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The M5Cardputer and Evil M5Project
The current Evil-M5Project README provides Evil-Flasher as a browser installation route. Use a supported desktop browser, select the exact board and verify required SD assets. This route complements the desktop/source methods below; it does not make every model's feature set identical.
| Resource | Role & Compatibility Boundary |
|---|---|
| GhostESP Revival | Alternative wireless observation/capture firmware; use its own official installer and board matrix. |
| NEMO | Separate compact M5Stack toolkit with its own publisher, SD and USB constraints. |
| Pico-Ducky Lab | Dedicated harmless USB HID setup; CircuitPython files and payload.dd are not Evil-M5 install artifacts. |
| Resource | Description |
|---|---|
| ESP32 & Related Firmware Catalog | Primary upstream projects, supported targets, use-cases & dated activity notes |
| Firmware Web Flashers | Dedicated installers plus a separate multi-device/multi-firmware reference |
Technical guide for the M5Cardputer running Evil-M5Project firmware - a pocket-sized, keyboard-driven wireless security workstation for authorized WiFi penetration testing, captive portal attacks, and network reconnaissance.
Covers hardware specifications, firmware installation via M5Burner or Arduino IDE compilation, SD card preparation, UI navigation conventions, and module deep-dives: WiFi scanning, wardriving with GPS, deauthentication, evil twin captive portal, handshake capture, BadUSB, EAPOL/deauth detection, BLE device detection (Wall of Flipper, AirTag, skimmers), and the Reverse TCP Tunnel implant mode. Includes an 8-exercise closed-lab playbook and a blue-team attack/defense table.
Equip security professionals with a discreet, pocket-portable WiFi attack and detection platform for authorized red-team engagements, client demonstrations, and security training.
- WiFi security assessments requiring a low-profile tool (Cardputer on a lanyard is not a laptop)
- Client demonstrations of evil twin attacks, deauthentication, and captive portal credential capture
- Security awareness training: show clients their phone connecting to a rogue AP in real time
- Wardriving and passive WiFi reconnaissance with GPS-tagged output
- Defensive monitoring: detecting deauth floods, Flipper Zero BLE, Bluetooth skimmers
Reader prerequisites. This part of the repository assumes working familiarity with 802.11 frame types (beacon, probe request/response, deauthentication, EAPOL four-way handshake), basic Linux command-line use, soldering-free hobby electronics, and the legal framework governing wireless testing in your jurisdiction. If any of those are unfamiliar, read the foundations chapters first; the techniques described here can cause real disruption to networks and people if used carelessly or maliciously.
The Cardputer is a compact ESP32-S3 computer with a small integrated display and keyboard. It is the size of a credit card, has a 1.14-inch screen, a 56-key keyboard, an ESP32-S3 microcontroller, and a microSD slot. It does not look like a serious tool. That is precisely the point.
Loaded with the Evil-M5Project firmware by 7h30th3r0n3, that toy becomes a self-contained, battery-powered wireless security workstation that fits in a shirt pocket. It performs reconnaissance, evil-twin captive-portal attacks, deauthentication, handshake capture, wardriving with GPS, KARMA-style probe response, BadUSB host attacks, and dozens of other operations that; only a few years ago; required either a full Kali laptop with an external Atheros card, a dedicated Pwnagotchi, or a stack of hardware costing ten times as much.
For the practicing security professional, the Cardputer/Evil-M5 combination earns its place in the kit for three reasons:
- Demonstrative power. A client board does not understand what an evil twin is until they watch their own phone connect to one in a conference room. The Cardputer's form factor and on-screen feedback make these attacks visceral in a way that a terminal window never will.
- Discreet site assessments. A Cardputer on a lanyard is not a laptop. For authorized red-team work where physical-environment realism matters, the device disappears.
- Education and skills development. The firmware exposes nearly every technique a junior pentester should be able to recognize on a capture file. Running these attacks against your own lab; and watching the corresponding frames in Wireshark; collapses weeks of theory into an afternoon of practice.
Nothing in this chapter is novel as wireless attack theory. What is novel is the accessibility. That accessibility is the threat model your defensive controls now have to address.
Wireless attacks of the kind this firmware performs are regulated in the United States primarily by:
- 18 U.S.C. ยง 1030; the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA). Unauthorized access to a "protected computer" is a federal felony. Wi-Fi networks are protected computers.
- 47 U.S.C. ยง 333; willful interference with licensed radio communications, including deauthentication of nearby clients on networks you do not own and have not been authorized to test. The FCC has issued six-figure civil penalties for hotel and convention-center deauth use: Marriott was fined $600,000 in 2014 for blocking guest hotspots at the Gaylord Opryland with deauth frames; Smart City Holdings was fined $750,000 in 2015 for similar conduct at multiple convention centers; M.C. Dean received a $718,000 Notice of Apparent Liability for related activity. The FCC's January 2015 Enforcement Advisory explicitly states that Wi-Fi blocking via deauth is "patently unlawful."
- State analogues; Washington's RCW chapter 9A.90 (the Washington Cybercrime Act) covers computer trespass in the first degree (9A.90.040, a Class C felony) and second degree (9A.90.050, a gross misdemeanor), plus electronic data service interference (9A.90.060, particularly relevant for deauth-style disruption). Oregon's ORS 164.377 (computer crime) parallels these and was used as recently as the 2024 State v. Azar decision in interpreting authorization. Neither requires a federal interstate-nexus element.
- Stored communications; captured credentials, captured handshakes, and intercepted traffic are governed by the Wiretap Act and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA).
You may use this platform legally in three contexts:
- On hardware and networks you personally own, in a controlled location, with no client devices present that you do not own.
- Under a signed Rules of Engagement (ROE) with a client who owns the target environment, with a defined scope, defined hours of operation, and a defined point of contact.
- In a closed-lab classroom or CTF environment explicitly configured for the purpose, with no exposure to outside RF traffic of bystanders.
You may not legally:
- Deauthenticate clients of nearby networks "just to test"; even briefly, even with no data captured.
- Stand up an evil twin in a public space (coffee shop, hotel lobby, conference venue) to "see who connects."
- Capture WPA handshakes from networks you do not own.
- Run KARMA or probe-response attacks in public, even passively.
A blanket personal rule: if the closest networks to your antenna are not yours and your ROE does not cover them, the radio stays off. Use a purpose-built and verified RF shielded enclosure or controlled laboratory testbed when assessing any active RF behavior. Do not use a household microwave oven as a test enclosure.
The firmware author publishes the project for educational and authorized red-team use and disclaims responsibility for misuse. So do I. So should you, in any deliverable you produce while using it.
A practical compliance checklist appears in Appendix C.
