–Sunni axis, with groups supported by both by Iran and Saudi Arabia.



TURKEY COUP, 2016

The Turkish Coup in 2016 has become a new flashpoint in the ongoing crises in the Middle East. The issue revolves around a US-based Islamic cleric Fethullah Gulen who heads a well organised movement in Turkey called Hizmet. Hizmet means service, and the organization runs a lot of schools and hospitals in Turkey and outside Turkey. Gulen is also a spiritual leader who preaches a liberal form of cultural Islam. The ultimate goal of Gulen is unclear but the movement primarily focuses on education. Gulen has a lot of followers in Turkey, including his hardcore loyalists deep within Turkish administration, police and intelligence. In the 1980s, when there was a coup in Turkey, the army had blamed Gulen for plotting for an Islamic dictatorial government. In 2000, the Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit indicted Gulen for the crime to undermine the core Turkish


state feature of secularism and charged him for trying to install an Islamic dictator in Turkey. In 1999, Gulen went to the US for medical reasons and since then has stayed in the US, living in exile in Pennsylvania today. Gulen was initially a supporter of Erdogan and his AKP party, but as Erdogan began to gain power, by 2010–11, his disagreements with Gulen began over power struggle. Problems began when pro-Gulen police and judiciary and members of AKP party were locked into a power tussle. The issue erupted when investigations in Turkish intelligence agency pitted officials who were pro-Erdogan in the intelligence agency against the pro-Gulen police and prosecutors. In 2013, the prosecutors of Istanbul Zekeriya Oz (a pro-Gulen official) raided three ministers and their sons belonging to the AKP party and also raided some bureaucrats. The raid opened up the ‘gold for oil’ transaction scandal between Turkey and Iran. Since January 2014, Erdogan and the AKP party began to perceive Gulen as an enemy of Turkey and in May, 2016, branded his organisation as a terrorist group. In 2016 July, there was a coup in Turkey and Erdogan blamed Gulen for the coup. He also said that there is a strong US–Israel nexus that is trying to destabilise Turkey.





QATAR CRISIS

In June 2017, Middle Eastern states namely Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Libya, Maldives and Yemen decided to suspend diplomatic, air and sea links with Qatar. The states assert that Qatar financially supports Muslim Brotherhood (MB), which is perceived by them as an organization that threatens the stability of the Middle East. The states also allege that Qatar has allowed Al Jazeera, a TV channel, to telecast anti-Saudi Arabia and anti-Egypt programmes. However the root cause of the crisis lies in sectarian fissures of the Middle East. The above states believe that the foreign policy of Qatar is deeply influenced by Shia Iran than by Sunni GCC states, thereby strengthening the Shia-Sunni sectarian divide. The suspension of diplomatic ties has pushed up prices of concrete and steel. Qatar is using the construction material in a full swing as it is completing projects to host the 2022 FIFA World Cup. Qatar is connected to Saudi Arabia through a small sliver of land along the Arabian Peninsula and uses the land route to import around 40% of its food from Saudi Arabia. The diplomatic standoff has enhanced food security concerns for Qatar causing inflationary spikes in the economy. There are more than 6,00,000 Indians in Qatar working as expats in different positions. The Indians in Qatar constitute the largest expat groups. The states that have imposed the diplomatic cutoff with Qatar have expelled the nationals of Qatar working in their territories. Qatar also has responded by expelling the nationals of those states. This, in the short run, has created job opportunities for Indians in Qatar.

CRUX OF THE ENTIRE MIDDLE EAST IN DIAGRAMS







2
CHAPTER

Issues Related to China

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- China's One Belt, One Road Initiative
- China-Pakistan axis
- China-Pakistan economic corridor
- South China Sea dispute
- String of Pearls

INTRODUCTION


In this chapter we shall catch a glimpse of One Belt, One Road Initiative and the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor. We shall also look at the South China Sea issue and the recent verdict related to Philippines and China.

ONE BELT, ONE ROAD INITIATIVE

The economy of the world is witnessing a profound change in the present times. The unfolding international financial crises have created a dent on the global economy. As China emerges as a strong player in this new unfolding global system, it has launched a new initiative called One Belt and One Road (henceforth referred to as OBOR) Initiative. It has just taken China a period of 40 years to transform itself from an agricultural economy to the manufacturing powerhouse of the world. It has followed a unique model of producing commodities at home and exporting the commodities to developed global markets. However, the Chinese economy, in recent times, has witnessed a slowdown in growth which has led the Chinese government to look for new avenues of growth within its developing neighbours who are witnessing a growing demand. The aim of the OBOR project is to create an economic land belt and a maritime link to redirect Chinese capital to develop infrastructure and trade capacity of ASEAN, Europe, Central Asia, Europe and Africa. The idea of the Silk Road has been taken from the old Silk Road built by the Han Dynasty, connecting Xian to the Roman Empire. In this mega trade network, the Chinese used to trade in silk, which inspired the German geographer named Ferdinand von Richthofen in the term, 'Silk Road' in the 19th century. The network built by Han dynasty reached its zenith during the Tang Dynasty when it emerged as a colossal network of lucrative trade and cultural exchange between China, India, Arabia, Persia, Rome and other Mediterranean nations.

During the Mongol and Yuan dynasty regimes in India and China, rule as the political powers fragmented, the Silk Road declined in its significance. With the rise of Ottoman Empire in 1453, the shipping route for silk also ceased to exist. Now, as China has achieved global resurgence, we see the revival of the ancient Silk Road in the 21st century

in the form of OBOR. As China knows that its own domestic development is connected to the development of Asia and beyond, it is now undertaking a mega initiative to establish infrastructure in the neighbourhood to give effect to the OBOR. China's ultimate goal is to use OBOR to establish connect from China to Latin America, Africa, Europe, Central Asia, South East Asia and East Asia. The entire plan is based on the core spirit of the ancient Silk Route.



The concept of the OBOR is based on certain principles where the broad aim is to establish a multi-dimensional and multi-tiered connectivity to tap the market potential of the region's leading countries to aggressively undertake job creation and promotion of consumption. The more important thing is that the OBOR has a very strong cultural agenda to enhance people-to-people contacts, trust and understanding to promote harmony, peace and prosperity. Not only does the OBOR rest upon mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, but also respect for the diverse development path adopted by a participating nation without any intention to change it. China does not want the initiative to be restricted to old Silk Road nations but rather proposes a global outreach for all to participate, as the basis of the Silk Road is to garner and channelise the market forces of demand and supply.

China has a plan to involve more than 60 countries in the project and also plans to negotiate Free Trade Agreement with all of them along the entire OBOR. Some studies done by the Asian Development Bank suggests that China would require around 8 trillion dollars' worth of investment for creating the needed infrastructure. China has created three financial institutions to support the OBOR. In February, 2014, China launched a 40-billion-dollar silk road infrastructure fund, to be managed on the lines of China's sovereign wealth fund. In October, 2014, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank was established as a global developmental bank for 21 Asian Nations, ranging from India to Laos to Oman to Uzbekistan, with a registered capital of 100 billion dollars. In July, 2014, with a seed capital of 50 billion dollars, a new development bank was launched by BRICS nations.



China has conceptualised the OBOR based on two mega initiatives, both of which, once complete, would impact around four billion people in the world from Asia, Europe

and Africa.




The OBOR is designed in a way that it will also impact the domestic economy of China. China today has achieved an overcapacity in steel, cement and aluminium industry and would like to undertake exports to further stimulate its domestic economy. To do so, China has divided its domestic territory into five different regions. In each identified region, China will build infrastructure and use that infrastructure to establish a connect with countries in the neighbourhood. China intends to fully leverage its domestic territories to proactively link to neighbouring areas.

Is One Belt, One Road the Chinese Ashwamedha? How China's Mythology Influences its Politics

As Western hegemony wanes in the global village, China envisioned the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) project.

At the heart of Chinese mythology is belief in the Mandate of Heaven. The Emperor of China has been given the divine authority to mirror heavenly order on earth. If the emperor fails to do so, he can be replaced. A successful revolution marks the shifting of this mandate from one king to another.

Although communism sees itself as rational, and so anti-religion and anti-mythology, the communist revolution under Mao Zedong effectively marked the shift in the Mandate of Heaven from the old order to the new. The rise of China into an economic powerhouse under Deng Xiaoping also indicates yet another shift in the Mandate of Heaven. The current leadership in China is now expanding its Pax Sinica.



Geography plays a key role in Chinese mythology. At the centre is the Forbidden City (Beijing) around which is China and around which are the peripheral nations who look towards China for guidance to create heavenly order on earth. Beyond are the lands of chaos, whose people are best kept out using projects such as the Great Wall of China.

By contrast, time (*kala*) plays a key role in Hindu mythology. Buddhism, Jainism and Hinduism speak of a world that has no beginning (*anadi*), no end (*ananta*) and is always impermanent (*anitya*). Indian mythologies speak of great universal emperors (*chakra-varti*) but these are more conceptual than historical. India thrives in dynamic diversity, with multiple kingdoms that rise and fall from Mauryas to Guptas to Vakatakas to Rashtrakutas to Kadambas to Gangas to Pallavas to Pandyas to Cholas to Nayakas to Mughals to British.

There is no Beijing equivalent in Hindu mythology, though Delhi is often projected as such in post-Independence textbooks. India, known in Buddhist, Jain and Hindu texts as Jambu-dvipa or Bharata-varsha or Arya-varta, is bound not by politics but by religion; it has been united not by empires but by pilgrim routes, an idea that perplexes modern historians who try very hard to prove India is a creation of the British.

In Chinese mythology, there is authority and bureaucracy in heaven too. The gods enable the living to be successful, and successful mortals such as emperors, military commanders and noblemen take the position of immortal gods. The highly formal, hierarchical and socially-responsible Confucianism, with its great regard for authority, is balanced by the more mystical and occult Taoism, that speaks of


harmony and flow.

Essentially, the tone is highly materialistic and worldly in contrast to the other worldly nature of Indian mythologies, where the psychological matters more than the physical. Jain, Buddhist and Hindu mythologies place great value on yoga, the uncrumpling of the mind crumpled by hunger and fear.


In Chinese worldview, India is seen in two ways. Firstly, it embodies luan, chaos. This chaos threatens the Chinese sense of order. This makes India a perpetual threat. It makes the Chinese leadership nervous. Secondly, India is Sukhavati, the Western Paradise in Chinese Buddhism, source of great spiritual wisdom. It speaks about transcending materialism to be free of suffering, an idea that invalidates the promise of the material philosophies, be it communism or capitalism.

Until the arrival of the Europeans, Buddhism was the only foreign idea that has had a dramatic impact on Chinese history. Since then, China watches with trepidation the rising tide of Christian evangelism in South Korea and Singapore, and Islam on its Western borders, and the hurricane of technology coming from the West. The Chinese way is eroding, unless the Emperor takes charge. Hence, OBOR.

For the OBOR to succeed, China has decided to cooperate upon some core priority areas with participating states. At an initial level, China envisages policy coordination to be undertaken through multi-level intergovernmental macro policy exchange and communication mechanisms. The second priority is to strengthen sub regional and border infrastructure, with a strong focus on promoting a green and low carbon infrastructure creation. At the infrastructural level, there are priority areas.



At the soft policy level, China intends to use OBOR to connect to people of different nations through scholar exchanges, tourism, films, cultural years, art festivals, TV programmes, and so on. Another core dimension is health based cooperation where the aim is to collaborate to address public health energies, with expanded cooperation in the idea of traditional medicine. There is also renewed emphasis upon youth employment, entrepreneurship training and skill development to accelerate regional and multilateral integration under which various cooperative mechanisms are to be used.



China has identified the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar (BCIM-EC) economic corridor as key initiatives broadly associated with OBOR. At the maritime level, China is to use the South China Sea to connect to the Indian Ocean on one side and South Pacific on the other side. The Indian Ocean route is to take China all the way to the African Coast and through the Suez Canal into the Mediterranean, all the way to Europe. Thus, through the OBOR, China intends to integrate and globalise its economy strategically through overland and maritime components.

CHINA–PAKISTAN ECONOMIC CORRIDOR


China–Pakistan Geopolitical Axis and CPEC

The China–Pakistan relations, over a period of time, have evolved to the extent that some scholars aptly call Pakistan China's Israel. The relations have deepened to the extent that China has been willing to supply nuclear materials to Pakistan. Pakistan has acted as a bridge for the US and China during the Cold War and a frontline state for the US to contain Soviets in last stages of the same. Today, China clearly believes that Pakistan has a core part to play in its transition to a global power as it lies at the heart of China's plan for ports and railways for oil and gas. As China engages more with the Islamic world for resources, the more it would need Pakistan to counter the influence of rising Islamic extremism so that it brings stability in the western periphery of China and also in its Islam dominated domestic provinces like Xinjiang.


This relation is based largely on self-interest of China, which intends to expand and reach out to the world. Apart from this, Pakistan otherwise serves no deep interests for China. It is rather an investment by China in its own geopolitical well-being than any sort of expectation of a quid pro quo. One of the greatest achievements of this long-standing friendship is the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The CPEC comes at a time of growing geopolitical ambition of China, being partly a developmental initiative and partly a strategic gambit. One of the important aims of the CPEC is to bolster the Pakistani economy by addressing the key infrastructure constraints in Pakistan and facilitate the development of Pakistan by establishing a connect from Kashgar in China to Gwadar in Pakistan. In March, 2015, China's National Development and Reform Committee announced the One Belt, One Road Initiative. The CPEC is a part of the OBOR and was formalised in April 2015 between Pakistan and China, who concluded around 51 memorandums of understanding with a total investment of 46 billion dollars.

The OBOR has an overland component called the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and a maritime component called the Maritime Silk Road (MSR). The CPEC is a flagship project which will have the potential to serve as a fusion of MSR and SREB. It is now believed that the conclusion of CPEC as a link from Arabian Sea from Pakistan to China through land based CPEC can help alleviate the Chinese Malaccan dilemma. China also faces threat due to rising Islamic extremism in Xinjiang province, especially from ethnic figures. Over a period of time, the Uyghurs have taken refuge in Pakistan. The Uyghur extremists have established relations with Al-Qaeda, Taliban and other Pakistani extremists, and China feels that such a relation might endanger Chinese interests in Pakistan. Thus, China's CPEC is designed to create jobs in Pakistan and reduce anti-state sentiments, thereby providing more resources for Pakistani security agencies which

Pakistan would use to safeguard the corridor. The CPEC is created in the manner that it will help Pakistan generate revenues to quell the Jihadi threats, thereby ultimately helping China to protect its own western periphery alongside, giving it an alternative route to the Strait of Malacca. Pakistan also feels that the project will help it to gain mileage politically in elections and also strengthen Pakistan against India.



As per the plan, China will invest in industrial power, railways, expressways and energy stations from Kashgar in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region to Gwadar port in the 2000 km long belt.



Once the CPEC materialises, it will be a blessing for the economy of Pakistan and will transform the country into a regional trade and energy hub. From the Chinese point of view, successful materialisation of the OBOR and CPEC would help China achieve the dream of constructive engagement announced by Xi Jinping. It will reduce Chinese vulnerability to oceanic piracy and provide China an opportunity to connect with South, Central and West Asia. One of the options for India is to protest against CPEC as it passes through disputed territory, but, this protest ultimately cannot halt the CPEC project. C Raja Mohan aptly suggests that an alternative is that India open up its land routes for China to connect to Pakistan, by which India can also eventually gain economically.

Wahhabism Meets Han-ism and the CPEC


The CPEC is going to alter the demographic equations in Gilgit- Baltistan region as it is going to emerge as the next region by China for demographic re-engineering. China has done a similar thing in Xinjiang. In 1950's, 90% of the population in Xinjiang was Uighur Muslims. China started exporting Han Chinese to Xinjiang. As per the 2000 Census, Han Chinese constituted 40% population and the Uighurs were down from 90% to 48%. The Gilgit-Baltistan region of Pakistan has seen a similar

policy executed by Pakistan. This region in Pakistan is a Shia dominated area. In 1974, Pakistani government abolished rules that prevented non-locals to buy property in the region. Post this abolishing of the policy; Pakistan began to export Sunni Muslims to this region. As per the 2001 report, old population ratio of 1:4 (non locals to locals) in 1974 was transformed to 3:4. CPEC, which passes through this region, allows Pakistan and China to alter the demographic equations of the region further as it is going to emerge as a new ground for volatile osmosis of Wahhabism and Hanism where both claim social dominance of communities. The region will be reduced to a zone of ethnic, religious and sectarian conflict creating grave security concerns for states in South Asia and Central Asia.

INDIA'S OFFICIAL POSITION ON THE OBOR AND CPEC

India's official position is that as the CPEC passes through Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK), which is a disputed territory, and land that has been illegally occupied. India asserts that China has not shown any understanding of India's sovereign claims and thereby it will not be part of the OBOR. In May, 2017, China organised a Belt and Road Initiative Summit (BRIS) in which India did not participate. India has asserted that China has to clarify through a statement that it is not supportive of any Pakistani claims over Kashmir. For India, OBOR is a national initiative of China to enhance its connectivity all over to ensure that it is able to sustain its low-cost manufacturing programme (which is declining due to rising domestic wages in China) by integrating itself to global value chains. India has to now decide whether it would allow political differences to prevail over economic interaction.

DIAGRAM EXPLAINING OBOR, CPEC AND STRING OF PEARLS



SOUTH CHINA SEA ISSUES

South China Sea (SCS from now) is a disputed territory. There are three broad perspectives that can be used to study the history of a sovereign dispute. The first perspective in International Relations is called the national perspective. Under this, we try to study the history of the territory as far as possible to look for evidences that the piece of land in question has always been a part of the national patrimony. Then, using the analysis, we demonstrate that the piece of land has always been under some sovereign control through various mechanisms ranging from occupation to utilisation of the land in question. In the second perspective, we use a non-partisan legal treatise and try to establish a chronology of all conflicting claims made to the sovereign piece of land and then evaluate the chronology on the basis of merits, as per international law. In the third perspective, we try to study the dispute as a part of international history. While doing this, we analyse the events through the prism of a change in balance of power vis-à-vis the international system. In a nutshell, in to the process of resolution of any sovereign dispute,

history plays an important role. In our attempt to analyse the SCS dispute, the parties involved in the conflict are making claims on the basis of ancient documents. Therefore, to understand the issue better, we shall need a quick overview of the earlier periods.

Historically, the SCS has always been used for the purpose of communication by small and large ships. This route of communication goes back to almost two thousand years. As the ships passed through the region, it also gave rise to powerful states all along the route which used the income from merchant vessels transiting the seas to sustain their states.



The rulers of all these states used to tax the ships passing by and maritime communication and trade certainly acted as a source of revenue. The trade in the Malacca Strait region was dominated by traders of Sri Vijaya state in the period from 8th to 12th century. In the period from 12th to 15th century, the Chinese emperor suddenly ordered a halt to expansion and building of ocean going ships. This sudden halt by the Chinese emperor gave Japanese, Koreans, Persians and Arabs an opportunity. The subsequent period witnessed Arabs and Persians not only resorting to maritime trade in the region but also bringing Islam to the region. In this long-distance trade, the Malaya language emerged as a lingua franca. The trade was dominated by Chinese ceramics, silk and Southeast Asian spices. In the 16th century, the region witnessed an inflow of commercial trading ships from Europe circumventing through Africa, with Europeans establishing trading bases in areas like Macau, Manila, Melaka, Formosa. As the ships used to pass through the region here, the captains of the ships used to steer their ships away from two reefs—namely Paracel and Spratly—which the captains used to perceive as danger zones in the middle of the sea. They did not know about a passageway between the two reefs that existed which, in modern times, is used as a transit route. Thus, at times during that period, the captains of the ships, during hostile weather, would often drop their wrecks containing merchandise on the reefs. Also, there have been some historical instances when the emperors in the region would authorise plunder of the shipwrecks. Today, such plunders are used as arguments to claim sovereignty which itself are dubious as the modern law at the international level requires proof to show exercise of sovereignty and not economic plunder to establish claims.



The pre-modern era saw a continuation of this with important powers such as the British, French, Spanish and Dutch passing through the route in the colonial period. became. During the colonial era, based on the concept of territorial sovereignty, new states were constructed by the European colonisers. During the era of colonial rule, the British established their presence in Singapore, Melaka, Hongkong and north Borneo. As a result, the Dutch began to merge all their possessions into the ‘Netherlands Indes’ while Spain deepened their presence in the Philippines. France colonised Indochina from 1863 onwards. After Japan won the Sino-Japanese war in 1895 and the US won the Spanish-American War of 1898, it led to rise of five mega external powers in the South China Sea.




As Europe began to slip into alliance formations, Japan allied with the British (in 1902) but the power relations amongst Japan and the four other powers got affected when the issue of the settlement post World War-I came up. The period after World War-I saw Japan diplomatically losing power as power relations post-war began to be dominated by the four western nations. Restrictions were imposed upon Japan about the number of ships it could build while also making it give up its Chinese possessions. This ultimately led to the emergence of the Asianist ideology spearheaded by Japan based upon anti-western domination. Japan resorted to consolidating its position by increasing its commerce and domestic production by using resources like guano from islands and the reefs of South China Sea. In the interwar period, Japan occupied Manchuria in 1932 and won a war with China, precipitating a crisis in the South China Sea. This compelled the western powers to consolidate their positions to check the expansionism of Japan.

No power used to pay attention to the islets in the SCS, but all of them did perceive the islets as a source of danger. The British captains began to give British names to these islands. One of such name to an archipelago was ‘Spratly’. The British, who had designated these islands as dangerous grounds, began to undertake surveys. The eastern Spratly was to be avoided for sailing while there commended route to sail was through the Palawan islands. As the oceanographic expeditions began, the surveys found that during some parts of year, the islands were inhabited by nomadic fisherman speaking Hainanese

dialects who primarily lived in Hainan. The British had established a Protectorate in Northern Borneo and had a governor in Labuan, which was an island in the north of Borneo. In the 1870s, same merchants in Northern Borneo sought some concessions from the British Governor in Labuan to use guano on Spratly and Amboyna Cay. In 1877, subsequently, the British asserted a formal claim on Amboyna Cay and Spratly. In modern times, this British claim emerged as one of its kind during this period. In the British colonial office list, the British annually made mention of Spratly and Amboyna Cay as British possessions.

Paracel island was a larger island along Singapore to Hong Kong shipping route to which no European power made claims to. After the decline of the Qing dynasty in China, even China did not make any claims to these islands, including small ones like Pratas. In 1932, even the British decided to give up their claims to Spratly islands and Amboyna cay. However, a renewed interest to claim Paracel and Spratly was generated when Japan began to assert its strength. In 1932, when Japan invaded Manchuria, it generated tremendous insecurity in the western world. Japan had already been exploiting the guano from Paracel and Spratly islands, and it turned out that the Japanese presence was not just commercial but also strategic in its expansion southwards. The fear of Japanese expansionism made France to assert claims on Spratly and Paracel. To forestall any aggression by Japan, in the period from 1930 to 1933 France claimed and occupied the islands. The British did not object to French claims as the British had given up claims to Spratly in 1932. In 1938, when China–Japan war broke out, the French established their permanent presence in the Paracel island to which the Japanese protested while the British did not. In 1939, Japan invaded Taiwan and claimed the entire archipelago of Spratly as Japanese territory. The island was used as a military base to invade Philippines in World War-II and the Japanese also drove out the French from one of the largest islands on spartly—ItuAba (Taiping Island).




From 1942 to 1968, the countries around the South China Sea witnessed change as the colonial rules were now replaced with new independent states which were all divided by Cold War ideologies. After the World War-II ended, the Chinese government of Chiang Kai-Shek sent a naval expedition in 1946 to Paracel and Spratly and established permanent presence on the Aba and Woody Islands. A dotted U-shaped line was established in 1948 by the government in Nanjing in the entire SCS territory. However, its legal status was not clarified by China. In 1946, the French sent expeditions and established a permanent presence on Pattle Island on the western part of Paracel. In 1949, the Chiang Kai-Shek government was chased away from mainland China and it fled to Taiwan. In the 1950s, the Chinese troops from Spratly and Paracel were removed. The French did not make any claims on the islands previously held by Ching Kai-Shek but defended their presence in Pattle island. Vietnam had two regimes—one led by the Ho Chi

Minh, which supported the claims of People's Republic of China and the Bao Dai-led state of Vietnam, supported by the US and Britain, which did not.

In 1951, at the San Francisco Peace Conference, Japan agreed to leave Taiwan and Hainan for China. Japan also decided to abandon claims on the islands in South China Sea but did not clarify to which player the other islands would be ceded. At the conference in San Francisco, there was no representation of China, while France and Vietnam continued to make own claims on islands of Paracel and Spratly. The British and the Americans were of the view that Paracel and Spratly were not strategically or economically important and thus allowed the issue to remain unsettled. Since Japan relinquished any claim to Taiwan, Pescadores, and Paracel and Spratly, the treaty gave the impression that Paracel and Spratly were henceforth a part of China. After the division of Vietnam along the 17th parallel at Geneva conference in 1954, in Philippines, two maritime activists Tomas Cloma and Filemon Cloma began to assert claims on Spratly, stating that Japan had abandoned all claims. The Cloma party proclaimed Freedom land or Kalaya'an by occupying a number of islands. This led to Taiwan counter-claiming Spratly. In 1950, Taiwan reoccupied the Itu Aba island and since 1971, has established a permanent occupation on Itu Aba. This led to PRC claiming Woody Island where it established a permanent presence, while, South Vietnam also protested against the Cloma party and began to claim Spratly. Due to Nikita Khrushchev's rapprochement with US, the Sino-Soviet split occurred in 1969, paving way for Sino-US rapprochement from 1972. In the subsequent period of Sino-US rapprochement, the Chinese government undertook naval expansion to re-emerge as a dominant naval player in the region.

In this period, 1971–72 to 1989, the UNCLOS-3 and the discovery of oil changed the stakes involved in the SCS. As oil surveys were being carried out, there was renewed interest in the world to discuss how far from the shore of a coastal state national jurisdiction of a continent shelf could extend. This also led to the UNCLOS-3 negotiations which began in 1973 and extended to 1983. During UNCLOS-3 negotiations, as the concept of EEZ was being pushed, the South East Asians began to be tempted to claim the Spratly islands. In 1982, the UNCLOS-3 finally accepted the 200 nautical mile limit for EEZ and this was enforced in 1994 after 60 states ratified the instrument of ratification. The period from 1969 to 1972 had already seen an aggressive attempt by states around SCS to push off-shore oil agendas. In 1971, Philippines had declared Kalayan as a part of its territory and had allowed oil firms to explore oil. In 1973, South Vietnam had given the US oil blocks for oil exploration in western region of Spratly. As the US-Vietnam war ended with the Paris Accord in 1973, Vietnam was eventually unified into a Socialist Republic of Vietnam In 1974, in a Vietnam-China conflict, China snatched away Paracel islands from Vietnam. This subsequently unfolded as an outright conflict between two distinct ideologies—namely, communist Vietnam and China. Since the 1974 war, Vietnam began to increase the presence in Spratly. Vietnam had received Soviet support all along. In 1978, when Vietnam invaded Cambodia, it led to the isolation of Vietnam in the region. But even during this period, Vietnam continued to extend oil concessions to oil consortiums in SCS. China often objected to such concessions when they were made within the dotted U-shaped line. After the ratification of UNCLOS-3 in 1982, the only way China could make a claim to the continental shelf in central SCS was to base claims based upon possessions of island of Spratly.

In Spratly, the only two claimants were Brunei and China who occupied no features, thus compelling China to enter the scramble of Spratly. In Russia, when Mikhail Gorbachev assumed power, he decided to scale down Soviet naval deployments abroad. This gave China an opportunity and in 1987, the Chinese sent an expedition in the region. In 1988, there was again a conflict and China established presence in Spratly. Vietnam withdrew from Cambodia in 1989, thereby ending its isolation and paving way for a region power constellation in the post-Cold War period.



