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Comprehensive Wireless Lab Security Assessment Master Playbook

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This document combines a Device Operational Guide, Red Team (Offensive) Plan, and Blue Team (Defensive) Assessment for an authorized, self-hosted wireless lab.

๐ŸŽฏ Purpose

Homelab-specific operational playbook that ties together the individual hardware guides in Documentation/ (Pwnagotchi, Bjorn, Evil-M5, Bruce, WiFi Marauder) into one coordinated red-team/blue-team exercise against your own lab network. This is the "how it all fits together" document - for command-level detail on any single device, see its dedicated file in Documentation/.

โš™๏ธ Function

Three parts: a device inventory/operational quick-reference table for every tool in the kit (cross-referencing the per-device guides), a phased Red Team playbook (passive recon โ†’ active recon โ†’ exploitation โ†’ physical/persistence), and a parallel Blue Team playbook (ROE, baseline definition, controlled validation phases, reporting templates) that reframes the same devices as defensive-validation tools rather than attack tools.

๐Ÿ† Goal

Run a full-cycle offense/defense exercise against your own homelab wireless environment using the hardware inventory, and walk away with a completed findings report and remediation backlog (Appendix A templates) rather than just a pile of captures.

๐Ÿ“‹ When to Use

  • Running a coordinated red/blue exercise across your full hardware kit rather than one device at a time
  • Onboarding a new piece of hardware into the lab and needing to know where it fits in the attack/defense phase model
  • Needing the Blue Team framing (Part 2) to validate defenses rather than just attack - useful when the goal is hardening, not just capture

PART 0: MASTER DEVICE INVENTORY & OPERATIONAL GUIDE

This section details every piece of hardware in your arsenal, its specific role, and general usage instructions.

1. Monitoring & Reconnaissance Station

Device Role Use Instructions / Config
Raspberry Pi Zero 2 W
(Kali Linux + USB/Eth Hat)
The "Mothership"
Central monitoring, packet capture, and logging.
Boot: SSH in via Ethernet or OOB WiFi.
Cmd: sudo airmon-ng start wlan0 (internal) or wlan1 (external).
Run: kismet -c wlan1 or airodump-ng wlan1.
2x Alfa AWUS036ACS Long-Range Eyes
High-gain packet capture linked to the Kali Pi or Laptop.
Connect: Plug into Pi Hat or Laptop.
Driver: apt install realtek-rtl88xxau-dkms.
Mode: Supports Monitor mode & Packet Injection (5GHz/2.4GHz).
T-Dongle S3
(ZeroTrace Firmware)
Wardriving / Presence
Passive tracking of devices and vendors.
Boot: Plug into power bank.
Usage: Observe screen for "Found Devices" counts. Review logs on SD card later.
Note: Use with VK172 GPS for geolocation data.
USB VK172 GPS Geolocation
Adds GPS coordinates to packet captures.
Connect: Plug into Kali Pi or T-Dongle hub.
Cmd: gpsd /dev/ttyACM0. Verifies location for Kismet/ZeroTrace.

2. WiFi Attacks & Handshake Capture

Device Role Use Instructions / Config
Hak5 WiFi Pineapple Rogue AP / MITM
The "Evil Twin" platform.
Boot: Power on.
Access: Web UI at 172.16.42.1:1471.
Action: Module > PineAP > Enable. Use Pineapple Pager to vibrate on client connect.
Pineapple Pager Physical Alerting
Haptic feedback for Pineapple events.
Setup: Connects wirelessly to Pineapple.
Use: Clip to belt. Vibrates when a victim connects to your Rogue AP.
Pwnagotchi
(Pi Zero + E-ink)
AI Handshake Hunter
Passive/Active learning capture.
Boot: Plug into battery. Watch screen.
Status: Face = Happy (Capturing).
Retrieve: Connect via USB (Data mode) to /handshakes folder.
Bjorn
(Pi Zero + E-ink)
Aggressive Scanner
Network vulnerability scanner/deauther.
Boot: Plug into battery.
Action: Automatically scans/attacks based on config.yaml.
Display: Shows current target and capture status.
M5Stack Fire
(Purple Hash Monster)
PMKID Capture
Captures RSN PMKIDs (WPA2).
Boot: Press Red button.
Usage: Device auto-scans 2.4G. Screen lists captured hashes.
Log: Hashes saved to SD card.
M5Stack Cardputer
(Evil-M5)
Portable Swiss Army Knife
Deauth, Beacon Spam, Probing.
Boot: Power switch.
Menu: Select WiFi > Scan > Select Target > Deauth.
Keyboard: Use onboard keys to select menu options.