The M5Stack Cardputer is built around the M5StampS3 module; a removable core board carrying an ESP32-S3FN8; slotted into a card-shaped enclosure with screen, keyboard, microSD, audio, and a detachable battery base. Relevant specifications from M5Stack's reference documentation:
| Component | Specification |
|---|---|
| Core module | M5StampS3 (or Stamp-S3A on the Adv variant) |
| SoC | Espressif ESP32-S3FN8 (Xtensa LX7 dual-core, up to 240 MHz, RISC-V ULP co-processor) |
| Memory | 512 KB SRAM, 384 KB ROM, no PSRAM |
| Flash | 8 MB (internal to ESP32-S3FN8 die) |
| Wi-Fi | 2.4 GHz 802.11 b/g/n |
| Bluetooth | BLE 5.0 (+ Bluetooth Mesh) |
| Display | 1.14" TFT, 240 ร 135 px, ST7789V2 controller |
| Input | 56-key keyboard (4 ร 14 matrix) |
| Storage | microSD slot (FAT32; 8โ16 GB recommended) |
| Power | 120 mAh battery in the StampS3 + 1400 mAh battery in the detachable base (~1520 mAh combined). USB-C charging. |
| Expansion | HY2.0-4P Grove port (IยฒC / GPIO); GPIO breakout on the StampS3 module itself |
| Audio in | SPM1423 digital MEMS microphone |
| Audio out | Cavity speaker driven by an NS4168 IยฒS amplifier @ 1 W, 8 ฮฉ |
| IR | On-board IR emitter (~410 cm at 0ยฐ) |
| Physical | 84.0 ร 54.0 ร 19.7 mm, 92.3 g |
The "Adv" version (the current SKU at time of writing; M5Stack lists the original as end-of-life) keeps the same ESP32-S3FN8 core but adds an ES8311 audio codec, NS4150B amplifier, 3.5 mm headphone jack, BMI270 6-axis IMU, redesigned 3D antenna, a single 1750 mAh battery (replacing the 120 + 1400 mAh split), and a softer keypress (160 gf vs. 260 gf). Both variants run the Evil-M5 Cardputer firmware. Either is fine; the Adv has noticeably better RF reach thanks to the new antenna.
- microSD card. FAT32-formatted, 8โ16 GB. The card holds the captive-portal site templates, wardriving logs, theme files, and SSID dictionaries. Many image, site-template, file and logging features require it; basic boot behavior depends on the selected build.
- USB-C data cable for flashing and BadUSB use. Confirm it is data-capable; charge-only cables will silently fail flashing.
- GPS unit (optional but recommended). Either the M5Stack "GPS-BDS Unit with SMA antenna" (AT6668-based) or the "Atomic GPS Base" (M8030-based) plugs into the Grove port and enables wardriving with Wigle-compatible CSV output. Cheap third-party UART GPS modules also work with a Grove-to-Dupont wiring jumper.
- RFunit module (optional). Required only for the Tesla / sub-GHz RF features. Sub-GHz transmission has its own legal considerations beyond the scope of this chapter.
- A faraday pouch. Not a joke. You will at some point want to test a behavior without irradiating the neighborhood; a $15 RF-shielded pouch large enough to hold the Cardputer and a victim phone solves that.
The firmware runs on several M5Stack devices, but feature parity is highest on the Cardputer. The author maintains separate builds for the M5Core2, M5Core3 (CoreS3), AtomS3, Fire, and Evil-Face, with progressively smaller feature sets as device capability declines. The M5StickC Plus 1.1, CYD1USB, and CYD2USB are listed as in-beta targets. The Cardputer build is the canonical target; historical examples referenced Evil-Cardputer-v1-4-9.ino, while a November 2026 upstream tree includes Evil-Cardputer-v1-5-8.ino, but source filenames and M5Burner/Evil-Flasher releases change independently; verify the actual current release and exact board, rather than assuming a fixed version number. Any procedure in this chapter assumes the Cardputer build unless explicitly noted.
Separate hardware family: the Plus2 HackStarterPack lab is for an ESP32-PICO board. Do not use M5Cardputer firmware binaries, native USB HID assumptions or GPIO maps interchangeably.
Evil-M5Project began as a port of the author's earlier M5Core2-based "Evil-M5Core2" tool and has grown into a multi-device wireless security framework. It is open source under the MIT License and hosted at https://github.com/7h30th3r0n3/Evil-M5Project. Active development is rapid; expect new features and breaking SD-card layout changes every few months.
The firmware's design philosophy is best understood as "Marauder + Pwnagotchi + Flipper Zero, fused into a single keyboard-driven menu." Where the Flipper hides functionality behind app silos and the Pwnagotchi runs a single autonomous loop, Evil-M5 exposes a flat menu of attacks and reconnaissance modes, each with consistent navigation and on-screen status feedback. The Cardputer's keyboard makes the navigation actually tolerable; every other M5Stack form factor relies on three buttons, which is fine for a demo and grueling for a real engagement.
The features fall into seven functional categories. The table below summarizes them; full procedures for the headliners appear in Section 8.
Reconnaissance
- Wi-Fi network scanning (active and passive)
- Wi-Fi channel visualizer
- Probe-request sniffing
- Wardriving (standalone and master-slave with auxiliary ESP32 nodes)
- Network/port scanning
- Full network scan with service enumeration
Active wireless attacks
- Deauthentication (manual and automated)
- Evil Twin (clone SSID + captive portal + concurrent deauth)
- Beacon spam (mass fake SSID broadcast)
- Probes attack (forge probe requests)
- KARMA attack (respond to any probed SSID)
- Automated KARMA, KARMA Spear (targeted SSID variant)
- WPA handshake capture (Handshake Master, Check Handshakes)
- WPA2 cracking helper (Aircrack integration)
Network-level attacks (post-association)
- DHCP Starvation
- Rogue DHCP server
- Switch DNS / DNS spoofing
- Network Hijacking
- Responder / WPAD abuse / NTLMv2 capture and crack helper
- SSDP poisoning, UPnP mapping and NAT abuse
- LDAP enumeration
- SkyJack (drone hijack)
Captive portal and credential capture
- Captive portal management with SD-stored site templates
- Web Siphoning Cookie
- Honeypot mode (with optional webhook reporting)
- Admin WebUI for remote control
Detection / defensive
- EAPOL and deauth detection (passive sniffing)
- Wall of Flipper (BLE Flipper Zero detector)
- Wall of AirTag, FindMyEvil (BLE Find My-network detection)
- Skimmer Detector (Bluetooth HC-03/05/06 module detection)
- Open Wi-Fi Checker
- IMSI Catcher (detection)
Host attacks via USB
- BadUSB with Ducky Script support
- Mouse Jiggler
- WebUI BadUSB payload editor
- SD-on-USB (expose the SD card as mass storage)
Implant / remote operation
- Reverse TCP tunnel (operate the device through a C2 server)
- Bluetooth keyboard (act as HID over BLE)
- UART shell
- LLM chat stream (talk to a remote model from the device)
- EvilChatMesh (mesh chat over Wi-Fi)
This is not exhaustive. The firmware also includes a SIP toolkit, CCTV toolkit, file manager, file print, printer attack, BLE name flood, autodiscover abuse, and the WiFi Dead Drop covert-storage feature. Treat the chapter as a guided tour of the headline capabilities, not a comprehensive command reference; that reference is the project wiki, which you should bookmark.