As the cold war ended, there was a sense that the US will withdraw from the South East and East Asia as its strategic goals to contain the Soviets had ended. As the debate on a power vacuum left by the US was raging, China became a possible filler. As Chinese economy and military had grown aggressively after its transition during the Cold War, there was a perceived fear of Chinese assertiveness. In 1995, the Chinese had built upon an artificial island on Mischief Reef in Spratly, located very close to the Philippines. As Taiwan was gearing up for its first presidential election, during a military exercise by China in 1996 in the Taiwan Straits, it launched a few missiles. This incident brought the US back into the picture as it sent a US carrier force into Taiwan Strait to signal China that it would not tolerate any interference or restriction on its maritime activity in the SCS.

In 1992, at a meeting of foreign ministers of ASEAN, all nations had agreed upon a joint declaration on SCS with a commonly agreed principle of not using any violence in the dispute settlement. As ASEAN expanded at the end of the Cold War, it brought Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Myanmar and Brunei within its fold. The 10-member ASEAN block had nations which had claims on territories in the SCS. In the first decade since the end of the Cold War, China, however, insisted that it would resolve all disputes in SCS bilaterally with the states. In 1999, ASEAN adopted a draft code of conduct putting an end to more occupation of reefs in the SCS. China again proposed that joint cooperation be the core value in dispute settlement. In 2002, the draft code of conduct was finally adopted as a Declaration of Conduct of Parties as conflicts had flared up repeatedly due to China's assertiveness and territorial claims in the SCS due to the presence of oil and gas region. In the recent past, we have witnessed China asserting itself over the "nine-dash line" to virtually claim the entire South China Sea. Countries in the region and the US have blamed China for aggressively militarising the SCS. China has been resorting to a passive-aggressive strategy to state claims.



After years of undertaking futile negotiations at a bilateral level with China, the Philippines, decided to take the issue to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in January, 2013. China completely opposed it, advocating that the issue needs to be resolved bilaterally.



The reason for the Philippines suddenly dragging China to the PCA was that China had escalated the tension by taking control of the disputed Scarborough Shoal in 2012. Tensions further got aggravated in 2012 when Chinese vessels began to poach marine species at Scarborough Shoal and Chinese surveillance strips prevented the authorities of Philippines to apprehend them. In July, 2016, after three years of intense deliberations on the SCS, the tribunal came out with a 501-page award in favour of Philippines.



However, China has refused to follow the verdict of the PCA. Considering the fact that PCA lacks an enforcement mechanism, nothing on the ground is likely to change, though the verdict is a morale booster for Philippines. The award is, however, likely to heavily affect diplomatic and economic ties between China and Philippines.



India is not a party to the dispute in the South China Sea. However, as it explores soil jointly with Vietnam and also uses the sea lanes of communication for commerce, in the recent times, it has evolved a stand based on the points above.

3
CHAPTER

Issues Related to Indian Foreign Policy

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- India's policy options for Afghanistan
- India's policy options for Iran
- India on North Korea Nuclear Testing
- Newness in India's China Policy
- Relevance of NAM in the 21st Century

INTRODUCTION

This chapter will be used for concluding the debates on Indian Foreign Policy where we shall emphasise upon possible challenges that India's foreign policy is likely to witness in the future. By using an issue-based framework we shall analyse some issues confronting Indian Foreign Policy at large.

ISSUE-1: INDIA'S POLICY OPTIONS FOR AFGHANISTAN—2018, 2019

In the chapter on India–Afghanistan relations, we have discussed how Afghanistan stands as a litmus test for India's quest for regional power. India always had a theoretical policy of extending influence in the neighborhood. However, it was only after it embraced globalisation that India began to use its rising economic power as a tool to fulfill its ambition of emerging as a great power. Afghanistan stands to be a step in India's global quest. The Indo–Afghan relationship chapter has explained the security, economic and strategic components of diplomacy used by India in Afghanistan. For India, a stable Afghanistan is very crucial as it will avert the spread of extremism to Kashmir. More importantly, India feels that Afghanistan also is a land bridge to resources-rich central Asia region. Thus, for India, Afghanistan is not only strategic due to security concerns but also crucial for achieving the economic resurgence of India. A long-term interest of India therefore, is a stable and peaceful Afghanistan. In this regard, the chapter of India–Afghanistan relations has explained the initiatives of India to develop infrastructure, health and education in Afghanistan, India has contributed to develop Afghanistan internally by providing capacity building to Afghans at all levels, from the army to police to healthcare, under the agreement on strategic partnership signed by the two sides in 2011.

In the recent times, India has gradually begun to support the integration of tribal fighters who are willing to abjure violence. In early 2017, India has started sending feelers

to the Afghan government especially after the Afghan government achieved success in negotiating a deal with Hekmatyar. India has declared support to an Afghan led and Afghan owned peace process in the future, as it is quite aware of the possibility of the return of Taliban to Afghanistan. As India has remained committed to soft power play and has supported Afghanistan in its development, there is a rising call by Afghan government to seek military support from India. One reason why India has remained reluctant in providing military hardware (as requested by Afghanistan since 2013) is because it feels that such a support could probably provoke the Taliban and instigate Pakistan to increase hostilities with India. India feels that military support would probably also dent India's image as an aid provider to Afghanistan. Many in Afghanistan, however, have perceived India's lack of support at military level as a myopic decision. As Taliban leadership undergoes a change, any hardliner at the helm of the Taliban will be detrimental to the security interests of India. For India, a key challenge in Afghanistan in future would be China. China has not only enhanced its economic footprint in the region, but has taken a more pro-active interest than India in initiating a dialogue with Taliban. Though Chinese foray into Afghan security is driven by its own fear of a spillover of extremism to its western borders; but it poses a risk to India for the fear of being isolated.




ISSUE-2: INDIA'S POLICY OPTIONS FOR IRAN—2018, 2019

After Iran concluded the nuclear deal with the US, India began to rework its priorities with Iran and immediately revived its plans to work upon energy, infrastructure and investments with Iran. Even though India may now not witness any external pressure on its diplomacy with Iran, regional rivalries could test India's ability to maintain a balance between the Shia, Sunnis and the Jews. Indo-Iran relations prospered during the regime of the Shah but the subsequent Iranian revolution in 1979 and Iranian decision to run its foreign policy based on Islam took India and Iran on divergent paths. The visit of Narasimha Rao in 1993 brought about a resurgence of India-Iran ties. The ties witnessed a downswing due to the Iranian nuclear issue but the Iran-US deal has again opened up a new space for cooperation. The main interest of India in Iran is to develop relations with Iran for energy security and a land bridge to central Asia. India feels developing infrastructure in Iran can help India access the resource rich central Asia. India, as explained in the chapter on India-Iran relations, has initiated the development of the Chabahar port for economic and security reasons. There is an emerging view that India could station its navy in the Chabahar port, which could also be used to keep a check upon the activities in the neighboring Gwadar Port.



ISSUE-3: NUCLEAR TESTS BY NORTH KOREA AND INDIAN POLICY

On 9th September, 2016, North Korea conducted a nuclear test for the 5th time and again defied international pressure. India criticised the test and advised North Korea to refrain from such tests in the future. India also described the tests as a matter of grave concern as such tests affect the stability and peace of the entire region. The statement issued by India on North Korea's nuclear tests expressed serious concern about India's national security due to the proliferation of nuclear technology and missiles around it. Pakistan–North Korea ties go back to the times of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Bhutto visited North Korea in 1976 and Pakistan purchased Long Range Missiles from North Korea and, in reciprocity, decided to help North Korea with nuclear enrichment technology. In January, 2016, during a nuclear test by North Korea, India's MEA observed the proliferation links between India's neighbours and North East Asia. India's MEA asserted that such ties are well known to the USA and South Korea and both have resorted to use UN sanctions as a mechanism to isolate North Korea. Both have repeatedly urged North Korea to give up its nuclear programme but have failed to create the needed deterrents. The main concern of India is that although the international community acknowledges and condemns the nuclear programme of North Korea, it does not acknowledge the network that North Korea and Pakistan have established, which, in future, is likely to emerge as a threat. India is concerned about the ability of North Korea to manufacture plutonium, which is being used to make miniature plutonium bombs. It is also quite likely that Pakistan, which failed to conduct a plutonium test device in 1998, can today develop miniature weapons grade plutonium devices, since it has had help from North Korea. India has condemned all nuclear tests done by North Korea in 2017. India has urged all countries to resort to peaceful resolution of North Korea issue.



ISSUE-4: NEWNESS IN INDIA'S CHINA POLICIES AND OTHER ISSUES

India has now followed a more realistic policy with China. India has started asserting its national interests with a new self-confidence vis-à-vis its more powerful neighbour. This is

also reflected in the way India has embraced Taiwan. China is now willing to cooperate with India in Afghanistan as well. As the ISIS threat looms large over China, it has found cooperation with India and Russia more fruitful in the process. In the backdrop of Chinese refusal to designate Masood Azhar as terrorist and its refusal to allow India's accession to the NSG, India has decided to work upon the insensitivities of China. The invitation of the Dalai Lama to Arunachal Pradesh in 2017 is a testimony. India is leveraging the Dalai Lama as under its new Act East Policy, India is eager to use the tool of Buddhism as a connector. India's relations with the Dalai Lama has been viewed by China as a violation of its core interests.

In the 21st century power transition, China is not exactly attempting to overthrow the USA as a dominant power but wants to establish its credentials as a parallel global power. China is aiming at multipolarity and does not wish to breakdown mechanisms that exist. The Asian infrastructure investment bank (AIIB) of China is an effective example. As the economic benefits were immense, India joined the AIIB. The Maritime Silk Road (MSR) has given Chinese some space in the Indian Ocean. They have increased their economic imprint in the island states through port construction. The Chinese have converted their debts in island states into equities. This has, in turn, raised concerns for India. There are strategic angles attached to the MSR and India needs a coherent strategy to tackle the same. As no clarity exists on structures and rights, responsibilities and stakes in MSR, India has shown reluctance in joining the same. Under the One Belt One Road (OBOR), China is constructing the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC as explained in the chapter of issues related to China). India's official position is that as the CPEC passes through Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK), which is a disputed territory, it is actually passing through illegally obtained land. India asserts that China has not shown any understanding of India's sovereign claims and thereby it will not be part of OBOR. In May 2017, China organised a Belt and Road Initiative Summit (BRIS), where India refused to participate. India has asserted that China has to clarify through a statement that it is not supportive of any Pakistani claims over Kashmir. India feels that OBOR is a national initiative of China to enhance its connectivity all over to ensure that it is able to sustain its low-cost manufacturing programme (which is declining due to rising domestic wages in China) by integrating itself to global value chains. India has to decide carefully whether it should allow its political differences with China to prevent an effective economic interaction or not.

ISSUE-5: RELEVANCE OF NAM IN THE 21ST CENTURY

NAM emerged during cold war to support decolonization and maintain world peace and security the 1955 Bandung Conference became the antecedent to NAM and it led to adoption of Ten Principles of Bandung. In 1961, the First conference summit in Belgrade legitimized the movement.



Hamlet Without the Prince of Denmark

In the 17th NAM Summit in Venezuela in 2016, the Indian PM did not participate and Indian Vice President was sent as the key Indian delegate. The absence of PM in

2016 Summit had a political message to convey. Since 2014, India has embarked upon a transactional diplomacy with a new quest for selective alignments in sync with Indian developmental and security needs. However, it needs to be remembered that NAM, for India, was never completely about alignments but about strategic autonomy. Some scholars have been critical about NAM as they observed that India never received support from NAM members in conflicts 1962 and 1965. These scholars miss the point by failing to appreciate that the NAM was about the unification of the global order and not the addressing of member-specific issues. By relegating NAM as a core ‘heritage’ of the Indian foreign policy, we have failed to appreciate the important role it can play at present. In future, NAM can be used as a platform for intensifying economic cooperation and promotion of a regional constituency of influence. India needs to reclaim the NAM ideology and make it into a more powerful multilateral forum.

4
CHAPTER

Issues Related to Europe

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Russia-China-Pakistan axis
- BREXIT and its implications
- Ukraine crisis and great power rivalry

ISSUE 1: RUSSIA-PAKISTAN RELATION, RUSSIA/CHINA/PAKISTAN AXIS AND RUSSIA IN AFGHANISTAN POST 2014—IMPACT ANALYSIS

Putin has brought back Russia on the international stage. Russia has opposed unilateral USA military interventions in Iraq, Libya and Syria. Russians backed the Assad regime and continues to counter the Islamic State (ISIS). Crimea had been gifted to Ukraine in 1954 but Putin annexed the province back. Russia has become a new partner to China at a time when the west is busy demonising Russia. As far as India is concerned, Russia has always supported India on important and defining issues like Kashmir, terrorism, technology, military equipment and so forth. India and Russia, as explained in the chapter of India–Russia relationship, have established a new partnership in the energy sector. As India is rising on the global scene, it is increasingly partnering with the west. The recent Indo–USA LEMOA is a testimony to the rising Indo–west proximity. The post-Cold War era has seen a shift in India’s armament policy, inducting France, Israel and USA, in a field that had always been dominated by Russia. As France, Israel and USA increase their presence in India’s armament supply, it shrinks in space for Russians. On the other hand, Russia wants to explore new markets for its arms and energy. It is the shrink of Indian space for arms supply that has motivated the Russians to look at Pakistan.

The US–Pakistan relations have not been very smooth lately. Due to a number of strains in the US–Pakistan relations, Pakistan does not want to be dependent solely upon the US in future. Pakistan too has demonstrated an openness to explore a relationship with Russia. The world is witnessing not just a multipolar world, but a huge spectrum of multiple alliance building based upon linkages and dependency. As the US tries to contain China, China has gone on to get the Yuan accepted as a world currency at the IMF to build up a new hegemony of US–China where both continue to dominate the international financial architecture. Russia has been quite cautious and it is carefully exploring whether the Chinese belt and road initiative is actually Chinese foray into the Russian backyard of Central Asia. One of the key motivations of Russia is to keep China in check, which has compelled Russia to balance China by improving relations with Pakistan, which is in the backyard of China.

There is potential re-alignment of power structure witnessed where a Russia–China–Pakistan axis could also emerge. Such an axis could use its combined effort to challenge the unipolarity of the US in global affairs. The Trump Administration is undertaking more assertion of US power in the world and it could meet the China–Russia–Pakistan axis as a potential challenger. The Sino–US rivalry in the Indo–Pacific and recent events in 2016–2017 point out to a rising discomfort between the US and China. Russia not only rejected the verdict of the tribunal on South China Sea but also went ahead with a bilateral naval exercise with China in the disputed region, raising further concerns. The Russia–China axis has been a channel to promote strategic co-operation to resist US hegemony but the inclusion of Pakistan in the matrix of Russia–China makes a compelling case for the commencement of a new Cold War. Russia is not only trying to rebalance the region but is positioning itself through a new diplomatic space to project Russia back on to the centre stage in global affairs. The new geo-strategic goal of Russia is to check USA hegemony.



What feeds the Russian matrix is the entry of Pakistan. Pakistan has been a core ally of the US but the sanctuary of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan and its support to terrorist groups has brought the US and Pakistan on two opposing sides of a continuum. As the number of players of west and their support to Pakistan dwindles, the entry of Russia on the scene opens a new strategic front for Pakistan. The gradually solidifying alliance of India with the USA hurts Russia as it can foresee that its role as the sole defence supplier to India will be compromised by aggressive US suppliers in the future. The signing of LEMOA has also exacerbated Russian fears. In 2016, Russia and Pakistan undertook a military exercise known as Druzhva 2016 or Friendship 2016, between Pakistan army and Russian ground forces, at the special force training centre in Cherat in North Pakistan. It lasted as a drill for two weeks where the two sides worked together on combat preparedness at high altitudes. Despite the fact that Russia and Pakistan have been rivals during the Cold War (the USA used Pakistan to breed Mujahideens against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan), the defence exercise marks a new shift in the ties. In 2014, the arms embargo on Pakistan imposed by Russia was removed and in 2015, Pakistan purchased four MI-35 helicopters from Russia. This should act as a wakeup call for India to not take Russia for granted. The USA–Pakistan relations post-2011, when Osama bin Laden was executed by US forces on Pakistani soil, have been very strained. The US also refused the sale of F-16 jets to Pakistan. This compelled them to purchase military aircrafts from Jordan. Pakistan is also trying to build up a hedge against USA by developing proximity to Russia.

The Russia–Pakistan relationship is also visible in Afghanistan in their support of the Afghan deal with erstwhile terror groups. In Afghanistan, there is a militant group called Hizb-e-Islami (HeI). It is the second largest militant group of Afghanistan. In 2016, there was a 25-page deal that was concluded between the Afghan Government and HeI that granted immunity to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Hekmatyar was an erstwhile warlord, who

was the Afghani Prime Minister in 1990s and has been a recipient of US support in anti-Soviet campaign. After the withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan post the Geneva Accord, Hezb-e-Islamihad unleashed violence in Afghanistan to capture power in Kabul. The intensity of violence unleashed got Hekmatyar the moniker of the ‘Butcher of Kabul’. Hekmatyar later left Afghanistan when the Taliban captured power in 1996. In 2003, the USA designated Hekmatyaras a terrorist. In recent times, as the Hizb-e-Islamitonned down the intensity of violence, the Afghanistan government extended an olive branch and initiated negotiations. This led to the conclusion of deals between Hekmatyar and Afghan government in 2016. The deal is significant as it is a first deal by the Afghan government without any UN mediation. There is a possibility that the deal could have a positive spill over on other groups to initiate rapprochement. The deal does prove that peace with rebel groups is possible. The Taliban and its spokesperson, Zabinullah Mujahid, has refrained from commenting upon the deal. Hizb-e-Islami controls the Shamshatu area in Peshawar where it has camps harbouring 10,000-plus refugees, now returned to Afghanistan. The returning families will get help from the international community.


The return of Hekmatyar will also bring various fractions of Hizb-e-Islami within a peaceful framework. But there are likely challenges ahead as well. The return of Hekmatyar will reinitiate the rivalry between the HezB and Jamat group. If the Shamshatu people return to Afghanistan, it will give Hekmatyar a space for mobilisation to pressurise the Afghan government. The deal does not talk about the fate of Hizb-e-Islami militias and their return of weapons. This may complicate issues as nothing on disarmament is mentioned. Whether Hizb-e-Islami will go through disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) is not very clear.

An emerging view is that the Hizb-e-Islami could pursue a policy of strategic depth in collaboration with Pakistan to keep India out of Afghanistan. It is believed that this could emerge as a possibility as Russia and China had been in favour of such a deal. Russia and China have also initiated a dialogue with other good Taliban. India, on other hand, refrained from any talks with the good Taliban or bad Taliban as it feels that Taliban, as a terrorist organisation, can't have good or bad elements. India's fears have been enhanced after the deal because it knows that Hekmatyar has his roots in Pakistan, which not only created Hekmatyar but also nurtured him. The ISI and Hamid Gul had at one point had called Hekmatyar as a great Pakistani. Indian concerns have been on an all-time high since the deal.

ISSUE 2: BRITAIN'S EXIT (BREXIT) FROM EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS IMPACT ON INDIA AND THE WORLD

After the World War-II, Germany and France began trade with each other following a mechanism that reduced trade duties. Later Germany, France, Belgium, Luxemburg and Netherlands joined the group and began to deal in coal and steel. In 1957, the trade between the above states saw the rise of a comprehensive framework governing the trade. In the same year, the Treaty of Rome was signed, setting up the European Economic Community (EEC) as a common market. Gradually, the EEC kept on expanding and became a union of 28 states. In 1990, a meeting of the European Council was held in Rome which initiated an inter-governmental conference on establishment of a monetary


union. In 1992, the Maastricht treaty on the European Union was concluded, which established the European Union (EU), aiming to ensure the free movement of people, goods, services, and capital within the internal market, enact legislation in justice and home affairs, and maintain common policies on trade, agriculture, fisheries, and regional development. The British had joined the EEC in 1973 and had been a part of the EU since its inception.



On 23rd June, 2016, there was a Brexit referendum where 51.9% of the voters in UK voted in favour of leaving the EU. The procedure to leave EU began from March, 2017 and is to be completed by March, 2019. We can have a look at the impact of Brexit on Indian economy in the short run and in the long run.

The impact of Brexit on the Indian economy on the immediate level will be comparatively less due to a rise in agricultural production in India. The consumer industry demand in India did slow down due to demonetisation but it is picking up due to the ratification of the 7th Pay Commission. The exports to and from India have fallen in UK due to a weak demand in the Euro zone and Britain, since the Eurozone crises. Post-Brexit the possibility of dip in exports may rise as currencies will fluctuate and the real picture will only emerge upon the basis of appreciation of other currencies with the Pound. The process will also create an impact on outbound FDI from India to the UK, which today stands to be at 8% of the total FDI. As India export automobiles, it will affect our exports to the EU and the UK. The deeper impact is to be on IT exports, which constitutes the core of Indian exports to the UK. Other commodities like metals, pharmacy, garments and financial service will also feel the pinch. As the number of EU applications for education to the UK will fall, it will be favourable for Indian students for outbound education seekers. A depreciation of the Pound will lead to short term gain for Indian students as the cost of education will decrease.

One of the big reasons for a 51.9% UK vote to leave EU was the free movement of labour in the UK. The intention to take back control on immigration was a key factor. It may impact immigration but skill gaps in the UK will also persist. Foreign firms would be impacted as, under the erstwhile passport scheme, a financial service firm could use another member EU state to carry out business without any extra cost that were normally associated with foreign entities. This feature will be lost now and it will create an impact. Many firms used to favour UK and over a period of time, London had become a trade hub.



ISSUE 3: THE UKRAINE CRISIS AND THE GREAT POWER RIVALRY

Ukraine has never existed independently and its existence has always vacillated between Europe and Russia. In the 13th and 14th centuries, the centre of gravity in the region shifted to Moscow and since then, Russia has been a force on the global scene. In modern times, Ukraine had an independent existence only for a limited period in the 17th and 18th centuries. In the post-World War-II Europe, Ukraine has the second largest area and below Ukraine was the Crimean peninsula. In the period from 1853 to 1856, the region witnessed the Crimean War, in which the Russian Empire lost to an alliance of the Ottoman Empire, France, Britain and Sardinia. The immediate cause involved the rights of Christian minorities in the Holy Land, which was a part of the Ottoman Empire. The French promoted the rights of Roman Catholics, while Russia promoted those of the Eastern Orthodox Church. The long-term causes involved the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the unwillingness of Britain and France to allow Russia to gain territory and power at Ottoman expense.

From 1917 to 1921, Russia witnessed the Russian revolution, during which Ukraine vacillated and drifted under the control of Austria-Hungary Empire and the Polish empire. Post-1921, Ukraine again came under the control of Russia and remained there for some time. Crimea was controlled by Russia but in 1954, there was transfer of power, annexing Crimea to Ukraine. Russia's Nikita Khrushchev decided to hand over Crimea to be controlled by Ukraine because Crimea was dependent upon Ukraine for all its basic needs. Khrushchev was of the opinion that such a mechanism would be useful for the administration of Crimea and would not create an issue for Russia because Ukraine was under Russian control. This mechanism prevailed till 1991. After the disintegration of Soviet Union, the erstwhile Russian satellite states began to assert independence. Ukraine too asserted independence but was vacillating between having a Pro-Russian or Pro-Euro zone regime. In the period after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, in a referendum in Ukraine, 90% people voted in favour of a separation from Russia. Since then, till 2004, Ukraine has vacillated and remained a state with loose control.

In 2004, Ukraine witnessed elections which Yenukovich won and initiated his rule. The election of Yenukovich was challenged by Yushenko, who launched a protest against Yenukovich called as Orange Revolution. The Orange Revolution led to a re-election in Ukraine which Yushenko won. In 2010, Ukraine had the next election. In the 2010 election, Yushenko lost while Yenukovich won. Yenukovich was a pro-Russian leader.

In 1994, Russia and the NATO entered into an agreement that neither would resort to

expansion in Europe. In 1998, Russia and Crimea entered into an agreement where Crimea agreed to allow Russia to station 25,000 Russian soldiers in Crimea near the Black Sea. This led NATO to initiate expansion and extend NATO memberships to Poland and Hungary. In 2004, NATO expanded by offering memberships to Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia. In 2008, the US initiated the process to bring Ukraine into the fold of NATO. In 2008, Ukraine was led by Yushenko, who was a pro-US leader. As a consequence, the Russians entered into an agreement with Crimea where Crimea offered Russia access to a part of Sevastopol in the Black Sea region. As per the agreement, Russia would maintain a Black Sea fleet in Sevastopol and such Russian presence would remain undisturbed till 2042. As this expansion and counter-expansion by NATO and Russia unfolded, in 2013, the US backed Euro zone offered Ukraine a membership to the European Union (EU).

This offer was made to Yenukovich, a pro-Russia leader, in power since 2010. Russia saw this offer as an indirect attempt by NATO to reach Russia borders. As Yenukovich rejected the deal to allow Ukraine to be a part of European Union, a crisis began to unfold. In the independence square in Kiev, massive protests took place to seek a pro-EU decision for Ukraine. Russia supported the counter-protests and this led to violence in Ukraine leading to the beginning of the Ukraine crisis in November, 2013. As the conflict intensified, in February 2014, Yenukovich fled the country, signalling a victory for the rebels. Witnessing the situation turning in favour of the rebels, Russia, in March 2014, instigated Crimea to undertake a referendum. On 16th March, 2014, Crimea ordered a referendum and 95% people in Crimea voted in favour of Crimea joining Russia. On 19th March, 2014, Russia took over Crimea and used Crimea to assert power in the region.

The 5% people who did not vote in favour of Crimea joining Russia were the Tartars. The Tartars are ethnic Muslims in Crimea who have always been at the receiving end of repression by the Russians. In 1950s, Stalin had crushed the Tartars and even deported them to Bulgaria, Turkey and Romania. Post-Soviet disintegration, the Tartars settled back in Crimea again. Since 19th March, 2014, Crimea is under the Russian control. The US and other western states allege that Russia has illegally annexed Crimea. In October, 2014, when fresh elections happened in Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko won the election. Poroshenko has favoured an equidistance policy and has maintained distance from both Russia and the US. Over a period of time, US too have realised its mistake of stirring up controversy in Russian backyard.

Russia has tried to assert dominance on the entire issue. For Russia, Crimea and Ukraine are very crucial. The Russians get an access to the warm waters of the Black Sea only through Ukraine and Crimea. Russia's northern stream and southern stream pipelines pass through there. These pipelines are lifelines for the European states of Germany, France and others. Russia supplies oil to the European states through these pipelines which pass through the region of Crimea and Ukraine. The violence in Kiev, Luhansk and Minsk, along with other regions, has been under control since a 2015 ceasefire agreed upon between the rebels and others. However, the rebels who were armed by the CIA (which had pumped 5 billion USD in the region) continue to possess arms as there has been no mechanism to take back the arms from the rebels.

The Ukraine issue was a geopolitical conflict for dominance. The west has expanded

through NATO aggressively and is at the doorsteps of Russia. An indirect attempt was made by NATO through the EU to penetrate into Ukraine. Russia lost its patience over NATO expansion and precipitated a crisis. Some scholars have observed that the crisis is only a beginning of a new energy war in Europe since the US is desperately looking for a shale gas market in Europe and wants to end the dominance of Russia in Western Europe. However, an assertive and rising Russia, as visible in Ukraine, Iran and Syria, is a pointer to the fact that the future could see a commencement of a new Cold War. The implications of the Ukrainian crisis on global politics is that Russia has tried to assert multipolarity and has conveyed to the US that it should learn to respect the opinions of others. Though India has not been a direct party to the dispute over the crisis in Ukraine, it has still maintained that it favours Russian assertion of multipolarity. Multipolarity itself is a goal that the Indian foreign policy stands for. India has not condemned the Russian intervention in Crimea like most of the western powers as it believes that there are Russian interests in the region that need to be taken care of by Russia. However, nor has it openly supported the Russian invasion as it stands for conflict resolution through positive dialogue.

