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Comprehensive Wireless Lab Security Assessment Master Playbook
This document combines a Device Operational Guide, Red Team (Offensive) Plan, and Blue Team (Defensive) Assessment for an authorized, self-hosted wireless lab.
Homelab-specific operational playbook that ties together the individual hardware guides in Documentation/ (Pwnagotchi, Bjorn, Evil-M5, Bruce, WiFi Marauder) into one coordinated red-team/blue-team exercise against your own lab network. This is the "how it all fits together" document - for command-level detail on any single device, see its dedicated file in Documentation/.
Three parts: a device inventory/operational quick-reference table for every tool in the kit (cross-referencing the per-device guides), a phased Red Team playbook (passive recon โ active recon โ exploitation โ physical/persistence), and a parallel Blue Team playbook (ROE, baseline definition, controlled validation phases, reporting templates) that reframes the same devices as defensive-validation tools rather than attack tools.
Run a full-cycle offense/defense exercise against your own homelab wireless environment using the hardware inventory, and walk away with a completed findings report and remediation backlog (Appendix A templates) rather than just a pile of captures.
- Running a coordinated red/blue exercise across your full hardware kit rather than one device at a time
- Onboarding a new piece of hardware into the lab and needing to know where it fits in the attack/defense phase model
- Needing the Blue Team framing (Part 2) to validate defenses rather than just attack - useful when the goal is hardening, not just capture
This section details every piece of hardware in your arsenal, its specific role, and general usage instructions.
| Device | Role | Use Instructions / Config |
|---|---|---|
|
Raspberry Pi Zero 2 W (Kali Linux + USB/Eth Hat) |
The "Mothership" Central monitoring, packet capture, and logging. |
Boot: SSH in via Ethernet or OOB WiFi. Cmd: sudo airmon-ng start wlan0 (internal) or wlan1 (external).Run: kismet -c wlan1 or airodump-ng wlan1. |
| 2x Alfa AWUS036ACS |
Long-Range Eyes High-gain packet capture linked to the Kali Pi or Laptop. |
Connect: Plug into Pi Hat or Laptop. Driver: apt install realtek-rtl88xxau-dkms.Mode: Supports Monitor mode & Packet Injection (5GHz/2.4GHz). |
|
T-Dongle S3 (ZeroTrace Firmware) |
Wardriving / Presence Passive tracking of devices and vendors. |
Boot: Plug into power bank. Usage: Observe screen for "Found Devices" counts. Review logs on SD card later. Note: Use with VK172 GPS for geolocation data. |
| USB VK172 GPS |
Geolocation Adds GPS coordinates to packet captures. |
Connect: Plug into Kali Pi or T-Dongle hub. Cmd: gpsd /dev/ttyACM0. Verifies location for Kismet/ZeroTrace. |
| Device | Role | Use Instructions / Config |
|---|---|---|
| Hak5 WiFi Pineapple |
Rogue AP / MITM The "Evil Twin" platform. |
Boot: Power on. Access: Web UI at 172.16.42.1:1471.Action: Module > PineAP > Enable. Use Pineapple Pager to vibrate on client connect. |
| Pineapple Pager |
Physical Alerting Haptic feedback for Pineapple events. |
Setup: Connects wirelessly to Pineapple. Use: Clip to belt. Vibrates when a victim connects to your Rogue AP. |
|
Pwnagotchi (Pi Zero + E-ink) |
AI Handshake Hunter Passive/Active learning capture. |
Boot: Plug into battery. Watch screen. Status: Face = Happy (Capturing). Retrieve: Connect via USB (Data mode) to /handshakes folder. |
|
Bjorn (Pi Zero + E-ink) |
Aggressive Scanner Network vulnerability scanner/deauther. |
Boot: Plug into battery. Action: Automatically scans/attacks based on config.yaml. Display: Shows current target and capture status. |
|