There are several upstream-documented installation methods. Start with the official Evil-Flasher for a named supported target, or use M5Burner/source compilation where those are specifically supported. Do not treat one universal image or Arduino toolchain as appropriate for every board.
- On a desktop Chromium-based Web Serial browser, open Evil-Flasher. Obtain the correct build for the exact board, including Cardputer vs Cardputer ADV, CoreS3/SE, AtomS3, and beta targets.
- Back up and stage the upstream
SD-Card-Filecontent in anevil/folder at the SD root before first boot. Save a checksum of any firmware image or SD archive you retain. - Connect a reliable USB data cable, select the exact serial port, confirm the chosen target and follow the flasher's bootloader prompts. Review any erase setting first.
- Confirm UI boot, file assets, device identity and a harmless owned-AP scan. Restore your previous known-good image if firmware/hardware mapping is wrong.
Model note: the supported AWOK Dual ESP32 Mini v2 target is not the same as LAB5 MonsterC5 or AWOK Dual C5 Mini/Touch.
M5Burner is the official M5Stack firmware flashing tool. It hides the entire ESP-IDF toolchain behind a one-click flow and is the lowest-friction path to a working device.
- Connect the Cardputer to your workstation via USB-C. Wait for the OS to assign a COM/tty device. On Windows, this is usually
COM3or higher; on Linux/macOS, look for/dev/ttyUSB0,/dev/ttyACM0, or/dev/cu.usbmodem*. - Download M5Burner from the M5Stack download center:
https://docs.m5stack.com/en/download; pick the "UIFLOW FIRMWARE BURNING TOOL" build for your OS. - Install and launch M5Burner.
- In the device list (left pane), navigate to Cardputer. In the search bar at the top of the firmware list, type
evil-. The current Evil-Cardputer build appears in results. - Click Download to fetch the firmware locally. Once the download completes, the button changes to Burn.
- Click Burn, select the correct serial port, leave baud at the default 1500000 (M5Burner handles this automatically), and confirm.
- When burning completes, physically disconnect the Cardputer, reseat the USB cable, and let the device boot. The Evil splash screen should appear within a few seconds.
If the device boots to a blank screen or a "no SD" indicator, that is expected; Step 5.3 below populates the SD card.
Compile from source when you want to:
- Track unreleased features on the
mainbranch - Patch the firmware for a custom use case
- Change defaults you cannot change at runtime (themes other than via theme.ini, default IPs for the Admin WebUI, etc.)
Procedure:
- Install the Arduino IDE (2.x recommended).
- Add the ESP32 board manager URL in File โ Preferences โ Additional Boards Manager URLs:
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/espressif/arduino-esp32/gh-pages/package_esp32_index.json - In Tools โ Board โ Boards Manager, install esp32 by Espressif Systems. The project documentation specifically requires version 2.1.4 or earlier and warns that 3.x (including the
3.0.0-alpha3revision) breaks the build on most non-M5 boards. Choose the ESP32/M5Stack board package and library versions required by the exact upstream commit and selected board. Older 2.x directions are historical guidance, not a universal compatibility guarantee. - Install the M5Stack board package - see
https://docs.m5stack.com/en/arduino/arduino_board(verify current URL; M5Stack docs restructure periodically) or search M5Stack's Arduino quickstart in their official docs. - Install the following libraries via Library Manager:
Adafruit_NeoPixelArduinoJsonESPpingIniFileM5GFXM5UnifiedTinyGPSPlus-
ESP8266Audio(yes, the ESP8266-named library; it works on ESP32)
- Clone the repository:
git clone https://github.com/7h30th3r0n3/Evil-M5Project.git cd Evil-M5Project -
Run the deauth prerequisites script in
utilities/deauth_prerequisites/. The README describes this as bypassing a check in the Arduino-ESP32 library that would otherwise block raw 802.11 management frames; in practice it patches the relevant library file(s) so deauth and beacon-spam frames can be transmitted. Without running this script, those modules will compile but their frame-injection calls will be silently dropped. - For BadUSB, install the libraries described in
utilities/Bad_Usb_Lib/README.md. - Open
Evil-Cardputer-v1-5-1.ino(or whatever the current release file is named) in the Arduino IDE. - Configure board settings under Tools:
- Board: M5Cardputer
- USB CDC On Boot: Enabled
- Flash Size: 8 MB (64 Mb); this is required, the default is wrong
- Partition Scheme: 8M with spiffs (3MB APP / 1.5MB SPIFFS); also required
- PSRAM: Disabled; the Cardputer's ESP32-S3FN8 ships without PSRAM hardware; enabling it in the IDE causes boot failures
- Upload Speed: 921600
- Port: the Cardputer's serial port
- Click Upload. First-time compile takes 5โ10 minutes; incremental builds are faster.
If you see Sketch too big errors, you missed Step 10's flash-size and partition-scheme configuration. Fix and rebuild.
The firmware is split between the on-flash binary and a data layout on the SD card. As of the v1.4.x series, the SD content must live in a folder named evil at the root of the SD card, not at the root itself. This is a recent change; older guides may show files at the root.
- Format a microSD card as FAT32 (do not use exFAT; the ESP32 SD driver does not handle it).
- Download the SD card content from the project's
SD-Card-File/directory in the repo. The fastest way:then copygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/7h30th3r0n3/Evil-M5Project.git
Evil-M5Project/SD-Card-File/*into anevil/folder on the SD card. - Resulting layout (per the project's installation wiki, the documented top-level subdirectories are):
Runtime modules create their own subdirectories the first time they write output; wardriving logs, EAPOL/handshake captures, captured portal credentials, and BadUSB payloads each land under
/evil/ โโโ IMG/ # splash and UI images โโโ sites/ # captive portal HTML templates โโโ NTLM/ # Responder/NTLMv2 capture data โโโ config/ # config.txt and runtime configuration โโโ theme.ini # color theme (Cardputer only) โโโ โฆ # additional folders are created at runtime/evil/in module-specific folders. Exact paths shift between firmware revisions; trust the device's own file manager and the wiki for authoritative locations. - Customize
theme.iniif you want non-default colors. Theming is currently Cardputer-only. - Insert the SD card before powering the device.
Power on. You should see:
- A splash image (the project logo, loaded from
/evil/IMG/). - The main menu after ~2 seconds.
- No "SD card missing" warning. If you see one, power off, reseat the SD card, and confirm it is FAT32 with an
evil/folder at root.
If you see only a black screen with the Cardputer power LED on, the firmware did not flash correctly; reflash.
The firmware uses a consistent set of keyboard conventions on the Cardputer. The hardware keyboard has no dedicated arrow keys; directional input uses the Fn layer documented by the M5Cardputer library. Internalize the mapping once and you can navigate any module:
| Key | Action |
|---|---|
Fn + ; / . / , / /
|
Up / Down / Left / Right navigation |
Fn + ` (backtick) |
Escape |
Enter |
Select / confirm |
Backspace |
Cancel / back / clean exit from a running attack |
Tab |
Cycle context where applicable |
Ctrl + Backspace
|
Force-quit certain attack loops |
| Alphanumerics | Direct text entry at any input prompt (SSID, password, IPs) |
The screen is small. A typical attack view shows a header (mode name), 4โ6 lines of live status, and a footer with the active hotkey. Get used to reading dense single-line indicators; ch6 -42dBm BSSID:aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff is the kind of line you will be parsing constantly.