5
CHAPTER

Issues Related to USA


After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Trans Pacific partnership
- Pivot to Asia
- Iran nuclear deal and US

ISSUE 1: OBAMA'S TRANS-PACIFIC-PARTNERSHIP AND TRUMP'S POLICY

Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a trade agreement drafted in 2015 aimed to promote US exports to other participating countries, namely, Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. TPP was designed to help the US economy to grow and help the US create jobs. Any USA farmer, entrepreneur or businessman would find it easy to sell his products in participating countries. The TPP has contributed to abolish more than 18000 taxes and barriers, making it easy for US companies to sell abroad. For the US, the TPP was a strategic goal as a strong US economy is at the core of its national interests and its global hegemony. Its national security is largely dependent on its economic performance. Since World War-II, the global trading system has been dominated by the US, which has lent the country tremendous stability in the global order. However, though it has always followed an open and a transparent model of global trade, in the recent times, it has been challenged by some less transparent and open models (for instance, China). Thus, the US felt the need to rewrite its trade rules for US firms to work effectively. The TPP established new rules for trade to help the US economy grow and allow it to maintain its hegemony. The US wants its values to be assimilated by other states, which could only happen if US standards are followed by other states. The USA, under TPP, established rules related to labour laws, environmental standards and so forth. These rules would have to be adhered to by the participating states and once adhered to, would strengthen US ties with its allies and contribute to the rebalancing of Asia.

In the TPP, the US set up very high standards in strategic areas. It advocated for free interest, free flow of information, ensuring strong IPR regimes, strong fair market access and ensuring that public sector firms of participating states don't take undue advantage. Between the US and other participating countries, TPP eliminated import duties on the manufacturing items as also 70% duties on automobiles and 5% duties on US-based IT exports. It also eases out farm exports. The TPP was a grand American plan to increase presence in the backyard of China.



After Donald Trump was elected as US President in January, 2017, he signed a presidential memorandum and withdrew the US from the TPP as a participating state in the same month. Trump believes that the TPP is an unfair agreement that will lead to loss of jobs for American workers and hurt the bottom lines of US firms. He believed that TPP strengthens states like Vietnam, Malaysia and others that have cheap labour there by hurting US workers. Trump has fulfilled his political promise of withdrawing the US from TPP for the benefit of American workers but he now has an uphill task of evolving a new trade policy for the benefit of US workers. In the short run, the withdrawal of the US from TPP is beneficial for US workers. The manufacturing firms in the US would not have to worry about cheap inflow of garments from Vietnam. It is a relief for the farmers as they may not have to worry about agricultural produce flooding the markets from Australia. Trump's withdrawal is in sync with his vision of 'making America great again'.

ISSUE 2: US–IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL OF 2015 AND REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS

In 1953, the US president Eisenhower gave a speech at the UN General Assembly entitled 'Atoms for Peace' (AFP). The US was determined to use atomic technology for peaceful purposes within and amongst developing countries for civilian nuclear programmes. The recipient states were to use the nuclear technology only for civilian and peaceful purposes. The Iranian Nuclear programme (INP) began in 1957 when Mohammad Reza Shah of Iran entered into an agreement to cooperate on civilian use of atomic energy. In 1959, in the University of Tehran, the Iranian Shah established the Tehran Nuclear Research centre and initiated negotiations with the US under AFP for civilian nuclear support. In 1967, the US established a 5 Mega Watt Nuclear reactor with highly enriched uranium fuel to fuel the reactor at the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre (TNRC), which had the capacity to produce 600 grams of plutonium per year in spent fuel. Akbar Etemad was the father of the INP. Under the AFP, Iranian scientists also got an opportunity to get trained in the US. In 1974, Iran created the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran to achieve the target of training manpower for 20 reactors in the next 20 years. Subsequently, in 1975, the Atomic energy organization of Iran and MIT entered into an agreement to train Iranian nuclear scientists.

Things changed after the 1979 Iranian Revolution. When the rule of the Shah came to an end in 1979, the US suspended all nuclear cooperation with Iran. Iran, on the other

hand, continued to receive support from Russia, China and Abdul Qadeer Khan's nuclear arms bazaar. Russians helped Iranians in building a heavy water reactor in Iran which had capabilities to produce weapons grade plutonium. China assisted Iran with two sub critical reactors and electromagnetic isotope separation technology for the Esfahan Nuclear technology centre. Pakistan provided Iran with P-1 and P-2 centrifuges which were used to enrich the uranium. Pakistan also gave Iran technical drawings and advanced design for reactors. Initially, Ayatollah Khomeini reduced the intensity of the INP but the 1980 Iran–Iraq war brought about a rethinking in Iran about its nuclear programme. In 1983, Iran asked the IAEA to provide Iran assistance for technical help in setting up of a plant to provide Uranium Hexafluoride (UF₆) required for enrichment. With assistance for France, Iran had established a home grown facility to develop nuclear fuel at Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre (ENTEC). The IAEA, under Article X1-A of its statute, was obligated to help a member state with such a project. In the same year, a team from the IAEA visited ENTEC to assist Iran with local expertise. Finally, due to US pressure, however, the IAEA did not initiate any support.

The time progressed, the US applied more pressure on the IAEA and other states not to assist Iran. In 1995, then Iranian President Rafsanjani decided to break the ice and began to improve ties. He gave a firm named Conoco a contract on 6th May, 1995, to develop an Iranian offshore oil field in the Persian Gulf but the Clinton administration prevented the firm from going ahead. Clinton continued sanctions against Iran while Rafsanjani signed an agreement with Russia to begin work on completing the incomplete Bushehr plant. From 1976 to 2003, as per the subsidiary arrangements of the safeguards agreement between Iran and the IAEA, Iran had to report any new facility to the IAEA within 180 days along with providing information on any new location or outside facility. Since 1992, the subsidiary arrangement which were part of the safeguard agreement began to change but Iran was not a party to change in the safeguard agreements till 2003. The Iranian opposition party, Mujahideen Khalaq Organisation (MKO), revealed that Iran had established a secret facility at Natanz. As Iran was not a party to the changing safeguard agreements till 2003, by not declaring the Natanz facility within 180 days, it did not violate any legal obligation of the IAEA.

Since 1992, the Board of Governors at the IAEA began to accept the subsidiary Arrangement called modified code 3.1 which required a member state to notify any decision to setup a new facility immediately. In 2003, Iran agreed to abide by the modified code 3.1, but as the US sanctions continued, Iran refused to finally ratify the code. Iran began negotiations with the EU–3, that is, Britain, France and Germany. The talks led to the adoption of Sadabad Declaration between Iran, Britain, France and Germany, whereby Iran decided to suspend all uranium enrichment. This was followed in 2004 with the Paris agreement. Under this, it was agreed that Iran and EU–3 will look for a long term agreement to ensure an INP for peaceful purpose. The Sadabad Declaration and the Paris Agreement failed as Iran could not get a security guarantee for any attack on Iran. Iran said that it got a box of chocolates out of the deals which was empty. Since 2006, Iran resumed enriched at its facility in Natanz. The belligerent policy of the US on Iran gave rise to a hardliner in Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who became the next president. The refusal of Iran to ratify the modified code 3.1 led the US to send the Iranian dossier for sanctions to the UN Security Council.

In 2009, Iran sent a letter to the IAEA declaring that it is constructing a second uranium enrichment facility at Fordo under the mountain. As the Iranian Majlis had not ratified the modified code 3.1, it was not bound to follow. Tensions between the US and Iran continued. In 2006, China, Russia and the US joined the group of EU-3, becoming the P-5+1. Germany was a key trading partner of Iran and its nuclear programme depended upon German products and services. German firms like Siemens, Mercedes, Lurgi, Krupp, and Volkswagen were also heavily operational with Iran. The negotiations of P-5+1 did not yield any results due to the presence of the hardliner Ahmadinejad. In 2012, with the election of Hassan Rouhani, things began to progress further. The first success was achieved in 2013 as per the Geneva Accord, where a Joint Plan of Action was achieved. It was further negotiated upon, leading to a final Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) in June, 2015. The 2013 Geneva deal acknowledged that Iran has to accept that it would not enrich Uranium for a nuclear bomb. The deal accepted the fact that it is a step-by-step solution where actions by Iran in good faith shall gradually lead to a comprehensive solution, and would finally involve an integrated whole, where nothing would be agreed upon until everything would be agreed upon. Under the Geneva agreement, Iran was not to enrich Uranium beyond 5%. Iran would make no advances of activities at facilities in Natanz, Arak and Fordo.

In 2015, under the Lausanne framework joint comprehensive plan of action, Iran has agreed not to enrich uranium beyond 3–6%. It retains the right for a peaceful nuclear programme. Iran would cut centrifuges from 19,000 to 6,104, with 5,060 centrifuges for enrichment. This makes it tough for Iran to make a bomb. Iran would also reduce its stockpile from 10,000 kgs to 300 kgs, ensuring transparency in its peaceful use of nuclear technology. The IAEA will access all nuclear facilities of Iran and there will be gradual lifting of sanctions. Iran has to address the concerns of the IAEA related to possible military dimensions of its nuclear programme and has to redesign the heavy water facility at Arak and transform the Fordo facility into a physics research centre.

The Middle Eastern states had a mixed response to this arrangement. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and the Lebanon's speaker Nabih Berri welcomed the deal, along with the Syrians. Saudi Arabia felt that the Iran deal allowed Iran to maintain a nuclear threshold and that the elimination of sanctions will economically revive Iran. A strong Iran will allow it to assert its hegemony over Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and Syria. Though Israel has criticised the deal, we need to remember that Israel has actually never witnessed any existential threat from Iran. It has, however, faced regional competition post withdrawal of sanctions. For Israel, the real issue, therefore, is not the bomb but the regional balance of power. A nuclear Iran, even for civilian use, threatens the decade-old strategy of allowing Israel to be an unrivalled military power of the Middle East. Israel knows that allowing Iran to have a civilian nuclear facility means that Iran too shall have the flexibility to turn military in nature at a short notice. Such a situation would severely delimit the ability of Israel to be the only player in the Middle East to establish regional hegemony with 200-plus unmonitored nuclear warheads. For Saudi, the revival of the regional GCC to prepare for a long term confrontation with Tehran is the only option. A renewed attempt to strengthen the Saudi–Pakistan axis is already underway. Iran has decided to follow the Chinese model. The idea is to get the sanctions removed and get rich and then use the wealth to establish Iran as a regional hegemony. Israel and Saudi Arabia both fear the

dominance of Iran stretching from Beirut, Damascus to Bagdad and Aden. This fear is disturbing the balance of power in the Middle East post the 2015 Nuclear Deal.

ISSUE 3: THE US'S PIVOT TO ASIA AND ASIAN REBALANCING INITIATIVE

The strategic contours of Asia are being recast by the rise of China and its assertion. As the Obama administration ended US involvement in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it began to shift to the Asia-Pacific region to secure American interests and values. The word used by Obama in this regard was ‘rebalancing,’ signifying readjustments of the US presence from Europe and Middle East to the Asia-Pacific. While the US offered the terminology of ‘rebalancing’ the global media loves to call it the USA’s ‘pivot to Asia’ policy. It was only during George W Bush (II)’s second term that the USA realised a need to deter a rapidly aggressive and hegemonic China from playing a negative role in Asia-Pacific.

When Obama became the President, his national security team prepared a sheet of assets and liabilities for the administration in foreign policy. The US found China to be critical to US on issues of global significance ranging from Afghanistan to North Korea to trade. However, aggressive military modernisation by China raised alarm bells in the strategic community of the US. Obama’s strategy to manage China was simple. He ensured that China would not be viewed as an adversary but a cooperative partner in resolving global crises and issues within the framework of international law, ensuring that China does not resort to the use of force or intimidation. Obama also ensured that China’s rise would not destabilise the existing order of the Asia-Pacific and that China would not act antagonistically to the allies and friends of the US. To manage China through his rebalancing strategy, Obama adopted an adequate mixture of military, economic, political and ideological elements by covering a wide geo-strategic space from Southeast Asia to Asia-Pacific, ensuring a confluence of Asia-Pacific and main allies of the US who feel that China may eventually not only project power as a regional hegemony but may try to lock out the US from the region completely.

As China is economically more empowered than the US, the US has understood that a rising China should not be contained but should be effectively balanced. To achieve this balance, USA has launched its rebalancing initiative. Militarily, under rebalancing, the US intends to deploy 60% of its naval strength in Asia, leaving 40% for other regions. The US, under the Pivot to Asia, has initiated a programme to strengthen its relationship with its key allies, such as Japan, South Korea and Australia. It has decided to augment strategic and military capabilities through strategic partnerships with India, Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam and Malaysia. To put up a viable strategic front in the region, ideas like USA–Japan–India–Australia quadrangles at the strategic level have been floated. An economic component of the Pivot was the TPP, but, the Trump administration has withdrawn the USA from the agreement. The US wants to use the Pivot to counter China at the ideological level, using the values of democracy and human rights.



India knows that nearly 65% of global raw material being in Asia gives enough impetus to the US to look towards Asia to grow its own economy. China feels that, since the end of Cold War, the allies of USA in Asia have economically become more integrated to China through forums like ASEAN. It feels that the US is concerned about its future with the allies and intends to reinforce some sort of unity amongst them, compelling them to rebalance their relationships. China has thus decided to remain more stable and strong in the face of any crisis. The Chinese have responded to US through their Belt and Road Initiative. If the USA, through the Pivot, wants to enter into the Chinese backyard, then China would enter Europe, which has been USA'S strategic sphere, through its Belt and Road initiative. China, however, says that it needs to cautiously watch the USA's military deployments in the region as it is directing its Air Sea Battle (ASB) at China where it may use air power and sea power to attack Chinese strategic land targets. This, China perceives, could lead to a new arms race, as a fallout of the US's rebalancing. China therefore deduces that it should develop both defensive and offensive capabilities.

As the Indo–USA relations are in an upswing, India, through its Act East Policy, has decided to shift from benign neglect of the South East Asian region to an active engagement with it. India has elevated its relationship to special strategic and global partnership level with Japan while trying to add more strategic content in its relationships with Australia, Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia and South Korea. India has favoured a cooperative framework in the Asia-Pacific to ensure a prosperous Asia. India is also willing to take up responsibilities to work closely with the USA to create an inclusive, secure and stable network of interdependence which is participatory in nature for all nations in Asia.

6
CHAPTER

Issues Related to Nuclear Diplomacy

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Nuclearisation of Asia
- Indian concept of disarmament
- Future nuclear strategy of India
- The objective of this chapter is to provide analytical insights into the issues confronting nuclear diplomacy of India and Asia at large.

THE NUCLEAR MATRIX AND THE NUCLEARISATION OF ASIA

Mahatma Gandhi once stated that those nations who have atom bombs are feared even by their friends. In 1998, India, after conducting a nuclear test, declared itself as a nuclear weapon state. Our first priority here is to analyse this contradiction—why did the land of Gandhi, which espoused the ideology of *ahimsa* for centuries, have to acquire nuclear weapons? Before we attempt our analysis, we need to understand that India has not acquired a nuclear weapon for enhancing its status or prestige in the world, which would rather be decided by how we solve our socio-economic problems and develop into a modern society, than by possession of nuclear weapons. In order to achieve our goals of human development, we need an environment that assures us of peace and stability.

The world actually witnessed the threat of nuclear confrontation for the first time during the period of the Cold War, when the world was ideologically divided, and nuclear weapons were used as instruments of political and military diplomacy. During the entire period of the Cold War, starting from 1946 onwards, the world witnessed more than 40 incidents where nuclear threats were exercised. A very detailed examination of the events and incidents (though beyond the purview of our analysis here) clearly prove that in all cases of nuclear threats, the country that exercised the treats played on asymmetry of the other nations. The country on which the nuclear threat was exercised either had no nuclear arsenal or was in an asymmetrical state with low capability to retaliate. For example, US conveyed a number of nuclear threats to China from 1950 to 1964 but when, in 1964, China acquired nuclear capability, the threats vanished.

The responses of the threatened parties were thus appropriately shaped based on the exercise of asymmetry. Out of the 40 plus incidents of nuclear threat, more than 30 were exercised upon Asian states. The threat against India got aggravated post 1960s when China began to acquire a nuclear arsenal, after the two nations fought a border war. The Chinese also clarified that they would continue to retain the nuclear arsenal for an indefinite period and thus, the existential threat to India would continue to emanate in the

future. The nuclear threat to India further increased in 1971 when the US sent the USS Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal to coerce India to follow the US line. Though the threat got mitigated by the Soviet navy tailing the USS Enterprise, it did expose our vulnerability. Thus, the core logic for India to possess nuclear weapons emerged from the changing geo-political and strategic concerns in our regional and global environment.

India's initial nuclear policy was driven by the Chinese factor; and the same factor shall continue to remain dominant in our policy discourse. As the Chinese economy grows in the 21st century and it uses its economic muscle to modernise its military, it will eventually alter the strategic balance of Asia. Though Sino-Indian relations have improved significantly in the post-Cold War period, India needs to be prepared for the future where there is any reversal of the relations back to pre-1962 times. If India continues to follow the spirit of non-alignment where it refrains from joining any military alliance with any state in the future, it will need its own insurance policy based on a principle of self-reliance. As China remains reluctant to give up its own nuclear weapons, the only way to have insurance is for India to have its own nuclear weapons. Since independence, India has pursued a nuclear policy where it has kept the option of a nuclear weapons open. However, India has exercised restraint, which was based upon the Indian civilisation value of following the middle path.

India still favours disarmament despite being a nuclear weapon state, but this is principally based on a global disarmament policy. Only a global nuclear disarmament will serve Indian national security interests. India has made it clear that it cannot be right that some countries have the ability to exercise the nuclear option while others don't. Either all nations in the world should have a right to have a nuclear weapon or all nations should go for complete disarmament. Despite possessing nuclear weapons, India is willing to go for disarmament if the world moves to achieve global disarmament. Since the end of the Cold War, there was a shift from disarmament to non-proliferation.


The non-proliferation order in the post-Cold War period revolves around the NPT. However, the indefinite extension of NPT in the 1995 Review Conference has only heightened Indian concerns. The inclination of nuclear weapon states since the end of the Cold War has been towards tightening the non-proliferation order to ensure that nuclear weapon states continue to maintain their hegemony. Even the CTBT and FMCT, instead of contributing to disarmament, have remained measures that propose and promote non-proliferation. By 1998, as the nuclear non-proliferation order tightened around it, India realised that if it does not exercise the open option to break out of it, then it would have been left with no options at all. Thus, India in 1998, after the nuclear test, broke out of the situation and emerged as a nuclear weapon state, thereby rectifies the asymmetry with nuclear weapons as an insurance against any arm-twisting or nuclear coercion by any power.



Indira Gandhi and 1974 Test

India had established a plutonium reprocessing facility at Trombay that had generated a huge stockpile of plutonium which was weapon grade in nature. The operation of the Purnima reactor designed by the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre had provided

Indian scientists the data needed for designing nuclear explosive devices. The scientists pressed the government to grant permission to conduct a nuclear explosion at the subterranean level for use in civil engineering purposes. The US and the USSR, during the Cold War period, conducted many Peaceful Nuclear Explosions. Indira Gandhi finally approved the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) for Indian scientists in October, 1972. One of the immediate factors that motivated Indira Gandhi to give a go-ahead for the PNE was the Bangladesh war. In the 1971 war, US had sent the nuclear-powered Enterprise Mission into the Bay of Bengal. After the visit of Henry Kissinger to China, he told the Indian Ambassador to Washington, L K Jha, that if there is an Indo-Pak war over East Pakistan and in case the Chinese intervene in the war to support Pakistan, the US would not be able to support India. Both these incidents were perceived by India as outright intimidation. Though no paper records exist for Indira Gandhi's decision to give a green signal for PNE, it is widely believed that this was one of the reasons that influenced her decision. Another reason was the continuous Chinese nuclear testing from 1964 onwards, which was certainly important in the security calculus of India. The core factors that influenced Indian decision-makers to make a decision in favour of the PNE in 1974 are explained in the diagram below.




INDIAN CONCEPT OF DISARMAMENT

India tested the nuclear weapon in 1998 and proclaimed itself to be a nuclear weapon state. Does that mean that India has switched over from its goal of disarmament? In this section, we shall try to assert that even though India has decided to weaponise, it still remains committed to global disarmament including domestic disarmament if there is a global will. Even today a Nuclear Weapons Free World (NWFW) remains a cherished goal for India, which it intends to achieve. However, it is imperative for us here to make an assessment of the Indian conception and initiatives on Nuclear Disarmament.

India has long been a champion of nuclear disarmament. In 1940, even before our independence, Nehru, in a confidential note written at Wardha on 25th August, 1940, had advocated the need of complete disarmament. The initial leadership of modern India articulated its views against a nuclear weapon and favoured nuclear disarmament on both security and moral grounds, arguing that nuclear weapons are against the spirit of humanity. The Indian ideal of NWFW was based upon the requisite of survival of humanity and the human race. India tried to position the issue of a NWFW not just as an international problem but one that affected the very existence of mankind. No nation in the world except India has ever tried to link the concept of disarmament to the survival of the human race. India perceived disarmament not as an end in itself but as a means for ensuring global peace, security, progress and development. India has been an ardent supporter of a time bound framework to achieve disarmament, but unfortunately, on this

point, it has merely received cold support from nuclear weapon states. India is also the only nation in the world that has propounded a link between disarmament and development. India has been a firm believer that if a country undertakes disarmament and reduction in military expenditure, it would help a country to have access to extra resources which it can use for development.




It is important to note that India has used every multilateral forum and opportunity available to pursue its objectives consensually.



In 1948, when the UN Atomic Energy Commission was established, India advocated a complete elimination of nuclear weapons and proposed that atomic energy be only used by nations for peaceful purposes. In 1950, India proposed the establishment of a UN Peace Fund to ensure that countries don't indulge in arms race and use the amount spent on arms race for development through the Peace Fund. After the US tested its first hydrogen bomb in 1954 in Marshall Islands, Nehru, on 2nd April, 1954, in a speech in the Parliament suggested a standstill agreement on all explosions.



Despite India having raised the matter innumerable times at various multilateral fora in the 1950s and 1960s, the measures proposed did not receive much attention and horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation continued. In 1964, India sowed the seeds to a future NPT by placing "Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" on the UN agenda for discussion to adopt an international treaty.



India continuously raised the disarmament issue at the Special Sessions on Disarmament, the Six Nation Five Continent Peace Initiative (with Argentina, Greece,

Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania) and through the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan, but with the absence of political will amongst Nuclear weapon states, the success of disarmament in a time-bound framework remained a distant goal. Thus, after waiting for almost 50 years, India finally responded in 1998 by undertaking the Pokhran-II which became a game changer. Even after Pokhran-II, India clarified that it would support a NWFN if all countries in the world opt for complete disarmament. The failure to achieve global consensus for nuclear disarmament, coupled with deteriorating strategic environment), necessitated Indian acquisition of weapons but India remains committed to the goal of global disarmament and a NWFN.

FUTURE NUCLEAR STRATEGY FOR INDIA

As the thrust to disarmament has shifted towards prevention of proliferation, it is all the more important for India to press for disarmament. India needs to press for disarmament for moral and ethical reasons. India, in the post Pokhran-II period, has advocated that in order to achieve effective non-proliferation, total elimination of nuclear weapons should be aimed for. Since the end of the Cold War, India has become an ardent supporter of a multipolar world. A multipolar world is possible only if it is non-hegemonic, and by extension, non-nuclear. India has stated that possession of nuclear weapons is antithetical to the achievement of a non-hegemonic international order. Since the two states are non-compatible, the only logical step favours complete nuclear disarmament. A more equitable international order is possible only if the nuclear weapons are eliminated. India has tried to link democratisation of the International order as a core principle leading to the evolution of national domestic democracy. India has pitched for complete elimination of nuclear weapons by all states in the world as a pre-requisite for its own national security. India has stated that it will also waive the rights to have its own nuclear arsenal. India's message now is clear—that we should denuclearise in proportion to the denuclearisation of the Nuclear Weapon States.

7
CHAPTER

Issues in Global Politics and International Foreign Policy

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Issues related to war
- Issues related to terrorism
- Issues related to environment

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this chapter is to analyse three key contemporary global concerns, namely, war, terrorism and global environmental issues, in international affairs. The chapter delineates basic concepts and focusses upon analysis of key themes in each issue stated above. This chapter expects the reader to read and internalise the theories of international relations (already discussed previously in the book).

ISSUES RELATED TO WAR

War has been a ubiquitous part of human history as states have tried to exercise influence over other states primarily through threat of force. Even though the phenomenon of war appears to be a part of human history, it is certainly different from other forms of violence. Warfare itself has undergone a tremendous change, from being fought with primitive weaponry to bows and arrows to complex forms of cyber tools today. The Cold War period (the postmodern warfare) has witnessed use of high technology, thereby blurring the distinction between the civilian and military uses of technology. Initially, there used to be wars of plunders where two states would often fight for natural resources or water resources. Today, war is more complex because it involves non-state actors and even terrorist organisations. In war, the conflict is furthered by the use of armed forces that do not resort to sporadic attacks as they are more organised. As per the UN, major conflicts are defined as ones where 1000 or more deaths occur. This definition, however, does not do justice to multiple conflicts faced by the world today. The World Wars—I and II are examples of ‘total war,’ which may be defined as warfare that includes the consideration of any and all civilian-associated resources and infrastructure as legitimate military targets, mobilises all of the resources of society to fight the war, and gives priority to warfare over non-combatant needs. It is understood to be the kind of war that is unrestricted in terms of the weapons used, the territory or combatants involved, or the objectives pursued, especially one in which the laws of war are disregarded.

Every war has an objective. The objective could be to establish hegemonic dominance or demand redrawal of boundaries. Wars are normally triggered due to some

socio-political circumstances. In the earlier sections of the book where we have discussed the World Wars and the Cold War, we have analysed how historical reasons may cause long-term conflicts. According to Kenneth Waltz, war theories have three levels of analysis.




Another explanation of war, as argued by the ancient Greek historian Thucydides, has placed emphasis upon human greed and a lust for power. The focus of the school is to brand war as an outcome of the human instincts to satisfy their infinite desires through the availability of finite resources. Liberals, however, base their explanation of war on inner characteristics posed by political actors of the state. The core emphasis is upon the ‘democratic peace’ thesis which argues that states that are democratic, often do not fight each other but authoritarian states are more inclined towards war due to the complete absence of any form of democratic representative process. In such authoritarian states, the domestic order is maintained through suppression by using instruments of the state (mainly the military) and war is recognised as a legitimate state policy. Realists, on the other hand, look at war as an inevitability since they perceive the international system as an inherently anarchic one by nature. In this context, they argue that the states, irrespective of their constitutional structure, only seek to maximise their power. The only way war could end permanently is through the abolition of this anarchy.


The Marxists have explained war as the consequence of a dynamics interpolated by capitalism. They argue that the capitalist urge to expand in search for zones of profits invariably lead to plunder. The Marxists consider war as an outcome of capitalist economic impulses. However, it is difficult to prove the utility of Marxist theories because countries have accepted that economic interdependence and trade has considerably weakened the urge of states to go to war. The economic expansionism is perceived more as a tool of prosperity than war today. Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz, in his work called *On War* (1832), has explained war as a continuation of politics and a means to compel an opponent to submit to the will of the one who initiated the war.