3. Bluetooth (BLE) & Sub-GHz RF

Device Role Use Instructions / Config
M5Stick Pro 2
(Nemo Firmware)
Portable BLE/WiFi Scanner
Handheld recon.
Boot: Side button.
Menu: Select BLE to see nearby beacons/tags. Select WiFi for deauth list.
Note: Great for checking "Apple Bleed" (spamming iOS popups).
GeeekPi nRF52840 Deep BLE Sniffing
Raw packet analysis.
Connect: Plug into PC/Mac.
Software: Wireshark + Nordic Sniffer Plugin.
Action: Select "nRF Sniffer" interface in Wireshark to see raw BLE frames.
T-Embed CC1101 #1
(Bruce Firmware)
Multi-Protocol RF
Sub-GHz & WiFi analysis.
Boot: Scroll wheel to select.
Menu: SubGhz > Read. Captures 433/915MHz signals.
T-Embed CC1101 #2
(Ghost ESP)
ESP-NOW / Beacon Spam
WiFi frame manipulation.
Boot: Auto-runs Ghost.
Use: Generates "Ghost" SSIDs or tests ESP-NOW triggers.
EvilCrow v2 RF Replay Attack
Sub-GHz signal recording.
Access: Web UI (WiFi AP).
Action: Receive > Press Button 1 to Record > Transmit > Press Button 2 to Replay.
YardStick One RF Transceiver
PC-based Radio analysis.
Connect: USB to Kali.
Cmd: rfcat -r (interactive python mode).
Use: Determining exact frequency and modulation of captured signals.

4. Physical & HID (Human Interface Device)

Device Role Use Instructions / Config
Rubber Ducky Keystroke Injection
Fast payload delivery.
Setup: Encode payload.txt to inject.bin.
Deploy: Plug into victim USB. Waits for driver, types script.
Lab Use: Test if endpoints block new USB keyboards.
Bash Bunny Advanced Exfiltration
Emulates Ethernet/Serial/Storage.
Switch: Select Position 1 or 2 (Payloads).
Deploy: Plug in. LED indicates status (Green = Done).
Loot: Saved to udisk/loot folder.
Raspberry Pi Zero
(P4wnP1 A.L.O.A + OLED)
The "Implant"
Persistent backdoor over USB.
Connect: MicroUSB (Data port) to target.
OLED: Shows IP address and current attack mode.
Access: Connect via WiFi to P4wnP1 AP, then SSH/Web UI to control.

PART 1: RED TEAM PLAYBOOK (The "Plan of Attack")

Phase 1: Passive Reconnaissance (The "Silent" Phase)

Goal: Map the wireless landscape without transmitting packets that could trigger an IDS.

1. WiFi Mapping & Client Discovery

  • Tool: Raspberry Pi Zero 2 W (Kali Linux + USB/Ethernet Hat)
  • Action: Put the interface in Monitor Mode. Run Kismet or Airodump-ng. This is your "Ground Truth" device.
  • Logging: Configure Kismet to log to .kismet and .pcap files.
    • Command: kismet -c wlan1 --log-title lab_audit

2. Automated Handshake Hunting

  • Tool: Pwnagotchi (Pi Zero with e-ink)
  • Action: Run passively using reinforcement learning to maximize handshake captures.
  • Logging: Handshakes saved automatically to /handshakes.

3. Presence Detection

  • Tool: T-Dongle S3 (ZeroTrace)
  • Action: "Wardriving" simulation to identify vendor presence (Apple, Samsung, etc.).

Phase 2: Active Reconnaissance & Signal Analysis

Goal: Probe the environment to identify specific vulnerabilities.