M5Stack Fire (Purple Hash Monster) |
PMKID Capture Captures RSN PMKIDs (WPA2). |
Boot: Press Red button. Usage: Device auto-scans 2.4G. Screen lists captured hashes. Log: Hashes saved to SD card. |
|
M5Stack Cardputer (Evil-M5) |
Portable Swiss Army Knife Deauth, Beacon Spam, Probing. |
Boot: Power switch. Menu: Select WiFi > Scan > Select Target > Deauth.Keyboard: Use onboard keys to select menu options. |
| Device | Role | Use Instructions / Config |
|---|---|---|
|
M5Stick Pro 2 (Nemo Firmware) |
Portable BLE/WiFi Scanner Handheld recon. |
Boot: Side button. Menu: Select BLE to see nearby beacons/tags. Select WiFi for deauth list.Note: Great for checking "Apple Bleed" (spamming iOS popups). |
| GeeekPi nRF52840 |
Deep BLE Sniffing Raw packet analysis. |
Connect: Plug into PC/Mac. Software: Wireshark + Nordic Sniffer Plugin. Action: Select "nRF Sniffer" interface in Wireshark to see raw BLE frames. |
|
T-Embed CC1101 #1 (Bruce Firmware) |
Multi-Protocol RF Sub-GHz & WiFi analysis. |
Boot: Scroll wheel to select. Menu: SubGhz > Read. Captures 433/915MHz signals. |
|
T-Embed CC1101 #2 (Ghost ESP) |
ESP-NOW / Beacon Spam WiFi frame manipulation. |
Boot: Auto-runs Ghost. Use: Generates "Ghost" SSIDs or tests ESP-NOW triggers. |
| EvilCrow v2 |
RF Replay Attack Sub-GHz signal recording. |
Access: Web UI (WiFi AP). Action: Receive > Press Button 1 to Record > Transmit > Press Button 2 to Replay. |
| YardStick One |
RF Transceiver PC-based Radio analysis. |
Connect: USB to Kali. Cmd: rfcat -r (interactive python mode).Use: Determining exact frequency and modulation of captured signals. |
| Device | Role | Use Instructions / Config |
|---|---|---|
| Rubber Ducky |
Keystroke Injection Fast payload delivery. |
Setup: Encode payload.txt to inject.bin.Deploy: Plug into victim USB. Waits for driver, types script. Lab Use: Test if endpoints block new USB keyboards. |
| Bash Bunny |
Advanced Exfiltration Emulates Ethernet/Serial/Storage. |
Switch: Select Position 1 or 2 (Payloads). Deploy: Plug in. LED indicates status (Green = Done). Loot: Saved to udisk/loot folder. |
|
Raspberry Pi Zero (P4wnP1 A.L.O.A + OLED) |
The "Implant" Persistent backdoor over USB. |
Connect: MicroUSB (Data port) to target. OLED: Shows IP address and current attack mode. Access: Connect via WiFi to P4wnP1 AP, then SSH/Web UI to control. |
Goal: Map the wireless landscape without transmitting packets that could trigger an IDS.
- Tool: Raspberry Pi Zero 2 W (Kali Linux + USB/Ethernet Hat)
-
Action: Put the interface in Monitor Mode. Run
KismetorAirodump-ng. This is your "Ground Truth" device. -
Logging: Configure Kismet to log to
.kismetand.pcapfiles.-
Command:
kismet -c wlan1 --log-title lab_audit
-
Command:
- Tool: Pwnagotchi (Pi Zero with e-ink)
- Action: Run passively using reinforcement learning to maximize handshake captures.
-
Logging: Handshakes saved automatically to
/handshakes.
- Tool: T-Dongle S3 (ZeroTrace)
- Action: "Wardriving" simulation to identify vendor presence (Apple, Samsung, etc.).
Goal: Probe the environment to identify specific vulnerabilities.
- Tool: M5Stick Pro 2 (Nemo) & GeeekPi nRF52840 Sniffer
-
Action:
- Nemo: Scan for BLE beacons.
- nRF52840: Sniff raw BLE packets into Wireshark.
-
Logging: Save
.pcapfiles to analyze unencrypted BLE data exchange.
- Tool: T-Embed CC1101 (Bruce/Ghost Firmware) & Yard Stick One
- Action: Scan for 433MHz or 915MHz signals (security sensors, remotes).
-
Logging: Use
rfcatwith Yard Stick One to log raw radio data.
Goal: Gain access to the network or devices.
- Tool: Hak5 WiFi Pineapple + Pineapple Pager
- Action: Launch PineAP. Mimic known SSIDs to trick devices into connecting.
-
Logging: Enable
PineAP Log. Usetcpdumpto capture victim traffic.