Though Clausewitz attempted a definition, it has invited multiple criticisms. One of the biggest criticisms is that Clausewitz’s theory is an outdated concept that had no applicability to the wars in the 21st century. The theory has also been criticised on moral grounds for considering war as an inevitable phenomenon as opposed to looking for solutions reached by negotiations based on principles of justice.



The end of the Cold War has affected the concept of warfare. The post-Cold War era is called as the phase of the ‘new’ war or postmodern war. A scholar named Kaldor calls it the post Clausewitzian or post-Westphalian phase of war. Kaldor says that earlier, after the establishment of the Westphalian states, wars were fought to give effect to the ideas that Clausewitz later propounded, that is, to subdue other states to conform to one’s will. However, Gilbert stated that during the Cold War, the tactics used in Vietnam, Palestine, Congo, Liberia and so on, proved that war had been redefined. The end of Cold War again saw a shift to ‘new’ wars as happened in cases of Afghanistan (2001), Iraq (2003) and Chechnya.



A peculiar feature of these ‘new’ wars, or wars in the post-Cold War era, are that 95% of such wars are civil and not inter-state in nature. Factors like democracy and its widespread acceptance, along with a shift in the moral attitude of states about war have been the dominant explanatory factors for the shift. In the post-Cold War era, civil wars have become more common and this has led to emergence of failed states that are unable to maintain domestic order, thereby transforming them into a zone of turmoil. Most of these failed states have tribal rivalry or economic underdevelopment caused by erstwhile colonialism. A scholar named Gray asserts that in postmodern war, even if actual conflicts on the ground are less, the states still prefer to undertake heavy weapons development. The assertion of Gray stands true for states like India under Modi and the US under Donald Trump.






ISSUES RELATED TO TERRORISM

International relations as a field of study has largely ignored the study of terrorism until the 1990s as it was perceived to be a second-order security concern. However, 9/11 changed everything and brought to the fore a new phenomenon of global terrorism, indicating the rise of non-state actors and terrorists as new threats to a stable order in the twenty first century. The subsequently launched global war on terrorism (GWOT) opened up a new chapter in the debate of new security threats of future.

The term terrorism owes its origin to the French Revolution when Robespierre unleashed a reign of terror, killing the so-called enemies of the revolution. However, in the modern times, 9/11 changed the way world perceived terrorism. Post-9/11, scholars asserted that the principal security threat to global peace is terrorism. Jeff Goodwin is of the view that terrorists aim to achieve their objectives by inculcating fear by perpetrating a form of political violence. Goodwin says terrorists strive to create uncertainty and apprehension by using an element of surprise in their acts. Thus, violence unleashed by terrorism is clandestine in nature. Schmidt and Long man are of the opinion that terrorists resort to violent acts to destabilise and inculcate fear in civilians as innocent civilians are their target and mostly their victims.


According to Glenshaw, terrorism as a tool is used by those groups who cannot defeat their opponents in an armed conflict and therefore is a weapon of the weak.



The realists have attempted to define terrorism on the basis of the state/non-state dichotomy. Politics is about the competition between several actors to seek and ultimately seize power. The terrorists, who are non-state actors, resort to violence to seek power. As terrorists cannot challenge the state actors directly through an armed conflict, the realists assert that any attempt by the terrorists to subvert the civil order should be sternly dealt by the state. The realists emphasise that, to protect the political order under threat, the states should even compromise upon the existing conventional morality and political leadership should be prepared to resort to a 'dirty hands' approach to deal with the threat of terrorism. There is a compromise upon civil liberties in the realistic framework of countering terrorism. The liberal school on the other hand focusses less on power seeking and emphasises more upon ideology. The liberals believe that terrorism is an attack upon

democratic and other liberal values of the society. They assert that any counter-terrorism offensive must stick to liberal democratic values and any counter-operation should not violate civil liberties.

At the critical level, the analysis by Noam Chomsky and Richard Falk states that terrorism perpetrated by state actors may be termed wholesale terrorism while by non-state actors may be called retail terrorism. As per their analysis, the terrorism orchestrated by the state as an actor is more coercive as it is meant to maintain economic and political influence over other states in the international system. This view brands the US as the most leading terrorist state in the world.



Tackling terrorism requires a key mixture of multiple initiatives. Three steps strategy to manage terrorism can be helpful.




ISSUES RELATED TO ENVIRONMENT

Environment has emerged as a global issue. Environmental activities or, more precisely, activities that threaten the environment in one state, may make another state vulnerable. The most meaningful way to resolve any environmental concern, therefore, is to raise the issue of usage at the global level. The realities of global environmental negotiations prove that the debate has become ridden with ideological and political underpinnings. As environmental priorities are in conflict with economic priorities, at the global level, there have been major disagreements and issues. The key concern at the global level is to link environment to economic growth which is sustainable in nature. The origin of green politics in modern times owes its origin to the 1960s and 1970s, when an environmental movement was launched in the west to showcase the divide between humankind and nature due to increased growth. In 1962, it was Rachel Carson's book, *Silent Spring* (1962), that highlighted how the use of pesticides affected wildlife. The period also saw a birth of new green NGOs like Green Peace and Friends of the Earth. A new emphasis was laid on highlighting the dangers of the excessive use of fossil fuels.




Initially, the movement emphasised upon the finite nature of resources and the need to conserve the exhaustible resources and wealth of the planet. The focus was primarily on industrialisation-led pollution and fast depletion of resources. The key theme during this period was to initiate an idea of putting some limits on the ongoing growth. As the problems highlighted acquired a global status, it led to the birth of the first UN conference on Human Environment (UNCHE) in 1972 at Stockholm, and ultimately to the birth of the UN environment programme (UNEP).

Towards the end of the Cold War, events like Bhopal Gas tragedy (1984), Chernobyl disaster (1986) and the publication of Brundtland Commission Report (1987) led to a new idea of sustainable development. The countries in the South showed more interest in linking development and environment. The end of Cold War finally saw the adoption of the Kyoto protocol in 1997. The negotiations for the Kyoto protocol clearly exposed the global fault lines in the negotiation process as it highlighted the differences between the collective interests of the international community and individual interests of the state. One school of green politics is known as the Reformist Ecology school and are also called Modernist Ecologists and Humanists.



For them, damage to the environment comes at a social cost. Thus, they advocate sustainable development where the growth is undertaken slowly, and in a manner where biological systems are able to remain diverse and productive indefinitely, thereby offering a balance between the goals of modernisation and sustainability of the planet.

On the other hand, another school known as Radical Ecology School has developed its thesis on anti capitalist plank. For them, commoditisation caused by capitalism is the root cause of environmental distress. They favour decentralised communities to take charge and control and self-manage natural resources. They also emphasise on eco-feminism and brand men as nature's enemy. They believe that the onus to save the environment and maintain ecological balance should be on humans as man is a part of nature.



The school of realism has not paid much attention to environmentalism due to its overt focus on survival. For realists, sustainability was never an issue as the state's priority is to ensure survival in an anarchic situation. The realists have discussed the Darwinian concept of survival of the fittest, while explaining conflict and war. Realists also argue that conflict owes its origin to the tensions generated due to scarcity of resources, thereby affirming that scarcity does play a role in conflict. The realists' anti-nature bias is due to their belief in individualism and human ingenuity. They believe that the needs of human are more important than any moral or philosophical values and, nature is an item of economic value to serve human needs

End of Section Questions

1. Discuss the India's Palestine policy. Do you think India's opening up of its relations with Israel has affected India's Palestine policy? Sketch your argument.
2. Why is the revolution in the Arab States called Arab Spring? What is India's policy on Arab Spring?
3. Is the One Belt, One Road initiative the Chinese Ashwamedha? How is India viewed in Chinese Mythology?
4. What is the significance of South China Sea? Discuss India's Stand on South China Sea dispute?
5. What is the impact of evolving Russia-Pakistan ties on Indo-Russia relationship?
6. Examine the core features of India's concept of disarmament.

Section I

India's Grand Strategy and Concluding Debates in Foreign Policy

[**Chapter 1 Challenges in the Indian Foreign Policy**](#)

[**Chapter 2 India's Grand Strategy**](#)

[**Chapter 3 Foreign and Strategic Policy of India**](#)

[**Chapter 4 Concluding the Indian Foreign Policy**](#)

1
CHAPTER

Challenges in the Indian Foreign Policy

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Introduction
- Section 1: Strategic consequences of India's economic performance on the Foreign Policy of India
- Section 2: Issues related to defence diplomacy of India and national security of India
- Section 3: Oceanic rivalry in the Indo-Pacific and the Samudra Manthan
- Section 4: India's quest for a global power status

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, we present an analytical survey of the multiple challenges that the Indian Foreign Policy is likely to face in the times ahead. The deliberate reason to put this chapter towards the end of the book is to provide the readers with valuable insights on multiple themes argued in the various chapters of the book so far. This chapter is divided into multiple sections for ease of understanding.

- Section 1: Strategic consequences of India's economic performance on the foreign policy of India
- Section 2: Issues related to defence diplomacy and national security of India
- Section 3: Oceanic rivalry in the Indo-Pacific
- Section 4: India's quest for a global power status

SECTION 1: STRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES OF INDIA'S ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF INDIA

Throughout the book, in the different chapters dealing with India's relationship with other countries, we have argued about the dimension of commercial diplomacy. Since the coming of Narendra Modi as the Prime Minister of India, a unique feature that India's foreign policy has witnessed is an aggressive thrust in economic diplomacy. This section primarily delves into the idea of the economic strategy that India intends to apply for its growth, development and security. For India to emerge on the global stage, what matters the most is how its economy functions and thrives. It is in this section that we shall argue how India, through a strong economic performance, can reclaim its rightful place in the world from an emerging to a predominant power. When the Cold War ended, a chaotic

situation ensued in the international system as no one was able to correctly understand or predict where the world was likely to go from there. However, Henry Kissinger, in his work entitled *Diplomacy*, argued that the ‘new world order’ of the 21st century was likely to revolve around six major powers, namely, the USA, Europe, China, Japan, Russia and, in all likelihood, INDIA. Kissinger did predict that India had the potential of emerging as a power. If, indeed, the fledgling nation had the potential, the question was how this potential could become reality. The answer to these questions is how India responds to the four-point challenge it witnesses.



India’s global power status will largely depend upon the nature of its economic growth and development. As we shall argue forcefully in the chapter on concluding debates in the foreign policy of India, mere economic growth is not the sole criteria for greater status, because other factors like India’s civilisational past and its global contribution to religion, philosophy and culture become equally relevant and play a role in its growth. However, economists do argue that for India to emerge as a strategically important power in Asia and the world, it needs to have a sustained growth rate of seven to eight per cent. A growth rate of seven to eight per cent will give India the needed resources that can also ensure the modernisation of the armed forces to meet the challenges the nation may face in order to emerge as a global player.

One of biggest threats India has witnessed on its way to achieve a global power status is from its immediate neighbour, Pakistan, which has held India back on many accounts, including the incurring of unnecessary expenditure on defence and counter-terrorist intelligence. India has clearly understood that it needs to attain an aggressive economic growth rate to tackle Pakistan, which has been spending resources on cross border terrorism. Its nuclear capable army may also be used to hold India back. If Pakistan, as a nation, continue to so indulge in unnecessary expenditure, its resources would drain and a time will come when it would be on the verge of collapse. However, if India, through aggressive economic development, is able to bolster its military capabilities, its strategic fortunes will further rise and thereby compel Pakistan to bolster its own capabilities. It would then become highly likely that, due to lack of resources, the Pakistani economy would no longer be able to support its military, consequently compelling Pakistan to stop cross border terrorism and normalise ties with India.


The Indian establishment had thus far favoured this long-term logic to mitigate the threat of Pakistan, but since 2014, India has been shifting towards a new strategy due to changing ground realities. In recent times, China, Pakistan’s all-weather friend, has decided to assist Pakistan in bolstering its economy through the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). New Delhi has been deeply concerned with the CPEC initiative as it may improve Pakistani economy, which may, in turn prove detrimental to India. India’s R&AW has, over a period of time, made it difficult for Pakistan to realize the dream of the CPEC. With the mention of Baluchistan in the Indian PM’s Independence Day speech in 2015, Pakistan had received the signal that India would make the realisation of the CPEC tougher for Pakistan. Since January 2017, Pakistan has started lending greater support to

India to seek Indian participation in the CPEC for the larger benefit of the region. India has refrained to comment upon such proposals from Pakistan till date; however, it seems that Pakistan has realised that it will not be able to support its economic growth without cooperation from India. As Indian economic performance increases through initiatives like Make in India, Skill India and so forth, the pressure on Pakistan to cooperate with India will also increase.

The second issue for India is the management of China. Both India and China, in the initial period of the Cold War, had similar levels of development. The difference in economic propulsion was laid down between 1980 to 2000. China, in this two-decade period, enhanced its economy and used it to propel its military and eventually emerged as the most major economic and military power of Asia in the 21st century. For India to match up to China, it has to grow economically as also widen its share in world trade. To achieve this, India will have to deepen its economic ties in Eurasia, the Trans-Atlantic and Asia-Pacific. In recent times, India has expressed willingness to be part of the International North-South Transit Corridor (INSTC) to reach the Eurasian landmass. It has established a single seamless whole with Japan, Korea and Australia in Asia-Pacific while bolstering economic and defence ties with France and Germany Europe. India has also concluded a Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) with the US and enhanced its valued strategic partnership.

India's role in Asia and the world at present, to a large extent, depends upon the strategic consequences of the economic competition India will face from China. For India to meet this economic competition, it would have to achieve a growth rate of at least seven per cent per annum and above till 2020. Otherwise, if China continues to grow the way it is growing, it may emerge as the only pre-eminent Asian power, which, in some sense, it already is. To meet the Chinese challenge, there is no need for India to be a part of any anti-China alliance. Instead, what is necessary is to deepen engagement with all nations that world assist India in its economic renewal. In fact, throughout the book we have seen that the core focus of Modi's foreign policy doctrine is to engage with other nation states to help India bolster its economy, which would help India to garner the impetus for the great power capabilities it aspires for. India has already seen a new wave of economic reforms through demonetisation and Goods and Service Tax (GST) that will help India to take advantage of globalisation and enhance Indian strategic capability.

For India to further enhance its strategic capabilities in the future, it needs to strengthen the 'Square of Power' as envisaged by Niall Ferguson.



India has to increase private investment but at the same time enhance public investment in strategic industries (defence and nuclear) to translate economic growth into strategic capability. India will have to manage economic performance more aggressively and address challenges in the Indian Ocean. Thus, we observe a direct relation between

India's strategic capabilities and its economic performance. India has to simultaneously take advantage of globalisation and integrate itself more aggressively with the international political economy. India has resorted to signing Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) too. A strong economic foundation can help India meet the 3-D challenges of Development, Defence and Diplomacy. To meet the 3-D challenge, at the foreign policy level, the Modi government has decided to seek help from the 4th D, that is, the Diaspora. At the level of development, India needs to generate resources to address social backwardness. At the level of defence, India would have to undertake fiscal empowerment to enhance strategic capabilities. Diplomacy has to be geared up to play an increasing commercial role. The ability to use the skills and capital of the diaspora will largely depend upon domestic economic performance.


Thus, here we have clearly articulated the fact that India's influence in the world can be effectively projected if India enhances its economic performance, since a strong economy can help India to develop its strategic capabilities.

Economic Dimension of the Indian Foreign Policy

The aim of this case study is to identify and elaborate the link between India's foreign policy and its economic policy. The link was recognised for the first time by Nehru, who believed that foreign policy is always the outcome of the economic policy of the state. Nehru's idea was that a country having successful economy can shape its foreign policy more independently and effectively because economic policy is an instrument of foreign policy. In the initial periods after independence, when India adopted non-alignment, it was coupled with a mixed economy at home. Through non-alignment, India was able to focus on its national interests of getting resources from the bipolar world for its domestic development. Using non-alignment as a development strategy, India from 1949–1951 was able to secure loans from the US, the USSR and China. The Soviets helped India in setting up its infrastructure for the public sector. India, during fifties and sixties, continued to resort to approaching international players for support for domestic development and there emerged as a significant link of economic development and non-alignment. In 1981, India approached the IMF for support to India under Extended Fund Facility. When USA initially showed reluctance to support India at the IMF, India suggested that in that scenario, it would be compelled to seek support from the USSR. Consequent to this, the US abstained from voting on the issue of India's request of loan from the IMF. India pursued an aggressive inward looking economic policy and a non-aligned foreign policy to approach the USSR or Britain and so on, continuously bargaining its way with more powerful nations. Thus, the policy adopted by India of a mixed economy almost became a corollary to the foreign policy of non-alignment.

However, when the Cold War ended, the NAM as a platform became marginalised. Since then, India has tried to position itself as a major world power, gradually evolving an understanding of the responsibilities that are attached to the status of being a global player. To achieve the status of a great power and fulfil global responsibilities, India has to rejuvenate and enhance its economic profile. Under the

Modi government, initiatives to improve skill sets through Skill India and improve infrastructure are being carried out in an aggressive way. The improvement in domestic manufacturing through Make in India will generate core economic wealth which India can use to execute those responsibilities that are the legacy of its foreign policy. Under the Modi government, India has evolved an aggressive, liberal, outward oriented foreign economic policy, leading to improvement in bilateral trade ties with all nations. If India intends to play the leadership role in South Asia and Indian Ocean, India would have to advocate for more global investment and trade flows.



In recent times, at the diplomatic level, there has also been an inclination to have an ‘economic diplomat’ as the foreign secretary. The government’s choice of selecting Dr Subrahmanyam Jaishankar as the Indian foreign secretary reiterates the same logic.

Economic diplomacy has emerged as a core tool of Indian foreign policy in the last couple of decades. The most visible manifestation of the same in India’s foreign relations has been seen in the recent Modi government’s foreign policy doctrines. The only feature missing in the Indian foreign policy is a coherently articulated doctrine of how to use economic diplomacy for helping India achieve the status of a great power.

SECTION 2: ISSUES RELATED TO DEFENCE DIPLOMACY OF INDIA AND NATIONAL SECURITY OF INDIA

In this section, we attempt an analysis of the national security strategy of India. India, at present, is not only facing conventional military threats but also a large number of non-conventional or non-military threats. The reasons for non-conventional threats range from poor governance to rise of communal conflicts to environmental stresses. All such non-conventional threats arise from either within the nation or outside and contribute to the detriment of the overall development of the country. India’s predominant threat remains conventional threats, ranging from attacks from a hostile state to proxy wars and terrorism. At the internal level, Naxalism and insurgencies continue to break the state.

A new feature of security threats India has started witnessing is that they come at a very short notice and may emanate from unexpected quarters. In April 2015, the civil war in Yemen led to an immediate threat to the Indian diaspora in Yemen, who had to be evacuated post haste. After India became independent, the Ministry of Defence was designated as the main decision-making body. During the Nehruvian era, the defence establishment was brought under the bureaucratic control of civilian bureaucrats. The Vajpayee government established the National Security Council and appointed a National Security Advisor (NSA). Despite institutional structures being available, the problem India faces is the absence of an articulate defence and national security strategy. The political executive has no consensus on what may constitute to be national security threats

for India. Moreover, due to an absence of a coherent policy, the actions taken at the national security level remain ad-hoc. Scholars assert that India should announce its national security strategy for at least a minimum of ten-year period. In order to do this, the first step is to state the national security objectives very clearly. The national security objectives can be defined on the basis of the study of the geopolitical environment externally as also the challenges found internally.

India faces multiple threats externally. India's biggest threat today is from China. We have argued at length in the chapter detailing the relationship between India and China that India still perceives China as an unreliable player. The recent economic rise of China, its assertion in the South China Sea on the sea lanes of communication and repeated incursions into the Indian territory across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) suggest that the possibility of an armed conflict in future cannot be ruled out. Whether such a war with China is going to be a limited or a full-scale war, is a matter of speculation. The rising Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean, which India perceives as its backyard, has opened up a new theatre of conflict.

The other threat remains from Pakistan and its continued sponsorship of cross border terrorism. The deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, which has become a fountainhead of pro-Pakistani extremist fundamentalism, has emerged as new challenge to the stability of Asia. Pakistan's strategy of maintaining strategic depth in the region against India will only lead to more chaos. The rising threats of piracy in the shores of Africa and maritime threats in the Gulf have increased India's problems in the recent time. Pakistan's ISI and Chinese intelligence have spearheaded multiple cyber-attacks on India and the nation has now become more vulnerable at the cyberspace level.

All the above mentioned threats press for the finalisation and enunciation of a national security strategy to ensure a coherent response to the crises situations. An important element to mitigate the above threats lies in intelligence. In 1968, India created a body for external intelligence gathering, called Research and Analysis wing (R&AW). Since its creation, RAW has not only played crucial role in getting intelligence input from our neighbourhood but has also developed capabilities to undertake high profile covert operations. In recent times, the RAW has effectively curtailed online jihad operations of ISIS and its impact on India and has responded adequately and more intensely to Pakistan funded cross-border terrorism. Thanks to the sustained work of RAW, Pakistan today is more vulnerable to collapse than it was during Cold War. Keeping this in mind, India should aggressively strive to establish a national security doctrine. It needs to conceptualise its national interests in concrete terms and work by taking opportunities in the age of uncertainty bred in the modern era. As the world moves to a more polycentric system, India needs to leverage its grand strategy and emerge as global power.

SECTION 3: OCEANIC RIVALRY IN THE INDO–PACIFIC AND THE SAMUDRA MANTHAN

In recent times, there is a new unfolding of oceanic rivalry between India and China at the maritime level. As the two nations turn towards the sea, we are going to witness a clash of the dragon and the elephant. The next few decades of the Asian century will lead to an altered global maritime environment due to the strained relationship between China and India. A study of these two nations' past shall provide valuable insight into the orientation

of both powers towards the sea.

Historically, India's priority was to protect its territorial frontiers from invaders from the north-west. For China, the threat was mostly the west and they built a great wall to stop the tribes pouring into the Chinese territory from that direction. Though both states faced threats from the waters around them, the development of maritime powers was never the priority. In the middle of the 20th century, as both states emerged strong, came the need to appreciate the power of the sea. During much period of the Cold War, both still focussed on economic development and the sea was relegated to a secondary position. At the end of the Cold War, a new interest in the surrounding seas erupted. A wave of globalisation came up, bringing with it rising sea trade. The rising trend in sea trade led both parties to search for mechanisms to protect the sea lanes of communication. The search culminated in an ambitious naval expansion programme individually adopted by both states. Both have articulated the need to acquire blue water naval capabilities in the future.




The urge to emerge as capable naval players can be perceived in China's attempts to assert its presence in South China Sea, while India does the same in the Indian Ocean. In the times ahead, we may witness a triangular dynamic where an assertive China and India would have to be balanced out by the USA. The USA will remain a security provider in the region, even if its presence or significance is diminished or undercut by China. The Indo-Pacific, connected by Bay of Bengal, South China sea and Strait of Malacca, are going to emerge as key competition areas. The twenty first century has seen a renewed conflict between India and China on new factors. Today, both states differ in their impulses to reshape the world and building communities at the regional level in Asia. Domestically, the two states have moved on to resolve border differences and have taken the border negotiation at the highest levels but India has made it clear to China that it would be forced to do exactly the same in Tibet what China would do in Kashmir. This approach has been a potential source of tension between the two.


The resolution of the boundary dispute may not end the rivalry, because the two will compete for influence in states outside like Africa, Latin America, Afghanistan, East Asia and Central Asia. Their policies towards control of peripheral regions will ensure that geography remain a source of irritant in the ties. Both sides have in the recent times evolved an interest in developing active maritime power and this will set a new stage in the rivalry between the two in the times ahead. During most of the Cold War period, both India and China had internal issues to resolve. During this period, they developed

defensive maritime capability as a part of their national security strategy. Another reason as to why the two states could not evolve a maritime vision is because the two followed a deliberate strategy of de-globalisation with little scope for external trade. In the 1970s, during the era of Deng Xiaoping, China began to pursue an integration with global economy. To facilitate the integration, it began to resolve the border disputes, with Shanghai-5 and the later SCO being testimony to this fact. This gave China an opportunity to productively consider a maritime plan. India's naval expansion too gained momentum at the end of Cold War when India embarked upon a programme of developing maritime power.

The Chinese maritime strategy is based on securing the sea lanes of communication to feed the domestic economy with resources and minerals. Indian maritime expansion is based on not only protecting the sea lanes of communication but also checking Chinese presence in its backyard, that is, the Indian Ocean. As both India and China pursue globalisation, the national security concerns too shift from land to the oceans. More the degree of external trade undertaken, the more would be the outward attention to sea power from both sides. India has well understood the link between the globalisation, economic trade and naval capabilities.



As the two sides build up their navies to secure the sea lanes of communication, they have also realised the need to build up military presence along the sea lanes as new symbols of security. Throughout the book, in various chapters, we have argued that how in India's bilateral relations with West Asia, Africa, Latin America and South East and East Asia, the maritime dimension of diplomacy has gained primacy in Mauritius, Seychelles, Oman, Madagascar, Maldives, Mozambique and Vietnam.



For India, the navy in the recent times has emerged not only as an instrument to protect the SLOC but also as a tool of foreign policy. The focus of the Indian Navy is to build diplomatic relations with maritime states to project power and create naval interoperability primarily to maintain tranquillity in the seas. The Indian navy has been undertaking modernisation by focussing on class destroyers, frigates and nuclear powered submarines, with a focus on stealth features and modern cruise missiles on board. These developments have to be seen in the larger context of India's Act East Policy, with a special attention towards maritime diplomacy.


For China, the focus issue is of resolving the Malacca dilemma. In 2003, Hu Jintao, while addressing a party conference, asserted that Chinese access to resources and supplies back home are shipped from Gulf, and Indian Ocean to the Strait of Malacca. China was of the view that an aggression by any player here could cut off vital supply lines for China. Most of the states along the Strait of Malacca are allied with the USA.

These states include India, Vietnam and Singapore and even outlet states like South Korea and Japan. In order to resolve the Malaccan dilemma, the Chinese have undertaken the Chinese Belt and Road initiative, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and the Irrawaddy corridor. The recent Chinese assertion in the South China Sea over territorial disputes is a testimony to the fact that China wants a completely secure SLOC. The recent Chinese attempts of OBOR and CPEC are endeavours to develop pipelines corridors to reduce the impact of the Malacca dilemma. To ensure the safety and security of energy resources, China has also focussed on building forward maritime bases.

India perceives Chinese naval engagement with the states in the Indian Ocean as a threat and as part of the larger design to encircle India with a String of Pearls¹. The Indian response has been Project Mausam and the Spice Route. India feel that Chinese port-pears in Djibouti, Aden, Colombo, Port Victoria, Singapore and Gwadar are military bases for future assertion in the Indian Ocean. China, on the other hand, has maintained that it has not established any military bases in the Indian Ocean and the Chinese port development in Indian Ocean states is to ensure an uninterrupted access to sea lines of communication and such port development is in sync with economic and geopolitical interests of China.

SECTION 4: INDIA'S QUEST FOR A GLOBAL POWER STATUS

It will not be wrong to state here that the Indian foreign policy (IFP), since its inception during the Nehruvian times, strove to achieve the status of a great power. In 1998, when India tested its nuclear weapon, one of the important reasons was to acquire nuclear capabilities, pushing India to the next rung in the global power structure. For great powers, there is always a strong link between its national security and capabilities which enable them to protect their national autonomy through hard power. A major power has to possess autonomy in the realm of military affairs as, through the acquisition of hard power capabilities, they reduce their own vulnerability to military attacks from other states while they develop deterrence capacities.