1. Bluetooth/BLE Enumeration

  • Tool: M5Stick Pro 2 (Nemo) & GeeekPi nRF52840 Sniffer
  • Action:
    • Nemo: Scan for BLE beacons.
    • nRF52840: Sniff raw BLE packets into Wireshark.
  • Logging: Save .pcap files to analyze unencrypted BLE data exchange.

2. Sub-GHz Signal Analysis

  • Tool: T-Embed CC1101 (Bruce/Ghost Firmware) & Yard Stick One
  • Action: Scan for 433MHz or 915MHz signals (security sensors, remotes).
  • Logging: Use rfcat with Yard Stick One to log raw radio data.

Phase 3: Exploitation (The Attack)

Goal: Gain access to the network or devices.

1. The "Evil Twin" / Rogue AP

  • Tool: Hak5 WiFi Pineapple + Pineapple Pager
  • Action: Launch PineAP. Mimic known SSIDs to trick devices into connecting.
  • Logging: Enable PineAP Log. Use tcpdump to capture victim traffic.

2. WPA/WPA2 Cracking

  • Tool: M5Stack Fire (Purple Hash Monster) & Bjorn
  • Action:
    • Purple Hash Monster: Capture PMKID.
    • Bjorn: Aggressive de-authentication to force 4-way handshakes.
  • Logging: Export .pcap or .hccapx files for Hashcat.

3. Signal Replay (RF)

  • Tool: Evil Crow RF V2
  • Action: Capture and replay signals (e.g., smart plugs).
  • Logging: Screenshot signal graphs to analyze Rolling vs. Fixed codes.

Phase 4: Physical Access & Persistence

Goal: Simulate physical intrusion.

1. The BadUSB Attack

  • Tool: Rubber Ducky or Bash Bunny
  • Action: "Ducky Script" execution (e.g., exfiltrate WiFi profiles).
  • Logging: Bash Bunny logs to loot folder.

2. The "Implant"

  • Tool: Raspberry Pi Zero (P4wnP1 A.L.O.A.)
  • Action: Create hidden network interface over USB.
  • Logging: SSH session logging via screen or tmux.

RaspyJack โ€” Raspberry Pi Portable Assessment Workflow

Project spelling and provenance: the upstream project is RaspyJack (sometimes typed "RaspiJack"), maintained at 7h30th3r0n3/Raspyjack, with a distinct installation wiki. It is a Linux/Python application suite for Raspberry Pi, not a flashable ESP32 binary, Hak5 Shark Jack firmware, or a Flipper Zero application. Integrate it into the lab as a scoped operator-controlled Raspberry Pi workstation, never as an unattended implant.

Hardware, Layout & Threat Model

Component Role / boundary
Raspberry Pi Zero 2 W + stable power + microSD Common reference target; a display is optional if using the WebUI
Waveshare 1.44-inch ST7735 or 1.3-inch ST7789 LCD HAT Supported portable menu controls; pick the right installer display profile
USB Ethernet/HUB HAT or lab Ethernet adapter Isolated management transport; some headless builds require wired connectivity
External USB Wi-Fi adapter (optional) Monitor-capable surveys depend on exact chipset/driver; never infer injection support from the Pi's built-in Wi-Fi
Raspberry Pi OS Lite, pinned upstream revision Host OS; installer changes packages, system services and network configuration
WebUI & Payload IDE Privileged management surface; accessible only from an isolated/admin-controlled network, not public Internet
/root/Raspyjack, payloads/, loot/, config/ Project and evidence locations described upstream; do not put actual client secrets into git

RaspyJack includes payloads that can affect networks, collect credentials or launch remote-control processes. Default scope here excludes those capabilities. An installed toolkit does not authorize executing all included payloads. Review upstream code and each selected script; its feature availability is not guaranteed across versions, display models or optional modules.

