Question COM 05

COM-05 How will a kiosk without internet check who is authorised to issue, change or withdraw a notice, including when a device or security key has been compromised?

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Why this matters

People need to know both who sent a notice and whether that person has the authority for that instruction.

What to bring back

Prepare trust rules for publishers and devices: who has been given authority, when it expires, secure storage and recovery of the signing keys that prove who sent a message, withdrawing access, isolating a compromised device and handling a delayed withdrawal message. Practise what the public sees when authority is uncertain.

What we know so far

• Straddie Disaster Kiosk Pitch.pdf — reviewed source; public copy can be added through the evidence process
• Professional review and comparison of proposed improvements (When this work overlaps professional or public-authority responsibilities, compare the proposal and Luke's research with applicable industry/global best practice and relevant legal-engine sources. Record differences, reasonable improvements and deficiencies, with the responsible reviewer and response. Routine authorised drafting and wiki work can advance.)
• Council plan crosswalk and proposed Aura integration (Relevant question row identifies the management/recovery source section and printed/PDF page. AI-generated analysis, 21 October 2026; proposed checks and actual review/operating agreements retain separate status.)

AI-generated potential answers

For discussion and review · research checked 2026-10-20. These are AI-generated options and transfer assessments. The user's request and research method identify the source of this work. The source catalogue states what the references establish. The decision and approval record retains its own status.

Separate transport encryption from authority to publish. Give each authorised issuer a bounded role and signing identity, with offline-verifiable records, expiry and a planned withdrawal path. Show uncertainty when the kiosk cannot confirm current authority, while retaining the issuer's original wording and source reference.

Offline trust pack

AI-generated adaptation of an existing pattern. Compare a signed local issuer register with managed device credentials, protected backups and a lost-key drill. Use NIST's device-security capabilities as a review checklist; check the chosen radio firmware's authentication limits independently.

Research basis: NIST's IoT Cybersecurity Capabilities Catalog · Meshtastic encryption.

Time-bounded delegated publisher

AI-generated future concept. Explore short-lived publication delegation for an Aura acting within a named person's or organisation's mandate. The signed record would preserve the delegator, permitted subjects, expiry and review trail, with clear public labelling of assisted drafting.

Examples and local differences

• Meshtastic encryption: AI transfer assessment: Meshtastic's version-dependent protections show why a network label alone does not establish message trust. Local difference to check: Official-issuer authority and stolen-device recovery require additional local agreements and security design.

Evidence to bring back next

• Run stolen-device, expired-authority and delayed-withdrawal exercises while offline.
• Have security reviewers compare the design with current Australian obligations and threat assumptions.

People and connected choices

Who reviews: Proposed information authority and security reviewer with operator; role and appointment awaiting confirmation

Connected questions: DAT-01, COM-01

Work state: open. Assigned person or AI assistant: Ready to be assigned.

Research and alternatives can move ahead while connected decisions develop. Before acting on a choice, check the people, evidence and approved scope in People decide.