Even though in recent times India has been a rising power, it remains more poorly integrated than other comparable powers in the international system. Scholars have called India a status-inconsistent nation because there is no congruence between India's ascribed status of what it intends to achieve vis-à-vis its achievements on ground. It is believed that India may not use force as an instrument to alter the power status of the international orders, but it uses diplomatic tools to mount strong resistance to some elements therein. For instance, India has been a vocal critique of the NPT and the CTBT since the time of the creation of these orders.

After India became independent, it envisaged a leadership role based more on the element of soft power than hard power. Indian diplomacy asserted global influence through Non-Alignment Diplomacy and not military capabilities. During the period from

1940s to 1960s, India continued to assert globally on the premise of its civilisational value. Nehru always asserted that India was historically a great civilisation and shall play an important role in global affairs as an independent modern state. The diplomatic value of non-alignment was used to further India's interests during this period. This active role initially played by India was not appreciated by the US. The USA, driven by its Cold War reality and its need to contain Moscow, armed Pakistan and made it a frontline state in its anti-Soviet campaign. This also enabled the USA to indirectly contain India in a limited manner. During this period, India faced the twin challenges of containing regional satellitisation unleashed by the USA as also developing its own industrial and scientific base.

The 1962 Sino-Indian conflict demonstrated to India that without hard power capabilities, the policy of using soft power would remain unrealistic. India decided to shift to being a 'real politic' as removed from its idealistic-normative postures and began an attempt possess hard power capabilities. As India embarked upon military development in the post-1962 period, the international system thwarted its attempts to emerge as a strong military power through various denial regimes. India also began to keep its nuclear option open, especially after the Chinese nuclear test in 1964. As India realised the world wanted to prevent it from exercising the nuclear option, it powerfully defied the international order set by the NPT and the CTBT and went on to test its nuclear weapons in 1998.

Historically, the major power status in international relations was attributed to states which fought the great war and were militarily and economically strong. The settlement post-World War-II bestowed the major power tag upon the USA, the UK, France, Russia and China. Since then, the major powers have tried to maintain status quo and have not permitted the entry of new players into the elite club. In fact, the five major powers have not even evolved a criterion to facilitate the transition. The question then arises as to what power ingredients are needed to emerge as a major power.

Historically, military power was the most vital factor in the assertion of power, where as now, apart from economic and technical capabilities, a state should possess demography, culture, norms and a state capacity driven by a grand strategy. In various chapters of India's bilateral relations, we have seen that India has started asserting demography as a new element in diplomacy. Under the Modi government, we have witnessed steps to enhance India's state capacity through initiatives like Make in India and improvement in the Ease of Doing Business. With testing of Agni-V in 2016 and development of intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities, India is gradually emerging as a credible military power. By undertaking joint defence programmes with Russia and the conclusion of Logistics Supply Agreement with the USA in 2016, India is well in its way to developing strong military capabilities. India remains a top contender to the major power status in the developing part of the world. However, there are international and domestic constraints that India is likely to witness in its future rise.

As noted previously that the major power status to the countries previously has been granted to states victorious in a war. In 1945, after the World War-II concluded, the post-war settlement bestowed the status of major powers to the victorious states of the World War-II. Since then, the system of adding a new state in the major power category has remained frozen.


When the World War-II ended in 1945, India was still a British colony. The post war settlement was carried out under the leadership of the USA. During the settlement, India had negligible presence in the conference at San Francisco. The US was not in favour of India playing a larger role. The British too took no steps to strengthen India's case as a leading state at the security conference. Thus, the US policies at the end of WW-II did not go in favour of India and it was restrained from playing a leadership role in the international order.

However, India did take steps through non-alignment and Afro-Asian solidarity to position itself as a leader and a third force during the initial decades of the Cold War. This brought India into close association with the UN where India began to work to support decolonisation. Despite a rising stature, India never used non-alignment as a cohesive power bloc to alter the scene of global governance. The non-alignment posture coupled with India's preference for the Soviet Union in 1971 made western countries all the more suspicious and hostile to India. India was also constrained due to the formation of the USA-Pakistan and China axis. Despite this, many western countries continued to provide economic aid to India. This was primarily done to ensure that India would not collapse economically. The USA believed that if India collapsed economically, it would ease the road for the communist camp to spread communism to Asia. Thus, the Cold War saw the USA simultaneously working with Pakistan to keep an eye upon India while continuing to provide economic aid to India.

After the 1971 war, the western bloc became all the more assertive to prevent India to play a role in the international order. This clash brought a serious dent on the Indo-US relations. In fact, the reason as to why India and USA could not synergise with each other lay in the disagreement each had on issues related to national security. India tried to portray itself as an independent-minded middle power trying to push itself to the category of a major power. The USA perceived India as an ambitious, unwilling and non-accommodative state in the global system. India's strategy was to resist western domination while the USA wanted to maintain its hegemony. The US, therefore, took steps to deprive India of all sympathy in the western bloc and the United Nation and tried to ensure that India had little strategic relevance for the USSR. Apart from this, another dent in Indo-US relationship was India's rejection of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). India did reject the NPT for the reasons we have already outlined in previous chapters of the book. However, one of the most significant reasons for India's opposition to the NPT was over major power status. India felt that NPT as a treaty strived to give monopoly of nuclear weapons only to a few states (called Nuclear weapon states-NWS). India felt that by preventing the Non Nuclear Weapon states to enter the NWS category, NPT as a treaty restricted India's global ambitions to emerge as a major power. India perceived NPT as a stumbling block to a Great Power status.

China has been another constraint in India's rise as a global power. Apart from the period in the 1950s, China has always tried to contain India. China has strengthened its ties with Pakistan to keep India regionally contained. Since the 1980s, the Chinese policy towards India has been a mixture of engagement and containment. China too has embarked upon a policy that is quite similar to the US. It continues to use Pakistan to regionally contain India. In fact, Pakistan is the sole ally in South Asia that China can use against India. At this level, the China-Pakistan axis is not very different from the USA-

Israel axis. China has provided Pakistan with nuclear and missile technologies and today favours the development of a strong Pakistani economy through the China–Pakistan economic corridor. Thus, China has successfully followed a strategy of keeping India and Pakistan fixated through the distant threat of a nuclear standoff. This gives China an opportunity to treat India and Pakistan as regional powers and not allow India to be treated as a global power at par with China. As China arms Pakistan, it will also ensure the diverting of Indian resources away from China, to balance Pakistan. Apart from Pakistan and China, domestically India has always moved for power. However, India has failed to understand that international power and status comes with tremendous responsibilities at the global level. As we will see in the last chapter of this section, India has now gradually asserted that it is willing to accept responsibilities. This may give a push to India's dream to be a major power in the future.



India as a Net Security Provider

In 2009, US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, while speaking at the Shangri-La dialogue asserted that India should emerge as a Net Security Provider (NSP) in the Indian Ocean. Since the speech, Indian policymakers have started using the term NSP in the Indian foreign policy discourse. NSP means a form of a relationship where two countries enhance their mutual securities by addressing security concerns common to both states. India witnesses common security concerns with many states in the Indian Ocean region ranging from piracy, organised crime, terrorism to natural disasters. In the NSP, there are four core activities- Capacity Building, Military diplomacy, Military assistance and Force deployment. India has been quite active in the first two core activities but has displayed some reticence in the last two. There are some structural challenges that prevent India from emerging a NSP. First is ideological. India has positioned itself as a land of ahimsa and therefore feels that any form of military assistance of any lethal weapons to any state could come into a conflict with its self perceived image as a land of peace. Secondly, India favors less engagement at the military diplomacy level outside the UN flag. India does not favor alliance formations or even acting as a junior partner in defense cooperation at the global level. Thirdly, there is inadequate domestic defense capabilities that hinder India to play a larger role. Fourthly, at the domestic level, there are coordination challenges at the political-military-diplomatic level when it comes to military support. In 2017, India has decided to give 25 Million Pesos aid to Philippines to fight Islamic State in Mindanao Province. This is the first time that India has decided to extend monetary assistance outside to any state to fight terrorism. This signals a rise of India's image as a NSP as it is in sync with the third core activity (Military Assistance) in India's diplomacy.

1. The String of pearls is a geopolitical theory on potential Chinese intentions in the Indian Ocean region, developed by

the US consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton in 2005. It refers to the network of Chinese military and commercial facilities and relationships along its sea lines of communication, which extend from the Chinese mainland to Port Sudan. The sea lines run through several major maritime choke points such as the Strait of Mandeb, the Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Lombok Strait as well as other strategic maritime centers in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, the Maldives, and Somalia. The term as a geopolitical concept was first used in an internal US Department of Defense report, "Energy Futures in Asia." The term has never been used by official Chinese government sources, but it is often used in Indian media.

2
CHAPTER

India's Grand Strategy

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Introduction
- Grand strategy and China and India Relationship
- Grand strategy and The USA and India Relationship
- Grand strategy and Afghanistan and India
- Grand strategy and India and Iran
- Grand strategy and India and Israel
- Grand strategy and Africa and India

INTRODUCTION

The concept of grand strategy has been explained earlier in the book. A grand strategy is an aggregation of the national resources and national capacity of a country. Scholars like George Tanham and K. Subramaniam are of the belief that India does not possess a systematic thought on strategic matters, which is due to the fact that India is averse to the idea of power. Even western scholars like David Malone, for that matter, have expressed impatience over an absence of a grand strategy by India. On the other hand, Indian scholars, namely Sunil Khilnani and Ramachandra Guha, in their works, have vouched for the idea that India does have a grand strategy since independence. Broadly the three core categorisations at the level of strategic thought are the three schools, namely, Nehruvian, Neoliberal and Hyperrealist.


All three schools accept that the base and core of International Relations is ‘anarchy’ (a term often used by Realists) and in the situation of anarchy, it is the responsibility of the state to secure its own well-being. The three paradigms accept that the state has to pursue its national interest and should strive to accumulate power in a system which is primarily competitive. Power, according to all schools, comprises of military and economic capabilities whose optimum mix is vital for the security of the state. However, the Nehruvian school of thought inclines more towards idealism. It favours a scenario where international institutions are tasked with maintaining global harmony. It perceives that any form of expenditure on arms may impoverish a state materially and therefore advocates that peace has to be maintained and war to be avoided at all costs. The Neoliberals, on the other hand, favour interdependence and increased interaction amongst states for collective economic well-being. However, the thrust of the neoliberals is on the importance of economic power over military power. They vouch for a free market paradigm and advocate aggressive promotion of trade and economic interactions. The Hyperrealists, in contrast, believe in threat and counter-threat mechanism over Nehruvian methodology of

communication and free market paradigm of neoliberals. The Hyper realists are of the view that in a state of anarchy, conflict and rivalry of the states can be resolved primarily through threat of violence or use of violence. They differ from Nehruvian and Neoliberal view on defence spending as they argue that in no way does defence spending derogates development strategies. The Hyperrealists favour military power over economic power thereby inverting the neoliberal paradigm.


For the Nehruvian model, war in a situation of anarchy is possible, and yet violence is not inevitable, if states pursue their interests judiciously. This model argues that conflict is generated foremost in the minds of the men and it is this mindset that needs to be eradicated. It argues that the occurrence of war is due to misperceptions between two states as the adversary state probably failed to comprehend the goals and methods of India, for which the Nehruvian school squarely holds the leadership responsible. This school agrees that with increased communications, the misperceptions can be reduced. For that matter, misunderstanding and miscalculation are core factors responsible for war in the world. The neoliberal school also believes that sustaining military confrontation under the era of globalisation is old fashioned.

However, in complete contrast, the Hyperrealist view believes that war is not an aberration but a natural phenomenon in international relations. The Hyperrealists argue that states have to be prepared for war to ensure their survival, which must follow the supreme logic of the balance of power. The Nehruvian school would prefer less force and more of communication for resolution of conflicts. They believe that exertion of force or coercion only harms political relationships and states should only possess force sufficient to defend their territory. The Neoliberals use a different explanation to tackle force. The idea of neoliberal thought is that force is an unsuitable instrument in the present world order, which is based on globalisation and the diminishing of socio-economic distances between states. The greatest source of strength for a state should be its ability to propel economic instruments. Hyperrealists accept force as the core instrument in foreign policy to be used for protecting national interest. We may therefore conclude Nehruvian and Neoliberals are relatively dovish while that of the Hyperrealists are hawkish. Also, Neoliberals are more pragmatic in their policy stance than Hyperrealists.

Since the rise of the new BJP government in power in India since 2014, there has been a new debate on the strategic perspective based on the principles of Hindutva. At this juncture, before we adopt an analysis of case studies, it is pertinent to outline the core feature of the Hindutva ideology. Those who advocate the Hindutva ideology emphasise upon the role and importance of civilizations, believing that human beings live his life in the shadow of larger civilizations and it's the civilizations which leave upon an individual an imprint of culture. The relationships between different civilizations are based on cultural values. The proponents of this school argue that civilizations shape history. They believe that in the world at one point of time, Hindu civilization was at its peak which fell on hard times due to more aggressive Islamic and Christian civilizations. They have a firm belief that a time would come when the Hindu civilization will become the leader of the world and all other civilizations will accept the superiority of the Hindu civilization. The advocates of this school believe that a time will come when India will dominate the world but till then, India, as a defender of the Hindu civilization, will continue to play its role in world politics.



This school also believes that the Islamic state of Pakistan and China are active threats to India. The threats from these states are not only based on values and practices of their society, but from the state machinery of the two states. It is believed that Pakistan is not only an external but also an internal threat to India as Golwalker argues that Pakistan works with Indian Muslims to weaken the Indian state from within. They feel China also works with India communists and other sympathisers to advance Chinese interest on Indian soil. A particular section of scholars in this school believe that the US uses Christian missionaries to convert poor and marginalised Indians to Christianity, which they perceive is a strategy to weaken India. The Hindutva scholars openly advocate the use of force to be used to defend civilizational values. They advocate that India as an independent state should have strong armed forces. As we have seen previously noted in the chapter of India's Nuclear Foreign Policy, the Jan Sangha was a proponent of nuclear weapons for India.



This section of the chapter attempts to analyse the Grand Strategy of India at its periphery through a country specific approach.


GRAND STRATEGY AND CHINA AND INDIA RELATIONSHIP

The aim of this study is to explore that how the strategic community of India views China and what could be the way ahead in future to forge a productive relationship between the nations. The study will explore three dominant prisms and conclude with strategic approaches for future.




The study heavily draws upon the literature already explained in the chapter on India–China relationship and expects that the reader is familiar with the basics of the Sino–Indian relations. Patel and Nehru were the key determinants of Sino–Indian policy in the 1950s. Patel presented a very Realist view of China, as he was quite apprehensive of

Chinese ambitions and perceived that China already exhibited signs of potential enmity towards India. Patel was also concerned about the lack of Indian capabilities to contain China, especially after the invasion of Tibet and forcefully argued that India's North East was highly valuable from a security point of view.



The Nehruvian view of China (as explained in the diagram above) was based on Idealist terms. Nehru had viewed China as a friend and believed that India neither possessed the military capacity to tackle the Tibetan takeover nor should be inclined to antagonise China over Tibet. He, thus, preferred to press for Tibetan autonomy which he considered as a more feasible goal. In a letter written by Nehru to the Indian Ambassador in Nepal, CPN Singh, here marked that China was not a 'real' threat to India as he believed that a military invasion of India would spark a war. However, he agreed that China could resort to gradual infiltration across disputed territory which required improvement in connectivity with far flung areas to prevent Chinese infiltration. In fact, in a letter to Nepalese King Mohan Shamsher Jung Bahadur Rana, Nehru emphasised the need to check the infiltration of ideas, especially communist ideas. Nehru explained that the democratic elements in a state are important to check communism. In contrast to Patel, Nehru believed that a military built up was not desirable as it would be counter-productive and would be perceived by China as a provocation. Thus, the Nehruvian view was to arrive at some kind of understanding with China rather than display any form of outright provocation. The difference noted above between Patel and Nehru's thoughts continues in a similar way even today. C. Raja Mohan has aptly stated that there has never been a consensus view on Sino-India relations in India. In fact, different scholars have also recorded different perceptions by the Indian Strategic Community.



There is also a group of optimists which is of the view that India and China will cooperate with each other in the future. The scholars and adherents to the optimistic school believe that China is no longer revolutionary in its outlook and exists more like a status quo power. They believe that China may not resort to military aggression until such action is completely unavoidable. They hold the idea that China has integrated itself very well into the global system and thus may not resort to any destabilising role as it may be self-defeating for China itself.



Important optimists like Amitabh Mattoo and Idealists and Asia-firsters believe that India and China will both eventually establish a strong partnership with each other. In fact, Surjit Mansingh has gone to the extent of implying that the Indo-China partnership to some extent could be based upon the logic of containing American hegemony. However, on a critical note, Mansingh has labelled the Optimists as apologists for China. The Optimists are not very critical of the past of Sino-Indian engagements. They believe that both the conflicts between the two in 1950s and 1960s were due to the super power rivalry occasioned by the Cold War. They rather see Panchsheel as the most important tool for bilateral interaction.

The Optimists admit that it was a misunderstanding and misperception between the two that led to the 1962 war. At the level of territorial dispute between India and China, there are two schools of optimists. One group is of the firm belief that the boundary talks happening between the two since the time of Rajiv Gandhi have been fruitful because they reflect the seriousness of the two players to resolve the conflict. They agree at times skirmishes on the border do happen but, both sides would firmly maintain tranquillity and peace on the borders. The other group, however, feels that Tibet may remain a destabilising irritant in the bilateral ties. They do believe that China has extended all support they could to Dalai Lama but argue that some western nations have instigated Dalai Lama to continue to protest. The optimists also believe that the Sino-Pakistan relations have been over exaggerated and that China is anyway more sympathetic towards India and does not prefer to support any extremism in Kashmir to prevent a spill over to China.

At a critical level, scholars have raised doubts over Optimists' view on Sino-Pakistan relations on the grounds of the newly announced China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. The Optimists feel that India and China can cooperate in Africa and Central Asia over resources, especially oil. They prefer to believe that the growing military capability of China is not directed against India but against other powers. At the level of multilateral fora, the Optimists believe that Sino-Indian cooperation in WTO can contain any unilateralism by the US and open up opportunities for both China and India to protect their respective autonomy. The Optimists, specially idealists and Asia-firsters believe that the US acts a destabilizing factor in Asia that could compel both China and India into undertaking an arms race.

The Pessimistic school on the other hand has very differing thoughts. The Pessimists believe that China and India will almost certainly witness competition and conflict in future. Their logic is based on the premise that both nations have a divergent self-image due to the varying nature of their political systems, coupled with their aspirations of power in Asia and beyond. Due to these overlapping aspirations, the two are likely to remain competitive, thereby making political rivalry imminent. Amitabh Mattoo is of the view that as the balance of power is presently not in favour of China, it prefers to cooperate, but it won't always remain this way. As China increases its military capabilities, it would use its military might due to the importance of the Chinese strategic culture that favours the use of offensive force. Thus, according to Gurmeet Kanwal, the possibility of a conflict between India and China is imminent. However, the critics of pessimists like Jairam Ramesh and Swamy call them alarmists and China-baiters. The Pessimists argue that their idea is based on a realistic assessment of the ground situation.

Swaran Singh and Kanti Bajpai argue that the China-Pakistan axis is fuelled by anti-India sentiments. Kanti Bajpai also says that China has cooperated with Pakistan to strengthen its missile programme. Pranab Dhal Samantha argues that China's cooperation with India on the issue of terrorism is limited and is clearly explained by the outright refusal of China to support India in sanctioning and blacklisting Masood Azhar, the mastermind of the Pathankot attack in 2016. Ashley Tellis asserts that the Sino-Pakistan axis is here to stay and for China, Pakistan is a strategic insurance policy to counter weigh India. The Chinese CPEC corridor strengthens the agreement of Ashley Tellis. Brahma Chellaney and Gurmeet Kanwal argue that the Chinese strategy of the string of pearls and

the one belt and one road initiative are attempts to undertake a strategic encirclement of India. The Pessimists thus feel that China's engagement in states peripheral to India is an attempt by China to prevent India's rise as a regional and global player.


Bharat Karnad remarks that this confrontation is visible even in Africa where China resorts to predatory actions for the preservation of its own self-interest. Shishir Gupta, while analysing the economic consequences of Sino-India trade, asserts that India exports its raw materials to China which in return dumps finished products into India affecting the Indian Small and Medium Enterprises. Kiran Rijiju and Gurmeet Kanwal are of the view that aggressive Chinese military modernisations and its deliberate improvement of military logistics in Tibet is bound to have severe strategic implications for India. This fear is further aggravated because of Chinese assertion in the Indian Ocean through its enhanced naval capacity. C. Raja Mohan adds that the Chinese presence in Gwadar port has fuelled more suspicion. Gurmeet Kanwal stresses that China, in the cases of border conflicts in Arunachal or Sikkim, may opt for the use of tactical nuclear weapons because Arunachal and Sikkim are not considered to be non-Chinese territories where the no first use policy applies. The Pessimists do argue, however, that Indo-US cooperation has given India a strong leverage against China.

Sidhu and Yuan are of the view that the Research and Analysis Wing, the Indian military and the BJP are composed majorly of Pessimists. According to Hoffman, these Pessimists are ultra realists who advocate the pursuit of power. As far as the interpretation of the past is concerned, the Pessimists argue that Nehru had made an unrealistic assessment of China, leading to appeasement and conciliation. They argue that Patel would have undertaken a much realistic assessment had he lived a little longer. In the interpretation of the past, the Pessimists draw inspiration from Patel. Bharat Karnad, for that matter, even criticises the Indian bureaucracy for their short sightedness on China. Sumit Ganguly says that India's initial Chinese policy was couched in legalese. He advocated that an apt approach for India after independence should have been to build up military capabilities to tackle China.


The Pessimists say that Nehru made a mistake in trusting China and did not pay heed to the warning signs, like China's approach to Tibet in 1950s. Thus, for the Pessimists, the past proves that China cannot and should not be trusted. The Pessimists assert that Chinese aggression happens due to the many weaknesses of the Indian state but whenever India confronts China, it does back down. Brahma Chellaney feels that talks between India and China on the border issues are fruitless. As the talks linger on, it gives China the time to economically and militarily strengthen its position. They argue that China will use military tactics to tilt the border solution in its favour. A deliberate delay in resolving the border issue also serves Pakistan because it continues to keep Indian resources tied up at the China border. Sumit Ganguly clearly says that the only success of the border talks lies in the fact that they have reduced the possibility of an accidental border conflict, but they have not helped in achieving any breakthrough. Gurmeet Kanwal further states that the Indian government has opted for asymmetrical concessions at the border by imposing restrictions on patrolling in border areas which has upset the Indian army which favours lifting of curbs on patrolling in sensitive border areas. China's assertions in Arunachal and Sikkim and its border transgressions are perceived by the Pessimists as an attempt to undertake the Balkanisation of India. Ashley Tellis strengthens the Balkanisation

argument by suggesting that there is an element in China which is sympathetic towards Maoists in India.

The third group is that of the Pragmatists who feel that in the short run, China is not a threat, but in the long run, it is. Subhajit Roy feels that China and India both have ample amount of space to meet their aspirations. Alka Acharya elucidates various factors that make China a pragmatist power.



According to Hoffman, the Pragmatists base their ideas on the moderate Realist prism. The Pragmatists, in their interpretation of the past, develop proximity to both pessimists and optimists. They agree that misperceptions can cause danger (as Optimists suggest) and recommend the need to build strength (as Pessimists argue). The Pragmatists feel that India should try to focus on developing an understanding of the motivations of the decision makers in China and should calibrate its own goals as per its own capabilities. The Pragmatists feel that China would not escalate any tensions at the border level due to larger stakes involved and assert that the claims China makes on Arunachal and Sikkim are to gain an upper edge in the border negotiations. The Pragmatists believe that the Indian support to Dalai Lama and the Tibetan cause can be an expensive element in the relationship (as was visible during the Dalai Lama's visit to India in 2017). Shekhar Gupta, for that matter, favours border negotiations while accepting the fact that the pace of the talks has been relatively slow. The Pragmatists feel that dialogue and diplomacy are, any given day, the most effective tools for solving disputes, including those at the border. Tannu Sharma and Rahul Bedi emphasise, however, that some strength building is also necessary.




A G Noorani asserts that Chinese incursions into Indian territories are probing operations to locate the new depth of defences and therefore should not be perceived as alarming because they are done to test Indian preparedness and are not a sign of war. The Pragmatists view Sino-Pakistan cooperation as something that gives way to Sino-India cooperation. They argue that if Pakistan and China are cooperating, it is so that China may

use the Sino–Pakistan axis to prevent a spillover of extremist tendencies in Xinxiang province, which would be, in turn, beneficial even for India. However, K Subramaniam argues that Sino–Pakistan nuclear cooperation is a serious concern for India. C Raja Mohan feels that India is quite uncomfortable with China’s engagement with the other neighbours of India but asserts that such an engagement is inevitable, as India too, after enacting an aggressive Act East Policy, has deepened engagement in South East and East Asia. Thus, C. Raja Mohan feels that both India and China would try jockeying for access in each other’s backyard and India would try to balance the Chinese influence through values like democracy and Buddhism.

Some Pragmatists feel that if China does not use its special engagement with others to contain India in the near future, then it can open up new avenues for Sino–Indian cooperation. C. Raja Mohan argues that if Beijing does not use the Islamabad card in Central Asia or pit Afghanistan against India, then New Delhi and Beijing can both cooperate with each other in Central Asia and Afghanistan. Constantino Xavier maintains that India does not have the bank balance to mimic China in Africa, Latin America and the Middle East; however, in all these regions, India has developed certain unique connectors which it should continue to exploit. Lilly Weymouth does view Sino–Indian cooperation in the economic sphere as a positive investment but Acharya and Bruce have recognised some limits to such engagement in the economic sphere. Acharya asserts that an unresolved border issue may limit deeper cross border trade while Bruce has identified the Indian government’s restrictions on use of Chinese equipments in security apparatus to confirm the argument of Acharya.

At the multilateral fore, Kanti Bajpai argues that Sino–Indian cooperation will create friction because China would favour a situation where India is excluded from global governance structures so that China may play a dominant role. The attempt by China to block Indian entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group in the Seoul plenary meeting in 2016 strengthens the arguments of Kanti Bajpai. Shyam Saran asserts that a possibility of Sino–US strategic convergence by establishment of forums like G–2 could affect Indian interests.

A scholar named Jervis asserts that difference in perceptions can lead to differences in policy prescriptions. The Optimist, Pessimist and Pragmatist perspectives have led to India advocating multiple strategies towards China. The core determinants of India’s future strategy towards China are mixed in nature. The answer basically lies in interpreting how different factors would impact Indian policies. The case asserts that an Indian grand strategy towards China would be based on multiple factors. How these factors will link together to the whole thing will decide the future of the Sino–Indian relationship.



GRAND STRATEGY AND THE USA AND INDIA RELATIONSHIP

The chapter detailing the relation between India and the US in the book has already highlighted the historiography of their bilateral relations. This study here attempts to analyse India's strategic behaviour with US with a study of the three examples of Korean crises (1950), Iraq War (2003) and Afghanistan. This study assumes that the reader is familiar with the historiography and basics of Indo-US relations. The ultimate aim of the case study is to capture the change in Indo-US relations from the point of view of the Indian strategic elite and its implications on the Indian Grand Strategy.

