Skip to content

Azure and Entra ID Security

github-actions[bot] edited this page Nov 17, 2026 · 2 revisions

Caution

Authorized use only. The techniques below are for authorized assessment, education, and defensive research. Test only tenants/subscriptions you own or have explicit written permission to assess, and follow the Microsoft penetration testing rules of engagement. See LEGAL.md.

M365 companion: CISA ScubaGear + SCuBA assessment covers consent, baseline deviations and retesting; Microsoft 365/Entra tenant assessments differ from Azure subscription checks.

Source and visual review: November 17, 2026. Original conceptual diagrams and documentation review only; no tenant enumeration, policy changes, or log export was performed.

๐ŸŽฏ Purpose

Microsoft Azure and Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) security reference - the identity model, the recurring attack paths, assessment tooling, and hardening.

โš™๏ธ Function

Covers the Entra ID / Azure RBAC split, common identity attacks (illicit consent grants, over-privileged app registrations, role abuse), enumeration tooling (ROADtools, AzureHound), and the hardening/detection baseline (Conditional Access, PIM, Defender for Cloud).

๐Ÿ† Goal

Let a reader assess an Azure/Entra environment and recommend concrete hardening mapped to Microsoft-native controls and the CIS Microsoft Azure Benchmark.

๐Ÿ“‹ When to Use

  • Authorized review or penetration test of an Azure subscription / Entra tenant
  • Looking up Entra ID attack paths (consent, app registrations, role abuse)
  • Building an Azure/Entra hardening and monitoring baseline

๐Ÿ“‹ Table of Contents


Entra ID vs Azure RBAC

Microsoft Entra roles govern directory administration; Azure RBAC governs Azure resource access. A principal may be powerful in one system and limited in the other. Microsoft's role comparison.

Entra directory roles and scoped Azure resource roles are separate permission systems

Figure 1 โ€” Original conceptual model based on Microsoft's role comparison. It does not describe the effective permissions of an assessed tenant.

A Global Administrator does not automatically become subscription Owner. The documented elevation mechanism assigns User Access Administrator at root scope (/) to the elevating user. Review and remove that elevation when its task is complete; deactivating a PIM Global Administrator assignment does not itself reset the elevation setting. Microsoft elevation guidance.

Owner and access-administration roles can assign Azure roles within their effective scope, subject to applicable restrictions. Do not read โ€œcan grant accessโ€ as unlimited authority over unrelated tenants or scopes.

Review Azure RBAC Scope

Management group, subscription, resource group and resource scopes form an inheritance hierarchy

Figure 2 โ€” Original hierarchy schematic based on Azure RBAC scope. The highlighted assignment is fictional, not a tenant finding.

Record the principal, role definition and assignment scope. Inspect inherited assignments, conditions, deny assignments, and eligible versus currently active access. Separate control-plane Actions from data-plane DataActions; a management role does not directly describe every data permission or indirect access path. Role definitions.


Common Identity Attacks

  • Illicit consent grants: A user or administrator may approve inappropriate app permissions. Delegated and application permissions have different consent and access models; a grant does not automatically confer every user's data. Review grants and app credentials as well as user sessions. Microsoft guidance.
  • Over-privileged applications: Review Microsoft Graph permissions, app-role assignments, ownership and credential lifetime. App registration presence alone does not establish exposure.
  • Directory role abuse: Reduce unnecessary standing privilege and validate activation controls. PIM is a control to configure and monitor, not automatic protection.
  • Legacy authentication: These clients do not support modern MFA/device signals; Conditional Access can block them. They do not universally bypass Conditional Access. Blocking legacy clients.
  • Device/session compromise: Evaluate token protection, device trust and recovery separately. A PRT is device-bound; do not assume simple transferable bearer-token replay in every scenario. Microsoft PRT model.

Enumeration & Assessment

Use the installed release's authentication and permission guidance before collection. The former bare commands omitted identity, tenant/subscription selection and prerequisites; they were not complete reproducible procedures.

Tool Assessment Role Preparation and Limits
ROADtools / ROADrecon Directory data collection and analysis Verify authentication and API support in the chosen release; protect exported identity data.
AzureHound Collect identity/resource relationships for BloodHound analysis Match collector and analysis versions; collection permissions affect graph completeness.
Prowler Supported Azure configuration checks Select authorized scopes and documented read permissions; a skipped check is not a passing control.
ScoutSuite Cloud configuration collection and reporting Validate supported API/SDK versions and granted permissions before interpreting findings.

Record tenant/subscription IDs, collector version, granted permissions, coverage, API failures and skipped checks. Keep โ€œnot assessedโ€ distinct from โ€œno issue found.โ€ A configuration report is not a penetration test or proof of effective runtime enforcement.


Hardening & Detection

  • Identity: Prefer phishing-resistant authentication where supported. Scope and test Conditional Access before enforcing it; feature/licensing requirements vary. Review exclusions and emergency-access procedures. Conditional Access overview.
  • Privilege: Use least privilege and appropriate PIM activation controls. Review both directory and resource roles; user MFA does not substitute for workload-identity credential controls.
  • Applications: Review user/admin consent, app permissions, credentials and owners; revoke grants and rotate credentials through an approved response plan.
  • Resources: Review Azure RBAC at the narrowest practical scope and inspect control/data permissions and inherited authority.
  • Posture and threats: Defender for Cloud capabilities depend on enabled plans, resource coverage and configuration. A score is a prioritization input, not evidence that all threats are prevented.
  • Benchmarking: Use the applicable CIS Azure benchmark version and record exceptions, evidence and retest criteria.

Validate Logging Coverage

Distinct identity, control-plane and resource log sources need configured routing and independently validated access

Figure 3 โ€” Original conceptual collection model. It is not a deployed architecture or proof that events reach a SIEM.

Source / Requirement What To Verify
Entra sign-in and audit activity Required categories, reader permissions, license-dependent availability and retention.
Azure Activity Log Subscription control-plane coverage; it is not a record of every data operation.
Resource logs Enable the required diagnostic categories; these logs are not collected by default.
Routing and destination Configuration permissions, destination access, retention, delivery latency and sample-event arrival.
Detection Test expected benign events, correlating identity and resource evidence; document gaps and ingestion failures.

Use Entra diagnostic settings, Azure Activity Log and Azure Monitor diagnostic settings. Log viewing, export configuration and workspace querying can require different privileges. Never infer working collection merely from a visible dashboard.


๐Ÿ“š Resources


Related Files


๐Ÿ“„ Source: Cloud/azure.md | โœ๏ธ Suggest an edit | โฌ…๏ธ Back to Cloud

Clone this wiki locally