- Tool: M5Stack Fire (Purple Hash Monster) & Bjorn
-
Action:
- Purple Hash Monster: Capture PMKID.
- Bjorn: Aggressive de-authentication to force 4-way handshakes.
-
Logging: Export
.pcapor.hccapxfiles for Hashcat.
- Tool: Evil Crow RF V2
- Action: Capture and replay signals (e.g., smart plugs).
- Logging: Screenshot signal graphs to analyze Rolling vs. Fixed codes.
Goal: Simulate physical intrusion.
- Tool: Rubber Ducky or Bash Bunny
- Action: "Ducky Script" execution (e.g., exfiltrate WiFi profiles).
-
Logging: Bash Bunny logs to
lootfolder.
- Tool: Raspberry Pi Zero (P4wnP1 A.L.O.A.)
- Action: Create hidden network interface over USB.
-
Logging: SSH session logging via
screenortmux.
Project spelling and provenance: the upstream project is RaspyJack (sometimes typed "RaspiJack"), maintained at 7h30th3r0n3/Raspyjack, with a distinct installation wiki. It is a Linux/Python application suite for Raspberry Pi, not a flashable ESP32 binary, Hak5 Shark Jack firmware, or a Flipper Zero application. Integrate it into the lab as a scoped operator-controlled Raspberry Pi workstation, never as an unattended implant.
| Component | Role / boundary |
|---|---|
| Raspberry Pi Zero 2 W + stable power + microSD | Common reference target; a display is optional if using the WebUI |
| Waveshare 1.44-inch ST7735 or 1.3-inch ST7789 LCD HAT | Supported portable menu controls; pick the right installer display profile |
| USB Ethernet/HUB HAT or lab Ethernet adapter | Isolated management transport; some headless builds require wired connectivity |
| External USB Wi-Fi adapter (optional) | Monitor-capable surveys depend on exact chipset/driver; never infer injection support from the Pi's built-in Wi-Fi |
| Raspberry Pi OS Lite, pinned upstream revision | Host OS; installer changes packages, system services and network configuration |
| WebUI & Payload IDE | Privileged management surface; accessible only from an isolated/admin-controlled network, not public Internet |
/root/Raspyjack, payloads/, loot/, config/
|
Project and evidence locations described upstream; do not put actual client secrets into git |
RaspyJack includes payloads that can affect networks, collect credentials or launch remote-control processes. Default scope here excludes those capabilities. An installed toolkit does not authorize executing all included payloads. Review upstream code and each selected script; its feature availability is not guaranteed across versions, display models or optional modules.
- Image a spare SD card with the upstream-compatible Raspberry Pi OS Lite version for your specific Pi. Establish a local admin user, secure SSH, and an isolated lab management network. Never first-install it on a client's production Pi.
- Verify power, display SPI pinout, Ethernet connectivity and target architecture. Apply system updates and take an SD image or snapshot before running a third-party installer.
- Review the source install script for package repositories, services, root privileges, firewall/proxy changes and web listener bindings. Review the exact revision with
git log -1. - Follow the upstream installer only after approval. The documented path is
/root/Raspyjack; execute from a local console and select the correct display type. The upstream installer may set up SPI, IยฒC, systemd units, Wi-Fi/network tools and a WebUI. - Reboot in the lab. Confirm expected screen/menu, network interface IDs and health checks; do not enable any offensive payloads. Run these read-only checks:
uname -a
cat /etc/os-release
ip -br link
sudo ss -lntp
systemctl --type=service --state=running | grep -Ei 'raspyjack|caddy' || true- Confirm the WebUI is reachable only through a management interface, close unexpected exposed ports, change all credentials/tokens, restrict access with firewall/VLAN rules and verify TLS if configured. Upstream documents
https://<device-ip>/with an optionalhttp://<device-ip>:8080fallback; a working HTTP fallback is not secure for untrusted networks. - Back up the configured lab image and document the commit, dependency versions, screen/hat, authorized network, remote-access configuration and rollback procedure.
- Start RaspyJack in the isolated lab with all network-invasive payloads disabled.
- Confirm LCD/joystick operation, device process status and read-only WebUI dashboard access. Identify any open remote management ports through
ss. - Compare installed services with the reviewed installer, and disable anything not needed for this exercise through normal host administration.
- Test a login failure and an approved login using synthetic credentials. Record authentication/session behavior without collecting real user credentials.