Example 1: Korean Crisis


The Korean crises began in 1950. It was on 25th June, 1950, when the forces of Northern Korea invaded southern part of Korea. After the end of the World War-II in 1945, an imaginary circle of latitude known as the 38th Parallel was created and recognized as a frontier to divide the Northern and Southern part of Korea. As the North invaded South Korea, the matter reached the UN Security Council. The strategic elite of US perceived India's support to the resolution very crucial. Anita Inder Singh and Robert McMahon have argued that the US state Department believed that the Indian vote at the Security Council signals India as a nation with tremendous potential in Asia. However, on 27th June 1950, there was another resolution and India abstained from voting in the resolution.

G Parthasarthy explains that India abstained in the vote on 27th June 1950 because it never wanted the support of armed forces to South Korea against the North. Nehru, as Parthasarthy argues, believed that such a support would be tantamount to an extension of the Cold War as India believed that Korean crises was an extension of Cold War politics. G Parthasarthy argues that Indian condemnation of North Korea and refusal to contribution of troops on the ground did not go down well with US and the Truman administration. The breaking point between Indo-US relations became fully visible by September, 1950. India believed that a dialogue with People's Republic of China was crucial which was rejected by the world powers. In September, the UN forces would cross over the 38th Parallel to the North. The Chinese Premier Chou En Lai communicated to Indian Ambassador to China, KM Pannikar, that if the UN forces under Douglas MacArthur would cross over to North, then China would come to the rescue of North. Chou En also made it clear that if the UN forces crossed the Yalu River, then the People's Liberation Army of China would have to exercise the military option as China was not a member of the UN and therefore not obligated to honour UN resolutions. India tried to convey the message to the US but to

no anvil. India tried to see this as an opportunity to act as a bridge in the Sino–America relations. On 7th October 1950, the UN General Assembly voted upon a resolution to unify Korea. India voted against the resolution, yet the resolution was passed. As India refused to brand China as an aggressor in the Korean crises, this posited India in a direction diametrically opposed to the majority of the western powers. Vincent Sheen argued that India's vote on 7th October, 1950 was perceived by the Americans as India's greatest crime. Klux and McGhee argue that Nehru was branded as a hypersensitive egoist and a socialist by the US. The Korean crisis cemented Indian strategic elite thinking that the US would not deal with India on an equal footing and the appeal of non-alignment was consequently further strengthened over the logic of dependency upon the US. As the Korean crisis were monopolised by the UN, and India began to develop a distrust of UN system which it began to perceive was monopolised and run by the powers victorious in the World War-II.


Example 2: The Iraq War 2003

The relationship that India had with the US, which was based upon suspicion, as argued in the previous case, continued till 1970s. In 1982, Indira Gandhi made a historic visit to the US, which reignited the spark in the dormant relationship. The new momentum brought about by Indira Gandhi in mid-1980s now continued after India initiated economic reforms in 1990s.



This freshness in the relationship saw its first manifestation in 2003 when President Bush invited India to join the 'Coalition of the Willing' to intervene in the Iraqi operation.

On 20th March, 2003, the US invaded Iraq. India, according to Arunhita Mojumdar, followed a middle path. The idea, as explained by K. Subramanian, was to follow a pragmatic approach by not offending the US and not allowing the Iraq issue to decide the fate of Indo-US relations. Jyothi Malhotra has articulated that India, by its soft approach to US by merely criticising and not condemning the unwarranted US attack, made a departure from the basic tenets of Indian foreign policy.



Gurmeet Kanwal argues that after the fall of Baghdad, the US asked India to send a division of its army to Iraq. Vishal Thapar argues that the VI division under a two-star general was dispatched. In an interview with Rudra Chaudhuri, the US secretary of defence, Donald Rumsfeld, elaborated that the US never pressed any nation to intervene, taking up the issue privately with high ranking officials of states to seek support. V. Sudarshan argues that the US did show an interest in help from India and that an Indian diplomat, during negotiations, agreed that there was considerable pressure from the US to commit Indian troops in Iraq. In May 2003, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) through the Ministry of External Affairs obtained clarification from R. Ahmed (the UN special advisor to Iraq) on troop deployment and so forth. A section of the Indian elite and Indian army displayed an uncomfortable behaviour on being made to report to US military leadership. V. Sudarshan has mentioned that the Indian political elites wished that if India were indeed given a sector in Iraq, then the division would be under the commandship of Indian Army. As the Bush administration sent Peter Rodman, the US assistant secretary of defence, for talks to India, C Raja Mohan favoured the idea of India positioning division sized troops in Iraq, as it would enhance India's military profile in the Middle East and would lay down a strong, new security foundation between the US and India in Indian Ocean. However, since the issue of command was not resolved with the visit of Peter Rodman, India turned down the request for troops in June 2003. What is worth appreciating here is that despite India's refusal to commit forces, the US believed that the fact India initiated such a thought reflected changing ground realities. Claudio, who was, one of the members of Peter Rodman's team, also observed that the thought of committing troops by India was indeed a strategic moment for India and represented a changing India. The entente was extended further with the UPA government when India and the US concluded the 'New Framework for US-India Defence Partnership for the next ten years' in June 2005 and subsequently signed the nuclear deal in 2008. A new chapter in the bilateral ties was opened up which was clearly reflected in the essence of the speech of Obama on his visit to India in 2010.



Example 3: Afghanistan, the US and India

This study examines how India, while maintaining top level policy relations with the US, has, on the ground level in Afghanistan, charted out its own policy. An important element of India's approach in Afghanistan is that it follows an alliance-free approach in international politics. As we have already argued in the chapter of India–Afghanistan relationship, India uses the case of its engagement with Afghanistan to position itself as a rising regional power provider. A unique element is that India was not a welcome party in Afghanistan as a lesser presence of India in Afghanistan allows Pakistan to maintain strategic depth against India. Initially, even Donald Rumsfeld argued that India was a complicating factor for the US in Afghanistan due to its proximity with the Northern Alliance and Hamid Karzai. As the US was, according to David Petraeus and General Stanley McChrystal, to engage with Pakistan very closely for operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan favoured less US dependency upon India in Afghanistan. The situation on the ground, however, was very different. India had charted out its own course in Afghanistan as it enjoyed tremendous goodwill. India did not engage either with the US or International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The ISAF or NATO's approach was to provide support to groups in Afghanistan that would increase stability in the local region. As Afghanistan is a tribal polity with a mixture of Pashtuns, Uzbeks, Tajiks and Hazaras, the ISAF and NATO favoured to provide development funds to groups in exchange for stability. This view of giving contracts (of development and infrastructure) to a group in exchange of stability is a policy well accepted amongst NATO states. India does not resort to any group-specific support but rather supports all groups. This gives India an option to engage with the entire spectrum of the Afghan society. As India deepens its engagement in Afghanistan with all groups in the society, its reach deepens and the US has now come to accept this dynamic. The US has understood that India will continue to follow its own unique strategy independent of the US presence or the ISAF. The US is appreciative of the Indian strategy because it still contributes to regional stability. Over the years US has understood that Afghanistan is a litmus test for India's regional aspirations of power. It does not support Pakistani allegations that India's RAW uses the consulates in Afghanistan for a destabilising Pakistan.

CONCLUSION

These studies of India and the US very clearly demonstrate how the two nations have built up their relationship in the last seven decades. The two examples of Iraq and Afghanistan clearly outline that the two states have not only strengthened their relations in the post-Cold War period but also how India has charted out its independent strategy of cooperation despite the Indo-US nuclear deal. With the recent conclusion of a logistics exchange memorandum of agreement between India and the US, we do witness a new phase of deepening and substantiating of the dialogue process between the two states. The newness in the Indo-US relations is based on the dimension of equality where both look at each other as natural partners rather than following a senior–subordinate foreign policy. Despite the differences that India and the US have had on issues like intervention in Libya, Palestine membership of the UN or climate change, this divergence has only strengthened the relations. The future of the Indo-US relations predictably will include hard-headed negotiations but, it will lead to a definite cooperation on shared values.

GRAND STRATEGY AND AFGHANISTAN AND INDIA

This section will provide an insight into the newfound relationship between India and Afghanistan. In order to put things in a context, we will quickly brush up the historical aspects of the relationship. This will help us to put the Indo–Afghan relationship in a context. India's relation with Afghanistan has seen the use of soft power and aid diplomacy. This approach is used by India not only to assist a war-ravaged Afghanistan but also simultaneously presents India with an opportunity to increase its influence in the region. Afghanistan can act as a land bridge to Central Asia and Eurasia. India feels such bridge can power benefits to the entire region. Thus, Afghanistan has become a new source of geopolitical rivalry between India and Pakistan which Shanthie B. calls the 'new great game'. The aim of this case study is to envisage the 'end game' of this new great game and see if a sustained Indian engagement with Afghanistan can benefit the Indian strategic elite and can help India expand its strategic outreach in Asia.

George Tanham has asserted that due to an absence of a grand strategy in Indian Foreign Policy, India is unable to emerge as a major global player. However, policy researcher Srinath Raghavan argues that an analysis of India's Afghan relations point out to a sustained search for a balance between diplomacy and force. A common policy between India and Afghanistan during the Cold War has been that of non-alignment. In fact, in the 20th century, Afghanistan, especially under king Nadir Shah, had been a proponent of the idea of neutrality. This clicked with the Indian value of non-alignment. As it has been noted in the chapter on India–Afghanistan relations, the bedrock of the Indo–Afghan relations has been the 1950 Treaty of friendship. When Soviet Invaded Afghanistan in 1979, according to JN Dixit, India did have reservations about the Soviet intervention, but resorted to a muted response at the public level. India, according to GS Bhargava, did convey its displeasure to the Soviets at private forums. But a muted public response of India affected India's international credibility.


In fact MK Rasgotra, in his book *A Life on Diplomacy*, even elaborates a conversation between Indira Gandhi and Brezhnev in 1982 where she requested Brezhnev to withdraw forces from Afghanistan and Brezhnev had, in turn, asked Indira Gandhi to show a way out. To this, Indira Gandhi had responded by saying that the way out is the same as the way in. The muted public response of India over Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, according to Surjit Mansingh, also affected goodwill for India amongst the Afghani citizens. But for India, the most important driving factor of its policy on Afghanistan during entire Cold War was that of ensuring peace and a stable Afghanistan. Shelton notes that in the 1985 address to Joint Session of the Congress, Rajiv Gandhi reiterated the need for stability and security in the region. Rajiv Gandhi noted that India cannot be indifferent to developments in Afghanistan, since it had brought Cold War to its doorsteps. The regional situation in Afghanistan deteriorated after the Soviet invasion but India's engagement at levels like sports, education, culture, and so on, remained undiminished. In 1989, Shah Mohammad Dost endorsed the review that India was a crucial stakeholder in region and had an important role to play in helping solve regional problems. Barbara noted that India continued to support Najibullah even after the Geneva Accords. As the Taliban assumed power in 1996 in Afghanistan, Hamid Ansari and C. Christine Fair note that India decided to shut down its embassy in Kabul but continued to engage with the United Islamic Front or Northern Alliance which continued to control

30% population of Afghanistan. India, as noted by John Cherian, became fervently anti-Taliban after the Kandahar hijack of IC-814 Indian Airline aircraft. John Cherian noted that one of the reasons of Indian opposition to Taliban was its support to Pakistan and the terrorism it sponsored against India. Praveen Swami asserts that Pakistan even today favours the presence of the Taliban in Afghanistan as it would give Pakistan an assurance of strategic depth against India.

Shashi Tharoor states that post-9/11 and the subsequent ousting of the Taliban by the US through its invasion of Afghanistan, India resorted to a soft power approach to assist reconstruction of a war-ravaged Afghanistan.

Subhajit Roy notes that India's developmental aid to Afghanistan has generated tremendous goodwill in Afghanistan. The Indian developmental diplomacy in Afghanistan has been unique because it channelises all the money through the Afghan government unlike other foreign donors who create their parallel structures. India's interaction with the Afghan government helps it establish a strong political dialogue. India also follows a very unique capacity building model where it focusses on women groups and tribal organisations, to which India provides special assistance for employment generation. To ensure local participation in the insurgency-prone Pashtun areas of East and South Afghanistan, the Indian strategy is to support small developmental projects. Shanthie D'Souza observes that Indian strategy of adopting community led, community owned and community driven projects in Afghanistan is based on the Gandhian strategy which is today being emulated by the Western powers. The chapter of India–Afghanistan relations notes the development partnership India has established with Afghanistan. Gul Agha Sherazi, the governor of Nangarhar Province of Afghanistan, has deeply appreciated revival of cultural ties between the two states through joint musical performances and football and cricket (for instance, the Subroto Cup for football).





Thus, our analysis of the relationship through a short snapshot has reiterated that India has positioned itself as a major regional and economic player capable of displaying immediate power in India's periphery and has aggressively worked for a revival of Afghanistan to establish a bridge to connect South and Central Asia. Now we shall turn our attention towards the geopolitical rivalry to conclude with the end game of this new rivalry.


Gautam Mukhopadhyaya, Sumit Ganguly and Nicholas Howenstein argue that Pakistan perceives India's cooperation with Afghanistan with a suspicion bordering on paranoia. It believes that a deep Indo-Afghan relation is not allowing Pakistan to maintain a strategic depth against India. Barnett Rubin observes that the Pakistani intelligence and army have always approached Afghanistan with an intention to balance out India. George Friedman further notes that Pakistan favours a weak Afghanistan or an Afghanistan with Pakistani influence, so as to render India's position weak in Afghanistan. General Stanley McChrystal, in a confidential report, had noted that India's contribution to Afghanistan has led to a huge benefit to the Afghani people but the rising Indian influence in Afghanistan was likely to cause regional tensions and that, consequently, Pakistan would be more encouraged to contain India. Jeremy Khan has remarked that it is widely accepted now that the road to peace in Afghanistan runs through Kabul, Islamabad and New Delhi and Pakistan feels that the rising influence of India in Afghanistan is to encircle Pakistan. The Indian strategic establishment however today feels that India & Pakistan and Afghanistan are playing a 'Zero Sum' game. The Pakistani goals to contain India in Afghanistan have only exacerbated Indian fears.



In India, K Subramanyam, Brajesh Mishra, G. Parthasarthy and Gurmeet Kanwal favour a situation where India, to guard its outer periphery or extended neighbourhood, should use its military as a tool of diplomacy. India has been training the Afghan National

Security Force, which is a mix of Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police. India, in the recent times during the visit of Indian PM Modi to Afghanistan, has also provided helicopters to Afghanistan. India has refrained from any proximity to ethnic groups but favours direct engagement with Afghan government. Rajiv Sikri, Tim Sullivan and Rahul Roy Chaudhary argue that India should not be a bystander to the developments in Afghanistan and should try to be meaningfully involved in the security setup of Afghanistan. Senior Indian diplomats do further hold that India signing an agreement on strategic partnership with Afghanistan has enabled India to initiate a more security-centric engagement with Afghanistan.

Ahmed Rashid says that India being overstretched in the Pakistani backyard may fall into the reputation trap. In the Indian Foreign Policy office, certain diplomats continue to assert that India should continue to engage with Pakistan to elicit a responsible behaviour from Pakistan related to Indian engagement in Afghanistan. C Raja Mohan has cautioned that it is for India to deepen its engagement with Afghanistan while assuaging Pakistani fears of encirclement. As the US has initiated troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, the US and other powers have initiated a dialogue with Taliban. As the dialogue with Taliban is under way and as of 2017, the Hekmattyar faction has made peace, India continues to maintain that it would support an inclusive political order which is based on an Afghan led reintegration only. It supports the logic that if any reintegration is undertaken by the government of Afghanistan that it would favour such reintegration. Shukla has observed that India has made it clear to Afghanistan that it would favour reintegration of any faction of Taliban if it abjures violence and agrees to settle down within the framework of the Afghan constitution. But Nirupama Rao, the Indian foreign secretary, has asserted that such an attempt of reintegration will be futile if Pakistan continues to support the strategic assets of the Taliban leadership and positions itself as an interlocutor in power sharing.




Sumit Ganguly observes that though India and the US may have convergence of

interests in Afghanistan, the USA's support to Pakistan shall only exacerbate the irritation between India and Pakistan, thereby fuelling geopolitical rivalry. Brahma Chellaney also clarifies further that unless the US destroys Pakistani sanctuaries of terrorism, it would not win the Afghan War.

The withdrawal of the US troops from Afghanistan has certainly intensified Indian fears. Even K Subramanyam notes that if US troops withdraw completely, it will lead to a triumph of the Jihadis who would feel that they have successfully defeated the US and the Soviets, further emboldening their aim to take upon India. Thus, to prevent something like this, the Indian diplomatic strategy has been to seek international commitment in Afghanistan and establish a strong Afghanistan government as these initiatives will prevent a Taliban takeover and a spillover of extremism to India. Gurmeet Kanwal has advocated for India to use military power in Afghanistan to create the needed deterrence to ground attacks on Indian embassy officials and workers in Afghanistan.

However, Tim Sullivan says that there is a belief that India might lean towards a self-interested coalition of Russia, Iran and Central Asian states to prevent a future Taliban takeover. Harsh Pant asserts that post 2015, the Lausanne framework between US and Iran, and India and Iran have initiated a new phase of consultation with respect to Afghanistan. Indian Foreign Secretaries, from Ranjan Mathai to S. Jaishankar, have favoured the addition of Iran as a key stakeholder in Afghan resettlement. As the situation on the ground remains unclear, there is a dilemma in India about whether it should continue the 'aid only' policy or whether it should favour reintegration. The strategy that India is planning to adopt in the future is a shift to programme delivery from asset creation. India is likely to take up systemic anti-poverty measures in Afghanistan in the future. This would be coupled with support to bridging critical gaps in the socio-political capital of Afghanistan. Such a strategy would help in an enduring long-term presence of India in Afghanistan with strategic partnership as its basis.



GRAND STRATEGY AND INDIA AND IRAN

In the chapter of India and Iran relations we have noted that India and Iran are civilisational partners that have common extra-regional ambitions. In this section, we will


try to analyse the Indo-Iranian relations through the prism of India's grand strategy. India is an energy hungry country. As a fast-growing economy, it is imperative for India to look for sources of energy to ensure energy security. Iran is geographically and materially significant for India. The location of Iran also serves the security interests of India. India's energy demands are rising, but its dependence on coal and oil, along with hydroelectric power, have not been effective in meeting the rising demands. Tanu Madan has observed India has the option of using renewable energy but such technology is unlikely to be used on a mass scale at least in the immediate future. Praful Bidwai has noted that the Indo-US nuclear deal can only help in meeting approximately 8% of the projected needs of energy but MV Ramana remarks that after the Fukushima nuclear disaster such projections may be too optimistic. Also, due to procedural issues related to the Civilian Liability Nuclear Damages Act of India, the nuclear deal with US is still to see its true potential. Thus, in this situation, keeping the climate change politics in mind, the sole winner seems to be natural gas. Gas has been rapidly put to use in various emerging market economies for the purpose of electricity generation. The only concern with gas is its transportation. We have explained the process of importing LPG to India in the chapter on India-Qatar relations. Theoretically, practically and economically, it is better if the gas supplier is closer to the importer. India is fortunate in this regard with respect to Iran, Qatar and the rest of the Persian Gulf. India has successfully entered into a long-term contract for LNG supply from Qatar. In Afghanistan, Iran perceives the presence of Taliban in Afghanistan as detrimental to regional security. As Taliban owes its overall present-day existence to Pakistan, it becomes a new point of cooperation between India and Iran. Due to a strained Iran-Pakistan relationship, it opens up a new vista of cooperation between India and Iran. Selig Harrison has argued that China's CPEC project has exacerbated Indian fears and India would therefore want to forge stronger security ties with Iran to keep a check on Pakistan, China and more importantly on Baluchistan.

A strong Indo-Iran partnership gives India not only a route to reach landlocked Afghanistan but also the larger Central Asia. Sudha Ramchandran notes, a good Indo-Iran relation will help lay down the foundation for strong Indo-Tajikistan relations as Tajikistan is an important Iranian ally. In future, if US-Pakistan or US-China relations sour, it could lead to a China-Pakistan-Iran axis which would be detrimental for India, and a strong Indo-Iran relationship could act as a possible hedge against such an axis.

A recent work on India and Iran relations has noted that India and Iran have an ancient relation spanning over many centuries. The rift between the two states came during the Cold War period when Iran, under the Pahlavi monarchy, tilted towards the US while India promoted the idea of non-alignment. The rift widened when, in the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War, Iran supported Pakistan. However, it has been noted that despite the difference in the ideologies of the two states, Iran never switched off oil exports to India. The 1979, the Iranian Revolution was viewed by India as a positive assertion of Iranian national identity. According to Farah Naaz, India even congratulated the new regime in Iran post-1979 by sending an unofficial delegation to Tehran. This newness in Indo-Iran relationship was cut short as according to Mohammed Reza, the new regime in Iran began to assert its Islamist character very strongly. Farah Naaz observes that this Islamist assertion by Iran was visible in their support to a Kashmiri Islamist bloc known as the Muslim United Front. In 1992, when the then Iranian President Rafsanjani visited

Pakistan, he condemned the Babri Masjid demolition and asserted the need for self-determination for Kashmir. John Calabrese and Arshin have noted that after the decline of Ayatollah Khomeini, the Iranian foreign policy underwent a shift. This shift was visible in 1989 when Rajendra Pachauri and Ali Shams proposed an Iran–India–Pakistan Pipeline. In 1993, during the visit of Narasimha Rao to Tehran, a memorandum of understanding and on the Iran–India–Pakistan pipeline was signed. The biggest surprise for India came as Farah Naaz asserts, when Iran aggressively used its clout in UN Human Rights commission to persuade Pakistan to drop a resolution condemning Indian actions in the valley of Kashmir. The visit of Rao in 1993 was followed by a state visit by Rafsanjani in 1995 to India–Iran ties back on track.


Harsh Pant observes that the visit of Rafsanjani to India led to India signing key agreements with Iran and Russia to deepen trade with Central Asia by creating the International North–South Transportation Corridor. M Atkins notes that coming of Taliban in Afghanistan provided an opportunity to both India and Iran to cooperate in Afghanistan through their support to the Northern Alliance. We have noted in the chapter on India–Iran relations that in 2001 during Vajpayee visit to Tehran, India and Iran entered into a strategic partnership. This opened up a new space of engagement. The Tehran Declaration not only affirmed the ancient civilisational ties but declared the willingness of the two to cooperate while tackling terrorism. The visit of Mohammed Khatami as the chief guest of Republic Day in 2003 led to the conclusion of the Delhi Declaration which explored the possibility of allowing India to use its military bases in the eventuality of an Indo–Pak War.



The most significant shift in the bilateral relations came in 2005 when India and Iran would agree signing an LNG agreement where India agreed to pay USD 3.51 per million British thermal units. The fate of the IPI pipeline got strained when US announced a nuclear deal for India as an indirect censure to Iran over its nuclear programme. C. Raja Mohan notes that the US agreed to help India meet its energy needs through a regular supply of the nuclear technology. The Indo-Iran relations took a severe hit when India supported the IAEA resolution citing Article III B. 4 of IAEA statute for international sanctions and military action on Iran. Siddhartha Varadarajan observed that Indian voting at IAEA was in contradiction to the Indian position that held that the Iranian nuclear issue would be resolved only through negotiations and not through punitive action. However, the Indian establishment clarified that its vote at the IAEA did not change the Indian policy as the vote did not refer the Iranian nuclear issue to the UN Security Council and asserted that the resolution has only agreed to solve all issues at the level of IAEA. After the Indian vote, Iran stated that it would reconsider its ties with India and hike the price of the LNG supply. In 2006, Iran stated that the 2005 LNG agreement has been invalidated due to differences over LNG pricing. India strongly objected to the unilateral abrogation of the deal by Iran but refrained from taking up any legal actions. There was certainly a very strong circumstantial link between India's vote at IAEA and the Iranian actions on the LNG deal.


The relationship deteriorated further in 2008 when India launched an Israeli spy satellite which was to spy over Iran. The relationship fell apart further when, after the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, Iran stated that it had been staged by the US and Israel secretly. India voted in 2009 for the third time against Iran at IAEA. Harsh Pant observes that it was in 2010 during Manmohan Singh's visit to Saudi Arabia that India, in the Riyadh declaration, made an unprecedented move of using the Saudi soil to encourage Iran to remove ambiguities about its nuclear programme.

If it was due to the US that the two nations drifted apart, then it was also US withdrawal from Afghanistan that again brought India and Iran closer to each other to maintain regional security. Anew bonhomie in the relationship erupted when in 2010 India denounced unilateral UN sanctions against Iran sponsored by the West and the European Union. The US did try to link India's nuclear deal with itself to how India would side with the US in its vote against Iran. However, K. Subramaniam, through his material structural framework analysis, suggested that India has gained more from a strategic alliance with US than any loss it may have suffered due to its voting at IAEA against Iran.



The Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran has observed that India's exercise of policy choices (read as Indian vote at IAEA against Iran) have had an impact on

accelerating India-US relations and have contributed to more depth in the relations. Since the end of the Cold War, as India positioned itself to exude a liberal democratic identity, it saw the nuclear deal offered by the US to India as a step to rise on a global platform, thereby pushing the relation with Iran to the periphery if it hampered the rise of India. India thought that it could create a distance from Iran for the time being as Indo-Iran ties were secondary as compared to India's ties with Gulf cooperation council states. But with the signing of the USA-Iran nuclear deal in 2015 (Lausanne Framework), India has now made an attempt to reconfigure its ties with Iran. As the Iranian nuclear programme now comes under the ambit of the IAEA safeguards, a stable and integrated Iran is viewed by India as positive alliance that is in its national interest. India owed US 8.8 billion dollars to Iran for the oil it supplied to India. India was unable to pay to Iran for the oil dues due to sanctions. As, since 2015, there has been a downward trend in oil prices, India has decided to increase oil and gas trade with Iran. During Indian PM's Visit to Iran, India has affirmed its commitment to assist Iran in port and railway construction. The US-Iran deal is in favour of India's grand strategy as it permits India to reach Afghanistan and Central Asia through Iran. The commitment to develop the International North-South Transit Corridor will allow India to have access to the abundant energy deposits of Central Asia.




GRAND STRATEGY AND INDIA AND ISRAEL

The chapter on India and Israel relations in the book has already explained various aspects of India-Israel relations. India, in 1950, did recognise Israel without advancing diplomatic ties the fact that Israel and India had no direct conflict of interests with each other. However, as noted in the same chapter, we have argued that in 1992, India took the pragmatic decision to bring about a shift in its relations with Israel through the prism of self-interest. This section will build upon the chapter detailing India-Israel relations to use

the grand strategy framework to assess the relationship.

Kanti Bajpai has observed several times that since India's independence, competing visions on Indian strategic thinking have emerged, none of which have ever dominated the decision-making apparatus of India. C. Raja Mohan, on his part, has noted that the Indian Foreign Policy has certainly witnessed a shift to pragmatism since the end of the Cold War.




The framework of C. Raja Mohan has been used by Richard Kozicki to explain India's Israel policy. Kozicki states that India rejected Zionism as it perceived it to be a form of colonialism. This rejection of Zionism had a deep imprint upon India's initial neglect of Israel in 1948. Sreeram Chaulia observes that it was in the light of its later pragmatism that India was motivated to tilt towards Israel when it had the opportunity to completely revisit the West Asia Policy in 1992. Nicholas Blarel has similarly observed that international, regional, domestic and structural factors at the end of the Cold War had necessitated that India to take another look at its Israel policy. Kanti Bajpai asserts that when India became independent & was faced with a bipolar world, Nehru's nonalignment was India's one of the important strategic priorities. In fact Nehru prioritized economic development after independence and stated that it was development which was an important strategic goal for India as an economically powerful India would be later recognized as a great commercial power by the other global great powers. Kanti Bajpai asserts that even today India's foreign policy has a commercial component where even today it strives to garner global support for India's economic initiatives like Make in India & Smart Cities Project. No doubt, as far as Israel is concerned, it doesn't directly fit into Alastair Johnston's central strategic paradigm for India, but an analytical framework for grand strategy is not just concerned about strategic ends. A grand strategy also looks at instruments to operationalise strategic options and it is with respect to this second part of grand strategy that India's Israel policy fits the case. To ensure the achievement of its main strategic goals, India has included Israel in its grand strategy, which will assist India to cope up with certain threats and vulnerabilities.