Installation โ€” Clean Disposable Lab First

  1. Image a spare SD card with the upstream-compatible Raspberry Pi OS Lite version for your specific Pi. Establish a local admin user, secure SSH, and an isolated lab management network. Never first-install it on a client's production Pi.
  2. Verify power, display SPI pinout, Ethernet connectivity and target architecture. Apply system updates and take an SD image or snapshot before running a third-party installer.
  3. Review the source install script for package repositories, services, root privileges, firewall/proxy changes and web listener bindings. Review the exact revision with git log -1.
  4. Follow the upstream installer only after approval. The documented path is /root/Raspyjack; execute from a local console and select the correct display type. The upstream installer may set up SPI, IยฒC, systemd units, Wi-Fi/network tools and a WebUI.
  5. Reboot in the lab. Confirm expected screen/menu, network interface IDs and health checks; do not enable any offensive payloads. Run these read-only checks:
uname -a
cat /etc/os-release
ip -br link
sudo ss -lntp
systemctl --type=service --state=running | grep -Ei 'raspyjack|caddy' || true
  1. Confirm the WebUI is reachable only through a management interface, close unexpected exposed ports, change all credentials/tokens, restrict access with firewall/VLAN rules and verify TLS if configured. Upstream documents https://<device-ip>/ with an optional http://<device-ip>:8080 fallback; a working HTTP fallback is not secure for untrusted networks.
  2. Back up the configured lab image and document the commit, dependency versions, screen/hat, authorized network, remote-access configuration and rollback procedure.

Lab RJ1 โ€” Console, Services & Configuration Acceptance

  1. Start RaspyJack in the isolated lab with all network-invasive payloads disabled.
  2. Confirm LCD/joystick operation, device process status and read-only WebUI dashboard access. Identify any open remote management ports through ss.
  3. Compare installed services with the reviewed installer, and disable anything not needed for this exercise through normal host administration.
  4. Test a login failure and an approved login using synthetic credentials. Record authentication/session behavior without collecting real user credentials.
  5. Ensure the WebUI is unreachable from a deliberately isolated guest/test VLAN.

Pass: a documented, restricted and recoverable management surface. Fail: unexpected root-accessible public listener or missing authentication.

Lab RJ2 โ€” Local Inventory Without Network Scanning

  1. From the Pi's terminal, record its own hostname, OS release, interface names/IPs and default routes.
  2. Review payloads/ directory names with find/ls; do not run them.
  3. Create a test folder with a dummy note, exercise the local files/loot browser only if its version supports read-only browsing, then remove the dummy note.
  4. Export a version/asset manifest. Use this as the baseline before enabling an optional Ethernet or monitor-mode Wi-Fi adapter.

Lab RJ3 โ€” Approved Lab Host Discovery

  1. Obtain written scope for one synthetic lab host IP and approved rate/ports. Confirm the Raspberry Pi is on the right isolated VLAN.
  2. Use a low-impact TCP connection check from the Pi to a known service on the controlled test host (such as SSH you configured). For example, nc -vz -w 2 192.0.2.10 22 is syntax illustration: replace the documentation-only IP with the approved test host.
  3. Compare observed reachability with the host firewall and switch/router logs. If blocked, do not broaden scanning without new approval.
  4. Record DNS/route changes and whether the Pi can reach excluded VLANs; verify that required segmentation is enforced.

Lab RJ4 โ€” Read-Only Wireless Adapter Qualification

  1. Connect an independently supported Wi-Fi adapter to the Pi on a dedicated isolated lab AP environment.
  2. Record lsusb, iw dev and ip -br link. Identify whether this driver supports monitor mode; do not assume all branded adapters have identical chipset revisions.
  3. Verify owned AP visibility using a passive-capable sensor workflow and an independent AP/controller inventory. If the adapter requires interface reconfiguration, save/restore baseline networking and do not disconnect the management link.
  4. Correlate with Marauder standalone survey, Flipper Marauder, and Biscuit as different collection platforms, not interchangeable firmware.

Lab RJ5 โ€” WIDS/Endpoint Telemetry & Evidence Export

  1. Create a unique lab SSID on a separate owned AP and record its BSSID, channel, start time and intended security posture.
  2. Monitor appearance through a supported, non-disruptive receiver. Where a separate Kismet sensor and Wazuh ingestion exist, compare their real logs to RaspyJack inventory notes.
  3. Do not claim RaspyJack directly ships Wazuh alerts: inspect the installed source first, and use a documented external log ingestion path where needed.
  4. Turn the AP off, collect negative-control observations, and store only redacted evidence and hashes.