Two features deserve mention up front because they change the operating posture of the device:
- Admin WebUI. The device can be configured to serve a control panel on its own SoftAP or to join your network and serve the panel on a LAN IP. The WebUI exposes most attack functions through a browser, allowing operation from a phone or laptop without touching the Cardputer's keyboard. Useful for demos and for setups where the device is hidden. Secure the WebUI with a strong password before deploying anywhere a third party can reach it; the default credentials are well-known.
- Reverse TCP Tunnel. The device connects outbound to a listener you control (typically a cheap VPS) and exposes a control channel. This converts the device into a remote-controllable implant. Powerful for authorized long-term assessments; legally hazardous everywhere else. Do not configure this against the public Internet without an ROE.
Both features are off by default. Leave them off until you have a specific use case.
The following sections cover the most consequential modules. Each follows the same structure: what it does, what it produces, how to run it, and what to watch on the wire (or BLE) in parallel for verification.
Purpose. Build a list of nearby 2.4 GHz APs with BSSID, channel, encryption, and RSSI. The list is the starting input for nearly every other attack; clone, deauth, evil-twin, handshake capture all consume an entry from the scan list.
Procedure.
- From the main menu:
Wi-Fi โ Scan WiFi. - The device performs a full-channel sweep (~5 seconds).
- Browse results with arrow keys. Each entry shows SSID, channel, RSSI, encryption type, and BSSID.
-
Enteron an entry opens the per-network menu; clone, set as target, view details, etc.
Verification. From an adjacent laptop, run sudo airodump-ng wlan0mon and confirm the same APs appear with the same BSSIDs and channels. The Cardputer's results should match within a few dBm and identical BSSID/channel pairs.
Purpose. Continuous SSID capture geotagged to GPS coordinates, written to SD card as Wigle-compatible CSV. The output uploads directly to wigle.net or imports into Kismet for offline mapping.
Procedure.
- Plug the GPS Unit into the Grove port. Allow 30โ120 seconds for first fix; expect longer under indoor or dense urban cover.
- From the main menu:
Wardriving โ Start. - The screen displays current GPS fix status, current scanning channel, total unique BSSIDs captured, and live SSID counter.
- The device writes incrementally to a Wigle-format CSV on the SD card under
/evil/(the filename typically encodes a timestamp). -
Backspaceto stop. The file is closed cleanly on exit; do not yank the SD card mid-run.
Master/Slave scaling. The Cardputer can act as a master that ingests SSID data from one or more auxiliary ESP32 "slave" nodes (AtomS3, ESP32-C3 with external antenna, WEMOS D1 Mini, ESP32-C5). Each slave locks to a single 2.4 GHz channel and broadcasts captures to the master, eliminating channel-hop blind spots. With 14 slaves you cover all 14 channels concurrently. This is overkill for casual mapping but extremely effective for dense corporate-campus surveys.
Verification. Drop the CSV into wigle.net's upload form. The site renders captured APs on the map; cross-reference against a known-location AP to confirm GPS calibration.
A spectrum-style overlay of 2.4 GHz channel utilization. Useful for picking a quiet channel to host an evil twin on (you want signal contrast with the legitimate AP, but you do not want a third-party AP camped on top of you). Also useful as a quick "is this corporate Wi-Fi properly planned" diagnostic; a deployment with five APs all on channel 6 advertises itself as poorly tuned.
Background. When a Wi-Fi client is not associated with an AP, it broadcasts probe requests asking for any of its "preferred network list" (PNL). Many devices broadcast SSIDs of every network they have ever joined; home, airport, hotel, ex's apartment. Probe sniffing captures these. A KARMA attack stands up an AP that responds affirmatively to any probed SSID, tricking the client into auto-associating with what it believes is a known network.
Probe sniffing.
-
Wi-Fi โ Sniffing Probes. - The device displays a live-updating list of
SSID; MACpairs as they appear. - Captures persist to SD on exit; the next module consumes them.
KARMA Attack.
-
Attacks โ Karma Attack. The device starts an AP that replies to all probes with affirmative responses. - Clients in the area that have any open or matching network in their PNL begin associating.
- Once associated, the captive portal flow (Section 8.6) can run on top.
KARMA Spear is a targeted variant; instead of responding to everything, the device responds only to a specific SSID you specify. Less noisy, more credible against a target who knows their devices remember "Starbucks WiFi" but is harder to fool with a generic catch-all.
Defensive observation. A defender running Kismet on the same channel will see beacons and probe responses from an AP that claims to be every SSID ever requested. This is unmistakable in any half-decent WIDS.
Purpose. Transmit 802.11 deauthentication frames spoofed from the AP's BSSID, telling target clients to disconnect. Used to force client reconnection (for handshake capture), to herd clients onto an evil twin, or as standalone denial-of-service.
Procedure.
- Scan and select a target network.
-
Attacks โ Deauther. Choose target type:- Broadcast: deauth all clients from the AP
- Specific client: deauth only the chosen STA (requires prior client sniff)
- The device begins transmitting deauth frames at a configurable rate.
- Live count and elapsed time are shown.
-
Backspaceto stop.
Auto Deauther sweeps targets and rotates automatically. Useful for "stress test" demonstrations; reckless and illegal anywhere outside an isolated lab.
Verification. On a target STA you own, watch the Wi-Fi indicator. A deauth flood typically causes the device to disconnect and reconnect every 1โ3 seconds. In Wireshark, filter wlan.fc.type_subtype == 0x0c to isolate deauth frames; expect a continuous flood.
Critical caveat. Modern Wi-Fi (802.11w, Protected Management Frames / PMF) was specifically designed to defeat this attack. WPA3 mandates PMF; WPA2 supports it as optional. Against a properly configured corporate WPA2-Enterprise network with PMF required, the Cardputer's deauth has no effect. This is part of why the technique is detectable and increasingly mitigated; and part of why your defensive posture should include enforcing PMF.
This is the marquee feature and the one most likely to appear in your book's "what an attacker can do in 60 seconds" demonstrations.
Concept. The device clones a chosen SSID, stands up a SoftAP impersonating it, runs a captive portal that mimics the legitimate network's login or some plausible system prompt ("Router firmware update; please re-enter your Wi-Fi password"), and concurrently deauths clients from the real AP so they roam onto the rogue. Submitted credentials are logged to SD.
Procedure.
- Scan for nearby APs.
- Select the target SSID.
Enter โ Set as Evil Twin target. - (Optional) Set a known password via "Set Password" if you want to mount a KARMA-style attack against a network whose key you already have.
- Select the captive portal template. Templates live under
/evil/sites/and are simple HTML/CSS bundles. The project ships with several generics (router-update, captive-portal-login, ISP-rebrand variants). You can write your own; structure is documented in the wiki's Captive Portal Management page. -
Attacks โ Evil Twin. The device launches the fake AP, starts deauthing the real AP's BSSID, and begins serving the portal. - Status display shows: target SSID, channel, deauth frame count, connected clients.