India maintained ties with West Asia prior to its independence. In the chapter of India-Israel relations, we have analysed in detail not only the historical aspects but also the support and policy of Indian National Congress to the Khilafat question. Rajendra Abhyankar observes that the INC wanted to use the Khilafat issue to forge a unity between Hindu and Muslims during the National Movement. Though Congress did show its first sign in the Khilafat issue to compromise its secular character to support a religious issue, but with the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, the entire issue became irrelevant. Najma Heptulla notes that Nehru used the policy of linking Indian and Arab

struggles against British as well as the British support to Zionists as a resistance against the British divide and rule strategy. Indian nationalists rejected the idea of a national home for Jews as India favoured a federal united single Palestine at the UN special commission on Palestine(UNSCOP) and rejected the idea of partitioning Palestine. However, India's support for a federal Palestine was lost to the General Assembly's vote in favour of a partition in November 1947.


PR Kumaraswamy notes that India, initially in 1948, refused to recognise the existence of Israel but after weighing all options, it recognised the nation state on 17th September, 1950. G. Parthasarthy asserts that India had to recognise Israel as it was already recognised by a large number of countries (including Turkey and Iran) but resorted to not establishing diplomatic relations, thereby adopting a limited relationship policy. Sumit Ganguly and Michael Blarel argue that India deliberately delayed the decision of recognising Israel (till 1950) so that it becomes a less decisive international issue. India basically wanted to wait for the first Arab–Israel war to end. Another important dimension that India had in mind was to garner support of the 13 Arab votes in UN on the Kashmir issue in contrast to one vote of Israel. Even as the constituent assembly debated, Nehru did agree that an important factor in delaying recognition of Israel was India's friendship with Arabs. Noor Ahmad Baba notes that as Pakistan failed in exploiting pan-Islamism in the Kashmir issue, it eventually opened up the possibility for India to recognise Israel. As India needed financial aid from the US, it would have become difficult for India not to recognise Israel or adopt a policy of deliberate delay. Thus, India recognised the existence of Israel without advancing diplomatic recognition. This policy of India of keeping diplomatic options open synchronises with India's strategic behaviour of an independent foreign policy.



R. Sreekant Nair assets that India's balance of factors policy helped in keeping all options open. As the regional situation in 1950s improved, India allowed Israel to open a consulate in Bombay in 1952. Michael Blarel notes that as the regional situation deteriorated after the 1956 Suez crises, India ruled out normalisation of diplomatic relations. Arthur R. argues that India did support Arabs against Israel in 1956, 1967 and 1973 but the Arabs never reciprocated their support to India in 1962, 1965 and 1971. However, as 80% of Indian Oil came from the Gulf, Indira Gandhi enhanced economic ties with Arabs. Gulshan notes that India began to provide engineers and technical manpower to Arab states but could never get support of Arabs for security and strategic issues.

The reassessment of India's Israel policy was occasioned by events during the Cold War. BK Srivastava notes that failure of Arabs to support India in 1962, 1965 and 1971 created a ripple in the Indian political establishment where Jan Sangha favoured the idea of establishing Indo–Israel ties. Rubinoff has suggested that some reassessment has

already happened before 1992 as Israel had supported India by providing military supplies in 1962 Sino-Indian War. In 1977, when Janata Party government came to power, Moshe Dayan, the Israeli Defence Minister, was secretly invited to India. JN Dixit notes that Janata Party government wanted to use the visit as a pretext to change the gears to a different Israeli policy. For that matter, Rajiv Gandhi knew that a rapprochement with Israel would incrementally pave way for normalisation of ties with the US. K Shankar Bajpai notes that as Narasimha Rao became the PM, he was able to give the needed impetus to the India's West Asia policy and specially the relations with Israel. J N Dixit asserted that it was a careful analysis of India's national interests that explained normalization of Indian ties with Israel.



C. Raja Mohan remarks that as India opened up to Israel and the US, it generated some insecurity in the Arab world that feared that they may lose out on developing relations with an emerging India. It is in this context that Saudi Arabia urged Pakistan to give up aspirations on Kashmir during the Kargil war.

Kanti Bajpai notes that the end of the Cold War freed Narasimha Rao from the tutelage of the non-alignment philosophy. The market reforms initiated by Rao domestically in India depended to a huge extent on how Rao would arrange for resources from the international bodies and the great powers. Keeping this in mind, India decided to join the move to revoke the UN resolution that had equated Zionism with racism in 1991. The most important priority of India after the end of Cold War was to bolster its military capabilities and with sudden disintegration of the Soviet Union, India sought assistance from nations offering military capabilities. The changed strategic environment favoured the improvement of relations with Israel and Israel was now a natural partner for India as it possessed the needed military industrial complex to assist India to modernise its defence capabilities. Thus, the Indo-Israel relationship, immediately upon improvement, took up a security dimension. India even decided to include Israel's counter-terrorism expertise in its security relationship. Bruce Riedel notes that military partnership got strengthened. Amit Gupta notes that Israel had developed capabilities in competition of Western powers and as per Stephen Blank, India decided to collaborate with Israel on Light Combat Aircrafts and ballistic missiles. Katz notes that India purchased Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Advanced Air Defence Systems from Israel.




C. Christine Fair observes that India continues to maintain foreign policy autonomy and does not get entangled in ideological alliances, preferring strategic partnerships with nations based on self-interests (Iran for energy and Israel for defence are examples here). Apart from defence, India has sought Israeli assistance in irrigation and soil management and as per James Lamont and Martin Wolf. India has also launched a negotiation process for a free trade agreement with Israel. As per the Grand Strategy framework analysis, it is imminent now that India's future relationship will flourish till Israel is able to fulfil the niche defence interests of India. Berman has argued that certain Hindu nationalists in the post 9/11 environment favour a natural Indo-Israel alliance against Islamic fundamentalism but on ground, collaboration may be difficult as India does not feel that the Israeli strategy of punitive wars will yield any positive changes in reality. The Indo-Israel partnership is highly a selective partnership on certain dimensions that assists India to achieve its grand strategy. Abhyankar argues that India, in order to emerge as a global player, should mobilise resources effectively from both Arabs as well as Israel. Dhiraj Nair states that India, despite institutionalising strategic cooperation with Israel, has officially maintained its pro-Palestine position at the international fore.

GRAND STRATEGY AND AFRICA AND INDIA


This section would be better understood if the readers develop an understanding of the themes discussed in the eleven chapters dedicated to Africa in the book. This part attempts to study India's foreign policy making process with respect to Africa to analyse institutional origins and key determinants of the India's Africa Policy. Amitav Acharya has noted that India in the post-independence period resorted to the use of non-alignment to engage with Africa and support anti-colonial movements in Africa. As the Cold War progressed, and Africa gained independence, many nations got entangled in 'hot' proxy fronts during Cold War, while India stayed away from any intervention in the bipolar power politics. A small period of disengagement followed at the end of the Cold War.

C. Raja Mohan asserts that at the end of the Cold War, India's focus shifted towards states in the Look East Policy and improvement of ties with the US. This led to a disengagement with Africa in terms of its strategic importance to India. Not only did trade dip, but India in 1990s, also closed its missions in Malawi and the Democratic Republic of Congo. India did lose some diplomatic capital it had built during Cold War but some Indian diplomats prefer to perceive this period as one of adaptation and transition due to divergent interests in Indian foreign policy. It was in 2000 that India was able to match up again to Africa and initiated a reengagement with the continent. The decade of 2000 brought about a radical shift as India, by now, had developed capabilities to undertake

commitments to Africa. The decade of 2000 saw initiatives ranging from trade to TEAM - 9 to the First India–Africa Forum Summit (2008) leading to the rise of a new programme of soft policy for African development.




There are four main factors that shape the Indo–Africa relations:




The Ministry of External Affairs majorly promotes Indian interest in Africa, in close collaboration with the other ministries in India, like Ministries of Defence, Commerce, and so on. As these other ministries have no overseas representatives in the Indian Mission, the burden of engagement falls majorly upon the MEA. Apart from the MEA, there are officers of the Research and Analysis Wing in the African mission. The R&AW officials are present in Kenya, Egypt, Nigeria, Mauritius, and South Africa. The Africa division in the MEA suffers from understaffing of diplomats while another issue is lesser number of diplomats in Indian missions in Africa. A very important hurdle at the diplomatic level is the language barrier. The moment an officer is selected in the Indian Foreign Service they have undergo compulsory foreign language training. Very few officers master French and Portuguese. For the Portuguese language, an IFS officer for CFL is sent to Lisbon, Brazil, Angola and Mozambique while for the French, the officers are mostly sent to Brussels. Apart from this, there is a common problem about an archaic image of Africa that officers have in mind. However, we are witnessing some young diplomats showing keenness to work in Africa as it gives them greater learning opportunities. Within the MEA, diplomats assert that as far as Africa is concerned, the responsibility for policy planning is solely of the institutional mechanism. Diplomats also agree that in Indian planning for Africa, the focus is more on English speaking nations than French and Portuguese speaking countries. These have been occasional efforts on facilitating horizontal interaction between diplomats posted in Africa to encourage inter-

institutional collaboration.

Ambassador Rajiv Bhatia argues that the Indian policy to engage with Africa lacks any coherence and there are no long-term guidelines and targets that India has set. He clearly points out to a lack of a document or a concept note that can be articulated as India's Africa Policy. Thus, according to the Ambassador Navdeep Suri, a sustained engagement with Africa began only after the First India–Africa Forum Summit in 2008 where India began to focus on the softer dimensions of diplomacy for long-term engagement.



Ruchita Bedi emphasises that the pace of the India policy is not fast and furious like Yangtze River, but is more like the Ganges, which is slow and complex, with many curves and changes in course. Therefore, India has an idea of a policy, which may not adhere to the strictest and most stringent interpretation of the term.



3
CHAPTER


Foreign and Strategic Policy of India

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Introduction
- India and Asian Theatre from China to Central Asia
- India in International Institutions in Relation to the Great Powers
- India—Hard Power Tools and Internal Security

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this chapter is to lay down a framework of opportunities that India should follow in the future to maximise its strategic autonomy and assume its rightful place in the world. To do the same, India needs to revive the Non Alignment and initiate a second generation of Non Alignment- Non Alignment 2.0.



The term non-alignment does not lead to any regression in Indian foreign policy in the twenty first century because it remains important for India due to its continuous quest for strategic autonomy.



We have argued on multiple occasions that India's non-alignment as articulated by Nehru did not imply a passive India. It has been seen throughout the book that despite its low economic and military profile during the Cold War, India was able to assert an active role in the world affairs since its independence. The instances of India asserting its voice at the UN against apartheid in South Africa, to the global movement for a nuclear disarmed world to playing a positive role in Korean issue are a testimony to the fact. Thus, arguing that India remained disengaged from the world order due to NAM till the 1990s is

largely a distortion. India adopted an inward-looking strategy during the Cold War in contrast to the popular foreign investment strategy but it still advocated an equitable financial system. If today, India plays the same assertive role at the WTO while asking for an equitable trade regime, then it is due to a confluence of India's tradition of global engagement and its growing global profile. It is in this context that NAM 2.0 strives to explore the opportunities that India will take to transform the global terrain and pursue its own destiny.

INDIA AND ASIAN THEATRE FROM CHINA TO CENTRAL ASIA

We have already discussed as to how India has historical ties with different regions starting from West Asia to Africa, from South East Asia to Central Asia. In the contemporary era, India has expanded its ties to the entire Asian region in a much bigger way. The idea of an Asian theatre was for the first time championed by Nehru when, in 1947, he convened at the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi, which was followed by the 1955 Afro-Asian conference in Bandung. This idea of an Asian theatre is now a reality of Indian Policy. India now has decided to look upon the Asian zone as a zone of economic opportunity. The commencement of the Look East policy to the announcement of the latest Act East Policy has clearly asserted the zeal with which India wishes to seize the economic opportunities in the world. Asia has emerged as a new theatre of institutional innovation with a modest beginning in 1967—the creation of ASEAN to the BRICS Bank/NDB and AIIB. India has seized the opportunity to be a part of all these institutions. Asia also witnesses strategic rivalry. In different chapters of the book we have made mention of new military flash points like the South China Sea and the eruption of the Taiwan issue after the coming of Donald Trump in the US. Many Asian states are looking for a hedge against a great power and some even advocating that India play an important role in the fray. However, India has not fully responded yet as its response is slowly emerging from several ground realities. There is a growing realisation amongst Indian policy makers that India can emerge as a net security provider in South East and East Asia along with the Indian Ocean region.

At this level, an analysis of China is warranted. China, since 1978, has expanded its presence drastically in the economic and strategic sphere. China has emerged as a powerful player which is aggressively building up its military profile and this is likely to cause a power differential with India. In order to maintain a clear line of thought, it is imperative for India to expand the edge it has on the maritime frontier. As the Sino-India border dispute is not going to be resolved soon it is important that India build up its maritime capabilities.

India continues to engage with South Korea. As far as North Korea is concerned, India knows that Pakistan and China have provided vital support to the country. In the eventuality of a regime collapse in North Korea, if with US support, South Korea expands over to the North and unifies Korea, a democratic reunified Korea will any day prove more beneficial for India than the hegemonic North Korea is now.


INDIA IN INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN RELATION TO THE GREAT POWERS

With the advent of globalisation, India has realised that its integration with the world

economy will be beneficial for its own prosperity. The foundation of India as a global power depends upon the economic footprint India is striving to leave upon the world.



The major economies like Japan and Europe internally will face challenges, including that of an aged population. In Japan, Shinzo Abe has resorted to Abenomics. As explained in the chapter on India–Japan relationship, Abenomics has led to an easy immigration policy for Indians and Japan is inviting skilled population from nations like India to revive the Japanese growth story. It is important for India to take opportunities available in foreign states and capitalise upon them over the next one decade. To continuously support economic liberalisation at the global level, India has been entering into multilateral agreements. At present, India's focus is on bilateral free trade agreements. India is trying to promote a rule bound international order. This has to be done to not only to keep a check on China by compelling it to focus on a fair multilateral system but also because an absence of India at multilateral agreements will have adverse effects on the entire system. Thus, a right balance of international multilateral and bilateral agreements are being struck by India. India has expressed its willingness to be a part of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and its ongoing negotiations are a step in the right direction. India has geared up its diplomacy to serve a larger commercial role in the future. At this stage, it is important for India that it has established a vision as to how it would integrate with the global economy. The interaction that India intends to undertake with international economic institutions is driven by a defined set of policies. Thus, when India interacts with the international order, it will follow the following core objectives as it has always done.



INDIA—HARD POWER TOOLS AND INTERNAL SECURITY

If India wants to achieve the set political objectives of being a global power, then it needs to ensure a complete stability of its immediate strategic neighbourhood. The 'Neighbourhood First' policy is a step in that direction. A disturbed neighbourhood may, in an extreme case, require India to use hard power if it witnesses a threat from external

agents. India has, since independence, followed a defensive stance, but, as the threats persist and continue to challenge the sovereignty and stability of India, it has signalled a shift to defensive–offensive approach. In the chapter on India's National Security Policy, we have already noted that India primarily witnesses external challenges from Pakistan and China, in terms of hostile land border relationship. It is important for India not only to protect its land frontiers but, also use the Indian Ocean to project power. For India to develop its military power, a major focus is now put upon the maritime dimension.

There are strategic objectives as to why India is trying to establish itself as a maritime power. With time, it is gradually becoming clear that Pakistan shall mostly remain engaged in dealing with its own internal troubles. As for China, it is busy with its power assertion tactics in the South China Sea while trying to create an economic environment to sustain growth in the midst of economic slowdown through its Belt and Road Initiative. While both China and Pakistan are occupied with their own issues, India has a small window of opportunity. Firstly, India is using the window to align its hard power capabilities with its political objectives. To achieve this, India is reallocating some resources from the Indo–Pakistan border towards the Sino–Indian border to build up defensive capabilities on that side. Secondly, India is using the window to allocate resources to develop maritime capabilities especially at a combat level. To manage Pakistan, India, under the new Modi Government has signalled a new enthusiasm for maritime development. With respect to its stance to Pakistan, India has been defensive majorly because of its awareness that any armed conflict could escalate at the nuclear level. Whenever Pakistan has launched cross border attacks, India has tried to defend itself without aggressively retaliating. However, India's new National Security Advisor and India's most decorated IPS officer, Ajit Doval, has signalled a shift from defensive to defensive–offensive strategy. In the new strategy, India has now decided to work towards exploiting the vulnerabilities of Pakistan. At the soft level, in defensive–offensive strategy, India has resorted to globally isolating Pakistan for its adventurism and its open support to extremism. At the diplomatic level, India has increased the pitch to brand Pakistan as a sponsor of terrorism. With the promotion of Anil Kumar Dhasmana as the Secretary of Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), India has diplomatically started taking up the issue of human rights violations in Baluchistan to counter constant references of Pakistan to Kashmir. Dhasmana is known and revered as an expert on Pakistan and especially Baluchistan. Under the new strategy, India has also carried out cross border surgical strikes in September, 2016 to eliminate terrorist camps. Thus, the signal India has conveyed to Pakistan is that it will no longer persist in its earlier defensive mode anymore and shall retaliate on provocation. The new strategy of India is a shift from being Defensive to now being Defensive-Offensive. In Defensive-Offensive strategy, India will go to the site of origin of the Offense and retaliate. India, however, will not shift to outright offensive mode due to the possibility of nuclear retaliation as also because undertaking outright provocation shall stand against the policies it espouses.



The border between India and China had been largely tranquil, but since 2010, India has been witnessing regular transgressions and incursions by China in the western sector of the Line of Actual Control (LAC). There is a possibility in the future of the China–India diplomatic ties deteriorating, leading to Chinese assertion in Arunachal and Ladakh. To tackle this, India has decided to first resort to maintaining status quo. With a better army, infrastructure and manpower, China will certainly have an edge over logistics. India has started building up both defensive and offensive capabilities along the LAC. The recent decision in 2016 to station the Brahmos missile alongside the border is a testimony to the fact, India would use the developed capabilities to resort to quid pro quo where any land grab by China along the LAC is likely to be met by a counter land grab by India on the Chinese side. In areas where operations and tactical advantage lie with India, development of capabilities for a possible quid pro quo tactic will help. India has already earmarked the exercise of marking out areas along the LAC to launch limited offensive operations if needed in the future.



While we assess the threats we may witness from China and Pakistan, there is a need for India to make some structural changes in its defence and security structures.




It is also important to note at this juncture that India's global capabilities could be

affected if its internal security challenges proliferate. India needs to have a developmental model that will be used to support the Asian developmental story, which may get adversely affected if its internal security challenges are not addressed. Every internal conflict basically manifests in a particular way and de-escalation depends upon the political skills that are applied to handle such conflicts. How the political elite of a society chooses to engage with people makes a conflict manifest in the way it does. At the strategic level, there is a need to evolve political conditions which may defuse such conflicts in advance. Though we cannot afford to discuss the internal security challenges in detail in this chapter of the book, we can identify a few areas of failures of the state that have given rise to challenges in internal security. It is important to address these state failures as they inflict a huge opportunity cost in our quest for global power.



The best way to tackle the threats of internal security is to take advantage of the institution of democracy. If people develop faith on the state and the state hears them and addresses their grievances, the violence and alienation that communities face would automatically reduce. For instance, secessionist movements can become virulent when governments refuse to adopt democratic participation and try to be authoritarian in their approach. India has to build a culture of federalism where it incorporates democratic values as a distinctive strength. We have to ensure that we create a state and a society where citizens have faith in the power of democracy. In Kashmir and the North-East our policies till date have created a Machiavellian state which is a state neither feared nor loved.



4
CHAPTER

Concluding the Indian Foreign Policy

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Introduction
- Core elements of Indian diplomatic style of negotiation

INTRODUCTION


In the concluding chapter of this book, we present an analytical survey of the core elements of the Indian diplomatic style of negotiation from the Nehruvian times to the time of Narendra Modi. We finally conclude our chapter and the book with an understanding of the kind of leadership role that India would be playing in the future. There will be use of case studies in the chapter to further enhance the understanding of India's negotiation style.

CORE ELEMENTS OF INDIAN DIPLOMATIC STYLE OF NEGOTIATION

At the eve of Indian Independence Day, Nehru while addressing the Constituent Assembly, made the assertion that an independent India would soon attain its rightful place in the world and this ancient land would contribute to maintain world peace. This assertion continues to shape Indian foreign policy even today. In this particular section, we will analyse three important dimensions at length.



The Indian establishment has based its diplomatic actions on the vision of India as an ancient civilisation, seeking to earn its rightful place in the world in the modern times. Driven by its historical biases, during the Cold War, India resorted to non-alignment. It has used the precepts of non-alignment differently since the end of the cold war.



Ancient–Modern Linkages

While shaping its foreign policy, India has imbibed a lot of values from Ashoka, Kautilya and the epics, *Mahabharata* and *Ramayana*. In an earlier chapter, we have delved into the foreign policy precepts of Asoka and Kautilya in detail. In fact, it will not be wrong to state that India's foreign policy has its roots in the Ashokan edicts. Ashoka, during his times, was renowned for his edicts, pillar inscriptions and rock carvings, which carried the message of peace and tolerance of heterodox beliefs. One of the strongest manifestations of Ashokan principles has been the concept of non-alignment, which itself is based on the concepts of moral superiority and idealism. The rhetoric of roaring idealism is evident in almost all speeches that Indian leaders have made everywhere till date. The traditions of Asoka and Gandhi were visible in the September 2014 address of the UN general Assembly by the Indian Prime Minister, who referred to the motto of Vasudhaivam Kutumbakam—the concept of the whole world being one family. This again clearly proves that, for India, even in the modern times, ancient philosophies do remain alive and find a place in Indian diplomacy.

As India embarked upon its journey after independence, non-alignment and a drive to achieve primacy in South Asia were two dominant areas of thrust. Under non-alignment, Nehru declared that the idea was to have a confluence of national interest and idealism. He categorically asserted that non-alignment envisioned a policy where India would refrain from bipolar alignment but pursue international peace through an independent approach to global issues. Nehru did clarify on multiple occasions that the essence of non-alignment was based upon Swiss model of passive neutralism. Non-alignment was thus not a 'third force,' but a zone of peace between two dominant ideologies.

Non-Alignment = Idealism + National Interest

The moral component of non-alignment was based upon the ancient Buddhist teachings that manifested as the Panchsheel (explained in the chapter dealing with India–China relationship). The reason for incorporating Panchsheel with China was because Nehru believed that a resurgent China and India would not only jointly break away from the colonial hangover of South Asia but usher in a new phase in world affairs through a new sophisticated diplomacy. Thus, the idea of non-alignment as envisaged at a moral level, was to foster international peace while helping India achieve economic progress. Raymond Cohen beautifully sums up the Indian negotiating style under NAM period, remarking that India, under NAM, had evolved a very unique formula where it would accept needed assistance when required without saying please or thank you. Unfortunately, the Western entities not only branded non-alignment as immoral (Johan Foster Dulles) but also called it contradictory, confusing it with neutralism and equidistance. It was through NAM that Indian diplomats got challenging opportunities to gain global exposure, for instance, participation in the Korean crisis, Congo, Gaza and Indo–China. The role India played especially in the Indo–China region to prevent the French from installing puppet leaders and proposing complete foreign troop withdrawals, enhanced the position of India as an important diplomatic player in the region. The NAM

remained a guiding factor in the foreign policy of India throughout the Cold War. The relevance of NAM may have reduced but its spirit remains alive and India continues to assert that its foreign policy still strives for strategic autonomy and economic diplomacy in a multipolar world.

Now we shall turn our attention towards the strategic vision and institutional setup in India that undertakes foreign policy negotiations. We shall now strive to identify the Indian negotiation style and then use certain case studies to see them executed. In the chapter of India's grand strategy, we have analysed the broad strategic vision of India. Without delving into the debate of Indian strategic vision, we shall now try to provide an intellectual map of three broad tendencies that are visible in the foreign policy thinking of India. Our intention would be to see how government actions and policies pass through the lens of this intellectual prism.




All three competitive visions above are based on a common assumption of what India is and what it ought to be. The most important component of the Indian view is based on India calling itself as a 'civilisational state,' having had an almost 5000-year-old extraordinary civilisation. India prides itself on being an important multi-cultural and civilisational state, which spills over in the Indian cultural space. This magnification of the idea of India as a civilisational state finds its logical extension in the idea of strategic autonomy which we have just argued is the core of the idea of non-alignment. India firmly believes that while being an ancient civilisation seeking the respect that is rightfully due to India in the world, it would not allow any state to dictate foreign policy for the nation. Due to this behaviour, based on the twin ideas of civilisation state and strategic autonomy, India refrains to join any alliances that may constrain its foreign policy choices. India, in order to pursue its strategic autonomy, refrains from joining international engagements based on the concept of 'Responsibility to Protect (R2P),' a step we have previously discussed that is why even when India uses terms like strategic partners or natural allies, the meaning associated with the tags is differently perceived by India and in the West.

India's international vision is based upon the promise of Indian democracy. The foreign policy establishment of India acknowledges the role of the Parliament in the making of the foreign policy of the country. Yet, India does not try to export the idea of democracy like the USA, and instead uses a common democratic paradigm to strengthen its bilateral ties. From Nehru to Modi, all Indian leaders have stressed that the international and domestic objective of Indian foreign policy should be to bring India out of poverty.


In the various chapters of the book, we have already seen that wherever the Indian PM has visited since 2014, developmental diplomacy (as a concept already explained separately) has been a preeminent agenda. Another unique feature of the India's international vision is to assert primacy in South Asia. Throughout the book our analysis of different bilateral relations helps us to now conclude that India's strategic space extends

from the Persian Gulf to South East Asia. Whether it is India's new security role in West Asia or commercial diplomacy through Act East policy in East Asia, all clearly assert the prominence of South Asia as a strategic block for India.

The last important element of the core has a shared political consensus amongst all political parties in India that an important element of India's vision is a world order with India as a long-term leader (also read as a pole in the multipolar world), favourable especially towards the poor countries of the world. The core of Indian strategic vision thus clear to us, now we can have a look at the three competing visions or tendencies. Though none of these tendencies fully describe the Indian foreign policy, they do provide a guide to differing visions available. Here we shall openly borrow and build upon concepts from the core discussion in the chapter of Indian grand strategy.



The non-alignment firsters believe in the confluence of India's ancient historical heritage and modernity. They believe that India is an inclusive tolerant place of multiple religions that have coexisted forever. The followers of this school base their foreign policy behaviour on the Nehruvian world view and espouse the logic of India as a moral power in the world seeking an end to colonisation for world peace.



Look East, Act East Dilemma


A very unique feature of this group is that they do not advocate aggressive economic engagement at international forums and do not favour market solutions. An important point to note in this regard is that in 2011, when Condoleezza Rice visited India, she recommended that India should open up economically with the South East and East. In fact, she recommended that as India's Look East policy was not delivering the intended results, India should not merely 'Look East' but 'Act East' where 'Act' was deemed to be an action oriented pro-market policy. However, in

2011, India had the UPA government in power, and the believers in non-alignment did not favour aggressive pro-market policies as they felt it may hurt the economic status of the domestic Indian poor. Therefore, no action was taken upon the suggestions of Rice to bring the much-needed dynamism. The decision to adopt an ‘Act East Policy’ was finally taken by the third group called Hard Power Hawk, of which the BJP is an ardent follower. India finally announced its Act East Policy in 12th India–ASEAN Summit, 2014, in Myanmar.