Lab RJ6 โ€” Operational Recovery & Secure Handoff

  1. Save the verified SD image, installed commit, packages, service configuration and hostname; encrypt any assessment artifacts.
  2. Test a controlled reboot, management reconnect and restoration to the baseline image on a spare SD card.
  3. Ensure no scanning/portal/C2/credential services auto-start. Confirm firewall, routes and WebUI exposure.
  4. Delete synthetic data and rotate any temporary admin credentials before putting the Pi into storage or shipping it between job sites.

Evidence & Deployment Acceptance

Evidence Minimum record
Host provenance Pi model, HAT, adapter/chipset, SD image, OS and upstream commit
Authorization Scope, approved VLAN/host/SSID, operator, stop time
Management UI bound address/ports, authentication, firewall isolation
Observation In-scope asset, tool/mode, timestamps, independent confirmation
Forensics Redacted filename, SHA-256 digest, retention and secure transport
Rollback Services stopped, guest isolation confirmed, backup restore tested

Failure conditions: unexpected routes, unsolicited wireless transmissions, privileged remote UI exposure, installer modifying production network services, collection of genuine credentials, or traffic to out-of-scope IPs. Stop and restore the clean image.

Related Existing Guides

Portable cyberdeck design ยท Bjorn Pi ยท Marauder ยท Bruce ยท Wireless surveying ยท Network architecture


PART 2: BLUE TEAM PLAYBOOK (Defensive / Authorized Assessment)

This section focuses on safe, defensive validation: discovering whatโ€™s present, measuring exposure, and verifying that common attack classes are mitigated.

0) Rules of Engagement (ROE) and Safety Guardrails

  • Written authorization: confirm you own the gear/network or have explicit permission.
  • Scope: define SSIDs, VLANs/subnets, APs, switches, endpoints, IoT, and โ€œout of scopeโ€ devices.
  • Impact tolerance: decide what is allowed (passive listening, active scanning, deauth tests, etc.). Default to non-disruptive.
  • Logging & evidence: enable central logging before you start (router/AP logs, syslog, Zeek/Suricata, packet capture points).
  • Stop conditions: any sign of instability, repeated client drops, or unexpected critical device behavior.

1) Lab Inventory and Tooling Map

Devices mentioned (capabilities, corrected notes)

  • Raspberry Pi Zero 2 W (Kali + USB/Ethernet hat): great for network discovery, packet capture, and running lightweight recon tooling.
  • Alfa AWUS036ACS adapters: useful for wireless monitoring/assessment (as drivers support).
  • Hak5 WiFi Pineapple: commonly used to test client/AP hardening against rogue AP / โ€œevil twinโ€ scenarios (defensively: verify protections are in place).
  • Pi Zero running P4wnP1 (USB gadget): useful for your own endpoint hardening tests in controlled conditions.
  • M5Stick / nRF52840 BLE sniffer: suited for Bluetooth Low Energy visibility and analysis (sniffing in your environment).
  • CC1101 radios (T-Embed): sub-GHz ISM exploration (common bands like 315/433/868/915 MHz depending on region).
    • Note: CC1101 is not an โ€œ802.15.1/SMBusโ€ tool-802.15.1 is Bluetooth; SMBus is a wired bus based on IยฒC.
  • Rubber Ducky / Bash Bunny: best treated as endpoint security validation tools (e.g., verifying USB policies, EDR response, least privilege), not โ€œpayload delivery platforms.โ€

2) Baseline: What โ€œGoodโ€ Looks Like

Before testing, define the target posture:

Wireless baseline

  • WPA2/WPA3 enabled appropriately (prefer WPA3 where possible).
  • PMF / 802.11w (Protected Management Frames) enabled if supported (helps mitigate some management-frame abuse).
  • WPS disabled.
  • Strong SSID separation (Guest/IoT/Corp) and VLAN segmentation.
  • AP firmware up to date; management interfaces not exposed broadly.

Network baseline

  • Default-deny inbound from Guest/IoT to internal segments.
  • Separate management VLAN (AP/switch/router admin only).
  • DNS filtering and egress control for IoT where possible.
  • Central logging (router/AP + host logs) and time sync (NTP).

3) Phase 1 - Passive Recon (Low Risk)

Goal: observe without changing anything.