- Captured credentials write to a logs file on the SD card under
/evil/(the wiki refers to a/logsendpoint exposed by the Admin WebUI for the same data). -
Backspaceexits cleanly.
What to demonstrate to a client. Run this in your own lab against your own SSID. Watch a phone you own roam to the rogue. Submit a credential into the portal. Pull the SD card and show the client the file. The reaction is consistent: "wait, that's it?" Yes, that's it. That's the point.
Defensive measures. Enterprise WPA2/WPA3 with proper EAP-TLS (mutual cert auth) breaks this technique cleanly; the client validates the server certificate before sending credentials. PSK networks are vulnerable; the mitigation is user training (never enter your Wi-Fi password into a web page) and PMF.
Purpose. Capture WPA/WPA2 four-way handshakes from the air, save them as pcap files on the SD card, and (with the Cracking helper) attempt offline dictionary cracking.
Procedure.
- Scan, target an AP.
-
Attacks โ Handshake Master. The device runs concurrent passive sniffing on the target channel and a low-rate deauth against the AP to provoke client reconnections. - When a complete four-way exchange is captured, the device announces it and writes a pcap file to the SD card (path varies by firmware revision; check the device's file manager).
- Exit, eject SD, copy the pcap to your workstation.
- Crack with hashcat:
hcxpcapngtool -o hash.hc22000 capture.pcap hashcat -m 22000 hash.hc22000 wordlist.txt
The on-device Aircrack module performs limited cracking against small wordlists; do not expect to crack a strong PSK on a 240 MHz Xtensa core. Use the device for capture, your workstation or GPU rig for cracking.
Check Handshakes validates a captured pcap to confirm the four messages are present and complete. A common failure mode is capturing M1+M2 only; useless for cracking. Verify before walking away from the engagement.
Purpose. With the Cardputer plugged into a target host via USB-C, the device enumerates as an HID keyboard and types out a Ducky Script payload. Classic BadUSB. The Cardputer adds a wrinkle: it can also enumerate as USB mass storage and serve the SD card, useful for staging larger payloads that the script then executes locally.
Procedure.
- Place your Ducky Script as a
.txtfile in the BadUSB directory on the SD card (the in-device file picker will list all files in that directory; consult the wiki's BadUSB page for the current path on your firmware version). -
BadUSB โ Select Payload โ <your payload>. - Plug the Cardputer into the target. Confirm enumeration.
-
BadUSB โ Run. The payload executes at HID typing speed. - The WebUI BadUSB editor lets you compose payloads from a browser without touching the SD card; useful for rapid iteration.
Defensive observation. Endpoint detection that watches for sudden HID device attachment, especially combined with rapid keystroke entry from an unrecognized vendor ID, catches this trivially. The hardware-level mitigation is to require admin authorization for new HID devices (Windows USB Restrict policy, macOS USB Restricted Mode, Linux usbguard).
Purpose. Sit on a chosen channel and log deauthentication and EAPOL frames. Useful as a portable WIDS sensor.
Procedure.
-
Detection โ EAPOL/Deauth Detection. - Choose target channel (or all-channel hopping).
- The device displays per-second deauth and EAPOL counts and writes incidents to SD.
Place the Cardputer near a network you want to monitor and you have a $35 deauth detector. Not a substitute for a real WIDS, but a useful sanity check during incident response and an excellent training aid; students can run the offensive deauth on one Cardputer and see the detection light up on another in real time.
The BLE-side defensive modules:
- Wall of Flipper. Detects nearby Flipper Zero devices by their BLE advertisement pattern. The project integrates with K3YOMI's Wall-of-Flippers convention.
- Wall of AirTag / FindMyEvil. Detects Apple Find My-network devices in the area, including potentially stalking-deployed AirTags.
- Skimmer Detector. Scans for Bluetooth modules commonly found in card skimmers (HC-03, HC-05, HC-06). A walk through a gas station forecourt with this running can identify deployed skimmers in seconds.
These are unambiguously defensive. Run them at conferences, on travel, near ATMs.
Sketch only: the device connects outbound to a listener of your choosing, registers, and accepts commands. Effectively turns the Cardputer into a beacon-style implant. Setup involves spinning up the project's server-side handler on a VPS (the wiki documents this), configuring the Cardputer with the listener's address, and starting the tunnel from the menu. Operationally, this is how you would deploy a Cardputer hidden in a target site during a long-running engagement.
If you are reading this section to decide whether to use it: confirm your ROE explicitly covers persistent remote-access implants before you flip this switch.
The following exercises are designed for a closed lab. Each one assumes:
- A target network you own (an old router, factory-reset, with a single client device).
- Your testing Cardputer (the "attacker").
- A workstation running Kali, Wireshark, and an external Wi-Fi adapter in monitor mode (the "observer").
- A second Cardputer in detection mode where applicable (optional but recommended for the full red/blue effect).
- A faraday space if you cannot otherwise isolate from neighbors' networks.
Run them in order; each builds on the previous.
Objective. Build a baseline inventory of your lab RF environment using only passive techniques.
Steps.
- On the Cardputer, run a Wi-Fi scan. Note all visible SSIDs, channels, BSSIDs, encryption.
- On the observer workstation, run
airodump-ng wlan0monfor the same duration. - Compare results. Identify any APs visible to one but not the other; account for the difference (antenna gain, channel coverage, scan duration).
- Run the Cardputer's channel visualizer. Identify the least-utilized channel.
Success criteria. You can state, with evidence, how many APs are reachable, on which channels, and which is your target.
Debrief. Why might the Cardputer miss APs that the observer sees, and vice versa?
Objective. Capture probe requests from a known client device (your own phone) and infer its preferred network list.
Steps.
- Put the test phone in Wi-Fi-on, not-connected state.
- Cardputer:
Sniffing Probes, run for 5 minutes. - Review the captured SSID/MAC list.
Success criteria. The captured probes include at least one SSID you know is in the phone's PNL.
Debrief. Modern iOS and Android randomize probe MAC addresses and reduce broadcast probing. How does your phone's behavior compare to the documented mitigations? What can a defender infer if they know a specific user's typical PNL (home, office, gym)?
Objective. Deauth a single client from your own AP and verify the effect on the wire.
Steps.
- Confirm your target STA is associated to your lab AP.
- On the observer, start Wireshark with filter
wlan.fc.type_subtype == 0x0c. - On the Cardputer: scan, select target AP,
Deauther โ Specific client(you may need to sniff clients first), select client MAC. - Run for 30 seconds.
- Stop. Observe Wireshark.
Success criteria.
- Wireshark shows a continuous flood of deauth frames spoofed from your AP's BSSID to the target STA.
- The target STA's Wi-Fi indicator shows disruption.
- Frame timing matches the Cardputer's reported transmission rate.
Debrief. Enable PMF on your AP (if it supports it; most modern routers do, though it is often off by default). Repeat the exercise. What changes?