- Ensure the WebUI is unreachable from a deliberately isolated guest/test VLAN.
Pass: a documented, restricted and recoverable management surface. Fail: unexpected root-accessible public listener or missing authentication.
- From the Pi's terminal, record its own hostname, OS release, interface names/IPs and default routes.
- Review
payloads/directory names withfind/ls; do not run them. - Create a test folder with a dummy note, exercise the local files/loot browser only if its version supports read-only browsing, then remove the dummy note.
- Export a version/asset manifest. Use this as the baseline before enabling an optional Ethernet or monitor-mode Wi-Fi adapter.
- Obtain written scope for one synthetic lab host IP and approved rate/ports. Confirm the Raspberry Pi is on the right isolated VLAN.
- Use a low-impact TCP connection check from the Pi to a known service on the controlled test host (such as SSH you configured). For example,
nc -vz -w 2 192.0.2.10 22is syntax illustration: replace the documentation-only IP with the approved test host. - Compare observed reachability with the host firewall and switch/router logs. If blocked, do not broaden scanning without new approval.
- Record DNS/route changes and whether the Pi can reach excluded VLANs; verify that required segmentation is enforced.
- Connect an independently supported Wi-Fi adapter to the Pi on a dedicated isolated lab AP environment.
- Record
lsusb,iw devandip -br link. Identify whether this driver supports monitor mode; do not assume all branded adapters have identical chipset revisions. - Verify owned AP visibility using a passive-capable sensor workflow and an independent AP/controller inventory. If the adapter requires interface reconfiguration, save/restore baseline networking and do not disconnect the management link.
- Correlate with Marauder standalone survey, Flipper Marauder, and Biscuit as different collection platforms, not interchangeable firmware.
- Create a unique lab SSID on a separate owned AP and record its BSSID, channel, start time and intended security posture.
- Monitor appearance through a supported, non-disruptive receiver. Where a separate Kismet sensor and Wazuh ingestion exist, compare their real logs to RaspyJack inventory notes.
- Do not claim RaspyJack directly ships Wazuh alerts: inspect the installed source first, and use a documented external log ingestion path where needed.
- Turn the AP off, collect negative-control observations, and store only redacted evidence and hashes.
- Save the verified SD image, installed commit, packages, service configuration and hostname; encrypt any assessment artifacts.
- Test a controlled reboot, management reconnect and restoration to the baseline image on a spare SD card.
- Ensure no scanning/portal/C2/credential services auto-start. Confirm firewall, routes and WebUI exposure.
- Delete synthetic data and rotate any temporary admin credentials before putting the Pi into storage or shipping it between job sites.
| Evidence | Minimum record |
|---|---|
| Host provenance | Pi model, HAT, adapter/chipset, SD image, OS and upstream commit |
| Authorization | Scope, approved VLAN/host/SSID, operator, stop time |
| Management | UI bound address/ports, authentication, firewall isolation |
| Observation | In-scope asset, tool/mode, timestamps, independent confirmation |
| Forensics | Redacted filename, SHA-256 digest, retention and secure transport |
| Rollback | Services stopped, guest isolation confirmed, backup restore tested |
Failure conditions: unexpected routes, unsolicited wireless transmissions, privileged remote UI exposure, installer modifying production network services, collection of genuine credentials, or traffic to out-of-scope IPs. Stop and restore the clean image.
Portable cyberdeck design ยท Bjorn Pi ยท Marauder ยท Bruce ยท Wireless surveying ยท Network architecture
This section focuses on safe, defensive validation: discovering whatโs present, measuring exposure, and verifying that common attack classes are mitigated.
- Written authorization: confirm you own the gear/network or have explicit permission.
- Scope: define SSIDs, VLANs/subnets, APs, switches, endpoints, IoT, and โout of scopeโ devices.
- Impact tolerance: decide what is allowed (passive listening, active scanning, deauth tests, etc.). Default to non-disruptive.
- Logging & evidence: enable central logging before you start (router/AP logs, syslog, Zeek/Suricata, packet capture points).
- Stop conditions: any sign of instability, repeated client drops, or unexpected critical device behavior.
- Raspberry Pi Zero 2 W (Kali + USB/Ethernet hat): great for network discovery, packet capture, and running lightweight recon tooling.