Wireless (monitor-only)

  • Identify SSIDs, channels, security modes (WPA2/WPA3), and band usage (2.4/5/6 GHz).
  • Confirm whether APs advertise PMF capability and whether clients negotiate it.
  • Capture representative management traffic for documentation (limited duration; avoid collecting sensitive payloads).

Wired / internal visibility

  • Identify subnets, gateways, and DHCP/DNS servers.
  • Confirm where logging sensors sit (SPAN port, inline tap, or host-based).

Artifacts to produce

  • Network diagram (SSID โ†’ VLAN โ†’ subnet โ†’ gateway โ†’ services).
  • Device inventory table (MAC/vendor, IP, hostname, segment, role).
  • โ€œExpected vs observedโ€ security settings snapshot.

4) Phase 2 - Network Enumeration (Controlled Active Scanning)

Goal: map assets and exposure with minimal disruption.

Host discovery and service mapping

  • Enumerate active hosts per subnet.
  • Identify open ports/services and tag โ€œshouldnโ€™t be hereโ€ findings:
    • Admin panels exposed outside management VLAN
    • SMB/AFP/NFS where not intended
    • Old protocols (Telnet, FTP, SMBv1)

Vulnerability and configuration review (defensive)

  • Check firmware versions (AP/router/switch) and patch status.
  • Validate TLS usage on admin interfaces.
  • Confirm strong admin auth (unique creds, MFA where supported, no default accounts).

Artifacts to produce

  • Service inventory (host โ†’ port โ†’ service โ†’ justification).
  • Patch/firmware status report.
  • โ€œHigh-risk servicesโ€ list prioritized by impact + likelihood.

5) Phase 3 - Wireless Security Controls Validation (Defensive Tests)

Goal: validate you are resilient to common wireless attack classes without providing attack recipes.

Rogue AP / evil twin resilience (defensive checklist)

  • Do clients auto-join similarly named SSIDs?
  • Are corporate devices configured to require correct certificate/known network parameters (if using enterprise auth)?
  • Is โ€œauto-joinโ€ disabled for sensitive endpoints?
  • Are guest networks isolated so a mis-association doesnโ€™t become lateral movement?

Client isolation and segmentation

  • Verify guest network cannot reach internal subnets.
  • Verify IoT VLAN cannot reach management VLAN.
  • Confirm mDNS/SSDP is controlled (only where required).

AP hardening checks

  • WPS disabled.
  • PMF enabled where possible.
  • Separate SSIDs for different trust zones.
  • Management plane restricted by VLAN/firewall rules.

Artifacts to produce

  • โ€œControl matrixโ€ showing each protection, where itโ€™s configured, and test evidence.

6) Phase 4 - BLE / Sub-GHz Surface Mapping (Visibility-First)

Goal: understand what RF surfaces exist in your environment and how youโ€™d defend them.

BLE (Bluetooth Low Energy) assessment

  • Inventory BLE devices (name, MAC/randomization behavior, services advertised).
  • Identify risky patterns:
    • No pairing/bonding required for sensitive actions
    • Legacy pairing modes
    • Debug characteristics left enabled
  • Validate defensive controls:
    • Firmware updates
    • Pairing restrictions
    • Physical access controls for critical BLE devices

Sub-GHz exploration (CC1101 class radios)

  • Identify whether your environment uses sub-GHz devices (sensors, remotes, alarms, weather stations).
  • Document frequencies and device types only for your own equipment.
  • Defensive focus: determine if critical functions rely on unauthenticated one-way signals and whether mitigations exist (rolling codes, encryption, physical safeguards).

Artifacts to produce

  • RF asset inventory (BLE + sub-GHz): device, purpose, risk notes, mitigations.

7) Phase 5 - Endpoint Security Validation (Safe, Controlled)

Tools like USB gadget platforms and keystroke-injection devices can be used defensively to validate endpoint controls:

What to validate

  • USB device control policies (block unknown HID/storage/network adapters).
  • EDR/AV detection & response for suspicious process trees and script execution.
  • Least privilege: can a standard user change security settings?
  • Logging: are events captured (Windows Event Logs, Sysmon, EDR telemetry)?