Objective. Capture a complete WPA2 four-way handshake against your lab network and crack a known-weak PSK offline.
Steps.
- Set your lab AP's PSK to a five-character lowercase word from a common wordlist (e.g.,
apple). This is for the exercise only. - Cardputer:
Handshake Master, target your AP. - Force the test STA to reconnect (toggle Wi-Fi).
- Wait for the device to announce a captured handshake.
- Copy the pcap to your workstation.
- Convert and crack:
hcxpcapngtool -o hash.hc22000 capture.pcap hashcat -m 22000 hash.hc22000 /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
Success criteria. Hashcat cracks the PSK and outputs the plaintext.
Debrief. Recompute with a 16-character random PSK. How long would brute-force take? Compute the difference using hashcat -b -m 22000 to benchmark your hardware.
Objective. Mount an evil twin against your lab SSID, capture a credential submission from a device you own, and document what the experience looks like to the user.
Steps.
- Confirm scope: lab only, your network, your device, no bystanders.
- Cardputer: select your lab AP, configure Evil Twin with a generic router-update captive portal.
- Launch Evil Twin.
- On the test device, attempt to use the network. Watch it roam to the rogue. The captive portal will appear (system-triggered on most modern OSes).
- Submit a fake credential into the portal.
- Stop the attack. Eject SD. Locate the credential file.
Success criteria. The credential file exists on SD, contains the value you submitted, and is timestamped.
Debrief. What signals did the device's OS provide that something was off? What would a non-technical user have noticed? How would you, in a client report, communicate this risk in a way that motivates remediation?
Objective. Detect the previous exercise from a detection-only posture.
Steps.
- Set up a second Cardputer in
EAPOL/Deauth Detectionmode, locked to your lab AP's channel. - Replay Exercise 3 (deauth) and Exercise 5 (evil twin).
- Observe the detection device.
Success criteria. The detection Cardputer logs the deauth frames and the channel/SSID disturbance.
Debrief. What is the smallest practical sensor footprint that would have detected this in a real corporate environment? What does it cost relative to the equipment that produced the attack?
Objective. Execute a benign Ducky payload on a host you own as a demonstration of HID-injection risk.
Steps.
- Create a Ducky Script file (e.g.
hello.txt) in the BadUSB folder on the SD card:DELAY 2000 GUI r DELAY 500 STRING notepad ENTER DELAY 1000 STRING Hello from the Cardputer. - Plug the Cardputer into your test workstation.
- Cardputer:
BadUSB โ Select Payload โ hello.txt โ Run. - Watch the host execute the payload.
Success criteria. Notepad opens and types the message. The host's USB device manager shows the Cardputer enumerated as a keyboard.
Debrief. Enable Windows' "USB Restrict" policy or macOS USB Restricted Mode. Repeat. What changes? What is the residual risk against an unlocked, unattended workstation?
Objective. Chain reconnaissance, evil twin, credential capture, and post-credential network access into a coherent narrative.
Steps.
- Scan โ identify lab SSID.
- Evil Twin โ capture lab PSK from your test device.
- Configure the Cardputer (or another device) to associate to the legitimate AP using the captured PSK.
- Run
Scan Network and Portto enumerate hosts and services. - Document the entire chain with timestamps.
Success criteria. A narrative timeline that walks from "I was outside your office with nothing" to "I am authenticated on your internal network." That timeline is, more or less, the structure of your engagement deliverable.
Debrief. Which controls; at any layer; would have broken the chain? Which of those controls are common in environments you have personally assessed? Which are not?
Source-checked against the maintainer's Evil-M5Project README and wiki on November 11, 2026. These are designed lab exercises, not a claim of physical testing.
The original eight exercises above describe particular attack workflows. The following non-disruptive deployments are the recommended starting point for a new board, a firmware update, an endpoint assessment, and client-facing demonstrations. Do not assume earlier attacker-oriented examples are safe, necessary, or legal on production RF infrastructure.
| Hardware | Typical Evil-M5 role | Installation & feature boundary |
|---|---|---|
| M5Cardputer / Cardputer ADV | Keyboard/display-controlled Evil-Cardputer firmware | Match model, firmware build and /evil/ SD assets; ADV does not grant native 5 GHz radio |
| M5Core2 / Fire / CoreS3 / SE | Device-specific menu/GUI builds | Different displays, controls, storage and runtime features; not the same image as Cardputer |
| M5AtomS3 | Compact device/control option | Requires applicable peripherals (e.g., GPS) for location features |
| M5StickC Plus/Plus2; supported CYD variants | In-beta or model-specific implementations | Confirm exact vendor's build/flash target; no universal keyboard, native USB HID or 5 GHz claim |
| AWOK Dual ESP32 Mini v2 | Separate target listed by the Evil-Flasher project | Not interchangeable with the AWOK Dual C5 Mini/Touch or LAB5 MonsterC5 |
| LAB5 M5MonsterC5 / projectZero | Separate ESP32-C5 + JanOS ecosystem | See the LAB5 field workflow |
Radio fact check: legacy ESP32 and ESP32-S3 M5 devices are generally 2.4 GHz Wi-Fi hardware. Their firmware cannot add an ESP32-C5's 5 GHz physical radio. Project feature matrices are per board and build, not a guarantee that every optional feature, CC1101, nRF24, NFC/IR, or USB HID exists.
- Document exact PCB, display/keyboard, SoC, flash/PSRAM, power supply, SD slot, bootloader and any add-on antennas/GPS. Note current firmware source URL/version/hash and photograph cables/board before changes.
- Use a spare FAT32 microSD and preserve pre-existing data. Obtain the actual
SD-Card-Fileresources from the same project revision as the firmware. Place their contents under theevil/directory at the SD root, not directly at the SD root; do not assume the layout of another project's SD files is compatible. - Review the official Evil-Flasher device target list. On supported boards, choose the exact Cardputer, Cardputer ADV, Core2, Fire, CoreS3, AtomS3, Stick, CYD, or documented AWOK variant. Browser Web Serial generally requires compatible desktop Chrome/Edge and a USB data cable.
- Alternatively use the M5Stack M5Burner image for the exact product, or a reproducible upstream source build. When compiling, check the upstream README's current ESP32 core/Arduino library/partition guidance for that chosen commit; an older statement that all releases work with a particular toolchain is not a guarantee.
- Avoid modifying libraries to enable disruptive injection modes as part of installation qualification; such changes are outside baseline device validation and must be reviewed/authorized separately.
- After flashing, disconnect/reconnect only as documented, check boot/UI, SD read/write, keyboard/buttons, Wi-Fi and Bluetooth features separately. Note any missing capability as not present, not configured or not tested.
- Preserve the known-good binary or installer target and SD backup. Never erase or reflash a client device merely because a module menu appears different.
Objective: confirm that the board, image, UI and SD layout actually match.
- Power on the known-good test board with a prepared
/evil/SD layout. - Record the displayed release/build, boot warnings, supported controls and available menus. Test directional navigation, back/cancel and power settings without starting any active attack module.