- Alfa AWUS036ACS adapters: useful for wireless monitoring/assessment (as drivers support).
- Hak5 WiFi Pineapple: commonly used to test client/AP hardening against rogue AP / โevil twinโ scenarios (defensively: verify protections are in place).
- Pi Zero running P4wnP1 (USB gadget): useful for your own endpoint hardening tests in controlled conditions.
- M5Stick / nRF52840 BLE sniffer: suited for Bluetooth Low Energy visibility and analysis (sniffing in your environment).
-
CC1101 radios (T-Embed): sub-GHz ISM exploration (common bands like 315/433/868/915 MHz depending on region).
- Note: CC1101 is not an โ802.15.1/SMBusโ tool-802.15.1 is Bluetooth; SMBus is a wired bus based on IยฒC.
- Rubber Ducky / Bash Bunny: best treated as endpoint security validation tools (e.g., verifying USB policies, EDR response, least privilege), not โpayload delivery platforms.โ
Before testing, define the target posture:
- WPA2/WPA3 enabled appropriately (prefer WPA3 where possible).
- PMF / 802.11w (Protected Management Frames) enabled if supported (helps mitigate some management-frame abuse).
- WPS disabled.
- Strong SSID separation (Guest/IoT/Corp) and VLAN segmentation.
- AP firmware up to date; management interfaces not exposed broadly.
- Default-deny inbound from Guest/IoT to internal segments.
- Separate management VLAN (AP/switch/router admin only).
- DNS filtering and egress control for IoT where possible.
- Central logging (router/AP + host logs) and time sync (NTP).
Goal: observe without changing anything.
- Identify SSIDs, channels, security modes (WPA2/WPA3), and band usage (2.4/5/6 GHz).
- Confirm whether APs advertise PMF capability and whether clients negotiate it.
- Capture representative management traffic for documentation (limited duration; avoid collecting sensitive payloads).
- Identify subnets, gateways, and DHCP/DNS servers.
- Confirm where logging sensors sit (SPAN port, inline tap, or host-based).
Artifacts to produce
- Network diagram (SSID โ VLAN โ subnet โ gateway โ services).
- Device inventory table (MAC/vendor, IP, hostname, segment, role).
- โExpected vs observedโ security settings snapshot.
Goal: map assets and exposure with minimal disruption.
- Enumerate active hosts per subnet.
- Identify open ports/services and tag โshouldnโt be hereโ findings:
- Admin panels exposed outside management VLAN
- SMB/AFP/NFS where not intended
- Old protocols (Telnet, FTP, SMBv1)
- Check firmware versions (AP/router/switch) and patch status.
- Validate TLS usage on admin interfaces.
- Confirm strong admin auth (unique creds, MFA where supported, no default accounts).
Artifacts to produce
- Service inventory (host โ port โ service โ justification).
- Patch/firmware status report.
- โHigh-risk servicesโ list prioritized by impact + likelihood.
Goal: validate you are resilient to common wireless attack classes without providing attack recipes.
- Do clients auto-join similarly named SSIDs?
- Are corporate devices configured to require correct certificate/known network parameters (if using enterprise auth)?
- Is โauto-joinโ disabled for sensitive endpoints?
- Are guest networks isolated so a mis-association doesnโt become lateral movement?
- Verify guest network cannot reach internal subnets.
- Verify IoT VLAN cannot reach management VLAN.
- Confirm mDNS/SSDP is controlled (only where required).
- WPS disabled.
- PMF enabled where possible.
- Separate SSIDs for different trust zones.
- Management plane restricted by VLAN/firewall rules.
Artifacts to produce
- โControl matrixโ showing each protection, where itโs configured, and test evidence.
Goal: understand what RF surfaces exist in your environment and how youโd defend them.
- Inventory BLE devices (name, MAC/randomization behavior, services advertised).
- Identify risky patterns:
- No pairing/bonding required for sensitive actions
- Legacy pairing modes
- Debug characteristics left enabled
- Validate defensive controls:
- Firmware updates
- Pairing restrictions
- Physical access controls for critical BLE devices
- Identify whether your environment uses sub-GHz devices (sensors, remotes, alarms, weather stations).
- Document frequencies and device types only for your own equipment.
- Defensive focus: determine if critical functions rely on unauthenticated one-way signals and whether mitigations exist (rolling codes, encryption, physical safeguards).