The group of Broad Power Realists has emerged since the end of the Cold War. This school is a product of the transformation of the Indian foreign policy since that time. This school also influences the foreign policy decision-making to a certain extent.



Many followers of this school do agree upon the need for strategic autonomy but argue that India should use its strategic autonomy to establish strong strategic partnerships to maximise its potential to emerge as a global power.




A very specific feature of this group is that they advocate India’s membership to multilateral fora, including the UN Security Council, as second order objectives for the nation state. However, they do argue that India should not focus too much upon seeking support for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. This is because this group says that all these memberships will automatically be accrued to India as its overall power status improves, and India is able to evolve a strong domestic economic architecture, military capabilities and credible nuclear weapons, along with an international political engagement with great powers. This group prefers to view India as a success story in the world.

The Hard Power Hawks differs from the first two schools on their tone of military strength. The main ideologue for this group had been Sardar Patel. The group prefers Patel over Gandhi and Nehru for his agility and military-centric mindset. They also admire the ruthlessness advanced by the Indian Machiavelli, Kautilya.



This group always displays a sense of emergency to achieve the vision of a powerful India. It comes very close to the school of Realism for they argue acquisition of power as an important goal to justify the ends of the existence of the nation state. They don't favour the success of democracy but rather advocate the use of military as a tool of diplomacy.



The uniqueness of this group is that they don't attach much importance to international institutions but use the symbolism associated with them to assert India's importance. For example, in recent times, the India–Japan nuclear deal (2016) has been given tremendous symbolic power through the use of media as a game changer in the bilateral relationship.

Hard Power Hawks = Military Strength + Diplomacy


The major thrust of this school is to use great power relationships to enhance the role of the Indian military. The focus on military expansion is not to conquer territory but disallow others to encroach upon the strategic autonomy of India or its assertion of regional diplomacy.

Keeping the three core schools in mind, we now try to analyse how each guides the foreign policy interests of the nation. The initial years of Cold War dominated by Nehru saw the imprint of non-alignment festers. This view was reflective of Indian behaviour in the Korean crisis and the Indo–China crisis. A realist element in the Indian policy emerged during 1971 war and 1987 Sri Lankan crisis. The Indian policy during Rajiv and Indira doctrine had instances of rhetorical realism but ultimately remained mired in the idealistic tradition. The end of the Cold War ushered in an era of Broad Power Realists. The overall tenets of the foreign policy from 1990s till 2014 remained in line with the thoughts of this school. The economic and commercial angle of diplomacy began to increase in this period. Now the economic success was used by the foreign policy establishment as a spring board for a greater global influence in the world. Though there had been an aggressive upgrade in Indian military power, it was not used as a pathway to power—something that again resonates with the ideals of the Broad Power Realists. The coming of Modi in 2014 as the PM has signalled a shift to Hard Power Hawk Policy as the new centre of gravity in Indian foreign policy.



The conclusion we draw here is that, firstly, India is a revisionist power. This means that despite having border problems and territorial disputes, instead of seeking territorial changes, India aims to revise the global order where a handful of American and European powers have primacy in global institutions, and to be a part of these elite groups that run the world.

Now, we shall turn our attention to the idea of negotiation. Negotiations are a unique tool of diplomacy that a state uses in foreign policy. The Indian officials, while negotiating, keep in mind three core elements.



The Indian negotiations use India's ancient civilisational status not only as a matter of pride but responsibility. To compensate for the country's natural weakness, Indian negotiations have seen Indian spiritual heritage, and its intellectual power as assets. As argued in the beginning of this chapter, non-alignment was seen as a logical extension of Indian civilisation's spiritual power. A unique aspect here is that when Indian negotiators negotiate, they don't expect their foreign counterparts to evolve an understanding of our civilisation but expect them to respect it as it is. India, while negotiating, has never resorted to use of hard power, but our analysis of certain chapters in the book, especially that of Mauritius, Sri Lanka and Pakistan, have shown that hard power (read free hand of R&AW) at times is used in Asia to assert primacy. There is strong tendency amongst the negotiators to remain bureaucratically inflexible and resort to their own institutional identity. As most of the negotiation is on paper to defend decisions, a close emphasis is laid upon the language. For example, the word 'assistance' may create a discomfort while 'sharing best practice' may be a preferable replacement. In the same way, India has, in the last few years, begun to provide aid to others nations, where negotiators prefer to call India a 'development partner' rather than a 'donor'. These terminologies are used by Indian negotiators to distinguish India from the west.

Diplomatic Language and China: Claim or Dispute?

In 1960, Nehru and Zhou Enlai had a meeting on the border question. China advanced a six-point plan to be adopted by both India and China to which Nehru had

no objection. Nehru was accompanied with one of the diplomatic negotiators, Jagat Mehta, who raised a concern over the point which stated ‘there exists a DISPUTE with regard to the boundary between India and China.’ When Mehta met Nehru, he urged the use of the word CLAIM over DISPUTE. As the matter was raised, Nehru eventually refused to endorse the six points of Zhou Enlai due to interpretational difference.

A very unique feature of Indian negotiators is that, in order to protect the dignity of the Indian state, they do not make requests. For example, in 1985, when Rajiv Gandhi was to visit the US, the Indian Ambassador K. Shankar Bajpai never formally sent a request to the speaker of the House of Representatives, as per the procedure, but found another way to put the message across to the speaker. During the era of Bush in the USA, Bush took an HIV initiative and India wanted to be designated as a ‘priority country’, as the tag of a priority country would have bestowed additional finances to pump India’s budgetary support to fight HIV, but Indian negotiators refrained from asking for the same, thereby leading to Vietnam being designated as ‘priority country’. Indian negotiators, however, do show a preference to be branded as the author of an idea in a bilateral arrangement to assert superiority. Normally, it has also been perceived that Indian negotiators do not prefer to follow any deadlines during negotiations. If the item negotiated is complex with some long-term consequences, then they prefer to take a long view of history before concluding any negotiation. A very unique feature here is the cyclical approach where, while negotiating at times, if no proper conclusion is achieved, then India may go for the next turn of the cycle of negotiation to bear fruit. (This fits very well into the Indian psyche of the cycle of death and rebirth which is deeply imbued in its cultural environment.) Another feature of our diplomatic negotiation is that we favour summits with great powers as it gives us an opportunity to showcase our diplomatic glamour. The biggest opportunity comes during the Republic Day celebrations where the head of the states are invited as chief guests. Indian negotiators, while negotiating on defence diplomacy, always look for best practices globally and incorporate them to get a custom-made arrangement for themselves, thus emphasising upon the core element of exceptionalism over the ‘everyone does it this way’ argument.

Indian negotiators, at multilateral level, show a strong preference for a moral high ground and dictate and frame issues on moral terms which many negotiators at the multilateral level find unnecessarily complicates the process. Foreign negotiators argue that India favours moralism in negotiations when negotiations inherently imply some give and take. Indian negotiators resort to a maximalist position to disagree on what may constitute ‘fairness’ (as perhaps most visible in the debate on climate change). Another uniqueness of the Indian negotiators is that they very carefully evaluate and record as to how they were received, especially when the Indian officials interact with officials of nations with asymmetric national favour. C. Raja Mohan has compared this style to a porcupine. When an Indian official has to interact with a diplomatic official of another state, a lot of time is spent on identifying the right person across the hierarchy. The Indian MEA is very cautious in cases of protocol and reciprocity. For example, as the process of granting an approval to an ambassador is relatively inefficient and slow in the USA, India at times has been seen reciprocating. When Indian ambassador to the USA, Nirupama Rao’s file, was sent there, there was a slight delay in the clearing of the file. Subsequently,


when US ambassador to India, Nancy Powell's turn of appointment came, she had to wait for exactly the same number of days as Nirupama Rao.

Indian negotiators have often used the asymmetry for Indian advantage in the neighbourhood and at times, this has created an impression of a big brotherly attitude. Indian negotiators are very particular about personal ties and treat known counterparts with great hospitality. However, at times, in an absence of personal relations, the official Indian negotiators take a hard view. The Indian negotiators have a very strong collective memory that at times acts as an invisible irritant. For example, as during the entire cold war when USA was proximate to Pakistan, and even supplied it arms, it remained a huge block in the memory of Indian negotiators that manifests even up till date in security negotiations with USA. But USA and other states do accept that Indian negotiators do resort to deception. If at any point of time India ever feels that there is an offence against India or its officials, it resorts to reciprocity and then the collective memory contributes to further aggravate the damage caused.

Khobragade Case

Divyani Khobragade, who was the Deputy Consul General of India in the US, was arrested in December, 2013 for charges of visa fraud and underpayment of her domestic servant. The USA allows diplomats to bring domestic help from their parent nation provided the domestic help is paid wages as per the US minimum wage. However, Devyani had signed another contract with her maid and thereby paid her lesser than the US minimum wage. The US government had already alerted India about the visa issue but no one in India ever believed that the US would resort to legal action over such a trivial issue as underpayment. As no action was taken by India, Devyani was eventually arrested, an action that did not sit well with India. It led to a huge diplomatic standoff that took almost two months to resolve. India reciprocated by making life uncomfortable for American diplomats in Delhi. The Devyani standoff pushed a number of hot buttons that affected the dignity of the state of India. Many began to label the US behaviour as brash, arrogant and insensitive to women. This clearly reflects how an issue that may affect an Indian official has the potential to damage international relations.

After having undertaken a detailed analysis of Indian negotiation, we shall now take help of individual case studies to deepen our understanding of how India applies negotiation tools in foreign policy decisions. There are three broad case studies we analyse in detail.



The Indian defence establishment is still affected by the psychological loss it faced in the 1962 conflict. It believes that Chinese assistance to Pakistan accentuates the security threat to India. Though India considers China to be a civilisational power, the border issue has pitted the two civilisational powers against one another. In this case, we shall try to analyse the approaches India has adopted to negotiate with China on the border issue. This case study builds up upon the literature already explained in the chapter on India–China relations.

India is well aware of the Chinese economic and military status. Since almost ancient times, Indian rulers till date have perceived the mighty Himalayas as security barrier from China. A rising China on the other side and its outright support to Pakistan has aggravated Indian strategic concerns. India feels that the status that China enjoys (of being a permanent member of the UNSC, with its nuclear weapon possessions legitimised through the NPT) should also be bestowed upon India. On the basis of the three key drivers of Indian foreign policy that we have analysed in this chapter, China is perceived by India as a challenge to its regional primacy. China fits well into the category of a player which holds economic opportunity for India who can strive with India to achieve a multipolar world. As far as China is concerned, it doesn't view India as a strategic threat. China explains its engagement with Pakistan as just another bilateral relation. However, China is certainly not very comfortable with a growing Indian posture in its backyard, that is South East and East Asia. Chinese negotiators dislike the practice of India regularly comparing itself to China. Chinese analysts agree that India, as a country, has a great potential to be a great power but believes it lacks the vision to achieve the status of a great power. With how both India and China view each other is now clear to us, let us turn our attention to the negotiations on the border issue.

The India–China boundary dispute pre-dated the independence or formation of both states. In the 1950s, Nehru primarily resorted to maintaining good relations with China as he dreamt of India and China together rewriting the global order for the poorer countries of the world. After China invaded Tibet in 1950, Nehru asserted that the boundary in the east with China was the McMahon line. However, China never accepted the MacMohan line. Throughout this period, China resorted to cryptic communication and ambiguous messages than negotiating explicitly with India. The Chinese tactic adopted during this period was that of waiting for India to speak up first. During most of this period, Nehru reacted to the tactics set by China. Some facts need to be mentioned here.

- In 1950, China invaded Tibet and Nehru asserted that McMahon line is the boundary in the east. Despite meetings between KM Panikkar and Zhou Enlai after Tibetan invasion, China never raised the issue of McMahon line.
- In 1951, when India assumed control of Tawang, China raised no objections.
- India interpreted Chinese silence as acquiescence.
- In 1953, India published a map claiming areas and in 1954, when Zhou Enlai visited India, the border issue was not raised, rather, the Panchsheel was signed.
- First bilateral border reference happened over a dispute over grazing ground in the middle sector when in late 1954, Nehru raised the issue with Zhou Enlai who

downplayed the map recommended by India advocating that the maps were ‘old’.

- In 1957, when Zhou Enlai visited India he made a reference to the McMahon line (the Burma–China segment) which India perceived as acceptance of the boundary on the east.
- The issue erupted openly when India contested a road made by China in the Aksai Chin region which was claimed by India.
- China challenged the Indian maps, arguing that it did not raise the border issue as the conditions were not ripe.
- The 1959 Tibetan uprising and subsequent fight of Dalai Lama to India plummeted the relations, compelling China in 1960 to organise negotiation on the border issue. This was perceived by India as a ‘discussion’ and not a ‘negotiation’. The talks failed to give a result and led to 1962 war.



As noted in the chapter on India–China relations, the border conflict in 1962 led to the suspension of diplomatic relations with China which was resumed only in 1976. Since the era of Rajiv Gandhi, the new feature in the border negotiations has been separating the border issue from other issues and maintaining status quo on the border with a tilt towards tranquillity and peace at the border. With the conclusion of the Border Defence Co-operation Agreement in 2013, India and China have agreed not to undertake ‘tailing’ of each other as well. With the coming of Modi and his visit to China as well as Xi Jinping’s visit to India, the new element of economics has entered the relationship. The two states have maintained status quo on the border but Modi did ask China to rethink the claims it is making on Arunachal Pradesh. Commerce now remains the dominant element in the bilateral ties.



India and Small South Asian Neighbour: Bangladesh

India has dealt with Asian powers in a different way than China or even the US for that matter. What is important in Indian engagement is a constant assertion of regional primacy and its pre-eminence in the area.



Though India has always favoured its neighbourhood states adopting democratic practices, as per Indian lines, it has refrained from exporting its democratic value and has adjusted itself well to coexist with autocratic regimes over an extended period of time. One important aspect of the Indian policy has been to prevent Chinese dominance in the neighborhood as it may constrain Indian regional primacy. In case of Bangladesh, India always expected that the nation would always shower gratitude on it for its support in its creation in 1971. However, Bangladesh had displayed the classical behaviour expected of big neighbour–small neighbour relationship. Things have only improved since 2010 when India has willingly accepted the role of other regional players in discussions on water and transit issues. Bangladesh always has felt that negotiating with the Indian political elite is easier and favourable for bilateral diplomacy than with Indian bureaucracy which it perceived to be rigid and unsympathetic towards Bangladesh.



Farakka barrage, as explained in the chapter on India–Bangladesh relations, has been an important issue for India. India has always had a focus on bilateralism while negotiating this issue. However, independent Bangladesh tried to galvanise world opinion on the barrage when it raised the matter in the United Nations. India vehemently opposed such internationalisation of a bilateral dispute. In 1996, after the failure to galvanise public opinion, Bangladesh concluded a treaty on Farakka barrage water dispute. Since then, the opposition parties of Bangladesh have decided to adopt a different position towards India as they were critical of the 1996 treaty. To rectify the perceived imbalance created by the 1996 treaty in favour of India, the opposition has adopted a policy of now linking river water issues with India to settlement of other disputes where the Bangladeshis holds better cards.

This has seen its manifestation in the case of India asking for transit rights from Bangladesh to its North-Eastern states. The rectification of the imbalance in the power relations of the two states as perceived by Bangladesh succeeded in 2010, when it convinced India to adopt the policy of multilateral management of rivers, opening up options for Nepal to be included in negotiations on Ganges and Bhutan on Brahmaputra. The Joint Rivers Commission established after Manmohan Singh's visit to Bangladesh in 2011 led to the a ‘gradual multilateral approach’ to the problem. Similarly, as examined in detail in the chapter on India–Bangladesh relations, during Modi's visit to Dhaka in June, 2015, the two sides again successfully resolved a bilateral issue of the pending land-boundary agreement.

Bangladeshis, however, have been holding the allowance transit to India over pending settlement on India–Bangladesh relations. Manmohan Singh, as PM, had tried to resolve the Teesta issue but due to intense opposition from Mamata Banerjee,

the chief minister of West Bengal (on the pretext that sharing of Teesta water with Bangladesh would harm farming communities of West Bengal), the deal could not be brokered. The coming of Modi saw not only a new negotiating technique but a new policy. Modi allowed Bangladesh to use India as a transit for transporting goods from Nepal and Bhutan. Bangladesh in turn reversed the ‘No Teesta, no transit’ policy to allow India access to Myanmar through Bangladesh despite no agreement on the Teesta issue even under the Modi regime. Thus, Modi, through bus diplomacy, additional aid, allowance para diplomacy and the tilt towards economic diplomacy, was able to overcome the Teesta barrier to seek transit rights.

Thus, the analysis of the case clearly suggests a new doctrine of linking diplomacy with economics. Modi’s idea of India acting as a regional leader and becoming a springboard for economic benefits for all the states in the neighbourhood has emerged as a new dimension in bilateral ties.

India and No First Use Policy

As we conclude the third and the final case study we take up an interesting question. If India has a nuclear weapon then why did India go for No-First-Use (NFU) policy? Why did India not keep the option of using the nuclear weapon for national defense if warranted directly? In the chapter on India’s nuclear policy we have dealt with the fact that what motivated India to go nuclear. The first instance was in 1962 when USS enterprise, entered the Indian Ocean to support India. India at this time realized the absence of deterrence it had in power capabilities. However in 1971 India-Pakistan war, the same USS enterprise entered Bay of Bengal to support Pakistan exposing Indian vulnerabilities. Since India tested the Peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974, India has been threatened twice by Pakistan of Nuclear retaliation. Thus, in 1998 when India conducted the nuclear tests and designated itself as a nuclear weapon state (NWS), India clarified that the test was to prevent further nuclear blackmailing but also asserted that in the nuclear age of the Post ColdWar world order these nuclear weapons are political weapons and currency of power and India would never use them against any nation first (No First Use) but assured of Massive and Unacceptable Retaliation on First Use by others. India holds the Nuclear weapons on the logic of Credible Minimum Deterrence.

Indian nuclear posture = Assured retaliation + No first use

Thus Indian nuclear doctrine is based on the anarchic world order where India through the possession of weapons now has ensured no nuclear blackmailing by any country.



Conclusion

In this concluding chapter of the book, we now present our final analysis of India's global vision and its negotiating style. In the preceding discussions, we have attempted an analysis of India's global vision from the time of Nehru till Modi. One thing that had remained constant in our foreign policy has been our quest for regional primacy and strategic autonomy. Since the end of cold war, economic diplomacy has emerged as a new source of national power and as a driver of Indian foreign policy. The coming of Modi at the helm of power has only strengthened the same vision on which India has been guiding its foreign policy since 1990s. Under Modi, we also see a marked decline in the rhetoric of non-alignment. However, the usage of the strategic autonomy principle owing its origin to non-alignment continues to be used by Modi to widen Indian strategic options. The future of India and its international modus operandi will be guided by three core elements.



It would not be wrong to suggest that India's ability to deal with global challenges would depend largely upon how stable its political order is and how strong its economic performance would be in the future. Since the end of the Cold War, India has adopted an open economic paradigm which has given tremendous results till date. Its economic performance has improved also due to its relationships with the US, South Korea and Japan, as they have contributed in the generation of economic wealth. This renewed thrust in the domestic economy has made India initiate a new dimension of economic-aid-cum-developmental-diplomacy as a new component of foreign policy.

The coming of Modi has seen a renewed push to improve Indian manufacturing through the Make in India initiative. There has been focus on removing domestic barricades to improve India's rank in 'ease of doing business'. A major challenge before Modi is to change and reform India's bureaucracy to implement the needed economic reforms. With the recent demonetisation of currency undertaken on 8th November, 2016, there are reports that the economy may witness a slowdown for a few quarters. However, the importance of demonetisation in the fostering the digitisation of the economy may shower benefits in the long run. A renewed economy will benefit India even at the foreign policy level to help build constituencies abroad. Thus, at the economic level India has to decide whether, in future, it would prefer a less risky strategy and pursue the same economic policy or it would embrace greater economic engagement by taking risks.

Modi's policies, however, do not suggest in any way that India is ready to go for a deeper economic engagement, as it has remained silent on two important issues that have global ramifications, including the One-Belt-One-Road (OBOR) initiative. The choice India has to make is between that of domestic imperatives versus deeper global engagement. The China factor will remain a major factor in the way of India expands its

global footprint. China's CPEC and its rising strategic footprint around India have raised security concerns in the Indian establishment. As the Chinese strategic footprint in our neighbourhood rises, it will initiate a policy to economically integrate South Asia as a single seamless whole for economic benefits for all. If China begins to assert itself in the Indian Ocean, India can always try to leverage its maritime diplomacy by bilaterally deepening engagement with maritime neighbours.

In order to expand its economic outreach in South Asia, Pakistan remains pivotal. Since early 2017, Pakistan and China both have been sending feelers to invite India to be part of CPEC. It is for India to decide how it may respond to such requests. At the same time, a strong relationship between India and the US would be strategically suitable for India as it will allow India access to global institutions in a way which it could not have achieved alone. The recently concluded LEMOA between India and USA is a positive move in that direction. An economically vibrant US engaging aggressively in Asia is beneficial for India in the long run. India is also trying to enhance its proximity to the US with an intention to implicitly balance China, which is the largest regional power in South East Asia. The recent India–Japan nuclear deal, and security relationships with Vietnam, Australia and Korea signify the rise of a new strategic partnership in the region. India is likely to continue to play an important economic and strategic role in China's backyard and shall continue to engage with the powers in East Asia without openly accepting the fact that the engagement in China's backyard is to balance China's influence. However, India has adopted a very cautious approach of engaging with China in forums like the BRICS and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to ensure that if power bases in Washington alters, it does not alter its ties with Beijing. India may modify its strategic orientation only if there is acute crisis and not with the gradual evolution of the global order.



Historically, while playing a global leadership role, India has contributed in the form of ideas (NAM and G-77 dominated the Cold War as counters to a bipolar world) but they were never aimed at a fundamental rehauling of the system. This is one of the key leadership styles of India. India tends to be non-offensive and defensively tries to block or delay any action it may perceive as unwanted. However, now there is a belief that India may happen to change its leadership style in future. This was evident from the speech by Indian foreign secretary S. Jaishankar in July, 2015. In the speech, while discussing the US, China and India, he asserted that India does not aim to be a balancing power but a leading power with a willingness to shoulder greater responsibilities in the future.



In the recent times Modi has visited several small countries. There were criticisms from many reviewers of the visits in India since the countries he visited were small ones, such as Fiji. The way India has reached out to these small nations clearly signify that it is willing to accept these states as willing participants in its regional outreach, which will help India to showcase its responsibilities as an emerging leader. India will use its economic assistance model to cultivate these constituencies in the near future. India has also started making efforts to embed its credible leadership into institutions and Indian Ocean Naval Symposium is an example of the same. Thus, in the future non-alignment (read as strategic autonomy) will continue to guide India's relations with great powers. Economic power will continue to be used a regional policy tool to assert power in South Asia. India, in the future, is likely to expand its options and accept global responsibilities to play a leadership role in the global affairs ahead.

Why is India not a Great Power (yet)?

The status of great power is not achieved only through economic strength, natural resources and population but a vision; a defined national interest and an aggressive foreign and military policy to achieve the national interests. It also includes the use of hard and soft power to assert the status in the global realm externally. In this concluding chapter of the book, we will analyze the constraints which are faced by India to be a great power and assert that the problem in India is that Indian policy making machinery invariably aims low and hits even lower. Though India has achieved economic growth, but, its growth has not seen a parallel increase in its ambitions and thereby sticking India at a level of a quasi-great power. In the 21st century, India has not articulated its own vision, but, prefers to be hailed as a 'major power' (as stated by US President Bush) by others and therefore, clearly showing a void in enlargement of policy horizons and ambitions. In the 21st century, India has tried to fit into the new world order to advance its own national interests. In Ramayana, when Hanuman is about to enter into a battle with Ravan, he loses his self-confidence despite others cheering around him. Hanuman's friend Jambuwan (a bear) reminds Hanuman that he has enormous powers to achieve success. India is this Hanuman in the situation. It is dwarfed with doubts in mind of its weaknesses and a lack of strategic will at the political level despite being potentially powerful. India does boast off its geography, resources and capabilities but lacks a political direction to improve its great power possibilities. India had made a blunder in the 1950's by allowing China to be a Permanent Member of the UNSC. Had India, based on its own assessments of its capabilities, took on the seat, India would have been able to assert its great power status. Doing this would have given India an edge over China also.

Due to this blunder at that time, till today, India keeps pleading for ‘structural reforms’ of UN. The second blunder of India was not to go fully nuclear even when in 1960’s it had developed the capabilities to do so. Had India tested a nuclear weapon prior to 1967(coming of NPT), India would have entered the privileged club of Nuclear Weapon States. But, India has used soft power as a tool to achieve great power status, but merely using the soft tools has not propelled the country to achieve the great power status it intends to achieve. In India, there are three different conceptions to achieve the great power status. One school believes that if India makes moral policies and assumes a moralistic foreign policy, it will take India in the great power club. Secondly, some feel that if India uses soft power tools and displays the soft power diplomacy, then soft power could be a passport to great power. Thirdly, some believe that India has its own domestic problems, ranging from poverty to internal security issues, and these problems are distracting India’s great power aspirations. Even though India has used soft power tools like culture to aspire for a great power status, but, at the foreign policy level, India has preferred to meshed more with great powers of the world. Most of the diplomatic and political capital has been invested in improving and deepening ties with the great powers of the world because India feels that its national interests are best served by great powers. Due to this inconsistency, of promoting soft power globally but engaging more with great powers only, India is unable to develop soft power superiority in the international arena. Many countries with which India has a strong cultural connect; in South East Asia and Africa have accepted that India’s soft power diplomacy is merely rhetoric. They assert that India uses soft power to show that it is culturally connected, but does not go beyond the rhetoric. This rhetoric has taken India all the more away from the great power status it aspires. Another factor responsible for narrowing the Indian ambitions to a great power status is India’s positioning at the nuclear level. In the last one decade, India has tried to establish itself as a ‘responsible nuclear power’. This is done by India to distinguish its nuclear program from that of Pakistan and North Korea. Such a view only positions India as a rising power and not a great power. Such an attitude of India has led to many states in the West to make India a strategic partner. The bigger issue in India is how India perceives the world. India believes in the concept of Vasudhaivakutumbakam. This means that India feels that the world is one family. Such a family affair assumed by India is a clear reflection of the fact that India wants to adopt a ‘don’t rock the boat’ approach. India wants to go along with the tide. India does not realize that great powers don’t go with the tide. The great powers rarely observe the international law. They rather mould the international system to suit their interests. All Indian Prime Ministers from Nehru to Modi have endorsed the concept of Vasudhaivakutumbakam. This clearly means that Indian political leadership is still not willing to break the glass and emerge in the international arena as a norm setter. Many Indian strategists agree that India believes that great power status is its birthright. Many agree that India feels that the world owes a lot of favor. India till now, strategists agree, has not yet geared up to play a role of responsibilities in the world. Therefore, India may have an exalted self-image, but, lacks a vision to achieve a great power status. Some scholars have asserted that during the British rule, the Indian army was used to suppress the population. Also, during the national movement, too much of emphasis was laid upon non-violence.

Therefore, post independence, in Indian foreign policy thinking, the goals of ahimsa became more important than use of military to achieve international power. What India instantly needs is a long-term vision and plan on how it intends to achieve a great power status. The plan needs to be executed by a strong political leadership that is capable of shaking up the bureaucratic setup to take India to the great heights it envisages.

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