- Create a synthetic text file through a documented local file manager (if supported); unmount/eject safely, read the file on a trusted PC and compute a SHA-256 checksum.
- Compare the installed
/evil/assets with the selected revision's distribution. Do not assume that missing logos/sites means firmware installation failedโthe filesystem and image are separate. - Reboot and verify the UI remains usable. Record SD recognition, config persistence, any missing peripherals and recovery path.
Expected output: model/revision + firmware/SD manifest, screenshot, hash and reversible setup notes.
- Configure an owned lab AP with a synthetic SSID, known BSSID/channel, documented security configuration, and an explicit start/stop time.
- Use the build's Wi-Fi Scan (observation) feature. Record whether that scan type sends probe requests; an interface named โscanโ does not itself guarantee passive reception.
- Compare observed BSSID/channel/signal with the AP controller. Repeat after changing the AP channel using the controller's normal configuration.
- Record multiple-BSSID or guest SSID behavior and false negatives over at least three short scans. Keep out-of-scope neighboring networks out of exported reports.
- If a 5 GHz test AP is absent on an ESP32-S3 Cardputer, report that the radio cannot survey 5 GHz directly; contrast with a supported C5/BW16 sensor instead of mislabeling the AP as hidden or insecure.
- Record 2.4 GHz APs on your lab/office controller, including 20/40 MHz bandwidth, channel, WPA2/WPA3 and PMF settings.
- Use Evil-M5's channel visualizer or equivalent observable scan mode if available for that firmware build; collect two identical-duration intervals at a stationary point.
- Compare channel trends with a dedicated Wi-Fi scanner or AP controller; do not infer actual packet airtime, noise floor, spectrum interference, throughput or negotiated PMF from an SSID count alone.
- Modify only your owned AP's channel or test SSID and repeat; leave other APs unchanged.
- Document which settings were verified through the controller and which were inferred from advertisements.
- Select one test phone owned by the operator, with permission to observe its Wi-Fi management behavior.
- Create two synthetic saved test SSIDs on your own AP, then disconnect the phone from Wi-Fi while leaving Wi-Fi enabled.
- Run the firmware's receive-focused probe observation for a short, bounded period. Record only a redacted list of any explicit SSID probes and whether addresses are randomized.
- Reconnect/disconnect under controlled conditions; contrast with an independent Kismet sensor where available.
- A phone that does not send named probes is not a test failure. Modern privacy controls reduce or randomize probe identifiers. Do not interpret passive probe data as a reliable complete Preferred Network List.
- Confirm the selected ESP32 hardware/build supports BLE scans. Legacy Cardputer S3 and ESP32-S2 accessories have different radio capabilities.
- Configure a test BLE development board or beacon with a unique synthetic name; record its advertised service/identifier in the operator notebook.
- Run an ordinary BLE discovery menu (where supported) and record actual advertised fields and RSSI, not an invented distance.
- Turn the beacon off as a negative control, then on. Note stale UI entries, address rotation and false positives.
- Compare any โskimmer,โ โAirTag,โ or other branded detection heuristic to the owned hardware and independent verification; a vendor name/OUI/advertisement match alone does not prove a malicious or specific device. See OUI-SPY labs.
- Keep the board and operator laptop on a separate management VLAN or dedicated isolated lab AP; never expose the firmware's admin UI to customers or the public Internet.
- Review which services, ports, passwords, API endpoints and radio APs the selected firmware actually enables. Do not assume the same WebUI behavior across Cardputer/CoreS3/Atom variants.
- Rotate or disable documented default credentials, limit the IP/interface binding where supported and firewall the management segment.
- Test reachability from the authorized management host and failed reachability from an excluded guest VLAN. Collect only synthetic test events and no real login submissions.
- Turn off the WebUI when not needed, verify it is no longer reachable, and restore any change to production lab routing.
Failure: uncontrolled WebUI visibility, default credentials, unexpected Internet connectivity, or unauthorized auto-start of portal/tunnel modes. Do not enable reverse tunnels as part of this lab.
- Confirm the exact Cardputer/ADV firmware and native USB HID support; do not assume M5StickC, Core2 or a USB-UART adapter can enumerate as a USB keyboard.
- On a disposable Windows/Linux test host, open a blank text editor and focus it manually.
- Stage a compatible simple script only after checking the firmware's exact BadUSB syntax:
REM Training-only: editor already open; no shell/privileged commands
DELAY 2000
STRING PNWC-EVILM5-HID-LAB
ENTER
- Trigger once under direct observation. Record whether the exact marker appears and any USB device-control/EDR event.
- If the marker goes elsewhere, immediately stop. Remove the board and restore the host; do not test credential prompts or app launch sequences.
- Compare with the existing Rubber Ducky assessment. Script syntax and compilation may differ; Evil-M5's files are not Hak5
inject.binby default.
Interpretation: typing harmless text is evidence of HID acceptance, not access bypass or privilege escalation.
- Configure a unique, independently controlled lab AP with a training SSID and record its BSSID, channel, time and controller owner.
- Observe its appearance and disappearance with Evil-M5's scan capability, plus a stationary Kismet/Wazuh lab.
- Compare real controller inventory and WIDS events. Do not activate Evil Twin, KARMA, deauth, beacon flooding or credential portals to produce the baseline alert.
- Turn off the training AP and confirm the sensor's record ages out. Check whether a normal authorized AP is not misclassified as rogue.
- Record missing detections, event timestamps, false positives, sensor coverage and changes required to reach the client's control requirements.
| Symptom | Check & documented limitation |
|---|---|
| Black screen/bootloop | Wrong hardware image, partition layout, PSRAM setting, power, SD separate from flash |
| Menus/images missing | Correct build-matched /evil/ SD assets and filesystem |
| 5 GHz AP missing | ESP32/S3 legacy radio lacks direct 5 GHz; use compatible C5 or independent radio |
| Wardrive has no coordinates | GNSS receiver, UART wiring, fix quality, real log field support; not every board has GPS |
| BLE or HID menu unavailable | Chip/USB and firmware version capability; modules may be absent or beta |
| WebUI reachable from guest | Network exposure: stop, isolate management, rotate credentials |
| Device records differ from sensor | Channel dwell, bands, antenna, timestamp skew and data minimization |
Capture authorization ID, scope, exact device/firmware and SD revision, operator, approved mode, observed vs expected results, negative controls, logs/UTC times, actual file hashes, retention decision, recovery and customer remediation. Resist translating โscan found a deviceโ into an unsupported vulnerability claim.
Adjacent projects: Bruce firmware, Standalone Marauder, Flipper add-ons, LAB5 C5 Monster / JanOS, Biscuit, Wi-Fi IDS.