Artifacts to produce
- RF asset inventory (BLE + sub-GHz): device, purpose, risk notes, mitigations.
Tools like USB gadget platforms and keystroke-injection devices can be used defensively to validate endpoint controls:
- USB device control policies (block unknown HID/storage/network adapters).
- EDR/AV detection & response for suspicious process trees and script execution.
- Least privilege: can a standard user change security settings?
- Logging: are events captured (Windows Event Logs, Sysmon, EDR telemetry)?
Artifacts to produce
- Endpoint hardening checklist results
- Gaps + recommended controls (Device Control, AppLocker/WDAC, macOS PPPC profiles, etc.)
- Maintain a single โcase notebookโ:
- Date/time, device used, test performed, scope, observed result
- Store captures responsibly:
- Minimize retention of sensitive payload data
- Hash evidence files if you care about integrity tracking
- Correlate:
- Packet captures โ AP logs โ DHCP logs โ endpoint logs
- What you tested
- Top 5 risks
- Quick wins (30โ60 minutes)
- Medium-term fixes (1โ4 weeks)
- Title
- Affected segment/devices
- Evidence (what you observed)
- Impact
- Likelihood
- Recommended remediation
- Validation steps (how youโll confirm the fix)
- Prioritized tasks with owners and target dates
Use the following templates to document your findings as you execute the playbooks.
Purpose: To visualize the target environment and where your tools sit within it.
# Network Map & Topology
**Date:** 2024-XX-XX
**Observer Device:** Kali Pi Zero 2 W (Monitor Mode)
## High-Level Topology
[ISP Modem] --> [Router/Firewall]
|
+--> [Managed Switch]
|
+--> VLAN 10 (Mgmt): [AP Admin], [NAS]
|
+--> VLAN 20 (Corp/Home): [PC], [Laptop], [Phones]
|
+--> VLAN 30 (IoT): [Smart Bulbs], [Cameras] (Isolated)
|
+--> [Attacker Tools]: [Kali Pi (Monitor)], [Pineapple (Rogue)]
## Subnet Details
| VLAN ID | Name | Subnet | Gateway | DHCP Range | Notes |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 1 | Native | 192.168.1.0/24 | 192.168.1.1 | None | Switch Mgmt only |
| 10 | Management | 10.0.10.0/24 | 10.0.10.1 | Static | Critical Infra |
| 20 | Home/Corp | 10.0.20.0/24 | 10.0.20.1 | .100 - .200 | Trusted Devices |
| 30 | IoT | 10.0.30.0/24 | 10.0.30.1 | .10 - .250 | **No Internet Access** |Purpose: A raw spreadsheet of discovered devices.
MAC_Address,IP_Address,Hostname,Vendor,VLAN/SSID,Role,Notes
00:11:22:33:44:55,192.168.1.50,Lab-Router,Ubiquiti,Mgmt,Gateway,Firmware v1.5.6 (Needs Update)
AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF,10.0.20.15,My-iPhone,Apple,Home_Secure,Client,Private Address enabled
12:34:56:78:90:AB,10.0.30.5,Unknown-Plug,Tuya/Generic,Home_IoT,IoT,Communicating with cn.tuya.com
DE:AD:BE:EF:00:00,N/A,Kali-Pi-Zero,Raspberry Pi,Monitor,Auditor,My Recon Device
CA:FE:BA:BE:00:00,172.16.42.1,WiFi-Pineapple,Hak5,Rogue_AP,Attacker,Management Interface
00:00:00:00:00:00,N/A,Pwnagotchi,Raspberry Pi,Monitor,Attacker,Handshake HunterPurpose: To audit the security settings of specific SSIDs.
# Wireless Controls Matrix
**Assessment Date:** 2024-XX-XX
## SSID Configuration Audit
| SSID Name | Broadcast? | Auth Type | Encryption | PMF (802.11w) | WPS Status | Frequency | Verdict |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| `Home_Secure` | Yes | WPA3-SAE | AES | Required | Disabled | 5GHz/6GHz | โ
PASS |
| `Home_IoT` | Yes | WPA2-PSK | AES/TKIP | Optional | **Enabled** | 2.4GHz | โ FAIL (WPS) |
| `Guest_WiFi` | No | Open | OWE | Disabled | Disabled | 2.4/5GHz | โ ๏ธ WARN (Open) |
## Rogue AP Resilience (Evil Twin Test)
| Client Device | Auto-Join Enabled? | Connects to Pineapple? | Notes |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| iPhone 13 | Yes | No | Correctly identified cert mismatch |
| Old IoT Camera | Yes | **Yes** | Device has no cert validation; captured creds |
| Windows Laptop | No | No | GPO Prevents auto-connection to open networks |Purpose: To log findings from M5Stick (Nemo), CC1101, etc.