Artifacts to produce

  • Endpoint hardening checklist results
  • Gaps + recommended controls (Device Control, AppLocker/WDAC, macOS PPPC profiles, etc.)

8) Logging, Notes, and Evidence Handling

  • Maintain a single โ€œcase notebookโ€:
    • Date/time, device used, test performed, scope, observed result
  • Store captures responsibly:
    • Minimize retention of sensitive payload data
    • Hash evidence files if you care about integrity tracking
  • Correlate:
    • Packet captures โ†” AP logs โ†” DHCP logs โ†” endpoint logs

9) Reporting Template (What You Hand to โ€œFuture Youโ€)

Executive summary

  • What you tested
  • Top 5 risks
  • Quick wins (30โ€“60 minutes)
  • Medium-term fixes (1โ€“4 weeks)

Technical findings (per item)

  • Title
  • Affected segment/devices
  • Evidence (what you observed)
  • Impact
  • Likelihood
  • Recommended remediation
  • Validation steps (how youโ€™ll confirm the fix)

Remediation backlog

  • Prioritized tasks with owners and target dates

Appendix A - Operational Templates

Use the following templates to document your findings as you execute the playbooks.

1. network_map.md

Purpose: To visualize the target environment and where your tools sit within it.

# Network Map & Topology

**Date:** 2024-XX-XX
**Observer Device:** Kali Pi Zero 2 W (Monitor Mode)

## High-Level Topology
[ISP Modem] --> [Router/Firewall]
      |
      +--> [Managed Switch]
            |
            +--> VLAN 10 (Mgmt): [AP Admin], [NAS]
            |
            +--> VLAN 20 (Corp/Home): [PC], [Laptop], [Phones]
            |
            +--> VLAN 30 (IoT): [Smart Bulbs], [Cameras] (Isolated)
            |
            +--> [Attacker Tools]: [Kali Pi (Monitor)], [Pineapple (Rogue)]

## Subnet Details
| VLAN ID | Name | Subnet | Gateway | DHCP Range | Notes |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 1 | Native | 192.168.1.0/24 | 192.168.1.1 | None | Switch Mgmt only |
| 10 | Management | 10.0.10.0/24 | 10.0.10.1 | Static | Critical Infra |
| 20 | Home/Corp | 10.0.20.0/24 | 10.0.20.1 | .100 - .200 | Trusted Devices |
| 30 | IoT | 10.0.30.0/24 | 10.0.30.1 | .10 - .250 | **No Internet Access** |

2. asset_inventory.csv

Purpose: A raw spreadsheet of discovered devices.

MAC_Address,IP_Address,Hostname,Vendor,VLAN/SSID,Role,Notes
00:11:22:33:44:55,192.168.1.50,Lab-Router,Ubiquiti,Mgmt,Gateway,Firmware v1.5.6 (Needs Update)
AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF,10.0.20.15,My-iPhone,Apple,Home_Secure,Client,Private Address enabled
12:34:56:78:90:AB,10.0.30.5,Unknown-Plug,Tuya/Generic,Home_IoT,IoT,Communicating with cn.tuya.com
DE:AD:BE:EF:00:00,N/A,Kali-Pi-Zero,Raspberry Pi,Monitor,Auditor,My Recon Device
CA:FE:BA:BE:00:00,172.16.42.1,WiFi-Pineapple,Hak5,Rogue_AP,Attacker,Management Interface
00:00:00:00:00:00,N/A,Pwnagotchi,Raspberry Pi,Monitor,Attacker,Handshake Hunter

3. wireless_controls_matrix.md

Purpose: To audit the security settings of specific SSIDs.

# Wireless Controls Matrix
**Assessment Date:** 2024-XX-XX

## SSID Configuration Audit
| SSID Name | Broadcast? | Auth Type | Encryption | PMF (802.11w) | WPS Status | Frequency | Verdict |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| `Home_Secure` | Yes | WPA3-SAE | AES | Required | Disabled | 5GHz/6GHz | โœ… PASS |
| `Home_IoT` | Yes | WPA2-PSK | AES/TKIP | Optional | **Enabled** | 2.4GHz | โŒ FAIL (WPS) |
| `Guest_WiFi` | No | Open | OWE | Disabled | Disabled | 2.4/5GHz | โš ๏ธ WARN (Open) |

## Rogue AP Resilience (Evil Twin Test)
| Client Device | Auto-Join Enabled? | Connects to Pineapple? | Notes |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| iPhone 13 | Yes | No | Correctly identified cert mismatch |
| Old IoT Camera | Yes | **Yes** | Device has no cert validation; captured creds |
| Windows Laptop | No | No | GPO Prevents auto-connection to open networks |

4. rf_inventory.md

Purpose: To log findings from M5Stick (Nemo), CC1101, etc.