For each major attack class, the table below names the control that defeats it. This is the table that belongs in your book's defensive chapter and in any client deliverable.
| Attack class | Effective control(s) |
|---|---|
| Probe sniffing / KARMA | Disable auto-join for open networks. Educate users to forget unused networks. Use OS-level MAC randomization (default on iOS/Android, opt-in on Windows). |
| Deauth flood | 802.11w / PMF required (mandatory on WPA3, available on WPA2). Migrate to WPA3-Enterprise. |
| Evil twin / captive portal phishing | WPA2-Enterprise with EAP-TLS using internal CA. Never use PSK on networks of consequence. User training: never enter Wi-Fi credentials into a webpage. |
| Handshake capture + offline crack | Long, random PSK (โฅ20 chars) on PSK networks. Migrate to Enterprise. WPA3-SAE resists offline brute force. |
| Beacon spam | Largely a nuisance, not a compromise vector. WIDS will flag it. |
| BadUSB | USB device control (Windows USB Restrict, macOS USB Restricted Mode, Linux usbguard). Physical security on unattended workstations. Endpoint detection rules on sudden HID enumeration + rapid keystroke entry. |
| DHCP starvation / rogue DHCP | Switch-port DHCP snooping. ARP inspection. Static reservations for critical hosts. |
| Responder / NTLMv2 capture | Disable LLMNR, NetBIOS-NS, and mDNS where not required. Enforce SMB signing. |
| Reverse TCP implant | Egress filtering. DNS monitoring for anomalous outbound. Asset inventory and physical sweeps. |
The recurring theme: every control here is either free or already deployed in any mature environment. The attacks succeed because the controls are not turned on, not because the controls do not exist.
Device boots to splash and freezes. SD card is missing the evil/ folder or is not FAT32. Reformat, re-populate.
"Sketch too big" on compile. Flash size and partition scheme are wrong. Set Flash Size to 8 MB and Partition Scheme to "8M with spiffs (3MB APP / 1.5MB SPIFFS)".
Deauth module compiles but does nothing. You skipped utilities/deauth_prerequisites. Run it and rebuild.
Evil Twin captive portal returns "site can't be reached." SD card missing /evil/sites/<chosen_site>/. Confirm the directory exists and contains index.html plus referenced assets.
Wardriving has no GPS fix. Move outdoors with sky view, allow 60โ120 seconds. Verify the GPS Unit's LED behavior (slow blink = searching, faster blink or solid = locked, depending on revision).
M5Burner can't find the device. USB-C cable is charge-only. Try another cable. On Windows, install the CH343 / CP210x driver. On Linux, confirm your user is in the dialout group: sudo usermod -aG dialout $USER.
Bootloops on first launch after compile. PSRAM is enabled. Disable it in the Tools menu and reflash.
Karma attack produces no associations. Modern phones aggressively avoid this. Confirm with a test device whose probe list you control; older Android with broadcast probing enabled, or any IoT device with a hard-coded preferred network.
Reverse TCP tunnel doesn't connect. Listener address is unreachable (NAT, firewall, ISP block on the chosen port). Test connectivity with nc from a regular host first.
| Tool | Strength | Weakness vs. Cardputer |
|---|---|---|
| Flipper Zero | Sub-GHz RF, NFC, IR, BLE, polished UX | No Wi-Fi without WiFi Devboard add-on; even with it, fewer Wi-Fi attacks than Evil-M5 |
| WiFi Pineapple | Mature multi-radio Wi-Fi platform | $200+, conspicuous, not pocket-portable |
| Pwnagotchi | Autonomous handshake capture, ML-driven channel selection | Single-purpose; no interactive attacks; needs an external display |
| Marauder (ESP32) | Mature Wi-Fi/BLE feature set on cheap ESP32 boards | No native keyboard; Cardputer is effectively Marauder + keyboard + screen in one device |
| WiFi Coconut | All-channel concurrent capture | Single-purpose hardware, not portable for attacks |
| Kali laptop + Alfa AWUS036ACH | Maximum capability | Maximum visibility; not a covert tool |
The Cardputer is not the best at any single thing on this list. It is, currently, the most capable tool in the smallest, least conspicuous, lowest-cost form factor. That makes it the right choice for demos, training, and authorized red-team work where size and discretion matter; and the wrong choice for sustained Wi-Fi capture campaigns where you want a Coconut, or for sub-GHz work where you want a Flipper or HackRF.
| Context | Keys |
|---|---|
| Menu navigation |
Fn + ;/./,// for up/down/left/right; Enter confirms; Backspace cancels |
| Escape (back to menu) |
Fn + `
|
| Any running attack |
Backspace for clean exit; Ctrl + Backspace for force-quit where supported |
| Text entry | Standard QWERTY; symbols via Shift and Fn layers |
| Caps lock toggle |
Fn + Shift
|
| Brightness / volume | Settings menu (no hardware shortcut) |
Before powering up the radio on any engagement, confirm:
- Written ROE signed and on file, covering specifically: Wi-Fi attacks, deauthentication, captive portal credential capture, BadUSB, and any other module you plan to use.
- Scope explicitly names target SSIDs, target IP ranges, and target hours of operation.
- Point-of-contact name and number for the client, on your person.
- Out-of-band communication channel to the client (cell phone) tested.
- Test environment isolated from non-scope networks (faraday space, RF-isolated room, or geographically remote location with no neighbors).
- Captured credentials and pcap files will be stored encrypted and destroyed per ROE timeline.
- Any persistent implants (Reverse TCP Tunnel) inventoried with location and removal date.
- Insurance and E&O coverage current.
If any line is unchecked, the radio stays off.
- Project repository:
https://github.com/7h30th3r0n3/Evil-M5Project - Project wiki (per-module documentation):
https://github.com/7h30th3r0n3/Evil-M5Project/wiki - M5Stack Cardputer product page:
https://shop.m5stack.com/products/m5stack-cardputer-kit-w-m5stampS3 - M5Burner download:
https://docs.m5stack.com/en/download - Wigle (wardriving database):
https://wigle.net - Wall of Flipper concept:
https://github.com/K3YOMI/Wall-of-Flippers - Reference reading on 802.11w / PMF: IEEE 802.11-2016 ยง11.11
- Hashcat WPA cracking reference:
https://hashcat.net/wiki/doku.php?id=cracking_wpawpa2
- flipper_zero_guide.md - Flipper Zero: complementary multi-radio tool (Sub-GHz, NFC, RFID, IR, iButton, BLE, BadUSB)
- bjorn_pi.md - Bjorn Pi: autonomous network-service attacker (pairs with Evil-M5 for RF + network-layer coverage)
- bruce_firmware.md - Bruce firmware: alternative to Evil-M5 on Cardputer with Sub-GHz, NFC, IR, and FM support
- WifiMarauder_CheatSheet.md - Marauder command reference (Marauder is a sibling firmware for the same ESP32 hardware)
- hcxtoolshashcat.md - Converting captured .pcap files to Hashcat mode 22000 format for WPA2 cracking
- Aircrack-ng_Commands.md - Aircrack-ng for processing handshakes captured by Evil-M5
This chapter is provided for educational and authorized red-team use only. The author of this chapter, the author of Evil-M5Project, and the manufacturer of the M5Cardputer accept no responsibility for misuse. Wireless attacks against networks, devices, or people without explicit written authorization are crimes in every U.S. state and most jurisdictions worldwide. Don't do them.
๐ Source: Documentation/evil_m5.md | โ๏ธ Suggest an edit | โฌ
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