# RF & Sub-GHz Inventory
**Tools Used:** M5Stick (Nemo), T-Embed (CC1101), Yard Stick One
## Bluetooth LE (BLE) Findings
| Device Name | MAC Address | RSSI | Services Exposed | Security Risk |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| `LivingRoom_TV` | Random | -60 | Remote Control, Audio | Low (Pairing req) |
| `Smart_Tag_01` | Fixed | -45 | Location Beacon | Medium (Trackable) |
| `N/A (Smart Lock)`| Fixed | -30 | **Unlock Service** | **Critical** (No bonding required!) |
## Sub-GHz (433/915 MHz) Findings
| Frequency | Modulation | Signal Type | Source | Replay Attack Possible? |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 433.92 MHz | ASK/OOK | Remote | Garage Door | No (Rolling Code detected) |
| 315.00 MHz | ASK | Sensor | Door Contact | **Yes** (Fixed code replay worked) |Purpose: To document specific vulnerabilities found.
# Technical Finding: [Title]
**Severity:** [Critical/High/Medium/Low]
**Affected Asset:** [Device Name/IP]
**Tool Used:** [e.g., WiFi Pineapple, Bjorn]
## Observation
Describe what was observed.
*Example: The 'Home_IoT' network was observed broadcasting WPS support. The Reaver tool successfully recovered the pin in 14 minutes.*
## Evidence
* [Insert Screenshot or Log Snippet]
* [Pcap file reference]
## Impact
Describe what an attacker could do.
*Example: An attacker can bypass the WiFi password and gain entry to the IoT VLAN.*
## Remediation
* Disable WPS in the router settings.
* If WPS cannot be disabled, upgrade firmware or replace the router.Purpose: To track fixes.
# Remediation Backlog
| ID | Finding | Priority | Owner | Status | Due Date |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 001 | WPS Enabled on IoT VLAN | High | Admin | To Do | 2024-02-01 |
| 002 | Deprecated SSH Key on Pi | Medium | Admin | In Progress | 2024-02-05 |
| 003 | Open Port 80 on Camera | High | Admin | **Fixed** | 2024-01-20 |- Update AP/router/switch firmware
- Disable WPS everywhere
- Enable PMF/802.11w where supported
- Separate Guest/IoT/Management VLANs + enforce firewall rules
- Lock down management interfaces (VLAN + ACL + MFA)
- Centralize logs + ensure NTP time sync
- Endpoint USB controls and script execution policies (where appropriate)
- Problem: Pi Zeros lack RTCs; logs may default to 1970, breaking timeline analysis.
- Fix: Install DS3231 RTC modules on the Kali Pi and Pwnagotchi, OR ensure an NTP sync via phone tethering occurs immediately upon boot.
- Problem: Power cuts corrupt SD cards, destroying the Pwnagotchi's learned "Brain".
-
Fix: Regularly backup
/root/brain.nnand/root/handshakes/to the Kali Pi or a laptop. Use a "Safe Shutdown" script/button if available.
- Problem: Bjorn may attack the Pineapple's Rogue AP if not scoped correctly, confusing your own logs.
-
Fix: Add the Pineapple's MAC address and "Evil Twin" SSIDs to Bjorn's
whitelist.txt(or equivalent config) so your tools don't fight each other.
- ../../Homelab/HomeLab_Setup.md - Homelab infrastructure this workflow runs on
- ../../Documentation/Aircrack-ng_Commands.md - Aircrack-ng command reference
- ../../Documentation/wireshark.md - Wireshark for blue team monitoring
- ../../IncidentResponse/network_intrusion.md - Network intrusion detection procedures
๐ Source: Homelab/workflows/self-hosted_network_attacks.md | โ๏ธ Suggest an edit | โฌ
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