# RF & Sub-GHz Inventory
**Tools Used:** M5Stick (Nemo), T-Embed (CC1101), Yard Stick One

## Bluetooth LE (BLE) Findings
| Device Name | MAC Address | RSSI | Services Exposed | Security Risk |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| `LivingRoom_TV` | Random | -60 | Remote Control, Audio | Low (Pairing req) |
| `Smart_Tag_01` | Fixed | -45 | Location Beacon | Medium (Trackable) |
| `N/A (Smart Lock)`| Fixed | -30 | **Unlock Service** | **Critical** (No bonding required!) |

## Sub-GHz (433/915 MHz) Findings
| Frequency | Modulation | Signal Type | Source | Replay Attack Possible? |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 433.92 MHz | ASK/OOK | Remote | Garage Door | No (Rolling Code detected) |
| 315.00 MHz | ASK | Sensor | Door Contact | **Yes** (Fixed code replay worked) |

5. findings_report.md

Purpose: To document specific vulnerabilities found.

# Technical Finding: [Title]

**Severity:** [Critical/High/Medium/Low]
**Affected Asset:** [Device Name/IP]
**Tool Used:** [e.g., WiFi Pineapple, Bjorn]

## Observation
Describe what was observed. 
*Example: The 'Home_IoT' network was observed broadcasting WPS support. The Reaver tool successfully recovered the pin in 14 minutes.*

## Evidence
* [Insert Screenshot or Log Snippet]
* [Pcap file reference]

## Impact
Describe what an attacker could do.
*Example: An attacker can bypass the WiFi password and gain entry to the IoT VLAN.*

## Remediation
* Disable WPS in the router settings.
* If WPS cannot be disabled, upgrade firmware or replace the router.

6. remediation_backlog.md

Purpose: To track fixes.

# Remediation Backlog

| ID | Finding | Priority | Owner | Status | Due Date |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 001 | WPS Enabled on IoT VLAN | High | Admin | To Do | 2024-02-01 |
| 002 | Deprecated SSH Key on Pi | Medium | Admin | In Progress | 2024-02-05 |
| 003 | Open Port 80 on Camera | High | Admin | **Fixed** | 2024-01-20 |

Appendix B - Quick Wins Checklist

  • Update AP/router/switch firmware
  • Disable WPS everywhere
  • Enable PMF/802.11w where supported
  • Separate Guest/IoT/Management VLANs + enforce firewall rules
  • Lock down management interfaces (VLAN + ACL + MFA)
  • Centralize logs + ensure NTP time sync
  • Endpoint USB controls and script execution policies (where appropriate)

Appendix C - Pro-Tips for Lab Stability

1. Time Synchronization (Forensic Integrity)

  • Problem: Pi Zeros lack RTCs; logs may default to 1970, breaking timeline analysis.
  • Fix: Install DS3231 RTC modules on the Kali Pi and Pwnagotchi, OR ensure an NTP sync via phone tethering occurs immediately upon boot.

2. Protecting the "AI" (Pwnagotchi)

  • Problem: Power cuts corrupt SD cards, destroying the Pwnagotchi's learned "Brain".
  • Fix: Regularly backup /root/brain.nn and /root/handshakes/ to the Kali Pi or a laptop. Use a "Safe Shutdown" script/button if available.

3. De-Confliction (Bjorn vs. Pineapple)

  • Problem: Bjorn may attack the Pineapple's Rogue AP if not scoped correctly, confusing your own logs.
  • Fix: Add the Pineapple's MAC address and "Evil Twin" SSIDs to Bjorn's whitelist.txt (or equivalent config) so your tools don't fight each other.

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